Interdependence; check and balance

In Re: Laureta and Maravilla G.R.No. 68635

G.R. No. L-68635 May 14, 1987

Facts of the case:

Atty. Wenceslao Laureta filed a motion for reconsideration of the per curiam resolution of the court
finding him guilty of grave professional misconduct and suspending him indefinitely from the practice of law.
Eva Maravilla-Llustres also filed a motion for reconsideration from the decision holding her in contempt.
Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the dismissal of her case (a land
dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution. Illustre claims that it was an unjust resolution
deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the 1 st Division, that it was railroaded with such hurry beyond
the limits of legal and judicial ethics. Illustre later filed a criminal complaint before the Tanodbayan,
charging the Justices with knowingly rendering an unjust Minute Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen
Ordonez were also charged of using their influence in the First Division in rendering said Minute Resolution.
Atty Laureta was the counsel of Illustre. He allegedly circulates copies of the complaint to the press, without
any copy furnished to the Court, nor to the Justices charged. It was made to appear that the Justices were
charged with graft and corruption. The Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint. The SC is charging them with
contempt. They claim that the letters were private communication, and that they did not intend to dishonor
the court.

Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court Resolution can be a subject of investigation by the Tanodbayan

Ruling: No, Supreme Court resolutions are beyond investigation from other departments of the
government because of the doctrine of separation of powers. The correctness of the SC decisions is
conclusive upon the other branches of government.

Legislative (Article VI)- Limitation

G.R. No. L-26979 April 1, 1927

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiffs,
vs.
MILTON E. SPINGER, DALAMACIO COSTAS, and ANSELMO HILARIO, defendants.

Facts of the Case:

An original action for quo warranto brought in the name of government of the Philippine Islands
against three directors of National Coal Company who were elected to their position by legislative members
of the committee. The National Coal Company is a corporation organized and existing by virtue of Act no.
2705 of the Philippine Legislature. A special meeting was called for the purpose of electing directors. The
Governor General through his representative asserted the sole power to vote the stock of the government.
The Senate President and the Speaker of the House likewise asserted their power to vote. The Governor
General objected but the chair recognized the Senate President and the Speaker of the house as majority
member. All the directors for whom the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House voted were
declared elected at the meeting.

Issue: Whether or not the members of the legislative body has the right to exercise the appointing power by
voting for the directors of the National Coal Company

Ruling: No, the placing of members of the Philippine Legislature on the voting committee constitutes an
invasion by the legislative department of the privileges of the Executive Department. The legislative body
cannot directly or indirectly perform functions of an executive nature through the designation of its presiding
officers as majority members of a body which has executive functions. The power of appointment in the
Philippines with minor exceptions belongs to the executive department; membership in the voting
committee is an executive function.
The Supreme Court emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it has nothing to do with
designating the persons to fill the office. Appointing persons to a public office is essentially executive. The
NCC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It was created by Congress. To extend the power
of Congress into allowing it, through the Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint members of
the NCC is already an invasion of executive powers.

Legislative (Article VI)- Limitation

CGDT v. Board of Public Utility G.R. No. 11216

[ G.R. No. 11216, March 06, 1916 ]
COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS, PETITIONER, VS. THE BOARD OF PUBLIC
UTILITY COMMISSIONERS, RESPONDENT.
MORELAND, J.:

Facts of the Case:

An Appeal was filed from an order of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners of the Philippine
Islands, requiring the petitioner to file a detailed report of its finances and operations in the form set forth in
the petition. The petitioner denied the authority of the board to require the report asked on the ground that
the provision of Act no. 2307 rely on by the said board as authority for such requirement was, if construed
as conferring such power, invalid as constituting an unlawful attempt on the part of the legislature to
delegate legislative power to the board.

Issue: Whether or not the legislature in section 16 Act no. 2307 has unlawfully delegated legislative power
to the board in a manner almost absolute without laying down certain guidelines

Ruling: Yes, the legislature unlawfully delegated legislative power to the board. The provision complained
of does not lay "down the general rules of action under which the commission shall proceed," nor does it
itself prescribe in detail what those reports shall contain.
By the Organic Law, all legislative power is vested in the legislature and the power conferred upon
the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor General or anyone else. The legislature
cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law. The case of the United States Supreme Court dealt
with the rules and regulations which were promulgated by the secretary of agriculture for Government land
in the forest reserve. These decisions hold that legislative only can enact law, and that it cannot delegate
legislative authority. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin says: That no part of the legislative power can be
delegated by the legislature to any other department of the government executive or judicial is a
fundamental principle in constitutional law, essential to the integrity and maintenance of the system of
government established by the constitution.
.
The Supreme Court held that that the Legislature, by the provision in question, has abdicated its
powers and functions in favor of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners with respect to the matters
therein referred to, and that such Act is in violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. The Legislature,
by the provision referred to, has not asked for the information which the State wants but has authorized the
board to obtain the information which the board wants.

Legislative -Structure/Rules:

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 114783, December 08, 1994 ]
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, AND
ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY
TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, AND THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, ALL OF THE
CITY OF MANDALUYONG, METRO MANILA, RESPONDENTS.
BIDIN, J.:

Facts of the Case:

The residents of Mandaluyong invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong
assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as An act converting the Municipality
of Mandaluyong into a highly organized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong. The petitioner
contends that the assailed law violates the present constitutional limit in the no. of representatives as set
forth in the Constitution in Article VI Section 5 (1). They contend that the assailed law resulted in an
increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond what is provided in the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. 7675 violates the constitutional limit of the members of the House of
Representatives

Ruling:
Republic Act no. 7675 does not violate the present limit, for the Constitution provides that the
House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided
by law. The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be
increased, if the Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in
congressional representation mandated by R.A. no. 7675 is not unconstitutional.

Qualifications: Gallego v. Verra, (supra) Legislative

Gallego v. Verra G.R. No. 48641

[ G.R. No. 48641, November 24, 1941 ]
PEDRO GALLEGO, PETITIONER, VS. VICENTE VERRA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
OZAETA, J.:
Facts of the Case: A petition for certiorari was filed to review the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, which declared illegal and void the petitioners election
to the office of Municipal Mayor of Abuyog Leyte on the ground that he did not have the residence
qualification. Pedro Gallego , the petitioner worked in Malaybay Bukidnon, registered himself as voter and
voted there in 1938 and acquired his residence certificate there for the year 1940. Afterwards he returned
to Leyte and filed his candidacy and won.

Issue: Whether or not Gallego had lost his domicile of origin in the Municipality of Leyte by the mere fact
that he worked in Malaybay Bukidnon as Government employee and registered himself as a voter therein in
1938

Ruling: The petitioner did not lose his domicile of origin in Leyte. Residence is synonymous to domicile. In
order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new
locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
Petitioner did not reside in Malaybalay with the intention of remaining there indefinitely and of not
returning to Abuyog. He is a native of Abuyog. Notwithstanding his periodic absences from Leyte previous
to 1937, when he was employed as teacher in Samar, Agusan and other municipalities of Leyte, he always
returned there. In the year 1937 he resigned as a school teacher and presented his candidacy for the office
of mayor of said municipality. His departure therefrom after his defeat in that election was temporary and
only for the purpose of looking for employment.The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

Legislative (Article VI) Privileges

G.R. No. L-543 August 31, 1946

JOSE O. VERA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
JOSE A. AVELINO, ET AL., respondents.

Facts of the Case: Pursuant to a constitutional provision (section 4, Article X), the Commission on
elections submitted, last May, to the President and the Congress of the Philippines, its report on the
national elections held the preceding month, and, among other things, stated that, by reason of certain
specified acts of terrorism and violence in the Province of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac,
the voting in said region did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will. A resolution was
approved to defer the oath taking of Petitioners Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero.
Petitioners immediately instituted this action against their colleagues responsible for the resolution. They
pray for an order annulling it, and compelling respondents to permit them to occupy their seats, and to
exercise their Senatorial prerogatives.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can question the Commission on Election in connection with their
resolution to defer their oath taking as Senator

Ruling : No, the Constitution provides (Article VI, Section 15) that for any speech or debate in congress,
Senators and Congressmen shall not be questioned in any other place. It has been interpreted to include
the giving of vote or the presentation of resolution. According to the Supreme Court of Massachusetts,
these privileges are thus secured not to protect the members against prosecution for their own benefit, but
to support the right of the people, by enabling their Representatives to execute the function of their office
without fear of prosecution, civil or criminal. The respondents must not be questioned in connection with
their votes because of their congressional privilege.

vii. Records and Journals:

[ G.R. No. L-29658, November 29, 1968 ]

ENRIQUE V. MORALES, PETITIONER, VS. ABELARDO SUBIDO, AS COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL
SERVICE, RESPONDENT.
Facts of the Case:
The petitioner Enrique V. Morales is the chief of the detective bureau of the Manila Police
Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. The question for resolution in this case is whether a
person who has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years but does not
possess a bachelor's degree, is qualified for appointment as chief of police. The question calls for an
interpretation of the following provisions of section 10 of the Police Act of 1966 (Republic
Act4864):"Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. - No person may be appointed
chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning
and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has
served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with the
rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has
served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/ or higher.
However somewhere in the legislative process a phrase was dropped under which the petitioner could
possibly qualified ,who is at least a high school graduate (both parties agree that the petitioner finished the
second year of the law course). The amendment was in nature an addition to the phrase ,who has served
the police department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/ or higher, Because of the
suggested possibility that the deletion was made by mistake, the writer of the opinion examined the
enrolled bill.
Issue: Whether or not the SC can look upon the history of the bill to inquire upon the journals, to look
searchingly into the matter.
Ruling: The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows
that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing.
The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the
other branches of the Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of
the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. The court cannot judicially
supply an omission at the time of enactment whether careless or calculated. Under the enrolled bill theory
the text of the act must be deemed as importing absolute verity as binding on the court. It carries on its
face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government charged that it
was passed by the congress. It was held that it appears that when the two chambers of the legislature met
in conference committee, the phrase "has served as chief of police with exemplary record" was added, it
logically means that - except for that vagrant phrase "who has served the police department of a city for at
least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher" - a high school graduate, no matter how long he has
served in a city police department, is not qualified for appointment as chief of police. All the SC holds is
that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in
the event of any discrepancy.

viii. The Electoral Tribunal

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 97105, October 15, 1991 ]
ROSETTE YNIGUEZ LERIAS, PETITIONER, VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL AND ROGER G. MERCADO, RESPONDENTS.
Facts of the Case: Petitioner Rossete Y. Lerias filed her certificate for the position of Representative of
Southern Leyte. Respondent Roger C. Mercado was the administration candidate for same position who
was proclaimed as the winning candidate. It appeared that, excluding the certificate of canvass from the
Municipality of Libagon which had been questioned by Mercado on the ground that it had been tampered,
he was the winning candidate. Thus if said copy will be included in the canvass Lerias will be the winning
candidate with a margin of 146 votes. Lerias then filed with the Comelec for the annulment of the canvass
and proclamation of Mercado. There being no action, he filed to the Supreme Court for the Annulment of
the Comelec resolution. The court dismissed the petition, hence she filed an election protest with
respondent HRET. The tribunal declares protestee Mercado as the duly elected representative. The
chairperson of the tribunal Justice Herrera as well as Justice Cruz and Gangcayo dissented stating that the
tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion that it disregarded the evidence, law and the rudiment of
fairness. For the tribunal rejected the election returns and their unfounded suspicion that it was tampered
and that it depart from the interpretation of neighborhood rule.

Issue: Whether or not the Electoral Tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion in proclaiming Mercado
as the Duly elected representative of Southern Leyte

Ruling: The court held that the action of the tribunal is arbitrary for it departs from the interpretation of the
neighborhood rule heretofore consistently followed by the tribunal and by injecting strange jurisprudence
particularly in the intent rule; the majority has succeeded in altering the figures that reflect the final outcome
of the election protest, thwarting the will of the electorate. Although the composition of the Tribunal is
predominantly legislative, the function of the body is purely judicial, to be discharged on the basis solely of
legal considerations, without regard to political, personal and other irrelevant persuasions. The Decision of
the HRET is reversed and set aside.

viii. The Electoral Tribunal

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 106971, October 20, 1992 ]
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., AND LAKAS-NATIONAL UNION OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS
(LAKAS-NUCD), PETITIONERS, VS. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ALBERTO ROMULO AND
WIGBERTO E. TAADA, RESPONDENT. NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, PETITIONERININTERVENTION.

Facts of the Case: This is a petition for Prohibition to prohibit respondents Senators Alberto Romulo and
Wigberto Taada from sitting and assuming the position of members of the Commission on Appointments
and to prohibit Senators Neptali Gonzales, as ex-officio Chairman, of said Commission from recognizing
and allowing the respondent senators to sit as members thereof. Petitioner contends that Senate have
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction when it designated respondent Senator Romulo as eighth
member of the Commission on Appointments, upon nomination by the LDP, and respondent Senator
Taada as LP nominee, notwithstanding, that, in both instances, LDP and LP are each entitled only to "half
a member". They contends that it clearly violates Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its
mandate that membership in in the Commission be based on proportional representation of the political
parties and in effect it reduced the representation of one political party.
Issue: Whether or not the election of Senators Alberto Romulo and Wigberto E. Taada as members of the
Commission on Appointments is in accordance with the provision of Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
Ruling: The court held that the election of Senator Romulo and Senator Taada as members of the
Commission on Appointments by the LDP majority in the Senate was clearly a violation of Section 18 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a
fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties.
A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application.
The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP
majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by
adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one partys fractional membership was
correspondingly reduced leaving the latters representation in the Commission on Appointments to less
than their proportional representation in the Senate. A political party must at least have two senators in the
senate to be able to have a representative in the commission on appointments, so that any number less
than two will not entitle such party to a membership thereof. Senator Tanada and Romulo being entitled
only to a half member cannot be entitled to be a member of Commission on Appointments.

xiii. Appropriation

[ G.R. No. L-33713, July 30, 1975 ]

EUSEBIO B. GARCIA, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. HON. ERNESTO S. MATA, SECRETARY
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, AND GENERAL MANUEL T. YAN, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES.
CASTRO, J.:

Facts of the Case: Eusebio B. Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty who was reversed into inactive
status. He filed an action for mandamus to compel the Department of National Defense and Armed Forces
of the Philippines to reinstate him to service and readjust his rank and pay emoluments. He contends that
his reversion to inactive status was in violation of R.A. 1600 which prohibits the reversion to inactive status
of reserve officers on active duty with at least ten years of accumulated active commissioned service. On
the other hand, the respondents contend that the said provision has no relevance or pertinence whatsoever
to the budget in question or to any appropriation item contained therein.
Issue: Whether or not R..A. 1600 contains a provision not related to the appropriation act and therefore it is
invalid for it violates Art VI. Section 19 par 2 of the 1935 Constitution
Ruling: The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. While R.A. 1600 appropriated money for the
operation of the Government for the fiscal year 1956-1957, the said paragraph 11 refers to the fundamental
governmental policy matters of the calling to active duty and the reversion to inactive status of reserve
officers in the AFP. It was a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure in violation of the
constitutional inhibition against 'riders' to the general appropriation act." It was indeed a new and
completely unrelated provision attached to the Appropriation. Section 11 is unconstitutional; the petitioner
cannot compel the respondents to reinstate him to active duty.

xiii. Appropriation

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 99886, March 31, 1993 ]
JOHN H. OSMEA, PETITIONER, VS. OSCAR ORBOS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY; JESUS ESTANISLAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF FINANCE;
WENCESLAO DELA PAZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS HEAD OF THE OFFICE OF ENERGY AFFAIRS;
REX V. TANTIONGCO, AND THE ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, RESPONDENTS.
NARVASA, C.J.:

Facts of the Case: Petitioner seeks the corrective, prohibitive and coercive remedies provided by rule 65
of the Rules of Court. He contends the invalidity of the trust account created pursuant to section 8,
paragraph 1 of PD no. 1956 as amended said creation of trust fund being contrary to Section 19 (3) Article
VI of the Constitution. This states that All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be
treated as a special fund and paid out for such purposes only. If the purpose for which a special fund was
created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the
Government." He contends that it must be treated as a special fund and not a trust account or trust fund.
Issue: Whether or not the creation of the trust fund violates 29(3), Article VI of the Constitution
Ruling: No. "The character of the Stabilization Fund as a special kind of fund is emphasized by the fact that
the funds are deposited in the Philippine National Bank and not in the Philippine Treasury, moneys from
which may be paid out only in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (1987) Constitution, ArticleVI,
Sec. 29 (3), lifted from the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 23(1).", It seems clear that while the funds
collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State.
OPSF is a special fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E. O. 137. It is segregated from the
general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a "Trust Liability Account," the fund
nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these
measures comply with the constitutional description of a "special fund." Indeed, the practice is not without
precedent

Executive- Powers/Limitations

Guevara v. Inocentes, 16 SCRA 379 (1966)

FACTS: Onofre Guevara took his oath On November 25, 1965, as an Undersecretary of Labor after his
appointment was extended ad interim on November 22, 1965. The appointment was questioned by Rauol
Inocentes on the ground that Guevaras appointment ceases to be valid after each term of Congress. At
around midnight of January 22, 1966, the Senate adjourned its session. The House of Representatives
continued its session and adjourned upon learning the Senates adjournment. In the case of Guevaras
appointment, Congress, through the Commission on appointments has not acted on it while the special
session is being conducted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ad interim appointment of Onofre P. Guevara by the Executive is valid even
after the senates adjournment
RULING: It was held that Art. VII, Sec. 10, Subsection 4 of the 1935 Constitution: "the President shall have
the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointment shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
Congress" The validity of an ad interim appointment shall be allowed when (a) until disapproval of the
Commission on Appointments and (b) adjournment of Congress, whether special or regular session. In this
case, the second mode of termination took effect when the Congress adjourned sine die at about midnight
of January 22, 1966 which made the appointment of petitioner Guevara ineffective. The contention that the
Commission on Appointments should be first organized before the second mode can be made effective is
untenable because they are two different and separate modes of termination. Since the termination of ad
interim appointment cannot be separated, the well-known maxim in statutory construction applies. Ubi lex
non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus.

Chief Executive

G.R. No. 46570

JOSE D. VILLENA, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, respondent.
LAUREL, J.:
Facts of the Case: Petitioner Jose Villena Mayor of Makati, Rizal was found to have committed bribery,
extortion, malicious abuse of authority and unauthorized practice of law profession by the Division of
Investigation of the Department of Justice upon the request of Secretary of Interior. The respondent was
suspended by the Secretary of Interior, he then filed for an original action of prohibition with prayer of
preliminary injunction against the Secretary of Interior. Petitioner contends that the Secretary of interior has
no authority to investigate and suspend him for it was lodge in some other agencies of the Government.

Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Interior has the legal authority to investigate and suspend the
petitioner

Ruling: The court held that under Section 79 (c) of Administrative Code the Department Head shall have
direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction and may, any
provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, repeal or modify the decisions of the chiefs of said
bureaus of offices when advisable in the public interest the Secretary of Interior is invested with authority to
order the investigation of the charges against the petitioner and appoint a special investigator for that
purpose. Also in section 86 of the same Code which grants to the Department of the Interior "executive
supervision over the administration of provinces, municipalities, chartered cities and other local political
subdivisions.
As to the power to suspension it was sustained on the principle of approval or ratification of the act
of the Secretary of Interior by the President of the Philippines. Under the presidential type of government
which we have adopted and considering the departmental organization established and continued in force
by paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations
are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants
and agents of the Chief Executive, and except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or the law to act in person. The acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

Executive Clemency

TORRES VS. GONZALES,152 SCRA 272

Facts of the case::
Sometime before 1979, petitioner Wilfredo Torres was convicted by the CFI of Manila of 2 counts
estafa and were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The maximum sentence would expire on November 2,
2000. A conditional pardon was granted by the President on condition that petitioner would not again
violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded
against in the manner prescribed by law.Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was released from
confinement. Respondent Minister of Justice Neptali Gonzales wrote the President informing her of the
Resolution of the Board recommending the cancellation of the pardon previously granted to petitioner for
records of NBI shows a long list of charges against him during the last 20 years. The conditional pardon
was cancelled and petitioner was arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his
sentence. An action was filed contesting the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment he claimed
that he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the 20
counts of estafa nor of the crime of sedition.
Issue: Whether or not a conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court necessary before the petitioner
can be validly rearrrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon.

Rulng: The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are
purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny. A convict granted conditional pardon, like
the petitioner herein, who is recommitted must of course be convicted by final judgment of a court of the
subsequent crime or crimes with which he was charged before the criminal penalty for such subsequent
offense(s) can be imposed upon him. Since Article 159 of the RPC defines a distinct, substantive felony,
the parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions thereof must be charged,
prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty in Article 159.

XV. Power to Tax

[ G.R. No. L-15270, September 30, 1961 ]

JOSE V. HERRERA AND ESTER OCHANGCO HERRERA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE QUEZON CITY
BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS, RESPONDENT.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Facts of the case: Petitioners Jose V. Herrera and Ester Ochangco Herrera filed an appeal from a
decision of the Court of Tax Appeals affirming that of Board of Assessment Appeals which held that certain
properties of said petitioners are subject to assessment for purposes of real estate tax. St Catherine
Hospital was granted exemption from real property taxes however it was reclassified from exempt to
taxable and was assessed. The court of tax appeals contend that it is like other hospitals operated for profit
on the ground that it has a pay ward and petitioners family occupy the portion of the building as their
residence.
Issue: Whether or not St. Catherine hospital although it admits pay patients is a charitable institution and
therefore exempt from taxation
Ruling: The lot, building and improvements constituting the St. Catherines Hospital are exempt from
taxation under the provision of the Constitution. Pursuant to the Constitution All lands, buildings and
improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxation regardless of whether or not material profits are derived from the operation of the institution in
question. In other words, Congress may, if it deems to do so, impose tax upon such profits but said lands
are beyond its taxing power. The admission of pay patients does not detract from the charitable character
of a hospital, if all of its funds are devoted exclusively to the maintenance of the institution as a public
charity the exemption in favor of a property used exclusively for charitable or educational purpose is not
limited to property actually indispensable therefore but extends to facilities which are incidental to and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of said purpose. St. Catherines Hospital is a charitable
institution exempt from taxation.

Executive- Powers Limitations

Doromal v. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354 (1989)

Facts of the Case: Quintin S. Doromal a public officer, being then a Commissioner of the Presidential Commision on
Good Governance was charged of participating in a business through the Doromal Trading Corportion a family
corporation of which he is the President. The company participated in the biddings conducted by the Department of
Education Culture and Sports and the National Manpower & Youth Council, which act or participation is prohibited by
law and constitution. He was charged for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. An information was then
filed by the Tanodbayan against Doromal and a preliminary investigation was conducted. The Supreme Court
directed the filing of information to the SandigangBayan instead to the Tanodbayan, a new information duly approved
by the ombudsman was filed to the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner filed a motion to quash and it was denied by the
Sandiganbayan on the ground that another preliminary investigation is unnecessary because both old and new
information involve the same subject matter. He then filed for a petition for certiorari and prohibitionat the Supreme
Court.

Issue: Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of Section 13 Article VII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits public officials in participating in any business
Ruling: The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of Doromal of the Application to bid
shows that he can rightfully be charged with having participated in a business which act is absolutely
prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution because the DITC remained a family corporation
in which Doromal has at least has indirect interest. Section 13 Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides
that President, Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not during
their tenure participates directly or indirectly in any business.

Executive
EN BANC
July 28, 1966
G.R. No. L-25716
FERNANDO LOPEZ, petitioner,
vs.
GERARDO ROXAS and PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondents.
Facts of the Case:
Petitioner Fernando Lopez and respondent Gerardo Roxas were the main contenders for the
Office of Vice-President of the Philippines in the general elections in 1965. Fernando Lopez won as the
Vice-President, respondent Gerardo Roxas who lost filed a petition with the Presidential Electoral tribunal
contesting the election of Lopez as the Vice- President of the Philippines, upon the ground that it was not
he, but said respondent, who had obtained the largest number of votes for said office. Petitioner Lopez
filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction, against respondent Roxas, to prevent the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal from hearing and deciding the election contest, upon the ground that Republic Act No.
1793, creating said Tribunal, is "unconstitutional," and that, "all proceedings taken by it are a nullity." They
contend that it is illegal for Justices of the Supreme Court to sit as members of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, since the decisions thereof are appealable to the Supreme Court on questions of law; that the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal is a court inferior to the Supreme Court; and that Congress cannot by
legislation appoint in effect the members of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.

Issue: Whether or not the creation of Presidential electoral tribunal which is composed of Justices of
the Supreme Court is constitutional and therefor has power over election contests involving Presidential
and Vice- Presidential candidate
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the Presidential electoral tribunal is not in conflict with the
Constitution. R.A. 1793 merely adds the courts jurisdiction and such can be validly legislated by Congress.
It merely confers upon the S.C. additional functions. This is valid because determination of Election Contest
is essentially judicial .It is not inconsistent with the Constitution or with the principle of separation of powers
underlying the same, but, also, that it is in harmony with the aforementioned grant of "the judicial power" to
said courts. , the power to be the "judge ... of ... contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications"
of any public officer is essentially judicial. As such under the very principle of separation of powers
invoked by petitioner herein it belongs exclusively to the judicial department, except only insofar as the
Constitution provides otherwise. Indeed, the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and courts of first
instance, are vested with original jurisdiction, as well as with appellate jurisdiction, in consequence of which
they are both trial courts and appellate courts, without detracting from the fact that there is only one
Supreme Court, one Court of Appeals, and one court of first instance, clothed with authority to discharged
said dual functions.

Declaratory Relief/Justiciable Controversy

PACU v. secretary of Education, 97 Phil 806 (1955)
Facts of the case:
Petitioning colleges and universities request that Act no. 2706 as amended by Act no. 3075 and
commonwealth Act no. 180 be declared unconstitutional on the grounds that A. They deprive owners of
school and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law. B.
They deprive parents and of their natural rights and duty to rear their children. C. Provisions conferring on
the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules standards constitute an
unlawful delegation of legislative power. The Solicitor General contends that the matter constitutes no
justiciable controversy for none of the petitioners has cause to present the issue because all of them have
permits to operate and are actually operating and they do not assert that the respondent has threatened to
revoke their permits.

Issue: Whether or not the court can take cognizance of the case for the matter raised by the petitioner
constitutes a justiciable controversy
Ruling: There was no justiciable controversy. The Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law
upon the complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. The power of courts to
declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of the litigant require the use of that judicial
authority for their protection against actual interference, a hypothetical threat being insufficient. Mere
Apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit of one of the
petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy. Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic
questions to satisfy scholarly interests therein however intellectually solid the problem maybe. This is
especially true where the issues reach constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into play regard for
the courts duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion. Petition for
prohibition was denied.

Legal Standing
G.R. No. L-10405
December 29, 1960

WENCESLAO PASCUAL, in his official capacity as Provincial Governor of Rizal, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, ET AL., respondents-appellees.

Facts of the Case: Appeal, by petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, from a decision of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, dismissing the above entitled case and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction therein issued,
without costs. Petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, as Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted this action for
declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the ground that Republic Act No. 920, entitled "An Act
Appropriating Funds for Public Works: connect any government property or any important premises to
the main highway; that the aforementioned Antonio Subdivision were private properties of respondent Jose
C. Zulueta, who, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, was a member of the Senate of the
Philippines. The plaintiff contends that Republic Act No. 920, is null and void for it is subject to an
onerous condition, said donation partook of the nature of a contract; that, such, said donation violated the
provision of our fundamental law prohibiting members of Congress from being directly or indirectly
financially interested in any contract with the Government, and, hence, is unconstitutional, , for the
construction of the projected feeder roads in question with public funds would greatly enhance or increase
the value of the aforementioned subdivision of respondent Zulueta, "aside from relieving him from the
burden of constructing his subdivision streets or roads at his own expense"; Respondents moved to dismiss
the petition upon the ground that petitioner had "no legal capacity to sue", and that the petition did "not
state a cause of action"
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner as Provincial Governor of Rizal has legal standing to questions the
validity of R.A. 920
Ruling: Yes, petitioner has legal standing. It is well-stated that the validity of a statute may be contested
only by one who will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many
decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds, 5upon
the theory that "the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The petitioners has legal standing because
of the importance of the issues therein raised is present in the case at bar. Again, like the petitioners in
the Rodriguez and Barredo cases, petitioner herein is not merely a taxpayer. The Province of Rizal, which
he represents officially as its Provincial Governor, is our most populated political subdivision, and, the
taxpayers therein bear a substantial portion of the burden of taxation, in the Philippines. the rule
recognizing the right of taxpayers to assail the constitutionality of a legislation appropriating local or state
public funds has greater application in the Philippines than that adopted with respect to acts of Congress of
the United States appropriating federal funds. The authority of the Republic of the Philippines over the
people of the Philippines is more fully direct than that of the states of the Union, insofar as the simple and
unitary type of our national government is concerned.

Rules of Procedure/Admission to the Bar/Dsicipline

G.R. No. 116049 July 13, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 47, Puerto Princesa City, ARNE
STROM and GRACE REYES, respondents.

Facts of the Case: Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott was complemented with a reprimand and a fine P10,
000.00 by the Court a quo for gross ignorance of the law. He filed for reconsideration and supplemental
motion for reconsideration. He contends that it is only the full court and not a division thereof , that can
administratively punished him. He filed a motion pleading that the spreading of the aforesaid decision be
reconsidered for his chance for promotion in the judiciary will be foreclosed. He also questions why he was
not informed that the case has been transferred to another division.

Issue: Whether or not the second division of the Supreme Court can administer disciplinary action against
the respondent judge

Ruling: The very text of the present Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the Constitution clearly shows that there are
actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause which states that the SC en banc shall have the
power to discipline judges of lower courts, is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the
determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not therein intended
that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole Court since it would
result in an absurdity The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is
intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en banc can
order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on
the issues in the case and voted therein. In this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon
and decided by the full Court itself. Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary
power to the Court en banc, a decision en banc is needed only where the penalty to be imposed is the
dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension
of any of them for a period of more than 1 year or a fine exceeding P10, 000.00 or both.
Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters or cases
regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay in
the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving the
penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc. Under circular no 2-89 en banc cases
assigned to a division rest on the same rationale and applies with equal force. As to the second contention
the court held that the spreading of the personal record is an official procedure and requirement and there
is no rule that parties are to be informed that a case has been transferred to another division, as
respondent judge would want or expect.

Civil Service- Scope of Authority

G.R. No. 96298 May 14, 1991

RENATO M. LAPINID, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY and JUANITO JUNSAY, respondents.
Facts of the Case:
Petitioner Renato M. Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine Ports Authority to the position of Terminal
Supervisor at the Manila International Container Terminal. This appointment was protested by private
respondent Juanito Junsay, who asks for a review of the decision of the Placement Committee. He
contended that he should be designated terminal supervisor, or to any other comparable position, in view of
his preferential right thereto. When the PPA had not acted on his protest, he challenged. Lapinid's
appointment with the Civil Service Commission. The Civil Service Commission in its resolution directed
appellants Juanito Junsay and Benjamin Villegas be appointed as terminal supervisor while vice protestees
Lapinid and Dulfo may be considered for appointment to any position commensurate and suitable to their
qualifications. Lapinid and the Philippine Ports of Authority, filed their own motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment
on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding,
order his replacement by the latter
Ruling: Civil Service Commission has no power of appointment except over its own personnel. Neither
does it have the authority to review the appointments made by other offices except only to ascertain if the
appointee possesses the required qualifications. The determination of who among aspirants with the
minimum statutory qualifications should be preferred belongs to the appointing authority and not the Civil
Service Commission. It cannot disallow an appointment because it believes another person is better
qualified and much less can it direct the appointment of its own choice. This is a matter addressed only to
the discretion of the appointing authority. It is a political question that the Civil Service Commission has no
power to review under the Constitution and the applicable laws. A full reading of the provision of section 9
(h) of Article V of the Civil Service Decree specially of the underscored parts, will make it clear that all the
Commission is actually allowed to do is check whether or not the appointee possesses the appropriate civil
service eligibility or the required qualifications. If he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is
disapproved. No other criterion is permitted by law to be employed by the Commission when it acts onor
as the Decree says, "approves" or "disapproves'an appointment made by the proper authorities. The
Civil Service Commission is ORDERED to desist from disregarding the doctrine announced in Luego v.
Civil Service Commission and the subsequent decisions reiterating such ruling.

COMELEC- Powers/Functions/ Scope and limitations of Authority

G.R. No. 112060 July 17, 1995
NORBI H. EDDING, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and PABLO BERNARDO, respondents.
FRANCISCO, J.

Facts of the Case: Petitioner Norbi H. Edding and Respondent Pablo S. Bernardo were among the
candidates for the office of the Municipal mayor of Sibuco Zamboanga del Norte. Bernardo was declared
winner over Edding. Edding filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court . The RTC rendered
judgment on July 2, 1993 proclaiming Edding as the winner of the election and declaring null and void the
election of respondent Bernardo. The RTC granted Edding's Motion for Immediate Execution then he
replaced Bernardo and assumed office. Bernardo filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Certiorari with
Application for Preliminary Injunction and for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. The COMELEC
gave due course to the petition. The court granted petitioner Edding's prayer for a temporary restraining
order and ordered respondent COMELEC to cease and desist from further proceeding with the case.
Petitioner advances the argument that in the absence of any conferment on the COMELEC, under the
Constitution or by any statute, the COMELEC lacks jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction to issue Writs of Certiorari
against the interlocutory order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in election cases.
Ruling: Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 providing as follows: The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive
authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases
remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of
the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue
the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. But
notwithstanding the aforementioned pronouncements, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
in the instant case when it enjoined the order of the RTC, dated July 13, 1993, granting petitioner's motion
for immediate execution Considering however that the term of office for the disputed mayoralty seat will
already expire on June 30, 1995, in addition to the fact that the election for the next term of office for the
contested post has recently been concluded, the instant petition has therefore become moot.

COMELEC- Powers/Functions/ Scope and limitations of Authority

EN BANC
G.R. No. 85742 April 19, 1990
JESUS F. SALAZAR, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, AND BENJAMIN S. IMPERIAL, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Facts of the Case: In the 18 January 1988 local elections, Petitioner Jesus V. ZALAZAR and respondent
Benjamin S. IMPERIAL were candidates for Mayor of Legaspi City. Petitioner SALAZAR registered
objections to the admission of 165 election returns allegedly due to massive irregularities committed by or
on behalf of Respondent IMPERIAL. The City Board of Canvassers (the City Board, for short) overruled the
objections. Salazar filed before the COMELEC a Petition (SPC No. 88-265) for "Declaration of Failure of
Election and Holding of New Election, or annulment of Disputed Election Returns, and/or Appeal from the
Rulings of the City Board of Canvassers of Legaspi City." In the alternative, Petitioner Salazar asked the
COMELEC to order a recount of the votes cast, or to annul the affected returns; and in either case, to set
aside the appealed rulings of the Board. The comelec en banc resolved to suspend the effects of the
proclamation of Bejamin Imperial.In the meantime, the COMELEC was reorganized. Subsequent to that
reorganization, or on 26 February 1988, the First Division of the COMELEC promulgated a Minute
Resolution which resolve to lift the suspension of proclamation and order the proclamation of the winning
candidate.
Issue: Whether or not Comelec first division lacks jurisdiction to resolve motions for reconsideration

Ruling: Petitioner SALAZAR's contention that the COMELEC First Division could not have lifted the
suspension of proclamation mandated by the COMELEC en banc (Resolution of 31 January 1988) is
without merit. As authorized in the COMELEC en banc's Resolution of 21 October 1988. The Commission
en banc itself, in an executive session shortly after said elections, empowered the Division to which a
particular case is assigned, to lift the order of suspension should such Division find it proper in the course of
its consideration of the case. The minute resolution of the First Division of 26 February 1988 was in
accordance with this executive resolution. Petitioner SALAZAR cannot justifiably argue that the COMELEC
was devoid of jurisdiction to do so, the matter of jurisdiction, meaning the light of a tribunal to act in a
particular case, being governed by law. It thus uphold the proclamation of Respondent Benjamin S.
Imperial.

The Commission on Audit- Powers/Functions/ Scope and limitations of Authority

G.R. No. L-107016 March 11, 1994

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, VIVENCIO MACAPAGAL, ALFREDO CASAL, EDUARDO
MENDOZA, ADORACION GARCIA, RODEL MAGNAYON, ROSARIO ELEP, MA. ANTONIO REBUENO,
JOSE RIVERA, M. SAPALICIO and G. ROJAS, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent
Facts of the Case: Respondent Commission on Audit disallowed the amount P246,539.25 representing
payment of custom duties and taxes for one ((1) unit of KVA Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS)
purchase by petitioner Development Bank. A public bidding was conducted out of the eight suppliers who
participated, two bidders qualified namely Paris Manila Trading Corporation and Voltronics Industrial
Corporation. Upon thorough evaluation, it was given to Voltronics, the offer was exclusive of custom duties
and taxes. After a review of documents, then corporate auditor Gervacio found the subject transaction to
be in order and suggested that in future biddings the quotation should always mean the total price to be
paid to DPB including custom and duties and/or other charges. In the meantime COA Circular no. 82-299
was passed lifting the pre-audit government transaction and then the new Corporate Auditor disallowed the
amount representing custom duties and taxes and it was affirmed by the Commission En Banc. The
petitioner filed for a petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent Commission erred in applying the post audit system under the COA
circular no. 82-299 considering that at the time of the questioned bidding the law in force was COA circular
no. 86-257
Ruling: The court held under Article IX (D) Section 2(1) of the Constitution expressly grants respondent
Commission the power to conduct a post-audit, to wit: Sec. 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the
power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts
of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the
Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies,
commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous
state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from
or through the Government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as
a condition of subsidy or equity. DBP is no doubt a government corporation and the question of whether
COA Circular 86-299 was retroactively applied to the subject transaction is thus of no moment. To begin
with, there was never any retroactive application of post-audit. Regardless of the result of the pre-audit, it
cannot be denied that respondent COA is so empowered to conduct a post-audit.
The decision of COA was reversed and set aside and directed it to allow in post audit for there
was no undue advantage could been said to have been awarded to Voltrex and DBP was well aware that
the offer does not include custom duties and taxes. For, even if Paris-Manila were afforded the opportunity
to improve its bid, considering the disparity of its bid with Voltronics' of P1,436,539.25, inclusive of duties
and taxes, the latter would still be the lowest bidder.

Local Government - Composition/ Qualifications

G.R. No. 84663 August 24, 1990

JOHNNY D. SUPANGAN, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. LUIS T. SANTOS, Secretary of the Department of Local Government, and MARISSA DOMANTAY,
respondents.
G.R. No. 85012 August 24, 1990

Facts of the Case: Petitioner Johnny D. Supangan, Jr., is a member of the Kabataang Barangay (KB) of
Mabini, Pangasinan. He was elected KB Chairman of the said municipality and in the same year was
elected KB Provincial Federation President of the province of Pangasinan. Petitioner was appointed by
then President Marcos as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province of Pangasinan
representing the youth sector. He accordingly assumed office, discharged his functions and participated in
the deliberations of the said body. However on August 8, 1988 at the session hall of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, respondent Marissa Domantay presented to the Presiding Officer a letter dated August 3,
1988 written by respondent Secretary Luis T. Santos advising the Sangguniang Panlalawigan that
respondent "Marissa Domantay has been named as member thereof to replace Johnny D. Supangan, Jr."
She took her oath of office on August 25, 1988 and began attending the sessions of the said body.
Petitioner contends that respondent Marissa Domantay lacks the basic qualification for appointment as a
representative of youth sector for she was never elected as KB Provincial President.
Issue: Whether or not Marissa Domantay can be validly appointed as member of Sangguniang
Panglalawigan even if she was never elected as KB Provincial President
Ruling: No. Private respondent Marissa Domantay has never been elected as Kabataang Barangay
Provincial Federation President of Pangasinan, a basic qualification for appointment as member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan representing the youth sector. (Section 132 of B.P. Blg. 337) Furthermore,
Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution of 1986, Proclamation No. 3 of President Corazon C.
Aquino provides: All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall
continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or
appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one year from February
25, 1986.
The petitioner, as one who was appointed under the 1973 Constitution continues in office until the
appointment and qualification of his successor. Since the appointment of his successor, respondent
Marissa Domantay, is not valid, the tenure of petitioner Johnny Supangan, Jr. cannot be terminated on that
basis alone.

Local Government- Powers/Functions/ Scope and limitations of Authority

G.R. No. 111511 October 5, 1993
ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LUCILA PAYUMO, ET AL., respondents.
Facts of the Case; Mayors, Vice Mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve
Municipalities of the Province of Bataan constituted themselves into a preparatory recall assembly to
initiate the recall of the petitioner Garcia. Thereafter a resolution was passed for the recall of the petitioner
on the ground of loss of confidence. Petitioner filed a motion to deny due course to said resolution
alleging that it failed to comply with the substantial and procedural requirement under R.A. 7160. The
Comelec dismissed the petition and scheduled the recall election. The petitioner then filed a motion for
certiorari and prohibition with a writ of preliminary injunction to annul the said resolution. He contends that
the people have the sole and exclusive right to decide whether or not to initiate recall proceedings.

Issue: Whether or not the preparatory recall assembly has the power to initiate recall of a local elective
official

Ruling: Yes, Under R.A. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1995, Congress
provided for a second mode of initiating recall process through a preparatory recall assembly which in the
provincial level is composed of all mayors, vice-mayors and sanggunian members of the municipalities and
component cities. There were two (2) principal reasons why this alternative mode of initiating the recall
process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct
action of the people; and (b) to cut down on its expenses. Initiation by the PRAC is also the initiation of the
people, albeit done indirectly through their representatives. It is not constitutionally impermissible for the
people to act through their elected representatives. The court uphold the constitutionality of the assailed
mode of recall through preparatory recall assembly.

Local Government- Powers/Functions/ Scope and limitations of Authority

G.R. No. L-1281

JOSEPH E. ICARD, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE CITY COUNCIL OF BAGUIO and THE CITY OF BAGUIO, respondent-appellants.
REYES, J.:

Facts of the Case: The City of Baguio filed for an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Mountain Province. The city of Baguio enacted the following ordinances No. 6-v, providing among other
things for an amusement tax of P0.20 for every person entering a night club licensed to do business in the
city; No. 11-V, providing for a property tax on motor vehicles kept and operated in the city; and No. 12-V,
imposing a graduated license fee on every admission ticket sold by enterprises enumerated in said
ordinance among them, cinematographs. Petitioner a resident of the City of Baguio contends that the
ordinances are unjust and ultra vires. For in addition to said amusement tax and license fee, petitioner has
also been required to pay 0.20 per person entering the night club and an additional property tax for his
automobile in which he is already paying P37 under the Revised Motor Law.

Issue: Whether or not the City of Baguio is empowered to levy a property tax on motor and an amusement
tax on night clubs

Ruling: The court held that a Municipal Corporation unlike a sovereign state is clothed with no inherent
power of taxation. The Charter or a statue must plainly show an intent to confer that power as the
Municipality cannot assume it. Ordinance No. 6V which provides for every person entering those
amusement places for a tax of 0.20 is a part and distinct from the license fee. This tax is not authorized by
any act of the legislature. It is therefore beyond the power of City of Baguio to levy. While ordinance no. IIV which designates property tax on motor vehicles kept in the City of Baguio has all the earmarks of
Municipal license fee which is forbidden by section 7 (b) of the revised motor vehicle law. There is no legal
provision authorizing the city of Baguio to impose this tax. Therefore the City of Baguio may not collect the
tax in the absence of legal provision authorizing it to do so. In view of the foregoing, it is our conclusion that
Ordinance No. 6-V, in so far as it provides for an amusement tax of P0.20 for each person entering a night
club, and Ordinance No. 11-V, which provides for a property tax on motor vehicles, should be declared
illegal and void as beyond the authority of the City of Baguio to enact

Adoption of International Law

In re: Garcia, 2 Srcra 984 (1961)

Facts of the Case: Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines
without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers, among others, that he
is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, Province of Negros Occidental, of Filipino parentage; that he had
taken and finished in Spain, the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was approved, selected and
qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied
and finished the law course graduating there as "Licenciado En Derecho"; that thereafter he was allowed to
practice the law profession in Spain; and that under the provision of the Treaty of Academic Degrees and
the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state, he is entitled to
practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can validly invoke the provision under the treaty of Academic Degrees
between the Philippines and the Spain for him to be entitled to practice law in the Philippines without taking
the required bar examinations
Ruling: The court resolved to deny the petition on the following grounds the provision of the treaty on
Academic degrees and the exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Spanish State cannot be invoked by applicant. Under Article 11 said Treaty for it was intended to govern
Filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice
their professions in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in
the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country. It is clear, that the privileges provided
in the Treaty are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting State in whose
territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with Sections
2,9, and 16 thereof, which have the force of law, require that before anyone can practice the legal
profession in the Philippine he must first successfully pass the required bar examinations; Furthermore, the
Treaty could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon the
constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in
the Philippines, to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the
Philippines.

Respect for human dignity and human rights (Article II, Section 11; Article XIII, Sections 17-19; Article
XVI, Section 5(2)

G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994

BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO OCAMPO,
petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES, respondents.
Facts: A "Demolition Notice," signed by Executive Officer Quimpo of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers
Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private
respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In
said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of 3 days within which to vacate the questioned
premises of North EDSA to give way to the construction of the"People's Park". Private respondents, led by
their President Fermo, filed a letter-complaint with the CHR, asking for a letter to be addressed to then
Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr. of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents'stalls, sari-sari
stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. CHR issued a preliminary order directing the petitioners to desist
from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters'
complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR.Petitioners
started the demolition despite CHRs order to desist. Respondents consequently asked that petitioners be
cited in contempt.Meanwhile, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint filed by respondents. They
alleged that the Commission has no jurisdiction over the complaint as it involved respondents privilege to
engage in business, not their civil and political rights.The CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying
out the demolition.Their Motion for Reconsideration have been denied, petioners Simon Jr. et al filed a
petition for prohibition to enjoin the CHR from hearing private respondents complaint.
Issue: Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to hear the complaint and grant the relief prayed for by
respondents and to investigate the subject matter of respondents complaint.
Ruling: Under the constitution, the CHR has no power to adjudicate and the complaint does not involve
civil and political rights. The Commission on Human Rights was not meant by the fundamental law to be
another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the
latter . The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. In the particular case at hand, there
is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as
temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a
"People's Park." Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it is readily apparent that the
delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe
cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1)
protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair
and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes
committed against the religious Looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the
circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition
of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of
"human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution.

Self-reliant and independent economic order (Art. II, Secs. 19-20; Art. XII)

Tanada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295

Facts of the Case: Respondent Secretary Navarro of Department of Trade and Industry representing the
Government of Republic of the Philippines signed the Final Act, the agreement establishing the World
Trade Organization. It was ratified by the President of the Philippines and adopted by the Senate.
Petitioners assail the World Trade Organization for allegedly violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution
to develop a self-reliant and independent National Economy effectively controlled by the Filipinos. It is
petitioner position that the WTO place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as
Filipinos local products contravening the Filipino First Policy of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the World Trade Organization violates the mandate of 1987 Constitution to develop
a self-reliant and independent National Economy effectively controlled by Filipinos

Ruling: The court held that world trade organization agreement does not violate the mandate of the 1987
Constitution. Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on
the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign
competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an
isolationist policy. Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and independent national
economy" 35 does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It
contemplates neither "economic seclusion" nor "mendicancy in the international community. The WTO
reliance on "most favored nation," "national treatment," and "trade without discrimination" cannot be struck
down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members.
Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on "equality and reciprocity," 37 the fundamental law
encourages industries that are "competitive in both domestic and foreign markets," thereby demonstrating a
clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of
robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Petition was dismissed for lack of
merit.