DUE PROCESS OF LAW

consistently with what has been the accepted standards of constitutional

adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.

Art 3, Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property

without due process of law

Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any
evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged
statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm:
"The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the elected
representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors
must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their
particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which
surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by
enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are
essential to the well being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not
lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of
personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.

ERMITA-M ALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSO. VS. M AYOR OF M ANILA
[20 SCRA 849; G.R. NO.L-24693; 31 JULY 1967]
Facts:
Petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association with one of
its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and Go Chiu, the president and general
manager of the second petitioner, filed a petition for prohibition against
Ordinance No. 4760 against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who
was sued in his capacity as such charged with the general power and duty to
enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for
the execution and enforcement of such ordinances. It was alleged that the
petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection
of the interest of its eighteen members operating hotels and motels,
characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and
city authorities and regularly paying taxes. It was alleged that on June 13,
1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760,
approved on June 14, 1963 by the then acting City Mayor, Vice-Mayor
Herminio Astorga. After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance
were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being beyond the
powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it
regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of
Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels. it also being
provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging
houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of
Police, or their duly authorized representatives. The lower court on July 6,
1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to
refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.

It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the

necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or
ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. The principle has
been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman &
Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. where the American Supreme Court
through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus:
The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of
the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the
specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives
the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may
condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption
of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of
record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in
the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and
the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the
judgment against the ordinance set aside.

VILLEGAS VS. HIU CHIONG

[86 SCRA 270; NO.L-29646; 10 NOV 1978]

Issue:
Facts:
Whether or Not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is unconstitutional,
therefore, null and void.
Held:
A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought
to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation
of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand,

The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of
Manila on February 22, 1968 and signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an
ordinance making it unlawful for any person not a citizen of the Philippines to
be employed in any place of employment or to be
engaged in any kind
of trade business or occupation within the city of Manila without securing an
employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and for other purposes.

Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying
for the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the
enforcement of said ordinance.

have already taken their oath and have assumed office. Petitioners contend
that such Resolution is null and void because they were not accorded due
notice and hearing, hence constituting a violation of the due process
principle.

Issue:
Issue:
Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal
protection clauses of the
Constitution.

Whether or Not due the COMELEC has the power to suspend a proclamation
or the effects thereof without notice and hearing.

Held:
Held:
It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00
pesos to enable aliens generally to be employed in the city of Manila is not
only for the purpose of regulation.
While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an
employment permit from
the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion
and judgment in processing and approval or disapproval of application is
regulatory in character, the second part which requires the payment
of a
sum of 50.00 pesos is not a regulatory but a revenue measure.
Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial
of the basic human right of the people in the Philippines to engaged in a
means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a state is not
obliged to admit aliens within it's territory, once an alien is admitted he cannot
be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the
means of livelihood. Also it does not lay down any standard to guide the City
Mayor in the issuance or denial of an alien employment permit fee.

No. The COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a

proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and
hearing. The proclamation on May 20, 2001 enjoys the presumption of
regularity and validity since no contest or protest was even filed assailing the
same. The petitioners cannot be removed from office without due process of
law. Due process in quasi-judicial proceedings before the COMELEC
requires due notice and hearing. Furthermore, the proclamation of a winning
candidate cannot be annulled if he has not been notified of any motion to set
aside his proclamation. Hence, as ruled in Farias vs. COMELEC, Reyes vs.
COMELEC and Gallardo vs. COMELEC, the COMELEC is without power to
partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a
proclamation without notice and hearing.
ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ
[101 PHIL 1155; L-7995; 31 MAY 1957]
Facts:

NAMIL VS. COMELEC

[414 SCRA 553; G.R. NO. 150540; 28 OCT 2003]
Facts:
On May 20, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Palimbang, Sultan
Kudarat proclaimed the petitioners as winning candidates for their
Sangguniang Bayan. The following day, herein private respondents were
proclaimed winners as well. Private respondents claimed that they should be
recognized as the winners, and not the petitioners. Upon receipt of such
letter, the Commissioner-in-charge for Region XII asked the Law
Department, the Regional Election Registrar and the Provincial Elections
Supervisor to submit their reports on the matter. All of them found the
second proclamation valid. Hence, the COMELEC issued a Resolution
ordering the immediate installation of the private respondents as the newly
elected members of the Sangguniang Bayan, even though petitioners herein

Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as An Act to Regulate the Retail

Business was passed. The said law provides for a prohibition against
foreigners as well as corporations owned by foreigners from engaging from
retail trade in our country. This was protested by the petitioner in this case.
According to him, the said law violates the international and treaty of the
Philippines therefore it is unconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity
between the Philippines and China was violated according to him.
Issue:
Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power.
Held:
According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was
also then provided that police power can not be bargained away through the

medium of a treaty or a contract. The Court also provided that RA 1180 was
enacted to remedy a real and actual danger to national economy posed by
alien dominance and control. If ever the law infringes upon the said treaty,
the latter is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent
law and the same may never curtain or restrict the scope of the police power
of the state.

PHIL. PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORP. VS. TORRES

[231 SCRA 335; G.R. NO.98050; 17 MAR 1994]

of the action or ruling complained of petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its

position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted
for decision on the basis of the position papers filed by the parties, there was
sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process, as petitioner was
afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side. Moreover, petitioner
could have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing to confront and examine the
witnesses of the other party. But it did not; instead it opted to submit its
position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the
opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of Labor.

Facts:
Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI for brevity), filed with the
Department of Labor and Employment a petition for certification election
among the supervisory employees of petitioner, alleging that as a
supervisory union duly registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment it was seeking to represent the supervisory employees of
Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation. Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S.
Milado issued an order directing the holding of a certification election among
the supervisory employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom the
superintendents and the professional and technical employees. However, the
PMPI filed an amended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it sought to
represent not only the supervisory employees of petitioner but also its
professional/technical and confidential employees. The parties therein
agreed to submit their respective position papers and to consider the
amended petition submitted for decision on the basis thereof and related
documents. Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an order granting the petition and
directing the holding of a certification election among the "supervisory,
professional (engineers, analysts, mechanics, accountants, nurses,
midwives, etc.), technical, and confidential employees. PHILPHOS appealed
the order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment who rendered a
decision through Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma dismissing the
appeal. PHILPHOS moved for reconsideration but the same was denied;
hence, the instant petition alleging denial of due process on the part of the
DOLE to which the mediator-arbiter was under.
Issue:
Whether or Not there was denial of due process.
Held:
There was no denial of due process. The essence of due process is simply
an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration

RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO

[39 PHIL 660; G.R. NO. 14078; 7 MAR 1919]
Facts:
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other
Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro.
The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which states that
provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants
(uncivilized tribes) are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed
necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take
up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him
and approved by the provincial board. It is resolved that under section 2077
of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao
on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of
Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on
this reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously
recommended by the provincial governor.
Thereafter, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2,
which says that the provincial governor has selected a site in the sitio of
Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in
Mindoro. In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised
Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola
and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of
Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their
habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who
shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not
exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised
Administrative Code.
Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary
measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the

protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized

customs among them.
It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their
dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.
It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by
the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to
be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will,
and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff
in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.
Issue:
Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of
his liberty without due process of law.
Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional.

considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of
the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been
followed.
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of
law. To constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial
proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and
notice are not requisite a rule which is especially true where much must be
left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to
particular cases.
The idea of the provision in question is to unify the people of the Philippines
so that they may approach the highest conception of nationality. The public
policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to
benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this
governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their
own good and the good of the country.
Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their
liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

Held:
The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive
a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him
the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in
accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary
servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the
Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat
analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set
apart the Tigbao reservation, it will be read, assigned as reasons fort the
action, the following: (1) The failure of former attempts for the advancement
of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully
method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a
permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The
protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which
they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the
Manguianes.
Considered purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly
say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. It is, indeed, an
unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an equally
drastic remedy. One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly
interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is

KWONG SING VS. CITY OF MANILA

[41 PHIL 103; G.R. NO. 15972; 11 OCT 1920]
Facts:
Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who has
general and the same interest, filed a complaint for a preliminary injunction.
The Plaintiffs also questioned the validity of enforcing Ordinance No. 532 by
the city of Manila. Ordinance No. 532 requires that the receipt be in
duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number
of articles delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning establishments.
The permanent injunction was denied by the trial court. The appellants claim
is that Ordinance No. 532 savors of class legislation; putting in mind that they
are Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates between persons in similar
circumstances; and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property
rights. They also contest that the enforcement of the legislation is an act
beyond the scope of their police power. In view of the foregoing, this is an
appeal with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act beyond the
scope of police power

Whether or not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation that

infringes property rights.

YU CONG ENG VS. TRINIDAD

[47 PHIL 385; G.R. NO. 20479; 6 FEB 1925]

Held:
Facts:
Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are permissible
under the police power. The police power of the City of Manila to enact
Ordinance No. 532 is based on Section 2444, paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2744, authorizes the municipal
board of the city of Manila, with the approval of the mayor of the city:
(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following:
xxxx xxxxxlaundries xxxx.
(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for
the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the
promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience,
and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants.
The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid
disputes between laundrymen and their patrons and to protect customers of
laundries who are not able to decipher Chinese characters from being
defrauded. (Considering that in the year 1920s, people of Manila are more
familiar with Spanish and maybe English.)
In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that the ordinance
invades no fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege. Under the
guise of police regulation, an attempt is not made to violate personal property
rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in its
operation. It applies to all public laundries without distinction, whether they
belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without
exception, and each every one of them without distinction, must comply with
the ordinance. The obvious objection for the implementation of the
ordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code. Although, an
additional burden will be imposed on the business and occupation affected
by the ordinance such as that of the appellant by learning even a few words
in Spanish or English, but mostly Arabic numbers in order to properly issue a
receipt, it seems that the same burdens are cast upon the them. Yet, even if
private rights of person or property are subjected to restraint, and even if loss
will result to individuals from the enforcement of the ordinance, this is not
sufficient ground for failing to uphold the power of the legislative body. The
very foundation of the police power is the control of private interests for the
public welfare.
Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a
preliminary injunction is denied, with costs against the appellants.

The petitioner, Yu Cong Eng, was charged by information in the court of first
instance of Manila, with a violation of Act 2972, which provides that (Section
1) it shall be unlawful for any person, company, or partnership or corporation
engaged in commerce, industry or any other activity for the purpose of profit
in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with existing law, to keep its account
books in any language other than English, Spanish or any local dialect. He
was arrested, his books were seized, and the trial was about to proceed,
when he and the other petitioner, Co Liam, on their own behalf, and on
behalf of all the other Chinese merchants in the Philippines, filed the petition
against the fiscal, or prosecuting attorney of Manila, and the collector of
internal revenue engaged in the prosecution, and against the judge
presiding.
Issue:
Whether or Not Act 2972 is unconstitutional.

Held:
Yes. The Philippine government may make every reasonable requirement of
its taxpayers to keep proper records of their business transactions in English
or Spanish or Filipino dialect by which an adequate measure of what is due
from them in meeting the cost of government can be had. But we are clearly
of opinion that it is not within the police power of the Philippine Legislature,
because it would be oppressive and arbitrary, to prohibit all Chinese
merchants from maintaining a set of books in the Chinese language, and in
the Chinese characters, and thus prevent them from keeping advised of the
status of their business and directing its conduct.

ANIAG VS. COMELEC

[237 SCRA 194; G.R. NO. 104961; 7 OCT 1994]
Facts:
In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections, the
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2323, Gun Ban, promulgating rules and
regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearm or other deadly
weapons on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members

of security agencies or police organizations, and organization or

maintenance of reaction forces during the election period. COMELEC also
issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of
candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms,
organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints. Pursuant
to the Gun Ban, Mr. Serrapio Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of the House of
Representatives, wrote petitioner for the return of the two firearms issued to
him by the House of Representatives. Petitioner then instructed his driver,
Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioners house and return them to
Congress. The PNP set up a checkpoint. When the car driven by Arellano
approached the checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and found the
firearms. Arellano was apprehended and detained. He then explained the
order of petitioner. Petitioner also explained that Arellano was only complying
with the firearms ban, and that he was not a security officer or a bodyguard.
Later, COMELEC issued Resolution No.92-0829 directing the filing of
information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of the Omnibus
Election Code, and for petitioner to show cause why he should not be
disqualified from running for an elective position. Petitioner then questions
the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues that gunrunning,
using or transporting firearms or similar weapons and other acts mentioned
in the resolution are not within the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code.
Thus, according to petitioner, Resolution No. 2327 is unconstitutional. The
issue on the disqualification of petitioner from running in the elections was
rendered moot when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in the elections.
Issue:
Whether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver
to return the firearms issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered
from the warrant less search of his car

Held:
A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an
appropriate authority. However, a warrantless search is not violative of the
Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants
subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely
limited to a visual search. In the case at bar, the guns were not tucked in
Arellanos waist nor placed within his reach, as they were neatly packed in
gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Given these
circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly searched the car lawfully
as well as the package without violating the constitutional injunction. Absent
any justifying circumstance specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner

and Arellano, the search could not have been valid. Consequently, the
firearms obtained from the warrantless search cannot be admitted for any
purpose in any proceeding. It was also shown in the facts that the PNP had
not informed the public of the purpose of setting up the checkpoint. Petitioner
was also not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus
Election Code. He was not informed by the City Prosecutor that he was a
respondent in the preliminary investigation. Such constituted a violation of his
right to due process. Hence, it cannot be contended that petitioner was fully
given the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not
informed that he was himself a respondent in the case. Thus, the warrantless
search conducted by the PNP is declared illegal and the firearms seized
during the search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against the
petitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional, and therefore, set
aside.

JAVIER VS. COMELEC

[144 SCRA 194; G.R. NOS. L-68379-81; 22 SEPT 1986]
Facts:
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the
Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to
enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage of being the
nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the
eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when
several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the
latter's men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now
facing trial for these murders. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to
railroad the private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to the
Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His
complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed
winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon
came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made
only by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as
required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation,
the private respondent took his oath as a member of the Batasang
Pambansa.

Issue:
Whether or Not the Second Division of the Commission on Elections
authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the
private respondent the winner in the election.

Held:
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of
an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. To
bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be
impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the
parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than
that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a
judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they
will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise
they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no
point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance
with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans
for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a
court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made
and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the
charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are
not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the
motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is
no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only
after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the
established facts and the pertinent law.

The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power, because it is

not reasonably necessary for the purpose of the law and is unduly
oppressive. It is difficult to see how prohibiting the transfer of carabaos from
one province to another can prevent their indiscriminate killing. Retaining the
carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there. Prohibiting
the transfer of carabeef, after the slaughter of the carabaos, will not prevent
the slaughter either.

PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ

[180 SCRA 218; G.R. NO.84818; 18 DEC 1989]
Facts:
Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving
telecommunications. Charging rates for certain specified lines that were
reduced by order of herein respondent Jose Alcuaz Commissioner of the
National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be
reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which
granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior
notice and hearing.
Issue:
Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.
Held:

YNOT VS. IAC

[148 SCRA 659; G.R. NO. 74457; 20 MAR 1987]
Facts:
Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos and
carabeef from one province to another. The carabaos of petitioner were
confiscated for violation of Executive Order No 626-A while he was
transporting them from Masbate to Iloilo. Petitioner challenged the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. The government argued that
Executive Order No. 626-A was issued in the exercise of police power to
conserve the carabaos that were still fit for farm work or breeding.
Issue:
Whether or Not EO No. 626-A is a violation of Substantive Due Process.
Held:

Yes. Respondents admitted that the application of a policy like the fixing of
rates as exercised by administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than
quasi-legislative. But respondents contention that notice and hearing are not
required since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire
proceedings and temporary in nature is erroneous. Section 16(c) of the
Public Service Act, providing for the proceedings of the Commission, upon
notice and hearing, dictates that a Commission has power to fix rates, upon
proper notice and hearing, and, if not subject to the exceptions, limitations or
saving provisions.
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to
make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order
be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made
upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own
motion as in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of
respondents is hereby SET ASIDE.

(6)
EASTERN BROADCASTING CORP (DYRE) V. DANS JR.
[137 SCRA 628; L-59329; 19 JUL 1985]
(7)
Facts:
A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station DYRE. DYRE was
summarily closed on grounds of national security. The radio station was
allegedly used to incite people to sedition. Petitioner, DYRE contends that
they were denied due process. There was no hearing to establish factual
evidence for the closure. Furthermore, the closure of the radio station
violates freedom of expression. Before the court could even promulgate a
decision upon the Issue raised, Petitioner, through its president Mr. Rene
Espina, filed a motion to withdraw the petition. The rights of the station were
sold to a new owner, Manuel Pastrana; who is no longer interested in
pursuing the case. Despite the case becoming moot and academic,
(because there are no longer interested parties, thus the dismissal of the
case) the Supreme Court still finds that there is need to pass a
RESOLUTION for the guidance of inferior courts and administrative
tribunals in matters as this case.
Issue:
Whether or not due process was exercised in the case of DYRE.
Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the Constitutional Right
of Freedom of Expression.

The tribunal body must act on its own independent

consideration of law and facts and not simply accept
subordinates views
Court must render decision in such a manner that the
proceeding can know the various issued involved and
reasons for decisions rendered.

The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise definition of
Due Process, it gives an unavoidable standard that government actions must
conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty and property is valid.
The closure of the radio station is like wise a violation of the constitutional
right of freedom of speech and expression. The court stresses that all forms
of media, whether print or broadcast are entitled to this constitutional right.
Although the government still has the right to be protected against
broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. The test for the
limitation of freedom of expression is the clear and present danger rule. If
in the circumstances that the media is used in such nature as to create this
danger that will bring in such evils, then the law has the right to prevent it.
However, Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or
signal a start of widespread uprising. The freedom to comment on public
affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. The people
continues to have the right to be informed on public affairs and broadcast
media continues to have the pervasive influence to the people being the
most accessible form of media. Therefore, broadcast stations deserve the
the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and
freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.

Held:
The court finds that the closure of the Radio Station in 1980 as null and void.
The absence of a hearing is a violation of Constitutional Rights. The primary
requirements in administrative proceedings are laid down in the case of Ang
Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relation (69 Phil.635). The Ang Tibay Doctrine
should be followed before any broadcast station may be closed. The Ang
Tibay Doctrine provides the following requirements:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

The right to hearing, includes the right to present ones

case and submit evidence presented.
The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
The decision must have something to support itself.
Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that
is adequate to support conclusion)
Decision must be based on the evidence presented at
hearing

ANG TIBAY VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (CIR)

[69 PHIL 635; G.R. NO. 46496; 27 FEB 1940]
Facts:
There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union, Inc
(NLU). The NLU alleged that the supposed lack of leather material claimed
by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all
the members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is desired to be
proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of Customs and
Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. That National Worker's
Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated
by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. The
CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion
for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for
opposing the said motion.

Issue:

(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its
own independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the
reason for the decision rendered.

Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted.

Held:
To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The
CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its
creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an
administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the
nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government.
Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its
jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the
parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its
organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises
judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between
employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and
extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider,
investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes
arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and
landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between
them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.
As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point
out that the CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure,
and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities
or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence
but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.

The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases
coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative
character. There cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present
one's cause and submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented
at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected;

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable
to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a
new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of
this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the
case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth. So ordered.

ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO CAPULONG

[222 SCRA 644; G.R. 99327; 27 MAY 1993]
Facts:
Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of
serious physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the initiation rites
of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol
Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical
injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del
Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating
Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72
hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said
notice also required respondent students to submit their written statements
within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent students
received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the
meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. The Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the
written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a
prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the
Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were then
required to file their written answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean
created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent
students. The Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3
of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in
hazing activities. However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the
members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the
imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr.
Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students.

Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently
enrolled. This was granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining petitioners from
dismissing the respondents. A day after the expiration of the temporary
restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the
charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza. This was
requested to be stricken out by the respondents and argued that the creation
of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which
alleged lack of due process. This was granted and reinstatement of the
students was ordered.
Issue:

Abakada Guro Party List, et al vs Exec. Sec. Ermita

Facts: On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or
the VAT Reform Act. Before the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court
issued a TRO enjoining government from implementing the law in response
to a slew of petitions for certiorari and prohibition questioning the
constitutionality of the new law.
The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections
4, 5 and 6: That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to
12%, after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:

Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.

(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);

Held:
There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due
process. Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent
students to submit their written statement on the incident. Instead of filing a
reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the
charges. The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled
out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing.
Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the
instant petition under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for
reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and
the Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the
doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of
law, as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students
have been afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal from
Petitioner University.
Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions
in academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature
and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.

or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous

year exceeds one and one-half percent (1%)
Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to
increase the VAT rate is an abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to
tax because such delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI
Consti. They argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods
and services which cant be included within the purview of tariffs under the
exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute
payable upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on
imported/exported goods. They also said that the President has powers to
cause, influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about the
conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are
made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance will make the
recommendation.
Issue: Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to
increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power
granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of
legislative power? NO
Held: The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those
which are strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative
power which can never be delegated is the authority to make a complete lawcomplete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be
applicable, and to determine the expediency of its enactment. It is the nature
of the power and not the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise which
determines the validity of its delegation.
The exceptions are:

(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution

(b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution
(c) delegation to the people at large
(d) delegation to local governments

considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information
and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function
is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and
verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it
describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of
his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which
the legislative process can go forward.

(e) delegation to administrative bodies

For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standard.
A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits,
maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.
In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of
ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the
increased rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the
operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a
specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of
the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No
discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of
discretion is the fact that the word SHALL is used in the common proviso.
The use of the word SHALL connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute
denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of
discretion.
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the
12% rate upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress.
This is a duty, which cannot be evaded by the President. It is a clear directive
to impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present.
Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the
existence of a fact--- whether by December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as a
percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the national
government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one
and 1%. If either of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary of
Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit such information to the
President.
In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of
the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of
the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the
legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its
expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the
means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented,

There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as

to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress did
not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law.