Atlas of the Gulf States

Atlas of the Gulf States

By
Philippe Cadène and Brigitte Dumortier

LEIDEN • BOSTON
2013
This atlas was originally published in French in 2011 by Presses de l’université Paris-Sorbonne (http://pups.paris-sorbonne.fr) and RFI (http://www.rfi.fr), with funding from the French
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Contents
Introduction 1
The Gulf: A Strategic Space between the Sea and the Desert
A Semi-enclosed Sea 6
An Area of Continual Movement 8
The Crossroads of Civilizations 10
A Muslim World 12
Singular States 14
Water Scarcity 16
Oases and Pastoral Nomadism 18
Marine Resources 20
The Gulf: The Heart of the World’s Energy Reserves
Petroleum, a Complex Sector 24
Oil Production and Reserves 26
Gas Production and Reserves 28
Processing and Transport of Oil and Gas 30
Numerous Tensions 32
A Speedy and Radical Transformation
Influx of Migrants 36
Spectacular Urban Growth 38
Quality Infrastructure 40
Developing an Industrial Sector 42
Free Zones and Special Economic Zones 44
Explosion of Finance and Real Estate Sectors 46
The Rise of Tourism 48
Towards a Knowledge Society 50
The Gulf Cooperation Council 52
Dissimilar Territories
The State of Kuwait 56
Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province 58
The Kingdom of Bahrain 60
The Emirate of Qatar 62
The Federation of the United Arab Emirates 64
The Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai 66
The Emirates of Ajman and Sharjah 68
The Northern Emirates 70
North Oman 72
The Iranian Coast of the Gulf 74
The Iraqi Governorate of Basra 76
Urban Societies
Basra City 80
Kuwait City 82
Greater Dammam 84
The Oasis City of al-Ahsa 86
Manama, an Island Capital 88
Greater Doha 90
The Island and the City of Abu Dhabi 92
The Coastal Conurbation of Dubai-Sharjah-Ajman 94
The al-Ain-Buraimi Oases 96
Muscat’s Capital Region 98
Sohar and Sur: Two Cities on the Gulf of Oman 100
The Port City of Bandar Abbas 102
Abadan and Khorramshahr: Two Oil Cities 104
Integration of Metropolitan Areas 106
Conclusion 108
Bibliography 111
Index 115
Introduction
In the vast expanse of land dominated by Muslim countries, it is customary to
distinguish between the Arab world, which stretches from the Persian Gulf to
the Atlantic Ocean and encompasses countries bordering the Red Sea and the
Mediterranean, and the Turco-Iranian world, which extends from the Darda-
nelle Straits to the Indus River and the western borders of China. Those who
support this view claim that despite the differences in geographical, linguis-
tic, and political conditions, the Turco-Iranian world has a unity which stems
from the interpenetration of the Iranian and Turkish civilizations in the course
of history. As for the Arab world, it is characterized by the principle of unity
in diversity. The perennial or seasonal shortage of water, the use of the Ara-
bic language, and the presence of oil deposits constitute distinctive common
denominators, and, paradoxically also the reason for internal differences. The
feeling of unity, strengthened by memories of a glorious shared past, combined
with a common religion and later exalted by the ideology of pan-Arabism,
is founded on a common written language. At the same time, the diversity
asserted by groups and individuals, who believe that belonging to a particular
nation, region or locality takes precedence over a transnational Arab identity,
is also visible in the landscape, social conditions, dress, food habits, dialect,
etc. The sense of belonging to the umma, or community of believers, competes
with the feeling, among Christian minorities, of belonging to the Arab world.
Colonization, followed by independence, led to the emergence of a national
patriotism so strong that in some countries there are now demands that dia-
lectal Arabic, which only used to be spoken but is now in the process of also
being written, be recognized as national languages. Ultimately, belonging to a
particular tribe or community remains an important reality.
Considering the dialectics between unity in diversity inherent to the geo-
graphical approach, Arab geographers contrast Maghreb (the West) to Mashriq
(the East), while Western geographers divide the Arab world into sub-regions
with a variable geometry. Beyond multiple variants from one author to the
other, there is a tendency to distinguish between the Maghreb, the countries
of Nile Valley, the Horn of Africa, the countries of the Fertile Crescent, and
the Arabian Peninsula. Like any division, it is not a simple recording of facts
but the result of an intellectual construction; therefore, it cannot be confined
within normative limits because there are peripheral areas and transitional
areas. Further, it is not permanent, because the world is continually changing
and the geographer must be cognizant of these changes.
With regard to today’s importance of the Middle East in the field of energy,
the traditional division of the Arab world is no longer pertinent. It means
dissociating Iraq, one of the major countries of the Fertile Crescent (a term
first used at the end of the nineteenth century to describe an area known for
archaeological riches and achievements in the history of irrigation) from its
other oil-rich neighbors, particularly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia situated in the
Arabian Peninsula, which serves as a bridge between Africa and Asia. Its physi-
cal demarcation is not difficult, but it presents an internal diversity not to be
underestimated. In addition, however true it may be, the cleavage between the
Arab and Persian worlds must be discussed. Iran is an oil-producing country
like its neighbors on the opposite shore of the Gulf. We have therefore decided
to include in the same group Iran and the Arab countries bordering the Arabo-
Persian Gulf, i.e., Iraq and the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, with the
exception of Yemen. Including the Sultanate of Oman among the Gulf states
may give rise to debate since it is situated mainly on the Gulf of Oman and the
Arabian Sea, with some twenty-odd kilometres bordering the Persian Gulf. But
the country’s centrepiece, situated in its north, resembles the northern part of
the United Arab Emirates.
The decision to prepare this Atlas of the Gulf States was not based on the sole
consideration that these countries are among the world’s major oil exporters.
It is also based on an understanding of civilization that does not always stress
divisive factors at the cost of those that unite. When geography is considered
from the Orientalist viewpoint, which has few followers today, the Persian Gulf
appears as a dividing line between two distinct cultural areas, the Semitic and
the Indo-European. This interpretation is based on archaeological arguments
that have been discredited by the excavations conducted over the past thirty
years and ethno-linguistic considerations that need to be moderated in view
of the findings of recent studies of dialects spoken in the Gulf region. Further,
the existence of a khaleeji identity (is it not revealing that we have to resort to
a neologism derived from the word khaleej, which means gulf in both Arabic
and Persian?) is now emphasized. There is no doubt whatsoever that eastern
Arabia is very different from central Arabia and that the part of Iran situated
1
between the Zagros Mountains and the sea has its own peculiar characteristics Black Sea
N

and that these two peripheral areas maintain links that are as complex as they
are ancient. In many ways, this narrow stretch of shallow water can be regarded Caspian
as a “Mediterranean Sea,” not from a bio-climatic point of view, but in the sense Sea

of the French historian Fernand Braudel, i.e., as a space that fosters human
movement and exchanges. Consequently, semantic arguments on the choice Mediterranean
Sea
of name that excite specialists may be less difficult to resolve. Iraq
Iran

While it is not our task to find a solution to this debate which exploits ono-
Kuwait
mastics, we cannot afford to ignore it altogether. There is nothing unusual
about it, because every riparian State sees things from its own viewpoint. Thus Bahrain

the sea between France and England known as La Manche in France becomes Saudi
Qatar
Arabia
the English Channel in England and what the French call Détroit du Pas-de- UAE

Calais is called the Strait of Dover by their British neighbors. There is therefore Oman
nothing unusual in that the Persian Khalij-i Fars should become al-Khalij al- Red
Sea
Arabi for the Arabs. But in a confrontational environment, linguistic ethno-
centrism becomes an unending source of protest and the struggle to impose Indian Ocean

the Persian or the Arabic name on the international community has become
extremely virulent. On the grounds of the name’s antecedence and antiquity,
some writers outside the region advocate the continued use of the name Per-
sian Gulf. They add that medieval Arab geographers spoke of the Persian Sea
and used the name Arabian Sea to denote the Red Sea. The same argument
has been put forward by the United Nations Group of Experts on Geographi-
cal Names, which recommends the use of the term Persian Gulf in its Report
No. 61 (Spring 2006). This recommendation, made in a working paper to add
legal weight to the historical argument, does not have the value of a resolution,
though the United Nations uses the term Persian Gulf in its maps. If history
can be mobilized by listing ancient, medieval, and modern geographers and
cartographers who have used the term Persian Gulf, it is also possible to invoke
contemporary geographical reasons to take into account the viewpoint of the
seven other riparian states. The Gulf cannot be considered Persian forever. At
the same time, it cannot be treated as exclusively Arabian. Calling it the Arabo-
Persian Gulf seems to be a reasonable compromise, but we have opted to use
the simple term “Gulf ” in this atlas. We will follow the local usage where khaleej
is used without an adjective to designate the Gulf considered in this book.
The expression “Gulf states,” which figures in the title, is used in the text
to describe not only the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman), but all
the riparian states, including Iraq and Iran. However, it does not necessarily
cover the entire territory of the States bordering the Gulf. Hence, we have not
taken into account the central desert of Saudi Arabia and its Red Sea coast.
0 500 km
Central Iraq and the Kurdish provinces in the north have also been left out
for the purposes of this book. Only the coastal provinces of Iran bordering
the Gulf and the northern part of Oman have been studied, since southern
Oman is considered to be a part of southern Arabia. So, in discussing the Gulf
states, we refer to countries like Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab
Emirates, as well as parts of some countries like the Governorate of Basra in
Iraq, the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, North Oman, and the Iranian coast
bordering the Arabo-Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.
Despite their small area, covering less than one million square kilometres as
compared to the earth’s total land surface of more than 149 billion square kilo-
metres and their low population of barely 25 million as compared to the total
world population of more than 7 billion, the coastal regions of the Gulf occupy
an important place in the international economic and political arena. These
regions are frequently in the limelight and there are numerous references to
them in the media. Economic columnists and commentators regularly consider
the key role played by the Gulf ’s financial institutions, particularly their richly
endowed sovereign and investment funds. Conversely, It was believed that
Dubai, which receives the most attention from the international media and is
widely praised for its forward-looking policies, could trigger an international

2

stock market crash after the speculative real estate bubble burst and the local
banking system, already in the throes of the subprime crisis, was subsequently
weakened in 2009.
With regard to the general public, for whom it can be either Eldorado or Hell,
the Gulf also evokes memories of several wars involving, in varying degrees,
leading Western powers, especially the United States, whose armed forces are
present throughout the region. Finally, the Gulf seems to be continually faced
with the threat of imminent conflagration, particularly because the external
tensions linked to Iran’s efforts to become a nuclear power could lead to a
point of no-return. There is also the possibility of the region’s governments
being destabilized by internal tensions.
Of course, the Gulf states receive a great deal of attention because of the
region’s strategic importance: it holds more than 50 percent of the world’s oil
reserves and 40 percent of its gas reserves. Another reason for this interest lies
in the way most of these countries manage this natural bounty, by seizing the
opportunities offered by globalization, with either determination or reticence,
to use the sizeable means at their disposal to move from a rent-based economy
to a productive one. National oil companies earn enormous profits. Instead of
exporting crude, they have now invested in industrial complexes in petroleum
related sectors to add value to their exports. As a result, oil refineries, petro-
chemical plants, aluminium factories, steel mills, and so forth have mushroomed
in the region. Many Gulf states have also successfully developed the services sec-
tor. The financial sector, of course, owes its prosperity to the wealth earned from
oil and gas exports. Maritime trade served by modern port facilities has turned
the Gulf into an important artery and trading hub between Europe and Asia
while air transport has benefited by the development of very efficient transit
facilities for intercontinental flights. The tourism industry has taken advantage
of the sunshine, sea, and desert. It is now working to diversify by promoting cul-
tural tourism. This multifaceted development, in various stages of advancement
in the different countries of the region, has reduced the share of oil revenue in
their GDP and led to an explosion in the real estate sector.
The spectacular changes visible in the Gulf, which have been largely initi-
ated by a new generation of decision-makers, aided by skilled manpower from
abroad (mostly from other Arab and Asian countries), oblige us to take a fresh
look at the region’s geography. Given these developments, it would not be
implausible to imagine the Gulf ’s Arabian shore being gradually transformed
into a vast megalopolis that covers a dozen cities of different sizes, some of
them approaching or even exceeding one million inhabitants. Such a multi-
polar urban system has not yet come into existence, but it is evidently taking
shape in the plans being drawn up by the Gulf Cooperation Council. It is nec-
essary to examine this prospect of a megalopolis in the region’s geopolitical
introduction
context, which could jeopardize its future: the tensions caused by the Ameri-
can intervention in Iraq continue to have economic and political repercus-
sions in neighboring countries; and the threat posed by Iran on account of its
religious policies and nuclear strategy could have a destabilizing effect on the
region, even though it continues to be an important commercial partner.
The Atlas of the Gulf States is meant to be a document combining maps and
text to facilitate the understanding of ongoing changes in the Gulf states. This
book is as much against essentialism, which stresses cultural factors to explain
the “progress” or the “backwardness” of these societies, as it is on any analy-
sis supportive of the Third World, which inevitably looks at the oil-producing
countries of the Gulf as peripheral areas dominated by the capitalist West and
ruled by a fabulously wealthy tribal oligarchy. This work simply aims to present,
in all their complexity, the distinctive traits of the new centre emerging in a
region of the world characterized by its immense oil reserves, the phenomenal
growth of its coastal cities, and the constraints imposed by a parched land. It is
also necessary to understand the practicalities of managing a region simultane-
ously strong and fragile; an area that lies between the sea and the desert. Pre-
paring this Atlas of the Gulf States has been a challenging task. The object was
to provide readers with reliable up-to-date information together with analyses
which challenge stereotypes often verging on prejudice.
This atlas is not a textbook, nor is it a compilation of existing works, though
it has drawn on the most relevant among them. A large number of maps in this
book have not been published until now. We offer our readers the fruit of seri-
ous research, the successful outcome of a multi-scale approach, the product of
numerous field studies, the result of digital, graphic and cartographic process-
ing of data obtained from numerous national and international sources, duly
criticized and compared to create databases. We will not go into the details
of the methodological problems encountered in the course of the geographi-
cal study of a space shared by eight sovereign States, most of them of recent
origin and having very different political and economic conditions, but they
cannot be totally ignored. In fact, most of these States do not have statistical
institutions able to provide data regarding their population and economy. The
need for infra-national statistics about some countries only added to our dif-
ficulties. Further, tensions related to the strategic aspects of operating oil wells
and transporting oil, the existence of different religious sects, and the presence
of large expatriate communities impeded access to reliable and quantifiable
information on sensitive topics.
Finally, by calling upon the concepts and methods available to geography,
the science of territories, and by abiding by the rules of graphic semiology, we
have tried to present a book that opens up new prospects for specialists while
remaining accessible to non-specialists.
3
The Gulf: A Strategic Space between the Sea and the Desert
A Semi-enclosed Sea

The Arabo-Persian Gulf is an extension of the Indian Ocean connected to the Gulf TWO ASYMMETRIC SHORES
of Oman, another extension of the same ocean, by the Strait of Hormuz. While the BATHYMETRY, TOPOGRAPHY AND COASTAL MORPHOLOGY

Gulf of Oman drops off to a depth of more than 1,000 meters, the Arabo-Persian Gulf 50°00'E 55°00'E N

is an epicontinental sea, which means that it is quite shallow. It is characterized by a ZA

GR
bathymetric dissymmetry linked to the mainland’s relief. Hence, its depth increases OS
faster along the Iranian shore, which is dominated by high mountains, than along the M
OU
30°00' N

NT
Arabian coast, where plateaus and plains extend right up to the sea. Except for the AI
NS
area around the Strait of Hormuz where there is an increase in altitude and depth,
the Arabian shore is quite low and flat with a sandy and muddy foreshore bordered
with islands, shallows, and coral reefs. The numerous lagoons turn into sebkhas (sandy
plains), where their access to the sea is cut off and gradually filled up by a gypseous
crust due to evaporation. In this arid environment, the process is accelerated as blown

A
sand is deposited in these areas. Towards the lower latitudes, the lagoons provide a a

r
b
-P
Strait of
fertile ground for mangroves, which are very common on the shores of the Gulf of e r
s i Hormuz
a n
Oman. These mangroves, generally of the dwarf variety and a far cry from the luxuri- G u
l f
ant growth normally associated with them, constitute a rich ecosystem that has been
destroyed or mistreated in many places, but which is now protected as a natural heri-

Gu
0 100 km 25°00' N
tage. The straight line of the coast is broken up by bays and khors, i.e. waterlogged

lf o
A L HA
Om

f
an
paleo-estuaries, similar to rias, which are a legacy of wetter climatic periods. These Mangrove

AR J
natural harbors were, historically, the sites of ports that grew into large coastal cities Swamp

MO
following the development of the oil industry. The sudden urbanization of the coastal Sebkha

UN
TA
Coral reef IN
areas and their artificial alteration as a result of the straightening and construction S

of artificial islands, peninsulas, and embankments for building industries, ports, and 0
Topography (metres)
100 200 500 1 000 2 000 3 000
Bathymetry (metres)
-3 200 -2 000 -1 500 -1 000 -500 -300 -150 -100 -70 -50 -30 -15 0
airports are likely to damage the fragile environment. However, protective measures
are now being taken in the form of bird sanctuaries, marine reserves, and the protec-
tion of endangered species like the dugong and the tortoise.
The hot and dry climate means that the temperature of the water surface is This 195-kilometer long waterway is formed by the confluence of the
quite high and also subject to considerable seasonal variation and high salinity, Tigris and the Euphrates, whose silt deposits form an underwater del-
which increases from the north to the south, because more rivers empty into the taic cone. The high tidal range, which can give rise to violent local cur-
sea at the northern end of the Gulf. This is where the Shatt al-Arab, called Arvand rents, reaches 3.5 meters in Kuwait, but does not rise above one meter
Rud in Persian, enters the sea after having passed through marshy territory. on the coast of the United Arab Emirates. It is said that after seeing

6
 the gulf: a strategic space between the sea and the desert

WARM WATERS
TEMPERATURE* �SUMMER� SALINITY** �SUMMER� TEMPERATURE* �WINTER� SALINITY** �WINTER� CURRENTS
40
25

3
15
25

40
16
24

40
39

17
39
38
4
Upwelling
25

40

37
6
2

40 3

37

3
20

30
29
2 19
30 18
8
2

1
4
31 22

* Surface temperature (Celsius). ** Surface salinity (Practical Salinity Unit). Practical Salinity Unit (psu) is a conductivity ratio used to describe the concentration of dissolved salts in sea water. 1 PSU means 1 pound of salt per 1,000 pounds of sea water. The average salinity of sea water is around
* Surface temperature (Celsius). ** Surface salinity (Practical Salinity Unit). Practical Salinity Unit (psu) is a conductivity ratio used to describe the concentration of dissolved salts in sea water. 1 PSU means 1 pound of salt per 1,000 pounds of sea water. The average salinity of sea water is
35 psu, i.e. 35 g/l or 35 ‰.
around 35 psu, i.e. 35 g/l or 35 ‰.
From R. M. Reynolds, "Physical Oceanography of the Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman - Results from the Mt Mitchell Expedition", Marine Pollution Bulletin, 1993, vol. 27, p. 35‒59.
From R. M. Reynolds, “Physical Oceanography of the Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman—Results from the Mt Mitchell Expedition”, Marine Pollution Bulletin, 1993, vol. 27, p. 35‒59.

the tides in the Persian Gulf in the fourth century BC,

Depth Length Width Surface Volume
Selerrens of Babylon established the link between this O���cial dimensions
average (m) maximum (m) km km km² km³
phenomenon and the phases of the moon and pointed
Arab-Persian Gulf 42 115 950 180 to 320 240,000 10,000
out the effects of the declination of stars on tidal move-
Strait of Hormuz 56 229 195 83 16,200 900
ments. In this inland sea, the proportion of sweet water
Gulf of Oman 1,393 3,691 450 180 to 330 112,000 156,000
(precipitation plus fluvial discharge minus evaporation) From International Hydrographic Organization.
is very low because of low rainfall and arheism (lack of
runoff and surface drainage) in the Arabian Peninsula,
combined with a high rate of evaporation due to heat A SHALLOW SEA HYDROLOGY OF THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ
and dry winds. This deficit is, however, compensated by SUPERFICIES OF THE ARAB-PERSIAN GULF AND OF A DEFICIT IN THE ARAB�PERSIAN GULF
the exchange of salt water in the Gulf of Oman, which THE GULF OF OMAN BY DEPTH SLICE BALANCED BY SUPPLIES FROM THE GULF OF OMAN
produces a flushing effect in the Strait of Hormuz where Arab-Persian Gulf Gulf of Oman
Fresh water balance
Salt water exchanges

the two currents overlap. The upwelling or rising of cold,

through the Strait of Hormuz
superficy depth superficy
(000 km2) (m) (000 km2) P + r - E = - 1 380 mm x - y = + 1 380 mm
heavy, sub-surface water rich in nutrients is conducive to 240 200 160 120 80 40 0 0 40 80 120 + 270 mm + 150 mm - 1 800 mm

the production of phytoplankton, which in turn contrib- 0 to 1,000 (m) AF P E Strait of Hormuz
utes to the proliferation of fish in the Strait of Hormuz 0
Arab-Persian Gulf
x
1,000 to 2,000 y
and the area around it. 200
400 (P + r - E) + (x - y) = 0
Gulf of Oman
2,000 to 3,000 P = precipitation
600 AF = runo�f
3,000 to 4,000 800 E = evaporation
Continental shelf
x = in��ow
(0 - 200 m) 1 000 y = out��ow
Data from Atlas okeanov, terminy, ponjatija, spravocnye tablicy
Data from
(Atlas of Atlas okeanov,
Oceans, terminy, ponjatija,
terminology, spravocnye
concepts, tablicy tables),
statistical
1980. Communication from Prof. F. Carré.
(Atlas of Oceans, terminology, concepts, statistical tables), 1980. Communication from Prof. F. Carré.

7
An Area of Continual Movement

The funding of excavations in the Gulf has been made possible by the income THE PERFUME ROUTES OF ANTIQUITY
from oil. It has allowed rapid advances in archaeology during the last three or Alexandria
Jerusalem
four decades, revealing that maritime traffic was intense in early times. The Gaza Babylonia

discovery, around Hormuz in the 1990s, of pottery originating from the north- Petra

ern Gulf shows that the people living on the coast crossed this shallow inland Apologus Persepolis

sea as early as 5000 BC, before venturing into the Indian Ocean to trade with Leuce
Gerrah ?
the mouth of the Indus. The location of Meluba, Dilmun, and Magan, men- Myos
Hormos
Come
Daydan
Thaj

tioned in a cuneiform inscription on a clay tablet dating back to 2300 BC, has Koptos

been the subject of speculation and controversy among scholars for a long Yathrib
Gerrah ?
to North
time. Since it is now accepted that Meluba was situated on the west coast of Berenice India

India, this discovery confirms the regularity of trade between the Gulf and Cryptus

India. In addition, archaeological and geological evidence now enable us to

identify Dilmun with Bahrain and Magan (the land of copper and precious
stones) with northern Oman, thus proving the presence of links within the
Gulf region between the northern civilizations and their trading partners in
the south. Najran

As for southern Arabia, the boswellia sacra, a bush native to Dhofar, supplied Sarnhar
Moscha
products that were exported from the end of the second millennium BC. Its Adulis
Marib
Shabwa
resin, used as incense, was transported by caravan along with myrrh, the gum to South
Muza India
of the balsam tree. The Nabataeans, who carried these precious perfumes to the Frankincense
production area
Qani

Eudaemon Arabia
Mediterranean, controlled the land route across western Arabia. The suprem- Myrrh production Mosylbum Dioskouridou
area
acy of Nabataean traders was undermined by the merchants of Gerrah, a city Sea route Mendus
on the east coast of Arabia, whose precise location is still disputed. The inhab- Land route Opone
to Rhapta
0 300 km

itants of Gerrah controlled the sea route along the coast of the Arabian Sea. At
its busiest during the Roman era, it transported incense to ports in Mesopota-
mia and India. Like the perfume route, the continental silk route, which crossed
Central Asia, also had a corresponding sea route. Arab geographers and travel-
lers have described the bustling and cosmopolitan atmosphere in Sur, Sohar,
and Julphar (present Ras al-Khaimah). But the two most important ports in
the Gulf were Basra, where the sea route meets the river route to Baghdad, and
From various archeological reports, D. Potts works and Maritime Incense Route <http://nabataea.net/isearoute.html>.
From various archeological reports, D. Potts’ works and Maritime Incense Route <http://nabataea.net/isearoute.html>.
Siraf (present Bandar Taheri), the last stop for ships coming from India, Mari-
time Southeast Asia, and China. Persians, Arabs, Indians, Malays, Chinese, and
Jews traded in spices and other oriental products as well as in precious goods
like amber and linen cloth brought from the Baltic through the Caspian Sea.

8
 the gulf: a strategic space between the sea and the desert

THE MARITIME SILK ROAD THE CONTAINER LINES

Bla
c kS Astrakhan
Medit

ea Sea road
Khorramshahr
Konya Bandar Imam Khomeini
err

Tiran Strait
Tbilisi
a

Erzurum Bushehr
ne

n
Hami Land route

ian Sea
a

Sea Aleppo
Frunze Anxi Shahid Rajaee
Palmyra Deir ez Zor Kuqa
Tashkent Jubayl

Casp
Alexandria Bukhara Karashar Dunhuang Shanghai
Cairo Damascus Jebel Ali
Mary Xi’an Dammam Mina Shabahar
Samarkand Kashgar Sharjah
Khotan Lanzhou
Sulman Khor Fakkan
Baghdad Tehran Qarqan
Mashhad Mina Zayed Fujairah
Tiran Esfahan Gilgit
Kabul
Herat
Islamabad Mina
Shiraz Jeddah Sultan Qabous
Kandahar Canton
Siraf
Red Sea

Julphar Hormuz
Agra
Vanarasi
Sohar
Sur Calcutta Container traffic 2008

a Sea
twenty-foot equivalent
unit (TEU) Salalah

Chin
11,827,000
Bab al Mandab Arabian Sea Bay of Bengal

uth
3,000,000

So
500,000
75,000 0 300 km
Palk
Mal
acca Data from Containerisation International Yearbook, London, Informa and estimations
Mogadishu
by Prof. J. Charlier.

I n d i a n O c e a n
0 500 1000 km
Sunda or the Horn of Africa and contribute to bypassing
the restrictions in Iran on unloading the miscel-
The Gulf ’s commercial role and the importance his voyage from Siraf to India and China. In 1490, laneous cargo brought from ports on the Arabian
of the Strait of Hormuz on the route to India aroused Ahmad bin Majid, a navigator from Sohar or Jul- coast. But the Gulf is now a space traversed mainly
the greed of the western seafaring countries quite phar who served as Vasco de Gama’s pilot, wrote by oil and gas tankers and container ships. Jebel Ali
early in history, starting with the Portuguese in the “The book of useful information on the principles is one of the world’s few container ports with traffic
sixteenth century, and soon followed by the Dutch, and rules of navigation.” He explains how ships exceeding 10 million twenty-foot equivalent units.
before the English had time to consolidate their gathered at the Horn of Arabia in the spring to set As in ancient times, the Gulf is connected to the
supremacy over the sea and maritime trade in this sail for the Indian coast, taking advantage of the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and even further, to the
strategic space in the nineteenth century. summer monsoon winds, and then headed back Mediterranean, through straits, land bridges across
Long-distance shipping of precious goods towards the African coast in autumn driven by the deserts where long convoys of trucks have taken
required a thorough knowledge of navigation. Like winter monsoon. Dhows, a generic term covering the place of caravans of dromedaries, or hub ports,
the legendary Sindbad the Sailor, the region’s inhab- several types of ships with lateen sails now pow- Salalah and Jeddah having now become gateways
itants were exceptionally skilled seamen. Around ered by engines are used for fishing and transport. to the Gulf that enable ships to avoid the Strait of
851, Suleiman Sirafi gave an accurate description of They still sail along the Gulf coast towards Pakistan Hormuz.

9
The Crossroads of Civilizations

Instead of separating the Arab and Persian worlds, from very ancient times the Gulf THE ARAB FRINGES
OF
THETHE ACHAEMENID
FRINGES AND SASSANID EMPIRES
has encouraged the movement of people, goods, and ideas. It is thus a Mediterranean ARAB
OF THE ACHAEMENID AND SASSANID EMPIRES
Sea in the sense used by Braudel, an interface between two shores that are some-
times united, sometimes in conflict, but linked by geographical proximity and com-
mon interests. The Median Empire (728–550 BC) controlled the northern shore of the
Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, but did not extend west of the Tigris; the Achae-
menid Empire (550–330 BC) included Mesopotamia and its access to the sea and the
Parthian Empire (247 BC–224 AD) dominated the Arabian coast right up to Qatar. The
Sassanids (224–642 AD) controlled it up to the Arabian Sea.
In the seventh century, there were two Christian Arab kingdoms located between
the powerful Christian Byzantine Empire in the west and in the east the Zoroastrian
Persian Empire. (Zoroastrianism descended from the ancient Vedic religion that also Achaemenid Empire
(550‒330 B.C.)
gave birth to Hinduism and is based on the teachings of Zarathustra, who lived in Achaemenid
Sassanid Empire
Empire
(550‒330A.C.)
B.C.)
(224‒642
the first millennium BC.) To the west, allied with the Byzantines, was the kingdom Sassanid Empire
Vassal kingdoms
(224‒642 A.C.)
of the Ghassanids who followed the Monophysitic Jacobite doctrine, which asserted Maximum extension of
Vassal kingdoms
Eastern Roman Empire, Sassanids
the existence of only one nature of Christ, the divine having absorbed the human. then Byzantine Empire 0 500 1000 km Maximum
(early 6th
Sassanids
extension of
century)
Eastern Roman Empire,
To the east, the Lakhmid kingdom, which had sworn allegiance to the Persians, fol- then Byzantine Empire 0
From I. Barnes et R. Hudson, The History Atlas of Asia, London, 500
Macmillan, 1000and
1998
(early 6th century)
km from Revue Questions Internationales.

lowed the Dyophysitic Nestorian doctrine, which asserted the disunion between the n° 25, 2007.
OF THE SELJUK AND OTTOMAN EMPIRES
human and divine natures of Christ. These two doctrines opposed the Hypostatic doc-
OF THE SELJUK AND OTTOMAN EMPIRES
trine (the consubstantial union of the two natures) proclaimed in the Nicene Council
(325 AD) and were declared heretical. The condemnation of the Nestorian doctrine
by the Council of Ephesus (431 AD) did not prevent its spread in the Middle East
during the following decades and its establishment in the Sassanid Empire under the
leadership of the bishops of Ctesiphon. The spread of monastic communities in the
Arabian Peninsula, including eastern Arabia, which was converted to Christianity in
the middle of the fifth century and was the seat of a bishop mentioned in Chris-
tian sources, is supported by archaeological evidence dating back to the pre-Islamic
period, particularly the vestiges of a Nestorian convent and a church discovered in the Seljuk Empire (1040‒1194)
1990s on Sir Bani Yas Island to the southwest of Abu Dhabi. Maximum extension
Seljuk Empire (17th) of
(1040‒1194)
Ottoman Empire (1300‒1922)
This time of debates on Christology and dissidence on the eastern borders on Maximum extension (17th) of
0 500 km

Christendom was revealed in Arabic in the religious expression of the desert peoples. Ottoman
From I. Barnes EmpireThe
et R. Hudson, (1300‒1922)
History Atlas of Asia, London, MacMillan, 1998. 0 500 km

In 610 AD, Muhammad, a respectable merchant of Mecca, received his first revela- From I.I. Barnes
From Barnes et
et R.
R. Hudson,
Hudson, The
The History
History Atlas
Atlas of
of Asia,
Asia, London,
London, MacMillan,
Macmillan, 1998.
1998.

tion. In 622, he migrated to Medina. This event, called the hijra, marks the beginning

10
 the gulf: a strategic space between the sea and the desert

EXPANSION OF THE ARAB MUSLIM DIVISION Abbas came under the rule of a Turkish dynasty Bastakiya, a historic district of Dubai, derives its
between 1040 and 1194. While the Ottoman Turks name from a village near the Iranian port of Bandar
ruled the eastern part of Arabia from a distance, Lengeh. Thus, despite linguistic competition between
the area around Hormuz and the coast of Oman Arabic (the Khaleeji dialect) and Persian, there are
passed alternately under the control of Arab and Persian-speaking pockets on the Arabian coast and
Persian rulers. The Qawassim of Sharjah and Ras Arabic-speakers (Khaleeji and Bandari) on the Ira-
Medina al-Khaimah ruled over principalities on the Persian nian coast, in addition to peninsular dialects (Shikuki
Mecca
coast until the early twentieth century just as the of Musandam) and island dialects (Qeshmi of Qeshm
sultans of Muscat controlled Baluchistan. island) that have borrowed from both languages.

ARAB AND PERSIAN: A LINGUISTIC DIVISION

Extension of Islam
at the death of the
Prophet (632)
about 650 0 500 km

From
From B.B.Dumortier,
Dumortier, Atlas
Atlas des des religions,
religions, Paris,Paris, Autrement,
Autrement, 2002. 2002.

of the Islamic calendar. At the time, most Arabs

practiced a form of polytheism in which each tribe
worshiped its own god; the statues of all these dei-
ties, traditionally numbering 360, were kept in a
central shrine in Mecca known as the Kaʿaba. Apart
from the Nestorian communities, Jewish tribes had
settled in Arabia. The new religion of Islam spread
rapidly and the Arabian Peninsula passed to the
rule of the caliphs, who conquered the declining
Persian empire; the majority of the population con-
verted to Islam. There was no linguistic arabization
except for the adoption of the Arabic alphabet with
four additional letters. Within a short period, all the Arab Baluchi
Arab-Persian
areas surrounding the Gulf had embraced Islam. dialects Kurdish

With the arrival of the Seljuk Turks, the northern Persian Qashqai 0 100 200 km

end of the Gulf and the Iranian coast up to Bandar From

FromGulf/2000
Gulf/2000Project, School
Project, of International
School and Public
of International Affairs,Affairs,
and Public Columbia University.
Columbia University.

11
A Muslim World

Around 630 AD, during the Prophet’s lifetime, his emissaries spread his message in BRANCHES, SCHOOLS AND SECTS OF ISLAM
eastern Arabia. After his death, his successor, the caliph Abu Bakr, quelled a rebel- Period of establishment and doctrine
lion by several tribes. These were known as the Ridda Wars (632–633) and were outside Gulf viiith-ixth century
Hana��
considered by Muslim historians as Wars of Apostasy led by false prophets. They States Greater emphasis on reasoning,
less constraint
have also been interpreted as resistance on the part of chiefs who were unwilling
ixth century
to submit to the caliph’s authority and pay tribute to him. After their defeat near Maliki
Greater emphasis on the practice of local
present-day Riyadh and the death of their chief Musaylimah on the battlefield, community
the Banu Hanifa of Yamamah (eastern Nejd) submitted to Islam, as did the rebels ixth century
Sha��’i
of Bahrain after their defeat. Hudhaifa bin Mihsan was sent by the caliph to sub- Greater emphasis on Sunna, consensus of
Sunni the Muslim community and not only of the
due the Yazd tribes who controlled the area now occupied by the Emirates and doctors of law
North Oman. His army was reinforced by the troops of Ikrimah ibn Abi Jahl, the ixth-xth century
original
Prophet’s companion who had just crushed the rebels of Yamamah and won the Strictness about dogma,
Battle of Dibba against Laqit bin Malik Dhu al-Tag, the leader of the insurrection. Hanbali
rigorism about moral code
Following this, the entire Arabian coast of the Gulf embraced Islam. xviiith century
Having consolidated their power over the Arab tribes during the rule of the Wahhabi Condemnation of the cult of saints,
severe conservatism, greater emphasis on
first caliph, the Muslims launched a campaign against Persia under his suc- Quran and Sunna
cessor, ʿUmar. The Sassanid Empire, which had adopted Zoroastrianism as its Imami
viith century
official religion, was weakened by internal struggles and its rivalry with the (Twelvers)
Divine knowledge and authority of the
Byzantine Empire. Initially, the Sassanids fought back the incursions by the Imam, esoteric theology
newly converted nomadic tribes. After the capture by the caliph’s armies of Zaydi
(Fivers) viiith century
the Lakhmid capital, al-Hira, on the right bank of the Euphrates, the Persian Close to Sunnism
war elephants routed the Arab cavalry that had crossed the Euphrates (Battle Shiʿa
ixth century
Alawi
of the Bridge, 634). Two years later, the Shah’s armies crossed the Euphra- Esoterism, syncretism and trinitarianism
tes and reached the edge of the Arabian desert. The Persians had the upper Ismaʿili
hand for the first two days, until a sandstorm broke out, giving the Arabs an xth century
(Seveners) Nizari
Esoterism, syncretism, and
advantage, as they were more familiar with the territory. The subsequent cap- neoplatonicism
ture and decapitation of their leader forced the Persians to retreat (Battle of xith century
Druze
al-Qadisiyya, 636). The Muslims expanded their domain further with the con- Esoterism, syncretism and belief in
quest of the Iranian plateau (Battle of Nahavand, 642). After the death of transmigration of souls

Kharijites viith century

ʿUthman, the third caliph, the Prophet’s son-in-law Ali was elected caliph. His Ibadi Eligibility of any pious Muslim to the
legitimacy was disputed by the Sunnis, who had been won over by Muʿawiyah, leadership of the community, right to revolt
the Umayyad claimant to the caliphate. While he was willing to submit the dis- against any ruler who deviates from justice
and consultation
pute to arbitration, it was not acceptable to some of his supporters (Kharijites).
From
FromB.B.Dumortier,
Dumortier,Atlas des des
Atlas religions, Paris,Paris,
religions, Autrement, 2002. 2002.
Autrement,

12
 the gulf: a strategic space between the sea and the desert

SHIʿI CRESCENT, SUNNI AREAS AND IBADI PLACES MOSQUES AND NEIGHBORHOODS
THE CASE OF KUWAIT SOUTH SUBURBS
Shi’a
Maliki or
Sha��’i
Ring 6 N
Wahhabi
Ibadi
Desert
Sabah
Al Salem

Al Adan

King

Indep
Fa
hd Cu

enden
stodia

Exprece
n of t
Al Qusor

ssway
he Tw

(Istiq
o Ho

al Exp
ly Mo
Al Qurain

sques

ressw
0 100 km

ay)
Expre
From
From Gulf/2000
Gulf/2000Project,
Project,School of of
School International andand
International Public A�fairs,
Public Columbia
Affairs, University.
Columbia University.

ssway
7
Ring

Ali was assassinated in 661 and his son Hussein was Sunnis represent the faith of the majority in the Urban area
Fintas
killed in 680 in the Battle of Karbala. Together with Arab world, and play a dominant political role in Unbuilt area

Najaf (where Ali was buried), Karbala became a holy Saudi Arabia in its Wahhabi interpretation, while Mosque

city for Shiʿi Muslims, the followers of Ali. The polit-
ico-religious dissensions in the early years of Islam,
along with the theological and juridical divergences
during the following centuries, divided Islam into
three sects. All are found around the Gulf, which is
characterized by a very complex religious geogra-
phy, and thus cannot be considered a simple divid-
ing line between Sunnis and Shiʿis. Nevertheless,
Shiʿism, which was declared the official religion by
the founder of the Safavid dynasty in Tabriz in 1501,
is the foundation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
established in 1979.
Today, more than 90 percent of the native popu-
lation of the countries and regions of the Gulf are
Muslims, though the presence of large numbers
of Hindu and Christian migrants has considerably
0 0,5 1 1,5 km
From Hamdy El-Gamily, Geoinformatics Center, Kuwait.
From Hamdy El-Gamily, Geoinformatics Center, Kuwait.
altered the proportion of Muslims in the resident
population. The presence of recently constructed
mosques of monumental proportions and the den-
sity of neighborhood mosques are reminders of the
dominance of Islam in this region.

13
Singular States THE ARAB RULING FAMILIES IN THE GULF
Kuwait Al Sabah, 1752 Sharjah Al Qassimi, 1727**
Saudi Arabia Al Saoud, 1932* Ajman Al Nuaimi, 1800
Bahrain Al Khalifah, 1783 Umm al Quwain Al Mualla, 1775
Qatar Al Thani, 1868 Ras al Khaimah Al Qassimi, 1680
In 1507, the conquest by Alfonso de Albuquerque of Hormuz Island, one of the
Abu Dhabi Al Nahyan, 1761 Fujairah Al Sharqi, 1876
three key outposts, with Goa and Malacca, of the Portuguese colonial empire
Dubai Al Maktoum, 1833 Oman Al Bu Said, 1744
in Asia marks the beginning of a domination that lasted almost one and a
** Foundation
FoundationofofthetheKingdom
KingdomofofSaudiSaudiArabia,
Arabia,but
butthe
theSaudi family
Saudi already
family controlled
allready a first
controlled « Saudi
a ��rst State »
«Saudi (1744–1818), then a second
State»
half centuries. The Portuguese, who seized ports in the Gulf of Oman and the « Saudi State »
(1744-1818), (1824‒1891)
then a second «Saudi State» (1824‒1891)
**The dynasty
dynastyconsiders
considersit’s
it’sreign
reignbegining with Al Al
Qasim BinBin
Rashid Bin Bin
Mohamed who who
ruledruled
from from
1575 to 1600.
Strait of Hormuz either by force (Muscat and Khor Fakkan) or by concilia- **The
to 1600.
begining with Qasim Rashid Mohamed 1575

tion (Sohar), faced numerous rebellions and Ottoman military expeditions. For
defence, they built a series of forts along the coast, some of which have now
been restored. The Gulf was thus opened to trade with the Dutch and the
French who were granted commercial privileges together with the British. The
latter formed alliances with local families and drove away the Portuguese, but
they faced resistance from the seafaring merchant tribes, who are, in colonial
historiography, considered pirates. The British led naval expeditions to ward
off the Ottomans and took advantage of the rivalry between various tribes to
impose truces and treaties until a permanent peace treaty guaranteeing them
PORTUGUESE FORTS 1500‒1650
Gombroon-Comorao
Hormuz
ab
Ar
safe navigation and trade monopoly was signed; this took place only after they
overcame a rather feeble resistance from the French in the southern part of
the Gulf and the ambitions of Germany and its Turkish and Persian allies in
the north. The British gained control over Kuwait and Basra, among the rare
ports at the northern end of the Gulf, as a way of containing the expansionist
designs of the Ottomans and fending off the Germans since, in the beginning
of the twentieth century, controlling the Gulf’s oil reserves had become con-
siderably more important than controlling the route to India.
From the arrival of the resident general of the British East India Company in
1763 until the independence of the last British territory in 1971, the Gulf occu-
pied a strategic place in the British Empire. The resident general in the Gulf
was subordinate to the governor of Bombay and the viceroy of India until India
became independent in 1947. Posted in Bushehr on the northern coast until his

-P Queixome transfer to Bahrain in 1947, the resident general coordinated the activities of
ers
Catifa
ian
Gul Khasab British residents and a network of political agents posted in the formal protec-
f
Bahrein Julfar
torates (Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the Trucial States) as well as the informal
Libedia
Doba
Corfaçao
protectorates (Muscat and Oman) on the southern coast. For more than two
Mada Gu centuries, the British did not interfere with the tribal system that constitutes
Quelba lf o
Soar
f Oma
n the basis of political structures in the Gulf region, where the concept of the
Borca
nation-state does not exist. In the traditional Bedouin structure, the sheikhs
Sibo Matrah
Mascate exercised a paternalistic and nepotistic authority. They were responsible to pro-
Curiate vide sustenance for the tribe and ensure its security, consult its elders, receive
its members, and listen to their concerns. They were dismissed if they failed in
0 100 200 km their duty. The British made these tribal chiefs sovereigns with the title of emir.
FromM.M.Ramerini,
Ramerini, « The Portuguese inArabia
the Arabia Peninsula andPersian
in the Gulf »,
Persian Gulf<www.colonialvoyage.com/eng/asia/persian_gulf/>
», 2007, The al-Bu Said rulers, who had built an overseas empire from their capital in
From « The Portuguese in the Peninsula and in the 2007,
<www.colonialvoyage.com/eng/asia/persian_gulf/>
and M. Ziolkowski, « Excavations at al-Bidiyya: new lightand M. Ziolkowski,
on the « Excavations
Portuguese presence in the at al-Bidiyya:
Emirates », new light
Tarabulus, Al on
Ain,the Portuguese
Emirates Natural Muscat, assumed the title of sultan and in 1932 Ibn Saud, who ruled the territo-
presence
History in the
Group, Emirates », Tarabulus, Al Ain, Emirates Natural History Group, 1999.
1999.
ries that lay outside British control, proclaimed himself King of Saudi Arabia.

14
 the gulf: a strategic space between the sea and the desert

Their immense oil reserves and political independence increased the power of
these dynasties, which shared part of the oil revenue with their subjects and TIMELINE OF THE BRITISH PROTECTORATES IN THE GULF REGION
legitimized their position by adopting constitutions sanctioning a hereditary 1763 First English East India Company factory established in the Gulf at Basra.
monarchy in which succession is regulated through the institution of the crown 1793 English East India Company factory established in Kuwait.
prince. The latter is not necessarily the eldest son, but a member of the fam- 1798
The Qawasim begin resisting British ambition to control sea trade and
ily considered to be the most suited to perform the king’s duties. Neither the attack British ships.
ruler nor the crown prince are irremovable, as is evident in various instances 1805 Royal Navy raid from Bushehr against Qawasim.
in which a king or an emir has been deposed with the family’s consent and 1809 Second Royal Navy raid against Qawasim.
replaced by one of his relatives. In this arid land where space is conceived in 1819 Royal Navy expedition from Bombay against Qawasim ��eet and bases.
terms of the itineraries of nomads rather than in terms of territorial entities Agreement between the English East India Company and the Al Khalifa
based on tribal allegiances, the rise of independent states raised the question 1820
of Bahrain ; maritime truce imposed on the Sheikhdoms of the coast.
of borders that were earlier blurred and porous. Boundary disputes and ter- British-Bahraini Peace Treaty ; General Treaty of Peace imposed by the
1835
ritorial claims have brought into conflict almost all countries around the Gulf British on nine Sheikhdoms.
and given rise to a range of geopolitical peculiarities: neutral zones, enclaves, 1853
Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship changing the Arab Sheikhdoms
detached fragments, and no man’s lands. Despite the gradual resolution of known as the Pirate Coast in British historiography into the Trucial States.
these problems in the 1980s and 1990s through bilateral agreements, exchange 1861 Bahrain signs Protectorate Agreement with Britain.
of territory, and international arbitration, disputes reappear, especially those 1868 Anglo-Bahraini agreement by which Britain recognized the Al-Thani rulers of Bahrain.
related to sovereignty over islands and uninhabited islets. They remain unre- 1892 Trucial States signs Protectorate Agreement with Britain.
solved because they involve rights over the continental shelf, and therefore
1899 Kuwait sign Protectorate Agreement with Britain.
over offshore oil reserves, and represent a major strategic stake in the region
1904 British political resident assigned to Kuwait.
around the Strait of Hormuz. Maritime boundaries, too, are not clearly demar-
cated and are therefore the subject of bitter disputes. 1913 British monopoly on oil exploration and exploitation.
1916 Qatar signs Protectorate Agreement with Britain.

A CONTROVERSIAL BORDER DEMARCATION 1935 Royal Navy Gulf Headquarters are moved from Bushehr to Bahrain.
THE CASE OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 1940 British political agent assigned to Dubai.
Ar 1946 Senior British o���cial in the Middle East is moved from Bushehr to
ab- Bahrain.
Persian Gulf
Ras al Khaimah
Umm al Quwain 1956 Anti-British riots in Bahrain.
Gu

Doha Sharjah Ajman

of
lf

Dubai Fujairah
Om
1961 Independence of Kuwait.
an
Khor-al-Odaid 1963 Anti-British general strike in Qatar.
Abu Dhabi Sohar
Buraimi 1971 Independence of Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial states.
Al Ain Foundation of the UAE.
Safaq Wells Muscat Various sources,
Various sources,particularly
particularly<www.britishempire.co.uk>
<www.britishempire.co.uk>
Border claimed by Saudi Arabia on
04/03/1935
Bonayan
Border proposed by Sir A. Ryan on
11/25/1935 or Riyadh Line
Qusaiwara Umm-
al-Zumal Claim by Saudi Arabia in 1949

Claim by Abu Dhabi in 1949

Al Qarayni
Claim by Qatar in 1952
Adjustment of Riyadh Line on
10/26/1955
UAE / Qatar border (1971-1995)
0 100 km Contemporary border

From Ch. Dallaporta, « Les transferts institutionnels et politiques dans l’émirat d’Abou Dhabi », Politique étrangère, n° 6, 1974.
From Ch. Dallaporta, « Les transferts institutionnels et politiques dans l’émirat d’Abou Dhabi », Politique étrangère, n° 6, 1974.

15
Water Scarcity AN ARID ENVIRONMENT: LOW PRECIPITATION, HIGH TEMPERATURE
30°N

30°

Kuwait
45 Bushehr
45
35
35 45
The countries around the Gulf suffer from varying degrees of aridity, ranging 25
15
25 35
25
from semi-aridity on the Iranian coast to total aridity on the Arabian coast. 5
J Ap Au D
15
5
Bandar Abbas
15
Low, scant, and irregular rainfall combines with high temperatures, bright sun- J Ap Au D 5
J Ap Au D
shine, and strong winds. These factors are conducive to evaporation, which is
45
further increased by sparse vegetation, which itself is a result of these climatic 35 45 25°

conditions. There is a permanent shortage of water even in coastal regions 25 35

25
15
where the atmospheric humidity, which normally exceeds 90 percent, brings 25° 5 15
J Ap Au D 5
mists and fogs but no rain because the stagnation of subtropical high pres- Annual Monthly Abu Dhabi J Ap Au D

sure cells blocks the upward movement of air currents that brings rain. Except rainfall
(mm)
temperature
( Celsius)
Muscat
Tropic of Cancer
for the mountainous areas, where orographic updrafts release rain, the annual 0
100 Average
rainfall is usually less than 100 millimetres and on rare occasions exceeds 200
400
maxima
Average
300 millimetres; the average number of days when there is rain varies between 600
1,000 minima
0 100 200 km
10 and 20 in a year. The rain, which usually comes down as heavy showers,
occurs between November and April, with several months without a single FromG.
From G. Blake
Blake et
and
al.,al.,
World Meteorological
Meteorological
The
Organization
TheCambridge
Cambridge
Organization
Atlas
Atlas of the
of the Middle
Middle
for temperatures.
for temperatures.
EastEast
andand North
North Africa,
Africa, Cambridge
Cambridge University
University Press, Press, 1989
1989 for for rainfalls
rainfalls and
and World

drop; however this does not rule out indirect precipitation in the form of noc-
turnal dew. In addition to strong seasonal variations, there is also a strong mul-
tiyear variation (in Abu Dhabi, in February, which is the wettest month, the
rainfall varied between 0 and 202.3 millimetres over the last two decades). The
average annual temperature exceeds 25°C. The short and mild winter, when
the average temperature ranges between 10 and 20°C (depending on location)
in January, which is the coldest month of the year, is followed by a long torrid
summer with the average temperature in July and August rising above 30°C
and reaching an absolute maximum over 45°C.
The rain, which evaporates or seeps into the ground almost immedi-
ately, is not enough to feed the perennial streams; the rain in the Zagros
Mountains feeds the rivers on the Iranian coast, while the wadis flow
intermittently in the foothills of Oman and its border regions. Due to
the shortage of surface water, ground water reserves are extremely pre-
cious. There has been an irreversible fall in the level of the water tables of

AVERAGE MONTHLY RAINFALL SHOWING PREDOMINANT WINTER PRECIPITATION

Unit : mm January February March April May June July August September October November December Annual total
Kuwait City 25.5 15.5 13.3 14.8 3.8 0 0 0 0 3.3 13.8 17.3 107.3
Abu Dhabi 3.9 42 24.8 7.3 2 0 2 0.1 2 0 1.8 9 94.9
Muscat 15.2 19.7 17.7 13.2 3.7 0.6 3.7 1.8 0 0.9 5.9 15.3 97.7
Bandar Abbas 39.7 47.5 34.8 10.7 4.8 0 0.6 2.2 0.8 1.3 5 24 171.4
Bushehr 66.4 33.9 20.3 8.7 1.5 0 0 0 0 8.4 27.3 62 228.5
Datafrom
Data fromWorld
WorldMeteorological
Meteorological Organization,
Organization, World
World Weather
Weather Information
Information Service. Service.

16
 the gulf: a strategic space between the sea and the desert

fossil aquifers dating back to a more rainy climatic environment—those have
been discovered and tapped by deep drilling. At the same time, phreatic
groundwater reserves are not sufficiently recharged because more water is
being extracted on account of economic growth and changing lifestyles. Tra-
ditional societies treated water as a precious commodity and used it sparingly.
It was thus possible to maintain not only the quantity but also the quality of
groundwater reserves that are now threatened by salinization. Just as the flora
and fauna display a remarkable ability to adapt themselves to arid climatic
conditions, human beings, too, used to adapt themselves to water shortages,
either by leading a nomadic or semi-nomadic existence or by farming land in
oases thanks to ancestral water management and irrigation techniques.
Today, the growing difference between consumption and available resources
of potable water has made the Arabian shore of the Gulf increasingly depen-
dent on the desalinization of seawater, a process that satisfies 60 percent of
its needs. This figure has reached 98 percent in the United Arab Emirates,
which ranks second (after the United States) in the consumption of water
for domestic use with a figure of 373 litres per person per day. In 2005, Saudi
Arabia accounted for almost a quarter of the world’s desalinization capacity
with giant plants and innumerable small local units along its two coasts. Other
states continually add to their desalinization capacity to satisfy their grow-
ing needs. Since the most commonly used technologies like reverse osmosis
(filtering water through very fine membranes trapping minerals) and multi-
stage flash distillation are energy intensive, desalinization and power plants
are associated.
TOWARDS THE PRIVATISATION OF TWO INTERLINKED STRATEGIC SECTORS
N
Abu Musa
Wasit

THE DEPENDENCE UPON DESALINATION OF SEA WATER Layyah Khor

Fakkan
Iraq Fujairah
Jebel Ali (Qifda)
10
Aweer
Kalba
Kuwait Iran
420 Taweelah
200
Ar
ab
-P

si
er

an Abu Dhabi
Gu Umm al Nar
lf Shuwaihat
Bahrain
102 Mirfa Al Ain

UAE
Qatar
180 Gul
f of Om Production of electricity Production of fresh water
an
Saudi Arabia Madinat Zayed
(in megawatt*) (million liters per day)
1 030 Public Public
3,226
power 1018 desalination
Main desalination plant UAE 1,500 plant plant
Production of desalinated water in 950 1,000 500
500 Private Private
2000 (million m3) Oman power
100 100 desalination
Production of desalinated water in 109 plant plant
2005 (million m3) 0 25 50 75 100 km (* million watts)
950 2005 data 0 100 200 km

FromB.B.Dumortier,
From Dumortier,L. L. Lambert,
Lambert, « Vers
« Vers la privatisation
la privatisation d'un double
d'un double secteur stratégique
secteur stratégique : : l'eau etaux
l'eau et l'électricité l'électricité aux Émirats
Émirats arabes unis », arabes
Sourcefor
Source forwater
water production
production volume
volume: : Aquastat,
Aquastat, FAO, 2008.
FAO, 2008. unis », Maghreb-Machrek,
Maghreb-Machrek, n° 191, 2007.n° 191, 2007.

17
Oases and Pastoral Nomadism AN INHERITED GRAVITY IRRIGATION SYSTEM
THE QANAT / FALAJ

Section
Underground collection
Conveyance part Open channel Irrigated area
part of the tunnel

Traces of human habitation dating back more than 7,000 years have been Shaft for repair and cleaning
discovered on the shores of the Gulf. Around the fifth millennium BC, at the Village
Holocene Climate Optimum, the region received a little more rain and the Agriculture

people of the early Neolithic Age, who lived in fortified enclosures, devised a
mixed farming system. But as the climate became more arid after 4000 BC, the
area under cultivation was reduced. The people, who started cultivating date
palms and cereals at that time, were concentrated around oases where ground-
water could be accessed by manually digging wells. The domestication of
dromedaries at the end of the second millennium and the invention of gravity
irrigation techniques (called falaj in Arabic and qanat in Persian) to mobilize
hydrogeological resources in the mountainous regions constituted important
milestones. In the tribal system, control over watering holes and grazing lands
was determined by the balance of power and alliances between tribes and the
economy depended on the complementarities between the oases, the desert
and the sea. The combination of pastoral nomadism and irrigated sedentary
agriculture is a way to adapt to the arid environment. In the oases, the sharing
of water is determined by unwritten rules, with special jurisdiction to define
the right to water and to resolve conflicts. The oases, which have served as
stopping places and markets for caravans, have groves of palm trees for local
consumption and exchange of surplus for salt and dried fish from the coast.
THE OASIAN SYSTEM
Optimum use
of water resources
by water management
and irrigation systems
Oasis :
an anthropized bioclimatic
environment
Creation of an oasian
microclimate thanks
to shade cultivation
From A. Cariou, La Mise en valeur de l’écosystème aride, le cas des oasis d’El Aïn et de Liwa, Oasian Studies Workshop, Paris Sorbonne University Abu Dhabi,
From
2010. A. Cariou, La Mise en valeur de l’écosystème aride, le cas des oasis d’El Aïn et de Liwa, Oasian Studies Workshop, Paris Sorbonne University
Abu Dhabi, 2010.
Meticulous use
of soil resources
by arboricultural and
gardening techniques
Development of
subsidiary activities to
agricultural production
Groundwater surface
Impermeable rock
Plan
Underground collection part Open channel
Oasis
Shaft for repair and cleaning
There are also citrus, banana, mango, and pomegranate trees. In the shade
of the trees, oasis-dwellers grow fodder, vegetables, and aromatic herbs. The
oases and their surrounding areas are also used for goat, sheep, and poultry
farming.
The advent of the petroleum era has not sounded the death knell for agri-
culture, but has led to the sedentarization of the nomads. The camel, a symbol
of Bedouin identity that served simultaneously as a mount, a draught animal,
a supplier of milk and meat, as well raw materials for traditional cottage indus-
tries, now enjoys a great iconic value. The construction of camel racetracks
and the organization of camel races encourage the loose housing of camels
and the raising of purebreds. High-priced food products and cosmetics made
from camel’s milk have recently appeared in the market. Similarly, the cultiva-
tion of dates has increased with the popularity of branded varieties and top
quality condiments and confectionery products made from dates.
Although they have benefited from new equipments (e.g., the cementing
and covering of canals and the installation of electric pumps), the oases are
now showing signs of abandonment. They have been deserted by their original
inhabitants, who have handed over their maintenance to foreign agricultural
labourers. Near the old oases, new irrigation perimeters have been devel-
oped thanks to deep drilling in the fossil aquifers. In case of depletion of the
aquifer, the water supply comes from the desalination plants on the coast.

18
 the gulf: a strategic space between the sea and the desert

LIWA, WESTERN REGION OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES under government supervision. Circular patches on which cereals are grown in
A WELL IRRIGATION the middle of the desert are a remnant of the desire (which soon proved illu-
LIWA, WESTERN REGION OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES sory) in the 1980s and 1990s to attain self-sufficiency. To reconcile food security
A WELL IRRIGATION
with water resources management, purchases of agricultural land in Africa and
Well
Eastern Europe began during the first decade of the twenty-first century. In
Well the vicinity of urban consumer markets, palm groves have given way to the
cultivation of cash crops, often grown in greenhouses, to meet the demands
of a wealthy cosmopolitan clientele. New crops like lettuce, spinach, and basil
have been introduced along with organic farming. As for the conversion of
oases into heritage sites, which formed the spearhead of the domestic tourism
development program, often unskilful renovation undertaken in the 1990s has
Dynamic dune Pleistocene dune Clayey sand Quaternary aquifer
now been replaced by restoration actions caring about authenticity and reviv-
From A. Cariou, La Mise en valeur de l’écosystème aride, le cas des oasis d’El Aïn et de Liwa, Oasian Studies Workshop, Paris Sorbonne University Abu Dhabi,
From A. Cariou, La Mise en valeur de l’écosystème aride, le cas des oasis d’El Aïn et de Liwa, Oasian Studies Workshop, Paris Sorbonne University
2010. Dynamic dune
Abu Dhabi, 2010. Pleistocene dune Clayey sand Quaternary aquifer ing vernacular know-how. Finally, some oases have been integrated within the
FROM
From SEMI-NOMADIC
A. Cariou, La Mise en valeur deLIFE TO SEDENTARIZATION
l’écosystème aride, le cas des oasis d’El Aïn et de Liwa, Oasian Studies Workshop, Paris Sorbonne University Abu Dhabi,
urban areas that have developed around them.
2010. Mafraq
Al Khatim
FROM SEMI-NOMADIC LIFE TO SEDENTARIZATION
Ruwais
Mafraq
Mirfa Al Khatim

Ruwais
to HATTA OASIS, A DUBAI TERRITORY
Abu Dhabi
Mirfa A TOURIST DESTINATION
Ghayathli Habchan to Arjan
to Abu Dhabi
Built area Wadi
N Qatar
Habchan Madinat Zayed Bin Hamad to
Ghayathli Arjan Heritage Village Foothills
Al Ain
to
N UAEQatar Fijrah
Palm grove Mountain
Madinat Zayed Bin Hamad to
Al Ain New irrigated area
Traditional itinerary of the
Bani Yas UAE Fijrah
Market
interior to coast Mosque
summer School
Traditional itinerary of the bases
to fishing Sedentarization village
winter
Bani Yas to Liwa Palm grove Fort
interior to coast Mizaira Police station
oasis to desert Oasis
summer to fishing bases Sedentarization village Clinic
summer to croplands
winter to Liwa New irrigated
Palm grove area
winter to grasslands Bus station
oasis to desert
Mizaira LIWA Oasis
Arada Hamim New town
summer to croplands
winter to grasslands New irrigated area
Resort
LIWA 0 20 km Oil city
Arada New town
SAUDI ARABIA Hamim
Resort
Source : unpublished papers of the authors.
0 20 km Oil city
SAUDI ARABIA
Source : unpublished papers of the authors. 0 200 400 m

From Digital globe, CNES/Spot Image 2010 and Hatta Heritage Village map.
From Digital globe, CNES/Spot Image 2010 and Hatta Heritage Village map.
Small and medium-size farms have been given to nationals who prefer market
gardening and fodder crops to arboriculture, if they do not simply regard agri-
culture as a leisure. Large capital intensive farms, often experimental, are run

19
Marine Resources

“We are all, from the most powerful to the humblest among us, slaves of just PEARL DIVING: AN ABANDONED TRADITION
one mistress: the pearl.” This remark, made by the emir of Qatar in 1863, is 50°00'E The pearl��shing ��eet at the
beginning of XXth century
55°00' % of pearl divers in total
population at the beginning
echoed by the British agent, J. G. Lorimer, who wrote in 1915 that pearl diving (number of boats)
1,000
of XXth century 30°00' N

was the Persian Gulf’s prime industry and the principal and the only source 500
5 to 25

of wealth of the people living on the Arabian coast. Pearl diving was practiced Kharg 250
100
25 to 50

Kuwait 50 more than 50

from ancient times on both the Persian and Arabian coasts. On the Arabian
Area mapped by J. G. Lorimer (Gazetteer of the
coast, it was practiced from places located at quite a distance from the oyster Persian Gulf Oman and Central Arabia, vol. 1 :
Historical, Calcutta, 1915)
beds but with an ample supply of water and agricultural produce like Julphar Location of major pearl oyster banks at
the beginning of XXth century
(Ras al-Khaimah) or from simple bases like Kuwait and Abu Dhabi. It pros-
pered in Bahrain, which was located close to oyster beds and relatively well
supplied with water. When the price of pearls, which were in fashion in the Shib Kuh
Qatif
royal courts of Europe, rose in the eighteenth century, ports were developed
Lengeh
in the Qatar Peninsula and the proceeds from the sale of pearls were used to Ras al Khaimah
import food and even water for the fishing crews. Only Oman, where Muscat Umm al Quwain
was a major market for mother-of-pearl, did not join the pearling industry. An Bahrain Ajman
Sharjah 25°00'
Assyrian inscription dating to the beginning of the third millennium BC and Qatar Dubai
descriptions by medieval Arab geographers state that diving for pearl oysters
Abu
was an important activity for many centuries. 0 100 km
Dhabi

Faced by competition from Japanese cultured pearls and later by the eco-
nomic depression of 1929, pearling disappeared from the Gulf around the time
of the development of the oil industry. Pearling had given rise to marked social
disparities, together with chronic and hereditary indebtedness among the
divers. A merchant with contacts with European brokers would act on behalf
of reputed jewellers, or with Indian intermediaries dealing in pearls in Bombay
and advance money to a captain to equip his boat, thus bypassing the religious
ban on lending money on interest by buying pearls from him at a price well
below their market value. The captain in turn paid his diving crew in advance,
which put them, and even their children, at his mercy. The latter were initiated
into this arduous and hazardous profession when they were barely seven years
old. Depending on the temperature of the water into which the divers plunged
to a depth of more than 15 meters, pearling operations were conducted in four
seasons: the main season lasting from the middle of May to the end of Sep-
tember was flanked by two cold diving seasons in April and October, while in
From R. Carter, "The History and Prehistory of Pearling in the Persian Gulf", Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 48-2, 2005.
From R. Carter, “The History and Prehistory of Pearling in the Persian Gulf ”, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient,
48–2, 2005, 139–209.
winter the pearl fishers waded into shallow waters to collect pearls. Thanks to
pearling, this region became a part of distant commercial circuits and a mone-
tary economy quite early in its history. If one were to add Dubai’s involvement
in gold smuggling under the British Empire in the nineteenth century, it is easy
to understand how, because of its long familiarity with the gold and jewellery
trade, it rapidly emerged as the world’s top diamond trading centre: with the
help of the leading Belgian and Indian diamond merchants, Dubai cleverly
took advantage of the suspension of special tax regulations in Antwerp.
On the Arab Gulf, sometimes supposed to be the “Land of the Ichtyophagy”
of ancient texts, fish, together with rice and dates, is the staple food of the
locals. It is consumed not only by the coastal population, but also by people
living inland because it is exchanged and exported.

20
 the gulf: a strategic space between the sea and the desert

SEA FISHING: AN ACTIVE ECONOMIC SECTOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF FISHING

50°00'E Fish captures by country
in 2006 (tons) IN THE UAE AND IN OMAN
Iraq* 375,000
Captures
(1000 tons)
150,000
200
Kuwait
190
50,000 Oman
180
15,000 170
Iran* 5,000 UAE
160
150
140
130
120
110
100
Bahrain 90
Saudi Arabia
80
70
60
50
25°00'
Qatar 40
30
20
0 100 km
10
(* except continental waters ��shing) 0
United Arab Emirates Oman
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Data from FAO, Fishery and Aquaculture Statistics 2006, Roma, 2008.
Data from FAO, Fishery and Aquaculture Statistics 2006, Rome, 2008.
Data from
from FAO.
FAO.

Dried fish is sold as human food as well as cattle fodder. Traditional fishing
methods are encouraged today along with the development of new meth- FISHING AND OVERFISHING IN ABU DHABI
ods. Small-scale fishing in flimsy boats made of palm fronds, or more solid CAPTURES OVEREXPLOITED SPECIES
wooden boats now equipped with outboard motors, is practiced in coastal
(total in tons) 100 % of captures
waters side-by-side with large-scale fishing in traditional dhows and mod- 7,000
Hamour - Epinephelus coioides
ern trawlers. Modernization of the fishing fleet, the development of fishing 6,000

ports, and the construction of cold-storage plants and deep freeze units have 5,000 Chanaad - Scomberomorus commerson
enabled the United Arab Emirates to remain self-sufficient in seafood in spite 4,000
3,000 Sa�� - Siganus canaliculatus
of tremendous population growth. Oman exports a part of its catch to neigh-
2,000
boring countries, especially Saudi Arabia, while crustaceans are exported to 1,000
Farsh - Diagramma pictum

more distant overseas markets. However, there has been a fall in the catch 0 Sha'ari - Lethrinus nebulosus
2005
in recent years as a result of pollution in the sea and overfishing from those
using modern fishing techniques. Measures have been taken recently to con- Pelagic
��shes
Benthic
��shes
Maximum level of captures
for species conservation
Over��shing

serve fish stocks. From Environment

From EnvironmentAgency,
Agency,Abu
AbuDhabi.
Dhabi.

21
The Gulf: The Heart of the World’s Energy Reserves
Petroleum, a Complex Sector

Hydrocarbons are compounds of carbon and hydrogen resulting from the A CARTEL FORMED BY MAJOR OIL COMPANIES
alteration of organic matter that produce petroleum and gas when these THE STRUCTURE OF IRAQ PETROLEUM THE STRUCTURE OF ARAMCO IN ����
organic sediments (kerogen) are buried under specific conditions. Hydrocar- COMPANY IN ����
bon droplets contained in source rocks are expelled when sufficient energy is Anglo-Persian Oil Company Standard Oil of New Jersey (Exxon)
23.75 % 30 %
imparted. They then migrate and accumulate in reservoir rocks. Hydrocarbons
may remain trapped between impermeable strata (seal rocks) that block their
vertical or lateral migration in certain geological structures. Depending on Royal Dutch Shell
23.75 % Standard Oil
their origin, hydrocarbons have different degrees of viscosity and may contain of California (Chevron)
30 %
Compagnie française
A VISCOUS ROCK ASSOCIATED WITH GAS des pétroles
TYPES OF OIL TRAPS 23.75 %

Texas Oil Company (Texaco)

Near East Development Corporation 30 %
23.75 %
Calouste Gulbenkian Standard Oil
5% of New York (SOCONY)
10 %

varying quantities of sulphur. The most prized qualities are the light crudes
with low sulphur content. Some “crudes” (e.g., Arabian Light, Dubai Light, Ira-
nian Heavy) are coted as benchmark oil prices.
Anticlinal Fault Established in the United States, the oil industry spread to other countries
in the early twentieth century; at that point, the Middle East became the main
area of rivalry between governments and corporate alliances. The British held
a monopoly in Iran, where the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, predecessor of
British Petroleum, was established in 1913, and a dominant position in Iraq.
In Saudi Arabia, however, their power was undermined by the Americans,
who set up Aramco in 1933. In 1928, the Red Line and Achnacarry Agreements
sealed the trade arrangements between the major western oil companies, who
Discordance Diapir shared among themselves the underground reserves of the ancient Ottoman
Chalck Clay Gas Water
Empire, and the oil market. One-sided contracts were signed between local
rulers and the oil companies, which paid fixed royalties; after World War II,
Dolomites Halite (rock salt) Oil Well drilling
the major oil companies were forced to accept the principle of “fifty-fifty”.
From B.B.Dumortier, Géographie de l’Orient arabe, arabe,
ArmandArmand
Colin, 1997 and 1997
P.-A. Bourque
In Iran, the oil was nationalized in 1951 by the Mossadegh government, which
From Dumortier, Géographie de l’Orient Colin, and P.-A.(www.ggl.ulaval.ca/planete_terre.html)
Bourque (www.ggl.ulaval.ca/planete_terre.html).

24
 the gulf: the heart of the world’s energy reserves

NATIONAL COMPANIES OPERATING IN ALL AREAS OF THE INDUSTRY

National Companies Date of creation THE CASE OF ABU DHABI NATIONAL OIL COMPANY
Iran NIOC (National Iranian Oil Company) 1948
Kuwait KNP (Kuwait National Petroleum) 1960 Abu Dhabi National Oil Company
Iraq INOC (Iraq National Oil Company) 1966
Abu Dhabi ADNOC ( Abu Dhabi National Oil Company) 1971 Exploration and Chemical and
Exploration and Oil and gas
production production petrochemical Transportation Distribution
Qatar QP (Qatar Petroleum) 1974 processing
services industry
Bahrain BANOCO (Bahrain National Oil Company) 1976
Saudi Arabia SAUDI ARAMCO (Arabian American Oil Company) 1988 ADMA- ADNOC
ADCO ZADCO NDC ESNAAD IRSHAD GASCO ADGAS TAKREER FERTIL BOROUGE ADNATCO NGSCO
OPCO Distribution
Oman OOC (Oman Oil Company) 1996
From ADNOC.
From ADNOC.

was overthrown two years later by the CIA (Operation Ajax). A consortium
of western companies then took control of the Iranian oil industry, until the
Islamic Revolution in 1979. On the Arabian side, the nationalization process
has been completed in all countries except Oman. The relations between the OIL MARKET VOLATILITY
national oil companies, which have gradually taken over the entire operation, Average price of crude oil
and multinational firms, which benefit from technological expertise, are based ( $ per barrel)
on extremely complex legal and financial arrangements, while small inde- 140
pendent companies, like the Russian ones firmly entrenched in Iran, and the 130

increasingly active Asian companies, have induced an even more complex situ- 120

ation. OPEC (the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), established 110

100
in 1960 to “coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of its member coun-
90
tries in order to secure fair and stable prices for petroleum producers” consists 80
of five founding members (Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela), 70
four of them Gulf countries, which were later joined by Qatar and the United 60
Arab Emirates. This cartel of petroleum-exporting countries manipulated the 50
price of oil during the 1970s by controlling its production through a system of 40

quotas. The Arab countries of the Gulf, with the exception of Oman, are also 30
20
members of OAPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries),
10
established in 1968. Since 1973, when the first oil crisis occurred, the price of 0
oil has fluctuated in response to the world economic situation and regional 1973 75 80 85 90 95 2000 05
political upheavals, reaching a historic high price in the 2000s. Data fromUNCTAD.
Data from UNCTAD.

25
Oil Production and Reserves

Oil continues to play a preponderant role in the world’s energy budget; its share MORE THAN A QUARTER OF THE WORLD’S OIL PRODUCTION
has remained stable at 40 percent since 1990. It is the most widely used source GULF STATES LARGEST CRUDE OIL PRODUCERS IN 2006
of energy and will remain so during the coming years: the global demand for
oil, which rose from 75 million barrels per day in 2000 to 82.5 million in 2005, is Iran
Iraq
expected to reach 115 million in 2020. This increased demand is a result of the 2,014 4,150

persistently high rate of oil consumption in industrialized countries, especially

Kuwait Bahrain
in the area of transport, but even more so because of the rise in consumption 2,665 46 Gulf
Qatar
in emerging and developing countries, particularly in Asia: China and India 1,131
UAE
Countries
24,347
have become major actors on the oil stage. As recent assessments show that 2,936
Saudi
their reserves are higher than presumed, the Gulf states will play an increas- Arabia
10,659
Oman
746
ing role in satisfying the growing demand for petroleum. In 2007, Gulf oilfields 10,659
5,000
produced 23 million barrels per day, i.e. about 28 percent of the world’s crude. 0 1000 km 0 5000 km
1000 barrels per day
(over 10,000 b/d) 1,000
The Gulf ’s proven reserves amount to 735 billion barrels of exploitable crude Datafrom
fromAnnual
AnnualEnergy
EnergyReview,
Review,2007.
2007.
10
Data
oil, i.e. 55 percent of the world’s proven reserves.
Although oil is a shared regional characteristic, it also constitutes, at a finer
level of analysis, a differentiating factor between the Gulf states, taking into MORE THAN HALF OF THE WORLD’S CRUDE OIL RESERVES
account the time drilling operations started, as well as the volume of produc- TOP PROVEN OIL RESERVES IN 2006 GULF STATES
tion and reserves. Petroleum was used in the region for caulking, lighting, and
medicinal purposes since antiquity, but modern oil drilling began in Iran before Iraq Iran
World War I (1901). During the 1930s, oil was discovered in the Basra region 115 132

(the fields of the Kirkuk region have been exploited since 1927); in Bahrain; a
little later in Saudi Arabia; and then, on the eve of World War II, in Kuwait and Gulf
Kuwait
104
States Qatar
in Qatar. After the war, the centre of world oil production shifted from Amer- 737 15
UAE
ica to the Gulf, where drilling zones moved gradually from the north towards 98
Saudi
the south, spreading mainly along the coast with the discovery of littoral and Arabia Oman
6
267
sub-littoral deposits. In the 1960s, the first barrels of oil were produced in the billion barrels
267
100
Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai and some years later in Oman. 0 5000 km
(over 0,5) 20
0.5 0 1000 km

Data from Oil and Gas Journal, December 2007.

Data from Oil and Gas Journal, December 2007.

26

Saudi Arabia, which started drilling operations
in the 1930s and has high production volumes with
easily extractable top quality crude, competes with
Russia for first place. Saudi Arabia, which has the
world’s highest oil reserves, produces 40 percent
of the Gulf ’s oil and holds one-fifth of the world’s
reserves. By contrast, Bahrain has almost exhausted
its reserves, while Qatar, which has more gas than
oil, and Oman are small producers with limited pros-
pects. Iran (ranked fourth in the world in terms of
production and third in terms of reserves), followed
by the United Arab Emirates (ranked eighth in
terms of production and sixth in terms of reserves),
90 percent of whose production is contributed by
the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, and Kuwait (ranked elev-
enth in terms of production and fifth in terms of
reserves) are among the big producers. In spite of
the disruption of its oil sector, Iraq remains a fairly
ONE GIANT, FOUR MAJOR AND
THREE MINOR PRODUCERS
Crude oil production
(1000 barrels per day)
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0 0
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Data
Datafrom EnergyInformation
from Energy Information Administration,
Administration, OctoberOctober
2008. 2008.
the gulf: the heart of the world’s energy reserves
large producer (ranked fifteenth in the world). The FIELDS EASY TO OPERATE AND ACCESS,
contribution of its northern oilfields in Kurdistan FREQUENTLY OFFSHORE
(0.3 million bbl/d) to the national production is of
secondary importance as compared to the produc-
tion of its southern oilfields in Lower Mesopotamia
(1.9 million bbl/d). Since it extracts less than its
production capacity, Iraq still has enormous proven
reserves (ranked fourth in the world), three-quar-
ters of which are located in the country’s southern
region. This estimate is manifestly lower than the
country’s probable reserves, considering that there
has been no oil prospecting since the 1980s. Only
at the end of May, 2012, has Iraq again auctioned
off a limited number of exploration licenses for oil
and gas.
The evolution of oil production in the entire 0 100 200 300 km
region has followed the development of the world
oil market: a rapid growth until 1974; readjustment
in the period between 1974 and 1980, with signifi-
cant annual variations in annual production in the
LARGE RESERVES different countries; fall in production between 1980
REVISED UPWARDS and 1985; revival and steady growth since 1985, with
Proven crude oil reserves some turbulences after the 1990s. Though Saudi
(billion barrels) Arabia is adjusting to these trends or is trying to
300 curve them by playing on OPEC quotas and on its
own extraction level, the production graphs of its
250 neighbors are affected by regional crises. The fall of
production in Iran after the 1979 Islamic Revolution
200
Saudi Arabia was brought under control in 1981, while Kuwait,
Iran
Iraq 150 whose production had fallen drastically after its
UAE invasion by Iraq in 1991, restored production to its
Kuwait 100 earlier level in 1993. As for oil production in Iraq,
Bahrain
Oman
it has suffered from the effects of thirty years of
50
Qatar political and military turmoil: the Iraq-Iran war in
the 1980s, the invasion of Kuwait and the western
2005 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 embargo during the 1990s, and then the American
Data fromEnergy
Data from Energy Information
Information Administration,
Administration, January January
2008. 2008. intervention and chaos in the 2000s.
27
Gas Production and Reserves

Every oilfield also contains gas, a methane-rich fuel. This associated gas, which LESS DOMINANT IN GAS THAN IN OIL
was flared in the past, it is now frequently re-injected into the wells to improve GULF STATES LARGEST NATURAL GAS PRODUCERS IN 2006

the oil recovery rate, or is processed. Gas fields that do not contain any oil pro-
duce natural gas. Before it can be transported by sea, gas must be liquefied at Iran
169
a very low temperature (–163°C) so as to reduce its volume significantly (600 Iraq
12
times). This liquefied natural gas (LNG) is different from liquefied petroleum Kuwait
14 Gulf
gas (LPG) obtained either by refining petroleum or by processing gas rich in Bahrain Qatar
States
459
heavy hydrocarbons extracted from oil or gas fields. 14 62
UAE
These technical details explain variations in the figures from one publica- Saudi
Arabia
73

tion to another and in the classification of the countries with regard to their 85 Oman
30
gas production. The variations depend on whether or not the figures include 666
billion m³ 250
associated gas, consider only the gross production of natural gas, as on the 0 1000 km 0 5000 km
(over 5) 100
5
map, or the LNG production as on the chart. The latter indicator is more Data from
from World
World Gas
Gas Intelligence, 2007.
Data Intelligence, 2007.
adequate to give an idea of the place occupied by producers from the Gulf
in the international market. In fact, while the hierarchy of oil producers is
not very different from that of oil exporters, the same does not hold true in A GROWING SHARE IN GAS
the case of natural gas, whose transport requires a greater investment, with TOP PROVEN GAS RESERVES IN 2006 GULF STATES

the result that slightly more than a quarter of the global production of gas is
traded internationally. On one hand, even though Iran, which accounted for Iran
27,500
3.7 percent of the world production in 2006, is the fourth largest producer of Iraq
92
natural gas after the Russian Federation, the United States, and Canada, it is Gulf
Kuwait
1,586
not a large exporter. On the other hand, Qatar, which unlike Iran and Saudi States
71,879
Bahrain Qatar
25,783
829
Arabia (ranked ninth with 2.2 percent of the world production) does not figure UAE
6,848
among the top ten producers of natural gas, is one of the world’s major export- Saudi
Arabia
ers. Though Russia, Canada, Norway, and Algeria export very large quantities 6,071
Oman
47,500 3,170
of gas through pipelines, Qatar is the world’s top exporter of LNG, ahead of 25,000
billion m³
Indonesia. 0 5000 km (over 100)
5,000
100 0 1000 km

Data from
Data from World
World Gas
Gas Intelligence,
Intelligence, 2007.
2007.

28
 the gulf: the heart of the world’s energy reserves

The Gulf states are expected to play an increas- had been neglected, but is now the first choice for THE WORLD LARGEST GAS FIELD
ingly important role in the supply of gas; since the running industrial installations, power plants, and IRAN
1970s consumption has been rising rapidly—at the desalinization units. The growing production will Arab-Persian Gulf
rate of 2.5 percent per year—because of the grow- also allow an increase of the export. In all Gulf
Iran
ing industrialization of developing and emerging countries taken together, the production of LNG Qatar
countries. Natural gas is still under-exploited and quadrupled between 1980, when it represented
under-utilized by two of the region’s largest produc- 15 percent of global production, and 2007, when it South Pars
ers. In Iran, where 65 percent of the gas production represented 30 percent.

is marketed, 18 percent re-injected, and 17 percent
lost, natural gas accounts for 49 percent of the
country’s energy consumption. It accounts for only
40 percent in Saudi Arabia, where 14 percent of
the gas is lost, while production remains limited as
compared to its vast existing reserves. In Qatar, on
the contrary, where gas accounts for 79 percent of
the national energy consumption, the production of
natural gas has more than tripled between 1995 and
2005 and should increase six times over between
2005 and 2015. In the United Arab Emirates, gas
in
Bahra
Qatar
Since exploitation began for gas much later than
oil and exploration intensified only after the 1970s,
proven gas reserves in the Gulf states, estimated to North Dome
be 41 percent of the world’s reserves, show a signifi-
cant rise during the last thirty years. After Russia,
four Gulf countries are among the five biggest hold-
ers of natural gas reserves. Iran and Qatar shared
almost equally 30 percent of the world’s proven
reserves in 2008. The world’s largest gas field, cross-
ing the maritime border between the two countries,
is called North Dome in Qatar where it covers an QATAR

Gas ��eld
A STRONG HIERARCHY THE NEW GEOGRAPHY Doha
Maritime boundary
BETWEEN LNG EXPORTERS OF NATURAL GAS RESERVES
0 10 20 30 40 50 km

Liquefied natural gas production Proven reserves of natural gas

(trillion m³) FromIHS
From IHSEnergy.
Energy.
(1000 barrels per day)

30,000
1,400

1,200 25,000

1,000 Saudi Arabia 20,000 area of 6,000 km2 and South Pars in Iran where it
800
Iran stretches over 3,700 km2 and accounts for 47 percent
Iraq
UAE
15,000 of the Islamic Republic’s gas reserves. Saudi Arabia
600
Kuwait
10,000 and the United Arab Emirates, which share just
Bahrain
400
Oman
under 8 percent of the world proven reserves, are
200 Qatar 5,000 ahead of the United States. But according to the
0 0 geologists, the region’s probable reserves exceed
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 by 20 percent the proven reserves. The distortion is
Data from Energy Information Administration, October 2008.
Data from Energy Information Administration, October 2008.
Data from Energy Information Administration, January 2008.
Data from Energy Information Administration, January 2008.
likely to be higher in Iraq and also in Oman.

29
Processing and Transport of Oil and Gas

A mixture of hydrocarbons, crude oil requires a refining process that depends STRATEGIC FACILITIES
on its physical and chemical properties, which differ from one oilfield to IRAQ Abadan
Juaymah
another, and also on its ultimate use (industry, fuel, petrochemical industries). Umm Qasr
Khor Al Amaya
KUWAIT Al Faw IRAN
It must be purified, desulfurized, and refined in order to separate heavy prod- Mina Al Bakr
Ras Bahregan
Kharg Island
Mina Al Ahmadi Shuaibah
ucts (bitumen, heavy fuel oil, and lubricants), semi-heavy products (domestic Mina Abdullah
Mina Al Zour
Cyrus

fuel, diesel fuel, and kerosene), light products (naphtha and gasoline), and Ras al Kha��i Main Pipeline

gas (butane and propane) by a process of distillation. Since the proportion of Ar

ab
-P
heavy products obtained is higher than the one of light products, for which Jubayl
Ras al Juaymah
er
si Lavan
an
the demand is greater, a portion of the heavy products are converted into light Ras Tannurah
Sitrah
Gu
lf
products by cracking. By re-forming, naphtha molecules, which are used for B. Ras La�fan
Halul
Sirri

the manufacture of plastics, are transformed into high-octane gasoline. QATAR Das
Fateh

SAUDI ARABIA Umm Said Zirku

Mubarraz
Jebel Dhana
Ruwais Mina al Fahal
Refineries and refining capacity by process UAE
Oil terminal
(1000 barrels per day) Qalat
OMAN
Number of National refining Catalytic Thermal Gas terminal 0 100 200 km
Distillation Reforming
refineries capacity cracking cracking
From World Port Source, Maritime-Database, Petroleum review.
From World Port Source, Maritime-Database, Petroleum review.
Iran 9 1,909 1,474 30 237 168

Iraq 8 665 588 0 0 77 The Gulf states are establishing their own refineries (1.3 million bbl/d in
3 939 889 36 0 14
1980, 2.2 million in 1990, and 3 million in 2000) to satisfy their growing domestic
Kuwait
demand and to add value to their hydrocarbon exports. They have 36 refiner-
Saudi 8 2,180 1,745 104 138 193 ies, which is not a large number considering the high volume of oil production
Arabia
and in comparison with western Europe (135 refineries), North America (176),
Qatar 1 289 200 60 0 29
and Asia (170). They have a total refining capacity of about 7 million bbl/d as
Bahrain 1 321 249 41 20 11 compared to the world capacity of 85.4 million bbl/d in 2008. Iranian refin-
eries are located near large cities (Isfahan, Tabriz, Kermanshah), just like in
5 574 514 34 0 26
UAE Saudi Arabia (Riyadh), which also operates a refinery on the Red Sea coast, at
Oman 1 101 85 0 0 16 Yanbu; Iraq has very low-capacity refineries close to the oilfields in the north-
ern region, but the Gulf coast is the main location for refining: there it has
From Energy
EnergyInternational Agency.
From International Agency.
about twenty refineries, including some giant ones, usually near oil terminals,
together with three enormous gas liquefaction plants, which figure among the
twelve largest in the world. The Gulf supplies most of its natural gas to Asia,

30
 the gulf: the heart of the world’s energy reserves

INSUFFICIENT PROCESSING CAPACITY while Europe imports from Russia, Norway, and Algeria, and Canada is the main
IRAQ Basra Abadan supplier for the United States.
Through a dense network of pipelines petroleum is transported from oil
KUWAIT Shiraz IRAN
and gas fields to the processing plants and the export terminals. Pipelines are
Mina Al Ahmadi Shuaibah
Mina Abdullah also used for exporting, sometimes in combination with maritime transporta-
A
Ras al Kha��i ra
b-
tion. Whether to supply their Asian clients, particularly Japan and Korea and
Pe
rs in increasing quantities China and India, or their Western clients, particularly
ia
Jubayl n
Gu Lavan
Bandar Abbas
Europe, which has diversified its energy sources and suppliers, leading to a
lf
Ras Tannurah
Sitrah
decline in their purchases from the Gulf, tankers have to cross the Strait of
Abqaiq
B. Ras Lafan Hormuz. Around half the world’s maritime oil and gas transit moves through
Hamriyah
QATAR Das Island
Jebel Ali Fujairah Hormuz, giving this choke point its strategic importance. To the East, a major
SAUDI ARABIA Umm Said
sea route leads to the Strait of Malacca. To the West, the route around the
Umm al Nar
Re��nery
Ruwais
Cape of Good Hope skirts Africa, going towards America or northward to
more than 400,000 b/d Mina al Fahal
200,000 to 400,000 b/d UAE Europe. The alternate route to Europe through the Suez Canal, which cannot
10,000 to 200,000 b/d Qalat be taken by super-tankers, is reachable through the Strait of Bab al-Mandeb
OMAN
Gas liquefaction plant 0 100 200 km or through an oil pipeline that crosses Saudi Arabia from east to west. But the
From Energy Information Agency and national sources. canal fees and trans-shipment costs imposed by technical constraints make
From Energy Information Agency and national sources.
this solution less attractive.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SEA ROUTES FOR HYDROCARBONS TRANSPORTATION A NETWORK OF PIPELINES

OIL TRANSPORTATION LNG TRANSPORTATION

Ceyhan
Bosphorus Oil pipeline
Disused
Hormuz oil pipeline
Suez
Gas pipeline
Bab el Mandeb Malacca

Tap
Aqaba line

Jubayl

Million metric tons per year Trillion cubic meter per year
more than 300 Choke points more than 10
200 to 300 825 5 to 10 Yanbu Petroline
0 5000 km 120 0 5000 km
less than 200 less than 5 0 500 km

From CNUCED,
From CNUCED,EIA,
EIA,Technip.
Technip. From BP
From BPStatistical
StatisticalReview of World
Review Energy,
of World 2007. 2007.
Energy,
From
FromEnergy
EnergyInformation
InformationAdministration.
Administration.

31
Numerous Tensions

The Gulf region occupies a strategic position between the East and the West. PERMANENT WESTERN BASES
With the development of the oil industry in the twentieth century, it became
a major area of tension and conflict involving national, regional, and global Ali Al Salem
interests. The latter became dramatically important during the 1973 oil cri- Camp Doha

sis: the oil producing countries, most of which are Arab, joined together to Ahmed al Jaber Camp Ari��an

demand a higher price for crude oil. Since then, the issue of oil supply has
become crucial for the great powers that keep a monopoly on more and more
sophisticated extraction technologies and control a large part of the oil indus- Manama
Cheikh Isa
try, but are now obliged to devise strategies to safeguard their supplies. In Situation in 2010 Jebel Ali Fujairah
Al Udeid
addition, the United States and their allies have become the target of activist Navy base

groups aiming to eradicate the Western influence in the name of Islam and Air force base
Al Dhafra
Seeb
Masna’ah
to replace the ruling Arab powers by Islamic governments. Consequently, the Army base

Gulf has become the focus of attention of all oil importing countries. Combined base

Over the last few decades, rising tensions in the oil market following the US base
French base
industrial development of Asia have exacerbated regional conflicts. After UK base 0 100 200 km
Masirah
the Islamic Revolution in 1979, which had hoped to eliminate the American
Data from <www.globalsecurity.org>.
influence, Iran’s relations with Iraq, which was then an economic and mili- Data from <www.globalsecurity.org>.

tary power, began to deteriorate. Each country played on ethnic and religious
factors and revived historical enmities. The Arab socialist regime in Baghdad,
faced with the decline of pan-Arabism and the rise of pan-Islamism, denounced
Khomeini’s support for the Islamist Shiʿi opposition in Iraq and laid claim to
Khuzestan (Arabistan), an oil-rich region of Iran inhabited by an Arab popula-
tion that nevertheless remained loyal to Tehran during the war, just as the Iraqi
Shiʿis fought under their country’s flag. Iraq’s abrogation of the Algiers Agree-
ment of 1975, which had put an end to the century-long dispute over the Shatt
al-Arab (Arvand Rud) and border skirmishes, led to a long war (1980–88) with
a toll of approximately 200,000 dead and 350,000 wounded in Iraq and at least
300,000 dead and more than 500,000 wounded in Iran, to say nothing of the
destruction of cities and infrastructure or the annihilation of the oil industry.
The first Gulf War, as it is commonly known in the region, had barely ended
on an indecisive note, or Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. Heavily in debt to its
neighbor, which had supported it financially during its war against Iran, Iraq
disputed the ownership of the Rumailah oil field on the border between the
two countries. In addition, Iraq, which was keen on widening its access to the
sea, argued that Kuwait was historically a part of the Ottoman province of
Basra and laid claim to what it called the 19th province of Iraq. This second
Gulf War led to western intervention and an irreversible break-up of the rela-
tions between the Iraqi government and the United States.
To the western world traumatized by the attacks on September 11, 2001,
President Bush justified the American military action against Iraq by claiming
that it was a fight against terrorism, a search for weapons of mass destruction,
and an attempt to establish democracy in the country. In retrospect, and with-
out becoming embroiled in various theories, there is a general consensus that
this action was motivated as much by American oil interests as by strategic
compulsions. As result of the third Gulf War, launched in 2003, a US-supported
government was installed in Baghdad and the Shiʿi community gained politi-
cal strength.

32
 the gulf: the heart of the world’s energy reserves

Even as tensions persist at the northern end of the interfering in their internal affairs, and engaging in A MOST STRATEGIC STRAIT
Gulf, the question of sovereignty over the islands of religious propaganda among their Shiʿi population. Bandar Abbas
Lesser Tunb, Greater Tunb, and Abu Musa, which Intercommunity problems within each coun- Traffic separation
system
controls access to the Strait of Hormuz, is a matter try are a potential source of tension. For different Disputed Island

of dispute between the Emirates and Iran, which historical reasons, the national population of these IRAN
of
Strait Horm
has been occupying them unilaterally since 1992 countries includes ethnic and religious minori- Bandar Lengeh

uz
and rendering invalid the fragile compromise of 1971 ties. In the coastal provinces of Iran, the ancient
Greater Tumb
between the Shah of Iran and the Emir of Sharjah. division between the Persian majority and Arab A ra
Lesser Tumb
b - Pe r
This has led to a permanent tension between the minorities has been aggravated by the arrival of

G ulf
sian Gulf
OMAN
Islamic Republic of Iran and member states of the Persian-speaking workers, while the separatist feel-

of O
Abu Musa Ras al Khaimah
Gulf Cooperation Council, who also accuse Iran of ings of the Sunni Baluchi living on the coast of

m
Umm al Quwain

an
the Gulf of Oman are beginning to be expressed Ajman UAE
Sharjah 0 50 km
openly. In the Iraqi province of Basra, the opposi- Dubai
tion between Sunni and Shiʿi populations devel- From Strait
From StraitofofHormuz
HormuzMap,
Map,Perry-Castañeda
Perry-CastañedaLibrary, University
Library, of Texas.
University of Texas.
WESTERN PREDOMINANCE oped into a civil war after the American and British
ON A MAJOR WEAPONS MARKET intervention; in addition, frequent battles arose Divisions within local societies, rivalries between
Cumulated value 1990-2008 between different Shiʿi factions. In the Eastern states, competition between major powers, and the
of weapons purchases
(in million USD) Province of Saudi Arabia, in Qatar, and above all in rise of emerging countries have created tensions
20,000 Bahrain, there are tensions due to the presence of without ever leading to an explosion affecting the
10,000 Iraq Shiʿi minorities in Sunni states. entire region. Nevertheless, business circles, groups
5,000 of experts and army headquarters remain constantly
1,000 vigilant. While large projects aim to skirt round the
Strait of Hormuz to the north (via oil pipelines) or in
GCC AIR FORCE
Kuwait Iran the south (through ports on the Gulf of Oman), the
Bahrain
Number of aircrafts in operation or on order United States have stationed troops, the French are
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
setting up a military base in Abu Dhabi, and Indian
Qatar
����� and Chinese warships patrol the Arabian Sea. As for
���� the region’s Arab states, they are making concerted
Saudi ������� efforts to augment their military strength by acquiring
Arabia UAE ������ sophisticated weaponry at great expense and seeking
Oman
Suppliers 1990-2008 ��� alliances to counter Iran, which seems bent on devel-
Western Europe ����� ������ oping nuclear weapons. The Gulf will remain one of
USA the world’s major strategic regions for a long time to
Other (China, Suppliers
European United
come: daily, 40 percent of the world’s oil crosses the
Russia, Korea…) 0 500 km France USA
Consortium Kingdom Gulf and an oil tanker passes through the Strait of
Data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2010.
Data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2010. Data from
Data from <wwwglobalsecurity.org>.
<wwwglobalsecurity.org>. Hormuz every six minutes during peak hours.

33
A Speedy and Radical Transformation
Influx of Migrants

Migratory flows appear to be an important element of differentiation between MASSIVE FOREIGN IMMIGRATION,
the two coasts of the Gulf. In the north, Iran has been witnessing the departure EXCEPT IN IRAN AND IRAQ
of a considerable portion of its elite since the 1950s; this emigration increased Foreigners
after the Islamic Revolution (1979) and during the 2000s. Since the fall of the Iraq
Taliban regime, the Islamic Republic has been trying to persuade hundreds Nationals

of thousands of Afghan refugees to leave its territory. In the west, Iraq suffers
from the consequences of three successive conflicts and a continuing quasi-
civil war. Since 2002, the foreign population consists mainly of a large number
of soldiers, advisors, and technicians from the West. Since the 1950s, coun- Iran

tries on the southern Gulf coast have been attracting a continuous influx of
migrants headed towards the oldest oil producing countries; an influx so great
that foreigners now constitute a majority, giving these societies a distinctive
multicultural character. Foreign workers at every skill level arrived in large
Kuwait
numbers as countries on the southern coast became richer with the develop-
Saudi Arabia
ment of their oil industry. The economic diversification further encouraged
the influx of migrants. Bahrain
Total population in 2005
(000)
69,000 Qatar
THE DECREASING SHARE OF ARABS
IN THE GCC POPULATION
United
0 20 40 60 80 100 %
Arab Emirates
Population by geographical
Saudi 1975 20,000
origin
Arabia 2005 Oman
Nationals
Bahrain 1975
2005 Arab migrants 4,000
United Arab 1975 Non Arab migrants 2,500
Emirates 2005 1,000
700
0 500 km
Kuwait 1975
2005 Estimated by the authors from national censuses.
Estimated by the authors from national censuses.
Oman 1975
2005 This population movement intensified after the 1970s. In the middle of the
Qatar 1975 2000s, the large presence of foreign workers was a common feature in all these
2005
From Ph. Cadène, B. Dumortier, « L'impact politique des flux migratoires dans les États du Conseil de coopération du Golfe » , L'Espace politique, n° 4, countries, in spite of serious efforts to increase the contribution of the nation-
From Ph. Cadène, B. Dumortier, « L’impact politique des flux migratoires dans les États du Conseil de coopération du Golfe », L’Espace politique,
<www.espacepolitique.org/revue.php>.
n° 4, <www.espacepolitique.org/revue.php>. als to the active work force. In fact, the proportion of expatriates has reached

36
 a speedy and radical transformation

70 to 80 percent in Qatar and in the United Arab Philippines. In the summer of 1991, at the time of the of Kuwait, where their number remains stagnant,
Emirates. The institution of kafala, which requires Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the pro-Iraq stand taken by migrants from Arab countries, although their num-
a local sponsor (kafil) for any foreigner, and the fact some countries and migrants and the rise of Islamism ber has more than tripled on the southern coast
that it is almost impossible to acquire citizenship encouraged the diversification of sources of immigra- of the Gulf between 1975 and 2005, now constitute
or own property in most of these countries creates tion, reducing the proportion of Arab immigrants as a minority among foreigners. Only in Saudi Arabia
a feeling of precariousness among foreign workers. compared to Asians. As a reaction to Yemen’s pro- and Kuwait, Egyptians, who initially constituted the
The exploitation of building industry workers and Iraq stand, Saudi Arabia expelled 80,000 migrant largest number of expatriates and are still the largest
domestic staff, who are particularly powerless and workers in a span of 48 hours following the invasion community of Arab immigrants in the Gulf, account
vulnerable, has been widely criticized by the foreign of Kuwait. After the war, Kuwait took similar action for a major portion of the migrant population in 2005.
press, UN agencies, and NGOs. Initially, migrants against Palestinians, Egyptians, and Yemenis. At the In the Gulf region as a whole, India and Pakistan are
came mainly from Egypt and the Near East. Since same time, all these countries welcome non-Muslim now the two major sources of migrants, whose distri-
the 1980s, there has been an influx of South Asian Asian workers. The composition of this foreign popu- bution increases along a northwest-southeast gradi-
workers, particularly from India and Pakistan, and lation underwent a significant change, while migrant ent. Finally, the Westerners, though small in number,
Southeast Asians, generally from Indonesia and the workers continued to pour in. With the exception cannot be ignored. Playing an important role because
of their high level of skill, they form small communi-
ties, consisting mainly of North Americans, Europe-
THREE MAJOR EXPATRIATE COMMUNITIES IN THE GCC COUNTRIES
ans, and Australians.
INDIANS PAKISTANIS EGYPTIANS
The need for skilled manpower is one of the
Number in 2005 Number in 2005 Number in 2005
(000) (000) (000) major issues for these countries, whose econo-
1,400 1,000 1,000
1,000
500 300
mies are already busy framing post oil strategies.
300
300
100
200
100 Though the high salaries paid to senior executives
Kuwait 100
Kuwait
50 Kuwait 50
15 are still attractive, it is becoming more difficult to
Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia attract and retain people with average skills due to
Bahrain Bahrain Bahrain the rapid growth of Asian economies. This situa-
Qatar Qatar Qatar
tion reinforces the diversity of geographical origins.
UAE UAE UAE
Even the least skilled workers, mainly from South
Asia, now have to be recruited from the most dis-
Oman Oman Oman
advantaged communities in these countries or even
0 250 km 0 250 km 0 250 km
from remote areas of China and other Asian coun-
tries like Nepal and Vietnam. While the pursuit of
% of Indians in total population % of Pakistanis in total population % of Egyptians in total population
5 to 10 10 to 15 25 under 5 5 to 10 10 to 15 under 5 5 to 10 10 to15 development has given rise to new types of migra-
From A.
A. Kapiszewski,
Kapiszewski, « Arab
« Arabversus
versus Asian
Asian migrant
migrantworkers
workersin
in the
the GCC
GCC countries »,
countries »,U.N.
U.N. Expert
Expert Group
Group Meeting
Meeting on
on International
InternationalMigration
Migrationand
andDevelopment
Developmentininthe
theArab
Arabregion,
region,Beirut,
Beirut,15–17
15-17 May tion, the adaptation of laws concerning foreigners
From May
2006.
2006. is crucial.

37
Spectacular Urban Growth

Although without a strong urban tradition, Gulf societies today belong to a Around 1950, the region’s principal cities were concentrated at the north-
metropolitan world. An urbanization rate of about 80 percent, and at times ern end of the Gulf where oil cities supplanted historical ones. Abadan, with
even more than 90 percent along the southern coast reflects, in addition to the a population of about 250,000, was the largest city, followed by Kuwait with
growing importance of cities, the stark difference between cities and desert. just over 100,000 inhabitants, then Ahvaz and Basra, which approached that
Conversely, a lower rate of urbanization, in spite of the existence of several figure. A dozen modest ports with several tens of thousands of inhabitants,
cities, including large cities, in countries with more abundant water resources like Manama, Doha, Dubai, and Bushehr, came next, while al-Ahsa was an
like Iraq, Iran, and Oman, reflects the existence of a sedentary peasantry, agricultural oasis and Abu Dhabi a small administrative centre with some
despite a growing rural exodus. The population of cities continues to grow 25,000 inhabitants.
and is now composed of a variety of groups. Some have been living in coastal In 1970, the development of the oil industry led to the rapid growth of several
or oasian mercantile places from ancient times, or they descend from fishing cities. Kuwait overtook Abadan, which itself recorded a considerable increase
communities. Others belong to nomadic tribes who have opted for a sedentary with a population exceeding 400,000, a size that Basra was approaching. Ahvaz
existence, or are former peasants who have moved to the city recently. As for and Dubai had a population of about 260,000 and Dammam, Manama, and al-
foreigners, who constitute more than half the urban population of the coun- Ahsa about 150,000. Abu Dhabi, with almost 120,000 inhabitants, was gaining
tries on the southern coast, they often come from rural areas. significance in the region, as was Doha with 100,000.
From the late 1980s, urban hierarchies changed drastically. Independence
led to the emergence of new capital cities. Drilling operations started in new
oilfields. The Iraq-Iran war wreaked vast destruction on both the warring coun-
tries. Thus Basra, which was fast regaining its pre-war status, had a population
Urbanization rate (%) of 400,000, and Dubai and Dammam were emerging as important cities. Abu
1950 1970 1990 2000 2005 2010 Estimation 2015 Dhabi, with more than 300,000 inhabitants, established itself as the capital city
27.5 41.2 56.3 64.2 70.0 69.5 71.9
of both an oil rich emirate and a newly formed federation. The urban region
Iran
of Muscat had a population of 300,000. The population of Sharjah, bordering
Iraq 35.1 56.2 69.7 67.8 66.9 66.4 66.5
Dubai, was close to 270,000, while Doha reached 230,000. On the Iranian side
Kuwait 61.5 85.7 98.0 98.2 98.3 98.4 98.5 of the Gulf, Ahvaz remained a major city with 700,000 inhabitants, but Abadan,
Saudi Arabia 21.3 48.7 76.6 79.8 81.0 82.1 83.2 fallen into ruin, had only 60,000. Though the historical port of Bushehr, with
Qatar 79.2 88.4 92.2 94.9 95.4 95.8 96.2 more than 100,000 inhabitants, gained in importance, it was Bandar Abbas
Bahrain 64.4 83.8 88.1 88.4 88.4 88.6 89.0 with 250,000 inhabitants, located near the Strait of Hormuz, which became a
major port, even though its development slowed down as a result of the US
UAE 54.5 77.7 79.1 77.8 77.7 78.0 78.8
embargo against Iran after the 1979 hostage crisis.
Oman 8.6 29.7 66.1 71.6 71.5 71.7 72.3
The years that followed witnessed an expansion of the process, leading to a
From
FromUnited
UnitedNations,
Nations,World Urbanization
World Prospects.
Urbanization Prospects. new configuration. But once again the Gulf region was subjected to tensions

38
 a speedy and radical transformation

METROPOLIZATION AND LITTORALIZATION

URBAN HIERARCHY IN 1987 URBAN HIERARCHY IN 2007
Ahvaz Ahvaz
Urban agglomeration Urban agglomeration
population population
Basra
Kerman Basra Kerman
Shiraz 2,500,000 Shiraz 4,500,000
1,500,000 Kuwait City
750,000 2,500,000
Kuwait City
500,000
Bushehr 250,000 Bushehr 1,500,000
100,000 750,000
25,000 500,000
Hafar al-Batin Hafar al-Batin 250,000
Bandar Abbas 100,000
Jubayl Jubayl Bandar Abbas 25,000

Dammam
Dammam Al-Khobar
Muharraq Manama
Dahran Manama
Ajman Dubai-
Al Rayyan Sharjah Riyadh Doha Sharjah-
Riyadh
Doha Dubai Ajman
Al Ahsa Al Ahsa
Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi
Al Ain Al Ain Muscat
Muscat

0 100 km 0 100 km

Estimated by the authors from national censuses.

Estimated by the authors from national censuses.

with global implications. Kuwait was occupied by Dhabi is rapidly developing and has a population longer threatened by Iraq. With a smaller popula-
the Iraqi army in 1990, leading to the intervention of approximately half a million. Three other cities, tion (of 1.25 million) and lower media coverage,
of US and allied troops under UN mandate. Political Doha, al-Ain, and al-Ahsa, have a population close the conurbation of Dammam is growing steadily
troubles broke out in southern Iraq after the end to 300,000. The oil industry is no longer the sole in importance. Ahvaz, with a solid industrial base,
of the conflict and the country faced an economic driving force behind urban growth. The develop- still holds an important place with a population of
embargo. Basra suffered a long period of stagna- ment of industry and tertiary activities, such as the one million. Abu Dhabi is reaching a similar level,
tion; development slowed in Kuwait. The Iranian construction of offices, residential buildings, and its growth being triggered by the development of
cities on the Gulf coast suffered from the country’s neighborhoods of villas are creating more employ- the tertiary sector, thanks to heavy investments
global marginalization and did not experience any ment opportunities. from oil income. Six other cities—Muscat, Bandar
real growth. By contrast, two large conurbations In 2007, this trend became more marked, affirm- Abbas, Doha, al-Ain, Manama, and al-Ahsa—have
emerged on the southern coast of the Gulf. At the ing the new urban hierarchy. With a population populations between 250,000 and over 500,000.
turn of the millennium, Dubai came to prominence. of 2.5 million, the conurbation polarized by Dubai Fifteen-odd cities have populations ranging from
Now, including Sharjah and Ajman, its population symbolizes the region’s urban growth and also its 100,000 to 250,000 and about thirty from 30,000 to
exceeds 1.5 million. The second conurbation, con- limitations. Kuwait continues to be a major agglom- 100,000. In the course of a few decades, some Gulf
sisting of Damman, Dhahran, and al-Khobar, is eration with a population of 2.2 million. The city is cities, formerly small towns between sea and desert,
home to almost a million people. The city of Abu even rediscovering its old dynamism as it feels no have become world famous.

39
Quality Infrastructure

The creation of efficient transport and communication networks is essential A CONCENTRATION OF INFRASTRUCTURES
for the global integration of the Gulf. During the past twenty years, various Railways Oil terminal
states, in partnership with powerful private companies, have invested heavily Motorway and
Gas terminal
in strategic infrastructures. Ports play a crucial role in this strategy, whether it highway
Main road Container port
is oil and gas terminals, non-specialized ports or container ports. The develop- International General cargo

ment of airports has also received great attention and there is an effort to cre- airport port

ate hub airports near the largest cities for transit passengers between the West
and the East. Dubai, which ranks eighth in the world in terms of container traf-
fic and twentieth in terms of air passenger traffic, outstrips the region’s other
cities. Finally, the Gulf Cooperation Council countries have set up efficient
telephone and IT networks.
The authorities are fully aware of the importance of infrastructure for
regional integration and greater synergy between the various Gulf cities. How-
ever, this awareness is too recent for them to have set up cross-border net-
works, except the highways joining cities along the littoral. In Saudi Arabia,
Iraq, and Iran, highways link their respective capitals with coastal cities. Other
roads are still in the planning stage, with the exception of the 26-kilometer 0 100 km
King Fahd Causeway between Dammam and Manama, completed in 1986 and
used by more than ten million people every year. Other important projects
will take a long time to be completed. The main structuring project is the pro- bypass the oilfields along the coast and also Saudi Arabia. Bypassing Saudi
posed high-speed railway lines between the different cities of the Gulf, which, Arabia’s territorial waters would have meant increasing the bridge’s length by
it is hoped, will connect them to Baghdad and Istanbul in the future. The first 65 km, making it the world’s longest bridge. The second bridge, 40 km long,
section of this ambitious project drawn up by the Gulf Cooperation Council is is planned to be constructed between the Qatar Peninsula and the island of
likely to be commissioned in Saudi Arabia, where a railway line will connect Bahrain. Called the “Friendship Bridge,” it will make the exchanges between
the principal cities of the east coast, then lead to Kuwait. Another section in the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council easier because it will reduce the
the United Arab Emirates will join the coastal cities of the different Emirates time need to drive from Doha to Manama by car from five hours to just thirty
belonging to the federation. In addition, there was a proposal to construct minutes. The strategic King Fahd Highway, which is often saturated with traf-
two of the world’s longest bridges, the first between Abu Dhabi and Doha, to fic, will be widened during the next few years.

40
 a speedy and radical transformation

AMBITIOUS RAILWAYS PROGRAMME ELECTRIC INTERCONNECTION BRIDGES AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION BRIDGES AND URBAN PLANNING

Esfahan Bafq High-voltage line

Jaber bridge Bubiyan
Ahvaz in operation
Khorramshahr Kerman High-voltage line BAHRAIN (three proposals)
Zahedan Dammam
Basra Bandar e Shiraz under building Manama Failaka bridge
Emam Sirjan
Kuwait City Power station
Bushehr Al Zout
Bandar Abbas

Dammam Manama QATAR

Doha
Doha Dubai
Abu Alladhill
Riyadh Dhabi to Kuwait
SAUDI
Muscat HVDC Jazrah ARABIA
Abu Dhabi Bay Failaka
Ghunan
Doha South Kuwait City
Existing railways Al Fouhai Existing bridge
Salwa M’Hadah
Proposed railways Bridge under building
Silaa UAE
Train station Bridge in project
0 200 km 0 100 km 0 50 km 0 10 km

From Al Manakh 2, Abu Dhabi, UPC, 2010 and Rah Ahan Iran. From GCC Interconnection Authority. O���cial data. O���cial data.
From Al Manakh 2, Abu Dhabi, UPC, 2010 and Rah Ahan Iran. From GCC Interconnection Authority.

At the intra-urban level, infrastructure is urgently required to ease traffic

congestion. The extremely fast spatial growth of cities has taken place until
recently without any prior planning or sufficient public investment. Private
cars are the most common mode of transport and public transport must be
THE BUILDING OF A PUBLIC TRANSPORT NETWORK: DUBAI METRO
upgraded. Bus services are still in their infancy. The opening of the Dubai
metro is a step forward in the region’s urban development because it will cer-

N
tainly be followed by similar projects in Kuwait and Doha. Abu Dhabi aspires
to introduce an innovation in the domain of public transport by integrating its
proposed metro network with modern trams.
The numerous projects framed by the members of the Gulf Cooperation
Council illustrate the hiatus and dissymmetry between the two shores of the Khalid Bin Waleed Union Square
Gulf. Nothing has been done to facilitate connections between Iran and its SHARJAH
Arab neighbors. On the Iranian coast, there are few infrastructure projects Jebel Ali
Creek
Airport Terminal 1

and the proposed highways will only serve to open up the country’s eastern Lines in operation
Etisalat

region. The railway proposals are intended to improve, through privatization, Red line
Rashidiya
elevated
the trans-Iranian rail network built between 1929 and 1937 to connect Tehran Al Maktoum
International Airport 0 5 10 km
underground
to the Caspian Sea, the country’s large cities, and the Gulf coast. The most
Green line Planned line
important project is a highway coupled with a railway line joining the port of elevated Red line extention Black line Purple line
Bandar Abbas, on the mainland, to the port of Kaveh on Qeshm Island. This underground Yellow line Blue line
requires the construction of a 2.2-kilometer bridge to accelerate the develop-
ment of a free trade zone set up on the island. From DubaiMetro.
From DubaiMetro.

41
Developing an Industrial Sector

In the Gulf states, the main industry revolves around petroleum; but it is not
limited to simply drilling and processing oil and gas. Heavy investments have
been made in the petrochemical sector, as well as in energy-intensive indus-
tries like steel, aluminium, and cement. The development of vast industrial
port complexes, where raw materials are imported and from where semi-fin-
ished and finished products are exported, is the result of policies aimed at
adding value to hydrocarbons and diversifying industrial activity. Production
volumes, though still relatively modest, will increase considerably once the
ongoing projects are completed.
Production of fertilizers and plastics are an offshoot of the petroleum
industry. Saudi Arabia is the region’s largest producer, with 40 million tons
of chemicals and plastics in 2006. SABIC (Saudi Basic Industries Corporation)
dominates this sector and owns shares in several new companies. The ongoing
projects aim to raise production by 60 percent by 2012. Iran (30 million tons) is
the second largest producer, ahead of Qatar (10 million tons). Growth prospects
are very bright and many foreign (especially western) companies are setting
up joint-ventures with local companies. While Iran (1.4 percent of the global
petrochemical production in 2005) is building new plants, member countries
of the Gulf Cooperation Council are expected to move from 4 percent of the
global production in 2005 to 10 percent in 2015.
Thanks to low energy costs, aluminium production has expanded signifi-
cantly around the Gulf. Bahrain (870,000 tons in 2006) and the United Arab

HEAVY INDUSTRY PROMINENCE

ALUMINIUM METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY CHEMICAL INDUSTRY CEMENT INDUSTRY

Iran Iran
Iran n/a - n/a Iran
n/a
n/a
Kuwait Kuwait
n/a Kuwait Kuwait
Bahrain
Bahrain
Bahrain Bahrain Qatar
Saudi n/a Saudi Saudi
Qatar Qatar Saudi Qatar
Arabia Arabia Arabia
n/a Arabia n/a
UAE n/a UAE
n/a UAE UAE

Oman Oman
Production (million of metric tons) Production (million of metric tons) Production (million of metric tons) Oman Production (million of metric tons) Oman
3 14.6 64 42
2006 10 2006 40 2006 30 2006
1.5 15
5 20
1 Estimation 2012 Estimation 2012 Estimation 2012 Estimation 2012
2 10 5
0.12 1.4 1.5
n/a : non available 0 500 km n/a : non available n/a : non available 0.18 n/a : non available

From GCC Industry Report, Manufacturing the Future, 2008 and official Iranian statistics.
From GCC Industry Report, Manufacturing the Future, 2008 and official Iranian statistics.

42
 a speedy and radical transformation

Emirates (860,000 tons) owe their production capacity to the giant plants set AL-JUBAIL
up by ALBA (Aluminium Bahrain) in Sitrah and by DUBAL (Dubai Alumin- A CITY ESTABLISHED BY SABIC (SAUDI BASIC INDUSTRIES CORPORATION)
ium) in Jebel Ali. The growing international demand for aluminium is respon- Shopping mall
Residential area
sible for the expansion of this sector. In Saudi Arabia, two enormous smelting Residential area
International hotel

plants are under construction in collaboration with the Chinese and the Aus- in development University, college
Navy base Hospital
tralians. In Qatar, a factory was built recently with Norwegian investment. In Port and industrial Public administration
2012, three huge projects should make the United Arab Emirates the region’s zone
Industrial zone Police, civil defense
in development
largest aluminium producer and also one of the largest in the world with a pro- Airport area Arab-Persian Gulf
duction of 3 million tons. Iran, which produces bauxite, has opened a factory Unbuilt area
N

in Bandar Abbas with Italian expertise. It has also signed an agreement with Motorway
Oil port
China for the construction of a factory in Lamard, near Assaluyeh, to double Other road
Oil pipeline
the country’s production (250,000 tons in 2006).
The steel industry is following a similar path, but even though there are
steel mills located around the Gulf, they cannot be compared with the world’s Commercial port
major producers (China, Japan, the United States, and even Russia). The coun-
tries of the Gulf Cooperation Council represent just a little more than 1 percent
of the world production. Driven by rising consumption in emerging countries,
especially India and China, and their own development needs, they plan to
increase their production to possibly reach 50 million tons by 2012. Saudi Ara- King Abdulaziz
navy base
bia alone will reach the present production level of all the member countries
taken together (15 million tons) and Oman will reach two-thirds of the total.
Desalination
Production in Oman will be concentrated in a giant factory in Sohar, which plant
is being set up as a joint project between the Oman government, Rotterdam
port, and a Brazilian giant of the sector. Huge steel mills are being commis- 0 1 2 3 4 5 km

sioned in al-Jubail, Dammam, Muharraq, and in the Mussafah industrial zone

in Abu Dhabi. Iran, which has iron and coal mines, has been trying to develop
a steel industry since the 1920s. Since it is able to satisfy only 70 percent of
its domestic needs of cast iron and steel, in spite of opening large steel mills
in Isfahan in 1971 and in Ahvaz in 1989, Iran (10 million tons) is now building
a steel complex in Bandar Abbas and wants to raise its production to 15 and
then 18 million tons between 2010 and 2015.
Spectacular urban growth has spurred the expansion of the construction
materials sector. Iran (41 million tons of cement in 2006) and Saudi Arabia
(27 million tons) have outstripped the United Arab Emirates (17 million tons).
Though the sector is expected to grow by more than 50 percent in most Gulf
countries, the United Arab Emirates, where Ras al-Khaimah has become a
regional centre for the production of ceramics, glass, and cement, aspire to
double their production. Under Iran’s five-year plan (2005–10), its cement
production was expected to rise from 32 to 70 million tons; the current plan
aims at a target of 240 million tons.
Other less important sectors are concentrated in industrial zones, some of
which enjoy the status of free trade zones or special economic zones to encour-
age the development of import substitution industries in countries where
almost all consumer goods are imported. There is a wide variety of activities
ranging from flour mills to light engineering together with the manufacture
of paints and detergents, as well as activities like packaging, assembling, and
manufacture of ready-to-wear clothing, often set up to get around export quo-
tas imposed on some countries. As for high-technology, which is the main
focus of government attention, the companies in this sector are mainly service
providers.

43
Free Zones and Special Economic Zones

In 2008, the Gulf coasts were home to thirty-odd free zones and six special Ahvaz
economic zones. In addition to a dissymmetry between the Arab and Iranian IRAN
IRAQ Khorramshahr
coasts, there is a concentration of special zones in the vicinity of the Strait of Bandar e Emam
Hormuz. In such zones national laws are less rigid or even inoperative. Khor Al-Zubair
Shiraz
Sirjan
In Iran, free zones illustrate the contradictions of the Islamic Republic, Shuwaikh
KUWAIT Bushehr
which wants to change Iranian society by protecting it from harmful external
influences without giving up trade with the outside world. The five-year plan,
Asaluyeh Fulad
introduced in 1991 after the war with Iraq (1980–88), envisaged the creation of
Bandar Shahid Rajae
zones that would not be subject to common laws and would enable the econ- Kish Qeshm
omy to take off. The law of 1993 created three huge free zones, two of which Dammam BAHRAIN
Sitrah Shabahar
were located on islands in the Gulf, to attract investments by offering the usual QATAR
incentives (exemption from customs duties and taxes, no restrictions on the Doha

transfer of capital and goods, etc.), but even more by allowing activities in the Sohar

zone to evade the rules imposed by Islamic laws in these enclaves of liberalism Buraimi Muscat
Nizwa
where religious restrictions are relaxed. On the Arabian coast, the incentives UAE
Sur
offered to investors in free zones—a convenient location on the world map,
affordable energy and manpower, top quality infrastructure and services, total
repatriation of profits, tax advantages—are available for the most part even
SAUDI ARABIA
outside these zones. Their main attraction lies in the fact that they are not OMAN
required to have a local partner and allow 100 percent foreign investment.
On the Iranian side, while few companies have started operations in the
free industrial zones of Qeshm, Kish (connected by several daily flights to Teh-
ran and Dubai) is successful because one can trade, without breaking the law,
in goods that are forbidden in the Islamic Republic. This has given rise to a Free Zone
flourishing tourism industry and rampant smuggling. In addition, Iran pro- Special Economic Salalah
Zone
motes extensive self-sufficiency in neighboring Muslim countries through its 0 100 200 300 400 km

fifteen-odd special economic zones bordering the Caspian Sea, implemented FromB.B.Dumortier,
From Dumortier, « Développement
« Développement économique
économique et contournement
et contournement duzones
du droit : les droitfranches
: les zones
de lafranches
rive arabede
du la rivePersique »,
golfe arabe duAnnales
golfe
along its land border, or located in the Gulf ports. de Géographie,
Persique 2007. de Géographie, 2007.
», Annales

On the Arabian side, free zones are unevenly distributed. In Iraq, near the
oil port of Khor al-Zubair, a private free zone was granted in 2006. Kuwait the country’s other ports. Bahrain set up an industrial free zone rather late on
has a free trade zone in Shuwaikh, the country’s main port. In the Saudi the north of Sitrah Island and thirty years ago acquired the technical and legal
free re-export zone in Dammam, the main activity is reshipping goods to means needed to take advantage of the difference in time zones to speculate

44
 a speedy and radical transformation

A TOOL FOR ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION
IN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Free Zone
Special Economic
Zone
Date of creation
before 1990
from 1990 to 1999
from 2000 to 2004
after 2005
N
Sharjah Airport
Flower Centre
Health Care City
Gold and Diamond Park
Technology and Media
Jebel Ali International Humanitarian City
Abu Dhabi Airport
Industrial City
of Ajman and Umm al-Quwain attract mainly small Located thirty-five km from the centre of Dubai,
entrepreneurs from poor countries. Those in the the Jebel Ali free port inaugurated in 1985 covers
OMAN
Emirate of Sharjah, the airport free zone and the an area of 48 square km. In 2011, it contained 6,400
industrial and port free zone in Hamriyah, as well enterprises from more than 100 countries. More
Ras al Khaimah as the fast-growing one in Ras al-Khaimah par- than a third of them are large western enterprises
ticipate in less sophisticated activities and attract and multinational firms. In addition to this non-
Umm al Quwain investors who are less sought after than free zones specialized zone, which is the region’s oldest and
Hamriyah
Ajman
in neighboring Dubai. most important, other more specialized free zones
have arisen over the years like the Media and Tech-
Dubai Airport
Academic City
nology free zone created in 2000; in that zone Inter-
Silicon Oasis
International Financial Centre
Fujairah
net City, Media City, and Knowledge Village have
proved to be successful. While Dubai is continu-
JEBEL ALI, A DEEP SEA PORT AND
A PIONEER INTEGRATIVE FREE ZONE ally setting up new projects, Abu Dhabi, which has
criticized the piling of activities as a result of this
N to
Dubai strategy, has opted for a different model by setting
up special economic zones for the development of
OMAN export-oriented industries.
0 25 50 km

From
From B.B.Dumortier,
Dumortier, « Développement
« Développement économique
économique et contournement
et contournement du droit ».
du droit », .
Hotels RECENT SPECIALIZED FREE ZONES
Heavy industry FOR MEDIA AND HIGH-TECH
on exchange rates round the clock: its Offshore
Banking Units, comparable to Singapore’s Asian

N
Currency Units, are involved in speculative interna-
tional operations. Though Qatar too has yielded to to
the desire for free zones, the density of free zones is to
Abu Dhabi Al Sufouh Road
Dubai

higher in the United Arab Emirates. Driven by their

keen desire for economic diversification and a lib- Knowledge Village
Media City
eralization policy adopted on the advice of foreign
to
experts and international organizations, they have Abu Dhabi Knowledge
Village
set up these zones all along the coast with the high- Internet City Media
City
est concentration in Dubai. 0 500 1000 m Sheikh Zayed Road
Each member of the Federation has at least one Plots for entreprises Oil terminal
free zone with a hierarchy based on the size and Warehouses Container terminal Emirates Golf Club 0 100 300 500 m

geographical origin of the companies installed in JAFZA office General cargo terminal
Building for offices inside FZ Building outside FZ
the various zones where the cost of licenses and Accomodation Food terminal Landscaped garden Lake

the fees vary considerably. The modest free zones FromJebel

From JebelAliAli Free
Free Zone
Zone Authority.
Authority. FromDubai
From DubaiMedia
Media and
and Technology
Technology FreeFree
Zone.Zone.

45
Explosion of Finance and Real Estate Sectors

The income from oil plays a major role in the budgets of the Gulf states. Vari- GULF SOVEREIGN AND INVESTMENT FUNDS
ous modes of redistribution allow their nationals to maintain a high to very MORE THAN $ 10 BILLION IN 2011
high standard of living, according to the number of inhabitants. For instance,
in 2007, with US$ 31.686 billion earned from the sale of petroleum in Saudi Mubadala
(UAE)
Arabia, the sum available for each kingdom’s subject was US$ 1.72 million. In
Investment Corporation of Dubai
Qatar, the respective figures are US$ 19.424 billion and 77.7 million. In Iraq (UAE)
and in Iran, the former with a population of more than 30 million and the lat- Oil Stabilisation Fund
ter more than 70 million, as well as in Bahrain, whose oil wealth is less than (Iran)
US$ 70 billion, the redistribution capacity is necessarily lower. Qatar Investment Authority
Recycling petrodollars and moving from oil rent to financial rent are not (Qatar)

new developments. As early as 1953, with the aim of safeguarding its oil wealth Kuwait Investment Authority
(Kuwait)
for future generations, the Kuwaiti government set up the Kuwait Invest-
ment Authority (KIA), historically the first sovereign fund. In 1962, it set up SAMA Foreign Holdings
(Saudi Arabia)
the Kuwait Stock Exchange, the Gulf ’s leading stock exchange after the one
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority
in Riyadh. Gradually, all the countries in the region set up stock exchanges (UAE)
with a limited scope, sovereign funds for long-term investment, and invest-
ment funds to gain short-term returns or to serve national development. Abu 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Credit ( $ billion )
Dhabi, for example, has the world’s richest sovereign fund (ADIA, set up in Data from
Data from Sovereign
SovereignWealth
WealthFund Institute.
Fund Institute.
1976) and a public investment fund (Mubadala, set up in 2002), as well as
a special organization for investments in the industrial and military sectors
(Tawazun, set up in 2007), which deals with offset clauses in arms contracts. most of them British, have been operating for many years, Islamic banking,
In view of the predominant role played by funds and central banks overseen which is gaining popularity, offers higher than average returns and accounts
by vigilant regulatory bodies, the banking system consists mainly of a dense for almost a quarter of financial transactions. Finally, the recent development
network of deposit banks that are mostly national. Bahrain, which opted for of the insurance sector holds great promise.
offshore banking quite early, appears to be an exception. In Iran, the oldest Even though monetary issues—fixed parity with the US dollar, single cur-
banks (Sepah founded in 1925, Melli in 1928, and Sader in 1952) were national- rency, and inflation—continue to be debated, the financial surplus, which
ized in 1979, but a law was passed in 2000 to authorize the opening of private rose from US$ 31 billion to 260 billion between 2001 and 2008, has driven the
banks (Parsian in 2001). On the Arabian coast, where leading foreign banks, countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council to increase the volume of their

46
 a speedy and radical transformation

A GREATER DIVERSIFICATION IN INVESTMENTS on the customary tribal appropriation of land have been replaced by a system
ABU DHABI INVESTMENT FUND based on private ownership, allowing foreigners to acquire property, generally
GEOGRAPHICAL DIVERSIFICATION SECTORIAL DIVERSIFICATION in designated free tenure areas. Although they are stakeholders in the global
- Great-Britain - Saudi Arabia
- France - Libya - Ferrari financial system, Gulf countries have managed to resisted the subprime crisis.
- VEOLIA
- Italy - Oman - EADS - Lease Plan
- OXY Nonetheless, under the joint impact of the world economic crisis and local
- Finmecanica
- Rolls Royce - TOTAL factors Dubai has unable to avoid the bursting of a speculative real estate bub-
Europe Middle-East Car industry Water ble, triggering a crisis in the banking sector. Several projects, most oversized
Aeronautics Energy
and harmful for the environment, have been cancelled or postponed. While
MUBADALA
promoters, for whom the dividing line between private and public is blurred,
MUBADALA
are turning to overseas markets to expand their activities, real estate projects
Education Technology are on the rise in most cities, changing the landscape and leading to urban
Africa Asia
Real Estate Health sprawl.
- Université
- EDS
Paris Sorbonne
- Nigeria - South Korea - Indonesia - Advanced
Abou Dhabi - Kor Hotel - Imperial
- Kazakhstan - Philippines Micro Devices
- INSEAD - Related College NEW PROPERTY LAW AND MAJOR REAL ESTATE PROJECTS
- Singapore - Thailand
- John Buck London
- Poltrona Rau - Laboratory FREE TENURE AREAS IN DUBAI
Gevu Corporation
From H.L. Védie, Les Fonds souverains, ESKA, 2010. of America ** The Palm

N
From H.L. Védie, Les Fonds souverains, ESKA, 2010. Deira
* The World

* Dubai
The Palm
external investments and redeploy a part of this surplus in the Gulf. By invest- WaterFront * The Palm
Jebel Ali
Jumeirah
ing locally, the Gulf states have the means to pursue economic diversification.
By increasing their presence in global financial markets, they have acquired an Dubai Marina
additional geopolitical lever. Saudi Arabia gives preference to investments in Discovery Emirates Springs Burj Khalifa
bonds in countries with a global reputation and is partial to North-American Garden The Meadows
The Greens Dubai
pension funds. Others invest diversely: after repurchasing Harrods, acquiring Business Bay
a stake in the German Porsche and the Hochtief, a giant building company

SH
Jumeirah The Lagoons
from Essen, followed by its entry into the French Vinci and Veolia, Qatar was

AR
Jebel Ali Gulf Estates
Airport City

JA
interested in investing in Areva, which gave preference to KIA. The Islamic International

H
City
Republic of Iran prefers to invest in the Muslim world, particularly in the -stan
countries. However, the immensely wealthy religious foundations do not dis- Built area
Area under construction or
dain safe and lucrative investments in the West. development
Area under development, * Postponed or
Tourism and real estate are the main sectors that attract speculative invest- open to private property and
foreign buyers
delayed project
** Cancelled project 0 2 4 6 8 10 km
ments, with Dubai taking the lead. The explosion of the real estate sector
began around 2005, following the reform of property laws. Old practices based From Schedule of Law n°7, 2006, Dubai Emirate.
From Schedule of Law n°7, 2006, Dubai Emirate.

47
The Rise of Tourism1

According to the international definition of tourism, which includes business TOURISM AND HERITAGE
tourism and religious tourism, a tourist is a traveller spending at least one
Main attractive places
night, and at the most one year, away from his habitual surroundings. The Archeological site
reasons for travel are thus not limited to relaxation and holidays. Museum
In 1990, the Gulf states received only 5.76 million tourists (1.3 percent of the Fort
world figure); in 2007, their number has increased fourfold (about 3 percent of Monument
the world figure). This has been accompanied by the development of domestic
tourism involving short stays on the seaside or in oases. International tour-
ism in destinations that did not figure on the world tourism map in the 1970s
increased by more than 10 percent per annum over the last ten years. Crossing
the 15 percent mark in 2006–07, it grew faster than tourism in other parts of
the world. However, the importance of the tourism sector and the types of
tourism vary considerably from country to country.
Saudi Arabia, the region’s leading country with an inflow of more than
8 million tourists in 2007, is comparable to Egypt the same year. But most of 0 100 km
the tourists to Saudi Arabia are pilgrims performing hajj, the pilgrimage to
Mecca. This religious tourism is also significant in Iraq, which hosted, in 2007, LUXURY HOTELS
500,000 pilgrims, among others Iranians, who visited the Shiʿi pilgrimages cen- 0 100 km International hotels
(three stars and more)
tres of Najaf and Karbala. While the national museum in Baghdad reopened
in 2009, the ancient sites in Babylon and Ur are still inaccessible, though the 150

government hopes to revive cultural and archaeological tourism.

21 to 40
In Iran, in spite of great potential, the development of international tourism
11 yo 20
is impeded by the numerous restrictions on foreigners. By contrast, domes-
5 to 10
tic tourism is quite active, but not directed towards the Gulf coast, except 1 to 2
for Kish, which deserves special mention. In the 1970s, the Kish Development
Organization adopted the Hawaii model to attract a wealthy clientele to this Luxury palace or resort
�����, UAE 17
small island. In 1979, the revolution stopped such a project, but the establish- ������, Bahrain 3
ment of a free zone has given rise to a new type of tourism. In 2005, Kish ��� �����, UAE 2
����, Iran 2
received 1.5 million tourists. Although it is located more than 1,000 km from ������ ����, Kuwait 1
the country’s major cities, there are regular flights to Kish operated by a local ��� ���� ���, UAE 1
����, UAE 1
�����, UAE 1
������, Oman 1
Data from
Data fromMinistries
MinistriesofofTourism.
Tourism.
1 Based on 2007 figures.

48
 a speedy and radical transformation

AN EMERGING TOURISM DESTINATION DUBAI, FROM BUSINESS TOURISM

€ (million)
TO MASS TOURISM TOURISTS BY GEOGRAPHICAL ORIGIN, 2007
22 tourists (million) 9,000
Number of tourists (million) UAE
(6 %)
20 8,000 7 Asia
(23 %) GCC countries
6 except UAE
18 (14 %)
7,000 5
16 Arab countries
4 Oceania
except GCC
6,000 (3 %)
(8 %)
14 3
America Subsaharian
2 (8 %) Africa
5,000
12 (6 %)
1
10 4,000 Europe
0
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 (32 %)
8 Data fromDpt
Data from Dptofof Tourism
Tourism andand Commerce
Commerce Marketing,
Marketing, Dubai. Dubai. Datafrom
Data fromDubai
Dubai Establishment
Establishment Statistics,
Statistics, 2008. 2008.
3,000

6
2,000 religious police. Bahrain, which has a solid tourism to take charge of tourism development, which is
4 infrastructure with 117 hotels (about 30 of which based on extensive cultural, sports, and recreational
1,000
are 5-star), hosts thousands of Saudi tourists every complexes, including the cultural district on Sadi-
2 weekend. yat Island where the Louvre and the Guggenheim
While tourism is still a marginal sector in Kuwait, Museums will open branches, or the motor-racing
0 0
1990 2005 2005
which receives mainly business tourists, Qatar track on Yas Island. The emirate has invested huge
Foreign tourists Revenue adopted a tourism development policy about ten amounts and established the Tourism Develop-
Saudi Arabia Kuwait Oman years ago and tourism took off earlier in the United ment Investment Company to set up the necessary
UAE Bahrain Qatar Arab Emirates. In 2007, the Federation received infrastructure.
Data from
Data fromWorld
WorldTourism Organization.
Tourism Organization. 8.5 million foreign tourists. Dubai, a pioneer in the Contrary to the popular image of an up market
region welcomes 80 percent of the UAE visitors; destination consisting of ostentatious or futuristic
airline. It generally attracts people deprived of con- its department of tourism and commerce market- emblematic luxury hotels like the Emirates Palace
sumer goods, seeking the freedom of its shopping ing, which is in charge of promoting tourism, has in Abu Dhabi, or the Burj al-Arab and the Atlan-
centres and entertainment spots. In addition, many fifteen overseas bureaus. Revenue from tourism, tis in Dubai, the United Arab Emirates, which rank
migrant workers spend a night there to fulfil the combining business and commercial tourism with thirty-second in the world in terms of tourist arriv-
obligation of leaving the country to be eligible for beach resorts holidays and lucrative niche tour- als but forty-second in terms of tourism revenue, are
a new visa to the Arab Gulf States. ism, accounts for a fifth of the emirate’s GDP with more interested in promoting mass tourism. Oman,
Like Kish for the citizens of the Islamic Repub- occupancy rates exceeding 80 percent. While West with its splendid mountains, its seaside, and desert
lic of Iran, Bahrain is a place where the citizens Europeans and North Americans constitute a large landscapes has not yet given in to this temptation,
of neighboring Saudi Arabia can enjoy freedom in proportion of the tourists visiting Dubai, visitors as it seems determined to develop sustainable tour-
bars, nightclubs, and cinemas, which are banned from Central and Eastern Europe prefer the seaside ism by securing the loyalty of a well-to-do clientele
in the Wahhabi kingdom, as well as in shopping resorts of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah. Abu Dhabi genuinely fond of the country, while safeguarding
centres, which are not under the surveillance of the set up the Abu Dhabi Tourism Authority in 2004 its natural surroundings and cultural heritage.

49
Towards a Knowledge Society

The Gulf states have been framing policies for the last twenty years to develop THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION
the most advanced sectors of the global economy. During the 2000s, most Number of accredited
Ahvaz
of the countries that have focused on this strategy have striven, in varying Basra
Khorramshahr
Yasuj Rafsanjan higher education
institutions, 2009
Abadan
degrees, to create a knowledge society by resorting to various methods. For Shiraz Kerman
18
10
Kuwait City
the time being, none has reached a sufficient level to produce scientific and 5
3
technological innovation, nor do they give cultural activities and knowledge Bushehr Jahrom
1
Jiroft
workers a predominant position in society. Nevertheless, some governments
Hafar al Batin
are making an effort to adopt development models from more advanced Bandar
Abbas Iranshahr
countries based on activities and sectors employing highly qualified man- Al Jubail
power conversant with the latest technology. The petroleum sector, which is Dammam
Manama

dependent on research and development, is the major driving force behind Ras al Khaimah
Ajman
Shabahar

this desire for change. The energy sector in the Gulf ’s Arab countries attracts Al Ahsa
Doha
Dubai Sharjah
highly qualified people who contribute to the expansion of the knowledge Buraimi
Riyadh
society by demanding sophisticated services to satisfy their professional and Abu Dhabi
Al Ain
Sohar
Muscat
personal requirements. The development of these services, the moderniza- Barka

tion of numerous activities, and the rise of new sectors are largely based on 0 100 km
Nizwa
Ibra Sur

foreign collaboration. This encourages qualified migrants from western, Arab,

Adult Net enrolment Net enrolment Government spending and Asian countries to settle in the Gulf and speeds up the creation of multi-
literacy rate in primary rate in secondary in the ��eld of education cultural management teams.
rate education (%) education (%) (in % of GDP)
Investment in education is essential for the Gulf states, where a large part
1980 2008 2005 2005 1980 2002-2006 of the population was illiterate only a few decades ago. Developing an educa-
Iran 50 82.3 95.2 76.9 7.4 n/a tion system to train the country’s elite to take charge of its future and also
40 74 87.7 37.8 2.9 n/a
provide quality education to the children of expatriates is a major challenge.
Iraq
There is a sincere effort to improve the public education system, where teach-
Kuwait 68 94.5 88 86.1 2.4 5.4
ing methods remain authoritarian and still include learning by rote. There is
Saudi Arabia 48 89 90.7 87.5 4 7.2 also an increase in the number of private schools, where commercial motives
Qatar 70 93.1 96 79 2.6 2.7 sometimes take precedence over learning. Some schools target a specific
Bahrain 72 88.8 97.1 89 2.9 4.3 clientele and follow a curriculum that is similar to the one followed in the
UAE 70 90 71 57.4 1.3 1.7 pupils’ country of origin, often in their mother tongue or in English, as in many
Indian schools. Others attract foreigners, and, increasingly, local families who
Oman 57.2 81.4 73 78 2 4
are keen on sending their children to schools employing modern teaching
From Human
From HumanDevelopment
DevelopmentReports 2009,2009,
Reports UNDPUNDP;
; UNESCO data base
UNESCO ; Education
data International
base; Education Barometer.Barometer.
International
methods through the medium of either Arabic or English. In many countries,

50
 a speedy and radical transformation

DUBAI EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
Stress on social development :
Opening of Dubai International
Academic City,
Dubai Real Estate Institute,
Dubai Aerospace University,
Dubai Education council,
Knowledge and Human
Development Authority
Dubai Strategic Plan 2006 - 2015
Development of foreign
institutes in Free Zones :
Knowledge Village, Dubai
Media City, Dubai Internet
City, Dubai International
Financial Centre, Silicon
Oasis, Health Care City
Dubai Strategic Plan 2000 - 2010
Creation
of model
Rise of
private
Development of
vocational
schooling
institutes
Development of
public schooling
Building a
modern
education
system for boys
and girls
current reforms encourage the adoption of revised
curricula, which raises the question of initial and
continuous training for teachers.
2015 At the same time, university education is going
through a serious transformation. Until the late
1950s, there were no institutions of higher learning
2010 in the region, except for Shiraz University and the
Institute of Technology in Abadan. The University
2006 of Riyadh was established in 1957, Basra University
in 1964, Kuwait University in 1966, and UAE Univer-
sity at al-Ain in 1976. Yet it is not enough to open
2000 universities to produce large numbers of graduates
1998 : Zayed University,
of a high level in all specialized disciplines, and so
Abu Dhabi, Dubai the Gulf states give scholarships to their students to
schools
pursue higher education abroad. In the mid-1990s,
the need for training and the growing demand of
trained personnel, a result of the population’s age
1990
1989 : Higher College of
structure and the spread of secondary education,
Education, Dubai led to the rapid growth of public and private insti-
tutions, even in Iran where the latter offer more
interesting curricula and give preference to courses
leading to well-paid jobs. On the Arabian coast,
1980 prestigious foreign universities and well-respected
institutes are invited and funded to set up their
1977 : 1st University,
UAEU, Al Ain own campuses or open educational institutions in
collaboration with local organizations. Some gov-
1971 : Independance
ernments have set apart dedicated zones for educa-
1970
tion like the Knowledge Village and the Academic
1969 : 1st delivered City in Dubai.
oil barrels
Because most universities were established fairly
recently, they are not in a position to conduct
high-tech industries on a firm footing: they are still
in an embryonic stage or limited to providing ser-
vices to companies. The desire to acquire the most
sophisticated technology in all areas encourages
these countries to import the most efficient systems
and fund experimental projects.
The policy aimed at building a knowledge society
also requires the building an economy of culture,
which is considered indispensable for attracting
executives, engineers, and top-level experts, and
enhancing the region’s value in the world’s eyes.
Manifestations of this policy include Doha’s Museum
of Islamic Art and the Sadiyat cultural district in Abu
Dhabi, the Royal Oman Symphony Orchestra and
the Qatar Philharmonic Orchestra, the construction
of world-class convention centres with the capacity
for hosting major events as well as the organization
of festivals and the emergence of contemporary art,
which, paradoxically, is vibrant in Iran, though Ira-
nian artists exhibit their work in Dubai.
LARGE CULTURAL INVESTMENTS
SAADIYAT CULTURAL DISTRICT
N Saadiyat
Yas
Abu
Dhabi to
dubai
Guggenheim Museum (via Yas Island)
10 km (2013)
National Museum
Louvre Museum Abu Dhabi (2013)
(2013)

Only some research. All research activities take place in public Performing Arts Center (2013)
systematic
schools specialized agencies. The Arab Gulf States also pro- to Maritime
abu dhabi Museum
1960
vide funds to research institutions abroad and facil- (via Mina)
(2013)
From Lise
From Lise Commandeur,
Commandeur, «« La
Mondialisation et
Mondialisation et Société
Société de
de la
La politique
politique éducative
la Connaissance
éducative de
Connaissance aux
aux Émirats
de Doubaï »,
Doubaï », inin B.B.Dumortier
arabes unis,
émirats arabes unis, Maghreb
Dumortier (dir.),
(dir.),
Machrek, n°
Maghreb-Machrek, n°195,
195,
itate the stay of students pursuing doctoral research Motorway
0 2 km
2008.
2008. in foreign countries in order to benefit from the Express way
Sheikh
knowledge they acquire. Finally, most important Khalifa
Cultural
district
Nature
reserve
Real estate
project
bridge
contracts contain clauses regarding transfer of tech-
nology. In spite of these efforts, it is not easy to put From
From <www.saadiyat.ae/en>.
<www.saadiyat.ae/en>.

51
The Gulf Cooperation Council

The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, commonly known as FROM STRATEGIC ALLIANCE TO ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) brings together six of the eight countries THE SIX MEMBERS OF THE COOPERATION COUNCIL FOR THE ARAB STATES OF THE GULF
bordering the Gulf: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emir-
Oil field Oil pipeline
ates, and Oman. The council’s charter states in its preamble that the founding Gas pipeline
Gas field
members, fully conscious of their special connections, their common char- Oil terminal

acteristics, and their similar systems based on the religion of Islam, seek to Tabuk
Gas terminal
Container port
establish coordination, cooperation and integration in all domains. The Gulf Refinery

A l
Cooperation Council was established in 1981 as a strategic defensive alliance Liquefaction plant
N
against Iran. Sheikh Zayed, the emir of Abu Dhabi and the president of the Western army base

H
Kuwait Kuwait City

i j
Motorway, main road
United Arab Emirates, was the principal architect of this alliance. He saw it as

A rab
a
a powerful instrument of negotiation to prevent a confrontation with Iran and

- Pe
avoid foreign intervention. The Gulf Cooperation Council was also a manifes-

rsi
R e d
Medina

N e

an
tation of the desire to strengthen a strong solidarity between the Arab states Dammam
Bahrain

d
Manama G u

j
of the Gulf within the Arab world. This solidarity was expressed, for instance, Riyadh
lf
H
Jiddah St. of or
at the diplomatic level by a common declaration supporting the claim of the Mecca
Al Ahsa Doha

muz
Qatar Dubai
United Arab Emirates to the islands of Lesser Tunb, Greater Tunb, and Abu At Taif Abu Dhabi

Gul
S e a
Saudi Arabia of
Musa, currently held by Iran. It was also expressed in the realm of humanitar-

f
Al Ain
O m an

A s
UAE
ian aid by setting up a system of common funding and in the area of secu- lH Muscat

A
aja

i r
r
rity by signing mutual defence agreements. It was under these agreements
that troops were sent to Bahrain in the spring of 2011 to quell violent protests
against the ruling dynasty by a section of the population.
Since its establishment, particularly under the influence of Kuwait, the GCC Oman
progresses towards a customs union and a common market. It is gradually
becoming a model of economic integration along the lines of the European Manama Capital city
0 to 200 m
Union, even going as far as to examine the possibility of adopting a common 200 to 500 m
Urban agglomeration
population in 2010
currency. Several common organizations that existed before the creation of 500 to 1000 m
5,000,000
Oman
Sea
the alliance were retained, particularly in the domains of the media, health, 1000 to 2000 m
2,500,000
1,000,000
and industrial development. But the Council must go further and coordinate 2000 m and more
500,000
100,000 0 200 km
plans to promote cooperation between the member states and encourage

52
 a speedy and radical transformation

Population Birth rate Death rate Total fertility rate GDP GDP Oil production Natural gas production
Area HDI
2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 per capita 2010 2010
(km²) 2010
(thousands) (‰) (‰) birth / women (million $) 2009 (thousands of b/d) (billion of m³)
Kuwait 17,818 2,795 17.6 1.9 2.1 148,023.7 36,412 0.771 2,450,370 11.69
Saudi Arabia 2,149,690 25,391 24.2 3.6 3.1 375,766.4 14,799 0.752 10,521,089 89.62
Bahrain 791 728 16.2 3.3 2.2 20,594.9 26,021 0.801 46,435 15.49
Qatar 11,000 1,409 10.7 1.8 2.2 98,313.2 69,754 0.803 1,437,224 102.79
UAE 830,600 4,598 16 1.3 2.2 230,251.9 50,070 0.815 2,812,837 75.83
Oman 212,457 2,845 21 2.6 2.8 46,114.4 17,890 0.800 877,876 31.06
Data fromWorld
Data from WorldBank,
Bank, IMF,
IMF, UNDP,
UNDP, EIA. EIA.

complementarities in order to avoid the duplication
of efforts and competition. However, crucial proj-
ects are progressing in the realm of infrastructure,
projects such as the interconnection of the elec-
tricity grid and the water supply network and the
construction of a high-speed railway line. Allowing
the free movement of citizens from one member
country to another and granting them the freedom
to invest in economic activities and acquire land
and property in any member country are essential
aspects to strengthening this integration process.
The functioning of the Gulf Cooperation Council
is dependent on several institutions. The highest
authority, known as the Supreme Council, consists
of the heads of the Member States, and its presi-
dency rotates. Resolutions on major issues must be
passed unanimously. A Dispute Settlement Com-
mission is constituted on a case by case basis if a
dispute arises. The Secretary General is assisted by
ten Assistant Secretaries General (political; eco-
nomic; security and military affairs; human rights;
environment relations with the European Union,
etc.). The Ministerial Council, which meets once
every three months, consists of the foreign affairs
ministers of Member States. It formulates poli-
cies, makes recommendations, and coordinates the
implementation of ongoing projects. The distribu-
tion of the various offices among the capitals of dif-
ferent member countries has created tensions and
discontent while the insistence that all decisions be
based on consensus often obstructs the implemen-
tation of projects. Various countries find it difficult MULTIPLE MEMBERSHIPS
to renounce even a small fraction of their sovereign
Member of OPEC
powers. There is a divergence of interests between
Member of OPAEC
Member States due to significant differences in land
area, population, and the volume of their oil and
gas reserves. The GCC countries find themselves
Iraq
at different stages of human development and of Iran
social and cultural changes, which is reflected in
their demographics. For example, the difficulties Kuwait
faced by the proposal to introduce a common cur-
rency, which Oman did not support and which Bahrain
Qatar
United Arab Emirates withdrew from midway, Saudi
arose in a large measure from the diversity of their Arabia
UAE
economies. There is disagreement on the eventual Oman
admission of Yemen to the Gulf Cooperation Coun-
cil. Finally, one of the most important problems
facing the Council is that the various countries are
members of different alliances whose objectives do Member of the G.C.C.
not always coincide, to say nothing of the need to Member of the Indian Ocean
Rim Association for Regional
make adjustments to satisfy the requirements of the Cooperation 0 500 km
Greater Arab Free Trade Area.

53
Dissimilar Territories
The State of Kuwait
A CITY-STATE
A CITY-STATE
THE CAPITAL AND THE DESERT
THE CAPITAL AND THE DESERT

Although oil was discovered as early as 1938 in south- which included a small port that gave its name to
west Kuwait (where the Burgan oilfield became the emirate. In 1899, the emir seceded from Otto-
the world’s largest after Ghawar in Saudi Arabia), man rule and signed a treaty making Kuwait a
Kuwait did not start drilling operations until 1946, British protectorate. In 1961, when Kuwait was
because of the outbreak of World War II. As one threatened by an Iraqi invasion just six days after
of the earliest countries to develop its oil indus- its independence, it survived as an independent
try in the region, Kuwait, which ranks eleventh in country thanks to its former protector and the
terms of production, eighth in terms of exports, and Arab League. In addition to economic reasons, like
fourth in terms of the size of its reserves, produces the huge debt Iraq owed Kuwait, contracted dur-
3.2 percent of the world’s oil and owns 8.5 percent ing the Iraq-Iran War (1980–88), the Iraqi invasion
Population density
of its total oil reserves. Since income from oil of August 1990 appears to be a structural element Population density
by Governorate in 2005
by Governorate
100in 2005
accounts for 62 percent of its GDP and oil consti- of the relationship between the small emirate and 10
10
1 000
100 1 000
tutes 95 percent of its exports, the emirate appears its powerful neighbor. A military intervention by a (inh/km2) 0 20 km
to be the quintessential Rentier State as, in addition coalition of thirty-four countries restored Kuwait’s (inh/km2) 0 20 km
Data from
from Population
PopulationCensus
CensusofofKuwait,
Kuwait,2005.
to the direct oil revenues, there is also indirect rent territorial integrity. But the seven months of Iraqi Data 2005.
Data from Population Census of Kuwait, 2005.

derived from interest on the 10 percent earnings
invested in funds for the benefit of future genera-
tions. Although Kuwait’s economy depends mainly
on its oil reserves with diversification confined to
oil-based industries such as refineries and the pro-
duction of chemical fertilizers, its location on the
north-western shore of the Gulf adds to its geopo-
litical importance. Dominated in turn by Mesopo-
tamia and Persia in ancient times, this land, which
changed hands frequently, became an independent
sheikhdom under a British protectorate. The latter,
however, faced stiff competition from two German
URBAN SPRAWLING TOWARDS SOUTH
occupation induced the country, which has main- URBAN SPRAWLING TOWARDS THE SOUTH
tained an Arabist and non-aligned stand for thirty
years, to reorient its diplomacy. After the Gulf War,
Arab migrants from Iraq and pro-Iraq countries like
Palestine, Syria, and Yemen became unwelcome
in Kuwait. Although the number of Egyptians liv-
ing in Kuwait is still sizeable, workers from South Kuwait City
Kuwait City
Asia now constitute a majority among the migrant Al Jahra
Al Jahra
population. Including natives and foreigners, ethnic
Arabs still account for almost 60 percent of the total Number of inhabitants
population, more than in any other country of the Number
in 2005 of inhabitants
in 2005 Hawalli
1,155,500 Hawalli
GCC, with the exception of Saudi Arabia. This demo- 1,155,500

allies, Iran and the Ottoman Empire, which con- graphic means that even though English is widely Al Ahmadi
Al Ahmadi
trolled Iraq; all were interested in Kuwait because spoken, Arabic is used more frequently than in the
350,000
350,000
200,000
it could provide them access to the sea. other Gulf states, in addition, the emirate set about 200,000

In 1756, a member of the al-Sabah family, the educating its population quite early and adopted a 0 20 km
0 20 km
reigning dynasty, ruled under the title of emir policy of “Kuwaitizing” its labour force. This early Data from Population Census of Kuwait, 2005.
over a portion of the desert with vague boundaries investment in education and healthcare was not Data from
Data from Population
PopulationCensus
CensusofofKuwait,
Kuwait,2005.
2005.

56
 dissimilar territories

AN OIL-RICH EMIRATE AT THE NORTHERN END OF THE GULF limited to Kuwait, as the Kuwaiti government also funded schools, hospitals,
47°00' E 48°00' and infrastructure in emirates lacking oil reserves. Its generosity in providing
IRAN
humanitarian and financial assistance—not only to its neighbors and Arab
countries—was one of the distinctive traits of this pioneering democracy. In
Warbah 30°00' N 2006, following the demise of Sheikh Jabar after a reign that lasted twenty-
eight years, the Kuwaiti Parliament, which is elected by universal suffrage
since 1962, voted for the deposition of the new emir and his replacement by
IRAQ A l R u datai n
Bubiyan Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah.
Madinat During the 1990s the cost of reconstruction, as well as the money assigned to
al Hareer
B ahara western troops depleted the country’s wealth. Over the following decade, the
Subiyah
explosion of oil prices, together with a highly profitable transit trade after the
Kuwait Bay
second foreign intervention in Iraq, this time mainly by the United States,
Failaka
Kuwait City enabled Kuwait, which had been trying since 2008 to normalize its relations
with its neighbor, to revive growth. The economic system started to be liberal-
ized by encouraging private initiative and facilitating foreign investments. The
country also began speculating in real estate and built superb tower housing
281 m offices and apartments. It is developing seaside resorts and nautical sports:
Min ag i sh Failaka Island in the Bay of Kuwait (occupied by the Greeks in the time of
29°00' Alexander the Great) now hosts a luxury tourist resort. A deep-water port is
U mm
G adai r
under construction on Bubiyan Island which, when connected by rail to Basra
B u r g an
and beyond, will give Iraq greater access to the sea. The deregulation of air traf-
SAUDI ARABIA
fic has seen the rise of several private airlines using Kuwait as a hub. The new
dynamic, similar to the one that drives other Gulf emirates, is not determined by
Khiran
the size of this state, which has an area of just 17,818 km2 (including the 922 km2
Waf ra
on nine islands) and three million inhabitants with 98 percent urbanization
rate. Its location between the three regional powers has left a mark on Kuwait:
0 20 km
to its south and east, it shares oil reserves with Saudi Arabia, which stretches in
a neutral zone covering 5,770 km2 that was divided between the two countries
Highest point Urban area Oil field
in 1969; to its north lies Iraq, which has claimed Kuwait as its “nineteenth prov-
Main road New town Oil pipeline
ince”; to the west is Iran, with which it has no land boundary. Although, Brit-
Bridge in project Urban project Oil terminal ish cartographers demarcated the land borders between these four countries
Airport Desert Petrochemical industry across the desert around 1920, the sea borders between them have not been
Desalination plant Agricultural area Refinery demarcated as yet. This explains the strategic importance of the two largest
islands belonging to Kuwait, Bubiyan (863 km2) and Warbah (37 km2), lying
From B. Dumortier, Géographie de l'Orient arabe, Armand Colin, 1997 (updated, 2011).
From B. Dumortier, Géographie de l'Orient arabe, Armand Colin, 1997 (updated, 2011). just a few hundred meters from the Iraqi coast. These gave rise to fierce nego-
tiations when offshore oil deposits were discovered there. The country’s divi-
sion into six governorates, which vary in size varies from just 84 to 12,130 km2,
reflects the dichotomy between the desert and the urban sprawl of the capital
where the population, business activities and services are concentrated.

57
Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province SAUDI ARABIA. AN OIL�RICH COAST ON THE GULF
THE LARGEST STATE IN THE ARAB PENINSULA
JORDAN
IRAQ 0 to 200 m
IRAN
200 to 500 m

500 to 1000 m
Saudi Arabia opens onto the Gulf with a coast stretching over 585 kilometres Tabuk KUWAIT
1000 to 2000 m
from its border with Kuwait on its west to Qatar, to which must be added the N ufud D e s e r t Kha��i
2000 m and more
Hafar al-Batin
25 kilometres between East Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. The king- Hail Safaniyah
Jubail a b

Ar
Al
-
dom’s traditional division into regions is quite typical: in the centre lies the Buraydah sa

Ah
Ras Tannurah
ij Pe r s i a n G u l f

H
Bedouin region of Nejd, the birthplace of the ruling dynasty and Wahhabi az Riyadh
Abqaiq
Dammam
reformers where the capital Riyadh is located; to the west is Hijaz, tradition- Hofuf

N
e
ally a trading area where the holy cities of Mecca and Medina and the port of j Ghawar

d
Yanbu Medina Harad UAE
Jeddah on the Red Sea are located; to the southwest lies Asir, a mountainous Jiddah
region with rainfall similar to Yemen; to the east is the province of al-Ahsa. Mecca
OMAN
Before its conquest by the al-Sauds and its unification with the Nejd in 1914, At Taif
Rub Al Khal i

R e
the Eastern Province was a part of the Ottoman Empire and its population was

A
si
d
mainly Shiʿi. This peculiarity persisted after the establishment of the kingdom

r
S e
Khamis Mushayt
of Saudi Arabia in 1932 and the transfer of the provincial capital from the oasis 3207 m

a
SUDAN
Abha Najran
of Hofuf to the coastal city of Dammam, even though sizeable internal migra- Irrigated agricultural
area
tions and the influx of foreign migrants reduced the percentage of Shiʿis in Oil ��eld
the population. In 2007, the country’s Shiʿi population numbered 3,545,644 or ERITREA
Gas ��eld
15 percent of the country’s total population. After the enactment of the law of Population of urban
YEMEN Oil pipeline

1992, which reorganized the country into thirteen provinces divided into gov- agglomeration
Disused oil pipeline
Gas pipeline
4,000,000
ernorates, al-Ahsa (or al-Hasa) became the Eastern Province (al-Sharqiyah), 2,500,000 Oil terminal
1,000,000
which is by far the country’s largest (710,000 km2 or 31.5 percent of the coun- 500,000
200,000 DJIBOUTI
Non-specialized port
Re��nery
try’s total area) and stretches for the most part across the Rub al-Khali desert. Other town ETHIOPIA
0 300 km Motorway
SOMALIA
Out of the eleven governorates in the new province, nine border the Gulf.
There have been significant changes in this region since it started operating
its enormous oilfields in 1939. The world’s largest oilfield (Ghawar) and the
largest offshore field (Safaniyah) were discovered in the 1950s. The coast with city. These three cities have now become a part of the Metropolitan Area
its saline sands and marshes dotted with fishing villages has been developed for of Dammam, the kingdom’s third largest urban agglomeration after Riyadh
drilling, exporting, and processing this black gold. Consequently, some parts (5 million) and Jeddah (4 million). Urbanization is spreading in the north
of the province are becoming urbanized and industrialized at a rapid pace. towards the coastal oasis of Qatif (130,000), a Shiʿi stronghold located about
Today, Dammam, with a population of more than one million, has become twenty kilometres from the centre of Dammam, and the peninsula of Ras Tan-
economically important, especially because it is fast joining Dhahran (200,000 nurah developed during the 1940s by Aramco, which built not only a port and
inhabitants), headquarters of the Saudi Aramco (which controls the entire oil a refinery, but also a private township, Nejma, whose mainly American staff it
industry), and al-Khobar (200,000 inhabitants), a residential and commercial offers a golf course, bowling alley, theatre, and so forth. A cosmopolitan centre

58
 dissimilar territories

LOW DENSITY IMPACT OF OIL ON SETTLEMENT A POLYCENTRIC METROPOLIS

Iraq
Iran IRAN Hafar al-Batin IRAN
Al Jubayl
Kuwait
Qatif
Dammam-
BAHRAIN Dahran-
Bahrain Al-Khobar

QATAR
Qatar
riyadh QATAR
������� UAE
�������� Hofuf
UAE Number of inhabitants
UAE
in urban area, 2004
Sudan 1,200,000

Population density 600,000

Oman
Population density by Governorate in
300,000
by Region in 2004 the Eastern Region, 2004 200,000 najran
5 10 20 50 Yemen 5 10 100 1,000

(inh/km2) 0 300 km (inh/km2) 0 200 km OMAN 0 300 km OMAN

Data from Census of Population 2004, Central Department of Statistics. Data from Census of Population 2004, Central Department of Statistics. Data from Census of Population 2004, Central Department of Statistics.
Data from Census of Population 2004, Central Department of Statistics. Data from Census of Population 2004, Central Department of Statistics. Data from Census of Population 2004, Central Department of Statistics.

today, it is home to 3,200 persons. About 100 km
to the north of Dammam, in 1975 the government
built the new city of al-Jubail (250,000 inhabitants)
complete with zoning, gardens, and wide avenues
so that the quality of life is on a par with its mod-
ern industry. This industrial complex is linked with
Yanbu, its counterpart on the shores of the Red Sea,
by a 1,100 km pipeline (Petroline). The discovery of
oil deposits at Khafji in the neutral zone that was
divided in 1965 between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
has brought industrial development to this city
(60,000 inhabitants). During the Gulf War, Khafji
(in Saudi territory) was occupied by the Iraqi army
and after severe fighting was liberated by the Coali-
tion forces at the end of January 1991.
In the interior, Hofuf ’s population accounts for
almost half the total population of 600,000 of the al-
Ahsa oasis area. This area has a traditional wealth
of immense date-palm groves, citrus orchards,
vegetables, and fodder crops to feed its sizeable
livestock (sheep, goats, cows, and dromedaries),
associated with circular fields irrigated by sprinkler
systems and with battery farms. The proximity of
Dammam (150 km), Manama (160 km), and Doha
(250 km) has given a boost to the development of
food industry, including a factory processing dates.
This ancient crossroads of caravans located near
major oil reserves has a university and is the centre
for services in this part of the province. In the des-
ert, in addition to the oil town of Abqaiq (30,000
inhabitants), there are several oases inhabited by
a few thousand people, accessible by tarmac roads
and provided with government aid for the develop-
ment of irrigated intensive agriculture.
Public investments have not overlooked the
development of a transport infrastructure. Though
there are no railways in the rest of the kingdom,
a railway has been built to transport freight from
Dammam to Riyadh via Hofuf and Harad, a gas pro-
duction centre since 1951. In 1981, a passengers’ line
via Hofuf and Abqaiq was added. While the Saudi
Railways Organization is being privatized, a 950-km
track for freight and passengers trains is planned
between al-Jubail and Jeddah via Dammam, along
with a regional coastal line from Dammam to Ras
al-Zor, which has an aluminium factory. A network
of roads and highways connects the coastal region
with the capital and with neighboring countries,
while the King Fahd Causeway between Saudi Ara-
bia and the island of Bahrain was entirely funded
by the Saudi government. The airports of Hofuf and
al-Jubail serve domestic airlines and the King Fahd
Airport in Dammam caters to both national and
international passengers. The sizeable Shiʿi popula-
tion, the dynamism of the business sector, and the
progressive attitude of the youth have impelled the
central government to pay considerable attention
to the region’s development so as to forestall sepa-
ratist claims in this area that contains a significant
part of the kingdom’s wealth.

59
The Kingdom of Bahrain

A NORTH-SOUTH CONTRAST
Bahrain, with an area of just 707 km2, is an archipelago of thirty-three islands. DENSITY URBANIZATION
Connected to Saudi Arabia since 1987 by a 26-km bridge, the eponymous island,
which is by far the largest, is home to the majority of the kingdom’s population Muharraq

(650,604 in 2001 and 1,234,571 in 2010). The capital, Manama (155,000 inhabit- Manama
Jidd Hafs
Budai
ants), is an agglomeration with a total population of 250,000 including Muhar-
raq, the country’s second largest city (65,000 inhabitants). Their location and Ali Medina Isa
Sitrah
the availability of groundwater have made these islands an important stopover
for all shipping in the Gulf from antiquity. A prosperous trading centre, Bah- Hammad
rain, called Dilmun (the ‘land of two seas’) by the Sumerians, has long been Rifa

sought after by powers desirous of controlling the region. The archipelago came
under Portuguese rule in the sixteenth century and under the Persians during
the next two centuries. From 1920 to 1971, the British established a protectorate
that allowed the al-Khalifa dynasty, which has been ruling the archipelago since
1783, to remain in power.
Since its oil reserves, which have been exploited since 1932, are practically
exhausted, Bahrain has been obliged to diversify its economy. It has thus become 0 5 km 0 5 km

a hub of international trade serving Saudi Arabia and, albeit irregularly, Iran. Population density Number of inhabitants
Bahrain is a port of entry for a variety of goods. It also exports Saudi oil thanks to by Governorate in 2001 in 2001
10 100 1,000
its refinery built in 1936, which is the oldest in the Gulf. It collaborates with Saudi 150,000
50,000
Arabia and Kuwait to produce chemical fertilizers, and has a large aluminium (inh/km2)
30,000

plant and car factories. Many companies working in the areas of logistics and
Data from
from:: <www.citypopulation.de>. Data
Data from
from:: <www.citypopulation.de>.
business consultancy have set up their head offices in the kingdom. Because of its Data <www.citypopulation.de> <www.citypopulation.de>

reputation for tolerance and its lively nightlife, Bahrain is attractive for foreigners,
people from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, as well as tourists from countries outside
the Gulf region whom it offers luxury hotels and recreational areas, which are
less expensive than those in the neighboring emirates making it a popular vaca-
tion spot. But most importantly, since the 1980s Bahrain has become the region’s
and the Arab world’s financial centre, with more than 300 financial institutions.
This is a result of the difficulties experienced by Beirut in regaining its position
after the civil war, as well as the strong policy adopted by Bahrain in 1975; it offers
substantial tax benefits and the advantage of banking secrecy to banks wanting to
establish themselves in the kingdom. These offshore banks, though not permitted
to accept deposits from the kingdom’s citizens or residents, are placed under the
supervision of the Bahrain Monetary Agency, which reinforces the fight against
money laundering. They manage government funds as well as funds belonging
to regional institutions. Bahrain is also the Arab world’s Islamic finance cen-
tre, operating in US dollars on international markets in accordance with the
financial ethics prescribed by the Quran. Since 2001, Bahrain has been the seat
of the International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM), which aims to regulate
and promote Islamic banking. Although it wanted to diversify its economy as
early as the 1970s, a radical change was ushered in only after 1999, following the
accession of Sheikh Hamad bin Issa al-Khalifa and the introduction of large-
scale reforms.

60
 dissimilar territories

The native population, constituting about 60 percent of the total population,

is made up of a Shiʿi majority and a strong Sunni minority, to which the royal
A POST-OIL ARCHIPELAGO family and the influential circles belong. After independence, efforts to establish
50°15'E 50°30' a parliamentary system of government failed due to a certain amount of discrimi-
Al Khobar
nation against the Shiʿi population. Confronted with regular demonstrations, sup-
Muharraq ported after 1979 by Khomeinist Iran, and linked after 1994 to financial difficulties,
SAUDI 26°15'N
ARABIA the government became stricter, increasing the number of arrests and accepting
Kin
gF
Manama a strategic alliance with the United States. The kingdom’s transformation into a
ah
dC
aus
ewa
constitutional monarchy in 2002 was the beginning of a democratization process.
y
It consists in a bicameral parliament with an elected lower house and a nomi-
Sitrah
nated upper house; the right to vote and to be eligible for all citizens, including
Umm
Nasar
women; regular legislative and municipal elections; a general amnesty; the abo-
Karzakkan
lition of the emergency law; and the abolition of the State Security Court that
had been in operation since 1975. But the measures aimed at improving the social
Al Malikiyah
Awali integration of different religious groups did little to reassure the Shiʿi commu-
Gulf
50°45'E of
nity. At the same time, reformists within the government did not succeed in set-
Askar
25°45'N
Bahrain Al Zallaq ting in motion a lasting transformation that, for the more progressive elements,
Hawar Islands Jebel should have include the establishment of political parties. In the spring of 2011,
Al Wasmiyah
al-Dukhan
134 m
there were violent protests and the demonstrators hardened their stance after
Jaw 26°00'
clashes with the police. After the violent repression of these demonstrations and
Amar an armed intervention by Gulf Cooperation Council troops, a state of emergency
Al Dur
was declared and the leaders of the opposition were arrested.
Bahrain’s economic policy, considered by some international bodies as one of
Al Mumattalah Rumaithah the most liberal in the region, has not given rise to any controversy. It aims to
strengthen the country’s integration both at the regional and global levels. There
is an effort to reduce the public sector—until recently government jobs were the
only employment opportunity for the native population—by training the coun-
try’s youth to make them capable of performing skilled jobs in the private sector.
While taxation is very low, there is no ceiling on investments by foreign compa-
Main road
nies in many sectors including advanced technology, services, trade, and tour-
Desert

Airport Agricultural area

ism. Expatriates have been allowed to buy property in some areas since 2002. The
Desalination plant Oil and gas field 0 10 km
settlement of the border dispute with Qatar in March 2001 by the International
Urban area in 1990 Oil pipeline
Court of Justice in the Hague, in which Bahrain was granted sovereignty over the
26°45'
Urban area in 2008 Refinery
Aluminium smelter Ship repair industry islands of Hawar, will help normalize relations between the two neighbors. It also
Locality with more Gas liquefaction plant Steel industry Highest point
opened the possibility of building a 45-kilometer marine causeway to connect the
than 1,000 inhabitants
From B. Dumortier, Géographie de l'Orient arabe, Armand Colin, 1997 (updated, 2011).
two countries, thus accentuating the territorial integration of urban agglomera-
From B. Dumortier, Géographie de l’Orient arabe, Armand Colin, 1997 (updated, 2011).
tions along the coast.

61
The Emirate of Qatar

A HIGHLY CONCENTRATED POPULATION

The Emirate of Qatar, an extremely flat peninsula spread over 11,521 km2 severely
A CONTRAST BETWEEN TWO FACADES DOHA AND THE QATARI DESERT
lacking water resources and mostly desert, earns 60 percent of its GDP from
hydrocarbons. In 1908, Lorimer estimated that its continually fluctuating popu-
lation was about 28,000 and consisted of Wahhabi tribes from central Arabia,
tribes from Oman, and local Bedouin tribes leading a nomadic life in the inte-
rior. A sedentary population of Arabic and Persian origin earned its livelihood
from fishing, pearl diving, and small-scale trading in some coastal settlements.
The decline of pearling reduced its population to 16,000 in 1949. At the time of
independence in 1971, Qatar, which refused to join the United Arab Emirates,
had a population of 122,455. According to official sources the population, mostly
Umm Salal
of foreign origin, reached 744,029 in 2004 and 824,729 in 2007. Three-quarters of Doha
Al Rayyan
this population lives in the Doha agglomeration, the capital city.
Economic and demographic growth made a slow start in 1949 when drilling
operations began in the Dukhan oilfield (producing 350,000 barrels per day in Al Wakra
2007) on the west coast of the peninsula, an area that still accounts for more than
one-third of the national oil production. After 1960, seven offshore oilfields (pro-
ducing 607,000 barrels per day in 2007), including al-Bunduq that is shared equally Density of population
Number of inhabitants
in 2004
with Abu Dhabi, were discovered in the eastern part of Qatar. Idd al-Shargi, May- in 2004, by Zone
350,000
10 100 1,000 250,000
dan Mahzam, and Bul Hanin were discovered by Shell, which held the drilling
concession for the entire continental shelf from 1952 to 1974 when oil and gas 0 20 km (inhab./km2) 0 20 km
25,000

resources were nationalized. Their production, which peaked in 1972 and then
Data from
fromPlanning
PlanningCouncil,
Council,Qatar. Data
Datafrom
from<www.citypopulation.de>.
declined, is replaced by the that of the al-Khaleej oilfield near the terminal on al- Data Qatar. <www.citypopulation.de>

Halul Island, of al-Shaheen, which is expected to become the country’s largest oil-
field, and of al-Rayyan at the edge of the world’s largest gas reserves discovered in
1971. Nearly two-thirds of the immense dome of natural gas that Qatar shares with
Iran are located in its territorial waters. Qatar now holds the world’s third largest
gas reserves. The production started in 1989, tripled between 1995 and 2005, and
was planned to increase six times between 2005 and 2012.
An inexorable dynamic now drives the emirate towards a more complex society
and economy. Independence did not bring any spectacular changes since those
who were then in power were reluctant to disturb old values and lifestyles. During
the 1970s, Doha, the only real city in the country, witnessed the rise of impres-
sive towers, which did not show any boldness in architectural design. In spite
of encouragement from western companies to launch large-scale projects, the
government has been contented with expanding the existing port infrastruc-
ture. Heavy industries, mostly oil-related, built in collaboration with powerful
foreign companies, generally as turnkey projects, are concentrated 36 km to
the south of Doha Bay, near the Umm Said oil terminal, where the Mesaieed
Industrial City (population 15,000) consisting of planned business and residen-
tial zones has come up. Located close to the country’s first oilfield, Dukhan is
directly linked with the oil installations and Umm Bab to a huge cement fac-
tory, while the industrial city of Ras Laffan, an energy hub under expansion
situated 80 km to the northwest of Doha was built ex nihilo.

62
 dissimilar territories

A GAS�RICH PENINSULA In the northwest, the development of agriculture is being developed thanks to
51°00'E 51°30' 52°00'
300 artesian wells on 28,000 hectares of sandy-loamy soil. Thus Qatar, where the
Gulf
of Bahrain cultivable area is limited to 5.7 percent of its territory and agriculture accounts for
Madinat Ash Shamal only 0.1 percent of its GDP, manages to produce half its requirement of vegetables.
Though al-Zubarah, once an invincible fortress, was abandoned in 1937, small
Fuwairit
26°30' N
oases and coastal villages have survived. A local administrative centre, Medinat
Ras La�fan al-Shamal (‘City of the North’), with a population of 3,000, is located near Ruwais,
which was once an active port. In the southwest, al-Kiranah, on the highway from
Al Ghuwayriyah
Doha to the Saudi border, was disputed until 2001; it is the principal settlement in
this part of the country with a population of 1,000. The rise to power of a new gen-
Al Dhakira
Hawar eration has brought about a turn in Qatar’s development policy. The transition,
Islands
Al Khor which is taking place earlier than in other monarchies of the Gulf, is the result of a
Al Jumailyah palace revolution within the al-Thani dynasty that has ruled Qatar since 1867, the
country being controlled earlier by the ruling al-Khalifa dynasty of Bahrain. Sheikh
25°30' Khalifa bin Hamad Al-Thani, who dethroned his cousin in 1972, was deposed in
Umm
Al Khisah
1995 by one of his sons, Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani. The latter set the country on
Salal
Dukhan
Mohammed
the road to modernization and, in 1999, organized the first vote in the country, to
Ash Shahaniyah
elect the Doha Municipal Council. While worksites and prestigious operations
Doha
Al Rayyan increased and tourism was developed in the old pearling port of al-Khor (20,000
Rawdat Rasid
Umm Bab
Oil ��eld
inhabitants), the Education City built near the capital hosts numerous institu-
Abu Nakhlah
Al Wukair
Al Wakrah
Gas ��eld
tions of higher education. Qatar nurses the ambition of becoming not only an
educational and cultural centre (with the Museum of Islamic Art, the National
Oil pipeline
Museum, and a symphony orchestra, but also a diplomatic and media hub. The
Gas pipeline
Mesaieed
Arab world’s most popular satellite news channel was set up and is financed by
Umm Said
Oil terminal
Sheikh Al-Thani, who has abolished censorship and shut down the Ministry of
Al Kharrara
Salwa
Gas terminal Information. Al-Jazeera, run by a cosmopolitan team, shuns all taboos and broad-
Bay Steel industry casts debates on sensitive topics in Arabic from Doha since 1995, and in English
Major
agglomeration
Cement
factory
from Kuala Lumpur since 2006. This channel has given an aura of openness to the
Qurayn Abu Town from 5,000
to 25,000 inh. Aluminium dynasty and enhanced Qatar’s international repute, which far exceeds its military
al Baul
Highest
point 103 m
Place from 1,000
to 5,000 inh.
Petrochemical
industry
strength. Keen on playing mediator in conflicts involving Arab countries, Qatar
Road Desert Re��nery
has created facilities to host international conferences. As a symbol of its posi-
Harbor Industrial area
Liquefaction tion among the Gulf states, it has included among its numerous projects the con-
plant
0 10 km
24°30'
Desalination struction of two bridges, one leading towards Bahrain and the other towards the
Airport Agricultural area plant
United Arab Emirates, with which it had a common border until the exchange of
From B. Dumortier, Géographie de l'Orient arabe, Armand Colin, 1997 (updated, 2011).
From B. Dumortier, Géographie de l’Orient arabe, Armand Colin, 1997 (updated, 2011). territories between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in 1992.

63
The Federation of the United Arab Emirates
COMPLEX INTERNAL BORDERS
IRAN f Hormuz
Strait o

I R
Greater Tunb

A
Lesser Tunb OMAN

N
Except for the emirate of Fujairah, which opens on the Gulf of Oman, and Shar- Ara
b-Per Abu Musa Ras
sian Gulf
jah, which benefits from two coastlines, the other emirates that constitute the Ras al Khaimah
Musandam

United Arab Emirates range along the Gulf. These shores, which find mention

Gul
Umm al Quwain
Ajman
in the works of ancient geographers, are known in modern Europe as the Pearl Sharjah

f o
Dubai Fujairah
Coast. In the sixteenth century, the Portuguese, fighting with the Ottomans and QATAR

f
the Arab inhabitants of the harbors along the coast, became established in the

Om
Gulf area. In the eighteenth century, the British tried to impose their monopoly

an
Abu Dhabi Madha
on the region’s sea trade, but the Qawassim who controlled the area around
Buraimi
Hormuz resisted and defied them in their dhows against the ships of the Brit- Al Ain
Federal capital city
ish East India Company; thus the region came to be known as the Pirate Coast. Emirate capital city

SAUD
Through naval expeditions and negotiations, the British were able to protect the Abu Dhabi
Ajman
trade route to India and establish their supremacy over other European pow-

I
Tropic of Cancer
Dubai
ers. After 1820, they concluded truces with local chiefs, leading to the Treaty of Fujairah
Ras al Khaimah

AR
Peace in Perpetuity in 1853 and to exclusive agreements with the sheikhdoms in

N
Sharjah

A
A
IA M
O
1892. The so-called Pirate Coast thus became a British protectorate named the

B
Umm al Quwain
Ajman/Oman
Trucial States. In 1968, the British recommended the federal model, which had Former border
0 25 50 75 km Fujairah/Sharjah
Disputed Island
been experimented with for the decolonization of Malaysia. In 1971, indepen-
FromB.B.Dumortier,
From Dumortier,in in P. Picouet,
P. Picouet, J.P. Renard,
J.P. Renard, Les Frontières
Les Frontières mondiales,
mondiales, Nantes, Nantes, Le2007.
Le Temps, Temps, 2007.
dence was proclaimed and Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain,
Fujairah, and Ras al-Khaimah formed a federation known as the United Arab
Emirates (Bahrain and Qatar refused to join).
Oil production started in the 1960s and the strategic role of the Strait of Hor- AATREMENDOUS
TREMENDOUSDEMOGRAPHIC
DEMOGRAPHIC IMBALANCEDPOPULATION
IMBALANCED POPULATION
muz gave a critical importance to internal and external borders of the federa- GROWTH
GROWTH PYRAMID
PYRAMID
millionofofinhabitants
million inhabitants Population2007
Population 2007(in(inthousands)
thousands)
tion. Like the concept of the nation-state, the concept of borders is unfamiliar 4.54.5
8080
andand++
in these arid lands dominated by tribal societies. Traditionally, space is not con- 44 Men
Men 75-79
75-79
70-74
70-74
Women
Women

ceived in terms of territories bounded by imaginary lines, but in terms of chang- 3.53.5 65-69
65-69
60-64
60-64
33 55-59
ing itineraries determined by the location of pastures around watering places 55-59
50-54
50-54
2.52.5 45-49
45-49
or routes connecting harbors and oases. The power enjoyed by the sheikhs was 22
40-44
40-44
35-39
35-39
based more on genealogy than on geography. In 1992, the emir of Abu Dhabi, 1.51.5
30-34
30-34
25-29
25-29
20-24
20-24
keen to resolve the dispute with his powerful neighbor, agreed to an exchange of 1 1 15-19
15-19
10-14
10-14
0.50.5
territory and gave the Saudis a small opening on the Gulf between the Qatar 00
5-95-9
0-40-4
Peninsula and the United Arab Emirates. It was only in 2003 that the border dis- 1970 1975
1970 1975 1980
1980 19851985 1990
1990 1995
1995 2000
2000 2005
2005 2010
2010 600 500
600 500 400 400 300
300 200200 100100 0 0 0 0 100100 200
200
Data from Census and o���cial survey. Source : U.S Census bureau, International Data Base.
putes with Oman were resolved. The latter owns Madha, a small territory sur- Data from Census and o���cial survey.
Data from Census and official survey.
Source : U.S Census bureau, International Data Base.
Source: U.S. Census bureau, International Data Base.
rounded by the Emirate of Sharjah and the exclave of Ras Musandam, a peninsula

64
 dissimilar territories

overlooking the western shore of the Strait of Hor-

Oil production
muz. The demarcation of the border in the group of Area Population 2006 GDP 2006 GDP/inh.
2008
Oil reserves
oases historically known as the Buraimi Oasis gave number of million billion
km 2 % % % euro barrels/day % %
rise to a long dispute punctuated by skirmishes. The inhabitants of euro barrels
dispute was finally resolved by allowing Buraimi to Abu Dhabi 67,340 86.67 1,427,000 33.82 68,257 54.64 47,833 2,524,626 88.7 92.2 94.27
remain in Oman and al-Ain in Abu Dhabi. The mar- Dubai 3,885 5.00 1,366,000 32.37 38,647 30.94 28,292 240,000 8.4 4 4.10
itime borders with Iran continue to be a source of Sharjah 2,590 3.33 821,000 19.45 12,084 9.67 14,719 65,000 2.3 1.5 1.53
permanent tension and the United Arab Emirates Ajman 259 0.33 212,000 5.02 1,584 1.27 7,470 – 0 – 0
has denounced the occupation by Iran of the three Umm al Quwain 777 1.00 50,000 1.18 509 0.41 10,176 – 0 – 0
strategic islands of Lesser Tunb, Greater Tunb, and R as al Khaimah 1,684 2.17 214,000 5.07 2,379 1.90 11,117 15,000 0.6 0.1 0.10
Abu Musa. Finally, the legacy of an economy based
Fujairah 1,165 1.50 130,000 3.08 1,464 1.17 11,265 – 0 – 0
since ancient times on the complementarity between
Total 77,000 100 4,220,000 100 124,925 100 29,603 2,844,626 100 97.8 100
the coast, the desert, and the oases at the foothills
explains the complexity of internal borders and the
land’s excessive fragmentation into non-contiguous
tre in 2008) to the sparsely populated Abu Dhabi 121). All unlisted subjects are the responsibility of
territories, enclaves, and jointly administered zones.
(22 persons per square kilometre). With a Bedouin each individual member state (Articles 116 and 122).
The seven emirates belonging to the Federa-
and agro-pastoral tradition, Abu Dhabi is not only The Supreme Council of the Union, composed of the
tion, four of which have no oil and gas reserves, are
the largest but also the most populated and the most emirs of the seven emirates, is presided by the emir
demographically and economically unequal. The
powerful emirate, thanks to its huge oil resources. of Abu Dhabi, while the emir of Dubai is its vice pres-
disparities in population density are due essentially
With a tradition of trade and seafaring, Dubai is the ident. It combines legislative and executive powers.
to the differences in area ranging from the densely
second largest emirate in terms of land area, popu- The Federal National Council, an advisory body, con-
populated Ajman (865 persons per square kilome-
lation, income, and influence; the income from oil sists of 40 members drawn from the emirates in pro-
A COASTAL METROPOLIZATION
accounts for no more than 8 percent of its GDP. portion to their respective populations. Since 2006,
Since their independence all the emirates have half the members are elected by a college of 6,689
Ras al Khaimah
Number of inhabitants
in 2006 Umm al Quwain
recorded a spectacular population and economic electors chosen by the rulers. Over the years, the
1,355,000 Ajman growth as well as rapid urbanization. The Federation principle of integration has taken precedence over
Sharjah had a population of 7 million in 2011. In this state the centrifugal tendencies visible in the early years.
Dubai
600,000
where four out of five residents are foreigners (the A wise and respected leader, Sheikh Zayed Bin Sul-
350,000 Khor
Fakkan result of migratory dynamics peculiar to the Gulf ’s tan al-Nahyan, Emir of Abu Dhabi since 1966 and the
100,000 Arabian coast), the population is characterized by Federation’s President from 1971 until his demise in
30,000
an uneven gender ratio (67.6 percent males) and a 2004, modernized his country while remaining faith-
Fujairah predominantly young population (52.9 percent aged ful to the ancestral values of consultation (shura) and
Abu Dhabi between 20 and 39). consensus (ijma), as well as the practices of direct
The government functions under a provisional democracy, by preserving the institution of pub-
constitution drafted in 1971 and formally adopted in lic audiences (majlis). The numerous institutional
Al Ain 1996, the year Abu Dhabi officially became the fed- adjustments since 2000 and the framing of the new
0 25 50 75 100 km eral capital. The Federation’s jurisdiction covering strategy for federal governance made public in 2007
foreign affairs, defence, security, issues of national- raise the issue of harmonizing the laws enacted by
Data from <www.citypopulation.de>.
Data from <www.citypopulation.de> ity, and migration is clearly defined (Articles 120 and various emirates and their systems of governance.

65
The Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai

At the end of the eighteenth century, the Bani Yas tribe migrated from the Liwa ABU DHABI, AN OIL-RICH DESERT LAND
Oasis to the coast. The al-Bu Falah sub-section of the tribe settled in Abu Dhabi TOWARDS POST-OIL ECONOMY
under the leadership of the al-Nahyan family while the al-Bu Falasah led by the
al-Makhtum family settled in Dubai. At present, these two emirates, one with Urban agglomeration
(500,000 to 1 million)
vast oil reserves and the other a trading community, one fabulously rich and Middle town
(10,000 to 30,000 inh.)
Dubai
the other heavily in debt, differ from each other because of their economic poli- Small town
(5,000 to 10,000 inh.)
Das Island
Taweelah
cies: Abu Dhabi has a regulated economy, while Dubai is ultra-liberal. Although Other locality
International airport
Zirku

the focus of media attention on Dubai has cast Abu Dhabi into the shadows, Mina ZayedUmm
al Nar
Al Rahba
Delma Mubarraz
the latter, which loaned US$ 5 billion to Dubai, has changed direction since the Sweihan Al Ain
Abu Dhabi
mid-2000s. Jebel Dhana
Sir Bani Yas
Al Wafia Remah
Mirfa
The Emirate of Abu Dhabi draws its strength from its oil and gas, but in 2009 its Sila Shuwaihat
Ruwais
Tarif Abu Dhabi
Sharqiyah
contribution to the emirate’s GDP dropped to less than 50 percent as a result of Region
(Eastern
Ghayathi Habshan
the development of other sectors. Construction and real estate are now key sec- Region)
Al Wagan OMAN
tors in Abu Dhabi’s economy. In the capital, business and conference tourism, as Madinat Zayed

well as sports tourism have profited by the increase in the number of hotel rooms Gharbiyah (Western Region)

and other facilities. It is hoped that the ongoing construction of museums on Oil field
L i w a
Main agricultural
area
Sadiyat Island will promote international cultural tourism. The development of Oil terminal
Mizaira
Sparse agricultural
area
tourism facilities in Sir Bani Yas, an island sanctuary famous for local fauna, shows Refinery
Liquefaction plant
Arada
Hamim Tourist place

that the government is keen on promoting new tourist destinations. Another Container port Emirate border
SAUDI ARABIA 0 50 km Regional border
notable development is the construction of a luxury tourist complex in the desert Desalination plant

around the Liwa Oasis; al-Ain has been made more attractive for tourists by hold-
ing a music festival there. Although the country’s oases, now increasingly visited
by tourists, still retain their productive function, agriculture now has a marginal
role in the economy as compared to industry. Established in 2004, ZonesCorp is
developing the manufacturing sector by creating special economic zones, some in
Mussafah, located thirty kilometres from the centre of Abu Dhabi, and others in
al-Ain. Near the newly open Khalifa port, an industrial zone is under construction
at Taweelah between Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Finally, Ruwais is a huge complex of
oil-related industries.
Under a planning policy, the emirate has been divided into three regions to
counterbalance the excessive development of the coastal region. This develop-
ment program is a part of the plan outlined in Vision 2030. This road map for
economic diversification (published in 2006) is meant to coordinate the actions
of various actors in the field of development and banks on the development
of knowledge industries to reduce its dependence on oil. The emirate wants
to satisfy 7 percent of its energy requirements through the development of
renewable energy by 2020. Near the international airport, Masdar, planned
for 40,000 residents and 50,000 commuters working in 1,500 companies in the
clean energy sector, is a key element of this scheme. However, this eco-city,
which gets its electricity from a photovoltaic power plant and recycles its waste
water, has had to settle for less utopian goals than those announced in its initial
slogan: “Zero carbon, zero waste.” Though the project is running behind sched-
ule, it has not been cancelled. Similarly, successful lobbying by Abu Dhabi to
house the headquarters of IRENA (International Renewable Energy Agency)
is symbolic of the role this oil emirate wants to play in the development of

66
 dissimilar territories

PLANNING AHEAD: ENERGY FOR THE FUTURE alities of Sheikh Zayed and Sheikh Rashid, the first dence and flaunts its success. Although it now has
MASDAR CITY, ABU DHABI emblematic rulers of the two emirates and pillars of to compete more and more with Abu Dhabi, Dubai
the Federation at the time of its creation, but also retains its predominance in the domain of trade and
N Motorway
Other road
and essentially it is a result of the vast difference in its role as a financial hub, thanks to Dubai Interna-
PRT their oil revenues. tional Finance Centre (DIFC).
(Personal Rapid
Transit system) Alternately acclaimed and discredited, Dubai has
Photovoltaic
power station indisputably played a pioneering role in the region. CREATING A FINANCIAL HUB
It had sufficient oil revenues to finance top quality DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE
infrastructure but not enough to depend on them
indefinitely; so it was compelled to diversify quite Emirates Towers N
early. It did this by showing a rare open-mindedness
and an enterprising spirit bolstered by the existence
of a bourgeoisie well-versed in the trade of precious
commodities (pearls, gold, and spices) and in outfit-
ting ships. The Jebel Ali port, considered unrealistic
at the time, was commissioned as early as 1979; the Emirates
free zone adjoining it, which continues to expand, Towers
Station
was set up in 1985; the World Trade Centre was con-
structed in 1978. The Emirates Airways, in competi- Gate District Gate Village
tion with Abu Dhabi’s Etihad Airways since 2003,
inaugurated its first flights in 1985. While Kuwait
0 500 m
called upon Kenzo Tange and Écochard, Georges
Candilis was entrusted with the project of building
Residential University Car park
the Deira coastal road of Dubai in the mid-1970s, at a
Commercial Technological park
Special Economic
Park
time when signature projects were not yet in vogue
Hotels, leisure
Zone
Masdar limits
in the Gulf. Today Abu Dhabi has called upon Frank
Source
Source:: Masdar.
Masdar. Gerhy, Jean Nouvel, Zaha Hadid, Tadao Ando, and Al Fattan
Currency House
Norman Foster to build its museums. Dubai then Head office
0 100 m
future energy sources. Abu Dhabi, prudent, wise threw itself into a race for gigantism, building the Bank

and conservative in its outlook, has often been com- world’s largest mall and highest tower. Similarly, it Finance Hotel, restaurant DIFC

pared to Dubai, which is visionary, adventurous, and launched a publicity blitz to draw attention to its Fashion DIFC administration Built area

Park
innovative. This contrast, though subject to certain indoor ski track and its artificial islands. The real Jewellery Airline company
Road
Fine art Monetary authority
reservations, is not only a result of the differences in estate and bank crises in 2008 brought back to real- Metro

their historical evolution and the dissimilar person- ity the emirate that jealously guards its indepen- From DIFC,
From DIFC, Secure
Secure and
and fieldwork.
Fieldwork.

67
The Emirates of Ajman and Sharjah

The city and the emirate of Ajman were settled around 1775, and owe their ori- TWO FRAGMENTED EMIRATES
gin to the settlement of some North Omani tribes led by the al-Nuaimis, whose A MAIN TERRITORY HOSTING THE CAPITAL CITY
descendants now rule a tiny emirate divided into three parts that occupies only
0.33 percent of the total area of the United Arab Emirates. The first part, stretch- Arab-Persian Gulf
ing over 200 km2 and constituting more than two-thirds of the emirate’s area, is
surrounded on three sides by the emirate of Sharjah; it constitutes a semi-enclave
because one of its sides opens on the Arabo-Persian Gulf. This portion, which is
mostly urbanized, is occupied by the city of Ajman, the emirate’s capital. Its tra-
ditional economy was based on activities linked with the sea. After the decline
of pearling, Ajman, which has no oil, remained a fishing harbor and maintained
one of the region’s last shipbuilding yards. After the late 1980s, taking advantage
of its proximity to Dubai and the redistribution of income through the federal
budget, Ajman acquired the tools it needed for its development: the moderniza- IMBRICATED ENCLAVES
tion of its harbor, the development of industrial zones, the establishment of a masfout (Ajman) manama (Ajman)
free zone in 1988, and the establishment (during the same year) of the Ajman
University of Science and Technology. The city, whose economy is diversifying,
is now part of a coastal conurbation dominated by Dubai, though Ajman looks Hatta

like a poor relation because most of its growth has been achieved at a very low Hadf

cost as compared to its neighbors. The municipality, which plays a major role in dibba al hisn (Sharjah) central region (Sharjah)
the city’s economic policy, is striving to attract more investments and tourists Kalba
to this city, which had a population of 237,000 in 2010. Finally, even though the Dibba al Baya
Gulf Gulf
search for oil has proved unsuccessful, a gas deposit was discovered offshore, of Oman of Oman
though production has yet to start. Dibba al Fujairah

Manama, located 73 kilometres to the capital’s east, covers an area of 26 km2. khor fakkan (Sharjah) nahwa (Sharjah)
This enclave of Ajman, surrounded by the emirates of Sharjah and Fujairah, con-
sists of a small, primarily agricultural oasis containing quarries and mines (mag-
Gulf Madha Khor Fakkan Gulf
nesium and chromium). Masfut, located in a mountainous region 110 kilometres Madha of Oman of Oman
to the southeast of Ajman city, consists of a small town providing basic services
and valleys sustained by subsistence farming and marble quarrying. The territory, kalba (Sharjah)
stretching over 46 km2, is an international enclave bordering Oman, a condomin- Ajman
Umm
al Quwain
Oman
ium jointly ruled by Ajman and Oman and an intra-national enclave surrounded Sharjah
Ras International
Gulf al Khaimah border
by the emirates of Ras al-Khaimah and Dubai. This geopolitical curiosity is a leg- of Oman Ajman/ Internal
Dubai
acy of traditional economies and societies in the complex territorial structure of Oman
Fujairah/
border
Mixed
Ajman, a characteristic shared by the emirate of Sharjah. Fujairah
Sharjah border

68
 dissimilar territories

DEVELOPING CULTURAL AMBITION BUILDING AN ACADEMIC HUB

SHARJAH HERITAGE & ARTS AREAS SHARJAH UNIVERSITY CITY

Sharjah Creek Built area

N

Corni Park
Majlis che R
o ad Gulf
Al Midfaa
Bait Khalid Unbuilt area Study Centre
Al Marraija Road

Al Burj Avenue
Al Eslah Very
bin Ibrahim Old Souq
Heritage School museum Special
Museum Arts Centre Arts Bait Obeid
Bait Al Shamsi Museum of
Arts N
Al Naboodah Square Islamic Civilization American University
Calligraphy Sharjah Arts Museum
Music Poetry

Gulf Road
Museum House
House Built area of
Al Hisn
(Sharjah Fort) Protected heritage
Institute area
of Theatrical Arts Sharjah
Bait Cultural area
al Gharbi
Park
d
0 200 m uba Roa Wall
Al Aro Police
From Sharjah
SharjahMuseums
MuseumsDepartment, Sharjah Department of Culture and Information and SCDTA.
From Department, Sharjah Department of Culture and Information and SCDTA.
Academy College
ofTeaching
Hospital
Sharjah, which was founded by the powerful seafar- of Dibba is shared by Oman, Fujairah, and Sharjah, Medicine
ing tribe of Qawassim, declared itself an indepen- which administers its central portion, Dibba al-Hisn.
dent emirate in 1727. The al-Qasimi (pl.: Qawassim) In the middle of this coast is Khor Fakkan (50,000 (Womens
dynasty still rules the emirate. In 2010, the popu- inhabitants.), a tourist destination surrounded by College)

lation of the agglomeration of Sharjah, a part of mountains and bordered by beaches with excellent University
the urbanized Dubai-Sharjah-Ajman coastal strip, sites for diving. It is also the principal port on the Higher
Skyline
accounts for 800,000 of the emirate’s total popula- east coast of the Emirates. To the south lies Kalba, University
Colleges
of Technology
tion of 946,000. The emirate is made up of six parts. an independent emirate between 1903 and 1952, of
The main part, where the emirate’s eponymous declared a nature reserve because of its mangrove (Mens
capital is located, opens onto the Arabo-Persian swamp and its avifauna. The Central Region, also a College)
Gulf. It is a residential zone housing commuters, part of the emirate of Sharjah, located 50 kilome- Sharjah
who travel back-and-forth daily between Sharjah tres from the capital, is a fertile plain whose most Public Library
and Dubai, in addition to industrial zones housing important area is the Dhaid Oasis (36,000 inhabit-
manufacturing industries. To fulfil its cultural and ants), where a wide range of specialized cash crops, University
intellectual ambitions, Sharjah has created a heri- including strawberries, are grown. Finally, Sharjah City Hall
tage district and an art district where museums and also has a mountain village by the name of Nahwa
art galleries are concentrated, as well as a univer- (with an area of 8 km2), which owes its fame to Institute Australian
English Institute of
sity district with national and foreign educational its unique status as a counter-enclave. By its area, School of Nursing Technology
School 0 500 m

institutions. Sharjah also has, within a range of 120 population and revenue, Sharjah, taken as a whole, From Government of Sharjah.
From Government of Sharjah.
to 150 kilometres from the capital, three territories is the third largest emirate of the Federation.
overlooking the Indian Ocean. In the north, the city

69
The Northern Emirates

DESERT, MOUNTAINS AND SEA

THE EMIRATES OF UMM AL�QUWAIN, RAS AL KHAIMAH AND FUJAIRAH
The Emirates of Umm al-Quwain, Ras al-Khaimah, and Fujairah are grouped
together under the name Northern Emirates. This part of the Federation also International
Agricultural area
Al Jiri musandam N
border Sha'am
includes areas belonging to Dubai (Hatta), Ajman (Masfut and Manama), and Motorway Industrial area Ghalilah Jebel Bil Aysh
Khor
Sharjah (Khor Fakkan, Kalba, Dhaid and its surroundings, and one part of

S
Main road Touristic area
Khwair 1 934 m
Dibba). Crossed by the northern end of the Hajar Mountains, this area overlooks Airport
Tourism
development

N
the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. With almost no oil deposits, it is nevertheless Container
Natural spring
port SULTANATE
rich in limestone, kaolin, and quartz, minerals like iron, copper, and gold; it also Urban area
Nature conservation Ras al
Dhayah
OF OMAN

I
area Khaimah
has mineral and hot water springs. Village Re��nery
Shimal

The only exception to the description above is Umm al-Quwain. Consisting of

A
Camel
Museum
racetrack
a single stretch bordering only the Arabo-Persian Gulf, it is a completely barren
Arab-

T
land and the least populated and poorest emirate of the Federation. This tiny bit Persian Al Hamra
Falayah
Gulf
of land without oil or gas is ensconced between the northern territories and the Gulf of Oman

N
conurbation Dubai-Sharjah-Ajman, which may include, in the future, the town of Digdagga
Umm
Umm al-Quwain (46,000 inhabitants) situated only about 30 km from Dubai but al Quwain Dibba

U
more than 60 km from Ras al-Khaimah. The site of the capital has been inhabited Khatt

from ancient times, but the present city, in which more than 90 percent of the

O
Rul Dadnah

emirate’s population is concentrated, was founded at the tip of the peninsula, Dadnah

which blocks the lagoon on the west, around 1775 by the al-Mu’alla family, from Aqqa

M
whom the present emir is descended. The emirate, which has a small free zone Sharm

and a tourist complex, depends on fishing and date production in addition to sub- Bidiyah

sidies from the federal budget. Wadi

Wurrayah
To the north of Umm al-Quwain is the emirate of Ras al-Khaimah, which joined Khor
Fakkan
the Federation three months after the others. It consists of two separate territo- Manama Masa��
Qidfa
ries with no opening on the Gulf of Oman. Situated close to the Strait of Hormuz Nahwa
OMAN

R
and overlooking the Arabo-Persian Gulf, it has coasts and mountains, barren and Al Dhaid Murbah

green areas, agriculture and industry. It presents a diversity of landscapes not

A
seen in the rest of the federation: long sandy beaches and rocky coasts punctu- Mangrove
Fujairah
ated by creeks; arid stretches of dunes and mountains with ample rainfall; steep- Highest point

J
sided valleys with orchards and palm groves and fertile recently irrigated plains Altitude (metres)
producing fruits, vegetables, and fodder in the vicinity of traditional oases. This

A
0 400 800 1200 1600

diversity of landscapes is accompanied by an ethnographic diversity of which 0 10 km

Kalba

H
the inhabitants are very proud. Ras al-Khaimah is the fourth largest emirate of Khor Kalba
Main source : Map Services of the Emirate of Ras Al Khaimah.
the Federation on account of its size, its population, and its revenue. Although it Main source: Map Services of the Emirate of Ras Al Khaimah.

70
 dissimilar territories

has minuscule oil deposits, it has been growing at a rapid pace, as it has taken
measures to encourage local private initiative and attract foreign investment. It RAS AL-KHAIMAH CITY CENTRE
THE CAPITAL OF A RAPIDLY GROWING EMIRATE
thus hopes to resurrect its former position as a prosperous trading centre; it was
known as Julphar from the seventh to the seventeenth century and described by Urban area
geographers and voyagers as one of the region’s principal ports. Urban area
under construction
The port, which was originally located to the north of the present capital, was Port area
moved towards the Ras al-Khaimah lagoon, undoubtedly because it became Free zone
silted up. Ras al-Khaimah was an important seafaring power whose history, like Agricultural area Maritime
that of Sharjah’s, was linked to the Qawassim, a Sunni Arab tribe living on the Park
Museum

Iranian coast that settled in Ras al-Khaimah in the early eighteenth century. Mangrove
With a fleet of dhows at its command, this naval and trading power valiantly National Julfar Towers
resisted Britain’s imperial designs. As a British protectorate, Ras al-Khaimah, Museum
N
whose economy depended on agriculture and fishing, experienced a period of
decline as it was supplanted by Dubai. Since its independence, it has harnessed
its water resources to develop the cultivation of cash crops and set up a ther-
mal spa in Khatt and a mineral-water bottling plant in Masafi, the latter is now
diversifying into the production of fruit juices and milk products. Thanks to its
Tower Links
mineral resources, it has set up an industry manufacturing building materials Golf Club
(cement, tile, glass, and steel) that has benefited from the explosion of the real
estate sector in the entire region. Ras al-Khaimah has also put its hopes in the
pharmaceutical industry.
The capital (265,000 inhabitants in 2010) accounts for 90 percent of the emir-
ate’s population. Keen to develop its service and finance sectors, it has begun
to vaguely resemble Dubai with its free zone spread over several sites, its tech-
nopark, its twin towers where foreigners are allowed to buy office space and
residential apartments and its tourist complex built on an artificial island. The International hotel Falayah
Shopping mall
proposed green Gateway City is expected to compete with Masdar. Cultural place

Adjoining Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah, with which it shares Dibba in the north Iconic tower
Municipality
and jointly administers a small enclave in the south, the Emirate of Fujairah con- Emiri Diwan
Chamber of Commerce 0 1 km
sists of two mountainous territories washed by the Indian Ocean, which receive
From Map Services of the Emirate of Ras Al Khaimah.
more rainfall than the rest of the country and are separated by Khor Fakkan, From Map Services of the Emirate of Ras Al Khaimah.

which belongs to Sharjah. The sheikh of Fujairah once owed allegiance to the
emir of Sharjah, but freed himself of his domination in 1902, long before Fujairah
became an independent emirate of the Trucial States, in 1952. The only emirate
without an opening on the Arabo-Persian Gulf, Fujairah is of crucial interest to
the Federation, which finances most of its infrastructure because of its strategic
location. During the 1980s and 1990s, a highway was built across the mountains
to open up its capital (80,000 inhabitants), deep-water port, and international
airport. A military base was opened recently and there is a proposal to build a
railway line between Fujairah and Jebel Ali to transport freight; an oil pipeline
from the oilfield of Habshan in Abu Dhabi to the port of Fujairah is already under
construction. Finally, superb landscapes, ideal sites for diving, and picturesque
valleys are great assets for the development of tourism, provided care is taken
not to spoil the landscape and harm the ecosystem.

71
North Oman
BETWEEN GULF AND INDIAN OCEAN
SEA, MOUNTAINS AND DESERT
f
it o

Ho
Situated on the south-eastern tip of the Arabian Peninsula at the junction of Arab- Khasab

rm
Sebkha

a
IRAN

Str

uz
Persian
eastern Arabia, making it similar to the Gulf emirates, and to southern Arabia, Coastal plain
Gulf
Musandam
like neighboring Yemen, the Sultanate of Oman was an informal British pro- Sand dunes
Mahda
tectorate from 1899 to 1970 when the Sultan Qabus bin Said al-Said came to Desert plateau
N
power. Oman borders the Indian Ocean with a coast of almost 2,000 km stretch- Mountain range
Shinas
Height above Gulf of Oman
ing along the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, also called the Sea of Oman. 2000 m Sohar
Buraimi
Although it seems more like a country of the Arabo-Persian Gulf, it has only one Oil field Batinah
Al Muscat
opening of a few kilometres on the Gulf. Separated from the rest of the country Gas field UNITED Ha
jar Barka

Da
Mina al Fahal
by the United Arab Emirates,—the Musandam Peninsula forms a mountainous ARAB M

hin
Oil pipeline Rustaq o u n t a i n s Mina Sultan Qaboos

a
EMIRATES J
exclave on the southern shore of the Strait of Hormuz. For this reason, after the Gas pipeline
Ibri
Ak ebel
hda Jebel Shams
r 2 980 m Ras
Iranian Revolution Oman was called the “new watchman of the Gulf.” From 1970, Oil terminal
Gas terminal Nazwa
al-Hadd
Bahla Qalat
it transformed into a pro-western monarchy. Up until that point it was known Non-specialized Port

as the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman and could be characterized as a country Refinery
Liquefaction plant
Sur

divided into two parts—one part looking outward and the other inward. It also Wahiba
Motorway, main road
includes vast stretches of desert and the Dhofar area which has long wanted to City population Umm sand
dunes
break away. 600,000 al Samin

Oman is trying to adapt its future to its dual loyalty: its roots lie in the Arabian 100,000
50,000
Peninsula with openings onto Africa and Asia, it is heir to a powerful seafaring 20,000
5,000
tradition, and a vast overseas empire ruled by the sultans of Muscat, as well as an Other towns
Masirah
ancient religious principality more than a thousand years old, namely the Ibadi Ru b
SAUDI Al- Khali
Imamate of Nizwa, which controlled the inland mountains and their foothills. ARABIA
It is also a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Indian Ocean Rim Jiddat
Association for Regional Cooperation. Al-Harassis
The Batinah coastal plain forms an arc of 600 kilometers descending from the
northwest to the southeast plain at the foot of the Hajar Mountains, and comprises DHOFAR
the mountainous area of Jebel Akhdar that rises to a height of over 2,000 meters, Oman
Sea
the highest point being Jebel Shams (2,980 meters). It stretches along the Gulf of
Oman from Shinas on the northern border of the Emirates to Sib near Muscat. In Jebel Qara Jebel Kuria Muria Islands
the south, it gives way to cliffs up to Ras al-Hadd. Despite efforts to put an end to Jebel Qamar
Samhan

the rural exodus and reduce regional disparities, Oman has been through the same YEMEN
0 100 km

changes as its neighbors, namely the migration of its population to the coast and Salalah

rapid urbanization, although these have been less ­spectacular in the case of Oman. From B. Dumortier, « Oman », in Encyclopédie Universalis, 2008 and Census of Oman 2003.
From B. Dumortier, « Oman », in Encyclopédie Universalis, 2008 and Census of Oman 2003.

72
 dissimilar territories

A STRONG CONCENTRATION POPULATION DENSITIES PRIMACY OF THE CAPITAL,

OF POPULATION IN TWO REGIONS ON THE COAST COASTAL CITIES AND PIEDMONT OASIS
ANumber
STRONGof inh.CONCENTRATION
OF800,000
POPULATION IN TWO REGIONS IRAN
Population density
IRAN Number of inhabitants
by District in 2007 in 2003
700,000of inh.
Number 600,000
5 20 80 2,000
800,000
600,000
700,000
500,000 (inh/km2) 100,000
50,000
600,000
400,000 20,000
10,000
500,000
300,000 5,000

400,000 UAE Buraimi Sohar

200,000
300,000
100,000 UAE
Suwayq Muscat
200,0000
cat ah ah ah far rah da
m sta
100,000 Mus Ba
tin ar qiy iliy Dh
o
ah
i
san Wo
u
Sh kh Dh Al-
Da Mu
0
t ah h ah r h sta
sca
Data from <www.citypopulation.de>.
tin iya iliy ofa ira da
m u
Mu
Data from <www.citypopulation.de>.
Ba arq kh Dh
Dh
ah san Wo
Sh Da Mu Al-
Sur
�������� Iran
Data from <www.citypopulation.de>.

0 100 km 0 100 km
�������� Iran
Data from Ministry of National Economy. Data from Census of Oman, 2003.
Data from Ministry of National Economy. Data from Census of Oman, 2003.

United Arab ������� ������ The coastal provinces bordering the Arabo-Persian top-quality fish and rock lobsters are exported to
Emirates
��������
Gulf (Musandam) and the Gulf of Oman (Batinah, even more distant markets abroad. While shipbuild-
������
United Arab
Emirates
������� Muscat, and Sharqiyah) account for 70 percent of the ing yards continue to build dhows and international
���������� ���������
�������� country’s total population and more than one out of tourism is growing as a result of the presence of pic-
���������� ��������� four Omani nationals lives in the capital and its sur- turesque landscapes, historic ruins, and facilities for
Saudi Arabia rounding areas. Occupying less than 3 percent of the aquatic sports, the flourishing smuggling trade with
national territory, the shore of the Gulf of Oman is Iran brings in a substantial supplementary income.
Saudi Arabia dotted with oases and harbors that have given birth In spite of a fairly diversified economic base, oil is the
al-wusta to a string of cities where a growing number of people principal source of revenue. The major portion of the
and activities are concentrated. Fruits, vegetables, and oil recovered from inland oilfields is exported mainly
al-wusta
fodder are cultivated under the palm groves of Bati- to Asia through the Mina al-Fahal terminal located
dhofar
Population density
nah using groundwater resources and these comprise just north of Muscat. There is also a refinery in Mus-
by Region in 2007 the major part of the agricultural produce marketed cat, in addition to the one in Sohar commissioned
dhofar 5 20 80 240
Population density within the country or exported to the United Arab in 2006. Oman exports almost two-thirds of its gas
Yemen
0 100 km
by Region in 2007
20 ) 80
5 (inh/km
2
240
Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Similarly, the products to South Korea. Since gas production has increased
Yemen
Data from <www.citypopulation.de>.
of the fishing industry, which is still very active along almost fivefold between 2000 and 2005, Oman has set
0 100 km (inh/km2) the coast, are either sold locally, transported to cities up a gas liquefaction plant and terminal at Qalat, to
Data from <www.citypopulation.de>. located inland or exported to Gulf countries, while the north of Sur.
Data from <www.citypopulation.de>.

73
The Iranian Coast of the Gulf

A LONG SHORELINE ON THE GULF

Iran’s Gulf coast lies at the periphery of a vast country characterized by an
AN OIL-RICH PERIPHERY AND AN INTERFACE WITH THE ARAB WORLD
uneven population density with a strong centralization to the benefit of the
ARMENIA
capital. The Gulf coast is not only 1,000 km away from Tehran at the level of the AZERBAIJAN

TURKEY
0 to 500 m

Shatt al-Arab and almost 2,000 km at the level of the Strait of Hormuz, but it is Caspian 500 to 1000 m
TURKMENISTAN
further isolated by the Zagros Mountains, which form an almost insurmount- Tabriz Sea 1000 to 2000 m

able barrier reaching a maximum height of more than 4,500 meters. Most of 2000 m and more

the trade with the northern part of the country is therefore carried out from the Orumiyeh
Rasht
two ends of the coastal strip stretching over more than 1,200 km with a width
of less than 100 km, shrinking at times to just a few kilometres. From Tehran, Karaj
situated in the heart of the country, there is a highway and a railway line lead- Damavand Mt
5 671 m
ing to Abadan in the west and to Bandar Abbas in the east. In the middle, the Mashhad
Qom
historic port of Bushehr, at the mouth of the Dalaki, is connected to the famous Tehran
avir
Kermanshah Dasht-e K
city of Shiraz (Persia’s capital in the eighteenth century) by a road running along
this river. This coast is also distinctive because of its population. Although most
of the people living in the large cities are Persian, the dominant ethnic group
IRAQ
in the country, the small towns and villages combine a Persian and Arab iden- Z
Esfahan AFGHANISTAN
Ahvaz

Da
tity. At the central part of the coastal region, the population is partly Sunni and A
G

sh
R

t-
Arabic-speaking. Tensions between the two communities, though latent, are O

e
S

Lu
M
to be taken under consideration, especially after the Islamic Revolution, when o

t
u Kerman
Iran underwent severe economic difficulties while the countries on the opposite KUWAIT n
t a Zahedan
Shiraz i n
shore were becoming richer. The arrival of people from the country’s interior, s
PAKISTAN
whose incomes earned in the oil sector are relatively high, increases the feeling
of marginalization among the local population, who consider the newcomers as
South Pars
foreigners. Bandar Abbas

The province of Khuzestan in the northwest is considered potentially very rich, SAUDI BAHRAIN
ARABIA
though its development was severely retarded by the damages wreaked by the
QATAR
war with Iraq in the 1980s; the reconstruction process is not yet over. Having a 0 300 km UAE
high population density, it is different from the rest of the coast because of its fer-
tile soil, the presence of rivers, and its oil resources. In addition to the Arvand Rud Highest point
Motorway,
City population in 2008 Irrigated agriculture Oil pipeline

(the Persian name of the Shatt al-Arab), which marks Iran’s western border with main road 10,000,000 Non-irrigated agriculture Gas pipeline

Iraq, the Karun, which was once navigated for a distance of more than 200 km Railways
3,000,000
Cultivable salinated soils Oil terminal

from its mouth, crosses the province and provides electricity from the construc- Airport 1,000,000
500,000
Oil field OMAN Refinery

tion of several dams. The province’s capital, Ahvaz, stands on the banks of the Gas field Liquefaction plant

river, about 150 kilometres from the Gulf. It is an industrial city with a population

74

THREE MAIN URBAN AREAS ON THE GULF COAST
A CENTRE OF GRAVITY IN THE NORTH-EAST
N Shabahar
Population density
by Province in 2006
20 50 80 200 1,000
(inh/km2)
Ahvaz
Khorramshahr
IRAQ
Abadan
Bushehr
0 100 km
��������� KUWAIT
Data
Data from
fromCensus
CensusofofPopulation
Population2006.
2006.
�������
inhabitants) is known for its nuclear power station,
���������
which rouses fear among its neighboring countries.
For a long time, Bushehr, the country’s only commer-
����������� cial port, became Iran’s second largest commercial
port as well as an active fishing port that gave rise
to a sizeable food processing industry. A special eco-
nomic zone has been set up near the city. More than
0 300 km 200 km to the east of Bushehr, near the gas deposits
of South Pars, the Asaluyeh special economic zone is
Data from
from Census
Census of
of Population
Population2006.
Data 2006.
devoted to the hydrocarbon processing. In a pioneer-
ing atmosphere, it counts around 20,000 inhabitants
of over a million. Abadan and Khorramshahr, situ- who had been earning their livelihood from fishing
ated in the oil-richest region of Iran, have not yet and agriculture before the establishment of the oil
recovered from the effects of the war, even though related industries and the construction of townships
a special economic zone has been created at Khor- to accommodate their personnel.
ramshahr. The ports of these two cities, whose infra- Bandar Abbas, the largest littoral city, is located
structure was destroyed in the war, declined, while to the east in the province of Hormozgan. After the
Bandar Imam Khomeini (formerly Bandar Shapur) war with Iraq it became the country’s premier port
has become a busy port. and has been developing rapidly since the 1990s. It
At the centre of the coastal belt, the second highly takes full advantage of its proximity to Dubai, which
populated and industrially active region is the prov- has had a flourishing re-export trade with Iran since
ince of Bushehr, bearing the name of its capital. In the imposition of the embargo by the West. Bandar
addition to its civilian and naval port, the city (160,000 Abbas has also become an important industrial cen-
dissimilar territories
Shiraz
Bandar
Abbas
City population in 2006
1,300,000
500,000
300,000
100,000
50,000
20,000
tre in an area where the only notable urban agglom-
erations are the port of Lengeh to the west and the
city of Minab to the east. Off Bandar Abbas, near the
military base on the small island of Hengam, Qeshm
Island is striving to attract foreign companies to
its vast industrial free zone. Kish, a much smaller
island, faces Bandar Lengeh. It offers all the facilities
of a seaside resort and a free trade zone much appre-
ciated by Iranian tourists. These islands constitute
staging points through which licit and illicit trade is
carried out between the two shores of the Gulf.
The Iranian coast bordering the Gulf of Oman is
sparsely populated and most of the inhabitants are
Baluchis. Except for the port of Jask, where a naval
base was recently established and which will be the
terminal point of a 1,500-kilometer pipeline carrying
Central Asian oil from the Caspian Sea to the Gulf of
Oman, the only Baluchi city worthy of note is Shaba-
har near the border of Pakistan. This port city of about
85,000 inhabitants benefits from a free zone and is
becoming an important commercial and industrial
centre because of Tehran’s project to develop a port
to avoid crossing the Strait of Hormuz.
75
The Iraqi Governorate of Basra

THE NARROW IRAQI OPENING ON THE GULF

Zakhu
TURKEY Marsh
Even more than the highlands of Kurdistan with ample water resources and oil Rawanduz Alluvial plain
deposits, it is the southern part of Lower Mesopotamia, polarized by Basra that K U R D I S TA N Desert
plays a key role in the economic and political sphere of present-day Iraq. This Tall-Afar
Irbil High ground
Mosul
marshy plain with rich oil deposits and a largely Shiʿi population holds several Sulaymaniyeh Mountains and
SYRIA
advantages in this vast state created by western powers after World War I. It is high plateau

AL JAZIRAH Kirkuk
heir to the great civilizations of Mesopotamia and the Abbasid Caliphate. But, Oil ��eld

Tigr
tensions between communities, strong centralization, the three wars since 1980,

is
Anah City population
and a long embargo by the West have prevented southern Iraq from claiming its Euphrates Samarra
Khanaqin
over 5 million
rightful place among the Gulf region. Ba’qubah
IRAN over 1 million
Mandali over 500,000
Occupying a strategic position between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula, the Baghdad over 100,000
Ramadi
Governorate of Basra (19,070 km2; 1,000,000 inhabitants in 1978; 800,000 in 1988,
Fallujah Other towns
1,100,000 in 2006; 2,300,000 in 2008) provides an opening on the Gulf for Iraq with Rutbah

JORDAN
Suwayrah
a 20 kilometer-wide lagoonal coast that is of crucial economic importance not Al Hillah
Karbala
only for the region but for the whole country. In the west, the Shatt al-Basra (Basra Kut
Diwaniyah
canal) draws water from the marshes of the Euphrates before entering the sea. In An Najaf
Amarah
the east, the Shatt al-Arab, formed by the confluence of the Tigris and the Euphra- L O W E R M E S O P O TA M I A
tes in al-Qurnah, where the Bible places the Garden of Eden, empties into the Samawah
Persian Gulf. The lower course of this 195 km-long waterway constitutes the bor- SAUDI Nasiriyah
ha

S
tt A
ARABIA l-A
der between Iraq and Iran. This river offers the region a vast agricultural potential Basra ra

b
and a large population of farmers cultivates cereals, fruits, and vegetables on its Al Zubair

irrigated banks. But urgent action is needed to revive the extremely saline soil
KUWAIT
and reconsider the water management system established in the 1990s. Under
0 100 km
the pretext of improving agriculture by draining the wetlands where the marsh
Arabs (see Thesiger’s account) led a self-sufficient existence growing rice, fish- From B. Dumortier, « Irak, géographie », in Encyclopédie Universalis.
From B. Dumortier, « Irak, géographie », in Encyclopédie Universalis.

ing, raising buffaloes, and weaving reed mats, the government wanted to bring
under its control this dissident area. It served as a refuge for the Mandaeans or
Sabians, also known as Saint John’s Christians because the followers of this gnos-
tic faith born in Lower Mesopotamia in the first century AD worshiped John the
Baptist. This marshy area dotted with villages consisting of reed huts and lake
dwellings, accessed only by boat, served recently as a refuge for deserters from the
war against Iran and for insurgents who were a part of the Basra uprising of 1991.
The destruction of the embankments has facilitated the regaining of the wetlands
and the New Eden Project supported by NGOs has recommended the integrated
management of water resources.
Oil, which is abundant in the region, is the second and main asset of the
Basra Governorate. While Kurdistan now accounts for less than 30 percent
of the country’s reserves and 13 percent of its production, the vast oilfields of
North Rumailah (500,000 barrels per day), South Rumailah (800,000 barrels per
day), and Zubair (230,000 barrels per day) are playing an increasingly important
role in the country’s oil exports in spite of the poor condition of the transport
network, which, like the Basra refinery, was targeted by repeated attacks dur-
ing the war. Transporting oil northwards to the terminals on the eastern Medi-
terranean is still risky because of geopolitical reasons (Iraq’s relations with its

76
 dissimilar territories

THE SOUTHERN PART OF LOWER MESOPOTAMIA THE IMPORTANCE OF THE REGIONAL CAPITAL URBANIZATION ALONG THE SHATT AL-ARAB
Turkey missan missan
Qurnah

IRAN Sahin IRAN

thi-qar thi-qar Mudainah
Syria Iran Talha

Al Dair Hartha

Basra Abu al-Khasib

Al Zubair
muthanna
Umm Qasr
muthanna
Al Faw
Number of inhabitants
Saudi
in 2006
Arabia over 500,000

Population density Population density KUWAIT KUWAIT

by governorate in 2007 ����� by district in 2006
15 100 1,000 50 100 1,000
over 25,000
0 100 km Kuwait 0 40 km 0 40 km
(inh/km2) (inh/km2)

From Census
From Census of
of Population
Population 2003
2003and
andlater
laterestimates
estimatesby
byUN
UNagencies.
agencies. Data from
Data from New
NewEden
EdenMaster
MasterPlan
PlanforforIntegrated Water
Integrated Resources
Water Management
Resources in in the Marsh-
Management Data from
Data from New
NewEden
EdenMaster
MasterPlan
PlanforforIntegrated Water
Integrated Resources
Water Management
Resources in in the Marsh-
Management
the Marshlands
lands Area, 2006.Area, 2006. the Marshlands
lands Area, 2006.Area, 2006.

Turkish and Syrian neighbors) and technical prob-
lems (non-functional sections of the pipeline). How-
ever, it is possible to export oil through the southern
ports after the reopening of the Iraqi terminals in
al-Faw and Khor al-Amaya, and with an oil pipeline
to Saudi Arabia. In addition, a strategic two-way
pipeline connects Rumailah, which has a large pet-
rochemical complex, to Kirkuk. Gas production can-
not be developed because of the destruction of the
liquefaction plant in Zubair and the gas terminal in
Khor al-Zubair.
In a country with cities rooted in a rich past, a
strong urban network constitutes another advan-
tages for this region: its capital Basra, Iraq’s third
largest city; al-Zubair (210,000 inhabitants) located
at the edge of the desert, which is historically a trad-
ing city with close ties to Nejd, is now an oil city;
the ports of al-Faw (with a population of 33,000),
Umm Qasr (30,000 inhabitants) and Khor al-Zubair
(35,000 inhabitants); administrative and service fight against each other to seize power. Exacerbated
centres like al-Mudainah (60,000 inhabitants) on by the desire to gain control over the country’s oil
the Euphrates; and large agricultural markets like wealth and its ports, these conflicts have triggered
Abu al-Khasib (26,000 inhabitants), famous for their new population movements: the expulsion of Chris-
palm groves and market gardens along the banks of tians and Mandaeans, and the exodus of the Sunni
the Shatt al-Arab. This waterway has both rural and population of al-Zubair and Abu al-Khasib. Gradu-
urban settlements along its banks and can also be ally, some of the refugees have begun settling down,
used by seagoing vessels; this has made Basra the reconstruction is proceeding at a brisk pace, and
country’s main non-specialized port. the British army, which exercised authority over the
However, the Ba’athist ruling party did not allow region, has withdrawn its troops. The Arab countries
the Basra region to make full use of its assets or enjoy of the Gulf are investing money into the al-Zubair dis-
the profits from its oil wealth. The wars disrupted life trict while Iranian investors are interested in Basra.
in the cities and the countryside, destroyed the infra- However, two essential issues regarding the future
structure and houses, and drove refugees, fleeing remain unresolved: the contracts between the South
bombs and armed battles, towards Baghdad. Recur- Oil Company, a public entity, and the oil majors;
rent Shiʿi uprisings followed by severe repression and whether autonomy will eventually be conceded
worsened the chaos and the economic crisis. After to the southern governorates of Basra, Thi Qar, and
the fall of Saddam Hussein, Islamist militias not only Misan within a federal region like Kurdistan.
waged fierce battles against foreign troops but also

77
Urban Societies
Basra City

The third largest urban agglomeration in Iraq after Baghdad and Mosul, Basra
A PORT ON A DISPUTED BORDER RIVER
has long been a rival of the capital city. This military encampment controlling
access to the Gulf was built in 638, before Baghdad, which was founded in 762. Urban area in Main road
Railways
Initially located on the site of the present al-Zubair, which was sheltered from 1942
Canal

floods, Basra moved to the right bank of the Shatt al-Arab after the construc- 1990 Tank

tion of a network of canals and occupied a strategic position between Mesopo- 2009 Civil airport

tamia, Persia, Arabia, and the Gulf. Historically, Basra’s strength lies in its port, Desert Militairy airport

which makes the city, which has not expanded on the left bank, a rich, cosmo- Tanuma
N
politan commercial and financial centre open to the outside world and similar
to the major trading centres of the Levant like Beirut, Salonika, Alexandria, or
Basra
Constantinople. Basra was reputed for its numerous Muslim intellectuals and
Sh
the lively theological debates it hosted. In 1884, the Shiʿi population, which had att
A l-A
ra b
been in a majority since the eighteenth century, successfully persuaded the
Ottomans to detach the southern part of Baghdad province and create a new Abu al Khassib
province with Basra as its capital. Although the city was then home to a Shiʿi
bourgeoisie specialized in sea trade, its new status did not preclude the exis-
tence of a Sunni elite pursuing trade and politics and maintaining good rela-
Orchard and
tions with the Ottomans, or the presence of Jewish and Christian merchants. Al Zubair market gardening
The British protectorate brought very little change apart from the moderniza- Cereal

tion of Basra port. This led to the development of mercantile activities, which 0 1 2 3 4 km Flood risk area

continued under the monarchy set up by the British in 1932. In fact, trading
Irak
Irak Reference
ReferenceMap, Map,OCHA,
OCHA,ONU, 2009
ONU, ; National
2009; NationalImagery andand
Imagery Mapping Agency,
Mapping US Government,
Agency, 2003 ; 2003;
US Government, Portion of Soviet
Portion GeneralGeneral
of Soviet Staff map at the
Staff mapscale 1:
at the
activities were revitalized during World War II when the British army, which 20,000,1: 1990
scale and1990
20,000, of India
and Field Survey
of India FieldatSurvey
the scale
at1the
: 253,440
scale .1: 253,440.
had reoccupied the country, made full use of the port. After 1947 and the depar-
ture of the British a second time, the city grew despite the political strife that
continued until the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958. The rural exodus and Urban growth stopped suddenly when the Iraq-Iran war broke out in 1980 and
the discovery and drilling of oil in this region caused a population explosion in continued until 1988. As a Shiʿi city, Basra was suspect in the eyes of the ruling
Basra, which had almost a million inhabitants around 1950; their number rose Ba’athist party dominated by Sunnis. As a strategic port on the Shatt al-Arab, it
to one and a half million twenty years later. The arrival of skilled personnel to was subjected to repeated bombing by the Iranians and was a prized stake in
run the oil industry and administrative services encouraged the emergence of several particularly destructive battles. Shipping activities in Basra’s port were
a middle class. But a process of social division resulted in increasing inequality brought to a complete halt and in the mid-1980s, when the bombing was at
and the cultural diversity that had existed in the first half of the twentieth cen- its worst, barely 400,000 people remained in the city. During the 1990s, urban
tury became impoverished. society changed drastically. Among the 900,000 persons living there from that

80
 urban societies

moment onwards were many newcomers who had the swift defeat of Iraqi troops. The third conflict in A CITY DEVASTATED BY WAR
migrated from the wetlands, for which the province the Gulf, which began in 2003, led to the city’s occu- 7% 4%
is well-known, driven by an agricultural develop- pation by British troops and a factional, covert war
ment policy whose hidden objective was the control that paralyzed economic and social life. Though the Condition of housing
of the area. These newcomers settled on the periph- port was blocked for a long time, the government according to returnee
households
ery, giving rise to tensions between them and the set up by the Coalition in Baghdad gave priority to
37% Destroyed
city’s original population. This was aggravated in the operation of oil wells and associated industries.
Severe
the ensuing years as Basra bore the brunt of the Gulf Politico-religious militias, either local or serving 52% damage
War that followed the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in external interests, fought to gain control of the city’s Moderate
damage
1990. Although the Coalition armies did not attack activities and the region’s resources. The departure No or minor
the city directly, it suffered from violent reprisals by of foreign troops in 2008 revived factional clashes damaged

the Iraqi government in 1991 after a revolt by the
local population after the end of the fighting and
THE CAPITAL CITY OF AN OIL PRODUCING SHIʿI PROVINCE
������
Tigris
only to end in a fragile peace based on the shared Source: Basrah Governorate Assessment Report, UNHCR, 2006.
Source : Basrah Governorate Assessment Report, UNHCR, 2006.
control of activities.
In spite of all its advantages, this wealthy city
with a significant industrial base has not benefited
the development enjoyed by other Arab cities of the
Motorway Oil pipeline
Gulf. As a result of municipal elections and admin-
Main road Gas pipeline
istrative reorganization, the attributes of normaliza-

Railways
Major civil
Oil ��eld
tion seem to be in place, but the after-effects of the
Oil terminal
Qurnah
airport
Secondary civil
conflict are still palpable. Though numerous urban
Talha Re��nery
Euphrates Al-Sahin airport
Gas liquefaction
projects are in the planning stage, generally with for-
Urban area
���-���
Mudainah
Town above
plant eign assistance and collaboration, the future of the
Harbor
25,000 inh. provincial capital seems uncertain.
Marsh,
Al Dair Shiite
��ood risk area
Sunni Orchard
Al Hartha
Alluvial plain
IRAN
Basra Desert

Al Zubair Abu Al Khassib

Sh
att
Al
-A
r
ab

�������� Umm Qasr

Al Faw

KUWAIT
Arab-Persian
0 20 km
Gulf

81
Kuwait City

Originally a pearling base established in the early eighteenth century at the end
of a bay, Kuwait has developed into a metropolis with a population of more than
EXPANSION OF KUWAIT CITY
two million, to become the macrocephalic capital of a rich desert emirate of the
1957 1980 2005
same name. Its diverse urban landscapes make it appear like an epitome of the
47°40' 48°00'
Gulf’s cities. This diversity is due in a large measure to the city’s hasty develop-
ment after oil-drilling operations started in 1946 and the creation, even before its 29°20'

independence in 1961, of a system for redistributing the oil rent for the benefit
of not only Kuwaiti nationals, but also early Arab immigrants. Though Kuwait
was the region’s richest city in the 1950s, there were few imposing buildings 48°20'
apart from the magnificent mosques. The city’s political and economic insti-
tutions were housed in low-rise buildings on the seafront. Some new districts Falaka
0 15 km 29°00'
like Hawali surround the original city centre. While the Kuwaitis invested their 29°20'

money abroad, most international investors, except companies linked to the oil From Geoinformatics
From GeoinformaticsCenter,
Center,Kuwait
KuwaitInstitute forfor
Institute Scienti��c Research.
Scientific Research.

economy, the city’s nerve centre, avoided investing in Kuwait, because of its
position wedged between the menacing Iraqi Republic and the Saudi Arabian
kingdom imposing a certain amount of circumspection. The two Kuwait towers
inaugurated in 1979 are landmarks that offer visitors a panoramic view of the
city as well as a prized restaurant, and are still used as water towers.
From 2 August 1990 to 26 February 1991 Kuwait was occupied by Iraqi troops.
The battle for its liberation, waged by an international force mandated by the
United Nations, caused a great deal of destruction, and left empty the residential
districts that had been occupied by Palestinians, who were forced to leave when
their representatives sided with Iraq. Reconstruction was slow and investors exer-
cised prudence given the fear of a new Iraqi attack. Urban development took off
only ten years later, when Saddam Hussein’s government was definitively over-
thrown and a new government was set up in Baghdad under the supervision of
the US forces. Numerous building projects mushroomed in just a few years, trans-
forming the urban landscape and the life of the city’s residents. The construction
of a large number of towers and malls, though not as colossal as those in Dubai,
nevertheless can be considered a major development. The urban and architec-
tural quality of the new outlying districts varies according to the social groups tar-
geted by the real estate developers. By the end of the 2000s, metropolitan Kuwait
is under renewal. The concentric plan around the core of the city has been
retained; ring roads, connected by radial avenues starting from the seafront,
are numbered according to their distance from the city centre. The long bou-
levard along the seashore has been extended and beautified: the large houses
of the city’s wealthiest residents bordering it have been renovated or rebuilt.
Beyond the free harbor zone of Shuwaikh, the city extends towards the west
and around the port of Doha. To the south, the urban agglomeration stretches
over forty kilometres along the coast. Luxurious office complexes overlook the
sea and behind them lie clusters of small apartment blocks without proper pub-
lic infrastructure—these house middle-income employees. To the southwest,
the airport area has also seen rapid development with the emergence of dis-
tricts combining services, trade, and residential zones.
Kuwait is incontestably different from the other Gulf cities because of its
composite urban landscape, where prestigious towers stand next to mediocre
and badly maintained residential areas or even to buildings and wastelands
lying abandoned since the Iraqi occupation. Groups of chic villas stand next to
small buildings occupied by middle or lower-class residents. Due to the blurred
distinction between public and private property, and land speculation, there

82
 urban societies

are many vacant plots. Urban life is marked by social relationships rooted in
Kuwait’s recent tumultuous history, whether it is antagonism between the long-
time residents of the old city and the numerous Bedouins who have settled in
al-Jahra or distrust between the natives and some groups of immigrants. The
city is pursuing the same path of urban growth and has launched spectacular
projects similar to those occurring in other Gulf cities since the mid-1990s, even
though it has made a late start and is going about it on a more modest scale.
The considerable social mixedness of Kuwait City has not been weakened by
the recent development of a complex polycentrism: a historical centre split
into two parts by the emergence of Sharq as a business district; the rise of a
new trade centre in Salmiya; the project of a university district in Shadadiyah;
and the development of planned areas for entertainment and trade in Faha-
heel not far from the al-Ahmadi township where the oil companies have their
offices.
While the bridge between the mainland and Failaka Island lying off the Bay
of Kuwait has been abandoned for the time being, other large projects are still
under discussion in the planning stage. Thus the former project of a new town
in Subiya on the other side of the bay near the al-Sabah Fort, connected to the
centre of Kuwait by a 22–kilometer bridge and planned for 250,000 people,
is reactivated under the Madinat al-Hareer (‘City of silk’) project expected to
accommodate 700,000 people by 2030 and dominated by a tower higher than
the one in Dubai. But uncertainty remains about the final form of this expansion.
Not far from there, on the island Bubiyan, the building of a large port, recently
started, is contested by Iraq.

KUWAIT CITY CENTRE KUWAIT METROPOLITAN AREA

Doha
Sharq
N
Shuwaikh

Hawali
Kuwait
St. Towers Al Jahra Salmiya
lf
Old Port Gu
ian N
St.
ab
Ar

em
al l
s
Al

Shadadiyah
hd
Fa

Fah
ah
e el
Ex
pre
ssw
Liberation ay
Tower Ki
ng Fintas
Fa
he Green
First Rd. d
bin
Island Residential area
Ab
du
Service area
laz
iz Mixed area
Rd
.
Industrial area
Al Ahmadi Fahaheel
Rd. Harbor
nd
Seco Shuaiba
Airport

International hotel Ministry of Oil Shadadiyah Campus project

Shopping mall Park

Diplomatic area
Iconic tower 0 0,5 1 1,5 2 km Urban land reserve
0 5 10 km

From
From Geoinformatics
GeoinformaticsCenter,
Center,Kuwait Institute
Kuwait for Scientific
Institute Research.
for Scientific Research. FromGeoinformatics
From Geoinformatics Center,
Center, Kuwait
Kuwait Institute
Institute for Scientific
for Scientific Research.
Research.

83
Greater Dammam

Dammam Metropolitan Area, comprising the three cities of Dammam, Dhah- THREE OIL CITIES, ONE METROPOLITAN AREA
ran, and al-Khobar, together with the urbanized oasis of Qatif, has developed
along the same lines as the rest of the coastal region of Saudi Arabia where it N
Ras Tannurah
is located. The present agglomeration, with a population of 1,500,000, was born
when drilling operations started in 1938 in Saudi Arabia’s first oil wells located
in the desert just a few kilometres from the coast. The township of Dhahran Safwa

was built by the concessionary company, CASOC (California Arabian Standard

Oil Company), to set up facilities for its operations in the vicinity of the oilfield.
Dhahran later became the headquarters of Aramco (Arabian American Oil Com-
pany), the Saudi branch of Standard Oil established after the war. Al-Khobar, Arab-Persian Gulf
a small fishing village to the east of Dhahran, was rapidly transformed into a
port to export crude oil to the nearby Bahrain refinery. Dammam, located to
the north, developed as a trading centre before its port overtook al-Khobar as Al Qatif

the region’s busiest port. While the oil company built a modern oil terminal and
a refinery in Ras Tannurah, about 30 kilometres to the west, the three towns King Fahd
expanded, maintaining their respective specializations. During the 1970s, the Airport King Abdul Aziz
Port
first industrial zone, which was soon occupied by about one hundred compa-
nies, was built in the vacant area in the middle of the emerging conurbation. In Dammam
the 1980s, when the Saudi government seized control of the American oil com-
pany and the Saudi Aramco was established, the three cities merged into a single
entity. By the end of the decade, with the creation of the Dammam Metropolitan
Area, they became a single administrative entity.
The development of the metropolitan area has continued since the early 2000s.
The metropolis expanded in the north towards the vast oasis of Qatif and Ras
Tannurah. In the south, a second industrial zone is coming up about twenty kilo-
metres from the centre of the agglomeration on the road connecting Hofuf to Urban area Dharhan Al Khobar

Riyadh. One hundred and twenty companies have already started functioning Civil airport

Military airport
and their number is likely to more than double during the next few years. The new King F
ahd c
ause
Agricultural area
airport, King Fahd International Airport, built in the late 1990s to the city’s north- Oil field
wa
y

west at a distance of 35 km from Dammam and more than 40 km from al-Khobar, Desert
to
Bahrain
seems to be too far from the agglomeration to stimulate an urban dynamic in Motorway
its direction yet. However, because of its location, it is in a position to serve the Road
Railways 0 5 10 km
industrial city of al-Jubail, 60 km to its north.

84

DAMMAM DHARHAN AL KHOBAR
N N N sit centre for international trade and also a signifi-
King Fahd
ARAMCO
University
0 1 km 0 1 km
Urban area International hotel
Urban area under development Shopping mall
Park University
King Fahd
0 1 km
Park
Unbuilt area Hospital
Today, though the metropolitan area includes Qatif Faisal University, which also has a campus in Hofuf.
and the 300,000 people spread over its oases, each The seafront and the immense park, the largest in
of the three principal cities has preserved its own the country, landscaped along the avenue leading
character and atmosphere. Dammam, with more to Dhahran, offer many recreational areas; these
than 800,000 inhabitants, is the most highly popu- are particularly appreciated by expatriate families,
lated. Since 1975, it has had a modern port, King many from South Asia, who constitute a large part
Abdul Aziz Port, which specializes in shipping of the city’s population. However, it is al-Khobar,
non-petroleum products. Having transhipped 24 with a population of almost 500,000, which is most
million tons of cargo in 2008, it is the second non- suitable for walks and outings. Along the seafront,
specialized port of Saudi Arabia after Jeddah (46 a large number of popular restaurants enjoy an
million tons) and recorded a 10 percent growth of atmosphere reputedly more liberal than in other
its activities in the same year. Dammam is also an parts of the country. The grid pattern of the streets
important administrative and services centre with in the city centre was built in 1942 and has been
several banks and hospitals. Since 1975, it has been preserved, giving the city a modern look. While its
home to the department of medicine of the King port now only handles secondary national trade,
urban societies
the city has become an important control and tran-
cant centre for services, particularly for the banking
sector. As for the city of Dhahran, with a population
of about 100,000, it remains organized by the corpo-
rate headquarters of the national oil company. The
latter has huge office complexes, residential areas
for its employees, common cultural and sports
facilities, and its own bus company. It stimulates
the establishment of a large number of companies
specialized in the petroleum sector, each of which
has built housing for its employees in the neigh-
borhood. There are two other important activities:
Civic administration
firstly, the airport, which was among the country’s
ARAMCO
three major civilian airports, has since 1999 become
Railways, station
an air base for the exclusive use of the Saudi armed
Motorway forces, although from 1945 a part of it has been was
used by the Americans. Secondly, the well-reputed
King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals
welcomes more than 10,000 students. The heart of
the city is thus a huge area where professional and
residential private spaces stand side by side. Most of
them are closely guarded gated communities within
which people of different professions and nation-
alities lead a segregated existence. Aggravated after
the fatal attacks in 1996, a security atmosphere
prevails in the city patrolled by the police and con-
trolled through roadblocks, while the regional head-
quarters of the Saudi special anti-terrorist force is
located next to the residential quarters of Aramco.
English is spoken more widely in the city than in
other parts of the kingdom and, in some areas,
the American way of life seems to be followed as
if some parts of Dhahran were exempted from the
strict rules enforced in the rest of the country.
85
The Oasis City of al-Ahsa

Located about 60 km inland from the Gulf coast and 140 kilometres to the AL-AHSA
southwest of Dammam, al-Ahsa stands on vast reserves of groundwater that AN OASIS AT THE EDGE OF A GIANT OIL FIELD
supply numerous artesian wells. It is the largest oasis in Saudi Arabia and one Abqaiq
BAHRAIN
of the largest in the world. Hofuf (320,000 inhabitants), the main centre, and al- Al-Qurayyah
Mubarraz (310,000 inhabitants), located a few kilometres to the north, account
for almost the entire population of this area comprising about 50 villages, farm-

R
land, and two small towns, al-Uyun, about 20 kilometres to the north of Hofuf,
and al-Taraf, about 15 kilometres to the southeast. One passenger rail line and

A
one freight rail line connect al-Ahsa with Dammam and Riyadh. An airport con- Al-Uyun Al Uqair
Shedgum SAUDI
nects the oasis to the country’s principal cities.

W
ARABIA
Al-Ahsa has been inhabited since prehistoric times and is mentioned in many
ancient texts. From the ninth to the eleventh century AD, al-Ahsa was a part of

A
Al Mubarraz
the independent Qarmatian state whose capital, al-Muminiya, was near modern
Hofuf. The oasis then fell into the hands of Bedouin tribes and later alternated

H
between self-government and foreign domination. In 1913, the Ottoman garrison Al Taraf
surrendered to Ibn Saud, who annexed al-Ahsa to the Nejd region; the former thus Hofuf

G
became a part of Saudi Arabia in 1932. Hofuf, capital of al-Ahsa province (later the Desert Urban area
Uthmaniyah
Eastern Province), ceded the status of provincial capital to Dammam in 1953 and Irrigated agricultural area Archeological site

was then reduced to the rank of the governorate’s administrative centre. Hofuf is
dominated by Qsar Ibrahim, a tenth-century fort associated with a mosque. The
main souk was badly damaged by a fire in the early 2000s but remains quite active.
It is known for streets that specialize in the gold trade, a reminder of the fact that
for many centuries the city was an important trading centre on the caravan route.
The centre of al-Mubarraz is also clearly identified by its fort, its mosque, and its
souk. The historical districts have been transformed during the last thirty years:
forts have been restored and souks have been renovated and expanded by the
opening of new shops in streets that were earlier residential. Traditional houses
have been replaced by modern structures that satisfy present norms of comfort
or they have been split into apartments rented out to foreign workers, most from
South Asia. Many local families have left the city centre and moved to villas or
apartment blocks built along avenues in peripheral districts. New commercial
centres and hotels have come up in this part of the city. The urbanized area thus
Oil and gas field Road
Track
0 10 20 km
Gas treatment plant
Railways
Power plant
extends along a north-south axis from two historic cores, inexorably encroach-
ing on the cultivated lands that once contributed to its wealth and are now
being shifted further away from the centre.
Al-Ahsa is still noted for its farming activities, a flourishing trade in agricul-
tural produce, and a food-processing industry. The oasis has more than two
million palms producing more than 500,000 tons of dates per year, making the
city the most important market for dates. Other fruits are also grown, espe-
cially citrus fruit, along with irrigated cereal crops (wheat, maize, barley, and
even rice). The livestock comprises 200,000 sheep, 50,000 goats, 12,000 cows,
15,000 camels, and about 15 poultry farms with an annual production of 100,000

86
 urban societies

A DEVELOPING OASIS : farm produce from the oasis (making fruit juices and
AGRICULTURE AND URBAN GROWTH dairy products), while other companies, supported
by the public al-Ahsa Development Company and
Urban area in 1987
Urban area in 2001 the Ministry of Agriculture support a factory with a
Urban area in project capacity of processing five tons of dates per day.
Irrigated agricultural area, 1987
Irrigated agricultural area, 2001 Side by side with traditional handloom units
Tank
Hill
(making woollen coats) and local metalworking
N Desert units (fabricating objects of copper, sabres, and dag-
gers), new industries produce materials for the con-
struction industry, and plastics factories have been
established mainly to the north of the oasis on the
road to Dammam. Large projects are being executed
with government assistance or foreign collaboration
to increase al-Ahsa’s cement-producing capacity
Jebel Al Qara
and set up a sizable aluminium factory. There is no
direct effect from the petroleum sector, but the oasis
is situated on the east edge of the Ghawar oilfield,
considered the world’s largest. Two mixed deposits
with huge oil-gas separating plants are located not
far from the city at Shedgum and Uthmaniyah. The
proximity of these installations for producing and
erinary science departments as well as its schools
of medicine and dentistry for women students
(the Dammam campus trains engineers and has a
department of medicine for men). Tourism, too, is
an important source of employment, particularly
hotels, restaurants, and travel agencies organizing
guided tours of various well-known tourist places in
the kingdom. In addition to forts, souks, mosques,
and an archaeological museum, visitors to the
oasis region can visit the springs and caves of Jebel
al-Qara or take an excursion to the ruins of the five-
thousand-year-old al-Uqair port, near which a small
seaside resort has come up, or to the still active one-
thousand-year old salt mines of Abqaiq.
HOFUF CITY CENTRE
HERITAGE REVALUATION
Dates
N
souk

processing hydrocarbons has contributed to the

development of the city, which provides services to Qasr Ibrahim
Gold
0 5 10 km oil workers who constitute 20 percent of the active souk

From Mohammed Aït Belaid, "Space techniques for desertification monitoring and
local population.
From Mohammed Aït Belaid, “Space techniques for desertification monitoring and control in Al
control in Al Ahsa Oasis", UN/Saudi Arabia Regional Workshop, Riyadh, 2004.
Ahsa Oasis”, UN/Saudi Arabia Regional Workshop, Riyadh, 2004. The al-Ahsa oasis with its flourishing agriculture
Archeological museum
and industry is also an important centre for the ser-
eggs and 30,000 chickens. Al-Ahsa, which has a stud vice sector, which provides 60 percent of employ- International hotel
Heritage place
farm that breeds thoroughbred royal Arabian horses, ment. Trade is evidently very important, as are Souk
Urban area
Park
is also famous for its camel market, where special banking services. The education sector also provides Bank
University Oasis
high-priced varieties are bred for racing. In the area numerous jobs. The Hofuf campus of King Faisal Train station
Unbuilt area
Railways 0 1 km
around the city a number of food-processing compa- University (established in 1975) attracts students
nies have sprung up. Private companies process the from all over the country to its agronomy and vet- After Oman, UAE & Arabian Peninsula, Lonely Planet, 2007.

87
Manama, an Island Capital

Manama, the capital and the only urban agglomeration in Bahrain, was origi- MANAMA, TOWARDS A POLYCENTRIC CITY
nally a vast oasis situated to the northeast of the island of the same name in the
N
archipelago that constitutes this small kingdom where traces of human settle- Arab-Persian Gulf
Muharraq
ment date back at least 5,000 years. In the 1960s, Manama had a population
of barely 60,000 and had difficulty surviving on agriculture and trade after the
decline of pearling. Today, it is an agglomeration with a population of approxi-
Water Garden
mately 700,000 people spread over the northern half of the island, and over the City
Bahrain
Bahrain World
Trade Center Diplomatic
neighboring islands of Muharraq and Sitrah. Seef
Lulu
Financial
Harbor Area National Museum
In the old centre houses of unbaked bricks with inner courtyards and a wind Almoayyed Tower Island
GOSI
tower have been preserved. The old souks, the most frequented of which is the Complex
Seef Mall Manama Hoora
gold souk with its traditional stalls, remind customers of bygone days, although Gold City
Souq La Fontaine
Khwar
al Qalaia
modern shops too have cropped up. The main entrance has arches that used to
house the offices of the British government and now lead to the diplomatic area Gudaibiya
and the business district in the north. The old houses lining the wide avenues now
make way for hundreds of banks and financial institutions that contribute to the Al-Fateh
Grand Mosque
city’s wealth. Several ministries and government offices are located in the mod-
ern district, the kingdom’s economic and political hub. The neighboring Hoora Zinj
Adliya
district is a centre of nightlife with numerous bars, restaurants, hotels, and night- Main ��nancial centre Ju�fair
clubs visited by crowds of foreign visitors. Many come from neighboring coun- Cultural place
Mosque
tries, especially Saudi Arabia, in search of the freedom that is a rare commodity Embassy
New Zinj
in this part of the world. In the daytime too, the district lures people with a huge International hotel

shopping centre, the GOSI Complex, which has many stores, a contemporary Shopping mall

art centre called La Fontaine set up in a cluster of beautiful old buildings, and Urban area
Umm Al Hassam
a museum of Islamic art. Further south Gudaibiya is a less popular district, even Real estate project

Park
though it houses several government buildings, including the parliament. Gudai- Tubli Bay
Unbuilt area
biya is where most immigrants live immediately after their arrival in Bahrain. 0 500 m

Not far and still within the older part of the city, the Adliya district has recently
become an alternative to Hoora, attracting tourists in search of night-time enter-
tainment in its bars and restaurants, and its art galleries that have been opened
in beautiful houses. Even further south, overlooking Tubli Bay, where mangroves
and water birds are now protected, Umm al-Hassam is a middle-class residen-
tial district. However, many of these houses, which were built in the late 1970s,
are quite run down and the heavy traffic on the roads makes driving and park-
ing difficult. The ongoing renovation does not allow buildings higher than four
storeys and includes a new fishing port in the bay. Finally, the eastern part of
Manama comprises the Zinj district near the site of the ancient village of Bilad
al-Qadeem, which was the island’s capital before the arrival of the Portuguese
in the early sixteenth century. The al-Saboor Mosque, one of the oldest in

88

Bahrain, bears witness to this past. Today, foreign
embassies are being opened in this area and new
buildings are being built closer to the sea, forming a
new district of luxury villas called New Zinj.
At the periphery of this urban complex, two new
districts have been built on reclaimed land. Over the
last few years, Juffair, to the southeast, has become
a smart district where the city’s privileged youth
and executives of western companies have set up
residence. A few government buildings, the national
library, the offices of the Bahrain Tribune, an Eng-
lish-language daily, and the al-Fateh Grand Mosque
add to the bustle, apart from the construction of
residential buildings advancing at a rapid pace. To
the northwest, the new district of Seef is an artifi-
cial peninsula with apartment blocks and luxury
hotels, company headquarters, and shopping cen-
tres, including the Seef Mall, the largest in the king-
dom. Seef has become the most expensive district of
Manama; it claims to be a second central business
district and is symbolized by the city’s tallest struc-
ture, the Almoayyed Tower.
The city of Manama is not, however limited to this
ever-expanding urban spread. It is also necessary to
take into account Muharraq Island, now a residen-
tial suburb of the city. A city stood on this site in
ancient times and the island has been continuously
inhabited since then. Muharraq, where Bahrain’s
international airport is located, is now connected
to Manama by three bridges. It has an industrial
zone and a small man-made archipelago, the Amwaj
Islands, where many posh buildings are under con-
struction. Connected to Manama by a bridge pass-
ing through the Nabih Salih Island, the Sitrah Island,
too, is a part of the city. The two islands, which tradi-
tionally practiced farming, are being rapidly urban-
urban societies
ized, particularly Sitrah, where a huge industrial COMPREHENSIVE URBAN PLANING
zone is developing which includes an oil refinery,
oil depots, an aluminium factory, chemical facto- Muharraq
N
ries, textile mills, and automobile repair shops. This
development has been facilitated by a second bridge Manama
connecting the industrial zone to the nearby Bah-
rain Island and the localities of Rifa, al-Wusta, and
Medina Isa, thus forming a vast suburban sprawl to
Saudi Arabia Nabih Salih
15 to 25 km from the city centre. BAHRAIN
Sitrah
Built on the site of ancient villages, gardens, and Medina
Isa
palm groves, Manama tourists visit many histori-
cal ruins, including the ruins of ancient Dilmun (a Rifa
UNESCO heritage site, whose inhabitants traded
with Mesopotamia and the Indus Delta) and a Por-
tuguese fort. The city is now characterized by the
distinctive atmosphere of its numerous districts to
Qatar
and a socially mixed population; its wide avenues
bordered with elegant buildings make way for
more modest residential buildings on the small side
streets. Like many other cities in the Gulf, the numer-
ous construction projects vying with one another to
draw attention with their bold and showy designs
are intended for the richest sections of the popula-
tion, foreign companies, and wealthy expatriates.
Most are located on the island’s north-eastern coast
on land reclaimed from the sea, thus expanding the
district where business and power are concentrated:
areas like the Bahrain Financial Harbor, which com- CBD
bines offices and luxury residences; the two slender University and High
0 10 km
Tech Corridor
towers of the Bahrain World Trade Centre; Bahrain Industrial area
Bay where towers and villas stand side by side, not Residential area
Port area
to mention the residential Lulu Island. To the city’s Airport
Touristic area
extreme south, other projects like al-Areen boast of Bridge
Projected touristic area Bridge under building
a Formula 1 circuit, a protected nature reserve, and
golf courses under construction. From Department of Industry, Bahrain.
From Department of Industry, Bahrain.
89
Greater Doha

Doha, Arabic for “bay,” is different from most cities in the Gulf because it devel- DOHA CITY CENTRE : A RADIO-CONCENTRIC PLAN
oped much later and at a very rapid pace. In 1906, the Swiss traveller Burckhardt
described three inhabited places in the bay—al-Bida, Salata, and Doha. The last, N

which depended on pearling for its livelihood, was then the largest settlement
in the Qatar Peninsula. Along with al-Wafrah, located further south, each had a
population of just a few thousand. A hundred years later, the population of the .
Weaponry Museum e St
town, which went through a slump in the 1930s following the collapse of the orn
ich
C
pearling industry, reached 850,000.
The city’s development around the historical centre began in earnest after inde-
pendence in 1971. Even as some of the old districts were becoming more densely
populated, the new capital developed in the form of two less densely populated Museum of
rings arranged in a semi-radial-concentric pattern, with circular roads named Islamic Art
Cor
after the letters of the alphabet. During the following decades, expanding beyond n iche St
.
Qatar National
the C-Ring Road, the city joined the industrial and working-class city of al-Rayyan, Museum
which was being developed a few kilometres to the west to accommodate newly
arrived immigrant workers. Doha’s population rose from 100,000 in 1970 to more Rin
gA
than 200,000 in 1980, and 350,000 in 1990, with al-Rayyan accounting for more than
Doha
100,000 inhabitants. Doha is expanding horizontally with a preponderance of low- International hotel
Ring B
International
Airport
rise buildings comprising more than 75 percent of the total buildings. Depending Shopping mall
Museum
on the districts and their inhabitants, houses range from luxury villas to working
Park
class dwellings, sometimes in a run-down condition. The few towers in the city Diplomatic area
Ring C
are located along the bay, where the Corniche was built on the embankment after 0 0,5 1 1,5 2 km D
g
the emir decided to improve the insalubrious pockets bordering the sea. Govern- Rin

ment institutions have opened their offices in these towers and in nearby build-
ings. At the same time, the port is being expanded without removing the existing
facilities. Industrial plants, too, are fairly modest and confined to a zone in the
city’s southwest, housing light industries manufacturing paints, detergents, and
light engineering goods to satisfy the demands of the domestic market.
In the mid-1990s, Doha’s population growth quickened, exceeding 380,000. Pop-
ulation grew even faster in al-Rayyan, which reached 320,000. The city is expand-
ing in the northeast towards the desert along the main roads. On the other side, it
is also moving towards al-Wafrah (population 30,000) south of the international
airport. Simultaneously, the restoration of the historic centre is in full swing. The
first decade of the new millennium was devoted to the execution of major proj-
ects, which were integrated in 2007 into the Greater Doha Master Plan, whose
architectural designs are based on the star and the arabesque. There is a plan-
ning effort, but it was has not managed to the same level of specialization as
other Gulf cities. A manifestation of Doha’s desire to become an international
transport hub like Dubai can be seen in the expansion of the airport in late
2009 on reclaimed land, together with the development of an economic zone,
and the development of the port. The development of the “Pearl of the Gulf,”
a man-made island to the city’s north that is expected to accommodate 42,000

90
 urban societies

RAPID DEMOGRAPHIC GROWTH A RECENT SPATIAL SPREAD PROPOSED LAND USE

Number of inhabitants
(1970-2006) N

800,000

Total N
700,000

600,000

500,000

400,000

D
Doha
Al Rayyan
300,000
Doha
A
B
C
200,000
Al Rayyan D

100,000 E

0
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
From Census of
From Census of Population and official
Population and official surveys.
surveys.

Al Wakrah
people, shows that Doha is keen to develop interna-
tional tourism and encourage expatriate executives
of multinational companies to buy freehold prop- Urban area Desert
erty in this prestigious locality. Twenty-first-century in 1973
Urban
0 1 2 3 4 5 km

Doha, a product of the recent boom in natural gas, in 1990 motorway

International Airport
is a city on the move, an urbanized agglomera- in 2002 Ring
Airport under construction
tion that is expected to spread over a distance of in 2008 Harbor (end of work 2015)
25 kilometres along the coast by the year 2025. There
From
FromNASA
NASAGlobal
Globaland coverfacility (data processsing M. LeM.Cam).
is a proposal to surround the city centre between the and cover facility [data processing Le Cam].

Corniche and the C-Ring Road by a serpentine canal

and to build on its other bank residential buildings al-Rayyan to Doha and the southern line will lead
flanked by green spaces and separated by barren along the coast of the Mesaieed Industrial City, fur- CBD Park
corridors to channel wind energy, beyond which ther south of al-Wafrah, and up to the new city of City centre Wooded area
there will be industrial zones. Lusail, a new township Lusail, at the northern end of the bay. The metro Densi��ed area
Harbor and 0 1 2 3 4 5 km
airport
rising on Doha’s northern coast, is expected to have network will also cover the new districts of the capi- Residential city Industrial area Desert
200,000 residents. A 140–kilometer metro network is tal, which will host the World Cup in 2022; an addi-
From Planning Council.
being built with German expertise (Deutsche Bahn) tional 80,000 hotel rooms are planned to be ready by From Planning Council.

to provide transport facilities in this fast-develop- then, a substantial jump from the 18,000 rooms now
ing urban territory. An east–west line will connect available.

91
The Island and the City of Abu Dhabi
At the time of independence in 1971, the city of Abu Dhabi was home to barely
100,000 people and the government did not expect their number to exceed
600,000. But according to the 2005 census, it reached 650,000 and is now
approaching one million. The new master plan expects this number to rise to
two million by 2020, and three million by 2030. This growth results from two
factors: first, Abu Dhabi is the capital of both the United Arab Emirates and
the Federation’s richest emirate and second, it is situated close to Dubai, which
serves as an inspiration. Abu Dhabi is, however, keen to avoid Dubai’s mistakes
leading to an uncontrolled growth.
According to tradition, the al-Bu Falah tribe discovered a spring on an island
while chasing a gazelle during a hunting expedition. Around 1790, their sheikh,
who belonged to the al-Nahyan family whose descendants still preside over the
destiny of the emirate and the Federation, left the oases of Liwa to settle on this
island, which had become an important pearling centre. It was easy to defend
because it was surrounded by islets and sand banks, which made navigation dif-
ficult. When oil-drilling operations began in the mid-1960s, the Bedouin popula-
tion settled and became urbanized, even as large numbers of migrants arrived in
Abu Dhabi. The city expanded to the northeast and beyond the al-Hosn fort, the
emir’s former residence. Japanese town-planners planned the city’s streets in a
grid pattern. As a result, traffic movement is organized along wide avenues lined
with very simple-looking buildings behind which are hidden apartment blocks
and villas. Behind the seafront, enlivened by green spaces and the Corniche that
is lined by international hotels, is a business district housing the offices of oil
companies. A power station and a desalinization plant have been built on the
island of Umm al-Nar, whose archaeological remains prove that it was inhabited
by human beings as early as the third millennium BC. The city has been rebuilt
on top of its own earlier layers, the earlier generation of buildings making way for
taller and more elegant constructions. The urban extension, which was initially
limited to a few districts covered by villas on the principal islands, including the
diplomatic quarter, is speeding up. The Corniche, now dominated by towers with
glass facades belonging to oil companies, has been widened by the construction
of an embankment and leads westward to the Emirates Palace, a luxury hotel that
opened in 2007. Close by, a huge shopping complex (Marina Mall) and a heritage
village are found on a man-made peninsula.
92
URBAN GROWTH AND ARTIFICIAL SHORELINE
1960 1978 2008
N
0 5 10 km
Urban area
Area under construction or
Tidal bank
development
The city’s prosperity is based on oil exports, but its economy is rapidly diver-
sifying in the areas of trade and services. The federal government, the Abu
Dhabi emirate authorities, and the municipal administration have a large num-
ber of offices in the city. The congestion of Dubai has driven many Arab and
western companies to relocate their offices in Abu Dhabi, which offers more
amenities today. As many new projects arise, a large number of construction
workers are housed in camps on the mainland at the edge of the city where
new districts are being built along the expressway that leads to Dubai and also
serves the international airport. Built in 1968 renovated and expanded in 2005
and then again in 2010, the international airport replaced the Bateen airport to
the island’s south, which, after having been a military air base before, is now an
executive airport for private planes.
The Master Plan Abu Dhabi 2030 envisages the development of uninhabited
islands and also the mainland. Bridges have been built or are under construc-
tion to connect various islands and a new bridge between the island of Abu
Dhabi and the mainland has doubled the capacity of the Maqta Bridge, which
was built on the site of an old fort. The man-made Lulu Island that faces the
 urban societies

Corniche will host an amusement park. Reem Island, on the northeast where a ABU DHABI MASTER PLAN 2030
Central Business District (CBD) is under construction, is the site of residential
and office towers. The construction of museums will make Sadiyat Island a cul- N
Port
tural district. Yas Island has a Grand Prix racing circuit. Apart from these projects Khalifa
and facilities, the plan envisages the construction of Capital City, a secondary
administrative centre beyond the monumental Zayed Mosque (completed in
2007), which dominates the south-eastern end of the main island. Finally, there
is Masdar City, an experimental project for the development of renewable energy
sources and recycling of used water and waste. The public transport system has
to be improved and the plan envisages the introduction of dedicated bus corri-
dors. Two railway stations, one near the Corniche and the other near the Capital
City, will serve the future Abu Dhabi-Dubai high-speed train service, while Mina
Khalifa, located between Abu Dhabi and Dubai’s Jebel Ali free zone, will add to
the existing ports of Mina Zayed at the northern end of Abu Dhabi Island and Saadiyat
Mussafah, whose industrial zone has enjoyed the status of a special economic Port
Zayed
zone since 2008. Yas
Lulu

Al Reem
ABU DHABI CITY CENTRE: AN ORTHOGONAL GRID Umm al Nar

N
Hudayriat

Capital
ic he City
or n t. Abu Dhabi Mall
C dS
con Port
e Se
th Mussafah
ed
Qasr ay
Eas

Z
tR

al Hosn
oad

Heritage
Marina Mall Village Cultural
Al

Foundation
Sal

e CBD Industrial
am

rn ich
S

Co
t.

High and medium-density residential Airport

Ai
.
St

rp
t
irs

or
eF

Low-density residential High Tech / Business Park

t
Ro
th

ad
Al

Emirates Palace
d
ye

Kh

Parks and environment reserve 0 5 10 km

Za

Ea
a lee

st
jA

Ro
lA

ad
ra
bi

Adapted fromUrban
Adapted from Urban Planning
Planning Council.
Council.
Str
ee
t

International hotel
St.
Shopping mall
ada
Cultural place Sa
Al
ADNOC Branch
(National Oil Company)
Diplomatic area 0 0,5 1 1,5 2 km

93
The Coastal Conurbation of
Dubai-Sharjah-Ajman

DUBAI-SHARJAH-AJMAN
Stretching along the sea, the Dubai metropolis now
A POLYCENTRIC LINEAR METROPOLIS
extends beyond the borders of the emirate bearing
the same name and to the territory of the emirates Iconic tower
The Gulf
of Sharjah and Ajman. This urban agglomeration,

N
Motorway
Other road
which is not under a supra-municipal administra- Palm
The World
Emirate border
Jebel Ali
tion, had a population of nearly 2.5 million at the
end of the 2000s. Located between the impressive Palm
Jumeirah
Jebel Ali port and industrial free zone and the more Palm
Deira
Jebel Ali
modest Hamriyah free zone, this urban polycentric Burj Al Arab Sharjah
Al Hamriya
strip of land stretching over more than 70 kilome- E11
E11 Jumeirah WTC
Dubai
Ajman

tres, some parts of which are densely populated in E11 E11

Burj Khalifa
high-rise buildings, is served by two highways in E11
E311
addition to the coastal road punctuated by districts E311
like Jumeirah, which are home to posh villas and
international hotels like the iconic Burj al-Arab E311
E311
shaped like the sail of a dhow. Often congested E6 Mushrif
11
with vehicles, the E 11, which is known in Dubai as E611
E611
Sheikh Zayed Road, runs through the agglomeration Urban area Postponed project
at a short distance from the coast. Some sections of Urban area under
construction
Park

the E 311 and E 611 highways were built later in the Industrial area Agricultural area

desert to serve as bypasses and these are bordered Airport Unbuilt area 0 5 10 km Awir

by new construction.
The city centre, which has arisen on the site of
Dubai’s original double nucleus, stretches on either
side of a khor (creek). On its right bank, known as
Deira, are a series of shopping areas around the
souks, which are located downstream, and a cluster
of buildings housing administrative and economic
institutions that overlook the dhow port located
upstream. On the opposite bank, known as Bur
Dubai, are the historic Shindagha district and Basta- trict whose landmarks—the World Trade Centre
kiya, where the restored houses of Iranian merchants built in 1978 and Burj Khalifa, the world’s tallest
with their wind towers house art galleries, and the tower (828 meters) opened in 2010—are symbols
al-Fahidi fort, built in 1799, has been converted into of Dubai’s elevation to a global city. To the east,
a museum. the historic core of Sharjah, located around a triple
To the west, the fashionable towers along Sheikh khor, which is sometimes called a lagoon, is another
Zayed Road constitute a linear central business dis- centre of the Dubai-Sharjah-Ajman conurbation.

94
 urban societies

DUBAI CITY CENTRE SHARJAH CITY CENTRE AJMAN CITY CENTRE

TWO CORES ALONG THE CREEK HERITAGE PRESERVATION THE GROWTH OF A SMALL PORT

N International hotel International hotel

N
Souk Sea resort
Shopping mall Souk
Cultural place Shopping mall
Municipality Museum
Food
Port Souk
Emiri Diwan Cultural place Port
Chamber of Commerce Fort
Rashid D e i ra Abra station (water taxis) Municipality Khaled
Gold
Souk Bus station Emiri Diwan
Spice Chamber of Commerce Al Sa��ya
Souk Island
Al Shindagha Bastakiya Fruit &
Th Vegetable
Textile eC Khwar of
Souk Dubai re Souk
Museum
N Ajman
ek

Dhow Central
Wharfage Souk

Bur Dubai

Urban area Port Saeed

Restored heritage SHARJAH
district Dubai Golf Khaled
Health Care City and Lagoon International hotel Urban area
Free Zone Yacht Club Souk
Urban area under
Park Shopping mall
construction
Qanat al Museum
Cimetary Qasba Municipality Industrial area
Health Care
0 0,5 1km City Industrial Emiri iwan
0 0,5 1km Free Zone
Al Khan area Chamber of Commerce

Lagoon
From Department
Department of
of Tourism
Tourism &
& Commerce
CommerceMarketing. From Ajman
From Marketing. From Ajman Municipality
Municipality &
& Planning
Planning Dpt.
Dpt.
Urban area
Al Mamzar
Within the federal framework of the U.A.E., the Lagoon Heritage area
class families working in Dubai, drawn there by the
Urban area under
Sharjah government has the capability to pursue DUBAI construction relatively low rents.
Port and industrial
its own urban strategies independently of Dubai. It area On the eastern fringe of the metropolis, again on
thus took up, at an early stage, the restoration of its 0 0,5 1km Park the banks of a khor, stands Ajman, whose modest
architectural heritage, a legacy of its rich seafaring FromSharjah
SharjahCommerce
Commerce&&Tourism
Tourism Authority.
Authority.
city centre located on the left bank can be described
From
past. While high buildings overlook the Corniche as a juxtaposition of residential districts inhab-
that runs past the port and shopping malls attract of Qanat al-Qasba. Although its museums, universi- ited by people belonging to low-income groups.
buyers, the city centre offers preserved traditional ties, and publishing houses enhance its reputation Ajman manages its development as a small inde-
architecture or even new buildings in traditional as a cultural and intellectual centre, Sharjah is also a pendent city even though it is overshadowed by its
style such as the cultural and commercial complex dormitory town, home to a large number of middle- neighbors.

95
The al-Ain-Buraimi Oases

AL-AIN – BURAIMI
On the border between the emirate of Abu Dhabi and the sultanate of Oman is
the area historically known as Tawam (meaning twins), a reference to the two A DISSYMETRIC CROSS-BORDER CONURBATION

vast palm groves of a group of oases mentioned in travellers’ stories as Buraimi.

Urban area Unbuilt area
Over the last four decades it has become a cross-border conurbation with a Agricultural area 320 to 500 m
population of nearly 500,000. Buraimi is the name of a town with a population Oasis 500 to 1000 m
of 70,000 in 2007, situated in Omani territory, 100 km from Sohar and 350 from Industrial area Above 1000 m
Muscat, while al-Ain (meaning the spring), situated in the United Arab Emir- Airport

ates, has a city population of 285,000. The metropolitan population, i.e. includ- Scenic road

ing peri-urban localities, came to 375,000 in 2007; it had doubled between 1975 Hili OMAN
and 1980 when it rose to 100,000, before rising to 200,000 around 1990, and to
Buraimi
300,000 ten years later. Almost equidistant (about 150 km) from Abu Dhabi and
Dubai, al-Ain is the Federation’s fourth largest and the emirate’s second largest
city. This “garden city”, which includes several oases surrounded by five-storey Al Ain National Museum
residential buildings along tree-lined avenues, has a great symbolic importance.
Initially, it was supposed to be the federal capital, as it was the favourite city of
Sheikh Zayed who was its governor at one time and enjoyed staying there even
after he became the emir of Abu Dhabi and the president of the United Arab Zayed

Emirates. Since 1976, the city has been home to the Federal University (502 stu- Military College
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
dents in 1979 and 12,500 in 2009).
People settled at the edge of the Rub al-Khali desert, in the foothills of Jebel
Hafeet, which rises to a height of 1,250 meters, and the limestone hills of the Hajar Ain al Faydah
range. These tertiary anticlines, which have endorheic wadis running down, con- International hotel UAE University

tain aquifers. The catchment and channelling of groundwater reserves have made Museum Higher College of Technology

Jebe
Archeological park Military academy Mazyad
it possible to develop carbonated soil on plain of fragmented rock resulting from Fort Shopping mall

l Ha
Zoo Camel market
the erosion of hills. Tombs on the lower slopes of Jebel Hafeet indicate that the OMAN

area was inhabited around 3000 to 2500 BC. The archaeological excavations in
Hili led to the discovery of a large village of farmers and craftsmen that dates
to the end of the third millennium BC. Iron Age sites (Rumailah and Qarn Bin
Saud) indicate that the domestication of dromedaries and the construction of the
first falaj (irrigation channel) around 1000 BC made it possible, by associating
pastoral nomadism with irrigated farming, to develop an area that had become
totally arid.
feet
Natural spring Camel racetrack 0 5 10 km
This system, which dates back thousands of years, persisted until the 1970s.
Between 1970 and 1980, the cultivated area increased by 290 percent. Plots
with an average area of 2.5 hectares and provided with a well and a pump were
distributed; a large number of forestation projects, experimental farms, and
battery farming were introduced. During the 1990s, Buraimi and the oasis of

96
 urban societies

A GROUP OF FOOTHILL OASES THE OASIS HERITAGE PROJECT IN THE CENTRAL AREA

J. Al Ohah
Oasis
Masoodi
Farms

t
Commerce
Hili

J. Haq
Civic

School

lah
Qatarha

tt
Healthcare

Al Jimi Buraimi Religious

Residential

Recreational

Unbuilt area

Muwaiji

Motarad Al Ain
0 500 1000 m

Adapted from
Adapted fromUrban
UrbanPlanning
PlanningCouncil.
Council.

groves are now no more than heritage sites visited
by tourists. The town-planning scheme aspires to
raise the population to one million by 2030 while
preserving its atmosphere, and hopes to combine its
booming tourism sector and fast-moving industrial
Dune sands development while also conserving its landscape
Chalcky detritic
deposits
and heritage. The central district project has given
Mountain rise to controversy. Its detractors are concerned that
Palm grove
the oasis will be turned into a museum and the area
around it will receive a token, symbolic treatment
J. Haf
sultan of Oman retained Buraimi, which was occu-
pied by the Saudis in 1952. In fact, the dispute over
Buraimi was not so much a power struggle among an
Ibadi sultan, a Maliki emir, and a Wahhabi king as a
disagreement between the British government and
the American oil companies. After an international
arbitration tribunal failed to resolve the issue in
1954, British military intervention put an end to the
Saudi presence in 1955. After independence (1971),
the United Arab Emirates ceded the coastal area

0 1 km Wadi
with the introduction of “neo-oasis” architecture. adjoining Qatar in exchange for a final renunciation
eet

From Dr S. Cleuziou works and Emirates Natural History Group documents.

Based on the publications of Serge Cleuziou and Emirates Natural History Group Documents.
Madha, opened up by the construction of a road,
moved from subsistence farming to commercial
farming, were oriented towards the Emirati market.
Al-Ain, which gets its water supply from the desali-
nization plants on the coast because of the drastic
fall in the groundwater level, still has farms in the
new irrigated areas, but the old abandoned palm
Because of its position as a crossroads and the
availability of water resources it was long coveted
by neighboring rulers. In the seventeenth century, it
was a bone of contention between the sultan of Mus-
cat and the imam of Nizwa; in the eighteenth cen-
tury, it passed to the control of Oman; from 1805, the
oases were subjected to forays by the Wahhabis, who
controlled the region partially until 1869. In 1891, the
emir of Abu Dhabi became ruler of al-Ain while the
of Saudi Arabia’s claim to al-Ain. The demarcation of
the border that passes through the city was officially
accepted in 2005. While the border remained porous
after 1971, the government of Abu Dhabi recently
built a wall with strictly guarded checkpoints, much
to the discontent of the people living along the bor-
der, to decrease infiltration of illegal immigrants
and drug smuggling from Iran through small Omani
ports after controls were tightened in Emirati ports.

97
Muscat’s Capital Region

The capital region (800,000 inhabitants) of the Sultanate of Oman stretches from EARLY COSMOPOLITISM
east to west over a distance of approximately 40 kilometres. It is fragmented due COMMUNITIES AND DISTRICTS IN MUSCAT AROUND 1900
to the limitations of the site, rocky hills with ravines that form a natural for-
Gulf of Oman
tress against inland tribes. For historical reasons, it was built around two cores
Mirani
nestled in sheltered bays. The Muttrah port (151,000 inhabitants), an active trad- Jilali
ing centre, presents a contrast with the imposing fortified city of Muscat (25,000
inhabitants). Situated four kilometres apart, these two cores, long connected by
a single path between the sea and the mountains and separated by an open
space, are now connected by an expressway. In addition to the site’s natural
beauty, tourists are attracted to Muttrah by its superb buildings belonging to N

rich merchants and old souks, and in Muscat by the historical edifices around
the sultan’s palace that have now been converted into museums.
Located almost at the middle of the coast of the Gulf of Oman, where it curves
towards the southwest, Muscat dethroned Sohar, a flourishing medieval port city
situated further north, in the sixteenth century. Muscat, which traded in goods
and slaves, built a prosperous colonial empire on the coasts of East Africa, Per-
sia, and India and was long coveted by the Portuguese, the Persians, the Dutch,
and the English. Its turbulent history gave the city its historical cosmopolitan
character and its community-based layout. Thus, the Lawatyas, an endogamous
Ismaʿili community probably originating in Sind but holding Omani nationality, Omani Arabs
have lived for generations in a gated district close to the Muttrah souk, where
Baluchi
they work as goldsmiths and jewellers. The Banias, Hindus belonging to merchant
castes, have been living here for centuries but do not have the Omani nationality. Bahraini Sultan’s Palace Mosque 0 100 200 m

Money-lenders to successive rulers of Muscat in the past, the Banias are concen- Persian British Consulate Fortress Pass
General
trated in a district close to the palace. In addition to these old foreign communi- Swahili Souk Wall Mountain
ties, who have been living in Muscat for a long time, since 1970 there has been
Fort
an influx of immigrants from the Indian subcontinent, constituting a little over Jadgah Indian bazar Escarpment

40 percent of the population, a figure higher than in other parts of the country. Adapted from F. Scholz, « La différenciation socio-spatiale de la ville arabo-musulmane. Le cas de Mascate », in B. Dumortier and
Adapted from F. Scholz, « La différenciation socio-spatiale de la ville arabo-musulmane. Le cas de Mascate », in B. Dumortier and M. Lavergne,
M. Lavergne, L’OmanKarthala,
contemporain,
2002. Karthala, 2002.
Hierarchies are now determined by income and pose a threat to older hierarchies L’Oman contemporain,

that were based on prestige. Thus the old divisions between communities are The city has branched out to the south into wadis, where small urban centres
becoming blurred and spatial differentiation on ethnic lines is making way for have developed in the wider parts of the valleys and newer districts are spread-
divisions based on differences in income. ing out. Separated from Muttrah by the residential district of Bayt al-Falaj,

98
 urban societies

A LINEAR FRAGMENTED URBAN REGION

N Urban area in 1970

Gulf of Oman Urban area in 2008

Large real estate project
Industrial area
Mina
Seeb al Fahl Airport area
The Wave Muscat Al Qurum Muttrah Park
Bayt Muscat Mangrove
Madinat as al Falaj
Sultan Qaboos Ruwi Unbuilt area
Al Udhaybah
Khuwayr Motorway
Wadi
al Kabir Motorway under construction
Ghala
Other road
Bawshar
0 2 4 6 8 10 km

From Explorer map and J.E. Peterson, Historical Muscat, Leiden, Brill, 2007.
From Explorer map and J.E. Peterson, Historical Muscat, Leiden, Brill, 2007.

Ruwi, the central business district of this multi-polar MUTRAH, A PORT AND A MERCANTILE CENTER MUSCAT, THE SULTANS’ CITADEL
capital, consists of international hotels, corporate
Gulf of Oman
headquarters, and offices of economic and finan- Hotel
Market, souk
Ministry
Museum
Gulf of Oman
N

cial institutions, while Wadi al-Kabir is an indus- Fort Fortress

trial and working class district. The city’s expansion Ancient
watchtower
Wall
Fort
is mainly directed towards the west, where the Ancient wall

Mirani
coastal plain of al-Batinah begins. Beyond the oil Fish Market Fort Jilali Fort
terminal and the refinery of Mina al-Fahal, Qurum Port Sultan Qaboos
Old Sultan
is a wealthy suburb. In al-Khuwair the middle-class port Palace
population lives south of the highway, while embas- or
niche
C

sies and ministries have been relocated north of it. N Soor

al Lawatya Gold
Medinat Sultan Qaboos is a new city, while Bushehr Souk
(150,000 inhabitants) grew out of a pre-existing vil-
lage. Beyond the Ghala and Udaibah districts that
house processing industries and warehouses, Seeb Mountain Mountain
(250,000 inhabitants) lies east of the airport. With Urban area Urban area
the establishment near the university and the Majlis Park Park

al-Shura (Consultative Assembly), the city of Seeb, 0 200 400 m

Unbuilt area
0 200 400 m
Unbuilt area

formerly an old village, constitutes a new centre at

the periphery of the capital region.

99
Sohar and Sur: Two Cities on the Gulf of Oman

Sohar and Sur, heirs to Oman’s rich thalassocratic past, are today just middle SUR
size cities in the Gulf region. On the national scale, they are regional capitals FROM A POLYCENTRIC SMALL TOWN TO AN EXPANDING TOWN
and part of a macrocephalic urban network dominated by Muscat. Sohar, whose
population jumped from 64,161 in 1993 to 95,728 in the 2003 census, is the coun- N
Historical core
Urban area
try’s third largest city, with 126,800 inhabitants in 2010. Sur, whose population before 1970
rose from 41,439 in 1993 to 47,727 in 2003, became the fifth largest town, but the from 1970 to 1990
fourth most populated urban agglomeration with 61,000 inhabitants by 2010. Gulf of Oman from 1990 to 2000
Located 220 km to the north of Muscat and 200 km to the south of Dubai, Al-Rusagh Expansion axis
Shariah
Sohar, the former capital of Oman, already mentioned in a sixth-century text,
was very prosperous from the eleventh to the fifteenth century and is purportedly
Sunaysilah
the birthplace of Sindbad the Sailor. Being the administrative capital of the al-
Batinah North Governorate, its area of influence interferes with the attractiveness Al-Janah
of Muscat, but also Rostaq. This oasis at the inland foothills of the western Hajar
Mountains was the capital of Oman in the eighteenth century and is now the Al-Ayjah

administrative capital of al-Batinah South. Al-Batinah (12,500 km2), the country’s Sur al-Sahil
most populated region with 28 percent of the total population, was divided in Husayniyah
Ghuaynah
two governorates in 2011.This is indicative of the tension between the coastal area Al-Subakh Al-Rashah
with its ports and the mountainous region with its oases—a tension that has influ- Bilad Sur Lagoon
enced Omani history and identity. Situated between coastal wadis that descend Al-Aqbah
Birmanah
from the foothills of the Hajar Mountains, Sohar presents the same dichotomy: International hotel

two strips of land running parallel to the seashore, the outer one traditionally Al-Hasa Cimetary
Nismah
dependent on fishing and the inner one on agriculture, separated from each other Sukaykirah
Agricultural area

Desert
by a palm grove. Sayh al-Qadim 0 1 km

After a long decline, Sohar is now part of regional urban dynamics, which From B.B.Mokhtar,
From Mokhtar,« Activités économiques
« Activités et extension
économiques urbaine
et extension à Sour à»,Sour »,
urbaine in B. Dumortier and M. Lavergne,
in B. Dumortier and M. L’Oman contemporain,
Lavergne, L’Oman contemporain, Karthala,
Karthala, 2002.
increases its polarization by the neighboring emirates and affirms its openness to 2002.

globalization. In 2001, a campus of Oman Medical College was established there,

as well as a university offering courses in various applied sciences, like manage-
ment, engineering, and information technology. These two private institutes,
established by the sultan’s decree, use English as the language of instruction and
award degrees recognized by the government in association respectively with
West Virginia University (USA) and Queensland University (Australia). Sohar City
Centre, a huge mall with shops and recreational facilities, has been announced
by the Majid al-Futtaim group of Dubai. But the largest project, with expertise
of Port of Rotterdam, consists of a deep-water port and a free zone that takes
advantage of Sohar’s strategic position close which avoids the ships crossing the
Strait of Hormuz. While GDF Suez is building a second power station, an alu-
minium factory, whose capital has been raised jointly by the Omani National
Oil Company (40 percent), the Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Company

100
 urban societies

SOHAR
TOWARDS THE REVIVAL OF AN ANCIENT CAPITAL
N

Salian Kurun Hadirah

Zafaran Hajirah Al-Subarah
Al-Afifah Al-Shizaw
Amq Sanqah Al-Shabul
Majis Al-Suwayhirah

Sohar
University

Sohar City
Centre

Wadi Jizi Wadi

Hil��
THE NEW PORT OF SOHAR
Wadi International hotel
Suq AN AMBITIOUS PROJECT
Oman Medical Museum
Port area Agricultural area College Urban area in 1987
Souk
Industrial area Oasis Urban area in 2001 Shopping Mall Port area Villages and agricultural
under construction areas
Park Desert Real estate project in operation
0 2 km Private university Road
in development existing
Adapted from
Adapted fromSohar
SoharDevelopment
DevelopmentOffice technical
Office documents.
technical documents. under construction
in project
in project
Free zone
Airport area
(in operation, in development)
(40 percent), and the Canadian company, Alcan oasis villages, is added to these two cores located on Industrial area
(in operation, in development)
(20 percent), opened in 2007. Early in 2011, Sohar wit- either side of the lagoon’s entrance. Its topographi-

N
Aluminium melting plant
nessed demonstrations and violent clashes between cal fragmentation, a mosaic of tribes and religious Gulf of Oman
the police and Omani youths demanding jobs and differences between the two shores, which are not
higher wages. connected by a bridge, has delayed the integration
Sur, 150 km to the south of Muscat, is the main city of the city’s components. Confined for a long time
of al-Sharqiyah. Until the 2011 administrative reform, to activities connected with the sea (fishing, build- to
to
it was the capital of the al-Sharqiyah Governorate ing dhows, sea-trade with East Africa, slave-trading, Dubai
Muscat

which comprises an area of 36,800 km2 and 13 per-
cent of the country’s population according to the
2003 census; it accounts for about a fifth of the popu-
lation of this largely rural area. Sur is now the capital
of al-Sharqiyah South Governorate, while Ibra is the
capital of al-Sharqiyah South. The city, whose built-
up area has asymmetrically grown tenfold over the
last quarter century, has expended northward from
Sur al-Sahil, settled by Ibadi Muslims, and al-Ayjah,
etc.), Sur witnessed considerable development of
its informal commercial and industrial sector dur-
ing the 1970s. The change was accelerated when the
College of Education was built in 1996 and an under-
graduate private college, in collaboration with Bond
University (Australia) in 2001, but above all when
the Qalat gas terminal located about 20 kilometres
to the north was completed during the same year.
0 2 km to Abu
Notably, Sur and Qalat were seriously damaged by Dhabi

inhabited by Wahhabis. Today, Bilad Sur, a group of the cyclone Gonu in June 2007. From Sohar
From Sohar Industrial
Industrial Port
Port Company.
Company.

101
The Port City of Bandar Abbas

Above all, Bandar Abbas is the principal Iranian port that handles 75 percent DEVELOPMENT TOWARDS THE SOUTH
of the country’s imports and 90 percent of its non-oil exports. Due to its stra-
tegic location on the Strait of Hormuz, it has received considerable attention Urban area

from Tehran over the last two decades and has seen continuous development Container port
Mineral and oil
as a result of huge investments. Known in ancient times as Hormirzad and later terminal

named Bandar Gumruk by the Persians and Comorao by the Portuguese, it was Shipyard

used for some time by the English and the Dutch, and rented out to the Sultan- Desert

ate of Oman from 1780 to 1868. Bandar Abbas (renamed in honor of Shah Abbas International airport
BANDAR ABBAS
Other airport
the Great who drove out the Portuguese) was a minor Iranian port for the most Road
part of the twentieth century, during which time the principal ports were Aba- Railways
Foulad Jetty Shahid Bahonar
dan and Khorramshahr at the end of the Gulf. But the war between Iraq and

A SEAFRONT CITY Shahid Rajaee (SEZ)

0 5 km

Iran changed the situation completely. The front-line ports on the Shatt al-
Arab (Arvand Rud) were, to a large extent, destroyed, making Bandar Abbas,
situated far from Iraq, the main trading centre for the Islamic Republic of
Iran, which has become increasingly isolated at the international level. Goods
imported from the West, as well as those manufactured in Asia, transit mainly
through Dubai on the opposite shore. They are then trans-shipped back to
Iran and partly re-exported to the Caucasus, and Central Asian countries.
Bandar Abbas, which was a small fishing harbor with 17,000 inhabitants in
1955, had a population of over 350,000 by 2010. The urban area is spread over
International hotel
almost 50 km along the coast, but the city itself is concentrated on about 15
Urban area Shopping mall kilometres. The urban core consists of the old harbor where dhows plying the
Park
Historic building trade with the opposite shore berth with their mixed cargoes, a lively bazaar,
Unbuilt area
Train station
Railways
and numerous administrative buildings, because Bandar Abbas is the capital of
0 500 1000 m
the province of Hormozgan. To the east, the city ends in a large area occupied

102
 urban societies

THE CAPITAL OF HORMOZGAN PROVINCE, BETWEEN ZAGROS AND THE GULF

Rudan 0 to 500 m
Fin
Fars Kerman 500 to 1000 m
2681 m
1000 to 2000 m
Minab
BANDAR ABBAS
Sistan
Shahid Rajaee Hormuz and
Bastak Bandar Pol
Qeshm Sanderk Baluchestan
Bandar Khamir
Lark Angohran
Gavbandi Jenah
Bandar Suza
Sirik
Lavan Hengam
t of Horm
Stra i
Bandar Charak Qeshm

uz
Kish Bandar Kong
Hendarabi
Bandar Lengeh
Kish

Provincial capital Historic building Nature reserve Motorway

OMAN
Main town Special Economic Zone International airport Other road
Jahlu

Other town Free zone Other airport Railways Jask

0 10 20 30 40 50 km
UAE

by the airport, which links Bandar Abbas with Teh-
ran and other large Iranian cities, as well as Shiraz
and Kish, and also Dubai. Westward, the port con-
tinues to expand. There lies the heart of the urban
economy, which includes a fishing harbor, an impor-
tant naval base linked with a military airport, huge
docks where cargo and container ships berth, oil
terminals, and several industrial zones, including a
steel mill and the country’s largest aluminium fac-
tory. The Shahid Bahonar port, located eight kilo-
metres from the city, is being modernized. About
15 kilometres further, the modern port of Shahid
Rajaee, built in 1983 and developed further in several
stages, continues to expand. In the frame of a spe-
cial economic zone open to foreign investment, and
with assistance from the port of Hamburg, it expects
to provide international quality services to ships.
Machine tools, arms, metal products, food, and phar-
maceuticals enter the country through its docks and
wharves, and it exports fruits and almonds, carpets,
leather, and steel. An oil and ore terminal is situ-
ated between these two ports. These port facilities
also include a shipbuilding yard. Bandar Abbas, a
port of strategic importance to the country’s devel-
opment, is connected by excellent highways and
railway lines with economic centres in the country’s
interior.
At the regional level, Bandar Abbas is closely
linked with Qeshm Island, which has a population
of around 115,000 dispersed in some 50 small towns
and villages. The island’s inhabitants pursue tradi-
tional occupations like fishing and farming, as well
as more modern occupations recently introduced to
the island, which has a free zone like Kish. Tourism
is growing fast, thanks to the presence of a nature
reserve and archaeological and historical remains,
and its proximity to the states of the Gulf Coopera-
tion Council, from which a number of expatriate
workers come, if only for a day, to renew their visas.
Bandar Abbas is also developing links with the small
coastal town of Asaluyeh, about 400 km by road,
with which the capital of Hormozgan will be linked
by a gas pipeline. A large number of installations for
processing gas, petrochemical factories, and heavy
industries are being developed in the Pars Special
Economic Energy Zone that was set up in the 1990s
near Asaluyeh, and where 27 industrial projects are
being implemented.

103
Abadan and Khorramshahr: Two Oil Cities

Situated about 15 km apart on the left bank of the Shatt al-Arab, known as A STRATEGIC BORDER AREA
Arvand Rud in Persian, Khorramshahr and Abadan are very different from each S
IRAN

ha
other, although they have close links. The present city of Khorramshahr, located al

tt
Basra - Arab Bandar
Mahshahr
at the confluence of the Karun and Arvand Rud rivers, has been in existence at Khorramshahr

least since the fourteenth century. In 1815, the Bedouin tribe of Bu Kassab named Al Zubair
Abadan Bandar
Emam Khomeyni
it Muhammarah and made it the capital of an independent emirate situated
International
between Persia and the Ottoman Empire. Claimed by both Turks and Persians, border Main
IRAQ airports
the city changed hands several times. In 1925, when Reza Shah established the Speed way
Refinery
Pahlavi dynasty in Tehran, the Persians tightened their control over the region, Secondary
road Gas
which lost its name of Arabistan. Since then, the region has been known as Khuz- Umm Qasr Railways
treatment
plant
estan, while the city took the name of Khorramshahr. In the meantime it grew Qasemiyeh Oil pipeline
Oil
terminal
considerably, due to the discovery of oil in the region in 1908. Khorramshahr K U WA I T Al Faw Container
Gas pipeline
0 10 km port
then became a very busy port with facilities for berthing high tonnage ships, Arab- Pe rsian Gulf

mainly involved in the export of petroleum. Abadan, too, grew significantly dur-
ing the same period. Described as a small port at the time of the Abbasids, it AN OIL CITY UNDER RECONSTRUCTION

is situated on an island bounded by the rivers Arvand Rud and Bahmansir, a IRAN Main road
secondary emissary of the Karun. Abadan was no more than a village when the Railways
site was selected by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company for building an oil township River, canal
and a refinery, the world’s biggest before World War II. The development of the Airport
r
oil industry is thus responsible for the importance acquired by these two cities Khorramshahr
Ri
ve
Port area
in the early years of the twentieth century, one built on the foundations of an run
Ka Oil pipeline
ancient urban nucleus and the other newly established. Today, both cities bear Oil area
the scars of the eight-year war between Iraq and Iran.

Ba
Khorramshahr was and still is structured by its port-based economy mainly Mahrat

hma
IRAQ
dependent on petroleum, but also import-export activities facilitated by the

ns i r
navigability of the Karun River. Its population, which was no more than 34,000
in 1991, had risen to 130,000 by 2010. It includes Arabs descended from nomadic

Arvan
Urban area

tribes, which traditionally moved from one bank of the Shatt al-Arab to the Free zone

d Ru
other, and Persians who have been living in the area since ancient times or have Agricultural area

come from other parts of Iran to participate in the economic boom associated

d
Marsh, flood risk area Abadan

with the development of the oil industry. Abadan, since its creation, is a planned Desert
0 5 km

104
 urban societies

city, built by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company as an adjunct to its refinery and
the port linked with it. The city had a population of 100,000 around 1950 and
more than 290,000 in 1976. Though it fell below 85,000 in the early 1990s, it had
reached 230,000 by 2010. Its urban structure reflects the hierarchy of a largely
industrial society. These social inequalities, which were ingrained in the city’s
districts from the time of its creation, are reinforced by marked ethnic differ-
ences. Despite latent tensions caused by this situation, its cultural diversity and
its fairly high salaries have made Abadan famous all over Iran for its freedom
and tolerance.
The war during the 1980s was accompanied by the brutal occupation of the
Iranian shore by the Iraqi army, fierce battles, and bombing. Houses, factories,
port facilities, and transport services were completely destroyed and the civil-
ian population sought refuge outside the combat zone. More than twenty years
after the end of hostilities, reconstruction is still going on and economic activi-
ties remain much below the level that existed in the late 1970s. Although there is
no doubt that the Abadan refinery has partially regained its earlier momentum
and the airport located between the two cities has recovered its activity, traffic
in the ports is still limited. The vast and ambitious project of the Arvand Free
Zone Organization will certainly contribute to the recovery of the two cities. It
proposes to develop the riverbank over an area of 155 km2 on either side of Khor-
ramshahr and Abadan (with the help of foreign capital) by taking advantage
of the existing infrastructure in the two cities. This project proposes to build a
railway line between Khorramshahr and Basra in Iraq and another to connect
this free zone with the ports of Bandar Imam Khomeini and Bandar Mahshahr.
The project also envisages setting up oil-related industries, various factories, and
even developing tourism. However, some have voiced concern that the project
involves tightening government control over the border areas and eventually
evicting the Arabic-speaking population of its villages. Be that as it may, Khor-
ramshahr and Abadan entered a new phase of development that could put an
end to a long period of stagnation that began with the Iraqi attack and continued
because of the regional instability caused by later conflicts and the persistent
uncertainty in the Gulf.

KHORRAMSHAHR ABADAN
N N
Destroyed historical
City center
city center
Oil city Oil city Bahma
nsir
Urban area Urban area

Recent expansion Airport

ver
n Ri
Ar Ka r u
Arvand
va Oil area Rud
nd 0 1 km
Ru Industrial area
d
Oil storage Refinery
Agricultural area Refinery Agricultural area
0 1 km facility expansion

105
Integration of Metropolitan Areas
Since the first decade of the twenty-first century, it is possible to see along the
Arabo-Persian Gulf an emerging megalopolis like those that exist in many parts
of the world. Such territories, some of which have already acquired a defini-
tive structure while others have not, are extensive, highly urbanized areas that
include a network of metropolitan cities as well as small and medium-sized
towns, agricultural areas, and tourist destinations. These are areas where politi-
cal, economic, and financial power are concentrated, where the head offices of
large corporations and media houses that influence public opinion are located,
together with major universities and research centres, and where the latest
fashions in clothes and music are launched. Organized by one or two very
large cities, these megalopolises are the products of globalization and are the
expression of a new cosmopolitanism even as they retain the main character of
the cultural area in which they are embedded and in which they appear to be
the centre.
The megalopolis that is emerging along the Gulf coast is made of a discontinu-
ous territory. It consists of a series of densely populated areas built on sandy ter-
rain along the coast, and large tracts of desert crossed by highways and oil and
gas pipelines. It constitutes a spatial archipelago whose elements are connected
by flow of people, goods, and capital and also by economic agreements and a
strategic alliance in the form of the Gulf Cooperation Council. This territory is
being developed across powerful economic networks that bring together the cit-
ies and ports extending from Kuwait to North Oman. It also includes agricultural
or urbanized oases in the desert and in the foothills. It maintains an ambivalent
relationship with the Iranian coast. It conforms to the megalopolis model because
of the strong complementarities between the chain of coastal cities interspersed
with oil and gas deposits, many of them offshore, oil terminals, industrial zones,
and military bases. The arid environment and geopolitical tensions make this
megalopolis quite unique.
The nucleus of this vast metropolitan system is situated in the eastern region
with Dubai as the economic hub, closely associated with Abu Dhabi, the capital
of the Federation of the United Arab Emirates and also, because of its enormous
oil resources, the capital of the wealthiest emirate. Ambitious plans to expand
106
these two cities and grandiose infrastructure projects on the federal scale have
led to the emergence of a powerful, polycentric coastal urban expanse with
three international airports and several seaports closely connected with other
large cities in the region, which now count among the globe’s major cities. Par-
adoxically, this metropolitan dynamic gained strength during the real estate
and banking crisis that struck Dubai in 2009, when Abu Dhabi took charge of
a part of Dubai’s assets, thereby increasing its influence not only within the
Federation but also in the entire megalopolis. An inland city with a popula-
tion of 500,000, the al-Ain oasis is also a part of this metropolitan area. Serving
simultaneously as residential, touristic, and agricultural areas, many oases are
connected by good roads to the coastal cities, supplying them with fresh fruits
and vegetables. They have also become attractive weekend destinations for the
residents of the large coastal cities. In addition, several ports and industrial cit-
ies like Bandar Abbas on the Iranian coast (located only a few hundred kilome-
tres from Abu Dhabi and Dubai) are growing at a rapid pace. Although they lie
outside the megalopolitan system, they share the dynamics that are driving the
other coastal developments. Defying the embargo imposed by western powers,
there is considerable trade, though mostly illicit, between the opposite shores of
the Gulf.
Further west, another group of cities are less powerful and less connected
with the other elements of the emerging megalopolis. This group includes the
Saudi Arabian cities of al-Jubail and Dammam, where there is a concentration
of oil-related activities. Then there is Manama, the capital of Bahrain, where
the financial sector is dominant, followed by Doha, the capital of Qatar, which
has been growing rapidly over the last few years following the exploitation of its
enormous gas deposits. In the interior, the role the Saudi oasis of al-Ahsa plays
in its adjoining urban areas is similar to that of al-Ain. The portion of this area
belonging to Saudi Arabia is evidently under the influence of Riyadh, with which
it has a lot of exchanges. Although it is not part of the megalopolitan system,
the royal Saudi capital wields considerable influence on the region’s dynamic.
No decision is taken in the coastal cities without taking into account Riyadh’s
view on the subject and nothing happens without Riyadh showing an interest.
 urban societies

THE EMERGENCE OF A COASTAL MEGALOPOLITAN SYSTEM the building of this megalopolis. Though located in
the neighborhood and despite their oil wealth, the
economies of Basra in Iraq and Khorramshahr and
Abadan in Iran have not yet fully recovered from the
destruction wreaked by the war, while the borders
between the three states have not become the kind
of trading centres that they could be in the future,
which would make them a part of the megalopolitan
dynamics.
At the other end of the emerging megalopolis,
beyond the Strait of Hormuz, the cities of the Gulf
of Oman have not yet acquired enough strength
to occupy an important place in this system. How-
ever, the development of the Indian Ocean coast,
whose ports benefit from not having to cross the
Strait of Hormuz, is significant and its trade links
with the urban areas of the emirates are becom-
ing stronger. On the other hand, the oases on the
inland foothills of the mountains bordering the
coast, including Nizwa, the former capital of an
independent mountainous state, have been affected
by the exodus of their inhabitants to the coastal cit-
ies, despite measures to develop the area and they
remain relatively unaffected by the dynamics expe-
rienced in the Gulf.
Agglomeration belonging to Stong decisional
Mountain Area under urban influence Strong ties Permeability
the megalopolitan system capacity
Urban oasis inside the Decisional Weak ties Impermeability
Desert Area of oil production
megalopolitan system capacity
Main exchanges
Agglomeration outside the
Gulf Irrigated agricultural area
megalopolitan system

Even though it is located about a thousand kilome-
tres from the Gulf coast and separated from it by the
Zagros Mountains, Tehran to some extent exerts a
similar influence. As Iran’s capital, Tehran’s imprint
is seen on the economic and military strategies of
the Iranian coast. And though Iran is considered an
enemy state, there is a flourishing trade with it across
the Gulf, and this influences the policies adopted on
the opposite shore.
The influence of Tehran is also notable at the
north-western end of the megalopolitan system.
Similarly, the Iraqi military-political dynamic, in
which Baghdad plays a determining role, has reper-
cussions in Kuwait. The relative isolation of Kuwait,
the capital of a rich oil emirate, is the result of persis-
tent political tensions in this part of the Gulf, which
has been through three wars in thirty years. In fact,
Kuwait does not participate as much as it should in

107
Conclusion
The Gulf, an expanse of shallow salty water surrounded by the desert or nar-
row coastal plains at the foot of mountain ranges (the Hajar Mountains of
Oman and the Zagros Mountains of Iran), has been a space for movements
and since antiquity. The discovery and exploitation of oil in the first decades
of the twentieth century transformed it into a critically important area for the
great powers and a wealthy region at the global level. There are strong differ-
ences between the region’s states, mainly former official British protectorates
like Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the Trucial States, or informal ones like Oman
and Muscat. These differences are a result of their oil histories, decreasing from
north to south, and the volume of their production and reserves, together with
the pre-existence of a diversified economic base due to the availability of more
ample water resources, as in the case of Iraq, Iran, and Oman. Open to reforms
(Kuwait, Qatar, Abu Dhabi) or having little choice given the scarcity (Dubai and
Sharjah) or exhaustion (Bahrain) of a non-renewable resource, the respective
authorities are working to diversify the economy. Consequently, since the 1990s
there has been a remarkable transformation in this region, which has served as
an interface throughout history. Located in a part of the world that has been a
bridge between Africa and Asia, between the Indian Ocean and the Mediter-
ranean Sea, acting as trading centres linking the Middle East to the rest of the
world and an area of transit between the West and the East, the cities on these
coveted coasts are now emerging as important players in the regional and global
stage. On the Arabian coast, these cities are being built with external resources:
migrant workers from Arab countries, South and Southeast Asia; technology
imported from the West; town-planning models inspired by North America;
and public policies that increasingly assimilate global norms prescribed by UN
agencies. On the Iranian coast, the port cities on the periphery of the national
territory attract people from the country’s central regions, and differ from the
rest of the country because they have been historically more open to the sea
than turned towards the inland plateau, and due to their continual interaction
with the opposite shore.
The maps and graphics in this atlas reveal that the rapid advance towards
modernity of these societies still bears the imprint of both the tribal organization
and Islam. Their distinctive characteristics are shaped by an economy based on
108
the complementarity between the sea, the desert, and, in some cases, moun-
tains with more abundant water resources. These societies combined trading
activities in a series of small ports with traditional agriculture based on careful
irrigation practices in oases isolated in the desert, scattered along the coast, or
located on the foothills of the mountains, and with a Bedouin culture charac-
terized by nomadic pastoralism and caravan trade. The use of new techniques
helps to keep alive a past rich in original solutions, while elements of traditional
life like dromedaries, dhows, and falcons have been imbued with a symbolic
value, and vernacular knowledge and practices acquired the status of intan-
gible heritage. Some oases are revitalized by new farming systems and some
ports by the establishment of commercial and industrial free zones. Islamic
banking institutions and products have been created in order to conform to
religious prescriptions regarding financial ethics. By going beyond the oil rent
economic model and diversifying their activities, the region’s societies have
become part of a new dynamic that heralds change. Thus, even though they
do not have industrial traditions, some states have become top-ranking pro-
ducers of chemical fertilizers, plastics, and aluminium. Trade has been revo-
lutionized by the construction of deep-water ports able to handle the latest
generation of container ships. Dubai has become one of the world’s largest
ports, while the region as a whole has become a major hub for the movement
of goods between Asia and the West. Some of the region’s airports, like Dubai
and Doha, have become indispensable hubs for long-haul flights, while some
airlines like Emirates and Etihad have acquired an enviable reputation in the
global market. Finally, thanks to a wide range of hotels, not limited to pres-
tigious iconic five-star establishments, and its communication policy, Dubai
ranks among the most visited destinations of the Arab world, hosting as many
tourists as Morocco and Tunisia. In other cities, heavy investments have been,
or are being made to increase the number of hotel rooms in order to develop
tourism by offering a wide range of tourism products and to host large-scale
sports and cultural events that receive wide media coverage. Abu Dhabi is a
perfect example of this endeavour, building a cultural district with the backing
of the world’s leading museums, offering beaches, organising discovery tours by
canoe in the mangroves, and having constructed a motor-racing circuit to host

the Formula-1 Grand Prix. The development models followed by the Gulf States
appear original, and include, paradoxically, the anti-western Islamic Republic
of Iran and the ultra-conservative, yet pro-western Saudi Arabia. Quite surpris-
ingly, the growth of the region’s most liberal countries seems, on many counts,
to prefigure the world’s future. On one hand, people throughout the world live
in ever increasing numbers in large cities. Now societies in the Gulf, where the
highest rates of urbanization in the world are observed, are basically urban. City
centres are filled with high-rise buildings, and peripheral districts are sprawl-
ing along the coastal highways and roads across the desert. On the other hand,
the environment and sustainability are core issues today. Because of the vul-
nerability of their arid ecosystems, societies in the Gulf maintain a strong rela-
tionship with nature, even though this nature, anthropized for thousands of
years and today strongly artificial, is now threatened by rapid changes in the
economy and lifestyles. Cities built on fragile coasts or on desert sands are now
obliged to look for solutions to ecological problems, particularly in the areas of
water management, carbon emissions, and waste disposal. They have recently
adopted sustainable development strategies based on energy transition: use of
solar and wind energy, development of public transport, and climate-friendly
architecture. Though these strategies may not always be effective and may often
be restricted to debates and discussions, they reflect, nevertheless, the keen
desire of the Gulf States to ensure their future survival. Finally, in a more general
context marked by drastic changes in the social system, these societies manifest
all the trends that accompany the phenomenon of globalization the world over:
the assertion of multiculturalism, widening inequalities, and a certain type of
authoritarianism.
The societies in the Gulf are essentially multicultural, given the massive and
multifaceted migrations that have been taking place over the years. During the
last decades, most of the region’s cities have recorded an extraordinary increase
in population. Such growth is linked to the influx of migrants from other regions
and hence of different ethno-linguistic groups on the Iranian coast. On the Ara-
bian coast, the population has exploded, due to the influx of foreigners, the only
exception being Iraq, and this because of its turbulent history during the last
thirty years. Today, these foreigners comprise a large portion of the population,
at times even a majority, and constitute entire communities that coexist and spe-
cialize in particular occupations according to their nationality, religious group
or region of origin. In most of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, English is
fast becoming the lingua franca in offices, shops, and transport, though people
speak their own language at home and socialize with people from the same geo-
graphical area. There are marked differences in the income and status of various
groups. The Gulf societies are therefore highly inequitable. They are organized,
conclusion
like all other societies, in a hierarchy of social strata determined by wealth and
standard of living. The lifestyle of wealthy local families, rich entrepreneurs,
and foreign experts is antipodal to that of construction workers and domestic
help. But this glaring contrast, which strikes travellers on a short visit, should
not diminish the importance of the middle classes that include not only immi-
grants, but also a part of the local population. Similarly, ill treatment of labour-
ers and excesses committed by dishonest employers or the tragic experiences
of exploited immigrants should not divert our attention from the opportunities
to move up the social scale. Among the local population, there is a hierarchy of
prestige that overrides economic differences, as a person’s status is determined
by his tribal or geographical origins, leading to divisions and even antagonism
between groups on account of old feuds.
The diversity of their place in the society illustrates the complexity of the sta-
tus accorded to women, their dress being the most visible sign. With the excep-
tion of Iran and Saudi Arabia, women in black abayas mingle freely with South
Asian women in colorful clothes, as well as a variety of women in western outfits
in many cities of the Gulf. Yet overall, women’s lifestyles and status differ dras-
tically according to their social and geographical origin and their family back-
ground. In the absence of gender studies based on in-depth research, it is not
possible to classify them. Concealed behind veils, women in the Gulf frequently
visit malls with their family and friends, when they are not confined behind the
walls of their houses. But among those who are educated, and this number is
rapidly increasing, many show enough determination to take up employment,
become career women, and bring about a change in society. Western women,
when they decide to take up employment, hold skilled jobs. The wives of middle-
level Arab and Asian executives stay at home or work in offices and shops that
also employ foreign women who have come to the Gulf on their own. Women
immigrants from the poorer Asian countries work as domestic help or cleaners.
Finally, societies in the Gulf are characterized by authoritarianism, which is
now spreading to many societies all over the world. More than anywhere else,
these societies exercise a strict control over the population through electronic
surveillance systems that utilize sophisticated technology. On the Iranian shore,
protest movements against the government are not tolerated. The Arabian coast
is ruled by monarchies, which do not yet allow a large place for modern repre-
sentative systems of government, nor for the full expression of an organized civil
society. These Arab monarchies still retain traditional methods of consultation
(shura) and consensus (ijma), in addition to direct access to authority through
the majlis, where sheikhs hear complaints and requests. Although the funda-
ments of existing institutions, the ruling dynasties and religious values, cannot
be questioned, rapid social changes are nevertheless openly debated and aired by
109
the media. Foreigners are mostly allowed to follow their own lifestyles and prac-
tice their religion in appropriate places of worship such as Christian churches
and Hindu temples. But rules pertaining to this freedom vary from country to
country and place to place.
Despite historical and geopolitical divergences between the two shores of the
Gulf, they have maintained trade relations over the centuries and are generally
driven by interrelated interests. Urban dynamics triggered by the petroleum
industry and globalization are similar, although their pace and intensity may not
be the same on account of differences in their economic policies. While Abadan
and Khorramshahr, like Basra in Iraq, are slowly overcoming the ravages of war,
Bushehr and Bandar Abbas have recorded a significant demographic and spatial
growth, while on the islands of Kish and Qeshm, like in the port of Shah Bahar,
free zones have been established, as well as in the coastal area near the huge
offshore gas deposits of South Pars. This peripheral area reveals all the contradic-
tions of a regime that advocates economic self-sufficiency but at the same time
provides loopholes to bypass its own laws in order to participate in globaliza-
tion, while a flourishing sea trade with the ports on the Arabian coast, particu-
larly Dubai, makes it possible to get round the embargo imposed on Iran.
110
On the Arabian coast, urban management, sustainable development, multicul-
turalism, marked social contrasts, and security are issues of crucial importance
for the future. Thanks to their revenues from oil and gas and the diversification of
their economies, these cities involved in a collective dynamic based on comple-
mentarity and competition. Such a dynamic led to the emergence of a multipo-
lar metropolitan structure, a megalopolis in the midst of the desert that is likely
to become the centre of the Arab world and play a leading role in the global
economy. To ensure this central place, these societies are obliged to pursue the
innovation process they have started to adopt. They must ensure that their mul-
ticulturalism gives rise to new initiatives, that their hierarchical structure per-
mits social advancement, and that their authoritarianism, touted as a guarantee
of peace and security, upholds the human rights of their people. At a time when
the people of the Arab world are demanding more freedom and development,
the progress towards greater modernity and the pursuit of regional integration
are indispensable conditions for building an effective and dynamic megalopoli-
tan structure. The region’s future is, however, uncertain because of the geopoliti-
cal and geostrategic conditions prevailing in the region and in the world.
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Index

Abadan, 38, 74, 75, 102, 104, 105, 107, 110 aluminium (industry), 3, 42, 43, 59, 60, Baghdad, 8, 32, 40, 48, 77, 80, 81, 82, 107 Bilad al-Qadeem, 88
Abbasid (Caliphate), 76, 104 87, 89, 100, 103, 108 Bahmansir River, 104 borders
Abqaiq, 59, 87 Amwaj Islands, 89 Bahrain, 2, 8, 12, 14, 20, 26, 27, 33, 40, disputes over, 15, 32, 61, 63, 64, 65
Abu Dhabi, 10, 16, 20, 26, 27, 33, 38, 39, Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 24, 104, 42, 44, 46, 49, 52, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, maritime, 57, 62
40, 41, 43, 45, 46, 49, 51, 62, 64, 65, 105 84, 88, 89, 106, 108 Braudel, Fernand, 2, 10
66, 67, 71, 92, 93, 96, 97, 106 aquifers, 17, 18, 96 Bahrain Financial Harbor, 89 bridges, 40, 41, 63, 83, 89, 92
Abu Dhabi Tourism Authority, 49 Arabia, Horn of, 9 Bahrain Monetary Agency, 60 “Friendship Bridge,” 40
Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Arabian coast, 6, 16, 17, 20, 108, 109, 110 Bahrain World Trade Centre, 89 British, 14, 24, 33, 46, 77, 81, 88, 97
Company, 100–101 Arabian Peninsula, 1, 7, 11, 72, 76 Baluchis, 33, 75 Empire, 14, 20
Abu al-Khasib, 77 Arabian Sea, 1, 2, 10, 33, 72 Baluchistan, 11 protectorates, 56, 60, 64, 71, 72, 80,
Abu Musa (islands of), 33, 52, 65 Arabistan. See Khuzestan Bandar Abbas, 11, 38, 39, 41, 43, 74, 75, 108
Academic City (Dubai), 51 Arab League, 56 102, 103, 106, 110 British East India Company, 14, 64
Adliya district, 88 Arabo-Persian Gulf, 1, 2, 6, 68, 69, 70, Bandar Gumruk, 102 British Petroleum, 24
Africa, 1, 31, 72, 108 71, 72, 73, 106, 108 Bandar Imam Khomeini (formerly Bubiyan Island, 57, 83
Africa, Horn of, 1, 9 Arabs, 8, 11, 12, 33, 36, 56, 104 Bandar Shapur), 75, 105 al-Bu Falah (tribe), 66, 92
agriculture, 18, 19, 59, 63, 66, 70, 71, 73, Aramco (Arabian American Oil Bandar Lengeh, 11, 75 al-Bu Falasah, 66
75, 76, 86, 88, 97, 100, 103, 108 Company), 24, 58, 84, 85 Bandar Mahshahr, 105 Bu Kassab, 104
al-Ahmadi, 83 archaeological (remains), 1, 8, 10, 92, Bandar Taheri, 8 Bul Hanin, 62
al-Ahsa, 38, 39, 58, 59, 86, 87, 106 96, 103 Banias (Hindus), 98 al-Bunduq (oilfield), 62
al-Ahsa Development Company, 87 architecture, 62, 82, 90, 95, 97, 109 Bani Yas tribe, 66 Buraimi Oasis, 65, 96, 97
Ahvaz, 38, 39, 43, 74 al-Areen (project), 89 banking, 46, 85, 87 Bur Dubai, 94
al-Ain, 39, 65, 66, 96, 97, 106 aridity, 6, 16, 18, 64, 70, 96, 106, 109 crisis, 3, 47, 106 Burgan oilfield, 56
air bases, 85, 92 Arvand Free Zone Organization, 105 Islamic, 46, 60, 108 Burj al-Arab, 94
airports, 6, 40, 59, 71, 84, 85, 86, 89, 90, Arvand Rud (P., Shatt al-Arab), 6, 74, offshore, 46, 60 Burj Khalifa, 94
92, 103, 105, 106, 108 104. See also Shatt al-Arab Basra, 2, 8, 14, 26, 32, 33, 38, 39, 57, 76, al-Bu Said (rulers), 14
Ajman, 39, 45, 64, 65, 68, 70, 94, 95 Asaluyeh, 75, 103 77, 80, 81, 105, 107, 110 Bushehr, 14, 38, 74, 75, 99, 110
Ajman University of Science and Asia, 1, 31, 32, 72, 73, 102, 108 Basra University, 51
Technology, 68 Asir, 58 Bastakiya, 11, 94 camels/dromedaries, 9, 18, 87, 96, 108
ALBA (Aluminium Bahrain), 43 Australians, 37, 43 al-Batinah, 73, 99, 100 Canada, 28, 31
Alcan, 101 authoritarianism, 109, 110 Bayt al-Falaj, 98 Cape of Good Hope, 31
Algeria, 28, 31 al-Ayjah, 101 beaches, 69, 70, 108 Capital City (Abu Dhabi), 93
Algiers Agreement of 1975, 32 Bedouin (tribes/culture), 14, 18, 58, 62, cash crops, 19, 69, 71
Al-Jazeera, 63 Ba’athist ruling party, 77, 80 65, 83, 86, 92, 104, 108 CASOC (California Arabian Standard
Almoayyed Tower, 89 Bab al-Mandeb, Strait of, 31 al-Bida, 90 Oil Company), 84

115
Caspian Sea, 8, 41, 44, 75 Deira coastal road, 67 special economic zones, 43, 44, 45, Failaka Island, 57, 83
cement (industry), 42, 43, 62, 87 democracy, 32, 57, 65 66, 75, 90, 93, 103 falaj (irrigation channel), 96
Central Business District (CBD; Abu democratization process, 61 economy, 20 al-Fateh Grand Mosque, 89
Dhabi), 93 demographics, 53, 56, 62, 65, 110 of culture, 51 al-Faw, 77
chemical (industry), 42, 89. See also demonstrations, 2, 52, 61, 101, 109 global, 25, 50, 110 Federal University (al-Ain), 96
fertilizers; industry desalinization plants, 17, 18, 29, 92, 97 post oil strategies, 37 Federation (of the United Arab
China, 8, 9, 26, 31, 43 desert, 18, 19, 38, 56, 57, 62, 72, 77, 82, rent-based, 3 Emirates), 40, 45, 49, 64, 65, 67, 69,
Chinese, 8, 43 106, 108 traditional, 18, 68, 71, 100, 103 70, 71, 92, 96, 106. See also United
Christianity/Christians, 1, 10, 13, 77, 80 Dhahran, 39, 58, 84, 85 (See also agriculture; fishing) Arab Emirates
cities, 38, 40, 41 Dhaid Oasis, 69 ecosystem, 6, 71, 109 fertilizer (industry), 42, 56, 60, 108
coastal, 3, 6, 40, 58, 106, 107 Dhofar (area), 8, 72 education, 50, 51, 56, 63, 87 financial
industrial, 62, 74, 84, 90, 106 dhows, 9, 21, 64, 73, 94, 101, 108 Education City (Qatar), 63 centres, 60, 67, 80
Coalition, 56, 59, 81 Dibba, 69, 71 Egypt/Egyptians, 37, 48, 56 institutions, 2, 60, 88, 99
Comorao, 102 Dilmun, 8, 60, 89 electricity, 53, 74. See also power plants markets, 47
construction diving, 69, 71 embargo (by the West), 27, 38, 39, 75, rent, 46
projects, 6, 18, 21, 39, 41, 43, 51, 53, Doha, 38, 39, 40, 41, 51, 59, 62, 82, 90, 76, 106, 110 sector, 3, 71, 106
57, 63, 66, 71, 74, 75, 80, 82, 89, 92, 91, 106 emigration, 36 fishing, 9, 20, 21, 38, 58, 62, 70, 71, 75,
93, 96, 97 Dubai, 2, 11, 26, 38, 39, 40, 41, 44, 45, emir (title of), 14, 15, 56, 57 76, 84, 100, 101, 103
sector/industry, 43, 66, 87 47, 51, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 75, enclaves, 15, 65, 68, 69, 71 harbors, 68, 102, 103
workers, 92, 109 92, 93, 94, 95, 100, 102, 103, 106, 108, energy industry, 73
container ships, 9, 40, 103, 108. See also 110 consumption, 26, 29, 42 ports, 75, 88
ports Dubai International Finance Centre renewable, 66, 93 flora and fauna, 17, 66
conurbations, 39, 84, 96 (DIFC), 67 sector, 1, 50, 62, 66 food, 18, 19, 20, 21, 59, 103
coastal, 39, 68, 94 Dubai-Sharjah-Ajman conurbation. solar, 109 processing industry, 75, 86, 87
Dubai-Sharjah-Ajman, 70, 94 See conurbations sources, 31, 93 foreign
Cooperation Council for the Arab DUBAL (Dubai Aluminium), 43 wind, 91, 109 companies, 61, 62, 75, 89
States of the Gulf (GCC). See Gulf Dukhan oilfield, 62 English, 9, 98, 102. See also British intervention, 52, 57, 77, 81
Cooperation Council Dutch, 9, 14, 98, 102 English (language), 50, 56, 63, 85, 100, 109 labourers, 18, 36, 58, 62, 65, 86, 109
Corniche, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95 ethnicity, 32, 33, 56, 74, 98, 105 tourists, 49, 88
currency, 46, 52, 53 East Africa, 98, 101 ethno-linguistic (groups), 1, 109 universities, 42, 50, 51, 69, 87
economic Euphrates, 6, 12, 76, 77 foreigners, 37, 38, 47, 48, 50, 56, 60, 65,
Dalaki River, 74 crises, 3, 20, 47, 74, 77, 81, 105, 107 Europe, 3, 19, 30, 31, 64 71, 98, 109, 110
Dammam, 38, 39, 40, 43, 44, 58, 59, 84, diversification, 36, 45, 47, 53, 56, 60, Europeans, 37, 49 forts, 14, 86, 87, 89, 92, 94
85, 86, 106 66, 68, 73, 92, 108, 110 European Union, 52, 53 fragmentation, 65, 101
dams, 74 growth, 17, 62, 65, 104 exclave, 64, 72 free (trade) zones, 41, 43, 44, 45, 48,
date palm (groves), 18, 19, 59, 70, 86, hubs, 88, 106 expatriates, 3, 36, 37, 50, 61, 85, 91, 103 67, 68, 70, 71, 75, 93, 94, 100, 103, 105,
97, 100 inequalities, 3, 65 108, 110
defence (issues), 14, 52, 65 integration, 52 Fahaheel, 83 French, 14, 33
Deira, 94 policies, 57, 61, 66 al-Fahidi fort, 94 Fujairah, 64, 68, 69, 70, 71

116
 index

Gateway City, 71 Hoora district, 88 investments, 2, 39, 41, 42, 47, 68, 102, 108 Jews/Jewish tribes, 8, 11, 80
GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council), 2, 3, Hormirzad, 102 foreign, 43, 44, 57, 61, 71, 103 al-Jubail, 43, 59, 84, 106
33, 40, 41, 42, 43, 46, 52, 53, 56, 61, 72, Hormozgan, 75, 102, 103 public, 46, 59 Juffair, 89
103, 106, 109 Hormuz, Strait of, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 15, 31, Iran, 1, 2, 3, 13, 25, 27, 28, 29, 32, 33, 36, Julphar (Ras al-Khaimah), 8, 20, 71
GDP, 3, 49, 56, 62, 63, 65, 66 33, 38, 44, 64, 65, 70, 72, 74, 75, 100, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 51, Jumeirah, 94
gender (issues), 65, 109 102, 107 52, 56, 57, 62, 65, 74, 75, 76, 102, 104,
geopolitics, 3, 15, 47, 56, 68, 76, 106, 110 al-Hosn fort, 92 107, 108, 109, 110 kafala (sponsorship), 37, 44
Germany/Germans, 14, 56 hydrocarbons, 24, 28, 30, 42, 62, 75, 87 coast of, 2, 6, 11, 16, 41, 44, 71, 75, 105, Kalba, 69
Gerrah, 8 106, 107, 108, 109 Karbala, 13, 48
Ghawar, 56, 58, 87 Ibn Saud, 14, 86 oil, 24, 25, 26, 30 Karun River, 74, 104
globalization, 3, 100, 106, 109, 110 Ibra, 101 Iranian Revolution. See Islamic Kermanshah, 30
GOSI Complex, 88 Idd al-Shargi, 62 ­Revolution Khafji, 59
Greater Arab Free Trade Area, 53 ijma (consensus), 65, 109 Iraq, 1, 2, 24, 25, 27, 29, 30, 32, 36, 38, al-Khaleej (oilfield), 62
Greater Doha Master Plan, 90 immigrants, 37, 82, 83, 88, 90, 97, 98, 40, 46, 48, 56, 57, 74, 76, 77, 80, 82, al-Khalifa, Sheikh Hamad bin Issa, 60
Greater Tunb (islands of), 33, 52, 65 109. See also labourers 83, 102, 104, 105, 107, 109, 110 Khalifa port, 66
Gudaibiya, 88 independence, 1, 56, 61, 62, 64, 65, 71, invasion of Kuwait, 32, 37, 39, 56 al-Khalij al-Arabi, 2. See also Arabo-
Gulf, 2, 9, 10, 26, 36, 107. See also 82, 90, 92, 97 US/foreign intervention in, 3, 27, 32, Persian Gulf
Arabo-Persian Gulf India, 8, 9, 14, 26, 31, 37, 43, 98 33, 39, 57 Khalij-i Fars, 2
Arab and Iranian shores contrasted, Indian Ocean, 6, 8, 9, 69, 70, 71, 72, 107, Iraq-Iran War (1980–88), 27, 38, 56, 74, al-Khobar, 39, 58, 84, 85
41, 44, 74, 106, 107, 108, 110 108 75, 76, 80, 102, 104, 105, 107 khor (creek), 6, 94, 95
Gulf War(s), 32, 56, 59, 81 Indian Ocean Rim Association for IRENA (International Renewable al-Khor, 63
Regional Cooperation, 72 Energy Agency), 66 Khor al-Amaya, 77
Habshan, 71 Indians, 8, 20 irrigation, 18, 96, 108 Khor al-Zubair, 44, 77
Hajar Mountains, 70, 72, 96, 100, 108 Indonesia, 28, 37 Isfahan, 30, 43 Khor Fakkan, 14, 69, 71
hajj (pilgrimage), 48 industrial Islam, 11, 12, 13, 52, 108 Khorramshahr, 75, 102, 104, 105, 107, 110
al-Halul Island, 62 centres, 3, 39, 42, 59, 75, 81, 99, 105 Islamic Republic of Iran. See Iran Khuzestan (Arabistan), 32, 74, 104
Hamriyah free zone, 45, 94 development, 32, 52, 97 Islamic Revolution (1979), 25, 27, 32, King Abdul Aziz Port, 85
Harad, 59 plants, 29, 90 36, 48, 72, 74 King Fahd Causeway, 40, 59
harbors, 6, 64, 68, 73, 82, 102, 103 sectors, 46, 101 Islamism, 37 King Fahd International Airport, 84
Hawali, 82 zones, 43, 44, 45, 66, 68, 69, 75, 84, Istanbul, 40 King Faisal University, 85, 87
Hawar (islands of), 61 89, 91, 93, 94, 103, 106, 108 al-Kiranah, 63
healthcare, 56, 57 industrialization, 29, 58 al-Jahra, 83 Kirkuk, 26, 77
heritage (sites), 19, 69, 89, 92, 97 industry, 39, 42, 62, 66, 70, 71, 74, 90, 103 Jask, 75 Kish, 44, 48, 49, 75, 103, 110
highways, 40, 41, 71, 74, 94, 98, 103, inequality, 80, 105, 109 Jebel Akhdar, 72 Kurdistan, 27, 76
106 infrastructure, 32, 40, 41, 49, 53, 57, 67, Jebel Ali, 9, 43, 45, 67, 71, 93, 94 Kuwait, 1, 2, 14, 20, 25, 26, 27, 38, 40, 41,
Hijaz, 58 71, 75, 77, 82, 106 Jebel al-Qara, 87 44, 49, 52, 56, 57, 58, 59, 82, 83, 106,
Hili, 96 Institute of Technology (Abadan), 51 Jebel Hafeet, 96 107, 108
al-Hira, 12 International Islamic Financial Jebel Shams, 72 invasion by Iraq, 27, 32, 37, 39, 56,
Hofuf, 58, 59, 84, 85, 86 Market (IIFM), 60 Jeddah, 9, 58, 85 81, 82

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Kuwait, Bay of, 83 Maydan Mahzam, 62 multiculturalism, 36, 109, 110 nomads/nomadism, 12, 15, 17, 18, 38,
Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), Mecca, 10, 11, 48, 58 Musandam Peninsula, 11, 72, 73 62, 96, 104, 108
46 Medina, 10, 58 Muscat, 11, 14, 20, 38, 39, 73, 96, 98, 100, North Americans, 37, 49
Kuwait Stock Exchange, 46 Medina Isa, 89 101, 108 North Dome (Qatar), 29
Kuwait University, 51 Medinat al-Shamal (‘City of the sultan of, 11, 72, 97 Norway, 28, 31
North’), 63 Museum of Islamic Art (Qatar), 51, 63 nuclear (power/strategy), 3, 75
labourers, 18, 36, 37, 58, 62, 65, 86, 109 Medinat Sultan Qaboos, 99 museums, 48, 49, 66, 67, 69, 87, 88, 93,
lagoons, 6, 94, 101 Mediterranean Sea, 1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 108 94, 95, 97, 98, 108 OAPEC (Organization of Arab
Lengeh, 75 megalopolises, 3, 106, 107, 110 Muslims, 12, 13 Petroleum Exporting Countries), 25
Lesser Tunb (islands of), 33, 52, 65 Meluba, 8 Mussafah (industrial zone), 43, 66, oases, 17, 18, 38, 59, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68,
livestock, 59, 86 Mesaieed Industrial City, 62, 91 93 73, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 92, 96, 97, 100,
Liwa Oasis, 66, 92 Mesopotamia, 10, 27, 56, 76 Muttrah port, 98 101, 106, 107, 108
Lorimer, J. G., 20, 62 migrants, 36, 37, 49, 50, 56, 58, 92, 108, Offshore Banking Units, 45
Lulu Island, 89, 92 109. See also labourers Nabih Salih Island, 89 oil, 24, 27, 32, 38, 57, 73, 76, 77, 80
Lusail, 91 migration, 37, 72, 109 Nahwa, 69 companies, 3, 24, 25, 77, 84, 85, 97,
military bases, 33, 71, 106 al-Nahyan, Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan, 100, 104, 105
Madha (oasis), 64, 97 Mina al-Fahal, 73, 99 52, 65, 67, 96 concessions, 62, 84
Madinat al-Hareer (‘City of silk’) Minab, 75 al-Nahyan family, 66, 92 consumption, 26, 66
project, 83 Mina Khalifa, 93. See also Khalifa port Najaf, 13, 48 deposits/reserves, 1, 3, 14, 15, 27, 32,
Magan, 8 mineral resources, 70, 71 nationality, 65, 85, 98, 109 56, 57, 60, 65, 66, 71, 74, 76, 106
Maghreb (the West), 1 mines/mining, 43, 68, 87 nationalization, 24, 25, 46, 62 exports, 1, 28, 76, 84, 92
majlis (public audiences), 65, 109 Misan, 77 National Museum (Qatar), 63 industry, 20, 24, 32, 36, 38, 39, 56,
Majlis al-Shura (Consultative modernity, 108, 110 nation-state, 14, 64 104
Assembly), 99 modernization, 63, 68, 80 natural gas, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 42, 62, post oil strategies, 37
al-Makhtum family, 66 monarchies, 15, 61, 72, 80, 109 66, 73, 91 production, 3, 28, 62, 64, 89
Malacca, Strait of, 31 monetary issues, 46. See also currency; deposits, 3, 29, 53, 62, 65, 68, 75, 106, rent, 46, 82, 108 (See also economic,
Malays, 8 economic 110 diversification)
Manama, 38, 39, 40, 59, 60, 68, 70, 88, mosques, 13, 82, 86, 87 liquefaction plants, 30, 73, 77 revenues, 3, 46, 67, 82, 104
89, 106 Mosul, 80 pipelines, 103, 106 terminals, 40, 103, 106
Mandaeans, 77 mountains, 2, 6, 18, 49, 58, 68, 69, 70, production, 59, 73, 77 oilfields, 26, 27, 30, 38, 40, 58, 73, 76
mangroves, 6, 69, 88, 108 71, 72, 74, 98, 100, 107, 108 terminals, 40, 77, 101 offshore, 58, 62
Maqta Bridge, 92 al-Mu’alla family, 70 nature reserves, 69, 89, 103 Oman, Gulf of, 1, 2, 6, 7, 10, 14, 33, 64,
maritime Mubadala (Abu Dhabi public naval bases, 75, 103 72, 73, 75, 98, 107
borders/boundaries, 15, 29, 65 investment fund), 46 Nejd, 58, 77, 86 Oman, Sea of, 72
trade, 3, 8, 9 al-Mubarraz, 86 Nejma, 58 Oman, Sultanate of, 1, 2, 8, 11, 14, 16, 20,
transportation, 31 al-Mudainah, 77 neutral zones, 15, 57, 59 21, 25, 26, 27, 29, 38, 43, 49, 52, 53,
Masdar City, 66, 71, 93 Muhammad (prophet), 10, 12 New Eden Project, 76 62, 64, 65, 68, 69, 72, 73, 96, 97, 98,
Masfut, 68, 70 Muhammarah, 104 NGOs, 37, 76 100, 101, 102, 108
Mashriq (the East), 1 Muharraq, 43, 60, 88 Nizwa, 97, 107 North Oman, 2, 12, 72, 106
Master Plan Abu Dhabi 2030, 92 Muharraq Island, 89 Nizwa, Ibadi Imamate of, 72 Omani National Oil Company, 100

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 index

Oman Medical College, 100 Portuguese, 9, 14, 60, 64, 88, 98, 102 Red Sea, 2, 9, 58, 59 47, 48, 49, 52, 57, 58, 59, 60, 73, 77,
OPEC (Organization of Petroleum power plants, 17, 29, 66, 92, 100. See Reem Island, 93 82, 84, 85, 86, 88, 106, 109
Exporting Countries), 25, 27 also electricity re-export trade, 44, 75, 102 Eastern Province (al-Sharqiyah), 2,
Ottoman Empire, 56, 58, 104 private ownership, 47 refineries, 30, 56, 60, 73, 84, 99, 104, 33, 58, 86
Ottomans, 11, 14, 64, 80 property laws, 47, 53, 61 105 Saudi Railways Organization, 59
protest movements. See religion, 1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 52, 108, 110 al-Sauds, 58
Pakistan, 9, 37, 75 ­demonstrations religious seafaring, 68, 71, 72
Palestinians, 37, 82 minorities, 33, 61, 101, 109 seaports, 106
pan-Arabism, 1, 32 Qabus bin Said al-Said, Sultan, 72 sects, 3, 12, 13 seas, 18
pan-Islamism, 32 Qalat, 73, 101 tourism, 48 access to, 56, 57
Parsian, 46 Qanat al-Qasba, 95 Rentier State, 56 trade, 64, 80, 101, 110
Pars Special Economic Energy Zone, 103 Qarn Bin Saud, 96 research (and development), 50, 51, sebkhas (sandy plains), 6
Pearl Coast, 64 Qatar, 2, 14, 20, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 33, 37, 106 sedentarization, 18
pearling, 20, 62, 68, 82, 88, 90, 92 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 49, 52, 58, 61, 62, rias, 6 Seeb, 72, 99
Persia, 56, 80, 98, 104. See also Iran 63, 64, 106, 108 Rifa, 89 Seef, 89
Persian (language), 2 Qatar Peninsula, 20, 40, 90 Riyadh, 12, 30, 46, 58, 84, 86, 106 service sector, 3, 61, 71, 87, 92
Persian Empire, 10, 11 Qatar Philharmonic Orchestra, 51 Rostaq, 100 Shabahar, 75
Persian Gulf, 1, 2, 7, 10, 20, 76 Qatif, 58, 85 Rub al-Khali desert, 58, 96 Shadadiyah, 83
Persians, 8, 12, 33, 60, 98, 102, 104 Qawassim, 11, 64, 69, 71 Rumailah, 32, 76, 77, 96 Shah Bahar, 110
petrochemical Qeshm Island, 11, 41, 44, 75, 103, 110 rural exodus, 38, 72, 80 al-Shaheen, 62
plants, 3, 30, 103 Qsar Ibrahim, 86 Russia, 27, 29, 31 Shahid Bahonar port, 103
sector, 42, 77 al-Qurnah, 76 Russian Federation, 28 Shahid Rajaee port, 103
petrodollars, 46 Qurum, 99 Ruwais, 63, 66 Sharjah, 33, 38, 39, 45, 49, 64, 68, 69,
petroleum, 18, 24, 26, 28, 31, 42, 46, 104. Ruwi, 99 70, 71, 94, 95, 108
See also oil sector, 3, 24–25, 50, 85, railways, 41, 59, 71, 74, 86, 93, 103, 105 Sharq, 83
87, 110 high-speed lines, 40, 53, 93 al-Sabah, Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad, 57 al-Sharqiyah, 73, 101. See also Saudi
pharmaceutical (industry), 71, 103 rainfall, 6, 16, 70, 71 al-Sabah family, 56 Arabia
pipelines, 31, 33, 59, 71, 75, 77, 106 Ras al-Hadd, 72 al-Sabah Fort, 83 Shatt al-Arab (Arvand Rud), 6, 32, 74,
Pirate Coast, 64 Ras al-Khaimah, 8, 43, 45, 49, 64, 68, SABIC (Saudi Basic Industries 76, 77, 80, 102, 104
plastics, 42, 87, 108 70, 71 ­Corporation), 42 Shatt al-Basra (Basra canal), 76
pollution, 21 Ras Laffan, 62 al-Saboor Mosque, 88 Shedgum, 87
polycentrism, 83 Ras Musandam, 64 Saddam Hussein, 77, 82 sheikhs, 14, 64, 71, 92, 109
population, 2, 38, 39, 104, 105 Ras Tannurah, 58, 84 Sadiyat Island, 49, 51, 66, 93 Sheikh Zayed Road, 94
growth, 21, 38, 62, 65, 90, 96, 100, Ras al-Zor, 59 Safavid dynasty, 13 Shiʿi, 13, 32, 33, 77
101, 109 al-Rayyan, 62, 90, 91 Salalah, 9 pilgrimages, 48
local, 74, 81, 87, 109 real estate sector, 3, 47, 57, 66, 67, 71, Salata, 90 population, 33, 58, 59, 61, 76, 80
ports, 3, 6, 9, 38, 40, 41, 42, 60, 62, 71, 106 Salmiya, 83 Shinas, 72
75, 77, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 90, 93, 97, reconstruction, 57, 74, 77, 82, 105 Sassanids (224–642 AD), 10, 12 Shindagha district, 94
102, 104, 106, 107, 108 Red Line and Achnacarry Saudi Arabia, 1, 2, 13, 14, 17, 21, 24, 25, shipbuilding, 68, 73, 103
deep-water, 57, 71, 100, 108 ­Agreements, 24 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 37, 40, 43, 46, Shiraz, 74, 103

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Shiraz University, 51
shopping complexes, 49, 88, 89, 92
shura (consultation), 65, 109
Shuwaikh, 44, 82
Siraf (present Bandar Taheri), 8, 9
Sir Bani Yas Island, 10, 66
Sitrah Island, 43, 44, 88, 89
slaves, 98, 101
smuggling, 20, 44, 73, 97
Sohar, 8, 14, 43, 73, 96, 98, 100, 101
Sohar City Centre, 100
souks, 86, 87, 88, 94, 98
South Asia, 85, 108
labourers from, 37, 56, 86
Southeast Asia, 8, 108
South Oil Company, 77
South Pars, 29, 75, 110
standard of living, 46, 109
Standard Oil, 84
steel industry, 3, 42, 43, 103
Subiya, 83
Suez Canal, 31
sultan (title of), 14
Sunnis, 12, 13, 33, 61, 74, 77, 80
super-tankers, 31
Supreme Council. See Gulf
­Cooperation Council
Sur, 8, 73, 100, 101
sustainable development, 49, 109, 110
Tabriz, 30
tankers, 9, 31, 33
al-Taraf, 86
120
Tawam, 96 Umm Bab, 62 Wadi al-Kabir, 99
Tawazun (investment organization), Umm al-Hassam, 88 wadis, 16, 96, 98, 100
46 Umm al-Nar, 92 al-Wafrah, 90, 91
Taweelah, 66 Umm Qasr, 77 Wahhabis, 13, 49, 62, 97, 101
technology, 50, 51, 61, 108 Umm al-Quwain, 45, 64, 70 Warbah Island, 57
high-tech industries, 43, 51 United Arab Emirates (UAE), 1, 2, 6, 12, water, 1, 6, 7, 16, 17, 53, 63
Tehran, 32, 41, 44, 74, 102, 103, 107 17, 21, 25, 27, 29, 33, 37, 40, 42–43, 45, groundwater, 16, 17, 18, 60, 73, 86,
Al-Thani, Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad, 49, 52, 53, 58, 62, 63, 64, 68, 72, 73, 96, 97
63 92, 95, 96, 97 management of, 17, 19, 76, 109
Thi Qar, 77 Northern Emirates, 70 resources, 38, 62, 71, 76, 97, 108
Tigris, 6, 10, 76 United Nations, 37, 82 weapons, 32, 33
tourism, 3, 19, 44, 47, 48, 49, 61, 63, 66, United States, 3, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 38, wetlands, 76, 81
70, 71, 73, 87, 91, 97, 98, 103, 105, 108 61 women, 109
Tourism Development Investment intervention in Iraq, 27, 32, 33, 39, World Trade Centre, 67, 94
Company, 49 57 World War I, 26, 76
trade, 8, 14, 20, 24, 28, 44, 57, 60, 61, 62, universities, 51, 59, 69, 83, 99, 100. See World War II, 26, 56, 80, 104
65, 66, 67, 73, 74, 75, 82, 83, 85, 86, also education al-Wusta, 89
87, 88, 92, 98, 106, 107, 108, 110. See University of Riyadh, 51
also free (trade) zones; smuggling al-Uqair port, 87 Yanbu, 30, 59
centres, 3, 20, 58, 60, 71, 77, 80, 83, urban. See also cities Yas Island, 49, 93
84, 86, 98, 102, 107, 108 agglomerations, 39, 58, 61, 75, 80, Yazd tribes, 12
maritime, 3, 9, 64, 80, 101, 102 82, 88, 89, 91, 94, 100 Yemen, 1, 37, 53, 56, 58, 72
traffic, 40, 41, 57, 88 growth, 38, 39, 43, 80, 83, 84, 92, 98,
transport, 3, 9, 26, 28, 31, 71 106 Zagros Mountains, 2, 16, 74, 107, 108
infrastructure/facilities, 40, 59, 76, hierarchy, 39, 105 Zayed Mosque, 93
91, 105 infrastructure, 41, 81, 82, 95, 110 Zinj district, 88
public, 41, 93, 109 networks, 77, 100 ZonesCorp, 66
Treaty of Peace in Perpetuity, 64 sprawl, 47, 57, 89 Zubair, 76, 77, 80
Trucial States, 14, 64, 71, 108 urbanization, 6, 38, 57, 58, 65, 72, 89, al-Zubarah, 63
Tubli Bay, 88 109
Uthmaniyah, 87
UAE University (al-Ain), 51
Umayyads, 12 vote, right to, 57, 61, 63