in the practice of law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co.

, 102
S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
RENATO L. CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177) stated:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues
are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political
aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1(1), Article IX-C:
"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not
have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section 1(1), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitutionwhich
similarly provides:
"There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including
the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for al least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a
legal qualification to an appointive office. cdphil
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is
not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by
maintaining an office where he is held out to be an attorney, using a letterhead
describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters,
negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and
collecting fees for services rendered by his associate." (Black's Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.).
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when
he:
". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,
firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears
in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee,
or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and
there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose
of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise
stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs
any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged

"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings
on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy
and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and
in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on
a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation.
They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear
an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court
and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It
is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary
functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill,
of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys." (Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.], p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the
Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v.Automobile
Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (19741975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counseling and
public service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the
profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual
for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows
some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney
at law within the meaning of the statute." (Barr D. Cardell, 155 NW 312).
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
(111 ALR 23).
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law." cdrep

"MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do
during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a
very brief statement?

of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A. 2d 863, 870 [1958]
[quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A. 2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers
perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition
would obviously be too global to be workable. (Wolfram, op. cit.)

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.
"MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on
Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section 1 is that 'They must be
Members of the Philippine Bar' I am quoting from the provision 'who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' "
"To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who
are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the
clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not
necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA. We have to interpret this
to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal
knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be
considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the
Commission on Audit.
"This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies
and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made
available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine
Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
"MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
"MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?"
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the
provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore,
the answer is yes
"MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the
practice of law.
"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you."
. . . (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with
not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word
"lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the
majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois), 1986], p. 15]).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means
"an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers
who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm
is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as
professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the
firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneys called "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologies, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram,Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is
defined as "the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for
lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593).
Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both
the public image and the self-perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.). LibLex
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why
is this so? Recall that the late Alexander Sycip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance
of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose
concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench
and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners
of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves
spending more time doing what [is] loosely describe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases.
The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the
surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where
internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner will engage in a number of legal tasks,
each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other
interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice will usually perform
at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax
practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different
one such as representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types
a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require
the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advicegiving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of
adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers'
work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is
organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of
corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary
transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional
groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends
in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an
accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law
research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal
policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and contingency planning," has
impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many
decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the
sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major

trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of

action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute
danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must
stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a
model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test
projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting
the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little
organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal
education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital
necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in
the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional contexts
and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a
master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the
legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and
analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of
complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the
services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from
each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised.
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado
de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele
composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is
that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single
corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large
corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have inhouse counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to
handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of
a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal
research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings),
appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and
Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the
law.LLjur

in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign
country is perceived by many as glamorous, this is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In
most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger
attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law
Practice," May 25, 1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of
finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to
wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who
perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts
them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No
longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to
the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining
modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the
corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skills applicable to a corporate
counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area
linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a
unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that
matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting
strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the
need to think about a corporation's strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nationstate is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only
with public entities but with each other often with those who are competitors in other
arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is
rapidly changing. The modern corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stockholder
in some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through
participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop
alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. (Emphasis supplied).

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of
the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as
determining policy and becoming involved in management. (Emphasis supplied.)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry
that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to
influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries.
In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between
governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or
not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the organization. This can be
frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a
corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running
of the business.

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises
a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of
both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to
identifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their
knowledge of the environment, coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team
achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are better
predictors of team performance than internal group processes.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational

corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer

vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current
research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures

and to understand relationships

considerations. (emphasis supplied)

of

financial

liability

and insurance

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors

are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for
new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An
understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable
users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems physical, economic, managerial, social,
and psychological. New programming techniques now make the systems dynamics
principles more accessible to managers including corporate counsels. (Emphasis
supplied).
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity
and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the
settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk
involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly
by parties and mediators in all kinds of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide
coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these
techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the
point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three
pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part
of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive
lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights
for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered
and made. llcd
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those
activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of
this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay
competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not
adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy
work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has
emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The
corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and
varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make
or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to
make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal
system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not to
understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also
gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the
basic legal "constitution" or make-up of the modern corporation. "Business Star, The
Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than
a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet,
many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory.
What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer

admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk
exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jar. 11, 1989, p. 4). LLpr
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments
on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsoddoes not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman
of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office
as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960
with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for
more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo).

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in
the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsodworked as an
operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted
with the laws of member-countries, negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project
work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served
as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and
since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief
executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of
NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL
in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal
capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human
Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor
groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and
lately the urban land reform bill.Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the
Davide Commission, a quasi-judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice
Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual
freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative." (pp.
128-129 Rollo) (Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is
adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation.
Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal
counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in
negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven,
"Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central
Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as
far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p.
13)

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring
program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal
advising, they score national development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by
L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of
Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the
World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). (Emphasis
supplied).
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely re negotiation
policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and
in re negotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business
specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be
carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with
the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of
the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law,
1987, p. 321). (Emphasis supplied).
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and
conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more
elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both
parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to
discharge an obligation. For a complete debt restructuring represents a devotion to that
principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements an
adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: 'They carry no banners, they
beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of
quiet genius and serene mastery.' (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and
Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law", particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers
of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the
rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law." (Emphasis supplied).
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the
President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond,
etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsodas
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the
Constitution which provides:
"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without re appointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall
hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members
for three years, without re appointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be
only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member
be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity."
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of
law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of
the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of
the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law
practice, perhaps practiced two or three times a week and would outlawsay, law practice once or twice
a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I
made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that
law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but
only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional
areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that
is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod isa
lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practicing law for over ten years. This is
different from the acts of persons practicing law, without first becoming lawyers.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said: prcd
"Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by
the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition
being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If
he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are
others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political
question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide." (emphasis supplied).
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
SCRA 744) where it stated:
"It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all
the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative
but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The
Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that
another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no
authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would
be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority.
An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt.
For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that
he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law.
The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond
judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant
case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less
a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown. llcd
Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme
Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in
the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission hasconfirmed? The
answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides toconfirm a
Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S.
Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
"We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life."
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who
was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that
"No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins."
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod
burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man.
Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and
fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly
replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was
clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., petitioner, vs. HAYDEE B. YORAC, in her capacity as

ACTING CHAIRPERSON of the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

The petitioner is challenging the designation by the President of the Philippines of Associate
Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of
Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding commission to
investigate the December 1989 coup d' etat attempt.
The qualifications of the respondent are conceded by the petitioner and are not in issue in this case.
What is the power of the President of the Philippines to make the challenged designation in view of the
status of the Commission on Elections as an independent constitutional body and the specific provision
of Article IX-C, Section 1(2) of the Constitution that "(I)n no case shall any Member (of the Commission
on Elections) be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity."
The petitioner invokes the case of Nacionalista Party v. Bautista, 85 Phil. 101, where President Elpidio
Quirino designated the Solicitor General as acting member of the Commission on Elections and the
Court revoked the designation as contrary to the Constitution. It is also alleged that the respondent is
not even the senior member of the Commission on Elections, being outranked by Associate
Commissioner Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr. cdphil
The petitioner contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an
internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the
President of the Philippines violates their independence. He cites the practice in this Court, where the
senior Associate Justice serves as Acting Chief Justice in the absence of the Chief Justice. No
designation from the President of the Philippines is necessary.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that no such designation is necessary in the case of the
Supreme Court because the temporary succession cited is provided for in Section 12 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948. A similar rule is found in Section 5 of BP 129 for the Court of Appeals. There is no such
arrangement, however, in the case of the Commission on Elections. The designation made by the
President of the Philippines should therefore be sustained for reasons of "administrative expediency,"
to prevent disruption of the functions of the COMELEC.
Expediency is a dubious justification. It may also be an overstatement to suggest that the operations of
the Commission on Elections would have been disturbed or stalemated if the President of the
Philippines had not stepped in and designated an Acting Chairman. There did not seem to be any such
problem. In any event, even assuming that difficulty, we do not agree that "only the President (could)
act to fill the hiatus," as the Solicitor General maintains.
Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as
"independent." Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President
of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts
its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own
discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review oncertiorari by this Court as
provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7.
The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that
discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the
Philippines.
A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially temporary and therefore revocable at
will. No cause need be established to justify its revocation. Assuming its validity, the designation of the
respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections may be withdrawn by the President of
the Philippines at any time and for whatever reason she sees fit. It is doubtful if the respondent, having
accepted such designation, will not be estopped from challenging its withdrawal. LibLex
It is true, as the Solicitor General points out, that the respondent cannot be removed at will from her
permanent position as Associate Commissioner. It is no less true, however, that she can be replaced
as Acting Chairman, with or without cause, and thus deprived of the powers and perquisites of that
temporary position.

The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the President of the
Philippines to fill the void by extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. This is still
a government of laws and not of men. The problem allegedly sought to be corrected, if it existed at all,
did not call for presidential action. The situation could have been handled by the members of the
Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of the President, however well-meaning.
In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections would most likely
have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have appreciated it. In any event, that
choice and the basis thereof were for them and not the President to make.
The Court has not the slightest doubt that the President of the Philippines was moved only by the best
of motives when she issued the challenged designation. But while conceding her goodwill, we cannot
sustain her act because it conflicts with the Constitution. Hence, even as this Court revoked the
designation in the Bautista case, so too must it annul the designation in the case at bar.
The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of the Commission on Elections,
foremost among which is the security of tenure of its members. That guaranty is not available to the
respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections by designation of the President of the
Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the designation by the President of the Philippines of respondent Haydee B. Yoracas
Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and the
respondent is hereby ordered to desist from serving as such. This is without prejudice to the incumbent
Associate Commissioners of the Commission on Elections restoring her to the same position if they so
desire, or choosing another member in her place, pending the appointment of a permanent Chairman
by the President of the Philippines with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. cdrep

TUPAY T. LOONG, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

ABDUSAKUR TAN, respondents.
SYNOPSIS
In the May 11, 1998 elections held in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), the
automated election system was implemented pursuant to R.A. No. 8436. However when the
automated machines failed to read correctly the ballots in the municipality of Pata, a manual count was
ordered by the COMELEC. The problem in Pata was traced by the technical experts of COMELEC and
the suppliers of the automated machines to an error in the printing of the ballots caused by the
misalignment of the ovals opposite the names of candidates and while the local ballots in the other
nearby five municipalities contained the wrong sequence code. The ballot boxes were then transported
to Manila. After a manual count, respondent Tan was proclaimed governor-elect. Petitioner Loong was
third in the count and Intervenor Jakiri placed second. The latter two questioned the resolutions of the
COMELEC ordering a manual count of the votes cast in Sulu claiming denial of due process and
illegality of manual count in light of R.A. No. 8436. cdasia
Petitioner Loong and respondent Tan who were given every opportunity to oppose the manual count
were not denied due process. They were orally heard and submitted written position papers and their
representatives escorted the transfer of ballots to Manila and watched the manual count from the
beginning to the end.
Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the error in counting is not machine-related.
However, COMELEC is given the broad power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall". This provision gives
COMELEC all the necessary powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections. Embraced therein is the power to order a manual count where
automated counting fails. Furthermore, R.A. No. 8436 did not prohibit the manual counting when
machine count does not work.
SYLLABUS
1. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; HAS THE DUTY TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATE OF
CONGRESS. Although not expressly sanctioned by law, such parallel manual count may arguably
be regarded as falling within the residual regulatory authority of the Comelec. Unfortunately and
inexplicably, however, only a manual count was done; the Resolution ordering an automated count
was simply ignored without the Comelec giving any reason therefor. To repeat, there was no reason at
all to completely abandon the automated count. The Comelec had a duty to comply with the mandate
of Congress. Yet, for unstated and, unexplainable reasons, it simply substituted the will of Congress
with its own arbitrary action. Clearly, the Comelec acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. EaScHT
2. ID.; COURTS; JURISDICTION; COURTS HAVE NO JURISDICTION TO MAKE LEGISLATIVE
PRONOUNCEMENTS. Courts have no jurisdiction to make legislative pronouncements. They have
no power to fill a vacuum in the law. Thus, the Court, should not give its imprimatur to the Comelec's
resort to the manual method of determining election results, where Congress has categorically
prescribed the automated system. Only Congress, the legislative arm of the government, can prescribe
a precise remedy that will address the flaws identified in this case. For the courts or the Comelec to do
so (like a resort to manual count) would be tantamount to judicial or administrative legislation, a course
diametrical to the constitutional principle of separation of powers. HEDSI
DECISION
In a bid to improve our elections, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8436 on December 22,
1997 prescribing the adoption of an automated election system. The new system was used in
the May 11, 1998 regular elections held in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
which includes the Province of Sulu. Atty. Jose Tolentino, Jr. headed the COMELEC Task Force
to have administrative oversight of the elections in Sulu. cdasia
The voting in Sulu was relatively peaceful and orderly. 1 The problem started during
the automated counting of votes for the local officials of Sulu at the Sulu State College. At about
6 a.m. of May 12, 1998, some election inspectors and watchers informed Atty. Tolentino, Jr. of
discrepancies between the election returns and the votes cast for the mayoralty candidates in
the municipality of Pata. Some ballots picked at random by Atty. Tolentino, Jr. confirmed that
votes in favor of a mayoralty candidate were not reflected in the printed election returns. He
suspended the automated counting of ballots in Pata and immediately communicated the problem

to the technical experts of COMELEC and the suppliers of the automated machine.After
consultations, the experts told him that the problem was caused by the misalignment of
the ovals opposite the names of candidates in the local ballots. They found nothing wrong
with the automated machines. The error was in the printing of the local ballots, as a
consequence of which, the automated machines failed to read them correctly. 2
At 12:30 p.m. of the same day, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. called for an emergency meeting
of the local candidates and the military-police officials overseeing the Sulu elections. Those who
attended were the various candidates for governor, namely, petitioner Tupay Loong, private
respondent Abdusakur Tan, intervenor Yusop Jikiri and Kimar Tulawie. Also in attendance were
Brig. Gen. Edgardo Espinosa, AFP, Marine Forces, Southern Philippines, Brig. Gen. Percival
Subala, AFP, 3rd Marine Brigade, Supt. Charlemagne Alejandrino, Provincial Director, Sulu, PNP
Command and congressional candidate Bensandi Tulawie. 3
The meeting discussed how the ballots in Pata should be counted in light of the
misaligned ovals. There was lack of agreement. Those who recommended a shift to manual
count were Brig. Generals Espinosa and Subala, PNP Director Alejandrino, gubernatorial
candidates Tan and Tulawie and congressional candidate Bensandi Tulawie. Those who insisted
on an automated count were gubernatorial candidates Loong and Jikiri. In view of their
differences in opinion, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. requested the parties to submit their written position
papers. 4
Reports that the automated counting of ballots in other municipalities in Sulu
was not working well were received by the COMELEC Task Force. Local ballots in five (5)
municipalities were rejected by the automated machines. These municipalities were
Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The ballots were rejected because they had the
wrong sequence code. 5
Private respondent Tan and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. sent separate communications to the
COMELEC en banc in Manila. Still, on May 12, 1998, Tan requested for the suspension of the
automated counting of ballots throughout the Sulu province. 6 On the same day, COMELEC
issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1747 ordering a manual count but only in the municipality of
Pata. The resolution reads: 7
"xxx xxx xxx
"In the matter of the Petition dated May 12, 1998 of Abdusakur Tan, Governor, Sulu, to
suspend or stop counting of ballots through automation (sic) machines for the following
grounds, quoted to wit:
'1. The Election Returns for the Municipality of Pata, Province of Sulu-District II do not
reflect or reveal the mandate of the voters:
'DISCUSSIONS
'That the watchers called the attention of our political leaders and candidates regarding their
discovery that the election returns generated after the last ballots for a precinct is scanned
revealed that some candidates obtained zero votes, among others the Provincial Board
Members, Mayor, Vice-Mayor, and the councilors for the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP;
'That the top ballot, however, reveals that the ballots contained votes for Anton
Burahan, candidate for Municipal Mayor while the Election Return shows zero vote;
'That further review of the Election Return reveals that John Masillam, candidate for
Mayor under the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP-MNLF obtains (sic) 100% votes of the total
number of voters who actually voted;
'The foregoing discrepancies were likewise noted and confirmed by the chairmen, poll clerks
and members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) such as Rena Jawan, Matanka
Hajirul, Dulba Kadil, Teddy Mirajuli, Rainer Talcon, Mike Jupakal, Armina Akmad, Romulo
Roldan and Lerma Marawali to mention some;
'The Pata incident can be confirmed by no less than Atty. Jose Tolentino, Head, Task Force
Sulu, whose attention was called regarding the discrepancies;

'The foregoing is a clear evidence that the automated machine (scanner) cannot be relied
upon as to truly reflect the contents of the ballots. If such happened in the Municipality of
Pata, it is very possible that the same is happening in the counting of votes in the other
municipalities of this province. If this will not be suspended or stopped, the use of
automated machines will serve as a vehicle to frustrate the will of the sovereign people of
Sulu;
'Wherefore, the foregoing premises considered and in the interest of an honest and orderly
election, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Commission that an Order be issued
immediately suspending or stopping the use of the automated machine (scanner) in the
counting of votes for all the eighteen (18) municipalities in the Province of Sulu and in lieu
thereof, to avoid delay, counting be done through the usual way and known and tested by
us.'
"While the commission does not agree with the conclusions stated in the petition,
and the failure of the machine to read the votes may have been occasioned by other
factors, a matter that requires immediate investigation, but in the public interest, the
Commission,
'RESOLVED to grant the Petition dated May 12, 1998 and to Order that the counting of
votes shall be done manually in the Municipality of PATA, the only place in Sulu
where the automated machine failed to read the ballots, subject to notice to all parties
concerned."' LLjur
Before midnight of May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was able to send to the COMELEC en
banchis report and recommendation, urging the use of the manual count in the entire Province of
Sulu, viz: 8
"The undersigned stopped the counting in the municipality of Pata
since he discovered that votes for a candidate for mayor was credited in favor
of the other candidate. Verification with the Sulu Technical Staff, including Pat
Squires of ES & S, reveals that the cause of the error is the way the ballot was
printed. Aside from misalignment of the ovals and use of codes assigned to
another municipality (which caused the rejection of all local ballots in one
precinct in Talipao), error messages appeared on the screen although the
actual condition of the ballots would have shown a different message.
Because of these, the undersigned directed that counting for all ballots in Sulu
be stopped to enable the Commission to determine the problem and rectify the
same. It is submitted that stopping the counting is more in consonance with
the Commission's mandate than proceeding with an automated but inaccurate
count.
"In view of the error discovered in Pata and the undersigned's order to suspend the
counting, the following documents were submitted to him.
"1. Unsigned letter dated May 12, 1998 submitted by Congressman Tulawie for manual
counting and canvassing;
"2. Petition of Governor Sakur Tan for manual counting;
"3. Position paper of Tupay Loong, Benjamin Loong, and Asani Tamang for automated
count;
"4. MNLF Position for automated count; and
"5. Recommendation of General E. V. Espinosa, General PM Subala, and PD CS
Alejandrino for manual count;
"Additional marines have been deployed at the SSC. The undersigned is not sure if it is
merely intended to tame a disorderly crowd, inside and outside SSC, or a show of force.
"It is submitted that since an error was discovered in a machine which is supposed to
have an error rate of 1:1,000,000, not a few people would believe that this error in
Pata would extend to the other municipalities. Whether or not this is true, it would be
more prudent to stay away from a lifeless thing that has sown tension and anxiety
among and between the voters of Sulu.
Respectfully submitted:

12 May 1998
(SGD.) JOSE M. TOLENTINO, JR."
The next day, May 13, 1998, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 98-1750 approving Atty.
Tolentino, Jr.'s recommendation and the manner of its implementation as suggested by Executive
Director Resurreccion Z. Borra. The Resolution reads: 9
"In the matter of the Memorandum dated 13 May 1998 of Executive
Director Resurreccion Z. Borra, pertinent portion of which is quoted as follows:
"In connection with Min. Res. No. 98-1747 promulgated May 12,
1998 which resolved to order that the counting of votes shall be done manually
in the municipality of Pata, the only place in Sulu where the automated
counting machine failed to read the ballots, subject to notice to all parties
concerned, please find the following:
"1. Handwritten Memo of Director Jose M. Tolentino, Jr., Task Force Head, Sulu, addressed
to the Executive Director on the subject counting and canvassing in the municipality of Pata
due to the errors of the counting of votes by the machine brought about by the error in the
printing of the ballot, causing misalignment of ovals and use of codes assigned to another
municipality.
He recommended to revert to the manual counting of votes in the whole of Sulu. He
attached the stand of Congressman Tulawie, Governor Sakur Tan and recommendation of
Brigadier General Edgardo Espinosa, General Percival Subala, P/Supt. Charlemagne
Alejandrino for manual counting. The position paper of former Governor Tupay Loong, Mr.
Benjamin Loong and Mr. Asani S. Tamang, who are candidates for Governor and
Congressman of 1st and 2nd Districts respectively, who wanted the continuation of the
automated counting.
"While the forces of AFP are ready to provide arm (sic) security to our Comelec
officials, BEIs and other deputies, the political tensions and imminent violence and
bloodshed may not be prevented, as per report received, the MNLF forces are
readying their forces to surround the venue for automated counting and canvassing
in Sulu in order that the automation process will continue. LLphil
"Director Borra recommends, that while he supports Minute Resolution No. 98-1747,
implementation thereof shall be done as follows:
"1. That all the counting machines from Jolo, Sulu be transported back by C130 to
Manila and be located at the available space at PICC for purposes of both automated
and manual operations. This approach will keep the COMELEC officials away from
violence and bloodshed between the two camps who are determined to slug each
other as above mentioned in Jolo, Sulu. Only authorized political party and candidate
watchers will be allowed in PICC with proper security, both inside and outside the
perimeters of the venue at PICC.
"2. With this process, there will be an objective analysis and supervision of the
automated and manual operations by both the MIS and Technical Expert of the ES &
S away from the thundering mortars and the sounds of sophisticated heavy weapons
from both sides of the warring factions.
"3. Lastly, it will be directly under the close supervision and control of Commission on
Elections En Banc.
"RESOLVED:
"1. To transport all counting machines from Jolo, Sulu by C130 to Manila for
purposes of both automated and manual operations, with notice to all parties
concerned;

"2. To authorize the official travel of the board of canvassers concerned for the
conduct of the automated and manual operations of the counting of votes at PICC
under the close supervision and control of the Commission En Banc. For this
purpose, to make available a designated space at the PICC;
"3. To authorize the presence of only the duly authorized representative of the
political parties concerned and the candidates watchers both outside and inside the
perimeters of the venue at PICC."
Atty. Tolentino, Jr. furnished the parties with copies of Minute Resolution No.
98-1750 and called for another meeting the next day, May 14, 1998, to discuss the
implementation of the resolution. 10 The meeting was attended by the parties, by Lt. Gen.
Joselin Nazareno, then the Chief of the AFP Southern Command, the NAMFREL, media, and the
public. Especially discussed was the manner of transporting the ballots and the counting
machines to the PICC in Manila. They agreed to allow each political party to have at least one (1)
escort/watcher for every municipality to accompany the flight. Two C130s were used for the
purpose. 11
On May 15, 1998, the COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1796
laying down the rules for the manual count, viz: 12
"In the matter of the Memorandum dated 15 May 1998 of Executive Director Resurreccion
Z. Borra, quoted to wit:
'In the implementation of COMELEC Min. Resolution No. 98-1750 promulgated 13 May
1998 in the manual counting of votes of Pata, Sulu, and in view of the arrival of the counting
machines, ballot boxes, documents and other election paraphernalia for the whole province
of Sulu now stored in PICC, as well as the arrival of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
said Municipality in Sulu, and after conference with some members of the Senior Staff and
Technical Committee of this Commission, the following are hereby respectfully
recommended:
'1. Manual counting of the local ballots of the automated election system in Pata, Sulu;
'2. Automated counting of the national ballots considering that there are no questions raised
on the National Elective Officials as pre-printed in the mark-sensed ballots;
'3. The creation of the following Special Boards of Inspectors under the supervision of Atty.
Jose M. Tolentino, Jr., Task Force Head, Sulu, namely:
'4. Additional Special Board of Inspectors may be created when necessary.
5. The Provincial Board of Canvassers which by standing Resolution is headed by the Task
Force Sulu Head shall consolidate the manual and automated results as submitted by the
Municipal Boards of Canvassers of the whole province with two members composed of
Directors Estrella P. de Mesa and Ester L. Villaflor-Roxas;
'6. The political parties and the candidates in Sulu as well as the Party-List Candidates are
authorized to appoint their own watchers upon approval of the Commission',

"1. The minute resolution under agenda No. 98-1796 violates the provisions ofRepublic Act
No. 8436 providing for an automated counting of the ballots in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao. The automated counting is mandatory and could not be substituted by a
manual counting. Where the machines are allegedly defective, the only remedy provided for
by law is to replace the machine. Manual counting is prohibited by law;
"2. There are strong indications that in the municipality of Pata the ballots of the said
municipality were rejected by the counting machine because the ballots were tampered
and/or the texture of the ballots fed to the counting machine are not the official ballots of the
Comelec;
"3. The automated counting machines of the Comelec have been designed in such a way
that only genuine official ballots could be read and counted by the machine;
"4. The counting machines in the other municipalities are in order. In fact, the automated
counting has already started. The automated counting in the municipalities of Lugus and
Panglima Tahil has been completed. There is no legal basis for the 'parallel manual
counting' ordained in the disputed minute resolution."
Nonetheless, COMELEC started the manual count on the same date, May 18,
1998. cda
On May 25, 1998, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. He contended that: (a) COMELEC issued Minute Resolution
Nos. 98-1747, 98-1750, and 98-1798 without prior notice and hearing to him; (b) the order for
manual counting violated R.A. No. 8436; (c) manual counting gave "opportunity to the following
election cheating," namely.
"(a) The counting by human hands of the tampered, fake and counterfeit ballots which the
counting machines have been programmed to reject (Section 7, 8 & 9 of Rep. Act 8436).
"(b) The opportunity to substitute the ballots all stored at the PICC. In fact, no less than the
head of the COMELEC Task Force of Sulu, Atty. Jose M. Tolentino, Jr. who recommended
to the COMELEC the anomalous manual counting, had approached the watchers of
petitioners to allow the retrieval of the ballots, saying "tayo, tayo lang mga watchers, pagusapan natin," clearly indicating overtures of possible bribery of the watchers of petitioner
(ANNEX E).
"(c) With the creation by the COMELEC of only 22 Boards of Election Inspectors to
manually count the 1,194 precincts, the manipulators are given sufficient time to change
and tamper the ballots to be manually counted.
"(d) There is the opportunity of delaying the proclamation of the winning candidates through
the usually dilatory moves in a pre-proclamation controversy because the returns and
certificates of canvass are already human (sic) made. In the automated counting there is no
room for any dilatory pre-proclamation controversy because the returns and the MBC and
PBC certificates of canvass are machine made and immediate proclamation is ordained
thereafter."
Petitioner then prayed:

RESOLVED to approve the foregoing recommendations in the implementation of Min.

Resolution No. 98-1750 promulgated on 13 May 1998 providing for the manual counting of
votes in the municipality of Pata, Sulu.'RESOLVED, moreover, considering the
recommendation of Comm. Manolo B. Gorospe, Commissioner-In-Charge, ARMM, to
conduct a parallel manual counting on all 18 municipalities of Sulu as a final guidance of the
reliability of the counting machine which will serve as basis for the proclamation of the
winning candidates and for future reference on the use of the automated counting
machine."'
On May 18, 1998, petitioner filed his objection to Minute Resolution No. 981796, viz: 13

"WHEREFORE, it is most especially prayed of the Honorable Court

that:
"1. upon filing of this petition, a temporary restraining order be issued enjoining the
COMELEC from conducting a manual counting of the ballots of the 1,194 precincts of the 18
municipalities of the Province of Sulu but instead proceed with the automated counting of
the ballots, preparation of the election returns and MBC, PBC certificates of canvass and
proclaim the winning candidates on the basis of the automated counting and consolidation
of results;
"2. this petition be given due course and the respondents be required to answer;

"3. after due hearing, the questioned COMELEC En Banc Minute Resolutions of May 12,
13, 15, and 17, 1998 be all declared null and void ab initio for having been issued without
jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and for
being in violation of due process of law;
"4. the winning candidates of the Province of Sulu be proclaimed on the basis of the results
of the automated counting, automated election returns, automated MBC and PBC
certificates of canvass;
"xxx xxx xxx."
On June 8, 1998, private respondent Tan was proclaimed governor-elect of Sulu
on the basis of the manual count. 14 Private respondent garnered 43,573 votes. Petitioner
was third with 35,452 votes or a difference of 8,121 votes.
On June 23, 1998, this Court required the respondents to file their Comment to the
petition and directed the parties "to maintain the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of
the petition." 15 The vice-governor elect was allowed to temporarily discharge the powers and
functions of governor.
On August 20, 1998, Yusop Jikiri, the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP-MNLF candidate for
governor filed a motion for intervention and a Memorandum in Intervention. 16 The result of the
manual count showed he received 38,993 votes and placed second. Similarly, he alleged denial
of due process, lack of factual basis of the COMELEC resolutions and illegality of manual count in
light of R.A. No. 8436. The Court noted his intervention. 17 A similar petition for intervention filed
by Abdulwahid Sahidulla, a candidate for vice-governor, on October 7, 1998 was denied as it was
filed too late.
In due time, the parties filed their respective Comments. On September 25, 1998, the
Court heard the parties in oral argument 18 which was followed by the submission of their written
memoranda. cdlex
The issues for resolution are the following:
1. Whether or not a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is the appropriate remedy to invalidate the disputed
COMELEC resolutions.
2. Assuming the appropriateness of the remedy, whether or not COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in ordering a manual count.
2.a. Is there a legal basis for the manual count?
2.b. Are its factual bases reasonable?
2.c. Were the petitioner and the intervenor denied due process by
the COMELEC when it ordered a manual count?
3. Assuming the manual count is illegal and that its result is unreliable,
whether or not it is proper to call for a special election for the
position of governor of Sulu.
We shall resolve the issues in seriatim.
First. We hold that certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner. Section 7, Article
IX (A) of the 1987 Constitution states that "unless provided by this Constitution or by law, any
decision, order or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court
oncertiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." We have
interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered
in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. 19 Contrariwise, administrative orders
of the COMELEC are not, as a general rule, fit subjects of a petition forcertiorari. The main issue
in the case at bar is whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it ordered a
manual count of the 1998 Sulu local elections. A resolution of the issue will involve an
interpretation of R.A. No. 8436 on automated election in relation to the broad power of the

COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of the Constitution "to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election . . ." The issue is not only legal but one
of first impression and undoubtedly suffused with significance to the entire nation. It is
adjudicatory of the right of the petitioner, the private respondent and the intervenor to the position
of governor of Sulu. These are enough considerations to call for an exercise of
the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court.
Second. The big issue, one of first impression, is whether the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered a manual count in light
ofR.A. No. 8436. The post election realities on ground will show that the order for a manual count
cannot be characterized as arbitrary, capricious or whimsical.
a. It is well established that the automated machines failed to read correctly the ballots in
the municipality of Pata. A mayoralty candidate, Mr. Anton Burahan, obtained zero votes
despite the representations of the Chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors and others
that they voted for him. Another candidate garnered 100% of the votes.
b. It is likewise conceded that the automated machines rejected and would not count the
local ballots in the municipalities of Talipao, Siasi, Indanan, Tapal and Jolo.
c. These flaws in the automated counting of local ballots in the municipalities of Pata,
Talipao, Siasi, Indanan, Tapal and Jolo were carefully analyzed by the Technical experts of
COMELEC and the supplier of the automated machines. All of them found nothing wrong
with the automated machines. They traced the problem to the printing of local ballots by the
National Printing Office. In the case of the municipality of Pata, it was discovered that the
ovals of the local ballots were misaligned and could not be read correctly by the automated
machines. In the case of the municipalities of Talipao, Siasi, Indanan, Tapal and Jolo, it
turned out that the local ballots contained the wrong sequence code. Each municipality was
assigned a sequence code as a security measure. Ballots with the wrong sequence code
were programmed to be rejected by the automated machines.
It is plain that to continue with the automated count in these five (5) municipalities
would result in a grossly erroneous count. It cannot also be gainsaid that the count in these five
(5) municipalities will affect the local elections in Sulu. There was no need for more sampling of
local ballots in these municipalities as they suffered from the same defects. All local ballots in
Pata with misaligned ovals will be erroneously read by the automated machines. Similarly, all
local ballots in Talipao, Siasi, Indanan, Tapal and Jolo with wrong sequence codes are certain to
be rejected by the automated machines. There is no showing in the records that the local ballots
in these five (5) municipalities are dissimilar which could justify the call for their greater sampling.
Third. These failures of automated counting created post election tension in Sulu, a
province with a history of violent elections. COMELEC had to act decisively in view of the fast
deteriorating peace and order situation caused by the delay in the counting of votes. The
evidence of this fragile peace and order cannot be downgraded. In his handwritten report to the
COMELEC dated May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. stated:
"xxx xxx xxx
"Additional marines have been deployed at the SSC. The
undersigned is not sure if it is merely intended to tame a disorderly crowd
inside and outside SSC, or a show of force.
"It is submitted that since an error was discovered in a machine
which is supposed to have an error rate of 1:1,000,000, not a few people
would believe that this error in Pata would extend to the other municipalities.
Whether or not this is true, it would be more prudent to stay away from a
lifeless thing that has sown tension and anxiety among and between the
voters of Sulu."
Executive Director Resurreccion Z. Borra, Task Force Head, ARMM in his May 13, 1998
Memorandum to the COMELEC likewise stated:
xxx xxx xxx

"While the forces of AFP are ready to provide arm (sic) security
to our COMELEC officials, BEI's and other deputies, the political
tensions and imminent violence and bloodshed may not be prevented,
as per report received, the MNLF forces are readying their forces to
surround the venue for automated counting and canvassing in Sulu in
order that automation process will continue."
Last but not the least, the military and the police authorities unanimously recommended manual
counting to preserve peace and order. Brig. Gen. Edgardo V. Espinosa, Commanding General,
Marine Forces Southern Philippines, Brig. Gen. Percival M. Subala, Commanding General, 3rd
Marine Brigade, and Supt. Charlemagne S. Alejandrino, Provincial Director, Sulu PNP Command
explained that it ". . . will not only serve the interest of majority of the political parties involved in
the electoral process but also serve the interest of the military and police forces in maintaining
peace and order throughout the province of Sulu."

the province to enable him to call a meeting with the heads of the political parties which
fielded candidates in the province, inform them of the technical error, and find solutions to
the problem.
On or about 12:30 p.m., the TF Head presided over a conference at Camp General Bautista
(3rd Marine Brigade) to discuss the process by which the will of the electorate could be
determined. Present during the meeting were:
"During said meeting, all of the above parties verbally advanced their respective
positions. Those in favor of a manual count were:
"Said parties were then requested by the TF Head to submit their respective position
papers so that the same may be forwarded to the Commission en banc, together with
the recommendations of the TF Head.

An automated count of the local votes in Sulu would have resulted in a wrong count, a
travesty of the sovereignty of the electorate. Its aftermath could have been a bloodbath.
COMELEC avoided this imminent probability by ordering a manual count of the votes. It would be
the height of irony if the Court condemns COMELEC for aborting violence in the Sulu elections.

"The TF Head returned to the counting center at the Sulu State

College and called his technical staff to determine the extent of the technical
error and to enable him to submit the appropriate recommendation to the
Commission en banc.

Fourth. We also find that petitioner Loong and intervenor Jikiri were not denied due
process. The Tolentino memorandum clearly shows that they were given every opportunity to
oppose the manual count of the local ballots in Sulu. They were orally heard. They later submitted
written position papers. Their representatives escorted the transfer of the ballots and the
automated machines from Sulu to Manila. Their watchers observed the manual count from
beginning to end. We quote the Tolentino memorandum, viz:

"Upon consultation with the technical staff, it was discovered that in

the Municipality of Talipao, some of the local ballots were rejected by the
machine. Verification showed that while the ballots were genuine, ballot paper
bearing a wrong "sequence code" was used by the NPO during the printing
process.

"xxx xxx xxx

"On or about 6:00 a.m. of May 12, 1998, while automated counting of all the ballots for the
province of Sulu was being conducted at the counting center located at the Sulu State
College, the COMELEC Sulu Task Force Head (TF Head) proceeded to the room where the
counting machine assigned to the municipality of Pata was installed to verify the cause of
the commotion therein.
"During the interview conducted by the TF Head, the members of the Board of Election
Inspectors (BEI) and watchers present in said room stated that the counting machine
assigned to the municipality of Pata did not reflect the true results of the voting thereat. The
members of the BEI complained that their votes were not reflected in the printout of the
election returns since per election returns of their precincts, the candidate they voted for
obtained "zero". After verifying the printout of some election returns as against the official
ballots, the TF Head discovered that votes cast in favor of a mayoralty candidate were
credited in favor of hs opponent.
"In his attempt to remedy the situation, the TF Head suspended the countin of all ballots for
said municipality to enable COMELEC field technicians to determine the cause of the
technical error, rectify the same, and thereafter proceed with automated counting. In the
meantime, the counting of the ballots for the other municipalities proceeded under the
automated system.
"Technical experts of the supplier based in Manila were informed of the problem and after
numerous consultations through long distance calls, the technical experts concluded that
the cause of the error was in the manner the ballots for local positions were printed by the
National Printing Office (NPO), namely, that the ovals opposite the names of the candidates
were not properly aligned. As regards the ballots for national positions, no error was found.
"Since the problem was not machine-related, it was obvious that the use of counting
machines from other municipalities to count the ballots of the municipality of Pata would still
result in the same erroneous count. Thus, it was found necessary to determine the extent of
the error in the ballt printing process before proceeding with the automated counting.
"To avoid a situation where proceeding with automation will result in an erroneous count,
the TF Head, on or about 11:45 a.m. ordered the suspension of the counting of all ballots in

Briefly, the following is the manner by which a "sequence code"

determined genuineness of a ballot. A municipality is assigned a specific
machine (except for Jolo, which was assigned two (2) machines, and sharing
of one (1) machine by two (2) municipalities, namely, H.P. Tahil and
Maimbung, Pandami and K. Caluang, Pata and Tongkil and Panamao and
Lugus). A machine is then assigned a specific "sequence code" as one of the
security features to detect whether the ballots passing through it are genuine.
Since a counting machine is programmed to read the specific "sequence
code" assigned to it, ballots which bear a "sequence code" assigned to
another machine/municipality, even if said ballots were genuine, will be
rejected by the machine.

"Other municipalities, such as Siasi, Indanan, Tapul and Jolo also

had the same problem of rejected ballots. However, since the machine
operators were not aware that one of the reasons for rejection of ballots is the
use of wrong "sequence code", they failed to determine whether the cause for
rejection of ballots for said municipalities was the same as that for the
municipality of Talipao.
"In the case of 'misaligned ovals', the counting machine will not
reject the ballot because all the security features, such as "sequence code",
are present in the ballot, however, since the oval is misaligned or not placed in
its proper position, the machine will credit the shaded oval for the position
where the machine is programmed to "read" the oval. Thus, instead of
rejecting the ballot, the machine will credit the votes of a candidate in favor of
his opponent, or in the adjacent space where the oval should be properly
placed.
"It could not be determined if the other municipalities also had the
same technical error in their official ballots since the "misaligned ovals" were
discovered only after members of the Board of Election Inspectors of the
Municipality of Pata complained that their votes were not reflected in the
printout of the election returns.

"As the extent or coverage of the technical errors could not be

determined, the TF Head, upon consultation with his technical staff, was of the
belief that it would be more prudent to count the ballots manually than to
proceed with an automated system which will result in an erroneous count.
"The TF Head thus ordered the indefinite suspension of counting of
ballots until such time as the Commission shall have resolved the
petition/position papers to be submitted by the parties. The TF Head and his
staff returned to Camp General Bautista to await the submission of the
position papers of the parties concerned. cdll
"Upon receipt of the position papers of the parties, the TF
Head faxed the same in the evening of May 12, 1998, together with his
handwritten recommendation to proceed with a manual count. Attached
are copies of the recommendations of the TF Head (Annex "1"), and the
position papers of the Philippine Marines and Philippine National Police
(Annex "2"), LAKAS-NUCD Tan Wing Annex (Annex "3"), Lakas-NUCD Loong
Wing (Annex "4"), LAKAS-NUCD-MNLF Wing (Annex "5") and LAMMP (Annex
"6"). Said recommendations and position papers were the bases for the
promulgation of COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 98-1750 dated May 13,
1998 (Annex "7"), directing, among other things, that the ballots and counting
machines be transported by C130 to Manila for both automated and manual
operations.
"Minute Resolution No. 98-1750 was received by the TF Head
through fax on or about 5:30 in the evening of May 13, 1998. Copies were
then served through personal delivery to the heads of the political
parties, with notice to them that another conference will be conducted at
the 3rd Marine Brigade on May 14, 1998 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning,
this time, with Lt. General Joselin Nazareno, then AFP Commander,
Southern Command. Attached is a copy of said notice (Annex "8")
bearing the signatures of candidates Tan (Annex "8-A") and Loong
(Annex "8-B"), and the representatives of candidates Tulawie (Annex "8C") and Jikiri (Annex "8-D").
"On May 14, 1998, the TF Head presided over said conference in
the presence of the heads of the political parties of Sulu, together with their
counsel, including Lt. Gen. Nazareno, Brig. Gen. Subala, representatives of
the NAMFREL, media and the public.
"After hearing the sides of all parties concerned, including that
of NAMFREL, the procedure by which the ballots and counting machines
were to be transported to Manila was finalized, with each political party
authorized to send at least one (1) escort/watcher for every municipality
to accompany the ballot boxes and counting machines from the
counting center at the Sulu State College to the Sulu Airport up to the
PICC, where the COMELEC was then conducting its Senatorial Canvass.
There being four parties, a total of seventy-two (72) escorts/watchers
accompanied the ballots and counting machines.
"Two C130s left Sulu on May 15, 1998 to transport all the ballot
boxes and counting machines, accompanied by all the authorized
escorts. Said ballots boxes reached the PICC on the same day, with all
the escorts/watchers allowed to station themselves at the ballot box
storage area. On May 17, 1998, another C130 left Sulu to ferry the
members of the board of canvassers."
Fifth. The evidence is clear that the integrity of the local ballots was safeguarded
when they were transferred from Sulu to Manila and when they were manually counted.
As shown by the Tolentino memorandum, representatives of the political parties
escorted the transfer of ballots from Sulu to PICC. Indeed, in his May 14, 1992 letter to Atty.

Tolentino, Jr., petitioner Tupay Loong himself submitted the names of his representatives who
would accompany the ballot boxes and other election paraphernalia, viz: 20
"Dear Atty. Tolentino:
"Submitted herewith are the names of escort(s) to accompany the
ballot boxes and other election paraphernalia to be transported to COMELEC,
Manila, to wit:
The ballot boxes were consistently under the watchful eyes of the parties'
representatives. They were placed in an open space at the PICC. The watchers stationed
themselves some five (5) meters away from the ballot boxes. They watched 24 hours a day and
slept at the PICC. 21
The parties' watchers again accompanied the transfer of the ballot boxes from PICC to
the public schools of Pasay City where the ballots were counted. After the counting, they once
more escorted the return of the ballot boxes to PICC. 22
In fine, petitioner's charge that the ballots could have been tampered with before the
manual counting is totally unfounded.
Sixth. The evidence also reveals that the result of the manual count is reliable.
It bears stressing that the ballots used in the case at bar were specially made to suit
an automated election. The ballots were uncomplicated. They had fairly large ovals opposite the
names of candidates. A voter needed only to check the oval opposite the name of his candidate.
When the COMELEC ordered a manual count of the votes, it issued special rules as the counting
involved a different kind of ballot, albeit, more simple ballots. The Omnibus Election Code rules
on appreciation of ballots cannot apply for they only apply to elections where the names of
candidates are handwritten in the ballots. The rules were spelled out in Minute Resolution 981798, viz:
"In the matter of the Memorandum dated 17 May 1998 of Executive Director Resurreccion
Z. Borra, re procedure of the counting of votes for Sulu for the convening of the Board of
Election Inspectors, the Municipal Board of Canvassers and the Provincial Board of
Canvassers on May 18, 1998 at 9:00 a.m. at the Philippine International Convention Center
(PICC),'RESOLVED to approve the following procedure for the counting of votes for Sulu at
the PICC
'I. Common Provisions:
'1. Open the ballot box, retrieve the Minutes of Voting and the uncounted ballots or the
envelope containing the counted ballots as the case may be;'2. Segregate the national
ballots from the local ballots;'3. Count the number of pieces of both the national and local
ballots and compare the same with the number of votes who actually voted as stated in the
Minutes of Voting: If there is no Minutes of Voting, refer to the Voting Records at the back
of the VRRs to determine the number of voters who actually voted.
If there are more ballots than the number of voters who actually voted, the poll clerk shall
draw out as many local and national ballots as may be equal to the excess and place them
in the envelope for excess ballots.
'II. Counting of Votes
'A. National Ballots:
'B. Local Ballots:

'III. Consolidation of Results

As aforestated, five (5) Special Boards were initially created under Atty. Tolentino, Jr.
to undertake the manual counting, 24 viz:

Later, the COMELEC utilized the services of 600 public school teachers from Pasay City to do the
manual counting. Five (5) elementary schools served as the venues of the counting, viz: 25
"
From beginning to end, the manual counting was done with the watchers of the
parties concerned in attendance. Thereafter, the certificates of canvass were prepared and
signed by the City/Municipal Board of Canvassers composed of the Chairman, ViceChairman, and Secretary. They were also signed by the parties' watchers. 26
The correctness of the manual count cannot therefore be doubted. There was no need
for an expert to count the votes. The naked eye could see the check marks opposite the big
ovals. Indeed, nobody complained that the votes could not be read and counted. The COMELEC
representatives had no difficulty counting the votes. The 600 public school teachers of Pasay City
had no difficulty. The watchers of the parties had no difficulty. Petitioner did not object to the rules
on manual count on the ground that the ballots cannot be manually counted. Indeed, in his
original Petition, petitioner did not complain that the local ballots could not be counted by a
layman. Neither did the intervenor complain in his petition for intervention. The allegation that it
will take a trained eye to read the ballots is more imagined than real.
This is not all. As private respondent Tan alleged, the manual count could not have
been manipulated in his favor because the results show that most of his political opponents won.
Thus, "the official results show that the two congressional seats in Sulu were won by
Congressman Hussin Amin of the LAKAS-MNLF Wing for the 1st District and Congressman
Asani Tammang of the LAKAS-Loong Wing for the 2nd District. In the provincial level, of the eight
(8) seats for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, two (2) were won by the camp of respondent Tan;
three (3) by the camp of petitioner Loong; two (2) by the MNLF; and one (1) by LAMMP. In the
mayoral race, seven (7) out of eighteen (18) victorious municipal mayors were identified with
respondent Tan; four (4) with petitioner Loong; three (3) with the MNLF; two (2) with LAMMP and
one (1) with REPORMA." 27 There is logic to private respondent Tan's contention that if the
manual count was tampered, his candidates would not have miserably lost.
Seventh. We further hold that petitioner cannot insist on automated counting
under R.A. No. 8436 after the machines misread or rejected the local ballots in five (5)
municipalities in Sulu. Section 9 of R.A. No. 8436 provides:
"SEC. 9. Systems Breakdown in the Counting Center. In the
event of a systems breakdown of all assigned machines in the counting
center, the Commission shall use any available machine or any component
thereof from another city/municipality upon approval of the Commission En
Banc or any of its divisions. cdtai
The transfer of such machines or any component thereof shall be
undertaken in the presence of representatives of political parties and citizens'
arm of the Commission who shall be notified by the election officer of such
transfer.
There is a systems breakdown in the counting center when the
machine fails to read the ballots or fails to store/save results or fails to print the
results after it has read the ballots; or when the computer fails to consolidate
election results/reports or fails to print election results-reports after
consolidation."
As the facts show, it was inutile for the COMELEC to use other machines to count the local votes
in Sulu. The errors in counting were due to the misprinting of ovals and the use of wrong
sequence codes in the local ballots. The errors were not machine-related. Needless to state, to
grant petitioner's prayer to continue the machine count of the local ballots will certainly result in
an erroneous count and subvert the will of the electorate.
Eighth. In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy
where the error in counting is not machine-related for human foresight is not all-seeing. We hold,
however, that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC from levitating above the
problem. Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power "to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to give

COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. Congruent to this intent, this Court has not been
niggardly in defining the parameters of powers of COMELEC in the conduct of our elections.
Thus, we held in Sumulong v. COMELEC: 28
"Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt
with realistically not from the standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on
Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political
strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with
political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide
complex political questions . . . . There are no ready made formulas for solving
public problems. Time and experience are necessary to evolve patterns that
will serve the ends of good government. In the matter of the administration of
laws relative to the conduct of election, . . . we must not by any excessive zeal
take away from the Commission on Elections the initiative which by
constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs to it."
In the case at bar, the COMELEC order for a manual count was not only reasonable. It was the
only way to count the decisive local votes in the six (6) municipalities of Pata, Talipao, Siasi,
Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The bottom line is that by means of the manual count, the will of the
voters of Sulu was honestly determined. We cannot kick away the will of the people by giving a
literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual counting when machine
count does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an election which is under the
control and supervision of the COMELEC. It ought to be self-evident that the Constitution did not
envision a COMELEC that cannot count the result of an election.
Ninth. Our elections are not conducted under laboratory conditions. In running for
public offices, candidates do not follow the rules of Emily Post. Too often, COMELEC has to
make snap judgments to meet unforeseen circumstances that threaten to subvert the will of our
voters. In the process, the actions of COMELEC may not be impeccable, indeed, may even be
debatable. We cannot, however, engage in a swivel chair criticism of these actions often taken
under very difficult circumstances. Even more, we cannot order a special election unless
demanded by exceptional circumstances. Thus, the plea for this Court to call a special election
for the governorship of Sulu is completely off-line. The plea can only be grounded on failure of
election. Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code tells us when there is a failure of election, viz:
"Sec. 6. Failure of Election. If, on account of force majeure,
terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes, the election in any polling place
has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour
fixed by law for the closing of the voting or after the voting and during the
preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such
cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the
election, the Commission shall on the basis of a verified petition by any
interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or
continuation of the election, not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure
to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect."
To begin with, the plea for a special election must be addressed to the COMELEC and not to this
Court. Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code should be read in relation to Section 4 ofR.A. No.
7166 which provides:
"Sec. 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special
Elections. The postponement, declaration of failure of elections and the
calling of special elections as provided in Sections 5, 6, and 7 of the Omnibus
Election Code shall be decided by the Commission en banc by a majority vote
of its members. The causes for the declaration of a failure of election may
occur before or after casting of votes or on the day of the election."
The grounds for failure of election force majeure, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes
clearly involve questions of fact. It is for this reason that they can only be determined by the
COMELEC en banc after due notice and hearing to the parties. In the case at bar, petitioner
never asked the COMELEC en banc to call for a special election in Sulu. Even in his original

petition with this Court, petitioner did not pray for a special election. His plea for a special election
is a mere afterthought. Too late in the day and too unprocedural. Worse, the grounds for failure of
election are inexistent. The records show that the voters of Sulu were able to cast their votes
freely and fairly. Their votes were counted correctly, albeit manually. The people have spoken.
Their sovereign will has to be obeyed.
There is another reason why a special election cannot be ordered by this Court. To
hold a special election only for the position of Governor will be discriminatory and will violate the
right of private respondent to equal protection of the law. The records show that all elected
officials in Sulu have been proclaimed and are now discharging their powers and duties. Thus,
two (2) congressmen, a vice-governor, eight (8) members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and
eighteen (18) mayors, numerous vice-mayors and municipal councilors are now servicing in their
official capacities. These officials were proclaimed on the basis of the same manually counted
votes of Sulu. If manual counting is illegal, their assumption of office cannot also be
countenanced. Private respondent's election cannot be singled out as invalid for alikes
cannot be treated unalikes.
A final word. Our decision merely reinforces our collective efforts to endow
COMELEC with enough power to hold free, honest, orderly, and credible elections. A quick
flashback of its history is necessary lest our efforts be lost in the labyrinth of time.
The COMELEC was organized under Commonwealth Act No. 607 enacted on August
22, 1940. The power to enforce election laws was originally vested in the President and exercised
through the Department of Interior. According to Dean Sinco, 29 the view ultimately emerged that
an independent body could better protect the right of suffrage of our people. Hence, the
enforcement of our election laws, while an executive power, was transferred to the COMELEC.
From a statutory creation, the COMELEC was transformed to a constitutional body by
virtue of the 1940 amendments to the 1935 Constitution which took effect on December 2, 1940.
COMELEC was generously granted the power to "have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections . . . ." 30
Then came the 1973 Constitution. It further broadened the powers of COMELEC by
making it the sole judge of all election contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the national legislature and elective provincial and city officials. 31In fine, the
COMELEC was given judicial power aside from its traditional administrative and executive
functions.
The 1987 Constitution quickened this trend of strengthening the COMELEC. Today,
COMELEC enforces and administers all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections,
plebiscites, initiatives, referenda and recalls. Election contests involving regional, provincial and
city elective officials are under its exclusive original jurisdiction. All contests involving elective
municipal and barangay officials are under its appellate jurisdiction. 32
Our decisions have been in cadence with the movement towards empowering the
COMELEC in order that it can more effectively perform its duty of safeguarding the sanctity of our
elections. In Cauton vs. COMELEC, 33 we laid down this liberal approach, viz:
"xxx xxx xxx
"The purpose of the Revised Election Code is to protect the
integrity of elections and to suppress all evils that may violate its purity and
defeat the will of the voters. The purity of the elections is one of the most
fundamental requisites of popular government. The Commission on Elections,
by constitutional mandate, must do everything in its power to secure a fair and
honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections. In the performance of its
duties, the Commission must be given a considerable latitude in adopting
means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective
for which it was created to promote free, orderly, and honest elections. The
choice of means taken by the Commission on Elections, unless they are
clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not be
interfered with."
In Pacis vs. COMELEC, 34 we reiterated the guiding principle that "clean elections control the
appropriateness of the remedy." The dissent, for all its depth, is out of step with this movement. It

condemns the COMELEC for exercising its discretion to resort to manual count when this was its
only viable alternative. It would set aside the results of the manual count even when the results
are free from fraud and irregularity. Worse, it would set aside the judgment of the people electing
the private respondent as Governor. Upholding the sovereignty of the people is what
democracy is all about. When the sovereignty of the people expressed thru the ballot is at
stake, it is not enough for this Court to make a statement but it should do everything to
have that sovereignty obeyed by all. Well done is always better than well said. cdrep
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of Tupay Loong and the petition in intervention of
Yusop Jikiri are dismissed, there being no showing that public respondent gravely abused its
discretion in issuing Minute Resolution Nos. 98-1748, 98-1750, 98-1796 and 98-1798. Ourstatus
quo order of June 23, 1998 is lifted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

REYNATO
BAYTAN,
REYNALDO
BAYTAN
AND
ADRIAN
BAYTAN, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioners assail Comelec En Banc's resolutions denying their motion to reconsider its order directing
its Law Department to file the proper information against them for double registration.HEcaIC
As defense, petitioners claimed honest mistake and good faith in registering twice.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on certiorari, ruling: that the assailed resolutions were
issued only in the preliminary investigation stage; that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution
of election offenses rests in the COMELEC's sound discretion; that there were certain circumstances in
this case sufficient to warrant the finding of probable cause; that double registration is malum
prohibitum, thus, their claim of lack of intent to violate the law is inconsequential; and that the election
offense in this case has not prescribed because the prescriptive period was interrupted when
COMELEC initiated proceedings against petitioners and remains tolled pending the termination of the
case.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; DETERMINATION
OF PROBABLE CAUSE; SUFFICIENCY OF CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANTING A FINDING OF
PROBABLE CAUSE IN CASE AT BAR. A preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial and is
only the means to discover who may be charged with a crime, its function being merely to determine
probable cause. All that is required in the preliminary investigation is the determination of probable
cause to justify the holding of petitioners for trial. . . . There is no question that petitioners registered
twice on different days and in different precincts without canceling their previous registration. Aside
from this, the COMELEC found certain circumstances prevailing in the case sufficient to warrant the
finding of probable cause. The COMELEC noted that petitioners wrote down their address in Precinct
No. 83-A of Barangay 18 as No. 709 T. Gomez Extension St., Barangay 18-Maya, Cavite City.
However, in Precinct No. 129-A of Barangay 28, petitioners registered as residents of No. 709
Magcawas St., Barangay 28-Taurus, Caridad, Cavite City. The COMELEC noted further that the
affidavits submitted by petitioners contained glaring inconsistencies. Petitioners claimed that Ignacio
led them to the wrong precinct to register. However, Ignacio's affidavit stated that while he led them to
the voting precinct of Barangay 18, he immediately left the area not knowing that petitioners registered
in the wrong barangay. . . . All told, a reasonably prudent man would readily conclude that there exists
probable cause to hold petitioners for trial for the offense of double registration.
2. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; DOUBLE REGISTRATION IS MALUM PROHIBITUM; CASE
AT BAR. The COMELEC also pointed out that since "double registration" is malum prohibitum,
petitioners' claim of lack of intent to violate the law is inconsequential.
3. ID.; ID.; COMELEC; FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN THE PROSECUTION OF ELECTION
OFFENSES RESTS IN COMELEC'S SOUND DISCRETION. It is also well-settled that the finding of
probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses rests in the COMELEC's sound discretion. The
COMELEC exercises the constitutional authority to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute
cases for violation of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses
and malpractices. Generally, the Court will not interfere with such finding of the COMELEC absent a
clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. IaEHSD
4. CRIMINAL LAW; PRESCRIPTION OF CRIME; INTERRUPTED WHEN PROCEEDINGS ARE
INSTITUTED AGAINST THE OFFENDER; CASE AT BAR. Prescription of the crime or offense is
the forfeiture or loss of the right of the State to prosecute the offender after the lapse of a certain time.
Section 267 of the Election Code provides that "election offenses shall prescribe after five years from
the date of their commission." In this case, the offense of double registration allegedly occurred on
June 22, 1997 when petitioners registered for a second time in a different precinct without canceling
their previous registration. At this point, the period of prescription for the alleged offense started to run.
However, prescription is interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the offender. Specifically,
the period of prescription is interrupted by the filing of the complaint even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation. The COMELEC initiated the complaint for double registration
against petitioners motu propriounder Sections 3, 4 and 5, Rule 34 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. CAHTIS
The Case

Challenged in this petition for certiorari 1 with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction is the Resolution dated June 3, 2002 2 of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC" for
brevity) en banc in E.O. Case No. 97-503. In its assailed Resolution, the COMELECen banc denied the
motion to reconsider Minute Resolution No. 00-2281 dated November 9, 20003 ordering the Law
Department to file criminal cases for "double registration" against petitioners Reynato Baytan,
Reynaldo Baytan and Adrian Baytan ("petitioners" for brevity).
The Antecedents
On June 15, 1997, petitioners were on their way to register for the May 1998 elections when they met
the newly elected Barangay Captain, Roberto Ignacio ("Ignacio" for brevity), in Barangay 18, Zone II of
Cavite City. Ignacio led petitioners to register in Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay 18. Petitioners
registered in this precinct as evidenced by Voters Registration Records Nos. 41762473, 41762472 and
41762470.
When petitioners returned home, they wondered why the registrants in this precinct looked unfamiliar
to them. This prompted petitioners to return to the registration center to study the precinct map of
Barangay 18. They then realized that their residence is situated within the jurisdiction of Barangay 28.
Thus, petitioners proceeded to Precinct 129-A of Barangay 28 and registered anew on June 22, 1997
as evidenced by Voters Registration Records Nos. 42662969, 42662968 and 42662917.
Subsequently, petitioners sent a letter dated August 21, 1997 to former COMELEC Assistant Executive
Director Jose Pio O. Joson and furnished a copy thereof to COMELEC Registrar Francisco Trias. In
this letter, petitioners requested for advice on how to cancel their previous registration. They also
explained the reason and circumstances of their second registration and expressed their intention to
redress the error. SECAHa
On September 16, 1997, the Election Officer of Cavite City forwarded copies of petitioners' Voters
Registration Records to the Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Juanito V. Ravanzo ("Ravanzo" for
brevity), for evaluation. Ravanzo endorsed the matter to the Regional Director for prosecution.
Eventually, the Law Department endorsed the case to Ravanzo for resolution.
On January 10, 1998, Ravanzo recommended filing an information for double registration against
petitioners. In an en banc meeting held on November 09, 2000, the COMELEC in its Minute Resolution
No. 00-2281 affirmed the recommendation of Ravanzo. Petitioners moved for reconsideration. The
COMELEC en banc denied the motion and disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the En Banc resolution dated
November 9, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. The Law Department is hereby
directed to file the proper information against respondents for violation of Art.
XXII, Sec. 261, par. (y) sub-par. (5) of the Omnibus Election Code."
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
Petitioners contend that the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in
1. Recommending the prosecution of petitioners for double registration despite
clear and convincing evidence on record that they had no intention
of committing said election offense;
2. Not considering the letter dated August 21, 1997 addressed to the
COMELEC Assistant Director of Cavite City as substantial
compliance with the requirement of the law for cancellation of
previous registration; and
3. Taking cognizance of the case in the first instance in violation of Section 3,
Article IX-C of the Constitution.
In sum, petitioners insist they are innocent of any wrongdoing in their act of registering twice on
different days in two different precincts. Petitioners argue that they did not intend to perpetrate the act

prohibited, and therefore they should be exculpated. They claim honest mistake and good faith in
registering twice. Petitioners claim they made the first registration because of the intervention and
instigation of Ignacio.
Petitioners theorize that their August 21, 1997 letter to the election registrar of Cavite City informing
him of the lapse and asking how to rectify the same constitutes substantial compliance with the
Omnibus Election Code's requirement of cancellation of prior registration. They further implore a liberal
construction of the laws on election offenses since almost five years had lapsed from the date of the
commission of the offense on June 15, 1997. They claim the case is about to prescribe under the
Election Code.
Lastly, petitioners fault the COMELEC en banc for assuming original jurisdiction over the case in
contravention of Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution. Petitioners argue that this constitutional
provision requires that election cases must first be heard and decided by a Division before assumption
of jurisdiction by the COMELEC en banc.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
First and Second Issues: Whether the criminal cases should be dismissed on the ground of lack
of intent and substantial compliance with the requirement of cancellation of previous registration.

In Minute Resolution No. 00-2281 dated November 9, 2000, the COMELEC en banc affirmed the
recommendation of the investigating officer. The COMELEC thus directed its Law Department to file
the necessary information against petitioners for violation of Article XXII, SEC. 261 (y) (5) of the
Election Code which reads:
"SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election
offense:
(y) On Registration of Voters:
(5) Any person who, being a registered voter, registers
anew without filing an application for
cancellation of his previous registration."
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration to which the COMELEC en banc issued the assailed
Resolution dated June 3, 2002 affirming the Minute Resolution.
The grant by the Constitution to the COMELEC of the power to investigate and prosecute election
offenses is intended to enable the COMELEC to assure the people of "free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections." This grant is an adjunct to the COMELEC's constitutional duty to enforce and
administer all election laws. Failure by the COMELEC to exercise this power could result in the
frustration of the true will of the people and make an idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of
every qualified citizen to vote. 4
Petitioners lose sight of the fact that the assailed resolutions were issued in the preliminary
investigation stage. A preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial and is only the means to
discover who may be charged with a crime, its function being merely to determine probable
cause. 5 All that is required in the preliminary investigation is the determination of probable cause to
justify the holding of petitioners for trial. By definition, probable cause is
". . . a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well
founded . . . such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a
person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest or
strong suspicion that a thing is so. The term does not mean 'actual or positive
cause' nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an
inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is
enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes

the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of
the prosecution in support of the charge." 6
There is no question that petitioners registered twice on different days and in different precincts without
canceling their previous registration. Aside from this, the COMELEC found certain circumstances
prevailing in the case sufficient to warrant the finding of probable cause. The COMELEC noted that
petitioners wrote down their address in Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay 18 as No. 709 T. Gomez
Extension St., Barangay 18-Maya, Cavite City. However, in Precinct No. 129-A of Barangay 28,
petitioners registered as residents of No. 709 Magcawas St., Barangay 28-Taurus, Caridad, Cavite
City. The COMELEC noted further that the affidavits submitted by petitioners contained glaring
inconsistencies. Petitioners claimed that Ignacio led them to the wrong precinct to register. However,
Ignacio's affidavit stated that while he led them to the voting precinct of Barangay 18, he immediately
left the area not knowing that petitioners registered in the wrongbarangay. Contrary to petitioners'
sworn statements, Aurora Baytan, mother of petitioners, had another version. She claimed in her
affidavit that on June 15, 1997, Ignacio went to their house to inform them about the redefinition of
their barangay's territorial jurisdiction. Right then and there, Ignacio brought her sons to Barangay 18
to register. CSaHDT
The COMELEC also pointed out that since "double registration" is malum prohibitum, petitioners' claim
of lack of intent to violate the law is inconsequential. Neither did the COMELEC consider petitioners'
letter dated August 22, 1997 as an application to cancel their previous registration. The COMELEC
explained that this letter was sent after their second registration was accomplished and after the
election officer of Cavite City had already reported their act of double registration to a higher official.
All told, a reasonably prudent man would readily conclude that there exists probable cause to hold
petitioners for trial for the offense of double registration. SECAHa
Moreover, petitioners' claims of honest mistake, good faith and substantial compliance with the
Election Code's requirement of cancellation of previous registration are matters of defense best
ventilated in the trial proper rather than at the preliminary investigation. 7 The established rule is that a
preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence.
It is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense
has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof. 8
It is also well-settled that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses rests in
the COMELEC's sound discretion. The COMELEC exercises the constitutional authority to investigate
and, where appropriate, prosecute cases for violation of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offense and malpractices. 9 Generally, the Court will not interfere with such
finding of the COMELEC absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.This principle emanates
from the COMELEC's exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses
punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided
by law. 10
We also cannot accept petitioners' plea for a liberal construction of the laws on the ground of
prescription. Prescription of the crime or offense is the forfeiture or loss of the right of the State to
prosecute the offender after the lapse of a certain time. 11
Section 267 of the Election Code provides that "election offenses shall prescribe after five years from
the date of their commission." In this case, the offense of double registration allegedly occurred on
June 22, 1997 when petitioners registered for a second time in a different precinct without canceling
their previous registration. At this point, the period of prescription for the alleged offense started to run.
However, prescription is interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the offender. Specifically,
the period of prescription is interrupted by the filing of the complaint even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation. 12
The COMELEC initiated the complaint for double registration against petitioners motu propriounder
Sections 3, 13 4 14 and 5, 15 Rule 34 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure. On September 16,
1997, the Election Officer of Cavite City forwarded copies of petitioners' Voters' Registration Records
for evaluation to Atty. Juanito V. Ravanzo, Provincial Election Supervisor of Cavite City, who was also
tasked to investigate the case. Ravanzo endorsed the matter to the Regional Director for prosecution.
The Regional Director forwarded the case to the Law Department and the latter re-endorsed the same

to the office of Ravanzo for resolution. A preliminary investigation hearing was conducted on January
19, 1998 where petitioners were instructed to submit their counter-affidavits. After the preliminary
investigation and based on the affidavits and other evidence submitted in the case, Ravanzo
recommended the prosecution of petitioners for the offense of double registration. Ineluctably, the
prescriptive period of the offense was interrupted upon the COMELEC's initiation of proceedings
against petitioners and remains tolled pending the termination of the case. SDHCac

"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers

and function:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating
to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction.

The liberal construction of punitive laws in relation to the prescription of offenses cannot be invoked to
prejudice the interest of the State to prosecute election offenses, especially those which the
COMELEC described as "ruffling the electoral system." 16
Third Issue: Whether the COMELEC en banc's assumption of original jurisdiction over the case
violated the Constitution.

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the

Commission on election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory,
and not appealable."

Petitioners rely on Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution which states:
"Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and
shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of
election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election
cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc."
Petitioners assert that this constitutional provision serves as basis to nullify the proceedings
conducted and orders issued by the COMELEC en banc in E.O. Case No. 97-503. Petitioners
citeSarmiento v. Comelec 17 and Zarate v. Comelec 18 to support their stand that the
COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it assumed
original jurisdiction over the case without first referring the same to any of its divisions.
In Sarmientoand Zarate, the Court similarly held that "election cases must first be heard and
decided by a Division of the Commission," and that the "Commission, sitting en banc, does not
have the authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance."
In its Comment for the COMELEC, the Solicitor General points out that the rulings
in Sarmientoand Zarate were clarified in Canicosa v. COMELEC 19 to mean that
"[I]t is only in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers that the
COMELEC is mandated to hear and decide cases first by division and then,
upon motion for reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc. This is when it is
jurisdictional."

The Solicitor General contends that the conduct of a preliminary investigation before the filing of
an information in court does not in any way adjudicate with finality the rights and liabilities of the
parties investigated. A preliminary investigation does not make any pronouncement as to the guilt
or innocence of the party involved. Hence, a preliminary investigation cannot be considered a
judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding required to be heard by the Division in the first instance.
On the other hand, petitioners countered that in Cruz v. People, 20 the Court held that the conduct of a
preliminary investigation "is a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding since there is opportunity to be heard
and for the production and weighing of evidence and a decision is rendered thereon."
Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC exercises both administrative
and quasi-judicial powers. The COMELEC's administrative powers are found in Section 2 (1), (3), (4),
(5), (6), (7), (8), and (9) of Article IX-C. 21 The 1987 Constitution does not prescribe how the
COMELEC should exercise its administrative powers, whether en banc or in division. The Constitution
merely vests the COMELEC's administrative powers in the "Commission on Elections," while providing
that the COMELEC "may sit en banc or in two divisions." Clearly, the COMELEC en banc can act
directly on matters falling within its administrative powers. Indeed, this has been the practice of the
COMELEC both under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. 22
On the other hand, the COMELEC's quasi-judicial powers are found in Section 2 (2) of Article IX-C, to
wit:

The COMELEC's exercise of its quasi-judicial powers is subject to Section 3 of Article IX-C which
expressly requires that all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be decided by
the COMELEC in division, and the motion for reconsideration shall be decided by the COMELEC en
banc. It follows, as held by the Court in Canicosa, 23 that the COMELEC is mandated to decide cases
first in division, and then upon motion for reconsideration en banc, only when the COMELEC exercises
its quasi-judicial powers.
The COMELEC is empowered in Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution to "prosecute
cases of violations of election laws." The prosecution of election law violators involves the exercise of
the COMELEC's administrative powers. Thus, the COMELEC en banc can directly approve the
recommendation of its Law Department to file the criminal information for double registration against
petitioners in the instant case. There is no constitutional requirement that the filing of the criminal
information be first decided by any of the divisions of the COMELEC.
In sum, the second sentence of Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable in
administrative cases, like the instant case where the COMELEC is determining whether probable
cause exists to charge petitioners for violation of the provision of the Election Code prohibiting double
registration.
Indeed, the COMELEC acted in accordance with Section 9(b), Rule 34 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules
of Procedure governing the prosecution of election offenses in meeting en banc in the first instance
and acting on the recommendation of Investigating Officer Ravanzo to file charges against petitioners.
The rule reads:
"SEC. 9. Duty of the Law Department, State Prosecutor, Provincial or City
Fiscal Upon Receipt of Records. . . .
(b). In cases investigated by the lawyers or the field personnel of the
Commission the Director of the Law Department shall review and evaluate the
recommendation of said legal officer, prepare a report and make a
recommendation to the Commission affirming, modifying or reversing the
same which shall be included in the agenda of the succeeding meeting en
banc of the Commission. If the Commission approves the filing of an
information against the respondent/s, the Director of the Law Department shall
prepare and sign the information for immediate filing with the appropriate
court." (Emphasis supplied)
Minute Resolution No. 00-2281 was issued during the en banc meeting held on November 9, 2000 to
resolve the recommendation of Ravanzo in the case. DcaSIH
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

RUPERTO TAULE, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY LUIS T. SANTOS and

GOVERNOR LEANDRO VERCELES, respondents.

1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ELECTION LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; JURISDICTION OVER

ELECTIVE BARANGAY OFFICIALS LIMITED TO APPELLATE JURISDICTION FROM DECISIONS
OF THE TRIAL COURTS. The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over contests involving elective
barangay officials is limited to appellate jurisdiction from decisions of the trial courts. Under the law, the
sworn petition contesting the election of a barangay officer shall be filed with the proper Municipal or
Metropolitan Trial Court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been
voted for the same office within 10 days after the proclamation of the results. A voter may also contest
the election of any barangay officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines by filing a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court
within 10 days after the proclamation of the results of the elections. Only appeals from decisions of
inferior courts on election matters as aforestated may be decided by the COMELEC.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION OVER POPULAR ELECTIONS, CONSTRUED. The jurisdiction of
the COMELEC is over popular elections, the elected officials of which are determined through the will
of the electorate. An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign
power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote.
Specifically, the term "election," in the context of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls,
including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the
votes which do not characterize the election of officers in thekatipunan ng mga barangay. "Election
contests" would refer to adversary proceedings by which matters involving the title or claim of title to an
elective office, made before or after proclamation of the winner, is settled whether or not the contestant
is claiming the office in dispute and in the case of elections of barangay officials, it is restricted to
proceedings after the proclamation of the winners as no pre-proclamation controversies are allowed.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION OF THE COMELEC DOES NOT COVER PROTESTS OVER THE
ORGANIZATIONAL SET-UP OF THE KATIPUNAN NG MGA BARANGAY. The jurisdiction of the
COMELEC does not cover protests over the organizational set-up of the katipunan ng mga barangay
composed of popularly elected punong barangays as prescribed by law whose officers are voted upon
by their respective members. The authority of the COMELEC over the katipunan ng mga barangay is
limited by law to supervision of the election of the representative of thekatipunan concerned to
the sanggunian in a particular level conducted by their own respective organization.
4. ID.; ID.; SECRETARY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT; WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN
PROTESTS INVOLVING THE ELECTION OF OFFICERS OF THE FABC. The Secretary of Local
Government is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the election of officers of
the FABC. There is no question that he is vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations as
set forth in Section 222 of the Local Government Code. Likewise, under Book IV, Title XII, Chapter 1,
Sec. 3(2) of the Administrative Code of 1987, the respondent Secretary has the power to "establish
and prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances and implementing laws on the general
supervision of local government units and on the promotion of local autonomy and monitor compliance
thereof by said units." Also, the respondent Secretary's rule making power is provided in Sec. 7,
Chapter II, Book IV of the Administrative Code. Thus, DLG Circular No. 89-09 was issued by
respondent Secretary in pursuance of his rule-making power conferred by law and which now has the
force and effect of law. It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly
empowered, administrative agencies are bereft of quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of
administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon the provisions of the statutes reposing power in
them; they cannot confer it upon themselves. Such jurisdiction is essential to give validity to their
determinations. There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even by necessary
implication conferring upon the Secretary of Local Government the power to assume jurisdiction over
an election protest involving officers of the katipunan ng mga barangay. cdasia
5. ID.; GENERAL SUPERVISION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE; CONCEPT. Presidential power
over local governments is limited by the Constitution to the exercise of general supervision "to ensure
that local affairs are administered according to law." The general supervision is exercised by the
President through the Secretary of Local Government. In administrative law, supervision means
overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fails or neglects to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed

by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The fundamental law permits
the Chief Executive to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local government or
the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President
cannot interfere with local governments so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their
authority. Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an
inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body.
6. ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION DEPRIVES SECRETARY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
AUTHORITY TO PASS UPON VALIDITY OR REGULARITY OF THE ELECTION OF THE OFFICERS
OF THEKATIPUNAN. Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of
the President over local governments, We hold that respondent Secretary has no authority to pass
upon the validity or regularity of the election of the officers of the katipunan. To allow respondent
Secretary to do so will give him more power than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect give
him control over local government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely democratic and
non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic component of local
governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved. In fact, his order that the
new elections to be conducted be presided by the Regional Director is a clear and direct interference
by the Department with the political affairs of the barangays which is not permitted by the limitation of
presidential power to general supervision over local governments.
7. ID.; AUTONOMY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS; STATE POLICY REFLECTED IN LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE. It is the policy of the state to ensure the autonomy of local governments.
This state policy is echoed in the Local Government Code wherein it is declared that "the State shall
guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development as
self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development
and social progress." To deny the Secretary of Local Government the power to review the regularity of
the elections of officers of the katipunan would be to enhance the avowed state policy of promoting the
autonomy of local governments.
8. ID.; ID.; DOUBT AS TO THE POWER OF SECRETARY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT TO
INTERFERE WITH LOCAL AFFAIRS, RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF GREATER AUTONOMY OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT. Although the Department is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations
and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring compliance" by
local government units of such issuances. To monitor means to "watch, observe or check." Even the
Local Government Code which grants the Secretary power to issue implementing circulars, rules and
regulations is silent as to how these issuances should be enforced. Since the respondent Secretary
exercises only supervision and not control over local governments, it is truly doubtful if he could
enforce compliance with the DLG Circular. Any doubt therefore as to the power of the Secretary to
interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government.
9. ID.; ELECTION PROTEST IN THE ELECTION OF THE OFFICERS OF THE FABC; REGIONAL
TRIAL COURTS ACCORDED EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION. The respondent Secretary
not having the jurisdiction to hear an election protest involving officers of the FABC, the recourse of the
parties is to the ordinary courts. The Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction to
hear the protest.
10. ID.; LOCAL GOVERNMENT; CIRCULARS AND REGULATIONS ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT; CANNOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY. The provision in DLG
Circular No. 89-15 amending DLG Circular No. 89-09 which states that "whenever the guidelines are
not substantially complied with, the election shall be declared null and void by the Department of Local
Government and an election shall conduct anew," being invoked by the Solicitor General cannot be
applied. DLG Circular No. 89-15 was issued on July 3, 1989 after the June 18, 1989 elections of the
FABC officers and it is the rule in statutory construction that laws, including circulars and regulations,
cannot be applied retrospectively. Moreover, such provision is null and void for having been issued in
excess of the respondent Secretary's jurisdiction, inasmuch as an administrative authority cannot
confer jurisdiction upon itself.

11. ID.; ID.; GOVERNOR, PROPER PARTY TO FILE ELECTION PROTEST OVER ELECTION OF
OFFICERS OF FABC. Under Section 205 of the Local Government Code, the membership of
thesangguniang panlalawigan consists of the governor, the vice-governor, elective members of the
said sanggunian, and the presidents of the katipunang panlalawigan and the kabataang
barangayprovincial federation. The governor acts as the presiding officer of the sangguniang
panlalawigan. As presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan, the respondent governor has an
interest in the election of the officers of the FABC since its elected president becomes a member of the
assembly. If the president of the FABC assumes his presidency under questionable circumstances and
is allowed to sit in the sangguniang panlalawigan, the official actions of the sanggunian may be
vulnerable to attacks as to their validity or legality. Hence, respondent governor is a proper party to
question the regularity of the elections of the officers of the FABC.
12. ID.; ID.; ELECTIONS OF THE OFFICERS OF THE FABC; NULLIFICATION FOR FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH DLG CIRCULAR NO. 89-09. Section 2.4 of DLG Circular No. 89-09 provides that
"the incumbent FABC President or the Vice-President shall preside over the reorganizational meeting,
there being a quorum." The rule specifically provides that it is the incumbent FABC President or VicePresident who shall preside over the meeting. The word "shall" should be taken in its ordinary
signification, i.e., it must be imperative or mandatory and not merely permissive, as the rule is explicit
and requires no other interpretation. If it had been intended that any other official should preside, the
rules would have provided so, as it did in the elections at the town and city levels as well as the
regional level. It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABC President nor the Vice-President
presided over the meeting and elections but Alberto P. Molina, Jr., the Chairman of the Board of
Election Supervisors/Consultants. Thus, there was a clear violation of the aforesaid mandatory
provision. On this ground, the election should be nullified.
13. ID.; ID.; APPOINTEES TO THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD; QUALIFICATIONS SET BY
LAW; SHOULD BE MET. In Ignacio vs. Banate, J. the Court, interpreting similarly worded provisions
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 on the composition of the sangguniang
panlungsod, declared as null and void the appointment of private respondent Leoncio Banate, Jr. as
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Roxas representing the katipunang
panlungsod ng mga barangay for he lacked the eligibility and qualification required by law, not being a
barangay captain and for not having been elected president of the association of barangay councils.
The Court held that an unqualified person cannot be appointed a member of the sanggunian, even in
an acting capacity. In Reyes vs. Ferrer, the appointment of Nemesio L. Rasgo, Jr. as representative of
the youth sector to the sangguniang panlungsod of Davao City was declared invalid since he was
never the president of the kabataang barangay city federation as required by Sec. 173, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337. cda
14. ID.; ID.; APPOINTEES TO THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN; QUALIFICATIONS SET BY
LAW SHOULD ALSO BE MET. Involving the sangguniang panlalawigan, the law is likewise explicit.
To be appointed by the President of the Philippines to sit in the sangguniang panlalawigan is the
president of the katipunang panlalawigan. The appointee must meet the qualifications set by law. The
appointing power is bound by law to comply with the requirements as to the basic qualifications of the
appointee to the sangguniang panlalawigan. The President of the Philippines or his alter ego, the
Secretary of Local Government, has no authority to appoint anyone who does not meet the minimum
qualification to be the president of the federation of barangay councils. Augusto Antonio is not the
president of the federation. He is a member of the federation but he was not even present during the
elections despite notice. The argument that Antonio was appointed as a remedial measure in the
exigency of the service cannot be sustained. Since Antonio does not meet the basic qualification of
being president of the federation, his appointment to the sangguniang panlalawigan is not qualified
notwithstanding that such appointment is merely in a temporary capacity. If the intention of the
respondent Secretary was to protect the interests of the federation in the sanggunian, he should have
appointed the incumbent FABC President in a hold-over capacity. The appointment of Antonio,
allegedly the protege of respondent Governor, gives credence to petitioner's charge of political
interference by respondent Governor in the organization. This should not be allowed. The barangays
should be insulated from any partisan activity or political intervention if only to give true meaning to
local autonomy.
DE C I S I O N
The extent of authority of the Secretary of Local Government over the katipunan ng mga barangay or
the barangay councils is brought to the fore in this case.

On June 18, 1989, the Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes,
composed of eleven (11) members, in their capacities as Presidents of the Association of Barangay
Councils in their respective municipalities, convened in Virac, Catanduanes with six members in
attendance for the purpose of holding the election of its officers.
Present were petitioner Ruperto Taule of San Miguel, Allan Aquino of Viga, Vicente Avila of Virac, Fidel
Jacob of Panganiban, Leo Sales of Caramoran and Manuel Torres of Baras. The Board of Election
Supervisors/Consultants was composed of Provincial Government Operation Officer (PGOO) Alberto
P. Molina, Jr. as Chairman with Provincial Treasurer Luis A. Manlapaz, Jr. and Provincial Election
Supervisor Arnold Soquerata as members. LLpr
When the group decided to hold the election despite the absence of five (5) of its members, the
Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Election Supervisor walked out.
The election nevertheless proceeded with PGOO Alberto P. Molina, Jr. as presiding officer. Chosen as
members of the Board of Directors were Taule, Aquino, Avila, Jacob and Sales.
Thereafter, the following were elected officers of the FABC:
President - Ruperto Taule
Vice-President - Allan Aquino
Secretary - Vicente Avila
Treasurer - Fidel Jacob
Auditor - Leo Sales 1
On June 19, 1989, respondent Leandro I. Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes, sent a letter to
respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government, * protesting the election of the officers
of the FABC and seeking its nullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was
conducted. 2
In compliance with the order of respondent Secretary, petitioner Ruperto Taule as President of the
ABC, filed his comment on the letter-protest of respondent Governor denying the alleged irregularities
and denouncing said respondent Governor for meddling or intervening in the election of FABC officers
which is a purely non-partisan affair and at the same time requesting for his appointment as a member
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province being the duly elected President of the FABC in
Catanduanes. 3
On August 4, 1989, respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of the officers of
the FABC in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as
possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local
Government. 4
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of August 4, 1989 but it was denied by
respondent Secretary in his resolution of September 5, 1989. 5
In the petition for certiorari before Us, petitioner seeks the reversal of the resolutions of respondent
Secretary dated August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989 for being null and void.
Petitioner raises the following issues:
1) Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an
election protest involving the election of the officers of the Federation of
Association of Barangay Councils;
2) Whether or not the respondent Governor has the legal personality to file an
election protest;
3) Assuming that the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction over the election
protest, whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in nullifying the election;
The Katipunan ng mga Barangay is the organization of all sangguniang barangays in the following
levels: in municipalities to be known as katipunang bayan; in cities, katipunang panlungsod; in

provinces, katipunang panlalawigan;

level,katipunan ng mga barangay. 6

in regions, katipunang

pampook;

and

on the national

The Local Government Code provides for the manner in which the katipunan ng mga barangay at all
levels shall be organized:
"SECTION 110. Organization. (l) The katipunan at all levels shall be
organized in the following manner:
(a) The katipunan in each level shall elect a board of directors and a set of
officers. The president of each level shall represent the katipunan concerned
in the next higher level of organization.
(b) The katipunan ng mga barangay shall be composed of the katipunang
pampook, which shall in turn be composed of the presidents of the katipunang
panlalawigan and the katipunang panlungsod. The presidents of the
katipunang bayan in each province shall constitute the katipunang
panlalawigan. The katipunang panlungsod and the katipunang bayan shall be
composed of the punong barangays of cities and municipalities, respectively.

The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC is over popular
elections, the elected officials of which are determined through the will of the electorate. An election is
the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people. 12 It involves
the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. 13Specifically, the term "election,"
in the context of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters,
the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes 14 which do not
characterize the election of officers in the Katipunan ng mga barangay. "Election contests" would refer
to adversary proceedings by which matters involving the title or claim of title to an elective office, made
before or after proclamation of the winner, is settled whether or not the contestant is claiming the office
in dispute 15 and in the case of elections of barangay officials, it is restricted to proceedings after the
proclamation of the winners as no pre-proclamation controversies are allowed. 16
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC does not cover protests over the organizational set-up of the
katipunan ng mga barangay composed of popularly elected punong barangays as prescribed by law
whose officers are voted upon by their respective members. The COMELEC exercises only appellate
jurisdiction over election contests involving elective barangay officials decided by the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Courts which likewise have limited jurisdiction. The authority of the COMELEC over
the katipunan ng mga barangay is limited by law to supervision of the election of the representative of
the katipunan concerned to the sanggunian in a particular level conducted by their own respective
organization. 17

xxx xxx xxx."

The respondent Secretary, acting in accordance with the provision of the Local Government Code
empowering him to "promulgate in detail the implementing circulars and the rules and regulations to
carry out the various administrative actions required for the initial implementation of this Code in such a
manner as will ensure the least disruption of on-going programs and project," 7 issued Department of
Local Government Circular No. 89-09 on April 7, 1989, 8 to provide the guidelines for the conduct of
the elections of officers of the Katipunan ng mga Barangay at the municipal, city, provincial, regional
and national levels.

However, the Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain any protest
involving the election of officers of the FABC.
There is no question that he is vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations as set forth in
Section 222 of the Local Government Code.
Likewise, under Book IV, Title XII, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(2) of the Administrative Code of 1987, ** the
respondent Secretary has the power to "establish and prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances
and implementing laws on the general supervision of local government units and on the promotion of
local autonomy and monitor compliance thereof by said units."

It is now the contention of petitioner that neither the constitution nor the law grants jurisdiction upon the
respondent Secretary over election contests involving the election of officers of the FABC,
the katipunan ng mga barangay at the provincial level. It is petitioner's theory that under Article IX, C,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, it is the Commission on Elections which has jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective barangay officials.

Also, the respondent Secretary's rule making power is provided in Sec. 7, Chapter II, Book IV of the
Administrative Code, to wit:

On the other hand, it is the opinion of the respondent Secretary that any violation of the guidelines as
set forth in said circular would be a ground for filing a protest and would vest upon the Department
jurisdiction to resolve any protest that may be filed in relation thereto.

Thus, DLG Circular No. 89-09 was issued by respondent Secretary in pursuance of his rule-making
power conferred by law and which now has the force and effect of law. 18

Under Article IX, C, Section 2(2) of the 1987 Constitution, the Commission on Elections shall exercise
"exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay
officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction." The 1987 Constitution expanded the jurisdiction
of the COMELEC by granting it appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or elective barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction. 9
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over contests involving elective barangay officials is limited to
appellate jurisdiction from decisions of the trial courts. Under the law, 10 the sworn petition contesting
the election of a barangay officer shall be filed with the proper Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court by
any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office
within 10 days after the proclamation of the results. A voter may also contest the election of any
barangay officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines by filing a
sworn petition for quo warranto with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court within 10 days after the
proclamation of the results of the election. 11Only appeals from decisions of inferior courts on election
matters as aforestated may be decided by the COMELEC.

"(3) Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out department

objectives, policies, functions, plans, programs and projects;"

Now the question that arises is whether or not a violation of said circular vests jurisdiction upon the
respondent Secretary, as claimed by him, to hear a protest filed in relation thereto and consequently
declare an election null and void.
It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly empowered, administrative
agencies are bereft of quasi-judicial powers. 19 The jurisdiction of administrative authorities is
dependent entirely upon the provisions of the statutes reposing power in them; they cannot confer it
upon themselves. 20 Such jurisdiction is essential to give validity to their determinations.21
There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even by necessary implication
conferring upon the Secretary of Local Government the power to assume jurisdiction over an election
protest involving officers of the katipunan ng mga barangay. An understanding of the extent of authority
of the Secretary over local governments is therefore necessary if We are to resolve the issue at hand.
Presidential power over local governments is limited by the Constitution to the exercise of general
supervision 22 "to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." 23 The general
supervision is exercised by the President through the Secretary of Local Government. 24
In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
the subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails or neglects to fulfill them the former may
take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other

hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter. The fundamental law permits the Chief Executive to wield no more authority than that of
checking whether said local government or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by
statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments so long as the
same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. 25 Supervisory power, when contrasted with
control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining
authority over such body. 26
Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of the President over local
governments, We hold that respondent Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or
regularity of the election of the officers of the katipunan. To allow respondent Secretary to do so will
give him more power than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect give him control over local
government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely democratic and non-partisan activity
aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic component of local governments so that the ultimate
goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved. In fact, his order that the new elections to be conducted be
presided by the Regional Director is a clear and direct interference by the Department with the political
affairs of the barangays which is not permitted by the limitation of presidential power to general
supervision over local governments. 27
Indeed, it is the policy of the state to ensure the autonomy of local governments. 28 This state policy is
echoed in the Local Government Code wherein it is declared that "the State shall guarantee and
promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social
progress." 29 To deny the Secretary of Local Government the power to review the regularity of the
elections of officers of the katipunan would be to enhance the avowed state policy of promoting the
autonomy of local governments.

As presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan, the respondent governor has an interest in the
election of the officers of the FABC since its elected president becomes a member of the assembly. If
the president of the FABC assumes his presidency under questionable circumstances and is allowed
to sit in the sangguniang panlalawigan, the official actions of the sanggunian may be vulnerable to
attacks as to their validity or legality. Hence, respondent governor is a proper party to question the
regularity of the elections of the officers of the FABC.
As to the third issue raised by petitioner, the Court has already ruled that the respondent Secretary has
no jurisdiction to hear the protest and nullify the elections.
Nevertheless, the Court holds that the issue of the validity of the elections should now be resolved in
order to prevent any unnecessary delay that may result from the commencement of an appropriate
action by the parties.
The elections were declared null and void primarily for failure to comply with Section 2.4 of DLG
Circular No. 89-09 which provides that "the incumbent FABC President or the VicePresident shallpreside over the reorganizational meeting, there being a quorum." The rule specifically
provides that it is the incumbent FABC President or Vice-President who shall preside over the meeting.
The word "shall" should be taken in its ordinary signification, i.e., it must be imperative or mandatory
and not merely permissive, 37 as the rule is explicit and requires no other interpretation. If it had been
intended that any other official should preside, the rules would have provided so, as it did in the
elections at the town and city levels 38 as well as the regional level. 39
It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABC President nor the Vice-President presided over the
meeting and elections but Alberto P. Molina, Jr., the Chairman of the Board of Election
Supervisors/Consultants. Thus, there was a clear violation of the aforesaid mandatory provision. On
this ground, the elections should be nullified.

Moreover, although the Department is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other
issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring compliance" by local
government units of such issuances. 30 To monitor means "to watch, observe or check." 31 This is
compatible with the power of supervision of the Secretary over local governments which as earlier
discussed is limited to checking whether the local government unit concerned or the officers thereof
perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Even the Local Government Code which
grants the Secretary power to issue implementing circulars, rules and regulations is silent as to how
these issuances should be enforced. Since the respondent Secretary exercises only supervision and
not control over local governments, it is truly doubtful if he could enforce compliance with the DLG
Circular. 32 Any doubt therefore as to the power of the Secretary to interfere with local affairs should
be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government.

Under Sec. 2.3.2.7 of the same circular it is provided that a Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants
shall be constituted to oversee and or witness the canvassing of votes and proclamation of winners.
The rules confine the role of the Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants to merely overseeing and
witnessing the conduct of elections. This is consistent with the provision in the Local Government Code
limiting the authority of the COMELEC to the supervision of the election. 40

Thus, the Court holds that in assuming jurisdiction over the election protest filed by respondent
Governor and declaring the election of the officers of the FABC on June 18, 1989 as null and void, the
respondent Secretary acted in excess of his jurisdiction. The respondent Secretary not having the
jurisdiction to hear an election protest involving officers of the FABC, the recourse of the parties is to
the ordinary courts. The Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear the
protest. 33

The Court therefore finds that the election of officers of the FABC held on June 18, 1989 is null and
void for failure to comply with the provisions of DLG Circular No. 89-09.

The provision in DLG Circular No. 89-15 amending DLG Circular No. 89-09 which states that
"whenever the guidelines are not substantially complied with, the election shall be declared null and
void by the Department of Local Government and an election shall conduct anew," being invoked by
the Solicitor General cannot be applied. DLG Circular No. 89-15 was issued on July 3, 1989 after the
June 18, 1989 elections of the FABC officers and it is the rule in statutory construction that laws,
including circulars and regulations, 34 cannot be applied retrospectively. 35Moreover, such provision is
null and void for having been issued in excess of the respondent Secretary's jurisdiction, inasmuch as
an administrative authority cannot confer jurisdiction upon itself.
As regards the second issue raised by petitioner, the Court finds that respondent Governor has the
personality to file the protest. Under Section 205 of the Local Government Code, the membership of
the sangguniang panlalawigan consists of the governor, the vice-governor, elective members of the
said sanggunian, and the presidents of the katipunang panlalawigan and the kabataang
barangay provincial federation. The governor acts as the presiding officer of thesangguniang
panlalawigan. 36

In case at bar, PGOO Molina, the Chairman of the Board, presided over the elections. There was direct
participation by the Chairman of the Board in the elections contrary to what is dictated by the rules.
Worse, there was no Board of Election Supervisors to oversee the elections in view of the walk out
staged by its two other members, the Provincial COMELEC Supervisor and the Provincial Treasurer.
The objective of keeping the election free and honest was therefore compromised.

Meanwhile, pending resolution of this petition, petitioner filed a supplemental petition alleging that
public respondent Local Government Secretary, in his memorandum dated June 7, 1990, designated
Augusto Antonio as temporary representative of the Federation to the sangguniang panlalawigan of
Catanduanes. 41 By virtue of this memorandum, respondent governor swore into said office Augusto
Antonio on June 14, 1990. 42
The Solicitor General filed his comment on the supplemental petition 43 as required by the resolution
of the Court dated September 13, 1990.
In his comment, the Solicitor General dismissed the supervening event alleged by petitioner as
something immaterial to the petition. He argues that Antonio's appointment was merely temporary
"until such time that the provincial FABC president in that province has been elected, appointed and
qualified." 44 He stresses that Antonio's appointment was only a remedial measure designed to cope
with the problems brought about by the absence of a representative of the FABC to the "sangguniang
panlalawigan."
Sec. 205 (2) of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) provides

"(2) The sangguniang panlalawigan shall be composed of the governor, the vice-governor,
elective members of the said sanggunian, and the presidents of the katipunang
panlalawigan and the kabataang barangay provincial federation who shall be appointed by
the President of the Philippines." (Emphasis supplied.)

The Supplemental petition is hereby GRANTED. The appointment of Augusto Antonio as

representative to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in a temporary capacity is declared null and void.

Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, under Sec. 2 likewise states:

SO ORDERED.

The sangguniang panlalawigan of each province shall be composed of the

governor as chairman and presiding officer, the vice-governor as presiding
officer pro tempore, the elective sangguniang panlalawigan members, and the
appointive members consisting ofthe president of the provincial association of
barangay councils, and the president of the provincial federation of the
kabataang barangay." (Emphasis supplied.)
In Ignacio vs. Banate, Jr. 45 the Court, interpreting similarly worded provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg.
337 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 on the composition of the sangguniang panlungsod, 46declared as
null and void the appointment of private respondent Leoncio Banate, Jr. as member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Roxas representing the katipunang panlungsod ng mga
barangay for he lacked the eligibility and qualification required by law, not being a barangay captain
and for not having been elected president of the association of barangay councils. The Court held that
an unqualified person cannot be appointed a member of the sanggunian, even in an acting capacity.
In Reyes vs. Ferrer, 47 the appointment of Nemesio L. Rasgo, Jr. as representative of the youth sector
to the sangguniang panlungsod of Davao City was declared invalid since he was never the president of
the kabataang barangay city federation as required by Sec. 173, Batas Pambansa Blg 337.
In the present controversy involving the sangguniang panlalawigan, the law is likewise explicit. To be
appointed by the President of the Philippines to sit in the sangguniang panlalawigan is the president of
the katipunang panlalawigan. The appointee must meet the qualifications set by law.48 The appointing
power is bound by law to comply with the requirements as to the basic qualifications of the appointee
to the sangguniang panlalawigan. The President of the Philippines or his alter ego, the Secretary of
Local Government, has no authority to appoint anyone who does not meet the minimum qualification to
be the president of the federation of barangay councils.
Augusto Antonio is not the president of the federation. He is a member of the federation but he was not
even present during the elections despite notice. The argument that Antonio was appointed as a
remedial measure in the exigency of the service cannot be sustained. Since Antonio does not meet the
basic qualification of being president of the federation, his appointment to the sangguniang
panlalawigan is not justified notwithstanding that such appointment is merely in a temporary capacity. If
the intention of the respondent Secretary was to protect the interest of the federation in
the sanggunian, he should have appointed the incumbent FABC President in a hold-over capacity. For
even under the guidelines, the term of office of officers of the katipunan at all levels shall be from the
date of their election until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified, without prejudice
to the terms of their appointments as members of the sanggunian to which they may be
correspondingly appointed. 49Since the election is still under protest such that no successor of the
incumbent has as yet qualified, the respondent Secretary has no choice but to have the incumbent
FABC President sit as member of the sanggunian. He could even have appointed petitioner since he
was elected the president of the federation but not Antonio. The appointment of Antonio, allegedly the
protege of respondent Governor, gives credence to petitioner's charge of political interference by
respondent Governor in the organization. This should not be allowed. The barangays should be
insulated from any partisan activity or political intervention if only to give true meaning to local
autonomy.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED in that the resolution of respondent Secretary dated August
4, 1989 is hereby SET ASIDE for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction.
The election of the officials of the ABC Federation held on June 18, 1989 is hereby annulled. A new
election of officers of the federation is hereby ordered to be conducted immediately in accordance with
the governing rules and regulations.

No costs.

|||

MIRIAM SANTIAGO VS COMELEC

The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands
special attention, as this system of initiative was unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps
to a few scholars, before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission
itself, through the original proponent 1 and the main sponsor 2 of the proposed Article on Amendments
or Revision of the Constitution, characterized this system as "innovative". 3 Indeed it is, for both under
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of proposing amendments to, or revision of, the
Constitution were recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members and
(2) by a constitutional convention. 4 For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed, we resolved to
give due course to this petition.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent
Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term
Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition) 5 wherein Delfin asked the
COMELEC for an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition
for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local
circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to
assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and
on the dates designated for the purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, 6 a
group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people power; that he and
the members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the
exercise of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be
established all over the country, with the assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify
the signatures affixed by individual signatories; that before the Movement and other volunteers can
gather signatures, it is necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the purpose be first fixed
in an order to be issued by the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral
process involved, it is likewise necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on which the
signatures shall be affixed, be published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the
control and supervision of the COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of
Article VI, 7Section 4 of Article VII, 8 and Section 8 of Article X 9 of the Constitution. Attached to the
petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution" 10 embodying the proposed
amendments which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning
term limits, and with the following proposition:

Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE),
the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order 11 (a) directing Delfin "to cause the publication
of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including the
proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of hearing in
three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his own expense" not later than 9 December 1996;
and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared: Delfin and Atty.
Pete Q. Quadra; representatives of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers, and
representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol
ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
(LABAN). 12 Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the
ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their
"memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. 13
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla,
and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill No.
1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitution Amendments by People's Initiative, which
petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the Senate Committee
on Constitutional Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the
Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative
on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle
II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in
the law in his privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994: "There is not a single word in that
law which can be considered as implementing [the provision on constitutional initiative]. Such
implementing provisions have been obviously left to a separate law.
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. This
indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter take
effect only upon ratification and not after publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern "the conduct of initiative
on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar
asinitiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to
provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only
Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof.
Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the
people's initiative.

DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE

GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4
AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF
ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?

(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the COMELEC nor
any other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.

According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is
signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be
formally filed with the COMELEC.

To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners allege that in the
event the COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the people's initiative spearheaded by PIRMA would
entail expenses to the national treasury for general re-registration of voters amounting to at least P180

million, not to mention the millions of additional pesos in expenses which would be incurred in the
conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the transcendental importance to the public and the nation of the
issues raised demands that this petition for prohibition be settled promptly and definitely, brushing
aside technicalities of procedure and calling for the admission of a taxpayer's and legislator's
suit. 14 Besides, there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the petition within a
non-extendible period of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining order, effective
immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC from
proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from
conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their Comment
They argue therein that:

15

on the petition.

1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL TREASURY FOR
GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00)" IF THE "COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION FILED BY
RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE THE COMELEC.
2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THE
COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE
SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS
VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO
THE COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING
SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID BY
DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571,200.00;
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE GATHERING
WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND "TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY" PURSUANT TO ITS
"INITIATORY JURISDICTION" UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN ITS RECENT
SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY
VS.COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW IMPLEMENTING
THE POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION.
SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE
ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;

SHOULD BE ALTERED." (PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN
G. BERNAS, S.J.).
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a Comment 16 which starts off
with an assertion that the instant petition is a "knee-jerk reaction to a draft 'Petition for Initiative on the
1987 Constitution'. . . which is not formally filed yet." What he filed on 6 December 1996 was an
"Initiatory Pleading" or "Initiatory Petition," which was legally necessary to start the signature campaign
to amend the Constitution or to put the movement to gather signatures under COMELEC power and
function. On the substantive allegations of the petitioners, Delfin maintains as follows:
(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which
governs the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution. The absence therein
of a subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, since subtitles are not requirements for
the validity or sufficiency of laws.
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in
an initiative to amend the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast
in the plebiscite shall become effective as of the day of the plebiscite.
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted
by (a) Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the
power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b) Section 20 of
R.A. 6735, which empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but
mere amendment to, the Constitution because it seeks to alter only a few specific
provisions of the Constitution, or more specifically, only those which lay term
limits. It does not seek to reexamine or overhaul the entire document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners' estimate of P180
million as unreliable, for only the COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if there will be a
plebiscite it will be simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any event, fund requirements
for initiative will be a priority government expense because it will be for the exercise of the sovereign
power of the people.
In the Comment 17 for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997, the Office of the
Solicitor General contends that:

5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991 PURSUANT TO

REP. ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE RECENT SEPTEMBER 26,
1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET
AL. G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE THE HONORABLE COURT SAID: "THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS BY SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING
GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF
THESE LAWS."

(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Its
Section 2 on Statement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power; and its
Section 3, which enumerates the three systems of initiative, includes initiative on the Constitution and
defines the same as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5
repeatedly mentions initiative on the Constitution.

6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A PROVISION

DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO "PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND
REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT." (SEC.
12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E, PETITION);

(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No. 6735
because, being national in scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in the subtitle on
National Initiative and Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent provisions of
the law when he claimed that nothing therein was provided for initiative on the Constitution.

7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS

PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A "REVISION" OF THE CONSTITUTION. IT
IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT. "AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW
SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A REEXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT

(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A. No. 6735 does
not deal with initiative on the Constitution.

(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to the
Constitution, not a revision thereof.
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735
and under the Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making power of the COMELEC to implement the
provisions of R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
vs. COMELEC.
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining order; (b) noted
the aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed by private
respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as the latter's Manifestation stating that he is the counsel for
private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for the
Pedrosas; and (c) granted the Motion for Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco
and allowed him to file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and (d) set the case
for hearing on 23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of
Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for Intervention.
Attached to the motion was their Petition in Intervention, which was later replaced by an Amended
Petition in Intervention wherein they contend that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of,
the Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., 18 it would
involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one
that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear to be an
isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of
elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities
for public service and prohibiting political dynasties. 19 Arevision cannot be done
by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution, is limited to amendments.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for
all other national and local elective officials are based on the philosophy of
governance, "to open up the political arena to as many as there are Filipinos
qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break the concentration of
political and economic powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective
proper empowerment for participation in policy and decision-making for the
common good"; hence, to remove the term limits is to negate and nullify the
noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative, particularly in a
conflict-of-interest situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position that may
be availed of by the people only if they are dissatisfied with the performance of
their elective officials, but not as a premium for good performance. 20
(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling
law that implements the people's initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It
fails to state (a) the proper parties who may file the petition, (b) the appropriate
agency before whom the petition is to be filed, (c) the contents of the petition, (d)
the publication of the same, (e) the ways and means of gathering the signatures
of the voters nationwide and 3% per legislative district, (f) the proper parties who
may oppose or question the veracity of the signatures, (g) the role of the
COMELEC in the verification of the signatures and the sufficiency of the petition,
(h) the appeal from any decision of the COMELEC, (I) the holding of a plebiscite,
and (g) the appropriation of funds for such people's initiative. Accordingly, there
being no enabling law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear Delfin's petition.

(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied by

COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, since the COMELEC is without authority to
legislate the procedure for a people's initiativeunder Section 2 of Article XVII of
the Constitution. That function exclusively pertains to Congress. Section 20 of
R.A. No. 6735 does not constitute a legal basis for the Resolution, as the former
does not set a sufficient standard for a valid delegation of power.
On
20
January
1997,
Senator
Raul
Roco
filed
his
Petition
in
Intervention. 21 He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law that implements the people's right to
initiate constitutional amendments. This law is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No.
21505; he co-authored the House Bill and even delivered a sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise
submits that the COMELEC was empowered under Section 20 of that law to promulgate COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he contends that the respondent Commission is without jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its publication because the said petition is not the
initiatory pleading contemplated under the Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300. What vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an initiative on the Constitution is
the filing of a petition for initiative which is signedby the required number of registered voters. He also
submits that the proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot avail of the authority and resources
of the COMELEC to assist them is securing the required number of signatures, as the COMELEC's
role in an initiative on the Constitution is limited to the determination of the sufficiency of the initiative
petition and the call and supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a Petition in Intervention
raising the following arguments:
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution.
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the required
implementing law on the initiative to amend the Constitution.
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does not have the required number of
signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which can be
proposed only by Congress or a constitutional convention. 22
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for Intervention filed by the
DIK and MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b)
admitting the Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions in Intervention of
Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to file within a nonextendible period of five
days their Consolidated Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN
to file its Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible period of three days from notice, and the
respondents to comment thereon within a nonextendible period of five days from receipt of the said
Petition in Intervention.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following pivotal issues,
which the Court formulated in light of the allegations and arguments raised in the pleadings so far filed:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the
Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing
the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local
Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the
absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.

3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in the draft
"Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to, the
Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to
obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election
officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations; and (c) directing
or causing the publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a
pending case before the COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective
memoranda within twenty days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of the
deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the allegations and
arguments in the main Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC should have dismissed the Delfin
Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause of action and that the Commission's failure or refusal to do
so constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal and the Record of
the House of Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill No. 21505, as well as the
transcripts of stenographic notes on the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee,
Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate
Bill No. 17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments on the Petitions
in Intervention of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP. 23 The parties thereafter filed, in due time,
their separate memoranda. 24
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil action.
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth issue which
appears to pose a prejudicial procedural question.
I
THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF
THE DELFIN PETITION.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to the fifth
issue, i.e., whether it is proper for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil action when there is
a pending case before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an affirmative answer. Thus:

30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by
the
political
ambitions
of
man,
only
the
Supreme
Court
can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the
Constitution. 25
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition
on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition. 26 The
COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments of Delfin and
the oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to submit within five days their
memoranda or oppositions/memoranda. 27 Earlier, or specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically
gave due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the petition,
together with the attached Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by
setting the case for hearing. The COMELEC's failure to act on Roco's motion to dismiss and its
insistence to hold on to the petition rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. Where the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board,
or person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding
the defendant to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin
Petition because the said petition is not supported by the required minimum number of signatures of
registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to
dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required number of signatures. In light of these
claims, the instant case may likewise be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Section I of
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may brush
aside
technicalities
of
procedure
in
cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr. 28
A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in
the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of issues raised.
In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this
technicality because the transcendental importance to the public of these cases
demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure.
II
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO
COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by private respondent
Delfin. This being so, it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding any further, and
under the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for prohibition is the proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction
and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a
jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is an
urgent necessity, in view of the highly divisive and adverse environmental consequences on the body
politic of the questioned Comelec order. The consequent climate of legal confusion and political
instability begs for judicial statesmanship.

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by

the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the
total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No
amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the
ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

This provision is not self-executory. In his book, 29 Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the
Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it still is
dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution
until Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has
recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever
reason, does not provide for its implementation.
This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or
Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986
Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No. 332). 30 That
section reads as follows:
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article___
Section ___of the Constitution. 31
After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the Committee submitted
a new formulation of the concept of initiative which it denominated as Section 2; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call attention of the Members of the
Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a
complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of
initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of
the Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly
propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least
ten percent of the registered voters.This completes the blanks appearing in the
original Committee Report No. 7. 32
The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are left to the
legislature. Thus:
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory questions.
First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at least 10 percent, there are no details in
the provision on how to carry this out. Do we understand, therefore, that we are leaving this matter to
the legislature?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long as the legislature does not pass
the necessary implementing law on this, this will not operate?
MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the committee hearing, especially with respect to
the budget appropriations which would have to be legislated so that the plebiscite could be called. We
deemed it best that this matter be left to the legislature. The Gentleman is right. In any event, as
envisioned, no amendment through the power of initiative can be called until after five years from the
date of the ratification of this Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment that could be proposed

through the exercise of this initiative power would be after five years. It is reasonably expected that
within that five-year period, the National Assembly can come up with the appropriate rules governing
the exercise of this power.
FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature the details on how this is to be carried out
is it possible that, in effect, what will be presented to the people for ratification is the work of the
legislature rather than of the people? Does this provision exclude that possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because even the legislature itself as a body
could propose that amendment, maybe individually or collectively, if it fails to muster the three-fourths
vote in order to constitute itself as a constituent assembly and submit that proposal to the people for
ratification through the process of an initiative.
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in the proposal is to vest constituent
power in the people to amend the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept ofthe proposal in terms of institutionalizing
popular participation in the drafting of the Constitution or in the amendment thereof, but I would have a
lot of difficulties in terms of accepting the draft of Section 2, as written. Would the sponsor agree with
me that in the hierarchy of legal mandate, constituent power has primacy over all other legal mandates
MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal values, the
Constitution is source of all legal mandates and that therefore we require a great deal of
circumspection in the drafting and in te amendments of the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.
MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of constituent power we have a separate
article in the constitution that would specifically cover the process and the modes of amending the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions are drafted now, to again concede
to the legislature the process or the requirement of determining the mechanics of amending the
Constitution by people's initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be placed in the hands of the National
Assembly, not unless we can incorporate into this provision the mechanics that would adequately
cover all the conceivable situations. 33
It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals to
AMEND not to REVISE the Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. . . . This proposal was suggested on thetheory that this matter of initiative, which came
about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional
modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this
system of initiative should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from
the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. 34

xxx xxx xxx

MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does not prevent the legislature from asking
another body to set the proposition in proper form.

MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a
separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an
amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of
setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative
is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total
overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a)
and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas theprocess of initiation to amend,
which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.

35

MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the implementation of this particular right
would be subject to legislation, provided the legislature cannot determine anymore the percentage of
the requirement.
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of the proper form for submission to
the people, may be subject to legislation.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In other words, none of the
procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or impair the right conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures which I have discussed be
legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes. 37

Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., which the Committee accepted. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose tosubstitute the entire Section 2 with the
following:
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed amendment after taking into account
the modifications submitted by the sponsor himself and the honorable Commissioners Guingona,
Monsod, Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo. The modified amendment in substitution of the
proposed Section 2 will now read as follows: "SECTION 2. AMENDMENTS TO THIS
CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH
INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER Of
REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED
BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT
UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE
RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS
THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed amendment is reflective of the sense
contained in Section 2 of our completed Committee Report No. 7, we accept the proposed
amendment. 36
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2 clearly
showed that it was a legislative act which must implement the exercise of the right. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it possible for the legislature to set forth
certain procedures to carry out the initiative. . .?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx xxx xxx

Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly confines initiative to
AMENDMENTS to NOT REVISION of the Constitution. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendment." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he
made the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1.
So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision." 38
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments
through initiative must be more rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this proposal, what is involved is an amendment
to theConstitution. To amend a Constitution would ordinarily require a proposal by the National
Assembly by a vote of three-fourths; and to call a constitutional convention would require a higher
number. Moreover, just to submit the issue of calling a constitutional convention, a majority of the
National Assembly is required, the import being that the process of amendment must be made more
rigorous and difficult than probably initiating an ordinary legislation or putting an end to a law proposed
by the National Assembly by way of a referendum. I cannot agree to reducing the requirement
approved by the Committee on the Legislative because it would require another voting by the
Committee, and the voting as precisely based on a requirement of 10 percent. Perhaps, I might
present such a proposal, by way of an amendment, when the Commission shall take up the Article on
the Legislative or on the National Assembly on plenary sessions. 39
The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and the final version,
which the Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as follows:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended, reads as follows: "AMENDMENT
TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH
INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED
BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT
UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE

RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS
THEREAFTER.
THE
NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY
SHALL
BY
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. 40

LAW

PROVIDE

The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on second reading
on 9 July 1986.41 Thereafter, upon his motion for reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon
was allowed to introduce an amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was withdrawn.
In view thereof, the Article was again approved on Second and Third Readings on 1 August
1986. 42
However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be amended by changing
"percent" to "per centum" and "thereof" to "therein" and deleting the phrase "by law" in the second
paragraph so that said paragraph reads: The Congress 43 shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right. 44 This amendment was approved and is the text of the present second
paragraph of Section 2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section
2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.
Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer the
question in the affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A.
No. 6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than
through the passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last minute
amendment by the Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article
XVII then reading:
The Congress 45 shall by law provide for the implementation of the exercise of RIGHT
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for the
rules implementing the exercise of the right. The "rules" means "the details on how [the
right] is to be carried out." 46
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill
No. 17. The former was prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the House of
Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, 47 which
dealt
with
the
initiative
and
referendum
mentioned
in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988, 48 which dealt with the
subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of
Article X (Local Government) and initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution.
Senate Bill No. 17 49 solely dealt with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of
local government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and
House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the
Senate 50and by the House of Representatives. 51 This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to "provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the right?"
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.

First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest
an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:
Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. The power of the people under a system of
initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or
in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby
affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied).
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither
germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national
laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the
Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to
AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in
whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to
"laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted from Section 1 of
Senate Bill No. 17, which solely referred to a statement of policy on local initiative and referendum and
appropriately used the phrases "propose and enact," "approve or reject" and "in whole or in part." 52
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the
Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5
(Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters
who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not
provide for the contents of a petition forinitiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires,
among other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition,
the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution.
Said paragraph (c) reads in full as follows:
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed, as the case may be;
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be
legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition. (Emphasis supplied).
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed" only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local
Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This
conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the
implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle
therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right
of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the
initiative on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is subsumed
under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading of

Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves
no room for doubt that the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on
its nature and character. It is "national initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is
a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is "local initiative" if what is proposed to be
adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the
governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass.
This classification of initiative into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which we
quote for emphasis and clearer understanding:
Sec. 3. Definition of terms
xxx xxx xxx
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments
to the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national
legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a
regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
(Emphasis supplied).
Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. 53
A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not
germane to the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs
(b) and (c) of Section 9, which reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called
for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation of the
Commission. (Emphasis supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the legislative bodies
of local governments; thus:
Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by law, may file a
petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies. . . .
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the findings of
sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum, which could be petitions for both
national and localinitiative and referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under subtitle III on Local Initiative and
Referendum is misplaced, 54 since the provision therein applies to both national and local initiative and
referendum. It reads:
Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the
proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to
this Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative
body to enact the said measure.

Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in the
implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving them
special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. Anent the initiative on national legislation, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of the petition;
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;
(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes for its
approval;
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;
(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines; and
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition. 55
As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for the petition;
(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;
(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocation of the power
of initiative as a consequence thereof;
(d) The formulation of the proposition;
(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local government unit
concerned as to whether the required number of signatures have been obtained;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the registered
voters for their approval, which must be within the period specified therein;
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;
(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
(k) The limitations on local initiative; and
(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies. 56
Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its
twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b) defines "initiative
on the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c)
speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may
be approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number
of voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the approved
proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system of
initiative. RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service. 57
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its
lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act. 58
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin
maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest. 59 The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 60
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate
rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in

every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is
valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out,
or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. 61 A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected. 62
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably
failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the
COMELEC is then invalid.

Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings
under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not
assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND,
meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not
have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the
order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time,
energy, and resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits
of elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is
rendered unnecessary, if not academic.

III
CONCLUSION
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND
REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's
power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations
referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the
Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the
"completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH
DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.

This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no
longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should
not tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of
the right of the people under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;

GRAVE

ABUSE

OF

Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress to
implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the
COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin
Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for
initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of
which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin
Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has
not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his
drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly
initiated.

b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing
rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the
Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
SO ORDERED.

The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is
theinitiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only
participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the
form of the petition; 63(2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the
total number of registered voters in each legislative district; 64 (3) to assist, through its election
registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; 65 and (4) to verify, through its election registrars,
the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits, and voters' identification cards
used in the immediately preceding election. 66
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH

6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON

The Case
These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the Commission on
Elections ("COMELEC") denying due course to an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution.
Antecedent Facts
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B.
Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups 1 and individuals, commenced gathering signatures
for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a
petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b)
and (c) 2 and Section 7 3 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at
least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at
least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC
election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of
Article VI (Legislative Department) 4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) 5 and by
adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions." 6 These proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino
Group prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following
proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF
THE 1987 Constitution, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM
THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERALPARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE
SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative. 7
The Ruling of the COMELEC
On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino Group's
petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The
COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections 8declaring RA
6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution. 9
In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus
to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due
course to their initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying due course to their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent.
Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims that Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and their
petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the "will of the sovereign people."
In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the Court require respondent COMELEC
Commissioners to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt for the COMELEC's
verification of signatures and for "entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition despite the permanent
injunction in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay Group's petition as an opposition-in-intervention.
In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor General joined causes with the
petitioners, urging the Court to grant the petition despite the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General
proposed that the Court treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules "as temporary devises to implement
the system of initiative."
Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or opposing the
Lambino Group's petition. The supporting intervenors 10 uniformly hold the view that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the opposing
intervenors 11 hold the contrary view and maintain that Santiago is a binding precedent. The opposing

intervenors also challenged (1) the Lambino Group's standing to file the petition; (2) the validity of the
signature gathering and verification process; (3) the Lambino Group's compliance with the minimum
requirement for the percentage of voters supporting an initiative petition under Section 2, Article XVII of
the 1987 Constitution; 12 (4) the nature of the proposed changes as revisions and not mere
amendments as provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino
Group's compliance with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only
one subject. ACETIa
The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26 September 2006. After receiving
the parties' memoranda, the Court considered the case submitted for resolution.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution
through a people's initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA
6735"incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
conditions" to implement the initiative clause on proposals to
amend the Constitution; and
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
due course to the Lambino Group's petition.
The Ruling of the Court
There is no merit to the petition.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for
conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition
warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic
requirements of the Constitution. For following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of
discretion is attributable to the Commission on Elections.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a
people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
centum of the total number of registered voters of which every
district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
voters therein. . . . . (Emphasis supplied)

proposed
twelve per
legislative
registered

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of an amendment
"directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition," thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to
propose a constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment ready to be shown to the people when they
are asked to sign?

MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and
shown to them before they sign. Now, who prepares the draft?

MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already a draft
shown to themand they are asked whether or not they want to propose
this constitutional amendment.
MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that proposal
and pass it around for signature. 13 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal. The
framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is already a draft shown to them." The framers
also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must
"prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition"
is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential
elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be
embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to
the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition.Thus, an
amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the
people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached
to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every
one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed
amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove
that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before
signing.
The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed 14 the concept of people's initiative from the United
States where various State constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all States 15 which
allow initiative petitions, the unbending requirement is that the people must first see the full text
of the proposed amendments before they sign to signify their assent, and that the people must
sign on an initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. 16
The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several decisions of various courts.
Thus, in Capezzuto v. State Ballot Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by
the First Circuit Court of Appeals, declared:
[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying
the signature has not first seen what it is that he or she is signing.
Further, and more importantly, loose interpretation of the subscription
requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud. A person permitted to
describe orally the contents of an initiative petition to a potential signer, without
the signer having actually examined the petition, could easily mislead the
signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or even flatly misrepresenting,
portions of the petition that might not be to the signer's liking. This danger
seems particularly acute when, in this case, the person giving the
description is the drafter of the petition, who obviously has a vested
interest in seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the
ballot. 17 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury, 18 the Court of Appeals of Oregon explained:
The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to amendments by initiative
commonly are described in similar terms. . . . (The purpose of the full text
requirement is to provide sufficient information so that registered voters
can intelligently evaluate whether to sign the initiative petition."); . . .

(publication of full text of amended constitutional provision required because it

is "essential for the elector to have . . . the section which is proposed to be
added to or subtracted from. If he is to vote intelligently, he must have this
knowledge. Otherwise in many instances he would be required to vote in the
dark.") (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of
that which is proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive and misleading" which renders the
initiative void. 19
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the
full text of the proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution
clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people's
initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the
framers intended that the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before
they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full text. Indeed, Section
5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as
valid, requires that the people must sign the "petition . . . as signatories." cADTSH
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the
signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested
parties who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to
the people. The proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the
arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the
signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in
gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures that the petition contained, or
incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the
people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of
a signature sheet 20 after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their
Memorandum on 11 October 2006. The signature sheet with this Court during the oral arguments was
the signature sheet attached 21 to the opposition in intervention filed on 7 September 2006 by
intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra.
The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition and the signature sheet attached to the
Lambino Group's Memorandum are the same. We reproduce below the signature sheet in full:
Province: City/Municipality: No. of
Verified
Legislative District: Barangay: Signatures:
PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF
THE 1987 Constitution, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT
BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND
ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?"
I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. My signature herein
which shall form part of the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution signifies my support for
the filing thereof.
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group's proposed
changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the
proposed changes is attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted this during the oral
arguments before this Court on 26 September 2006.
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the BicameralPresidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not

show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the
signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the "petition" that the framers of the Constitution
envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature-gathering from February to
August 2006, the Lambino Group circulated, together with the signature sheets, printed copies of the
Lambino Group's draft petition which they later filed on 25 August 2006 with the COMELEC. When
asked if his group also circulated the draft of their amended petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the
COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied that they circulated both. However, Atty. Lambino changed
his answer and stated that what his group circulated was the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended
petition, not the draft of the 25 August 2006 petition.
The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the draft of the 30 August 2006
amended petition almost seven months earlier in February 2006 when they started gathering
signatures. Petitioner Erico B. Aumentado's "Verification/Certification" of the 25 August 2006 petition,
as well as of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC, states as follows:
I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition in my
personal capacity as a registered voter, for and on behalf of the Union of
Local Authorities of the Philippines, as shown by ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02 hereto attached, and as representative of the mass of signatories
hereto. (Emphasis supplied)

The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 to the present petition.
However, the "Official Website of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines" 22 has posted the
full text of Resolution No. 2006-02, which provides:

COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE

AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 Constitution;
DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special meeting held on 14
January 2006 at the Century Park Hotel, Manila. 23 (Underscoring supplied)
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to prepare the 25 August
2006 petition, or the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02 "support(s) the porposals (sic) of the Consulatative (sic) Commission on Charter
Change through people's initiative and referendum as a mode of amending the 1987 Constitution."
The proposals of the Consultative Commission 24 are vastly different from the proposed changes of
the Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition or 30 August 2006 amended petition filed with the
COMELEC.
For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission affect all provisions of the
existing Constitution, from the Preamble to the Transitory Provisions. The proposed revisions have
profound impact on the Judiciary and the National Patrimony provisions of the existing Constitution,
provisions that the Lambino Group's proposed changes do not touch. The Lambino Group's proposed
changes purport to affect only Articles VI and VII of the existing Constitution, including the introduction
of new Transitory Provisions.
The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or more than six months before the
filing of the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC.
However, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group caused
the circulation of the draft petition, together with the signature sheets, six months before the filing with
the COMELEC. On the contrary, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 casts grave doubt on the Lambino
Group's claim that they circulated the draft petition together with the signature sheets. ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02 does not refer at all to the draft petition or to the Lambino Group's
proposed changes.

RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02

RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE
COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 Constitution
WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) to
adopt a common stand on the approach to support the proposals of the People's
Consultative Commission on Charter Change;
WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms as embodied in the ULAP
Joint Declaration for Constitutional Reforms signed by the members of the ULAP and the
majority coalition of the House of Representatives in Manila Hotel sometime in October
2005;
WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change created by Her
Excellency to recommend amendments to the 1987 Constitution has submitted its final
report sometime in December 2005;
WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political developments in Congress which
militates against the use of the expeditious form of amending the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members and thefailure of Congress
to amend the Constitution as a constituent assembly, ULAP has unanimously agreed to
pursue the constitutional reform agenda through People's Initiative and Referendum without
prejudice to other pragmatic means to pursue the same;
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED,
THAT ALL THE MEMBER-LEAGUES OF THE UNION OF LOCAL
AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ULAP) SUPPORT THE
PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULATATIVE (SIC)

In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the COMELEC, the Lambino Group
declared:
After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the proposed
amendments alleged in the Petition, more specifically, paragraph 3 of Section
4 and paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the Transitory Provisions were inaccurately
stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments. AaDSEC
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition because the amended
petition was what they had shown to the people during the February to August 2006 signaturegathering. Instead, the Lambino Group alleged that the petition of 25 August 2006 "inaccurately
stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments."
The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended
petition with the COMELEC that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the
signature sheets. Likewise, the Lambino Group did not allege in their present petition before this Court
that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. The signature
sheets do not also contain any indication that the draft petition is attached to, or circulated with, the
signature sheets.
It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions that the Lambino Group first
claimed that they circulated the "petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC," thus:
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here there is not (sic)
fraud, a signer who did not read the measure attached to a referendum
petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not
understand the nature of the act." [82 C.J.S. S128h. Mo. State v. Sullivan,
224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the registered voters who signed the
signature sheets circulated together with the petition for initiative filed
with the COMELEC below, are presumed to have understood the proposition
contained in the petition. (Emphasis supplied)

The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the petition for initiative filed with
the COMELEC" appears an afterthought, made after the intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(Cebu City Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had pointed out that the signature
sheets did not contain the text of the proposed changes. In their Consolidated Reply, the Lambino
Group alleged that they circulated "the petition for initiative" but failed to mention the amended
petition. This contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally stated during the oral arguments that what they
circulated was the draft of the amended petition of 30 August 2006.
The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that "a signer who did not
read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground
that he did not understand the nature of the act." The Lambino Group quotes an authority that cites
a proposed change attached to the petition signed by the people. Even the authority the Lambino
Group quotes requires that the proposed change must be attached to the petition. The same authority
the Lambino Group quotes requires the people to sign on the petition itself.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must be incorporated with,
or attached to, the initiative petition signed by the people. In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's
proposed changes were not incorporated with, or attached to, the signature sheets. The Lambino
Group's citation of Corpus Juris Secundum pulls the rug from under their feet.
It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed, circulated, from February to August
2006 during the signature-gathering period, the draft of the petition or amended petition they filed later
with the COMELEC. The Lambino Group are less than candid with this Court in their belated claim that
they printed and circulated, together with the signature sheets, the petition or amended
petition. Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino Group circulated the amended petition
during the signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted circulating only very
limited copies of the petition.
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only 100,000
copies of the draft petition they filed more than six months later with the COMELEC. Atty.
Lambino added that he also asked other supporters to print additional copies of the draft petition but he
could not state with certainty how many additional copies the other supporters printed.Atty. Lambino
could only assure this Court of the printing of 100,000 copies because he himself caused the
printing of these 100,000 copies.
Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006, the Lambino Group
expressly admit that "petitioner Lambino initiated the printing and reproduction of 100,000
copies of the petition for initiative . . . ." 25 This admission binds the Lambino Group and
establishes beyond any doubt that the Lambino Group failed to show the full text of the
proposed changes to the great majority of the people who signed the signature sheets.
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have received with certainty one
copy each of the petition, assuming a 100 percent distribution with no wastage. If Atty. Lambino and
company attached one copy of the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets
could have circulated with the petition. Each signature sheet contains space for ten signatures.
Assuming ten people signed each of these 100,000 signature sheets with the attached petition, the
maximum number of people who saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets would not
exceed 1,000,000.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically impossible for all or a great
majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have seen the petition before they signed the signature
sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million
signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If ever, not more than one million signatories saw
the petition before they signed the signature sheets.

In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full text of the proposed
changes, either on the face of the signature sheets, or as attachment with an indication in the signature
sheet of such attachment. Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments, and
this admission binds the Lambino Group. This fact is also obvious from a mere reading of the
signature sheet. This omission is fatal. The failure to so include the text of the proposed changes in

the signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-compliance with the constitutional requirement
that the amendment must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition."
The signature sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in the initiative clause of the Constitution.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets did not see the
full text of the proposed changes before signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of
the proposed changes, among which are:
1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus
members of Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely; 26
2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its
members, who are almost all the present members of Congress,
decide to call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the members
of the interim Parliament will determine the expiration of their
own term of office; 27
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim
Parliament shall convene to propose further amendments or
revisions to the Constitution. 28
These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino Group's signature
sheets. The people who signed the signature sheets had no idea that they were proposing these
amendments. These three proposed changes are highly controversial. The people could not have
inferred or divined these proposed changes merely from a reading or rereading of the contents of the
signature sheets.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his group assured the people
during the signature-gathering that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held
during the 2007 local elections if the proposed changes were ratified before the 2007 local elections.
However, the text of the proposed changes belies this.
The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found in the amended petition,
states:
Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the
members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held
simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. . . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament will be held
simultaneously with the 2007 local elections. This section merely requires that the elections for
the regular Parliament shall be held simultaneously with the local elections without specifying
the year.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the proposed changes, could have
easily written the word "next" before the phrase "election of all local government officials." This would
have insured that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held in the next local elections
following the ratification of the proposed changes. However, the absence of the word "next" allows the
interim Parliament to schedule the elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with any future
local elections. CDISAc
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of their own term of office. This
allows incumbent members of the House of Representatives to hold office beyond their current threeyear term of office, and possibly even beyond the five-year term of office of regular members of the
Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to the representations of Atty. Lambino and his group to
the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets. Atty. Lambino and his group deceived
the 6.3 million signatories, and even the entire nation.
This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative petition that contains the full
text of the proposed amendments to avoid fraud or misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3
million signatories had to rely on the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino and his group because
the signature sheets did not contain the full text of the proposed changes. The result is a grand

deception on the 6.3 million signatories who were led to believe that the proposed changes would
require the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with the local
elections.
The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed the signature
sheets. The proposed changes mandate the interim Parliament to make further amendments or
revisions to the Constitution. The proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions,
provides:
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the
interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions
of, this Constitutionconsistent with the principles of local autonomy,
decentralization and a strong bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a "surplusage" and the
Court and the people should simply ignore it. Far from being a surplusage, this provision
invalidates the Lambino Group's initiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the
Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this aslogrolling
when the initiative petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This puts the
people in a dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing them
to sign a petition that effectively contains two propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable.
Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire proposition and not only
the unrelated subject matter. Thus, in Fine v. Firestone, 29 the Supreme Court of Florida declared:
Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes
"logrolling," which, if our judicial responsibility is to mean anything, we
cannot permit. The very broadness of the proposed amendment amounts to
logrolling because the electorate cannot know what it is voting on the
amendment's proponents' simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the
iceberg. . . . . The ballot must give the electorate fair notice of the proposed
amendment being voted on. . . . . The ballot language in the instant case fails
to do that. The very broadness of the proposal makes it impossible to state
what it will affect and effect and violates the requirement that proposed
amendments embrace only one subject. (Emphasis supplied)
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v. McAlpine, 30 the Supreme
Court of Alaska warned against "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in logrolling:
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the problems
that the single-subject rule was enacted to prevent are exacerbated. There is a
greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate intermingling of issues to
increase the likelihood of an initiative's passage, and there is a greater
opportunity for "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in the enactment-byinitiative process. The drafters of an initiative operate independently of any
structured or supervised process. They often emphasize particular provisions
of their proposition, while remaining silent on other (more complex or less
appealing) provisions, when communicating to the public. . . . Indeed,
initiative promoters typically use simplistic advertising to present their
initiative to potential petition-signers and eventual voters. Many voters
will never read the full text of the initiative before the election. More
importantly, there is no process for amending or splitting the several provisions
in an initiative proposal. These difficulties clearly distinguish the initiative from
the legislative process. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further amendments or revisions to be
undertaken by the interim Parliament as a constituent assembly. The people who signed the signature
sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to propose an
amendment mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution.

Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4) to compel the interim Parliament to
amend or revise again the Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes, or
before the May 2007 elections. In the absence of the proposed Section 4(4), the interim Parliament
has the discretion whether to amend or revise again the Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4),
the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament mandatedto immediately amend or revise again
the Constitution.
However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in amending or revising again so
soon the Constitution. The signature sheets do not also explain what specific amendments or revisions
the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament to make, and why there is a need for such further
amendments or revisions. The people are again left in the dark to fathom the nature and effect of
the proposed changes. Certainly, such an initiative is not "directly proposed by the people" because
the people do not even know the nature and effect of the proposed changes.
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's amended petition of 30 August
2006. The proposed Section 4(3) of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members of
Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.

After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member of Parliament if the
interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010.
However, there is no counterpart provision for the present members of the House of
Representatives even if their term of office will all end on 30 June 2007, three years earlier than
that of half of the present Senators. Thus, all the present members of the House will remain
members of the interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, the Prime Minister exercises
all the powers of the President. If the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular
Parliament by 30 June 2010, the Prime Minister will come only from the present members of the
House of Representatives to the exclusion of the present Senators.
The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Senators. The 6.3 million people
who signed the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to
discriminate against the Senators. They could not have known that their signatures would be
used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim Parliament's choice of Prime Minister only to
members of the existing House of Representatives.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of
the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the
people. That is why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be "directly proposed by the
people . . . in a petition" meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text
of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nation's fundamental law, the
writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or
special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution.
This Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do not personally know
the people who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental assumption:
the full text of the proposed amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the
petition, not after they have signed the petition.
In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply
with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be "directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition."
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision
through Initiatives

A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and
not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments
and revisions to the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be
proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members,
or CcTIDH
(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed
by thepeople through initiative . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is
through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a
constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people's initiative.

MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting to

distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the
process of revision; whereas, the process of initiation to amend, which
is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the
Committee.
MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam President.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed
amendment on line 1 refers to "amendments." Does it not cover the word
"revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the
distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision"
should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it
can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you. 31 (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to "[A]ny amendment to, or
revision of, this Constitution." In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies
only to "[A]mendments to this Constitution." This distinction was intentional as shown by the following
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that
pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a
complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision
governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the
complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote
Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite
held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative
upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7.
This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which
came about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be
separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as
embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of
initiative should be limited to amendments to the Constitution and
should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we
removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on
Amendment or Revision. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative
as a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be
amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as
another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another
separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while
ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and
should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of
the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.

There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear
distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote,
that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution.
The framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only amendments to the
Constitution. Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the
power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are
empowered to propose amendments.
This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the United States. Thus, inMcFadden v.
Jordan, 32 the Supreme Court of California ruled:
The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the
Constitution . . . applies only to the proposing and the adopting or
rejecting of 'laws and amendments to the Constitution' and does not
purport to extend to a constitutional revision. . . . . It is thus clear that a
revision of the Constitution may be accomplished only through ratification by
the people of a revised constitution proposed by a convention called for that
purpose as outlined hereinabove. Consequently if the scope of the proposed
initiative measure (hereinafter termed 'the measure') now before us is so
broad that if such measure became law a substantial revision of our present
state Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not properly be
submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a
constitutional convention, and the writ sought by petitioner should issue. . . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling: 33
It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner in which it
may be amended or revised, it can be altered by those who favor
amendments, revision, or other change only through the use of one of the
specified means. The constitution itself recognizes that there is a difference
between an amendment and a revision; and it is obvious from an examination
of the measure here in question that it is not an amendment as that term is
generally understood and as it is used in Article IV, Section 1. The document
appears to be based in large part on the revision of the constitution drafted by
the 'Commission for Constitutional Revision' authorized by the 1961
Legislative Assembly, . . . and submitted to the 1963 Legislative Assembly. It
failed to receive in the Assembly the two-third's majority vote of both houses
required by Article XVII, Section 2, and hence failed of adoption, . . . .

While differing from that document in material respects, the measure

sponsored by the plaintiffs is, nevertheless, a thorough overhauling of the
present constitution . . . .
To call it an amendment is a misnomer.
Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a measure as can
be submitted to the people through the initiative. If a revision, it is subject to
the requirements of Article XVII, Section 2(1); if a new constitution, it can only
be proposed at a convention called in the manner provided in Article XVII,
Section 1. . . . .

Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative can only propose
amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can
be no deviation from the constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular
clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes
prescribed in the Constitution itself.

In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like
in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test.
The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change
directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing
provisions." 36 The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the
degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The
main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our
basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision." 37 Whether there is an alteration in the structure
of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental
plan" includes "change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches." 38 A
change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that "jeopardize the
traditional form of government and the system of check and balances." 39
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not
merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles
Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive affecting a total of 105 provisions in the
entire Constitution. 40 Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of
government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.

As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No. 364: 34

It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be revised or
amended in the manner prescribed by the instrument itself, and that any
attempt to revise a constitution in a manner other than the one provided
in the instrument is almost invariably treated as extra-constitutional and
revolutionary. . . . . "While it is universally conceded that the people are
sovereign and that they have power to adopt a constitution and to change their
own work at will, they must, in doing so, act in an orderly manner and
according to the settled principles of constitutional law. And where the people,
in adopting a constitution, have prescribed the method by which the people
may alter or amend it, an attempt to change the fundamental law in violation of
the self-imposed restrictions, is unconstitutional." . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the Constitution, cannot shirk from
its solemn oath and duty to insure compliance with the clear command of the Constitution that
a people's initiative may only amend, never revise, the Constitution.
The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the
Constitution? If the Lambino Group's initiative constitutes a revision, then the present petition should
be dismissed for being outside the scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution.
One of the earliest cases that recognized the distinction described the fundamental difference in this
manner:
[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent and
abiding nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision
indicate the will of the people that the underlying principles upon which
it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a
like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the significance of the
term "amendment" implies such an addition or change within the lines of the
original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the
purpose for which it was framed. 35 (Emphasis supplied) CDISAc
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the
principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the
change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial
provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that
adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects
several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision
being amended.

A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great coequal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the
separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to
a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and
executive branches is a radical change in the structure of government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation
of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one
chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a
revision of the Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a UnicameralParliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one
chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the
Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the
framework of government as set forth in the Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading
member of the Constitutional Commission, writes:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable
provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve
specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new
conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or
that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original
intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of
provisions of the document which have over-all implications for the entire
document, to determine how and to what extent they should be altered. Thus,
for instance a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary
system would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire
constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a
unicameral system be because of its effect on other important
provisions of the Constitution. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
In Adams v. Gunter, 42 an initiative petition proposed the amendment of the Florida State constitution
to shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The issue turned on whether the initiative "was
defective and unauthorized where [the] proposed amendment would . . . affect several other provisions
of [the] Constitution." The Supreme Court of Florida, striking down the initiative as outside the scope of
the initiative clause, ruled as follows:
The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to
provide for a Unicameral Legislature affects not only many other provisions
of the Constitution but provides for a change in the form of the

legislative branch of government, which has been in existence in the United

States Congress and in all of the states of the nation, except one, since the
earliest days. It would be difficult to visualize a more revolutionary
change. The concept of a House and a Senate is basic in the American form
of government.It would not only radically change the whole pattern of
government in this state and tear apart the whole fabric of the
Constitution, but would even affect the physical facilities necessary to
carry on government.
xxx xxx xxx
We conclude with the observation that if such proposed amendment were
adopted by the people at the General Election and if the Legislature at its next
session should fail to submit further amendments to revise and clarify the
numerous inconsistencies and conflicts which would result, or if after
submission of appropriate amendments the people should refuse to adopt
them, simple chaos would prevail in the government of this State. The same
result would obtain from an amendment, for instance, of Section 1 of Article V,
to provide for only a Supreme Court and Circuit Courts-and there could be
other examples too numerous to detail. These examples point unerringly to the
answer.
The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of men and
women and many sessions of the Legislature in bringing about the
Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate inconsistencies and conflicts and to give
the State a workable, accordant, homogenous and up-to-date document. All of
this could disappear very quickly if we were to hold that it could be amended in
the manner proposed in the initiative petition here. 43 (Emphasis supplied)
The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the present petition. The Lambino
Group's initiative not only seeks a shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, it also seeks to
merge the executive and legislative departments. The initiative in Adams did not even touch the
executive department.

In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the Florida Constitution that would
be affected by the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. In the Lambino Group's present
initiative, no less than 105 provisions of the Constitution would be affectedbased on the count of
Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. 44 There is no doubt that the Lambino Group's present
initiative seeks far more radical changes in the structure of government than the initiative in Adams.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between "amendment" and "revision" is onlyone of
procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and
proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called "revisions" because members
of the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. However, the same substantive changes,
when proposed through an initiative, are called "amendments" because the changes are made by
ordinary people who do not make an "occupation, profession, or vocation" out of such
endeavor.
Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory in their Memorandum:
99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional provisions
expressly provide for both "amendment" and "revision" when it speaks of
legislators and constitutional delegates, while the same provisions expressly
provide only for "amendment" when it speaks of the people. It would seem that
the apparent distinction is based on the actual experience of the people, that
on one hand the common people in general are not expected to work full-time
on the matter of correcting the constitution because that is not their
occupation, profession or vocation; while on the other hand, the legislators and
constitutional convention delegates are expected to work full-time on the same
matter because that is their occupation, profession or vocation. Thus, the

difference between the words "revision" and "amendment" pertain only

to the process or procedure of coming up with the corrections, for
purposes of interpreting the constitutional provisions.
100. Stated otherwise, the difference between "amendment" and
"revision" cannot reasonably be in the substance or extent of the
correction. . . . . (Underlining in the original; boldfacing supplied)
The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the
same proposed changes that the Lambino Group wrote in the present initiative, the changes would
constitute a revision of the Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that the proposed
changes in the present initiative constitute a revision if Congress or a constitutional convention
had drafted the changes. However, since the Lambino Group as private individuals drafted the
proposed changes, the changes are merely amendments to the Constitution. The Lambino Group
trivializes the serious matter of changing the fundamental law of the land.
The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the
Lambino Group's theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear
and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language. 45Any theory
espousing a construction contrary to such intent and language deserves scant consideration. More so,
if such theory wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the form of government established in the
Constitution. Such a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting inconsistencies in the
Constitution, only exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group's position. Any theory advocating that
a proposed change involving a radical structural change in government does not constitute a revision
justly deserves rejection.
The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents in American jurisdictions have
attempted to advance without any success. In Lowe v. Keisling, 46 the Supreme Court of
Oregon rejected this theory, thus:
Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to changes to the
constitution proposed by initiative. His theory is that Article XVII, section 2
merely provides a procedure by which the legislature can propose a
revision of the constitution, but it does not affect proposed revisions
initiated by the people. AcaEDC
Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a wholesale
change to the constitution that cannot be enacted through the initiative
process. They assert that the distinction between amendment and revision is
determined by reviewing the scope and subject matter of the proposed
enactment, and that revisions are not limited to "a formal overhauling of the
constitution." They argue that this ballot measure proposes far reaching
changes outside the lines of the original instrument, including profound
impacts on existing fundamental rights and radical restructuring of the
government's relationship with a defined group of citizens. Plaintiffs assert
that, because the proposed ballot measure "will refashion the most basic
principles of Oregon constitutional law," the trial court correctly held that it
violated Article XVII, section 2, and cannot appear on the ballot without the
prior approval of the legislature.
We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2(1), does not
prohibit revisions instituted by initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, . . ., the
Supreme Court concluded that a revision of the constitution may not be
accomplished by initiative, because of the provisions of Article XVII, section 2.
After reviewing Article XVII, section1, relating to proposed amendments, the
court said:
"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1, authorizes
the use of the initiative as a means of amending the Oregon
Constitution, but it contains no similar sanction for its use as a
means of revising the constitution." . . . .

It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and said: "It is the
only section of the constitution which provides the means for constitutional
revision and it excludes the idea that an individual, through the initiative, may
place such a measure before the electorate." . . . .
Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2,
does not apply to constitutional revisions proposed by initiative.
(Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory which negates the express intent of
the framers and the plain language of the Constitution.
We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green for amendments and at
the other end red for revisions. Towards the middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in
determining whether there is an amendment or revision. The present initiative is indisputably located at
the far end of the red spectrum where revision begins. The present initiative seeks a radical overhaul of
the existing separation of powers among the three co-equal departments of government, requiring farreaching amendments in several sections and articles of the Constitution.

The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law,
the later law prevails. This rule also applies to construction of constitutions. However, the Lambino
Group's draft of Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule of construction by
stating that in case of such irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier provision "shall be amended to
conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government." The effect is to freeze the two
irreconcilable provisions until the earlier one "shall be amended," which requires a future separate
constitutional amendment.
Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner Atty. Lambino readily conceded
during the oral arguments that the requirement of a future amendment is a "surplusage." In short, Atty.
Lambino wants to reinstate the rule of statutory construction so that the later provision automatically
prevails in case of irreconcilable inconsistency. However, it is not as simple as that.
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions is
not between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and a provision in the proposed changes.
The inconsistency is between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the "Parliamentary
system of government," and the inconsistency shall be resolved in favor of a "unicameral
parliamentary form of government."

Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting
any other section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a
revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years 47 is an
amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media
companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a revision. 48 Also, a change
requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment
and not a revision. 49

Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of government" do the Lambino Group's proposed
changes refer to the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are among
the few countries with unicameral parliaments? The proposed changes could notpossibly refer to the
traditional and well-known parliamentary forms of government the British, French, Spanish, German,
Italian, Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which have allbicameral parliaments. Did the
people who signed the signature sheets realize that they were adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean,
Israeli, or New Zealand parliamentary form of government?

The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the Constitution
other than the specific provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the structure of
government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches. These three
examples are located at the far green end of the spectrum, opposite the far red end where the revision
sought by the present petition is located.

This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for revisions of the Constitution but
only for amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
system requires harmonizing several provisions in many articles of the Constitution. Revision of the
Constitution through a people's initiative will only result in gross absurdities in the Constitution.

However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in
a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For
example, the substitution of the word "republican" with "monarchic" or "theocratic" in Section 1, Article
II 50 of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental
ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be examined case-bycase, depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of
government, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis
of the existing Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution,
adeliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision
requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles with those that remain
unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or
constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow people's
initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to
undertake only amendments and not revisions.
In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice
President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24
which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and
renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are
inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in which
case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary
form of government; . . . . (Emphasis supplied)

In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not an
amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments to this
Constitution."
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people's initiative to amend the
Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to cover the system of initiative to amend the
Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition.
Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply
with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the
Constitution.
This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case before the
Court can be resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the wellsettled doctrine that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be
resolved on some other grounds. 51
Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the constitutional provision on
initiatives to amend the Constitution, this will not change the result here because the present petition
violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present initiative
must first comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution even before complying with RA
6735. IATSHE
Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires that the "petition for
an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of
registered voters as signatories." Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people must sign the
"petition . . . as signatories."

The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the amended petition of 30
August 2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and
Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed the petition and amended petition as counsels for "Raul L.
Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners." In the COMELEC, the Lambino Group, claiming to
act "together with" the 6.3 million signatories, merely attached the signature sheets to the petition and
amended petition. Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the COMELEC did not even
comply with the basic requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group claims as valid.

The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's voice." However, the Lambino Group
unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the
COMELEC, that "ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms." The Lambino Group thus admitsthat their
"people's" initiative is an "unqualified support to the agenda" of the incumbent President to change
the Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of "people's voice" or "sovereign
will" in the present initiative.

The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No petition
embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; . . . ." The proposed
Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose further
amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the
form of government. Since the present initiative embraces more than one subject matter, RA
6735 prohibits submission of the initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the
Lambino Group's initiative will still fail.

This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution. The Constitution,
which embodies the people's sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This Court exists to defend and
protect the Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by deceptively
gathered signatures, to alter basic principles in the Constitution is to allow a desecration of the
Constitution. To allow such alteration and desecration is to lose this Court's raison d'etre.

4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the Lambino
Group's Initiative
In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely followed this
Court's ruling in Santiago and People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v.
COMELEC. 52 For following this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the
COMELEC. On this ground alone, the present petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court
should reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion
could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the
petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the
dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on
March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.
5. Conclusion
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect and obedience of all
the citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in
blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution
itself.
To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in unchartered waters, to
be tossed and turned by every dominant political group of the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier
change in the Constitution outside the constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the new dominant
political group that comes will demand its own set of changes in the same cavalier and unconstitutional
fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur well for the rule of law in this country.
An overwhelming majority 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of the total votes
cast 53 approved our Constitution in a national plebiscite held on 11 February 1987. That approval
is the unmistakable voice of the people, the full expression of the people's sovereign will. That
approval included the prescribed modes for amending or revising the Constitution.
No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures gathered by the Lambino Group,
can change our Constitution contrary to the specific modes that the people, in their sovereign capacity,
prescribed when they ratified the Constitution. The alternative is an extra-constitutional change, which
means subverting the people's sovereign will and discarding the Constitution. This is one act the
Court cannot and should never do. As the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to
perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the Constitution, which embodies the real sovereign will
of the people.
Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or "let the people decide" cannot override the
specific modes of changing the Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the
Constitution the people's fundamental covenant that provides enduring stability to our society
becomes easily susceptible to manipulative changes by political groups gathering signatures through
false promises. Then, the Constitution ceases to be the bedrock of the nation's stability.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.