No.

In The Supreme Court of The United States

________________
PETER LINDNER, Pro Se,
Petitioner,
v.
CSO NEWELL, ET AL.,
Respondents.
________________
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
________________
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
________________

Peter W. Lindner, Pro Se

1 Irving Place, Apt. G-23-C
NY, NY 10003
home: 212-979-9647
cell: 917-207-4962
nyc10003@nyc.rr.com
HH

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether Petitioner, pro se IFP litigant, was denied the fundamental constitutional right of equal
access to due process and equality under the Courts.
1) Did the lower Court err in misapplying the Federal Tort Claims Act?
2) Was petitioners equal protection rights violated by the Courts inequitable actions based on
petitioners indigence and pro se status
3) Does the judges oath create a fundamental right to equal access to the courts for individuals?

LIST OF PARTIES
[x] All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of all parties to
the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this petition is as follows:

1)

Petitioner Peter W. Lindner

2)

Respondent (C.S.O.) Newell

3)

Respondent (CSO) Muschitiello

4)

Respondent (CSO) John Doe # 1

5)

Respondent (CSO) John Doe # 2

6)

Respondent James Howard, US Marshal (USM)

7)

Respondent USM Brian Murphy

8)

Respondent USM Betty Ann Pascarella

9)

Respondent Witness Security S. Jones

10)

Respondent D. Disrud, Congressional Affairs Chief

11)

Respondent, USM Joseph R. Guccione

12)

Respondent The firm that subcontracted the CSOs to the US Marshal at SDNY

13)

Respondent Solicitor General of the US (pursuant to Rule 29.4)

14)

Other parties which were unilaterally dropped by USDJ Nathan prior to evidence of their

non-involvement, including US Attorney SDNY Preet Bharara who may have violated NY
Judiciary 487, or the Court Clerk who did not provide videotapes of the incident between CSO
Newell and Petitioner Lindner.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ................................................................................................................................ I
LIST OF PARTIES ............................................................................................................................................... II
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................................... III
INDEX TO APPENDICES ................................................................................................................................. IV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................................................... XIII
OPINIONS BELOW ............................................................................................................................................. 1
JURISDICTION .................................................................................................................................................... 1
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ................................................. 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................................................................... 5
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ............................................................................................ 8
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................................... 28
PROOF OF SERVICE ....................................................................................................................................... 29

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INDEX TO APPENDICES
[Inserted manually: Appendices 1-39]

iv

vi

vii

NOTE: ADDITIONAL APPENDICES ARE ATTACHED, INCLUDING "REQUIRED

APPENDIX A2" WHICH HAS MY REQUEST TO THE 2ND CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS OF THURSDAY, OCTOBER 03, 2013 2PM

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(SEVERAL BLANK PAGES RESERVED FOR ADDITIONAL APPENDICES' TOC)

ix

xi

xii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
06cv4751 Lindner v.IBM, et al ........................................................................................... 25
Amalfitano v. Rosenberg, 533 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2008) ......................................................... 16
Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 2120, 1996 WL 101277, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
March 7, 1996) ............................................................................................................... 9
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) .................................................................... 14
Bates v. Western Elec., 420 F.Supp. 521 E.D.Pa.1976 .......................................................... 21
Bates v. Western Elec., E.D.Pa.1976, 420 F.Supp. 521 ......................................................... 20
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) 14
Bolling v. Sharpe 347 U.S. 497; 74 S. Ct. 693 (1954) ........................................................... 12
Burnett v. New York Central Railroad Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) .................................... 19
Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 147, 159 (2d Cir. 2004) ............................................................... 18
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) ...................... 14
Gandler v. Nazarov, No. 94 Civ. 2272, 1994 WL 702004, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 1994) ...... 10
In re Chase Manhattan Corp. Secs. Litig., No. 90 Civ. 6092, 1991 WL 79432, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
May 7, 1991) .................................................................................................................. 9
In re WRT Energy Secs.Litig., No. 96 Civ. 3610, 1996 WL 580930, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.9,
1996) ............................................................................................................................. 9
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 ................................................................................. 13
Moos v. United States 118 F Supp 275 (D. Minn., 1954) ...................................................... 11
Moran v. Flaherty, No. 92 Civ. 3200, 1992 WL 276913, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.25, 1992) ........... 9
NYAT. Operating Corp. v. Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman, 191 Misc.2d 80, 741
N.Y.S.2d 385 (Sup. Ct. 2002) ......................................................................................... 16
People v. Oishei, 20 Misc. 163, 45 N.Y.S. 49. (Sup. Ct., Erie County, 1897) .......................... 17
San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 236 F.R.D. 491
(E.D.Cal.2006) .............................................................................................................. 21
Southern Blvd. Sound, Inc. v. Felix Storch, Inc., 165 Misc.2d 341, 629 N.Y.S.2d 635 (Civil Ct.
NY, 1995) .................................................................................................................... 17
Teeval Co v. City of New York, S.D.N.Y.1950, 88 F.Supp. 652 ............................................. 20
Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470 F.3d 491, 496 (2d Cir. 2006) ......................................................... 15
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Constitution, Amendment V ......................................................................................... 2
U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, 1 ............................................................................... 1
Other Authorities
Special Rules of Practice In Civil Pro Se Cases 10 ............................................................. 23
Special Rules of Practice In Civil Pro Se Cases 9 ............................................................... 23
Statutes
18 U.S.C.A. 1512(b)(3) .............................................................................................. 2, 23
28 U.S. Code 2671 ......................................................................................................... 12
28 U.S.C. 455 ................................................................................................................ 13
28 U.S.C. 2671. Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") ............................................................. 2
xiii

28 U.S.C., 453 ............................................................................................................... 13

28 U.S.C.A. 2671 ............................................................................................................ 11
28 USC 1346 ................................................................................................................. 11
28 USC 1346(b) ............................................................................................................. 11
28 USC 2402 ................................................................................................................. 11
28 USC 2680(h) ............................................................................................................. 11
28 USCA 1346.............................................................................................................. 11
Fed.R.A.P. 45 ................................................................................................................... 27
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(b)(1) ........................................................................................................ 20
Fed.R.Civ.P. 16 ................................................................................................................ 10
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c) ........................................................................................................ 9, 10
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) .......................................................................................................... 14
New York Judiciary 487 .................................................................................................... 3
NY Judiciary 487 ........................................................................................................ 8, 22
NY Judiciary Law 487 ..................................................................................................... 16

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(blank page reserved for additional Appendices' Table of Authorities)

xv

Petitioner Peter Lindner respectfully submits that a writ of certiorari issue to review the
judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit appears at
Appendix A to the petition and is not yet reported; or is unpublished.
The opinion of the United States District Court appears at Appendix B to the petition and
is not yet reported; or is unpublished.

JURISDICTION
The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case was December 4,
2013.
No petition for rehearing was filed in my case.
An extension to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted by Justice Ginsburg to
and including May 5, 2014 on March 3, 2014 (Appendix 37) in Application No. A13A894. A
subsequent extension on October 7, 2014 was granted to December 5, 2014 (Appendix 38).
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

INVOLVED
The following constitutional and statutory provisions are involved in this case
U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, 1:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
1

liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. Constitution, Amendment V:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand
jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
28 U.S.C. 2671. Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). Definitions:
As used in this chapter and sections 1346(b) and 2401(b) of this
title, the term Federal agency includes the executive
departments, the judicial and legislative branches, the military
departments, independent establishments of the United States, and
corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the
United States, but does not include any contractor with the United
States.
Employee of the government includes (1) officers or employees
of any federal agency, members of the military or naval forces of
the United States, members of the National Guard while engaged
in training or duty under section 115, 316, 502, 503, 504, or 505 of
title 32, and persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an
official capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service of the
United States, whether with or without compensation, and (2) any
officer or employee of a Federal public defender organization,
except when such officer or employee performs professional
services in the course of providing representation under section
3006A of title 18.
Acting within the scope of his office or employment, in the case
of a member of the military or naval forces of the United States or
a member of the National Guard as defined in section 101(3) of
title 32, means acting in line of duty.
18 U.S.C.A. 1512(b)(3). Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant.
Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly
persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in
misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to-2

hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement

officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the
commission or possible commission of a Federal offense or a
violation of conditions of probation1 supervised release,,2 parole,
or release pending judicial proceedings;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years,
or both.
New York Judiciary 487. Misconduct by attorneys:
An attorney or counselor who: 1. Is guilty of any deceit or
collusion, or consents to any deceit or collusion, with intent to
deceive the court or any party; Is guilty of a misdemeanor, and
in addition to the punishment prescribed therefor by the penal law,
he forfeits to the party injured treble damages, to be recovered in a
civil action.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16:
(b) Scheduling.
(1) Scheduling Order. Except in categories of actions exempted by
local rule, the district judgeor a magistrate judge when
authorized by local rulemust issue a scheduling order:
(A) after receiving the parties report under Rule 26(f); or
(B) after consulting with the parties attorneys and any
unrepresented parties at a scheduling conference or by telephone,
mail, or other means.
(2) Time to Issue. The judge must issue the scheduling order as
soon as practicable, but in any event within the earlier of 120 days
after any defendant has been served with the complaint or 90 days
after any defendant has appeared.
(3) Contents of the Order.
(A) Required Contents. The scheduling order must limit the time to
join other parties, amend the pleadings, complete discovery, and
file motions.
(B) Permitted Contents. The scheduling order may:

(i) modify the timing of disclosures under Rules 26(a) and

26(e)(1);
(ii) modify the extent of discovery;
(iii) provide for disclosure or discovery of electronically stored
information;
(iv) include any agreements the parties reach for asserting claims
of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material after
information is produced;
(v) set dates for pretrial conferences and for trial; and
(vi) include other appropriate matters.
(4) Modifying a Schedule. A schedule may be modified only for
good cause and with the judge's consent.
(c) Attendance and Matters for Consideration at a Pretrial
Conference.
(1) Attendance. A represented party must authorize at least one of
its attorneys to make stipulations and admissions about all matters
that can reasonably be anticipated for discussion at a pretrial
conference. If appropriate, the court may require that a party or its
representative be present or reasonably available by other means to
consider possible settlement.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d):
Supplemental Pleadings. On motion and reasonable notice, the
court may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental
pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that
happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented. The
court may permit supplementation even though the original
pleading is defective in stating a claim or defense. The court may
order that the opposing party plead to the supplemental pleading
within a specified time.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Lindners Cause of the Action

Petitioner was physically attacked by Court Security Officer Newell on August 20, 2010
in the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals building (the "incident"). Court Security Officer (CSO)
Muschitiello witnessed the event and CSO Newell apologized for hitting Petitioner and shook
hands in front of CSO Muschitiello. (Appendix 35 at A-159) Maragaret Lain, Chief Court Clerk
for the Southern District of New York, failed to render assistance to Petitioner, who she saw was
being attacked by CSO Newell.
Petitioner reported the incident to the United States Marshal Service (USMS), which
employs the Court Security Officers through an outside contractor, Akal Security. CSO Newell
denied all allegations. Petitioners charges were dismissed without investigation. Petitioner then
requested video surveillance footage documenting the altercation but was summarily denied.
Petitioner filed a lawsuit in the Second Circuit, Southern District of New York on
November 17, 2011 against Preet Bharara, D. Disrud, Joseph R. Guccione, James Howard, John
Doe # 1, John Doe # 2, S. Jones, Margaret Lain, Brian Murphy, CSO Muschitiello, CSO Newell,
Betty Ann Pascarella, and the firm that subcontracted the CSOs to the US Marshal at the SDNY
Courthouse (Akal Security). (See appendix 35 at A-159)
Plaintiff requested pre-discovery conferences and made discovery demands. Petitioner
required certain evidence of the incident that Defendants possessed. Respondents refused and
obstructed all attempts at discovery, and USDJ Nathan upheld that without a hearing, without
scheduling conferences and without the pre-scheduling conference hearings.
During the litigation, numerous dilatory actions by the Court and the Defendants caused
further delay and hindrance preventing redress for Petitioner's injuries. Among these actions
5

include: the USMS and US Attorney filing false documents to the Court in NY State (See
Attachment 2 of Appendix 41); the District Court conducting ex-parte in-camera meetings with
witnesses, during which he intimidated them (See Appendices 52 & 59); Hon. Nathan's Special
Rules of Practice in Civil Pro Se Cases disallowing pro-se litigants the option of oral argument
(See Appendix 21 pp.A-72,74); US Marshal Howard, an employee of the Department of Justice,
prevented Petitioner from interacting with the Clerk of the Court or the US Marshal Service
without legal representation, effectively installing a "poll tax" discouraging an indigent pro-se
litigant from pursuing his rights; the USMS making intimidating visits to Petitioners home in
December 2010, and harassing and intimidating Petitioner's witness who now fears for his /her
safety; Honorable Nathan allowing Defendants to violate Magistrate Judge's Scheduling Order
for pre-discovery conferences.
In November, 2012, Honorable Nathan refused to grant Petitioner his right to pre-trial
scheduling conference scheduling and to amend his Complaint to include additional Defendants.
(See Appendix 62) Her Honor ignored Petitioner's requests and delayed the case until
Defendants made a Motion to Dismiss (Appendix 67). At this point Hon. Nathan further
prejudiced Petitioner by allowing Defendants to have their motion heard, staying all Petitioner's
requests and discovery as well as the motion for sanctions that had been pending with the
Magistrate Judge. (See Appendix 65).
On March 26, 2013, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York rendered its decision to dismiss Petitioner's action.
Petitioner filed a timely Notice of appeal on April 26, 2013 from the judgment of
dismissal. Petitioner's appeal to the Second Circuit argued on the grounds that Petitioners Due
Process rights were violated in that the Court failed to rule on Petitioner's motion to compel

discovery, summarily dismissing the case before Petitioner could gain access to evidence
necessary to prosecute his case.
On December 13, 2014, the United States District Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit rendered its decision affirming the District Court.
The issues for which petitioner seeks review in this Court are set forth below:

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

1) The Supreme Court of the United States should grant this Petition for Writ of Certiorari to
determine that indigent pro-se litigants have constitutional rights as a protected class.
2) The Supreme Court of the United States should grant this Petition for Writ of Certiorari to
determine that the Judge's Oath creates a fundamental right for litigants.
3) The Supreme Court should grant this Petition For Writ Of Certiorari to decide that
incremental minor errors by lower courts can constitute a violation of procedural and substantive
due process.
4) The Supreme Court, to uphold the Supreme Court's authority to oversee lower federal courts
and prevent illegality and corruption, should grant this Petition For Writ Of Certiorari.
5) The Supreme Court should grant this Petition For Writ Of Certiorari to decide that the federal
courts have the supervisory authority to oversee the executive branch and prevent illegality and
corruption.
6) The Supreme Court should grant this Petition For Writ Of Certiorari to decide that the Courts
below should have information to make a decision and thus this case should be remanded for
discovery so that the trial Court can decide on actual data and events.
7) The Supreme Court should grant this Petition For Writ Of Certiorari to decide that both the
USMS General Counsel Auerbach and the AUSA Harwood violated NY Judiciary 487 on
intent to deceive any Court in NY State by respectively making false statements under
"penalty of perjury" [see Appendixes 30 and 31 ] and omitting the contradictory statements so
that the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals would (without a document on the official record) be
unable to examine them [see Appendixes 30, 31 and 41 ],
8) The Supreme Court should grant this Petition For Writ Of Certiorari to decide that the SDNY
and the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals both erred in not applying NY State law to this action,
specifically NY Judiciary 487 on intent to deceive any Court in NY State.

ARGUMENT
THE LOWER COURTS ERRED IN STAYING DISCOVERY PENDING THE OUTCOME OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
The District Court should not have allowed the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss to take
precedence over the Plaintiff's good faith attempts for reasonable discovery of evidence. Rule
26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure says that a court has discretion to stay discovery
for good cause shown. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c). Good cause may be shown where a party has filed a
dispositive motion, the stay is for a short period of time, and the opposing party will not be
prejudiced by the stay. See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 2120, 1996 WL
101277, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. March 7, 1996).
While discovery may in a proper case be stayed pending the outcome of a motion to
dismiss, the issuance of a stay is by no means automatic. In re WRT Energy Secs.Litig., No. 96
Civ. 3610, 1996 WL 580930, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.9, 1996) (Keenan, J.); see Moran v. Flaherty,
No. 92 Civ. 3200, 1992 WL 276913, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.25, 1992) ([D]iscovery should not be
routinely stayed simply on the basis that a motion to dismiss has been filed.); In re Chase
Manhattan Corp. Secs. Litig., No. 90 Civ. 6092, 1991 WL 79432, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 1991)
(same). Two related factors a court may consider in deciding a motion for a stay of discovery are
the breadth of discovery sought and the burden of responding to it. See Anti-Monopoly, Inc.,
1996 WL 101277, at *3. Finally, a court should also consider the strength of the dispositive
motion that is the basis of the discovery stay application. See, e.g., Gandler v. Nazarov, No. 94
Civ. 2272, 1994 WL 702004, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 1994)

In the instant case, a pre-discovery scheduling order1 was set by Magistrate Dolinger on
6/13/2012. The order directed the parties to participate in a conference under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16. Defendant made numerous
requests2 to Defendant's counsel to confer in person to make initial disclosures pursuant to FRCP
26. Petitioner's efforts were spurned by Defendants' counsel's unwillingness to meet or otherwise
make disclosures. Petitioner's due process was additionally hampered when Hon. Nathan
doubled down on this discriminatory treatment by allowing Defendants to shirk the Magistrate's
Order and grant Defendant's motion to dismiss.
In this case, the Second Circuit failed to properly weigh the factors involved in staying
discovery to grant a motion to dismiss. The Second Circuit upheld the dismissal of Petitioner's
Complaint and the Defendant's flagrant violation of a Court order, rather than allowing the
parties to conduct reasonable discovery. Moreover, Petitioner requested evidence that was under
Defendants sole control. There was also reasonable concern that evidence would be destroyed.
Lastly, the evidence was necessary to prosecute petitioners claims. Therefore, the 2nd Circuit
continued the stay of Petitioner's discovery and reviewed the motion to dismiss without weighing
the necessary factors, unfairly prejudicing this pro se petitioner.

THE LOWER COURTS ERRED IN RULING BASED UPON THE FTCA IN ASSESSING
THE INSTANT CASE

The Federal Tort Claims Act provides, in pertinent part, that the United States, shall be
liable for personal injury caused by the negligent or wrongful act of any employee of the

1
2

Appendix 63.
Appendices 57, 62, 64.

10

Government, acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where
the United States, if a private person, would be liable. 28 USC 1346. Liability is determinable
in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 28 USC 1346(b).
The Act further provides that the action can be brought only in a United States District Court (28
USC 1346(b)) within two years after the claim accrues, (28 USC 2401) and that the action
shall be tried by the court without a jury. 28 USC 2402.
Generally speaking, a claim accruing under this act would require the imposition of the
United States as Defendant. 28 USCA 1346.
In this case, the District Courts dismissal Order stated that Petitioners failure to impose
the United States as a Defendant was fatal. (See Appendix A-2, Order). However, Defendants
Marshals and Federal Court Officers are [e]mployee of the government under 28 U.S.C.A.
2671, which states, that [e]mployee of the government includes officers or employees of any
federal agency. 28 USC 2680(h), however, provides an exception of liability under the Act for
"any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit..." The section precludes recovery
through the FTCA upon any claim arising out of either negligent or willful misrepresentation or
claims arising from assault or battery.
Where an injurious act constitutes a technical assault and battery under local law,
recovery may be precluded under the Act because of its exception as to intentional torts. (Moos
v. United States 118 F Supp 275 (D. Minn., 1954). Here, the cause of action arises out of an
assault on August 20, 2010 perpetrated by a Federal Court Officer and the abuse of process,
misrepresentation and deceit perpetrated by the USMS when Petitioner sought redress. The
lower Courts were incorrect in utilizing the FTCA in addressing the cause of action and this

11

Court should find that based upon the plain language of the statute, the Petitioner does not need
to prove standing under the FTCA nor interpose the United States as Defendant, but rather, is
correct in suing the individual Defendants in their individual capacities, under New York law.

A JUDGE'S OATH CREATES A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT FOR LITIGANTS

There is a scope of protection from the courts regarding individual constitutional rights
that is guarded by a Judge's oath to the constitution. In Bolling v. Sharpe 347 U.S. 497; 74 S. Ct.
693 (1954), the Supreme Court held in paragraph 2 that:
The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the District of
Columbia, does not contain an equal protection clause as does the
Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to the states. But the
concepts of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The equal
protection of the laws is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited
unfairness than due process of law, and, therefore, we do not
imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But as this
Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to
be violative of due process.
A federal judge is a federal officer (28 U.S. Code 2671), and is in an imminent position
to deny equal protection under the law, as the Federal Courts did to the Petitioners who were
under the scope of the courts protection. This scope of protection is Constitutional and by a
judges oath, is an umbrella of Constitutional protection that covers the Petitioners and to all who
come to the Federal Courts for a Redress of grievances, or violations of other inalienable
12

Constitutional rights. Therefore, the courts responsibility is to the individuals under the
Constitution to see that those rights that are violated are remedied upon complaint.
Under a judge's oath, (28 U.S.C., 453) he agrees to perform his duties agreeably to the
Constitution and laws of the United States, apply the law to particular instances, support the
federal Constitution, and should fearlessly observe and apply fundamental limitations and
guarantees. His conduct should be free from impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, and
should avoid infractions of law and should indicate the reasons for his action in his opinions. 28
U.S.C. 453, 455. The Supreme Court quoted Blackstone: ... that every right, when withheld,
must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163.
Every injury must have its appropriate remedy. The District Court dismissed the instant
lawsuit and the Court of appeals affirmed, leaving Petitioner with no redress, and further injury.
It is alleged that such is not the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, and is a
violation of the Judge's Oath and by extension, the United States Constitution.
The Supreme Court stated in Marbury v. Madison that, [t]he very essence of civil liberty
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he
receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. Marbury v.
Madison at 163. The above together with the judge's oath, the Code of Conduct for United States
Judges and the fact that there are criminal penalties for violation of the laws all point to the
unmistakable conclusion that the law must be followed and every litigant must be granted a
fundamental right by virtue of these legal doctrines to have his injuries redressed by an impartial
Court.
The lower Courts, particularly the District Court by and through Hon. Nathan, refused to
allow Petitioner a fair hearing to redress the injuries caused to him by the Court Officers and the

13

US Marshal Service. Upon information and belief, the Judge summarily dismissed Petitioner out
of hand because her Honor did not have the patience to allow a pro-se litigant to conduct his own
case. The Judge refused to allow pre-trial discovery to be conducted, instead allowing the
Defendants to make a motion to dismiss without consideration for the outstanding discovery.

PETITIONER, AS A PRO SE LITIGANT SHOULD BE AFFORDED LATITUDE IN

THE READING OF PLEADINGS DUE TO THE LACK OF KNOWLEDGE
REGARDING THE CONSTRUCTION OF CLAIMS BY LAY-PERSONS
The lower Courts erred in dismissing Petitioner's action for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) merely requires Plaintiff
provide a short and plain statement evidencing entitlement to relief. The rule is satisfied when
Defendant is given fair notice of the grounds upon which relief is sought. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Factual allegations are
sufficient when they "raise a right to relief above the speculative level... on the assumption that
all the allegations in the complaint are true" Id. at 1965. A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)
While the standard requires more than what would be considered "naked assertions"
(Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), a more liberal
construction of pleadings is afforded pro se litigants. "[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully
pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (citing Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)).

14

In the case at bar, the lower Courts summarily dismissed the complaint as facially
insufficient. The lower court failed to properly weigh the fact that Petitioner is a pro se litigant.
The Complaint was admittedly lacking in content appropriate for a well-versed litigant; however,
a claim was presented and sufficient evidence to indicate that a tort was committed against the
Plaintiff was indicated. (See Appendix 35 at A-159, Complaint) Petitioner alleges in his
complaint that,
"the acts against me by CSO Newell... amounted to... intimidation,
as well as physically touching me, and then also covering up the
incident by lying to the US Marshal Investigator, who did not
properly conduct the cross-examination nor safeguard the tapes of
evidence... I was assaulted by CSO Newel, and then this was
covered up by the US Marshal in concert with the CSO and their
employer."
The complaint, viewed in light most favorable to a pro se litigant, demonstrates that an
intentional tort occurred. Defendant acted with the intent to cause an offensive contact upon the
Petitioner. The Court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to this
pro se plaintiff and find that a claim upon which relief could be granted was made.
The District Court further ruled: " '...a Plaintiff bringing a claim under Bivens, [a claim
under the Federal Tort Claims Act] must allege that he has been deprived of a constitutional right
by a federal agent acting under color of federal authority.' Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470 F.3d 491, 496
(2d Cir. 2006)(citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971))" (Quoting Order dated March 26, 2013, See Appendix A-2). The
same liberal reading of the Petitioner's Complaint should serve to inculpate the Federal
Defendants in depriving Petitioner of his constitutional rights. The Complaint alleges that the US
Marshal acted in concert with the CSO in an attempt to deprive Petitioner of his right to due
process by inhibiting him from accessing documents necessary to support his claims against

15

them. (See Appendix 32 at A-159). These Defendants ensured that Petitioner could not maintain
an action against the CSO who committed the tortuous act against Petitioner.
The Complaint should have been read in the more liberal fashion afforded pro se litigants
generally, and not simply summarily dismissed. The Complaint alleges enough factual
information to provide sufficient notice to Defendants and the Court that Petitioner is and was
entitled to relief.

THE COURT SHOULD APPLY THE STANDARDS OF NY JUDICIARY LAW 487

FOR THE RAMPANT DECEPTION AND COLLUSION PERPETRATED ONTO
THE PETITIONER AND THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
The NY Judiciary Law 487 makes an attorney or counselor guilty of a criminal
misdemeanor if he or she is guilty of any deceit or collusion, or consents to any deceit or
collusion, with intent to deceive the court or any party. Importantly, under New York's attorney
misconduct statute, the act of deceit need not occur during a physical appearance in court to
support civil action by party injured by attorney's intentional deceit or collusion on court or party
to litigation, inasmuch as the statute applies to any oral or written statement related to a
proceeding and communicated to a court or party with the intent to deceive. Amalfitano v.
Rosenberg, 533 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2008).
The statute allows an injured party to recover treble damages from attorney who is
guilty of and deception or collusion and could apply to single incident of attorney misconduct,
where lying under oath is alleged. NYAT. Operating Corp. v. Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler &
Krupman, 191 Misc.2d 80, 741 N.Y.S.2d 385 (Sup. Ct. 2002). In addition, the provision of the
Judiciary Law authorizing recovery of treble damages by any party injured because of deceit
practiced on court by attorney is in part penal statute, and thus must be strictly construed.

16

Southern Blvd. Sound, Inc. v. Felix Storch, Inc., 165 Misc.2d 341, 629 N.Y.S.2d 635 (Civil Ct.
NY, 1995).
In order to sustain a claim under the NY Judiciary Law 487, one must demonstrate that
an attorney made fraudulent representations. It is not necessary that the fraudulent
representations result in damages in order to be guilty of deceit, such offense is punishable
regardless of the damage. People v. Oishei, 20 Misc. 163, 45 N.Y.S. 49. (Sup. Ct., Erie County,
1897).
In the instant case, USMS General Counsel Auerbach and AUSA Harwood are guilty of
making fraudulent representations and causing deception upon the court. The attorneys made
certain false statements under "penalty of perjury" [see Appendixes 30 and 31 ]. Contradictory
statements were later made in ex parte letters to the Court. The letters that these statements were
made in were thus omitted from the record and as a result, the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals was
unable to examine them since the letters were not included in the official record. [See
Appendixes 30, 31 and 41].
District Court Judge Nathan's refusal to allow oral argument or pretrial discovery
prevented any challenge of these false statements made by USMS General Counsel Auerbach
and AUSA Harwood. The Judge compounded the deceit by allowing US Attorney Preet Bharara
to exclude the retraction of the false sworn statement of USMS General Counsel Auerbach [see
Appendices 16-17] and further prevented this evidence from being in the record. It is thus
imperative that this case be remanded to the lower court to allow for discovery as well as citing
USMS General Counsel Auerbach for violations of the NY Judiciary 487 for his fraudulent and
deceitful conduct before the Court.

17

THE COURT SHOULD EQUITABLY TOLL THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS

A MATTER OF FAIRNESS BECAUSE PETITIONER DILIGENTLY AND
PERSISTENTLY SOUGHT TO OBTAIN REDRESS FOR HIS INJURIES
The diligence with which Petitioner pursued all possible means of redress, combined with
the egregious and hostility he describes, warrant application of the doctrine of equitable tolling in
this case. Even if this Court concludes that the limitations period on claims arising from the
attacks on Petitioner commenced when those attacks occurred, Petitioner filed the instant lawsuit
only three months after the statute of limitations had run on the August 20, 2010 incident. In the
intervening period--indeed, from the first weeks after the August 20, 2010, attack -- Petitioner
has tirelessly pursued all conceivable avenues of relief and filed a federal suit only as a last
resort. This is not a case in which a person, having sat on his rights throughout the limitations
period and failed to notify the defendants of his grievances or to afford them an opportunity to
provide relief, asks a court to excuse his dilatory tactics. To the contrary, Petitioner alerted the
Defendants to his injuries in multiple ways, and he acted with reasonable diligence throughout
the period he seeks to toll. Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 147, 159 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation
marks omitted). His untimely filing (if the Court deems it as such) was primarily the result of
pursuing his claims in the wrong forum (the original tortious act should have been brought
individually against CSO Newell et al, in State Court, based upon a state cause of action) -- a
reasonable mistake for an unsophisticated litigant, engendered by severe confusion in the law at
that time, and a recognized basis for application of equitable tolling. This case therefore presents
the kind of extraordinary circumstances in which the statute of limitations should be tolled as a
matter of fairness.
Petitioner's allegations overwhelmingly describe an environment permeated with
discrimination and bigotry. The August 20, 2010, assault as well as the actions of the USMS and

18

CSO throughout the instant litigation, Petitioner alleges, was part of an orchestrated effort by
defendants to intimidate him and to prevent him from bringing his treatment to light. Appendix
32 at A-159.
The August 20, 2010 assault did not so much as result in disciplinary charges against the
CSO, despite repeated attempts by Petitioner to have his rights redressed (See. Appendix 9-10
pages A-54 to A-58).
Because Petitioner promptly and unrelentingly sought to vindicate his rights during the
relevant period, equitable tolling would not undermine the purpose of the statute of limitations.
As the Courts recognized in Doe v. Menefee, equitable tolling is appropriate where the
party acted with reasonable diligence throughout the period he seeks to toll. 391 F.3d 147, 159
(2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). The record in this case reflects extraordinary
efforts on Petitioner's part to vindicate his rights through every conceivable channel. In addition
to his pursuit of the formal administrative grievance procedure, Petitioner contacted any and
every person or agency who might have been able to aid him, only to be met with silence or
stonewalling. (See Appendix 9-10 pp.A-54 - A-58, Letters to Administrative Agencies)
Petitioner dutifully ensured that no witness's memory has faded and that no evidence had
been lost, and he had carefully pursued his claims so that he may ultimately present them to a
neutral arbiter. Equitable tolling would therefore serve the ends of justice without sacrificing the
policies underlying the statute of limitations. Cf. Burnett v. New York Central Railroad Co., 380
U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (holding that where a federal statute serves a humanitarian purpose,
Congress would not wish a plaintiff deprived of his rights when no policy underlying a statute
of limitations is served in doing so).

19

THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT

PLEADINGS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d) states that
"On motion and reasonable notice, the court may, on just terms,
permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any
transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the
pleading to be supplemented. The court may permit
supplementation even though the original pleading is defective in
stating a claim or defense. The court may order that the opposing
party plead to the supplemental pleading within a specified time."
Petitioner made a motion to add new Defendants to his complaint, which was summarily
denied by the trial court because of a perceived defect in stating a claim. This flies in the face of
the language in the statute, which explicitly allows the Court to permit supplementation even
though the original pleading is "defective." Here, the Court was not only incorrect regarding the
defectiveness of the pleadings, but also failed to consider that such motions should be freely
granted where doing so will promote justiciable disposition of case, will not cause undue
prejudice or delay or trial inconvenience, and will not prejudice rights of any parties to action.
Bates v. Western Elec, 420 F.Supp. 521 (E.D.Pa.1976).
It is well established that where a plaintiff desires to allege events which happened since
date of its original complaint, the appropriate pleading is supplemental complaint and permission
to serve a supplemental complaint would be granted. Teeval Co v. City of New York, 88 F.Supp.
652 (S.D.N.Y.1950). The Defendants who Petitioner requested to add caused Petitioner further
harm after the original pleadings were filed. They included Defendants' counsel who acted in

20

prejudicial ways towards petitioner as well as other persons responsible for causing Petitioner
harm during the pendency of the action.
An application for leave to file supplemental pleading, like application for leave to amend
complaint should be freely granted where doing so will promote justiciable disposition of case,
will not cause undue prejudice or delay or trial inconvenience, and will not prejudice rights of
any parties to action. Bates v. Western Elec., 420 F.Supp. 521 E.D.Pa.1976. Adding parties who
cause further harm to litigants during the pendency of an action, parties who are directly related
to the action itself, does not prejudice any other parties and serves to provide Plaintiff with
means to dispose of all claims related to his case and the controversies surrounding it at once,
rather than hurting judicial economy by making numerous separate claims.
Leave to file a supplemental pleading should be freely given, in the absence of any
apparent or declared reason, such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the
movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue
prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment,
et cetera. San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 236 F.R.D. 491
(E.D.Cal.2006). The trial court's decision does not provide a clear reasoning for not allowing
Petitioner's supplement aside from the erroneous claim that the pleadings were defective, which
as stated above, is an affront to the statute as written. Petitioner's supplemental adding of new
defendants was not made in bad faith and certainly would not have caused any undue prejudice
to the Defendants, nor was any such thing alleged by Defendants or the Court.

WHAT IS AT STAKE?

21

There is a lot at stake in this case. CSO Newell hit me and apologized thereafter in front
of his partner CSO Muschitiello. The incident can be verified by the videotapes and by testimony
of CSO Muschitiello, who would presumably rather tell the truth than cover up for a co-worker
and have a videotape contradict his lies. CSO Newell would then be found guilty of a felony lying to a federal Law Enforcement Officer3. The Assistant United States Attorney, the US
Attorney and the USMS General Counsel would be found guilty of a criminal misdemeanor,
which can result in disbarment from NY State, triggering their disbarment from SDNY and
treble damages to me. The head SDNY US Marshal, Guccione, should be relieved of his duty,
and perhaps found guilty of obstruction of justice, and maybe bribery for the actions of his
officers and for, upon information and belief, stopping Petitioner's paperwork from reaching The
2nd Circuit Court of Appeals4. The SDNY Pro Se Office should be forced to serve the public
rather than cover-up actions of the USMS and USDJ Sullivan. USDJ Nathan should be
chastened, and forced to allow discovery in the instant case, investigate the Petitioner's
allegations of perjury and the US Attorney's violation of NY Judiciary 487 on intent to
deceive any Court in NY State referenced above. USDJ Nathan should also explain what led
Her Honor to not follow Her Honor's oath to allow rich and poor equal treatment. Her Honor

I should be able to depose the 2 CSO's, the DEA/ATF handlers of the Confidential Informant, USMS Guccione,
USMS General Counsel Auerbach, and the CI (among others).
4 See Appendix 61 for my hand carried but then mailed letter of Friday, September 10, 2010 6:55
AM to SDNY US Attorney, which includes photo (page 6 of 8) of my appeal to the 2nd Circuit which
was routed (page 8 of 8) to both the USMS and then the SDNY Pro Se Office. It begins:
I hereby file my complaint to you about an Assault and Battery and intimidation by (CSO)
Court Security Officer Newel in front of the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, between 3:30pm
and 5:15pm on Friday Aug 20, 2010 on the 3rd floor of 500 Pearl St., while I was reporting a
series of mail delayed to the 2nd Circuit. I have proof of envelopes stamped USM and SDNY
when the address shows the letter was address to the 2nd Circuit. I have been unable so far
to file / report a criminal complaint done by a powerful person. I had also called the US
Attorney civilian criminal complaint line the day after the incident, and have not been called
back.

22

should also be forced to strike down her Special Rules of Practice In Civil Pro Se Cases 95 that
only members of the bar are allowed oral argument. Her Honor should also be forced to explain
her and Special Rules of Practice In Civil Pro Se Cases 10 and that within two months of a
compliant an initial case management conference be held, yet she decided not to follow her own
rule. USDJ Sullivan should be impeached for witness tampering (witnesses Lindner (petitioner)
and the Confidential Informant who was called specifically to Sullivan's chambers, mentioning
Lindner by name and also by code-name "Benedict Arnold6" were intimidated by USDJ
Sullivan). DEA/ATF agents then would be arrested for witness tampering for stopping the
testimony of the Confidential Informant(s), performing illegal wiretaps against witnesses, and
attempts to bribe the CI with money, drugs, and potential threats of physical retaliation. These
actions against the confidential informants caused him/her to be fearful for his/her life. Three
unknown men, suspected to be agents of the Federal Government, approached the CI in the
SDNY Courthouse and should be arrested for witness tampering.7 There should also be a retrial
of the criminal defendants who were not told of the attempted tampering of the Confidential
Informant, who was a witness during their trial. The DEA/ATF should be indicted for
obstruction of justice by not revealing this information to the Judge and criminal defendants in

See Appendix 45, document 14 or 17 on 'USDJ Nathan's "Individual Practice" not allowing oral
argument by non lawyers is de facto discriminatory'
6 Added July 16, 2014: The Confidential Informant also referred to me as "Benedict Arnold" when I
loaned the CI $60 to go to the DEA/ATF this week when he/she did not have money. The CI relayed
to them that I wanted the money back, and they ostensibly replied they would do so by Monday, July
14, and now it is several weeks past then.
5

18 USC 1512(b), and perhaps 18 USC 1512(a).

Additionally, the Confidential Informant told me in July 2014 that "If I get arrested for being high, I
will not get money owned to me" in the amount of several thousand dollars.
Also in Appendix 59, 14, the CI was told not to take a trip with me to Washington DC lest the CI be
introduced to politicians (who would investigate the DEA/ATF actions against me).
In Appendix 60, there were text messages sent to me that were spoofed, so as to hinder or delay the
witness (CI) from testifying / writing an affidavit for the US Supreme Court about possible federal
crimes. This is a violation of 18 USC 1512(b)(3).
7

23

said criminal case. The adversarial witness was suborned for perjury during the trial and the
AUSA wasn't notified even though the AUSA specifically thanked the CI and shook the CI's
hand for doing a good and brave job. The CI should be dismissed from working with the
DEA/ATF, and given a pension for the CI's (perhaps) 10 years of service, and loyalty to the
truth. Lindner should get vindication against people who said that a person even a citizen
can't win against a powerful Judge-for-life and against the DEA/ATF who asked the CI to plant
child porn on Petitioner's personal computer by virtue of a computer virus. The NY Bar might be
shook up to allow special avenues for cases like this that could provoke a Judge's ire. The
USMS should be downgraded for failure to pursue the truth, and for passing on information to
the subject of an investigation, to wit, USDJ Sullivan. The NYPD's Detective then would have to
explain why Judge Sullivan was called when the CI was arrested in a domestic violence dispute8,
which may serve to be the linchpin linking this criminal conspiracy to the FBI, DEA/ATF,
USMS, and NYPD. US Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney should explain why she called the
CI's mother in another State and why she did not look into the allegations against USDJ Sullivan
(nor did she forward them to the House Judiciary Committee). Maloney should be forced to
resign or be censured for witness tampering. The NSA should be compelled to reveal whether it
has wiretapped a US Citizen (Lindner) without a warrant for longer than allowed without post
hoc authorization. It should be reined in from such illegal actions on millions of American
citizens.
USDJ Sullivan should have to tell what criminal cases, if any, were swayed by the
apparent bribery he has received. The adversary law firm Jackson Lewis in 06cv4751 Lindner
The CI said she was under arrest when she heard a superior of the arresting officer / NYPD
Detective tell that detective "to call Judge Sullivan and see what he should do with this situation."
The CI heard the NYPD detective say the words "I will put [name of CI] through the system and
dismiss immediately." This is indeed what ultimately happened in Court, which was unusual even
to that defendant.
8

24

v.IBM, et al. then would have to explain the mechanism they used to determine that a federal
Judge was open to bribes, and how they accomplished it, and the two lead lawyers then would be
disbarred and sent to prison. The JacksonLewis partners then would be forced to reveal all their
bribes, resulting in a cascade of convictions of lawyers, Judges and clerks. IBM, the Defendants
in the above referenced case would have to declare why it bribed USDJ Sullivan and perhaps
other US officials (which may get Congress to pass domestic anti-bribery legislation). IBM then
should have to agree to give ESI for all cases involving discrimination, especially due to
protected categories, such as being homosexual. IBM then would have to admit wrong-doing by
intimidating vendors9 into not testifying for former employees.
All federal discovery should have been guided by SCOTUS' December 2006 rules on
ESI, including turning over emails (e.g. especially egregious with IBM falsely claiming no
relevant emails, and lying to the Judge about that, and not retracting that statement when given a
counter-example), including making the documents computer searchable, perhaps by turning
over complete databases rather than individual documents, and generous use of clawback
provisions. Use of testimony and affidavits by US Government should be nullified if physical
proof (such as videotapes) are not turned over to their adversaries. Judges then would have to
treat pro se litigants and US Attorneys as equally credible, and not ignore evidence to the
contrary of US Attorneys failing to abide by the Judiciary Laws' "intent to deceive" the Court or
by requirements to meet10 with adversaries, especially pro-se litigants.

By economic weapons against its vendors. One vendor told me that the office had shrunk down to
just that one person from several, even without losing IBM.
10 On "Meet The Press" (NBC, Sunday, March 30, 2014) former NYC Mayor Giuliani who was also a
US Attorney was asked whether the report commissioned by NJ Gov Chris Christie should have
released the full transcript of the Christie Q&A. Giuliani said, of course as much information should
be made public as possible, but it is most important that it be given to the US Attorney.
9

25

The DEA/ATF should be forced to reveal evidence to criminal defendants not only of
life-and-death threats, but also of suborning perjury of its witnesses. NYPD then would be
forced to take seriously the allegations of police corruption and involvement in smears of US
citizens, whether based on NSA wiretaps or just prejudice. Emails, text messages and phone
records from the DEA/ATF and NSA should be released to demonstrate a showing of bribery of
a witness, intent to frame an innocent US citizen (Lindner), and the conspiracy USDJ Sullivan,
Detectives, the DEA/ATF engaged in to deprive Lindner of his right to a fair trial. The NSA
would then have to get special permission to wiretap communications (phone, texts, or emails,
and maybe even letters) between a client and his attorney, especially if communications are
privileged or labeled "Lawyer Client CONFIDENTIAL", so that Lindner will not have to encrypt
his communications to his lawyer on this and related topics. The DEA/ATF then would be
prohibited from using counter-value deterrents of making the Confidential Informant a possible
target of criminals in order to stop Lindner from going public with the accusations.
Q: In order to give this investigation a little more credibility should Gibson Dunn the
law firm that conducted it release the full transcript of the interview they did with
Governor Christie?
A [Mayor Giuliani]: That's up to them. I mean I don't know how much more [overtalk of Q
&
A]
Q: But, I'm asking you, do you think it would be better for Governor Christie if that were
public?
A: I think that the more that is made public, the better it is. And the more they share with
the Joint Committee, and obviously they will give everything to the US Attorney. I would
consider that to be the most important part. Are they giving everything to the US
Attorney?
[3:57-4:34 minutes of 11:09]
http://www.nbcnews.com/video/meet-the-press/54819847/#54819847
HHU

UHH

This reflects a concept that the US Attorney should be made aware of the nature of events in order to
do his job properly. Unfortunately, AUSA Harwood and US Attorney Preet Bharara do not agree
with this concept, or else they would have met Lindner about the Confidential Informant (on being
asked to perjure him/her self, and on USDJ Sullivan speaking to the CI ex parte see Appendix 59)
nor about allowing discovery (to determine if CSO Muschitiello witnessed CSO Newell hitting
Lindner and later apologizing to Lindner and shaking Lindner's hand, and whether the USMS
interviewed CSO Muschitiello or not, and whether there is videotape corroborating Lindner's
account, and checking what system or lack thereof or cover-up made USMS General Counsel
Auerbach perjure himself on Lindner not submitting a complaint to the USMS office and the DOJ in
2010, which the US Attorney used as the sole basis for not allowing Lindner's suit).
U

26

Hopefully the SCOTUS will create a single package of best practices11 for the District
Courts and Appeals Courts, so that individual practices of Judges will not block pro se litigants
from equal justice under the law for poor (the rich have superior justice) and that acts of violence
[included in my letter to the Clerk, and possibly to the Judges to investigate my being hit, but
also mentioned in "Case: 13-1761 Document: 33 10/03/2013 1058152 102 pages" entitled
"Motion For Leave Of Ninety Days To Perfect Motion"], intimidation12, and bars to procedural
due process are removed, and also that sound reasoning rather than cryptic (or pro forma)
phrases13 be used to explain decisions.
There is also the important issue of Maragaret Lain's failure to perform her duties
required by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 45, which requires her as chief clerk
to safeguard all paper entrusted to her by litigants. I submitted documents to her officer in person
as well as by US mail, however the Clerk's office somehow lost or otherwise allowed my
documents to go missing and be marked late.

See Appendix 47 SCOTUS should have "best practices" Protocols as the Hague has for Nuclear
Control
12 The USMS James Howard required me to get a lawyer (I had none, so I was forced to get one,
which is in and of itself, perhaps, illegal) to deal with USMS and Clerks, and then stonewalled the
lawyer by refusing to provide the videotape of the incident of CSO Newell hitting me. Moreover, this
tape would have proven that CSO Muschitiello observed CSO Newell shaking my hand afterwards in
apology, which would prove that CSO Newell did indeed hit me, and that CSO Newell lied to the FBI
a felony in order to cover himself and hide behind a "blue wall of silence" even though Newell is
not a federal Law Enforcement Officer, but rather a paid contractor. USMS Howard even refused to
indicate to my lawyer whether there were videotapes, even though to the best of my recollection, I
vaguely recall being told that the USMS had such videos, but they couldn't confirm or deny it for
"security reasons."
13 For instance, the 2nd Circuit threw out my case for failure to state a cause of action, yet I did
supply a sworn affidavit of the factual basis to support my legal right for recovery which is a cause
of action.
Note that in the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, there have been articles in the NY Times about the
staff alleging improper handling / cover-ups / white washing of politically sensitive cases. See
Appendix 23 and also especially "Required Appendix A) Lower Court Opinion dated December 4,
2013 given from the US Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit"
11

27

Fairness dictates that Petitioner not lose all access to a federal tribunal as a result of his
diligent efforts to make sense of the rules applicable to his claims and his assiduous pursuit of
what he understood to be the legally mandated recourse.
U

CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that this Court grant the Writ of
Certiorari in this case to address the constitutional questions raised.
Respectfully submitted,
_________________________________
/s/ Peter Lindner, pro se litigant
Peter W. Lindner
1 Irving Place, Apt. G-23-C
NY, NY 10003
home/fax:
212-979-9647
cell: 917-207-4962
email: nyc10003@nyc.rr.com
HU

Dated: 5th day of December, 2014

New York City, New York

UH

28

No.

In The Supreme Court of The United States

________________
PETER LINDNER, Pro Se,
Petitioner,
v.
CSO NEWELL, ET AL.,
Respondents.
________________

PROOF OF SERVICE
I, Peter Lindner, do swear or declare that on this date,
, 2014, as required by Supreme Court Rule 29 I have served
the enclosed MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS and PETITION
FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI on each party to the above proceeding or that partys counsel,
and on every other person required to be served, by depositing an envelope containing the above
documents in the United States mail properly addressed to each of them and with rst-class
postage prepaid, or by delivery to a third-party commercial carrier for delivery within 3
calendar days.
1) US Attorney Harwood, 86 Chambers St, 3rd Floor, NY,
NY 10007 Phone 212-637-2728
and via email
Christopher.Harwood@usdoj.gov
2) Jennie Woltz, Esq., 900 Third Ave, , 7th Floor, NY, NY
10022
Phone 212-583-2689,
and via email
jwoltz@littler.com
3) Solicitor General of the USA (see Rule 29.4) Room
5616, Dept of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20530
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true
and correct. Executed on December 5, 2014

29

(Signature)
/s/ Peter Lindner

30