Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Morales (1960)
FACTS:
CFI: Hermenegilda S. Morales to pay P7,000 to a creditor Francisca
Gallardo
writ of execution was issued and delivered to the Sheriff who garnished
and levied execution on the sum of P7,000 out of the P30,000 due from
the Capital Insurance & Surety Co. Inc., to Morales as beneficiary whose
husband Luis Morales died by assassination.
Morales asked the sheriff to quash and lift said garnishment or levy on
execution invoking Rule 39, section 12, subdivision (k) of the Rules of
Court but it was denied.
All moneys, benefits, privileges, or annuities accruing or in any manner
growing out of any life insurance, if the annual premiums paid do not
exceed five hundred pesos, and if they exceed that sum a like exemption
shall exist which shall bear the same proportion to the moneys, benefits,
privileges, and annuities so accruing or growing out of such insurance that
said five hundred pesos bears to the whole annual premiums paid.
Morales appealed maintaining that it was a life insurance for it insured her
husband for injuries and/or death as a result of murder or assault or
attempt thereat
ISSUE: W/N the insurance is a life insurance and not an accident insurance
HELD: NO. order appealed from is reversed, and the garnishment in dispute
hereby set aside and quashed
life insurance policy - what is insured is the life of the subject for a
definite number of years
life insurance
investment contract
contract by which the insurer, for a stipulated sum, engages to pay a
certain amount of money if another dies within the time limited by the
policy
contract for insurance for one year in consideration of an advanced
premium, with the right of assured to continue it from year to year upon
payment of a premium as stipulated
includes accident insurance, since life is insured under either contract
includes all policies of insurance in which payment of insurance money is
contingent upon loss of life
"any life insurance"
applies to ordinary life insurance contracts, as well as to those which,
although intended primarily to indemnify for risks arising from accident,
likewise, insure against loss of life due, either to accidental causes, or to
the willful and criminal act of another, which, as such, is not strictly
accidental in nature
statutes of this nature seek to enable the head of the family to secure his
widow and children from becoming a burden upon the community and,
accordingly, should merit a liberal interpretation
Issue: Whether or not the death of the victim comes within the purview of the exception
clause of the supplementary policy and, hence, exempts the company from liability.
Held: NO. Basilio was a watchman of the Manila Auto Supply which was a block away
from the house of Atty. Ojeda where something suspicious was happening which
caused the latter to ask for help. While at first he declined the invitation of Atty. Ojeda to
go with him to his residence to inquire into what was going on because he was not a
regular policeman, he later agreed to come along when prompted by the traffic
policeman, and upon approaching the gate of the residence he was shot and died. The
circumstance that he was a mere watchman and had no duty to heed the call of Atty.
Ojeda should not be taken as a capricious desire on his part to expose his life to danger
considering the fact that the place he was in duty-bound to guard was only a block
away. In volunteering to extend help under the situation, he might have thought, rightly
or wrongly, that to know the truth was in the interest of his employer it being a matter
that affects the security of the neighborhood. No doubt there was some risk coming to
him in pursuing that errand, but that risk always existed it being inherent in the position
he was holding. He cannot therefore be blamed solely for doing what he believed was in
keeping with his duty as a watchman and as a citizen. And he cannot be considered as
making an arrest as an officer of the law, as contended, simply because he went with
the traffic policeman, for certainly he did not go there for that purpose nor was he asked
to do so by the policeman.
Much less can it be pretended that Basilio died in the course of an assault or murder
considering the very nature of these crimes. In the first place, there is no proof that the
death of Basilio is the result of either crime for the record is barren of any circumstance
showing how the fatal shot was fired. Perhaps this may be clarified in the criminal case
now pending in court as regards the incident but before that is done anything that might
be said on the point would be a mere conjecture. Nor can it be said that the killing was
intentional for there is the possibility that the malefactor had fired the shot merely to
scare away the people around for his own protection and not necessarily to kill or hit the
victim. In any event, while the act may not exempt the triggerman from liability for the
damage done, the fact remains that the happening was a pure accident on the part of
the victim. The victim could have been either the policeman or Atty. Ojeda for it cannot
be pretended that the malefactor aimed at the deceased precisely because he wanted
to take his life.
Biagtan vs. The Insular Life Assurance Company, LTD|
Makalintal, J.
NATURE
Appeal from CFIs decision
FACTS
- Juan Biagtan was insured with Insular for P5k and a supplementary contract Accidental Death Benefit
clause for another P5k if "the death of the Insured resulted directly from bodily injury effected solely through
external and violent means sustained in an accident . . . and independently of all other causes." The clause,
however, expressly provided that it would not apply where death resulted from an injury "intentionally
inflicted by a third party."
- One night, a band of robbers entered their house. Juan went out of his room and he was met with 9 knife
stabs. He died. The robbers were convicted of robbery with homicide.
- The family was claiming the additional P5k from Insular under the Accidental Death Benefit clause.
Insular refused on the ground that the death resulted from injuries intentionally inflicted by 3rd parties and
was therefore not covered.
- Biagtans filed against Insular. CFI ruled in favor of Biagtans.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
WON the injuries were intentionally inflicted by a third party? Yes
RATIONALE
- Whether the robbers had the intent to kill or merely to scare the victim or to ward off
any defense he might offer, it cannot be denied that the act itself of inflicting the injuries
was intentional.
- The exception in the accidental benefit clause invoked by the appellant does not
speak of the purpose whether homicidal or not of a third party in causing the
injuries, but only of the fact that such injuries have been "intentionally" inflicted this
obviously to distinguish them from injuries which, although received at the hands of a
third party, are purely accidental.
- Examples of unintentional:
>> A gun which discharges while being cleaned and kills a bystander;
>> a hunter who shoots at his prey and hits a person instead;
>> an athlete in a competitive game involving physical effort who collides with an
opponent and fatally injures him as a result.
- In Calanoc vs. CA: Where a shot was fired and it turned out afterwards that the
watchman was hit in the abdomen, the wound causing his death, the Court held that it
could not be said that the killing was intentional for there was the possibility that the
malefactor had fired the shot to scare the people around for his own protection and not
necessarily to kill or hit the victim. A similar possibility is clearly ruled out by the facts in
this case. For while a single shot fired from a distance, and by a person who was not
even seen aiming at the victim, could indeed have been fired without intent to kill or
injure, nine wounds inflicted with bladed weapons at close range cannot
conceivably be considered as innocent insofar as such intent is concerned.
- In Hucthcraft's Ex'r vs. Travelers' Ins. Co. (US case): where the insured was waylaid
and assassinated for the purpose of robbery, the court rendered judgment for the
insurance company and held that while the assassination of the insured was as to him
an unforeseen event and therefore accidental, "the clause of the proviso that excludes
the (insurer's) liability, in case death or injury is intentionally inflicted by any other
person, applies to this case."
DE LA CRUZ V. CAPITAL INSURANCE & SURETY CO., G.R. NO. L-21574, JUNE 30,
1966
Chris, a boxer, is a holder of an accident insurance policy. In a boxing match, he died after being
knocked out by the opponent. Can his father who is a beneficiary under said insurance policy
successfully claim indemnity from the insurance company?
Yes. Clearly, the proximate cause of death was the boxing contest. Death sustained in a
boxing contest is an accident. (De la Cruz v. Capital Insurance & Surety Co., G.R. No.
L-21574, June 30, 1966)
FACTS:
Simon de la Cruz, the father of the insured and who was named
beneficiary under the policy, thereupon filed a claim with the
insurance company
The Capital Insurance and Surety co., inc denied stating that the death
caused by his participation in a boxing contest was not accidental
RTC: favored Simon
ISSUE: W/N the cause of death was accident
HELD:YES.
insurer. The final rejection being referred to in said case is the rejection by
the insurance company.
EL ORIENTE V. POSADAS - TAXABILITY OF INSURANCE PROCEEDS
Under the view we take of the case, it is sufficient for our purposes to direct attention to
the anomalous and vague condition of the law. It is certain that the proceeds of life
insurance policies paid to individual beneficiaries upon the death of the insured are
exempt. It is not so certain that the proceeds of life insurance policies paid to corporate
beneficiaries upon the death of the insured are likewise exempt. But at least, it may be
said that the law is indefinite in phraseology and does not permit us unequivocally to
hold that the proceeds of life insurance policies received by corporations constitute
income which is taxable
It will be recalled that El Oriente, took out the insurance on the life of its manager, who
had had more than thirty-five years' experience in the manufacture of cigars in the
Philippines, to protect itself against the loss it might suffer by reason of the death of its
manager. We do not believe that this fact signifies that when the plaintiff received
P104,957.88 from the insurance on the life of its manager, it thereby realized a net profit
in this amount. It is true that the Income Tax Law, in exempting individual beneficiaries,
speaks of the proceeds of life insurance policies as income, but this is a very slight
indication of legislative intention. In reality, what the plaintiff received was in the nature
of an indemnity for the loss which it actually suffered because of the death of its
manager.