Consti 1 Reviewer

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
I.
IN GENERAL
POLITICAL LAW, DEFINED

Political Law has been defined as that branch of public
law which deals with the organization and operation of
the governmental organs of the State and define the
relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory
(People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may be
recalled that political law embraces constitutional law,
law of public corporations, administrative law including
the law on public officers and elections.
MACARIOLA VS. JUDGE ASUNCION, 114 SCRA 77
The provision in the Code of Commerce which prohibits
judges, justices, etc., (public officers) from engaging in
business within the territorial jurisdiction of their courts
is political in nature and therefore, said provision was
deemed abrogated when there was a change of
sovereignty from Spain to the United States at the turn
of the century. Political laws are deemed abrogated if
there is a change of sovereignty and unless re-enacted
under the new sovereign, the same is without force and
effect.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1, DEFINED
A study of the structure and powers of the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines.
CONSTITUTION, DEFINED
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the
governance and administration of a nation. It is
supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except
by the authority from which it emanates. It has been
defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the
nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a
system of government, assigns to the different
departments their respective powers and duties, and
establishes certain fixed principles on which
government is founded. The fundamental conception in
other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other
laws must conform and in accordance with which all
private rights must be determined and all public
authority administered.
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law
or contract violates any norm of the constitution that
law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative
or by the executive branch or entered into by private
persons for private purposes is null and void and
without any force and effect. Thus, since the
Based on the Lectures of Atty. Paul Montejo
JL CADIATAN
Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and

supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every
statute and contract.
KINDS OF CONSTITUTION
a) written or unwritten
b) rigid and flexible
c) cumulative or conventional
CONSTITUTION, HOW CONSTRUCTED
SELF-EXECUTING
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations
of policies and principles. Their provisions command the
legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of
the framers who merely establish an outline of
government providing for the different departments of
the governmental machinery and securing certain
fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. A
provision which lays down a general principle, such as
those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually
not self-executing. But a provision, which is complete in
itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the
nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability
imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they
can be determined by an examination and construction
of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the
subject is referred to the legislature for action.
NOT A PENAL STATUTE
The ordinary concept of retroactive applicability does
not apply. So even if it is favourable to the accused,
since it is not a penal statute, it cannot be applied.
ORDINARY MEANING
CHAVEZ VS JBC 696 S 496
In the creation of JBC, what should congress
mean?
In the interpretation of the constitutional provisions,
the Court firmly relies on the basic postulate that the
Framers mean what they say. The language used in the
Constitution must be taken to have been deliberately
chosen for a definite purpose. Every word employed in
the Constitution must be interpreted to exude its
deliberate intent which must be maintained inviolate
against disobedience and defiance. What the
Constitution clearly says, according to its text, compels
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acceptance and bars modification even by the branch

tasked to interpret it.
In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction
between the two Houses in their participation in the
JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate and
the House of Representatives in the screening and
nomination of judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of
the JBC, the Framers arrived at a unique system by
adding to the four (4) regular members, three (3)
representatives from the major branches of
government - the Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman
(representing the Judicial Department), the Secretary of
Justice (representing the Executive Department), and a
representative of the Congress (representing the
Legislative Department). The total is seven (7), not
eight. In so providing, the Framers simply gave
recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in the
interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it
as a major branch of government.
DESIGNEED TO MEET FUTURE EVENTS AND
CONTINGENCIES
TANADA VS ANGARA May 2, 1997. Constitutions are
designed to meet not only the vagaries of
contemporary events. They should be interpreted to
cover even future and unknown circumstances. It is to
the credit of its drafters that a Constitution can
withstand the assaults of bigots and infidels but at the
same time bend with the refreshing winds of change
necessitated by unfolding events. As one eminent
political law writer and respected jurist explains:
The Constitution must be quintessential rather than
superficial, the root and not the blossom, the base and
framework only of the edifice that is yet to rise. It is but
the core of the dream that must take shape, not in a
twinkling by mandate of our delegates, but slowly in
the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts, where it will
in time develop its sinews and gradually gather its
strength and finally achieve its substance. In fine, the
Constitution cannot, like the goddess Athena, rise fullgrown from the brow of the Constitutional Convention,
nor can it conjure by mere fiat an instant Utopia. It
must grow with the society it seeks to re-structure and
march apace with the progress of the race, drawing
from the vicissitudes of history the dynamism and
vitality that will keep it, far from becoming a petrified
rule, a pulsing, living law attuned to the heartbeat of
the nation.
II.
JUDICIAL
ELABORATION
CONSTITUTION
JL CADIATAN
ON
THE
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Atty Montejo: While the separation of powers are put
into our system to ensure that there is no over
concentration of power in one branch, the principle
admits of the so called INTERDEPENDENCE, that for a
more harmonious exercise of government or state
power, all the branches of government must work
INTERDEPENDENT with each other. Although the other
rule there is the concept of check and balance also
prevents them from getting into the bounds or the
boundaries of such power and because the power to
interpret the Constitution and the law, with respect to
questions of exercise of power, as we have mentioned
last night, the Constitution being a limitation, rather
than a grant, the JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, especially the
SC, is duty-bound, its not considered a prerogative but
a duty to ensure that the constitutional limitations of
power, the prohibitions of such exercised are not
violated or are maintained and the court will have to
exercise judicial review.
2 CONSIDERATIONS:
1. SEPARATION OF POWERS
CSC VS RAMONEDA 696 S 155. We have always
maintained that it is only the Supreme Court that can
oversee the judges and court personnels
administrative compliance with all laws, rules and
regulations. No other branch of government may
intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers. However, as aptly
pointed out by the OCA, Ramoneda-Pita was afforded
the full protection of the law, that is, afforded due
process. She was able to file several affidavits and
pleadings before the CSC with counsel. It may also be
noted that the case had been elevated to the Court of
Appeals and this Court, where the Resolution of the CSC
was upheld in both instances.
GARCIA VS DRILON 699 S 352. Petitioner contends that
protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power
which, under the Constitution, is placed upon the
Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may be
established by law and, thus, protests the delegation
of power to barangay officials to issue protection
orders.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer
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advocate in any proceeding before the Punong

Barangay.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.112 On the other hand, executive power "is
generally defined as the power to enforce and
administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws
into practical operation and enforcing their due
observance."113
As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the
BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his
unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad,
merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing
physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2)
threatening to cause the woman or her child physical
harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus,
purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty
under the Local Government Code to enforce all laws
and ordinances, and to maintain public order in the
barangay.114
We have held that (t)he mere fact that an officer is
required by law to inquire into the existence of certain
facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine
what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these
acts may affect private rights do not constitute an
exercise
of
judicial
powers.115
In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains
through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding whether
there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense
has been committed and the accused is probably guilty
thereof, the Punong Barangay must determine
reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger
of violence against the woman and her children exists
or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance
of a BPO. The preliminary investigation conducted by
the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a
judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance
of
a
BPO.
We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner
that since barangay officials and other law enforcement
agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of
violence and abuse, it would be very unlikely that they
would remain objective and impartial, and that the
JL CADIATAN
chances of acquittal are nil. As already stated,

assistance by barangay officials and other law
enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty to
enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.
HEIRS OF MALABANAN VS REPUBLIC 704 S 561.
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable
and disposable primarily rests on the classification of
public lands made under the Constitution. Under the
1935 Constitution, lands of the public domain were
classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and
mineral. Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution
classified lands of the public domain into seven,
specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial,
residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and
grazing land, with the reservation that the law might
provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution
adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution
into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but
added national parks. Agricultural lands may be further
classified by law according to the uses to which they
may be devoted. The identification of lands according to
their legal classification is done exclusively by and
through a positive act of the Executive Department.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two
categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or
those classified as lands of private ownership under
Article 425 of the Civil Code, without limitation; and (b)
lands of the public domain, or the public lands as
provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation
that the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently,
lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national
parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition
unless they are reclassified as agricultural. A positive act
of the Government is necessary to enable such
reclassification, and the exclusive prerogative to classify
public lands under existing laws is vested in the
Executive Department, not in the courts. If, however,
public land will be classified as neither agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when
public land is no longer intended for public service or
for the development of the national wealth, thereby
effectively removing the land from the ambit of public
dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be
made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or
by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law to that effect.
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JL CADIATAN
2. PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
PEREZ VS PEOPLE 544 S 532. There is strong
presumption of constitutionality accorded to statutes.
It is established doctrine that a statute should be

construed whenever possible in harmony with, rather
than in violation of, the Constitution. The presumption
is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible
and just law and one which operates no further than
may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of
the law. It is presumed that the legislature has acted
within its constitutional powers. So, it is the generally
accepted rule that every statute, or regularly accepted
act, is, or will be, or should be, presumed to be valid
and constitutional.
the concept of RIPENESS - In relation to that,

the concept of ripeness states that there is
already a violation or an impending violation
that if the acts sought to be declared
unconstitutional, is not prevented or is not
declared unconstitutional, will most likely be
ripe for violation
it must be
OPPORTUNITY
He who attacks the constitutionality of a law has the

onus probandi to show why such law is repugnant to
the Constitution. Failing to overcome its presumption of
constitutionality, a claim that a law is cruel, unusual, or
inhuman, like the stance of petitioner, must fail.
EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, CONDITIONS:
1. There must be an appropriate case or
controversy.
Atty. Montejo: two things come to mind: What is an
appropriate petition? What kind of petition of cases can
you raise a constitutional question?
DECLARATORY RELIEF - If it were to be an
ordinary petition, declaratory relief before a
claim if the violation has been had, provided it
is not the SC because the SC does not have
jurisdiction over declaratory reliefs but other
courts have.
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI under Rule 65 - it is a
question of jurisdiction.
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION - to prohibit an act
to be done and the reason is that, the act to be
done is unconstitutional.
DEFENSE IN A CRIMINAL CASE - so if you are
charged in a criminal case and you allege that
that law is unconstitutional if applied to you,
then that may be a proper venue for bringing a
constitutional question.
2. It must be raised at the earliest opportunity.
raised
at
the
EARLIEST
3. It must be raised by the proper party.

Ordinarily, legal standing is given:
a. when the person cant show that he will
personally suffer actual or threatened injury
because of the questioned act.
b. The injury is clearly traceable to the challenged
action
c. The injury is likely to be redressed by a
favourable action
Atty Montejo: Those are the 3 conditions or
requirements to grant the party, legal standing and this
is in the concept of a CITIZEN SUIT, an ordinary citizen
would bring a constitutional question before the court
and these three must have to be satisfied.
This has been related to the discussion in your civil
procedure, that, legal standing or locus standi, to be
given to a party petitioner is likened to a real party in
interest in a civil action. In a civil action, real party in
interest, as defined in your Rules of Civil Procedure, is
allowed to file a case because there is a VIOLATION OF
HIS PRIVATE RIGHT. In the context of JUDICIAL REVIEW,
a citizen is given LEGAL STANDING, as a REAL PARTY IN
INTEREST because of a VIOLATION OF A PUBLIC RIGHT.
Through the decisions of the SC, this has been expanded
to include among others:
1. TAXPAYERS SUIT if the questioned act involves
expenditure of public funds. If it has nothing to
do with public funds, the person filing the case
as a taxpayer will not be given the legal
standing.
2. VOTERS SUIT if there is a violation of a right,
of suffrage, meaning to run for public office, or
to be allowed to vote, on a constitutional
question, a voter may be given legal standing
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3. LEGISLATORS SUIT if a law is passed or a law

is implemented and executed by the executive
and it violates the prerogative of a member of
Congress, a member of Congress has a direct
interest over the outcome of the constitutional
question raised. He is given legal standing in the
concept of a legislators suit.
4. EXEMPTION OR DISCRETION OF THE SC we
have come to know the DOCTRINE OF
TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE this requires
that:
a.
there is a public character of the fund or

asset involved
b. there is a clear case of constitutional

disregard
c. there is lack of any other direct party with
legal standing
Atty. Montejo: This must be a QUESTION OF
DISCRETION. The usual question in the bar exams with
respect to judicial review, they will give you a set of
facts, and they will ask you to decide the petition. The
first thing to ask yourselves is this; Is there a prior ruling
of the SC on the given set of facts? If there is NONE, DO
NOT EVER ATTEMPT TO ANSWER THE CONSTITUTIONAL
QUESTION, DISMISS THE PETITION and YOU DISMISS
THE PETITION BECAUSE OF LACK OF ONE OR ALL OF THE
ELEMENTS because again, you are just being asked of
your knowledge of what judicial review is. Of course, if
there is a prior ruling of the SC, you must answer the
question based on that prior ruling.
4. It must be the very lis mota of the case.
It simply means that the SC cannot dispose of the case
without resolving the constitutional question. Stated
differently, the constitutional question must have to be
resolved because the court cannot go any way but to
meet the question head on. If one or some of the
elements or lacking and the constitutional question can
be avoided, meaning it is not the very lis mota of the
case. But if the constitutional question cannot be
avoided, then the court must have to rule on the
constitutional question.
Now, the other matter with respect to those conditions
would be the concept of MOOTNESS when by reason of
a SUPERVENING EVENT, the petition or the question
JL CADIATAN
raised has become MOOT AND ACADEMIC. Can the

court still resolve the constitutional question? YES. The
SC may still opt to decide the constitutional question
because or under any of the following circumstances:
1. there is a grave violation of the constitution
2. the exceptional character of the situation,
where there is paramount public interest
involved, meaning the question is NOVEL
3. the constitutional issue is raised and it requires
formulation of foregoing principles, to guide the
bench, the bar and the public
4. the case is capable of repetition
Actually, most of these refer to the SYMBOLIC OR
TEACHING FUNCTION.
3 THEORIES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
1. NEGATIVE OR CHECKING FUNCTION
When a petition is granted and a constitutional
question is resolved and the SC would declare the act in
question as UNCONSTITUTIONAL, then in effect, the
court has exercised its checking or negative function. In
negates the validity of the act in question.
2. POSITIVE OR LEGITIMATING FUNCTION
In positive or legitimating function, the constitutional
question is resolved, and the court will declare that the
law or act in question that the law or act in question is
NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. We remember the phrase
NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL in the double negative to
emphasize the presumption of CONSTITUTIONALITY.
The court, in the exercise of LEGITIMATING OR POSITIVE
FUNCTION will never declare a law to be constitutional.
With or without the declaration, the law is presumed to
be CONSTITUTIONAL. So that if the court will eventually
rule on the constitutional question and it will state that
it is not violative of the constitution, it will resolve it in
the manner that it is NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
3. SYMBOLIC OR TEACHING FUNCTION
When the question need no longer be resolved because
the question has become moot or academic. A
SUPERVENING FACT HAS TRANSPIRED which no longer
require a decision on the case.
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ADVOCATES FOR TRUTH VS BANGKO SENTRAL 688 S

530. In the 1993 case of Joya v. Presidential Commission
on Good Government,25it was held that no question
involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the
court unless there is compliance with the legal
requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) that the
question must be raised by the proper party; (b) that
there must be an actual case or controversy; (c) that the
question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (d) that the decision on the
constitutional or legal question must be necessary to
the
determination
of
the
case
itself.
In Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo,26rl1 the
Court summarized the requirements before taxpayers,
voters, concerned citizens, and legislators can be
accorded a standing to sue, viz:
(1)the cases involve constitutional issues;
(2)for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure
is unconstitutional;
(3)for voters, there must be a showing of obvious
interest in the validity of the election law in question;
(4)for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that
the issues raised are of transcendental importance
which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the
official action complained of infringes upon their
prerogatives as legislators.
While the Court may have shown in recent decisions a
certain toughening in its attitude concerning the
question of legal standing, it has nonetheless always
made an exception where the transcendental
importance of the issues has been established,
notwithstanding the petitioners' failure to show a direct
injury.27rl1 In CREBA v. ERC,28rl1 the Court set out
the following instructive guides as determinants on
whether a matter is of transcendental importance,
namely: (1) the character of the funds or other assets
involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of
disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by
the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a
more direct and specific interest in the questions being
raised. Further, the Court stated in Anak Mindanao
Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary29rl1 that
the rule on standing will not be waived where these
determinants
are
not
established.c
JL CADIATAN
In the instant case, there is no allegation of misuse of

public funds in the implementation of CB Circular No.
905. Neither were borrowers who were actually
affected by the suspension of the Usury Law joined in
this petition. Absent any showing of transcendental
importance, the petition must fail.
FUNA VS AGRA 691 S 196. In Funa v. Ermita, the Court

recognized the locus standi of the petitioner as a
taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer because the
issue raised therein involved a subject of transcendental
importance whose resolution was necessary to
promulgate rules to guide the Bench, Bar, and the
public in similar cases.
But, it is next posed, did not the intervening
appointment of and assumption by Cadiz as the Solicitor
General during the pendency of this suit render this suit
and the issue tendered herein moot and academic?
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present
a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no
practical use or value. Although the controversy could
have ceased due to the intervening appointment of and
assumption by Cadiz as the Solicitor General during the
pendency of this suit, and such cessation of the
controversy seemingly rendered moot and academic
the resolution of the issue of the constitutionality of the
concurrent holding of the two positions by Agra, the
Court should still go forward and resolve the issue and
not abstain from exercising its power of judicial review
because this case comes under several of the wellrecognized exceptions established in jurisprudence.
Verily, the Court did not desist from resolving an issue
that a supervening event meanwhile rendered moot
and academic if any of the following recognized
exceptions obtained, namely: (1) there was a grave
violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involved a
situation of exceptional character and was of
paramount public interest; (3) the constitutional issue
raised required the formulation of controlling principles
to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) the
case was capable of repetition, yet evading review.
It is the same here. The constitutionality of the
concurrent holding by Agra of the two positions in the
Cabinet, albeit in acting capacities, was an issue that
comes under all the recognized exceptions. The issue
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involves a probable violation of the Constitution, and

relates to a situation of exceptional character and of
paramount public interest by reason of its
transcendental importance to the people. The
resolution of the issue will also be of the greatest value
to the Bench and the Bar in view of the broad powers
wielded through said positions. The situation further
calls for the review because the situation is capable of
repetition, yet evading review. In other words, many
important and practical benefits are still to be gained
were the Court to proceed to the ultimate resolution of
the constitutional issue posed.
BELGICA VS OCHOA 710 S 1. By constitutional fiat,
judicial power operates only when there is an actual
case or controversy. This is embodied in Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently
states that "judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable x x
x." Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or
controversy is one which "involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible
of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. In other
words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that
can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing
law and jurisprudence." Related to the requirement of
an actual case or controversy is the requirement of
"ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for
constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication.
"A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that
something had then been accomplished or performed
by either branch before a court may come into the
picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of
an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of
the challenged action." "Withal, courts will decline to
pass upon constitutional issues through advisory
opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve
hypothetical or moot questions."
Based on these principles, the Court finds that there
exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these
cases.
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly
satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on
the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also,
the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for
adjudication since the challenged funds and the
JL CADIATAN
provisions allowing for their utilization such as the

2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya
Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the
Presidential Social Fund are currently existing and
operational; hence, there exists an immediate or
threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the
unconstitutional use of these public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that
the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and
academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A
case becomes moot when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose
can be served in passing upon the merits. Differing from
this description, the Court observes that respondents
proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not
terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful
purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared
towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF
Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains
legally effective and existing. Neither will the
Presidents declaration that he had already "abolished
the PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot precisely
because the Executive branch of government has no
constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal
existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or
nullification of a law may be done either by Congress,
through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court,
through a declaration of unconstitutionality.
MANILA MEMORIAL VS DSWD 711 S 302. When the
constitutionality of a law is put in issue, judicial review
may be availed of only if the following requisites
concur: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate
case; (2) the existence of personal and substantial
interest on the part of the party raising the [question of
constitutionality]; (3) recourse to judicial review is made
at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the [question of
constitutionality] is the lis mota of the case.32
In this case, petitioners are challenging the
constitutionality of the tax deduction scheme provided
in RA 9257 and the implementing rules and regulations
issued by the DSWD and the DOF. Respondents,
however, oppose the Petition on the ground that there
is no actual case or controversy. We do not agree with
respondents.
An actual case or controversy exists when there is a
conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal
claims susceptible of judicial resolution.33 The Petition
must therefore show that the governmental act being
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JL CADIATAN
challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual

challenging it.34 In this case, the tax deduction scheme
challenged by petitioners has a direct adverse effect on
them. Thus, it cannot be denied that there exists an
actual case or controversy.
Paragraph 2(a) of Section 5, Article VIII of the

Constitution, expressly establishes the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court, and impliedly recognizes the
original jurisdiction of lower courts over cases involving
the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance:
FUNCTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

CENTRAL BANK VS BSP 446 S 229. It bears stressing that
the exemption from the SSL is a privilege fully within
the legislative prerogative to give or deny. However, its
subsequent grant to the rank-and-file of the seven
other GFIs and continued denial to the BSP rank-and-file
employees breached the latters right to equal
protection. In other words, while the granting of a
privilege per se is a matter of policy exclusively within
the domain and prerogative of Congress, the validity or
legality of the exercise of this prerogative is subject to
judicial review. So when the distinction made is
superficial, and not based on substantial distinctions
that make real differences between those included and
excluded, it becomes a matter of arbitrariness that this
Court has the duty and the power to correct.
Section 5. The Supreme Court

shall have the following powers:
ALL COURTS CAN EXERCISE JUDICIAL REVIEW

ONGSUCO VS MALONES 604 S 499. The rule on
the exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended
to preclude a court from arrogating unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over
which is initially lodged with an administrative body of
special competence. Thus, a case where the issue
raised is a purely legal question, well within the
competence; and the jurisdiction of the court and not
the administrative agency, would clearly constitute an
exception. Resolving questions of law, which involve the
interpretation and application of laws, constitutes
essentially an exercise of judicial power that is
exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court and such
lower courts the Legislature may establish.
In this case, the parties are not disputing any
factual matter on which they still need to present
evidence. The sole issue petitioners raised before the
RTC in Civil Case No. 25843 was whether Municipal
Ordinance No. 98-01 was valid and enforceable despite
the absence, prior to its enactment, of a public hearing
held in accordance with Article 276 of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code.
This is undoubtedly a pure question of law, within the
competence and jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve.
xxxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari,
as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of
lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation,
order,
instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(Emphases ours.)
In J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,

Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, and Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Santos, the Court has affirmed
the jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve questions of
constitutionality and validity of laws (deemed to include
local ordinances) in the first instance, without deciding
questions which pertain to legislative policy.
EFFECTS
OF
DECLARATION
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
OF
GR: The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox

view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an
executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise
suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of
any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official
act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental
law once judicially declared results in its being to all
intents and purposes a mere scrap of paper. As the new
Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be
void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or
executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only
when they are not contrary to the laws of the
Constitution.
Page 8 of 30
FLORES VS DRILON 223 S 568. The constitutionality of

Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, 1 otherwise known as the
"Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992,"
under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of
Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA), is challenged XXX As incumbent
elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for
appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board
and Chief Executive of SBMA; hence, his appointment
thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes
the Constitution cannot be sustained. He however
remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA
official are not necessarily null and void; he may be
considered a de facto officer, "one whose acts, though
not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of
policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve
the interest of the public and third persons, where the
duties of the office were exercised . . . . under color of a
known election or appointment, void because the
officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of
power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason
of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such
ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to
the public . . . . [or] under color of an election, or
appointment, by or pursuant to a public
unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be
such
ALDOVINO VS ALUNAN 230 S 825. An unconstitutional
act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is,
in legal contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been
passed. It is therefore stricken from the statute books
and considered never to have existed at all. Not only
the parties but all persons are bound by the declaration
of unconstitutionality which means that no one may
thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to
apply it in subsequent cases. It is, in other words, a total
nullity. 16 Plainly, it was as if petitioners and
intervenors were never served their termination orders
and, consequently, were never separated from the
service, The fact that they were not able to assume
office and exercise their duties is attributable to the
continuing refusal of public respondents to take them in
unless they first obtained court orders, perhaps, for
government budgetary and accounting purposes. Under
the circumstances, the more prudent thing that public
respondents could have done upon receipt of the
decision in Mandani, if they were earnest in making
amends and restoring petitioners and intervenors to
JL CADIATAN
their positions, was to inform the latter of the

nullification of their termination orders and to return to
work and resume their functions. After all, many of
them were supposed to be waiting for instructions from
the DOT because in their termination orders it promised
to directly contact them by telephone, telegram or
written notice as soon as funds for their separation
would be available.
XPN: OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE
Atty. Montejo: So it was the old case of SERRANO DE
AGBAYANI vs. PNB on the moratorium law. The SC
applied what we know then, what is being repeated
today as the OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE that for the
period of the time that the law has been effect up to
the time that the law was declared unconstitutional,
one cannot close his eyes to that time like it never
happened, like that law never existed because in fact,
that law existed, acts and omissions were made or were
not made pursuant to that law. So whatever was done
or omitted to be done pursuant to that law for that
period of efficacy of that law shall be operative.
One must remember that the OPERATIVE FACT
DOCTRINE is a question or a matter of discretion. It is a
RULE OF EQUITY AND NOT A RULE OF LAW. If there is a
declaration of unconstitutionality, one cannot assume
that the SC can apply the operative fact doctrine in each
and every case but only as a matter of EQUITY. The SC
may only apply it based on their discretion.
Again, the question is asked on operative fact, whether
you give effect to those acts done or omitted to be
done based on a law which was subsequently declared
unconstitutional, DO NOT APPLY THE OPERATIVE FACT
DOCTRINE UNLESS THERE IS A COURT RULING BY THE
SUPREME COURT ON THAT ISSUE BECAUSE IT IS NOT A
RULE BUT AN EXERCISE OF DISCRETION.
Atty. Montejo: HACIENDA LUISITA VS PARC 660 S 525.
This has been a long running problem in hacienda luisita
and the question there is whether or not the operative
fact doctrine applies. That case involves the Stock
Distribution Option, SDO which SC declares
unconstitutional because the Agrarian Reform Law,
based on R.A. 6657, mandates that these beneficiaries
must be given lands, the SDO is not allowed by the law
because these are shares of stock in a corporation with
a land and these are not land. But in a span of 14 years,
some were already given shares so the question is,
Page 9 of 30
JL CADIATAN
should those already given out be returned? SC applied

the operative fact doctrine, yung nabigyan na, wala na
pero yung hindi pa nabigyan cannot be given anymore.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine

Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a
distinguished member of this Court, says:
Now, in the DAP case of hacienda luisita, one of the

arguements raised was that, the operative fact doctrine
SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED because that involves an
executive order, not a statute enacted by congress. SC
said no, it applies to law, executive orders as well
because that was the ruling in SERRANO VS DE
AGBAYANI, they always go back to that old case.
The first part of the authority represents the

traditional concept of judicial power, involving
the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred
as law. The second part of the authority
represents a broadening of judicial power to
enable the courts of justice to review what was
before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion
of the political departments of the government.
Atty Montejo: CIR vs SAN ROQUE, this was a claim for

tax refund, tax credit. And the subject of the erroneous
reliance of San Roque here was a BIR ruling declared
invalid because it was inconsistent with the law and
prior issuances of the BIR were based on that so a
question was asked whether the OPERATIVE FACT
DOCTRINE may be applied and the SC said, NO IT
CANNOT BE APPLIED. It can be applied only when there
is a declaration of unconstitutionality of a LAW OR AN
EXECUTIVE ORDER. Not a BIR ruling. A BIR ruling is not a
law. That is not part of the legal system. It is not a ruling
of an appealed case of the DOJ. Its not an adversarial
thing, it does not apply to anybody like a law or statute,
it only applies to that entity. It does not involve a LAW
OR AN EXECUTIVE ORDER.
POLITICAL
QUESTION
QUESTION
VS
JUSTICIABLE
OPOSA VS FACTORAN 224 S 792. It must, nonetheless,

be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no
longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of
judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects
executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or
review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII
of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the

judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court,
the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the
decisions of the executive and the legislature
and to declare their acts invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course,
is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion,"
which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or
contract according to the disposition of the
judiciary.
VELARDE VS SJS 428 S 283.
Issue
on
Judicial
Controversy
Transcendental
Importance
cannot
answered.
and
be
The basic question posed in the SJS Petition -WHETHER ENDORSEMENTS OF CANDIDACIES BY
RELIGIOUS LEADERS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL -undoubtedly deserves serious consideration. As stated
earlier, the Court deems this constitutional issue to be
of paramount interest to the Filipino citizenry, for it
concerns the governance of our country and its people.
Thus, despite the obvious procedural transgressions by
both SJS and the trial court, this Court still called for
Oral Argument, so as not to leave any doubt that there
might be room to entertain and dispose of the SJS
Petition on the merits.
Counsel for SJS has utterly failed, however, to convince
the Court that there are enough factual and legal bases
to resolve the paramount issue. On the other hand, the
Office of the Solicitor General has sided with petitioner
insofar as there are no facts supporting the SJS Petition
and the assailed Decision.
Page 10 of 30
We reiterate that the said Petition failed to state

directly the ultimate facts that it relied upon for its
claim. During the Oral Argument, counsel for SJS
candidly admitted that there were no factual allegations
in its Petition for Declaratory Relief. Neither were there
factual findings in the assailed Decision. At best, SJS
merely asked the trial court to answer a hypothetical
question. In effect, it merely sought an advisory
opinion, the rendition of which was beyond the courts
constitutional mandate and jurisdiction.
Regrettably, it is not legally possible for the Court to
take up, on the merits, the paramount question
involving a constitutional principle. It is a time-honored
rule that the constitutionality of a statute [or act] will
be passed upon only if, and to the extent that, it is
directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable
controversy and is essential to the protection of the
rights of the parties concerned.
VINUYA VS ROMULO 619 S 533.
In Taada v.
Cuenco, we held that political questions refer "to those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality of a particular measure."
Certain types of cases often have been found to
present political questions. One such category involves
questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that
"[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is
committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislative--'the political'--departments of the government,
and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this
political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision."
The US Supreme Court has further cautioned that decisions
relating to foreign policy
are delicate, complex, and involve large
elements of prophecy. They are and should
be undertaken only by those directly
responsible to the people whose welfare
they advance or imperil. They are decisions
of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither
aptitude, facilities nor responsibility.
To be sure, not all cases implicating foreign relations
present political questions, and courts certainly possess the
authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive
JL CADIATAN
agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine

government should espouse claims of its nationals against a
foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the
authority for which is demonstrably committed by our
Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In
this case, the Executive Department has already decided that
it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its
nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace
of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to
question. Neither could petitioners herein assail the said
determination by the Executive Department via the instant
petition for certiorari.
III.
THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE

TERRITORIAL WATERS
Baseline (sea) - Normally, the baseline from which the

territorial sea is measured is the low-water line along
the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially
recognized by the coastal state. This is either the lowwater mark closest to the shore, or alternatively it may
be an unlimited distance from permanently exposed
land, provided that some portion of elevations exposed
at low tide but covered at high tide (like mud flats) is
within 12 nautical miles (22 km; 14 mi) of permanently
exposed land.
Internal waters - Waters landward of the baseline are
defined as internal waters, over which the state has
complete sovereignty: not even innocent passage is
allowed. Lakes and rivers are considered internal
waters.
Territorial sea- A state's territorial sea extends up to 12
nautical miles (22.2 km; 13.8 mi) from its baseline.
Contiguous zone - The contiguous zone is a band of
water extending from the outer edge of the territorial
sea to up to 24 nautical miles (44.4 km; 27.6 mi) from
the baseline, within which a state can exert limited
control for the purpose of preventing or punishing
"infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or
sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or
territorial sea". This will typically be 12 nautical miles
(22 km; 14 mi) wide, but could be more (if a state has
chosen to claim a territorial sea of less than 12 nautical
miles), or less, if it would otherwise overlap another
state's contiguous zone.
Page 11 of 30
Exclusive Economic Zone - An exclusive economic zone

extends from the outer limit of the territorial sea to a
maximum of 200 nautical miles (370.4 km; 230.2 mi)
from the territorial sea baseline, thus it includes the
contiguous zone.
CITIZENSHIP
2 KINDS OF CITIZENSHIP
1. NATURAL BORN - The phrase from birth refers
to citizenship and not to the fact of performing
an act to perfect or acquire citizenship because
under our laws on reacquisition even if a person
has performed an act to reacquire citizenship,
his citizenship would still be reacquire to its
former status. So if he was a former natural
born, lost his citizenship, by law he is allowed to
reacquire it in its former status which is natural
born.
2. NATURALIZED CITIZEN
1. CA 473 which is the Judicial Naturalization;
and
2. RA 9139 which is the Administrative
Naturalization.
WHO ARE CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES?
ART IV SECTION 1 1987 CONSTITUTION
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
[1] Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time
of the adoption of this Constitution;
[2] Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
[3] Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; and
[4] Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
[1] Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution;
Time of the adoption of this Constitution - February 2,
1987
Atty Montejo: Citizenship in our country follows the jus
sanguinis or blood relations rule. We do not follow the
jus soli rule unless you fall under the category under the
Philippine Bill of 1902.
JL CADIATAN
Was there any time in the past where foreigners were

considered as Filipino citizens without going through
naturalization proceedings? YES
1. Before then, there were no Filipino citizens. And
because of the sale of the Philippines to the US
which included all the living creatures living
therein including indios, the Americans decided
who its natural-born citizens are. And for that
short period of time, they followed the rule of
jus soli ALSO, not only, but also jus sanguinis.
Those who were born here even of foreign
parents but after the sale or on 1899, because
the Treaty of Paris was in 1898, so those who
were born here even if they were not native
inhabitants of the territory but who remained
here after the Treaty of Paris were all deemed
to be Filipino citizens.
2. The second special classification you would find
in the 35 Constitution because if they were
already elected to public office, even if they
were foreigners, the 35 Constitution considers
them Filipino citizens, of course, not naturalborn.
[2] Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
So if a Filipino mother is married to a foreigner father,
the child follows the citizenship, during his minority,
that of the father. Is he a Filipino citizenship at birth? If
he subsequently elects Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority, then he is deemed to have
perfected his inchoate right to become a Filipino citizen.
By then, he is considered a Filipino citizen from birth.
But if the cohabitation is not one of legal marriage, the
Court has interestingly applied civil law provision. Since
the child is illegitimate, the citizenship follows that of
the mother. Then, he does not need to elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority because
since birth, he is deemed to be a Filipino. The
illegitimate child is given a right from birth to be a
Filipino citizen immediately unlike that of a legitimate
child of mixed parents.
[3] Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority;
The matter on the 73 definition is again the correct
interpretation of the phrase from birth. Does it refer
Page 12 of 30
to the fact of being a citizen or to the fact that the

person does not perform any act to perfect or acquire
citizenship from birth? In the 1935 Constitution, you
may see that there is a special class of Filipino
individuals born of a Filipino mother and married to a
foreigner father. Children under the 35 constitution will
have to elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority. If they have chosen under 35 Constitution,
cut of date being January 17, 1973, question asked is, is
that child a natural born? In the 87 Constitution, one of
the, if not the only provision which has retroactive
effect, it being applied prospectively, is that it clarified
that natural-born citizens also covers those who elected
Philippine citizenship under the conditions set under
the 35 but has elected upon reaching the age of
majority. So the meaning of from birth should not
refer to performance of any act but should refer to
the fact of citizenship.
COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 625
AN ACT PROVIDING THE MANNER IN WHICH THE
OPTION TO ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP SHALL BE
DECLARED BY A PERSON WHOSE MOTHER IS A
FILIPINO CITIZEN
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the
Philippines:
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with subsection (4), section 1, Article IV, of
the Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be
signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any
officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed
with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall
accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of
the Philippines.
Section 2. If the party concerned is absent from the
Philippines, he may make the statement herein
authorized before any officer of the Government of the
United States2 authorized to administer oaths, and he
shall forward such statement together with his oath of
allegiance, to the Civil Registry of Manila.
Section 3. The civil registrar shall collect as filing fees of
the statement, the amount of ten pesos.
Section 4. The penalty of prision correccional, or a fine
not exceeding ten thousand pesos, or both, shall be
JL CADIATAN
imposed on anyone found guilty of fraud or falsehood in

making the statement herein prescribed.
Section 5. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, June 7, 1941.
MA VS FERNANDEZ 625 S 566.
Should children born under the 1935
Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien
father, who executed an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and took their oath of
allegiance to the government upon reaching the
age of majority, but who failed to immediately
file the documents of election with the nearest
civil registry, be considered foreign nationals
subject to deportation as undocumented aliens
for failure to obtain alien certificates of
registration? NO.
In 1941, Commonwealth Act No. 625 was enacted. It
laid down the manner of electing Philippine citizenship,
to wit:
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with subsection (4), Section 1, Article IV, of
the Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be
signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any
officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed
with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall
accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of
the Philippines.
The statutory formalities of electing Philippine
citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath;
(2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and
Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of
the statement of election and of the oath with the
nearest civil registry.
In Re:Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar,
Vicente D. Ching, we determined the meaning of the
period of election described by phrase "upon reaching
the age of majority." Our references were the Civil Code
of the Philippines, the opinions of the Secretary of
Justice, and the case of Cueco v. Secretary of Justice.
We pronounced:
Page 13 of 30
JL CADIATAN
years before their filing with the proper office was not
satisfactorily explained."
x x x [T]he 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not

prescribe a time period within which the election of
Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter
only provides that the election should be made "upon
reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then
commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. In
the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases
involving the validity of election of Philippine
citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the
time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions,
the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship
was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the
Department of State of the United States Government
to the effect that the election should be made within a
reasonable time after attaining the age of majority. The
phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean
that the elections should be made within three (3) years
from reaching the age of majority. However, we held in
Cue[n]co vs. Secretary of Justice, that the three (3) year
period is not an inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a
reasonable time after reaching the age of majority, and
that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3)
years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine
citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted
to above, which period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when the person concerned has
always considered himself a Filipino.
VILANDO VS HRET 656 S 17.

Respondent
Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (Section
1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not
whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or by
naturalization.
Therefore, following the line of
transmission through the father under the 1935
Constitution, the respondent has satisfactorily complied
with the requirement for candidacy and for holding
office, as she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
However, we cautioned in Cue[n]co that the extension

of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not
indefinite.
Likewise, the citizenship of respondent Limkaichong

finds support in paragraph 4, Section 1, Article IV of the
1935 Constitution.
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on

February 16, 1923. He became of age on February 16,
1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15,
1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age,
or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of
majority. It is clear that said election has not been made
"upon reaching the age of majority.
Having failed to prove that Anesia Sy lost her Philippine

citizenship, respondent can be considered a natural born
citizen of the Philippines, having been born to a mother
who was a natural-born Filipina at the time of marriage,
and because respondent was able to elect citizenship
informally when she reached majority age. Respondent
participated in the barangay elections as a young voter in
1976, accomplished voters affidavit as of 1984, and ran
as a candidate and was elected as Mayor of La Libertad,
Negros Oriental in 2004. These are positive acts of
election of Philippine citizenship. The case of In re:
Florencio Mallare, elucidates how election of citizenship
is manifested in actions indubitably showing a definite
choice. We note that respondent had informally elected
citizenship after January 17, 1973 during which time the
1973 Constitution considered as citizens of the
Philippines all those who elect citizenship in accordance
with the 1935 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution
We reiterated the above ruling in Go, Sr. v. Ramos, a

case in which we adopted the findings of the appellate
court that the father of the petitioner, whose
citizenship was in question, failed to elect Philippine
citizenship within the reasonable period of three (3)
years upon reaching the age of majority; and that "the
belated submission to the local civil registry of the
affidavit of election and oath of allegiance x x x was
defective because the affidavit of election was executed
after the oath of allegiance, and the delay of several
In both cases, we ruled against the petitioners because

they belatedly complied with all the requirements. The
acts of election and their registration with the nearest
civil registry were all done beyond the reasonable
period of three years upon reaching the age of majority.
The instant case presents a different factual setting.
Petitioners complied with the first and second
requirements upon reaching the age of majority. It was
only the registration of the documents of election with
the civil registry that was belatedly done.
We rule that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners,
the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost
and they should be allowed to complete the statutory
requirements for such election.
Page 14 of 30
provisions, i.e., Section 1(3), Article [IV] and Section 2,

Article [IV] were enacted to correct the anomalous
situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien
mother was automatically accorded the status of a
natural-born citizen, while one born of a Filipino mother
and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine
citizenship yet if so elected, was not conferred naturalborn status. It was the intention of the framers of the
1987 Constitution to treat equally those born before the
1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority either before or after
the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. Thus, those who
would elect Philippine citizenship under par. 3, Section 1,
Article [IV] of the 1987 Constitution are now, under
Section 2, Article [IV] thereof also natural-born Filipinos.
[4] Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
2 laws on naturalization:
1. CA 473 which is the Judicial Naturalization; and
2. RA 9139 which is the Administrative Naturalization.
REPUBLIC VS LI CHING CHUNG 694 S 249. As held in Tan
v. Republic, "the period of one year required therein is
the time fixed for the State to make inquiries as to the
qualifications of the applicant. If this period of time is
not given to it, the State will have no sufficient
opportunity to investigate the qualifications of the
applicants and gather evidence thereon. An applicant
may then impose upon the courts, as the State would
have no opportunity to gather evidence that it may
present to contradict whatever evidence that the
applicant may adduce on behalf of his petition." The
period is designed to give the government ample time
to screen and examine the qualifications of an applicant
and to measure the latters good intention and sincerity
of purpose. Stated otherwise, the waiting period will
unmask the true intentions of those who seek
Philippine citizenship for selfish reasons alone, such as,
but not limited to, those who are merely interested in
protecting their wealth, as distinguished from those
who have truly come to love the Philippines and its
culture and who wish to become genuine partners in
nation building.
The only exception to the mandatory filing of a
declaration of intention is specifically stated in Section 6
of CA No. 473, to wit:
JL CADIATAN
Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to make a

declaration of intention. Persons born in the
Philippines and have received their primary and
secondary education in public schools or those
recognized by the Government and not limited to any
race or nationality, and those who have resided
continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty
years or more before filing their application, may be
naturalized without having to make a declaration of
intention upon complying with the other requirements
of this Act. To such requirements shall be added that
which establishes that the applicant has given primary
and secondary education to all his children in the public
schools or in private schools recognized by the
Government and not limited to any race or nationality.
The same shall be understood applicable with respect
to the widow and minor children of an alien who has
declared his intention to become a citizen of the
Philippines, and dies before he is actually naturalized.
(Emphases supplied)
Unquestionably, respondent does not fall into the
category of such exempt individuals that would excuse
him from filing a declaration of intention one year prior
to the filing of a petition for naturalization.
The substantive requirements are also the same for
administrative and judicial; the only difference is the
residency. Do you know the pneumonic there? ARCPEN
(Age, Residency, character, property, education, not
otherwise disqualified by law) applied to both
proceedings. The only difference is:
1. In administrative naturalization, the residency
requirement is changed to from birth because this is
especially applicable to those who were born here but
have remained to be foreigners and has not become
Filipinos. So to make it easier for them, they are allowed
to file for a decree of naturalization administratively. In
judicial its 10 years lowered to 5 years under special
circumstances.
2. The other difference is on education, property
requirement is also the same. The money value there is
P5,000 but with respect to livelihood, its the same. But
for education, unlike in judicial naturalization wherein
education is only required for children, in administrative
naturalization it is required for the applicant to be xxx
meaning he has to be schooled here because he has
been a residence since birth. Philippine schools must
not be exclusive to foreigners, among the subjects
taught would be Philippine constitution, government
Page 15 of 30
and in addition that just like judicial proceedings must

require minor children.
3. Procedurally, judicial naturalization requires
declaration of intention, in administrative theres none.
4. In judicial, there is a 2 year waiting period. In
administrative, there is no waiting period simply
because you were born here in the country. So if you
were able to prove substantive requirements before the
Special Committee on Naturalization, then you would
be given a decree of naturalization administratively.
5. In effect, in the Philippines we always follow the rule
that in naturalization proceedings that it is the husbandfather who would apply for naturalization. So in judicial
proceedings, it is supposed to be the husband who
should file and the grant will redound to the benefit of
the wife assuming she is a foreigner, and of the
children. The reason for that is the wife must not be
disqualified. In our naturalization proceedings, if a
Filipino-man marries a foreigner-woman, the foreignerwoman will automatically become a Filipino citizen. If it
is the other way around, if the man is foreigner and the
woman is a Filipina, the residency requirement for the
foreigner husband will be no longer from 10 years to 5
years. There is no automatic grant to citizenship status
to the foreigner husband. That is the ruling in the case
of Republic vs Batuigas. This referred to a foreigner
woman married a Filipino male. In all cases of
citizenship where the declaration of citizenship has
been sought, the SC has maintained the view that there
is no proceeding in our system where a person files a
case/petition to declare him a Filipino citizen. Cases
where Filipino citizenship issue is resolved is almost or
always a product of an issue of his citizenship not that
of voluntary petition for a declaration of citizenship is
filed because the SC said there is no proceeding in our
rules or in our jurisdiction. This case of Batuigas is an
exception because the wife here should have benefited
from that Sec 15 of CA 473. That when a foreigner
woman marries a Filipino male, the woman
automatically becomes a Filipino citizen. All that the
woman will have to show by administrative proceedings
only, is that she is not disqualified by law. She need not
prove that she is qualified but that she is not
disqualified. So Batuigas filed a petition in court wanting
to claim the benefit under Sec 15 of CA 473. SC
reiterated the rule that there is no such proceeding, but
because of the special circumstances this woman had to
undergo that there is no proceeding. Reason being
before she was declared Filipino citizen, her husband
died. So now she has no any citizenship. The special
JL CADIATAN
circumstance, SC granted the petition rather than

dismiss it and saying the law is quite clear that she is
already considered a Filipino citizen, without having to
prove anything except that she must have to prove that
she is not disqualified by law. In administrative
proceedings, it is allowable that a woman would file
citizenship or naturalization under RA 9139 because she
is born in the Philippines of foreigner parents and has
since birth resided here. So in judicial proceedings the
default is that it is the husband or father who will file
for the rights of the wife or the children. In the case of
administrative naturalization the woman is the
applicant, the grant to the woman will redound to her
children but will not benefit the husband if he is a
foreigner.
LOSS AND ACQUISITION
Republic Act No. 9225
August 29, 2003
AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE

CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP
PERMANENT.
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH
ACT. NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Section 1. Short Title this act shall be known as the
"Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003."
Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared
the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon
taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I _____________________, solemny swear (or affrim)
that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal
orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities
of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize
and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that
Page 16 of 30
I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily

without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the aforesaid oath.
Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child,
whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below
eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire
Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be
deemed citizenship of the Philippines.
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship
under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights
and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines
and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage
must Meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V
of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise
known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003"
and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall
meet the qualification for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe
and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior
to their assumption of office: Provided, That they
renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where
they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the
Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any
public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by,
or extended to, those who:
JL CADIATAN
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office

in the country of which they are naturalized citizens;
and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the armed forces of the
country which they are naturalized citizens.
Section 6. Separability Clause - If any section or
provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid,
any other section or provision not affected thereby shall
remain valid and effective.
Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders,
rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of
this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 8. Effectivity Clause This Act shall take effect
after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the
Official Gazette or two (2) newspaper of general
circulation.
SOBEJANA-CONDON VS COMELEC 678 S 267. R.A. No.
9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who
re-acquire their citizenship and seek elective office, to
execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenships before an authorized public
officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in
Philippine elections. The rule applies to all those who
have re-acquired their Filipino citizenship, like
petitioner, without regard as to whether they are still
dual citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the
exercise of the right to run for public office.
Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for
elective office specific only to Filipino citizens who reacquire their citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No.
9225. It is the operative act that restores their right to
run for public office. The petitioner's failure to comply
therewith in accordance with the exact tenor of the law,
rendered ineffectual the Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenship she executed on September 18,
2006. As such, she is yet to regain her political right to
seek elective office. Unless she executes a sworn
renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she is
ineligible to run for and hold any elective office in the
Philippines.
Atty. Montejo: Question, is a person with dual
citizenship under the Phil be allowed to hold public
Page 17 of 30
office? Answer is, if it were elective no, but if it were

appointed, yes.
There are 2 specific provisions for subsections there:
1. Elected public official
2. Appointed public official.
You will notice that in elected position, the sworn
renunciation is on citizenship but if it were appointed
office, the sworn renunciation is on allegiance. So you
may have more than 1 citizenship but only 1 allegiance
if you were to be appointed in an office. But if it were
an elective office, only 1 citizenship.
Atty Montejo: Maquiling vs Comelec.The person
involved is a Mayor in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. The
issue here was w/r the mayor was disqualified under
Sec 40(d) Those with dual citizenship; of the Local
Government Code. If you have read the case the dissent
proceeded that it would lead him w/o any citizenship
because apparently the Mayor took advantage of RA
9225 and then executed a sworn renunciation of all
foreign citizenship, including his American citizenship.
But he travelled several times to the US using his
American passport. So that the question there was has
he renounced his Philippine citizenship? Because in our
study of express renunciation as a ground for losing
citizenship, I remember the case of Yu vs Santiago. A
Portuguese national who was granted Filipino status, he
travelled to HK and made some business transactions,
stated publicly in the travel documents that he is a
Portuguese. So the SC sustained the decision, that the
act of publicly representing himself as a Portuguese
national despite of the grant of Filipino status is an
express renunciation. A renunciation which is not left to
interest but is voluntary and knowingly made.
So in Maquiling vs Comelec, here was a Filipino citizen
formerly natural born who has lost it but reacquired it
under RA 9225. But made public representations that
he was an American in his travels when his Philippine
passport was not yet issued. Did that amount to express
renunciation of his Filipino citizenship? SC said, it did
not. What he expressly renounced is his sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships. So it is
as if he has not executed that sworn renunciation which
made him a person with dual citizen, which makes him
disqualified under Sec 4(d) of the LGC.
JL CADIATAN
So if you have reacquired your citizenship under RA

9225 and you failed to execute those sworn statements
either with respect to citizenships or with respect to
allegiances, or if you did but you made public
representations that you are such a foreign citizen or
that you have other foreign allegiances, it does not
mean that you have lost your reacquired citizenship.
What you have lost or the effect of those acts would be
that there is an express renunciation of your sworn
renunciation required to be qualified for an elective or
appointive office. So that is the decision of the court in
the case of Maquiling vs Comelec.
It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino
citizen, or that he acquired American citizenship by
naturalization. There is no doubt that he reacquired his
Filipino citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to
the Philippines and that he renounced his American
citizenship. It is also indubitable that after renouncing
his American citizenship, Arnado used his U.S. passport
at least six times.
If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the
efficacy of Arnados renunciation of his American
citizenship when he subsequently used his U.S.
passport. The renunciation of foreign citizenship must
be complete and unequivocal. The requirement that the
renunciation must be made through an oath
emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making the oath
of renunciation to remain true to what he has sworn to.
Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign passport
because it is convenient for the person to do so is
rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of
taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial
formality.
The dissent states that the Court has effectively left
Arnado "a man without a country".1wphi1 On the
contrary, this Court has, in fact, found Arnado to have
more than one. Nowhere in the decision does it say that
Arnado is not a Filipino citizen. What the decision
merely points out is that he also possessed another
citizenship at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy.
DUAL CITIZENSHIP
MERCADO VS MANZANO 307 S 630. To begin with, dual
citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of
the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states.
Page 18 of 30
For instance, such a situation may arise when a person

whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to
the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which
follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso
facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is
concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our
Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of
citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in
foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and
alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such
children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters
country the former are considered citizens, unless by
their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the
Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a
citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly
possible given the constitutional provisions on
citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the
result of an individuals volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the
Constitution provides: Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with
by law.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
BASIS:
1. The Immunity from Suit Doctrine provided under Art
16 Sec 3, is not a grant of Immunity from the State. It is
a restatement that the State cannot be sued. The State
can only be sued if it has consented.
2. For this Immunity from Suit Doctrine to apply, one
must have to determine w/r the case is a suit against
the government or not. In old cases, there was an
JL CADIATAN
enumeration: xxx corporate government entity is sued,

when a public officer is sued in his official capacity. In all
these 3 instances, the common denominator is that any
adverse ruling must have to require the State to
appropriate money from the public treasury to pay the
adverse decision. So if the suit regardless of the name
of the defendant will not amount to appropriating funds
from the public treasury that is not a suit against the
State. State Immunity does not apply. We dont talk
about consent, waiver or anything.
3. When a construction supply is delivered to
government and government failed to pay the value,
can a case prosper? Again, the answer to the question
should go directly to the question of w/r any adverse
ruling would require the State to appropriate funds
from the public treasury. If it does not require even if
there is a money judgment, then you have to discuss
immunity. But if there is no financial obligation despite
the named defendant, it is not a suit against the State.
Do not discuss Immunity Doctrine. So those are the first
things to remember when a question is asked.
4. If a suit is filed against the State, it will only apply if it
does not involve an incorporated agency. We always
take the case of GOCCs. If the case involved a GOCC,
GOCC even w/o original charter, much more with, are
not part of the State technically in its political or
sovereign functions. GOCCs are established for business
or proprietary functions. So when a case is filed against
any of them, you dont apply State Immunity not only
because there are separate and different entities but
because any monetary liability against them will not
require disbursement from the public treasury.
Therefore all their assets any be levied, garnished,
whatever because it is not part of the funds of public
treasury. Are they public funds? The answer is yes! But
they are not part of the State in the public treasury
requiring legislative authorization in the form of an
appropriation.
CONSENT
ACT NO. 3083
AN ACT DEFINING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS MAY
BE SUED
SECTION 1.
Complaint against Government.
Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Government of
the Philippine Islands hereby consents and submits to
Page 19 of 30
JL CADIATAN
be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability

arising from contract, expressed or implied, which could
serve as a basis of civil action between private parties.
SECTION 9.
SECTION 2.
A person desiring to avail himself of the
privilege herein conferred must show that he has
presented his claim to the Insular Auditor and that the
latter did not decide the same within two months from
the date of its presentation.
Atty Montejo: Consent w/r express or implied, simply

grants the party claimant the right to file the case and
prosecute his case. It does not mean automatic liability
on the part of the State much more in case of an
adverse ruling, execution in the ordinary course of
things. The plaintiff claimant must still prove his case
because consent only allows filing and prosecuting his
case. The basis for allowing the case to proceed is the
presence of consent. The basis for filing liability is the
fact or evidence as proven by the claimant and the
applicable laws in the case at bar. This brings as to the
so called common form of implied consent which is
entering into a contract. If the State enters into a
contract, it means it has lowered its level into an
ordinary party. But while it is true, it is not actually
correct that any act of entering the contract would
mean an implied waiver because only those contracts
entered into not in sovereign or governmental capacity
or entered in business or proprietary concept would
constitute as valid consent. Its not the act or fact of
entering the contract, its the nature of the contract
entered into.
SECTION 3.
Venue. Original actions brought
pursuant to the authority conferred in this Act shall be
instituted in the Court of First Instance of the City of
Manila or of the province were the claimant resides, at
the option of the latter, upon which court exclusive
original jurisdiction is hereby conferred to hear and
determine such actions.
SECTION 4.
Actions instituted as aforesaid shall be
governed by the same rules of procedure, both original
and appellate, as if the litigants were private parties.
SECTION 5.
When the Government of the Philippine
Island is plaintiff in an action instituted in any court of
original jurisdiction, the defendant shall have the right
to assert therein, by way of set-off or counterclaim in a
similar action between private parties.
SECTION 6.
Process in actions brought against the
Government of the Philippine Islands pursuant to the
authority granted in this Act shall be served upon the
Attorney-General whose duty it shall be to appear and
make defense, either himself or through delegates.
SECTION 7.
Execution. No execution shall issue
upon any judgment rendered by any court against the
Government of the Philippine Islands under the
provisions of this Act; but a copy thereof duly certified
by the clerk of the Court in which judgment is rendered
shall be transmitted by such clerk to the GovernorGeneral, within five days after the same becomes final.
SECTION 8.
Transmittal of Decision. The
Governor-General, at the commencement of each
regular session of the Legislature, shall transmit to that
body for appropriate action all decisions so received by
him, and if said body determine that payment should be
made, it shall appropriate the sum which the
Government has been sentenced to pay, including the
same in the appropriations for the ensuing year.
This Act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, March 16, 1923.
Example: The Phil Air Force ordered new helicopters.

They ordered to a foreign supplier, the government did
not pay the value. Can it sue? You must have to answer
that not on fact of entering the contract, its the nature
of the contract entered into. W/r the contract is
entered in government capacity or in a proprietary
capacity. If that contract is entered into in
governmental capacity, then there is no xxx You must
proceed to file under Act 3083. Do not commit the
mistake of saying that yes because there is implied
consent because the act of the state is governmental
function, not proprietary function.
Now, assuming that there is consent. The decision of
the court will not be executed based on your ordinary
rules of execution under the rules of court. You must
have to present it to the COA and COA will fund it and
COA will submit to the president as part of the national
expenditure program. Congress may consider it and
make appropriations to be taken for the next year
budget.
DOH VS PHILPHARMA 691 S 421.
The doctrine of non-suability.
Page 20 of 30
The discussion of this Court in Department of

Agriculture v. National Labor Relations Commission32 on
the doctrine of non-suability is enlightening.
The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that
(t)he State may not be sued without its consent, reflects
nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign
character of the State and an express affirmation of the
unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the
jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of
sovereignty. x x x [A] sovereign is exempt from suit, not
because of any formal conception or obsolete theory,
but on the logical and practical ground that there can be
no legal right as against the authority that makes the
law on which the right depends. True, the doctrine, not
too infrequently, is derisively called the royal
prerogative of dishonesty because it grants the state
the prerogative to defeat any legitimate claim against it
by simply invoking its nonsuability. We have had
occasion to explain in its defense, however, that a
continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability
cannot be deplored, for the loss of governmental
efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its
multifarious functions would be far greater in severity
than the inconvenience that may be caused private
parties, if such fundamental principle is to be
abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy is not
to be accordingly restricted.
The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does
not say that the state may not be sued under any
circumstance. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the
doctrine only conveys, the state may not be sued
without its consent; its clear import then is that the
State may at times be sued. The States consent may be
given either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may
be made through a general law or a special law. x x x
Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when
the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself
to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. In
this situation, the government is deemed to have
descended to the level of the other contracting party
and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity.
This rule, x x x is not, however, without qualification.
Not all contracts entered into by the government
operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must
still be made between one which is executed in the
exercise of its sovereign function and another which is
done in its proprietary capacity.33?r?l1
As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if
it consents, either expressly or impliedly, then it may be
JL CADIATAN
the subject of a suit.34 There is express consent when a

law, either special or general, so provides. On the other
hand, there is implied consent when the state "enters
into a contract or it itself commences litigation."35
However, it must be clarified that when a state enters
into a contract, it does not automatically mean that it
has waived its non-suability. 36 The State "will be
deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability
[only] if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary
or private capacity. [However,] when the contract
involves its sovereign or governmental capacity[,] x x x
no such waiver may be implied."37 "Statutory provisions
waiving [s]tate immunity are construed in strictissimi
juris. For, waiver of immunity is in derogation of
sovereignty."
The DOH can validly invoke state immunity.
a) DOH is an unincorporated agency which performs
sovereign or governmental functions.
In this case, the DOH, being an "unincorporated agency
of the government"39 can validly invoke the defense of
immunity from suit because it has not consented, either
expressly or impliedly, to be sued. Significantly, the DOH
is an unincorporated agency which performs functions
of governmental character.
The ruling in Air Transportation Office v. Ramos40 is
relevant, viz:
An unincorporated government agency without any
separate juridical personality of its own enjoys
immunity from suit because it is invested with an
inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for
damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise,
the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated.
However, the need to distinguish between an
unincorporated government agency performing
governmental function and one performing proprietary
functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in
favor of the former because its function is
governmental or incidental to such function; it has not
been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was
not in pursuit of a necessary function of government
but was essentially a business.41
b) The Complaint seeks to hold the DOH solidarily and
jointly liable with the other defendants for damages
which constitutes a charge or financial liability against
the state.
Page 21 of 30
Moreover, it is settled that if a Complaint seeks to

"impose a charge or financial liability against the
state,"42 the defense of non-suability may be properly
invoked. In this case, PPI specifically prayed, in its
Complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint,
for the DOH, together with Secretaries Romualdez and
Dayrit as well as Undersecretary Galon, to be held
jointly and severally liable for moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.43
Undoubtedly, in the event that PPI succeeds in its suit,
the government or the state through the DOH would
become vulnerable to an imposition or financial charge
in the form of damages. This would require an
appropriation from the national treasury which is
precisely the situation which the doctrine of state
immunity aims to protect the state from.
The mantle of non-suability extends to complaints filed
against public officials for acts done in the
performance of their official functions.
As regards the other petitioners, to wit, Secretaries
Romualdez and Dayrit, and Undersecretary Galon, it
must be stressed that the doctrine of state immunity
extends its protective mantle also to complaints filed
against state officials for acts done in the discharge and
performance of their duties.44 "The suability of a
government official depends on whether the official
concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional
capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance
of official functions will result in a charge or financial
liability against the government."45 Otherwise stated,
"public officials can be held personally accountable for
acts claimed to have been performed in connection
with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or
where there is showing of bad faith."46 Moreover, "[t]he
rule is that if the judgment against such officials will
require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to
satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the
amount needed to pay the damages awarded against
them, the suit must be regarded as against the state x x
x. In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the
[C]omplaint on the ground that it has been filed without
its consent." 47
It is beyond doubt that the acts imputed against
Secretaries Romualdez and Dayrit, as well as
Undersecretary Galon, were done while in the
performance and discharge of their official functions or
in their official capacities, and not in their personal or
individual capacities. Secretaries Romualdez and Dayrit
JL CADIATAN
were being charged with the issuance of the assailed

orders. On the other hand, Undersecretary Galon was
being charged with implementing the assailed
issuances. By no stretch of imagination could the same
be categorized as ultra vires simply because the said
acts are well within the scope of their authority. Section
4 of RA 3720 specifically provides that the BFAD is an
office under the Office of the Health Secretary. Also, the
Health Secretary is authorized to issue rules and
regulations as may be necessary to effectively enforce
the provisions of RA 3720.48 As regards Undersecretary
Galon, she is authorized by law to supervise the offices
under the DOHs authority,49 such as the BFAD.
Moreover, there was also no showing of bad faith on
their part. The assailed issuances were not directed only
against PPI. The suspension of PPIs accreditation only
came about after it failed to submit its comment as
directed by Undersecretary Galon. It is also beyond
dispute that if found wanting, a financial charge will be
imposed upon them which will require an appropriation
from the state of the needed amount. Thus, based on
the foregoing considerations, the Complaint against
them should likewise be dismissed for being a suit
against the state which absolutely did not give its
consent to be sued. Based on the foregoing
considerations, and regardless of the merits of PPIs
case, this case deserves a dismissal. Evidently, the very
foundation of Civil Case No. 68200 has crumbled at this
initial juncture.
ROYAL PREROGATIVE DISHONESTY
The SC has applied it to a Foreign State claiming
Immunity in the Philippines because of the concept of
royalty. If the State is not immune then all of its
resources may have to be spent to protect itself from
suit. This was first applied in the old case where US
government was claiming immunity in this jurisdiction.
We still follow the concept of immunity from suit, not
because of section 3 of art 16 but because of section 2
of art 2. Generally accepted principles of international
law are deemed part of the law of the land and
Immunity from suit among equals is part and parens
habets imperio. So they say is the basis for co-equals
that a Sovereign cannot be subjected to the laws of
another Sovereign otherwise it will cause xxx among
nations.
IMMUNITY FROM SUITS OF STATES
1. HEADS OF STATE
Page 22 of 30
If it were a foreign state per se, theres no other

employer or officer involved, supposedly the immunity
is absolute. You cannot sue the US government here. If
it were to be heads of State, we follow still the so-called
theory of absolute immunity. President is immune from
the processes of host country. But what about
representatives of foreign country, then theres
absolute or relative immunity is supposed to be
discussed.
the same protections

themselves.
as
JL CADIATAN
the
diplomats
They are not subject to the processes of the host

country w/r its personal liability, official liability and in
all civil, criminal and administrative cases. The only
recourse of the host country is to declare this person as
persona non grata. If he refuses then thats the time
that the person be subjected to all processes because
he is no longer covered by any immunity.
2. DIPLOMATS
3. CONSULS
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 is
an international treaty that defines a framework for
diplomatic relations between independent countries.
Following is a basic overview of its key provisions.
Article 9. The host nation at any time and for

any reason can declare a particular member of
the diplomatic staff to be persona non grata.
The sending state must recall this person within
a reasonable period of time, or otherwise this
person may lose their diplomatic immunity.
Article 22. The premises of a diplomatic mission,
such as an embassy, are inviolate and must not
be entered by the host country except by
permission of the head of the mission.
Furthermore, the host country must protect the
mission from intrusion or damage. The host
country must never search the premises, nor
seize its documents or property. Article 30
extends this provision to the private residence
of the diplomats.
Article 27. The host country must permit and
protect free communication between the
diplomats of the mission and their home
country. A diplomatic bag must never be
opened even on suspicion of abuse. A
diplomatic courier must never be arrested or
detained.
Article 29. Diplomats must not be liable to any
form of arrest or detention. They are immune
from civil or criminal prosecution, though the
sending country may waive this right under
Article 32. Under Article 34, they are exempt
from most taxes, and under Article 36 they are
exempt from most customs duties.
Article 31.1c Actions not covered by diplomatic
immunity:
professional activity outside
diplomat's official functions.
Article 37. The family members of a diplomat
that are living in the host country enjoy most of
A consul normally operates out of an embassy in

another country, and performs two functions: (1)
protecting in the host country the interests of their
countrymen, and (2) furthering the commercial and
economic relations between the two countries.
Consular officers are not accorded absolute immunity
from a host countrys criminal jurisdiction, they may be
tried for certain local crimes upon action by a local
court, and are immune from local jurisdiction only in
cases directly relating to consular functions.
The 1963 Convention on Consular Relations only cover
immunity on the official functions of consular officers
and employees. For their personal and private liabilities,
the convention does not apply.
4. OFFICERS SUED IN OFFICIAL CAPACITY
If an American officer is sued here, the question is, can
he be subjected to immunity processes? If he is sued in
his official capacity where the ultimate liability rests on
the American government, then immunity shall be
claimable. But in case not, meaning he is not sued in his
official capacity because the liability is personal, then
the suit may prosper.
5. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Only the UN and its agencies are covered by the
absolute immunity rule. All the rest w/r its intergovernmental or international non-governmental
organizations, they are exempt from liability under the
concept of relative immunity. One must have to
determine based on the host agreement, what is the
extent of their liabilities or immunities.
6. IMPEACHABLE OFFICERS
Page 23 of 30
If the result of the case filed against the so called

impeachable officers, the President, Vice-President,
members of the Supreme Court, members of the
Constitutional Commission and the Ombudsman would
effectively cause to remove them from office then these
cases cannot prosper unless and until they are
impeached. To that extent they are immune from such
cases.
Special mention must be made to the President because
we follow the Rule on Immutability. During the
incumbency the president he cannot be sued. And it is
not only involving cases which were effectively removed
him from office. Any kind of cases to his or against his
person whether it involves criminal, civil or
administrative case, the President is immune. Do not
however confuse that which you come across against
the office of the president. It is not against the
President but it is against the decisions of the Office of
the President under the doctrine of qualified political
agency. Some decisions of the Secretary are elevated to
the Office of the President. And with regards to the
decision of the President that is questioned normally
the case title would involve the Office of the President.
That is not one of the cases.
SUABILITY VS LIABILITY
MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY VS DUMDUM 616 S 1.
The general rule spelled out in Section 3, Article XVI of
the Constitution is that the state and its political
subdivisions may not be sued without their consent.
Otherwise put, they are open to suit but only when they
consent to it. Consent is implied when the government
enters into a business contract, as it then descends to
the level of the other contracting party; or it may be
embodied in a general or special lawsuch as that found
in Book I, Title I, Chapter 2, Section 22 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, which vests local
government units with certain corporate powers one
of them is the power to sue and be sued.
Be that as it may, a difference lies between suability and
liability. As held in City of Caloocan v. Allarde, where
the suability of the state is conceded and by which
liability is ascertained judicially, the state is at liberty to
determine for itself whether to satisfy the judgment or
not. Execution may not issue upon such judgment,
because statutes waiving non-suability do not authorize
the seizure of property to satisfy judgments recovered
from the action. These statutes only convey an
implication that the legislature will recognize such
JL CADIATAN
judgment as final and make provisions for its full

satisfaction. Thus, where consent to be sued is given by
general or special law, the implication thereof is limited
only to the resultant verdict on the action before
execution of the judgment.
Traders Royal Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
citing Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, is
instructive on this point. In that case which involved a
suit on a contract entered into by an entity supervised
by the Office of the President, the Court held that while
the said entity opened itself to suit by entering into the
subject contract with a private entity; still, the trial
court was in error in ordering the garnishment of its
funds, which were public in nature and, hence, beyond
the reach of garnishment and attachment proceedings.
Accordingly, the Court ordered that the writ of
preliminary attachment issued in that case be lifted,
and that the parties be allowed to prove their
respective claims at the trial on the merits. There, the
Court highlighted the reason for the rule, to wit:
The universal rule that where the State
gives its consent to be sued by private
parties either by general or special law,
it may limit claimants action only up
to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution and
that the power of the Courts ends when
the judgment is rendered, since
government funds and properties may
not be seized under writs of execution
or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious
considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be
covered
by
the
corresponding
appropriations as required by law. The
functions and public services rendered
by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion
of public funds from their legitimate
and specific objects. x x x
With this in mind, the Court holds that the writ of
preliminary attachment must be dissolved and, indeed,
it must not have been issued in the very first place.
While there is merit in private respondents position
that she, by affidavit, was able to substantiate the
allegation of fraud in the same way that the fraud
attributable to petitioners was sufficiently alleged in the
Page 24 of 30
complaint and, hence, the issuance of the writ would

have been justified. Still, the writ of attachment in this
case would only prove to be useless and unnecessary
under the premises, since the property of the
municipality may not, in the event that respondents
claim is validated, be subjected to writs of execution
and garnishment unless, of course, there has been a
corresponding appropriation provided by law.
IV.
CONGRESS
TERM LIMITATION
Section 10 prohibits the increase in salaries to take

effect during the term of the Congress. The word term
is used in singular form to indicate that all the terms of
the members of that congress must have expired
already.Because of the interloping of 12 members in
any given time, the question is asked on the increase
that must have to be considered whether the senators
who are elected for a six year term every three years
hereafter their terms office singularly have already been
expired.
RESIDENCY
Constitution has used the word residence but the
Supreme Court has consistently defined it or means it,
as domicile. The reason for requiring residence as
domicile in an old case is that:
1) It entitles or it allows the person to know the needs
of his constituents more so in terms of legislation;
2) On the part of electors, if you are not really a
domiciliary in the place how will the electors know you
Now, it settled rule that it is your legal residence and
not your actual residence. Even if you are temporarily
absent there is an intention of returning, animus
revertandi.
And that intention of returning is
continuous, animus maniendi. It does not require
physical presence all the time. But it requires you have
the intention to return even you are absent on that
place. And some other ruling on residency brought
about the decision of the SC established:
1) minors retain the residency of their parents but
they are not prohibited to choose their own
residency after attaining the age of majority;
JL CADIATAN
2) Wives under the NCC or the FC may maintain a

residence other than their legal residence
because spouses are required to maintain a
conjugal dwelling. The conjugal dwelling may
not necessarily be the legal residency of the
spouse. Not because under the FC that the
conjugal abode shall be established by the
husband, it has to be established by both. But
the law says that in case of disagreement the
husbands decision shall prevail otherwise they
shall go to court. (Romualdes-Marcos vs.
Comelec)
While a person may have only one legal residence at
any given time, it does not mean that the same person
cannot acquire a new legal residence. What is only
required to acquire a new legal residence is that the
person must have:
a) a bona fide intention to change his old
residence;
b) actual abandonment of the old to acquire a new
one;
c) performance or commission of acts indicating
he is abandoning the old and acquiring a new
one.
Butch Aquino vs. (?), he was a legal resident of Tarlac.
He wanted to run in Makati that is why he rented a
house in Makati, without doing anything. Just renting a
house without residing in it. So the SC said there were
no acts performed that would show that he abandoned
the old and acquired a new one. All his businesses
private or official were still in Tarlac, the only thing that
would indicate his actual residence is the lease in an
apartment unit and nothing more. Which was further
discussed in the case of Mitra vs Comelec, where the SC
reversed the finding of COMELEC en banc that Mitra
was not able to change his residence. The SC said that
the Comelec is using non-legal standards referring to it
as subjective non-legal standards. As you could
remember, Mitra wanted to run as governor of the
province, he wanted to change his residence from
Puerto Princesa to a municipality. He bought an old
fertilizer mill warehouse and in the mezzanine that is
where he resided. And there are evidences to show
that the residence or feed mill was devoid of any luxury
which is consistent to his status as a Mitra. Walang
ayos, walang furnitures, walang appliances consistent of
his standing but the SC said those are non-legal
standard which are subjective the law only requires
three:
Page 25 of 30
1) that there is a good faith intention to change his old

residence,
2) the actual abandonment of the old to acquire a new
one,
3) performance of acts indicating he is abandoning the
old.
The SC took note of other evidences, that he bought the
adjoining property and start building his house. There
was a testimony from the barangay captain that he lives
were the old mill was located and a new house is being
constructed. He was actually going there and residing
there. As compared to other barangay captains from
the supposed town where (resides), he does not show
himself to Palawan or in that municipality. So it is a
matter of evidence but the thing is the SC said what the
Comelec used were subjective. It does not require you
to build a house appropriate of your social standing,
what is important is you uprooted yourself from the old
one and planted yourself to a new domicile.
Asistio vs. Aguire, a 2010 case, simply involved the
question of if your certificate of candidacy indicated an
address which is not legally existing does that mean you
already changed your domicile already. Asistio is from
Caloocan. The family are well known to be from there.
What is indicated in the COC is not an existing address
so what the primary respondent argued that he is not a
legal resident of Caloocan. And he is not a resident
because of a non-existing address. SC said that does
not indicate that the person change his domicile
because you can only change your domicile by
compliance of the three requisites.
APPORTIONMENT/DISTRICTS
NAVARRO VS ERMITA 612 S 131. LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 9.
Provinces. (a) Requisites for creation A province
shall not be created unless the following requisites on
income and either population or land area are present:
(1) Income An average annual income of not less than
Twenty Million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the
immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based
on 1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF. The
average annual income shall include the income
accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds,
special accounts, transfers, and non-recurring income;
and
JL CADIATAN
(2) Population or land area Population which shall not

be less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants, as certified by NSO; or land area which
must be contiguous with an area of at least two
thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by
LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the
income of the province. The land area requirement shall
not apply where the proposed province is composed of
one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a
province sought to be created shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds.
The creation of a new province shall not reduce the land
area, population, and income of the original LGU or
LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the
prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses
incidental to the creation shall be borne by the
petitioners. (Emphasis supplied.)
It bears scrupulous notice that from the above cited
provisions, with respect to the creation of barangays,
land area is not a requisite indicator of viability.
However, with respect to the creation of municipalities,
component cities, and provinces, the three (3)
indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide
services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are
provided for.
But it must be pointed out that when the local
government unit to be created consists of one (1) or
more islands, it is exempt from the land area
requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and
Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to
be created is a municipality or a component city,
respectively. This exemption is absent in the
enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a
province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is
expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
PARTY LIST SYSTEM ACT
ATONG PAGLAUM VS COMELEC 694 S 477. R.A. No.
7941 does not require national and regional parties or
organizations to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors. Under the party-list
system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political
party is clearly different from a sectoral party. A political
party need not be organized as a sectoral party and
need not represent any particular sector. There is no
Page 26 of 30
requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional

political party must represent a "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the
political party consists of citizens who advocate the
same ideology or platform, or the same governance
principles and policies, regardless of their economic
status as citizens.
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented"
should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are,
by their nature, economically "marginalized and
underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other
similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the
members of the sectoral party must belong to the
"marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees
of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector,
or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector
represented.
To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its
second guideline for the accreditation of parties under
the party-list system, that "while even major political
parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they
must comply with the declared statutory policy of
enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors xxx to be elected to the
House of Representatives. "However, the requirement
in Ang Bagong Bayani, in its second guideline, that "the
political party xxx must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented," automatically disqualified major
political parties from participating in the party-list
system. This inherent inconsistency in Ang Bagong
Bayani has been compounded by the COMELECs refusal
to register sectoral wings officially organized by major
political parties. BANAT merely formalized the
prevailing practice when it expressly prohibited major
political parties from participating in the party-list
system, even through their sectoral wings.
We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following
prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying petitioners. In
following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could
not have committed grave abuse of discretion.
However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections, we must now impose and mandate the partylist system actually envisioned and authorized under
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT, this
Court devised a new formula in the allocation of partylist seats, reversing the COMELEC's allocation which
JL CADIATAN
followed the then prevailing formula in Ang Bagong

Bayani. In BANAT, however, the Court did not declare
that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
Similarly, even as we acknowledge here that the
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, we
declare that it would not be in accord with the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in
Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT in determining who are
qualified to participate in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections.
Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the
COMELEC. In determining who may participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list
elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following
parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the partylist system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties
or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral
lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized
and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections
provided they register under the party-list system and
do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A
political party, whether major or not, that fields
candidates in legislative district elections can participate
in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that
can separately register under the party-list system. The
sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party,
and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be
"marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in
"well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that
their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
"marginalized and underrepresented" include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political
constituencies" include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the "marginalized and
Page 27 of 30
underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized

and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly,
a majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that lack "well-defined political
constituencies" must belong to the sector they
represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented," or that represent those who lack
"well-defined political constituencies," either must
belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track
record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at
least one nominee who remains qualified.
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13
May 2013 party-list elections those that did not satisfy
these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral
groups or organizations must represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2)
all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners
may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as
political or regional parties they are not organized along
sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees
who do not belong to the sectors they represent may
have been disqualified, although they may have a track
record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees
of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified
because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a
party may have been disqualified because one or more
of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at
least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed
above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their
nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the
1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
COCOFED VS COMELEC 703 S 165. The Supreme Court
(SC) has affirmed the disqualification of Coconut
Producers Federation (Cocofed) in the party-list
elections last May by the Commission on Elections
(Comelec).
In a decision penned by Associate Justice Arturo Brion,
the high court ruled that the Comelec was correct in
JL CADIATAN
canceling Cocofeds certificate of registration for failure

to submit names of at least five nominees.
The SC said that such requirement is mandatory since
the law uses the word shall.
Cocofed has shown that it is able to comply with the
five-nominee requirement after the elections; it should
have explained its inability to comply prior to the
elections, the high court said through a summary
released by its public information office.
A party is not allowed to simply refuse to submit a list
containing not less than five nominees and consider
the deficiency as waiver on their part, it added.
ABANG LINGKOD VS COMELEC 708 S133. The COMELEC
En Banc cancelled ABANG LINGKOD's registration as a
party list group. The COMELEC En Banc pointed out that
ABANG LINGKOD failed to establish its track record in
uplifting the cause of the marginalized and
underrepresented; that it merely offered photographs
of some alleged activities it conducted after the May
2010 elections. The COMELEC En Bane further opined
that ABANG LINGKOD failed to show that its nominees
are themselves marginalized and underrepresented or
that they have been involved in activities aimed at
improving the plight of the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors it claims to represent.
The COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of ABANG
LINGKOD's registration on the ground that it declared
untruthful statement in its bid for accreditation as a
party-list group in the May 2013 elections, pointing out
that it deliberately submitted digitally altered
photographs of activities to make it appear that it had a
track record in representing the marginalized and
underrepresented. Essentially, ABANG LINGKOD's
registration was cancelled on the ground that it failed to
adduce evidence showing its track record in
representing the marginalized and underrepresented.
The flaw in the COMELEC's disposition lies in the fact
that it insists on requiring party-list groups to present
evidence showing that they have a track record in
representing the marginalized and underrepresented.
Track record is a record of past performance often
taken as an indicator of likely future performance.13 As a
requirement imposed by Ang Bagong Bayani for groups
intending to participate in the party-list elections, track
Page 28 of 30
record pertains to the actual activities undertaken by

groups to uplift the cause of the sector/s, which they
represent.
R.A. No. 7941 did not require groups intending to
register under the party-list system to submit proof of
their track record as a group. The track record
requirement was only imposed in Ang Bagong Bayani
where the Court held that national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations seeking registration
under the party-list system must prove through their,
inter alia track record that they truly represent the
marginalized and underrepresented, thus:
JL CADIATAN
underrepresented sector; that representation of the

marginalized and underrepresented is only required of
sectoral organizations that represent the sectors stated
under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 that are, by their
nature,
economically
marginalized
and
underrepresented.
There was no mention that sectoral organizations
intending to participate in the party-list elections are
still required to present a track record, viz:
x x x In determining who may participate in the coming
13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the
COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
xxx
xxxx
In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down
the following guidelines, culled from the law and the
Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political pat1y, sector, organization or
coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Secdon 5 of RA
7941. In other words, it must show -- through its
constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history,
platform of government and track record -- that it
represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its
membership should belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a
conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose
the interest of such sectors. (Emphasis ours)
Track record is not the same as the submission or
presentation of "constitution, by-laws, platform of
government, list of officers, coalition agreement, and
other relevant information as may be required by the
COMELEC," which are but mere pieces of documentary
evidence intended to establish that the group exists and
is a going concern. The said documentary evidence
presents an abstract of the ideals that national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations seek to
achieve.
In Atong Paglaum the Court has modified to a great
extent the jurisprudential doctrines on who may
register under the party-list system and the
representation
of
the
marginalized
and
underrepresented. For purposes of registration under
the party-list system, national or regional parties or
organizations need not represent any marginalized and
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be

marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in welldefined political constituencies. It is enough that their
principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
marginalized and underrepresented include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political
constituencies'' include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth. (Emphasis ours)
Contrary to the COMELEC's claim, sectoral parties or
organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no longer
required to adduce evidence showing their track record,
i.e. proof of activities that they have undertaken to
further the cause of the sector they represent. Indeed,
it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector. Otherwise
stated, it is sufficient that the ideals represented by the
sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of
the sector/s, which they represent.
If at all, evidence showing a track record in
representing the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors is only required from nominees of sectoral
parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented who do not
factually belong to the sector represented by their
party or organization.
BANAT VS COMELEC 2009.
We therefore strike
down the two percent threshold only in relation to the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the
second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The
Page 29 of 30
two percent threshold presents an unwarranted

obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of the broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list
representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the
following procedure shall be observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be
ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2.
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving
at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed
seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes,
according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes until all the additional seats are
allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats
shall no longer be included because they have already
been allocated, at one seat each, to every twopercenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for
allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats
reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in
the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for
a rounding off of fractional seats.
SYNCHRONIZED TERMS OF OFFICE
ABUNDO VS COMELEC 688 S149.
Page 30 of 30
JL CADIATAN

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1

POLITICAL LAW, DEFINED

Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and

acceptance and bars modification even by the branch

Based on the Lectures of Atty. Paul Montejo

advocate in any proceeding before the Punong

chances of acquittal are nil. As already stated,

It is established doctrine that a statute should be

the concept of RIPENESS - In relation to that,

He who attacks the constitutionality of a law has the

3. It must be raised by the proper party.

3. LEGISLATORS SUIT if a law is passed or a law

there is a public character of the fund or

b. there is a clear case of constitutional

raised has become MOOT AND ACADEMIC. Can the

ADVOCATES FOR TRUTH VS BANGKO SENTRAL 688 S

In the instant case, there is no allegation of misuse of

FUNA VS AGRA 691 S 196. In Funa v. Ermita, the Court

involves a probable violation of the Constitution, and

provisions allowing for their utilization such as the

challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual

Paragraph 2(a) of Section 5, Article VIII of the

FUNCTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Section 5. The Supreme Court

ALL COURTS CAN EXERCISE JUDICIAL REVIEW

In J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,

GR: The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox

FLORES VS DRILON 223 S 568. The constitutionality of

their positions, was to inform the latter of the

should those already given out be returned? SC applied

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine

Now, in the DAP case of hacienda luisita, one of the

The first part of the authority represents the

Atty Montejo: CIR vs SAN ROQUE, this was a claim for

OPOSA VS FACTORAN 224 S 792. It must, nonetheless,

Based on the Lectures of Atty. Paul Montejo

As worded, the new provision vests in the

We reiterate that the said Petition failed to state

agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine

THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE

Baseline (sea) - Normally, the baseline from which the

Exclusive Economic Zone - An exclusive economic zone

Was there any time in the past where foreigners were

to the fact of being a citizen or to the fact that the

imposed on anyone found guilty of fraud or falsehood in

x x x [T]he 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not

VILANDO VS HRET 656 S 17.

However, we cautioned in Cue[n]co that the extension

Likewise, the citizenship of respondent Limkaichong

Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on

Having failed to prove that Anesia Sy lost her Philippine

We reiterated the above ruling in Go, Sr. v. Ramos, a

In both cases, we ruled against the petitioners because

provisions, i.e., Section 1(3), Article [IV] and Section 2,

Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to make a

and in addition that just like judicial proceedings must

circumstance, SC granted the petition rather than

August 29, 2003

AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE

I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office

Based on the Lectures of Atty. Paul Montejo

office? Answer is, if it were elective no, but if it were