Part V B

B.
Executive Department
1. The President
a. Qualifications, election, term and oath
Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to
read and write, at least forty years immediately preceding such
election.
Qualifications
1) Natural-born citizen
2) Registered voter
3) Able to read and write
4) 40 years of age on the day of election
5) Resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately
preceding the election
Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by

direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the
election and shall end at noon of the same date, six years thereafter.
The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No person who
has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than
four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any
time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for
the full term for which he was elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President
and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly
certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be
transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate.
Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the
Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election,
open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House
of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon
determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the
manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed
elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest
number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote
of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress,
voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the
certificates.
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Constitutional Law 1
Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.
Election and Term

(Regular) - Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election
for President and Vice-President shall be held on the second
Monday of May. The President and the Vice-President shall be
elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years which
shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the
day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date, six
years thereafter.
Case: For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a
justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the
people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made
the judgment; they have accepted the government of President
Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country
so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a
de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has
recognized the legitimacy of tlie present government. All the eleven
members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the
fundamental law of the Republic under her government. (Joint
Resolution of May 22, 1986 in G.R. No. 73748 [Lawyers League for
a Better Philippines, etc. vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.];
G.R. No. 73972 [People's Crusade for Supremacy of the
Constitution. etc. vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al.]; and G.R. No. 73990
[Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al.])
For the above-quoted reason, which are fully applicable to the
petition at bar, mutatis mutandis1, there can be no question that
President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H.
Laurel are the incumbent and legitimate President and VicePresident of the Republic of the Philippines.or the above-quoted
reasons, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar, G.R. No.
76180 October 24, 1986 IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ
(Special) When a vacancy occurs in the offices of President and
Vice- President more than eighteen months before the date of the
next presidential election, a special election to elect a President
and a Vice-President shall be called (Art VII, 10.)
In PBA v COMELEC, 140 SCRA 455, Is the resignation submitted
by Marcos, which was conditioned on the election, proclamation
and assumption into office by the elected President, a valid
resignation as to authorize the Batasan to pass a Snap Election
Law? The Court could have validly issued an injunction to stop the
COMELEC from proceeding with the preparations for the election.
But it did not, citing its delay in deciding the case and the
sentiments of the people that developed in the meantime as reason
for its inaction. According to the court, what at first was a legal
1
With necessary changes in points of detail (Blacks Law Dictionary)
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question became a political question because it was overtaken by

events.
Re-election - The President shall not be eligible for any reelection. No person who has succeeded as President and has
served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for
election to the same office at any time.
Electoral Tribunal - The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.
Case: Santiago and Ramos were contenders to the Presidential
Election on the year 1992. Ramos emerged winner, hence the
protest of Santiago, In the interim, Santiago ran and won as
senator in the 1995 elections.
Issue: Whether this case had been rendered moot by the election
of the Protestant as a Senator in the May 1995 election and her
assumption of office as such on 30 June 1995
Rule: Indeed, it would be entirely different where the protestant
pursued the new position through a popular election, as in the case
of Protestant Santiago who filed a certificate of candidacy for
Senator in the 8 May 1995 election, campaigned for such office,
and submitted herself to be voted upon. She knew that the term of
office of the Senators who would then be elected would be six
years, to commence at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election and to end at noon of 30 June 2001.
Knowing her high sense of integrity and candor, it is most unlikely
that during her campaign, she promised to serve the electorate as
Senator, subject to the outcome of this protest. In short, she filed
her certificate of candidacy for the Senate without any qualification,
condition, or reservation.
In so doing, she entered into a political contract with the electorate
that if elected, she would assume the office of Senator, discharge
its functions and serve her constituency as such for the term for
which she was elected. These are givens which are in full accord
with the principle enshrined in the Constitution that, public office is
a public trust, and public officers and employees must at all times
be accountable to the people and serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
The Tribunal, nonetheless, confirmed its power to dismiss an
electoral case on technical grounds. the Rules of the Tribunal
allow summary dismissal of election protests even for less
important grounds, to repeat, such as the petition filed with the
Tribunal or the annexes attached thereto are not clearly legible, or
the filing fees and cash deposits were not filed within the periods
fixed in the Rules,27and the additional provision for dismissal under
Rule 61.
WHEREFORE, the Tribunal hereby resolved to DISMISS the
instant election protest, since it has been rendered moot and
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academic by its abandonment or withdrawal by the Protestant as a

consequence of her election and assumption of office as Senator
and her discharge of the duties and functions thereof; BANC
P.E.T. Case No. 001 February 13, 1996 MIRIAM DEFENSOR- vs.
FIDEL VALDEZ RAMOS
Case On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe,
also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of President 2 of the Republic
of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino
(KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate
of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald
Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of
birth to be Manila.
Petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, initiated, on 09 January 2004, a
petition before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his
parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an
American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being
the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R.
No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of
the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in
urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they
directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The
omission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any
tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential
contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,
as "not (being) justiciable" controversies or disputes involving
contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the President
or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on
21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting
an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and
Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and
the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the
Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the
Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to
2
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses: "No person may be elected
President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read
and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines
for at least ten years immediately preceding such election
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be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption

of the parliamentary form of government under the 1973
Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793,
the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived
under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a
post-election scenario. Election contests consist of either an
election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct
remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the
winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule
12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April
1992, would support this premise
"Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the
Philippines.
"Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by
the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto
against the President or Vice-President. An election protest
shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for
quo warranto shall not include an election protest.
"Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate
for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who
received the second or third highest number of votes may
contest the election of the President or the Vice-President,
as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk
of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days
after the proclamation of the winner."
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
"President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of
"candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto
proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person
who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a
post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who
would have received either the second or third highest number of
votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a
post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would
not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the
qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency
before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson,
et al., vs. Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634,
entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a.
Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want of
jurisdiction. G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004 MARIA JEANETTE
C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.The COMMISSION
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ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE

FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER
(a.k.a.
Case: Past midnight, in the early hours of June 24, 2004, the
Congress as the representatives of the sovereign people and acting
as the National Board of Canvassers, in a near-unanimous roll-call
vote, proclaimed Mrs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) the duly
elected President of the Philippines. She obtained 12,905,808
votes, as against 11,782,232 votes for the second-placer, the
movie actor Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ). She took her Oath of Office
before the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on June 30, 2004.
Refusing to concede defeat, the second-placer in the elections, Mr.
FPJ, filed seasonably an election protest before this Electoral
Tribunal on July 23, 2004.
On December 14, 2004, the Protestant died in the course of his
medical treatment at St. Lukes Hospital.
However, neither the Protestees proclamation by Congress nor the
death of her main rival as a fortuitous intervening event, appears to
abate the present controversy in the public arena. Instead, notice
may be taken of periodic mass actions, demonstrations, and rallies
raising an outcry for this Tribunal to decide the electoral protest of
Mr. FPJ against Mrs. GMA once and for all. The oracular function of
this Tribunal, it would appear, needs to be fully exercised to make
manifest here and abroad who is the duly elected leader of the
Filipino nation.
Needless to stress, this Tribunal cannot shirk its constitutional duty.
Yet, neither could it go beyond its mandate under the Constitution
and the law. Further, this Tribunal is guided by its Rules, as well as
the Rules of Court in a suppletory manner. Considering the
transcendental importance of the electoral contest involving the
Presidency, a rush to judgment is simply out of the question. Yet
decide the matter we must, without further delay, to prevent popular
unrest and avoid further destabilization of government at the
highest level.
Plainly, the issue here is: May the widow substitute/intervene for
the protestant who died during the pendency of the latters protest
case?
It can be gleaned from the citation of this rule that movant /
intervenor seeks to appear before this Tribunal as the legal
representative/substitute of the late protestant prescribed by said
Section 16. However, in our application of this rule to an election
contest, we have every time ruled that a public office is personal to
the public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs upon
death. Thus, we consistently rejected substitution by the widow or
the heirs in election contests where the protestant dies during the
pendency of the protest.
This is not to say that death of the protestant necessarily abates the
pending action. We have held as early as Vda. de De Mesa (1966)
that while the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the
public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and
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exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of

either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest
proceedings. Hence, we have allowed substitution and intervention
but only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is the
party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the
party who is entitled to the avails of the suit
We are not unaware that a contest before election tribunals has two
aspects. First, it is in pursuit of ones right to a public office, and
second, it is imbued with public interest.
But herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, has overly stressed that it
is with the "paramount public interest" in mind that she desires "to
pursue the process" commenced by her late husband. She avers
that she is "pursuing the process" to determine who truly won the
election, as a service to the Filipino people. We laud her noble
intention and her interest to find out the true will of the electorate.
However, nobility of intention is not the point of reference in
determining whether a person may intervene in an election protest.
Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on
intervention in the absence of such a rule in the PET Rules. In such
intervention, the interest which allows a person to intervene in a suit
must be in the matter of litigation and of such direct and immediate
character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the effect of
the judgment. In this protest, Mrs. FPJ will not immediately and
directly benefit from the outcome should it be determined that the
declared president did not truly get the highest number of votes.
P.E.T. CASE No. 002
March 29, 2005 RONALD ALLAN POE
a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., vs. GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO, .
Section 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the
President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President shall take the
following oath or affirmation:
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and
conscientiously fulfill my duties as President (or Vice-President or
Acting President) of the Philippines, preserve and defend its
Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and
consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So help me God." (In
case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted.)
b. Privilege and salary

Section 6. The President shall have an official residence. The salaries
of the President and Vice-President shall be determined by law and
shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the term of
the incumbent during which such increase was approved. They shall
not receive during their tenure any other emolument from the
Government or any other source.
Executive Privilege
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The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been
used even prior to the promulgation of the 1986 Constitution. Being of
American origin, it is best understood in light of how it has been defined
and used in the legal literature of the United States.
Schwart defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to
withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress.
Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right of the President and high-level
executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the
courts, and ultimately the public." x x x In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of
executive privilege was recognized by this Court in Almonte v. Vasquez.
Almonte used the term in reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon.
It quoted the following portion of the Nixon decision which explains the
basis for the privilege:
"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations
and correspondences, like the claim of confidentiality of judicial
deliberations, for example, he has all the values to which we accord
deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the
necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even
blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. A President and
those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of
shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would
be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations
justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The
privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably
rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution Senate v.
Ermita G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006
Case: Petitioners non-government organizations, Congresspersons,
citizens and taxpayers seek via the present petition for mandamus and
prohibition to obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines
Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and
Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent
attachments and annexes thereto.
Petitioners Congressmen Taada and Aguja filed House Resolution No.
551 calling for an inquiry into the bilateral trade agreements then being
negotiated by the Philippine government, particularly the JPEPA which
became the basis of an inquiry subsequently conducted by the House
Special Committee on Globalization (the House Committee) into the
negotiations of the JPEPA.
In the course of its inquiry, the House Committee requested herein
respondent to study and negotiate the proposed JPEPA, and to furnish the
Committee with a copy of the latest draft of the JPEPA. Usec. Aquino did
not heed the request,
The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade agreement to be
entered into by the Philippines with another country in the event the
Senate grants its consent to it, covers a broad range of topics which
respondents enumerate as follows: trade in goods, rules of origin, customs
procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment, intellectual
property rights, government procurement, movement of natural persons,
cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance
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and settlement, improvement of the business environment, and general

and final provisions
To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must
meet the threshold requirement that it be a matter of public concern.
Apropos is the teaching of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission:
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern
there is no rigid test which can be applied. Public concern like public
interest is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because
these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally
arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the
courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is
of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public
It is well-established in jurisprudence that neither the right to information
nor the policy of full public disclosure is absolute, there being matters
which, albeit of public concern or public interest, are recognized as
privileged in nature.
Whether a claim of executive privilege is valid depends on the ground
invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. In the present
case, the ground for respondents claim of privilege is set forth in
their Comment, viz:
x x x The categories of information that may be considered
privileged includes matters of diplomatic character and under
negotiation and review. In this case, the privileged character of the
diplomatic negotiations has been categorically invoked and clearly
explained by respondents particularly respondent DTI Senior
Undersecretary.
The documents on the proposed JPEPA as well as the text which is
subject to negotiations and legal review by the parties fall under the
exceptions to the right of access to information on matters of public
concern and policy of public disclosure. They come within the
coverage of executive privilege. At the time when the Committee
was requesting for copies of such documents, the negotiations
were ongoing as they are still now and the text of the proposed
JPEPA is still uncertain and subject to change. Considering the
status and nature of such documents then and now, these are
evidently covered by executive privilege consistent with existing
legal provisions and settled jurisprudence
Practical and strategic considerations likewise counsel against the
disclosure of the "rolling texts" which may undergo radical change
or portions of which may be totally abandoned. Furthermore,
the negotiations of the representatives of the Philippines as
well as of Japan must be allowed to explore alternatives in the
course of the negotiations in the same manner as judicial
deliberations and working drafts of opinions are accorded
strict confidentiality
The ground relied upon by respondents is thus not simply that the
information sought involves a diplomatic matter, but that it pertains
to diplomatic negotiations then in progress.
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Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations

The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been
recognized in this jurisdiction. In discussing valid limitations on the
right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that
"information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion
of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable
safeguards for the sake of national interest." Even earlier, the same
privilege was upheld in Peoples Movement for Press Freedom
(PMPF) v. Manglapus wherein the Court discussed the reasons for
the privilege in more precise terms.
In PMPF v. Manglapus, the therein petitioners were seeking
information from the Presidents representatives on the state of the
then on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement.
The Court denied the petition, stressing that "secrecy of
negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the
constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of
the freedom of access to information." The Resolution went on
to state, thus:
The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of
authority and expedition of decision which are inherent
in executive action. Another essential characteristic of
diplomacy is its confidential nature . Although much has
been said about "open" and "secret" diplomacy, with
disparagement of the latter, Secretaries of State Hughes and
Stimson have clearly analyzed and justified the practice. In
the words of Mr. Stimson:
"A complicated negotiation cannot be carried
through without many, many private talks and
discussion, man to man; many tentative
suggestions and proposals. Delegates from other
countries come and tell you in confidence of their
troubles at home and of their differences with
other countries and with other delegates; they tell
you of what they would do under certain
circumstances and would not do under other
circumstances If
these
reports
should
become public who would ever trust American
Delegations in another conference? (United States
Department of State, Press Releases, June 7, 1930,
pp. 282-284)
xxxx
There is frequent criticism of the secrecy in which
negotiation with foreign powers on nearly all subjects is
concerned. This, it is claimed, is incompatible with the
substance of democracy. As expressed by one writer, "It
can be said that there is no more rigid system of silence
anywhere in the world." (E.J. Young, Looking Behind the
Censorship, J. B. Lipincott Co., 1938) President Wilson in
starting his efforts for the conclusion of the World War
10 | P a g e
declared that we must have "open covenants, openly arrived

at." He quickly abandoned his thought.
No one who has studied the question believes that such a
method of publicity is possible. In the moment that
negotiations are started, pressure groups attempt to
"muscle in." An ill-timed speech by one of the parties or
a frank declaration of the concession which are
exacted or offered on both sides would quickly lead to a
widespread propaganda to block the negotiations. After
a treaty has been drafted and its terms are fully
published, there is ample opportunity for discussion
before it is approved.(The New American Government and
Its Works, James T. Young, 4th Edition, p. 194) (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Still in PMPF v. Manglapus, the Court adopted the doctrine
in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. that the President is
the sole organ of the nation in its negotiations with foreign
countries, viz:
"x x x In this vast external realm, with its important,
complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the
President alone has the power to speak or listen as a
representative of the nation. He makes treaties with
the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone
negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate
cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to
invade it. As Marshall said in his great arguments of
March 7, 1800, in the House of Representatives, "The
President is the sole organ of the nation in its
external relations, and its sole representative with
foreign nations." Annals, 6th Cong., col. 613
(Emphasis supplied; underscoring in the original)
G.R. No. 170516 July 16, 2008 AKBAYAN CITIZENS
ACTION PARTY ("AKBAYAN"), vs THOMAS G. AQUINO
Rule: The elements of presidential communications privilege, to
wit:
1) The protected communication must relate to a "quintessential
and non-delegable presidential power."
2) The communication must be authored or "solicited and received"
by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The
judicial test is that an advisor must be in "operational proximity" with
the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a
qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate
need, such that the information sought "likely contains important
evidence" and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority. G.R. No. 180643 March 25,
2008 NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE
11 | P a g e
c. Prohibitions
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment
during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business,
or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise,
or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the
fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be
appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the
Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including governmentowned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
a. Shall not hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
Case: EO 284, allowing Cabinet Officials from holding other offices,
is here challenged.
Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect,
allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions
in addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation
therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides as follows:
"Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office
or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during
said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special
privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They
shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office."
xxx
xxx
xxx
[D]oes the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987

Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or
assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made
for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2),
Article IX-B which, for easy reference is quoted anew,
thus: "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions
of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
12 | P a g e
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or

instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporation or their subsidiaries." We rule in the negative.
Rule: In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII
in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is
unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that
Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may
hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two (2)
positions in the government and government corporations,
Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple
offices or employment in direct contravention of the express
mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the
1987 Constitution itself.
If maximum benefits are to be derived from a department head's
ability and expertise, he should be allowed to attend to his duties
and responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental
offices or employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his
efforts, attention and energy among too many positions of
responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency.
Surely the advantages to be derived from this concentration of
attention, knowledge and expertise, particularly at this stage of our
national and economic development, far outweigh the benefits, if
any, that may be gained from a department head spreading himself
too thin and taking in more than what he can handle.
Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence
provides: "They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly,
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries." These sweeping, allembracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official
family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public
officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members
of the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are
proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President
and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said
class stricter prohibitions.
But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7,
Article IX-B already contains a blanket prohibition against the
holding of multiple offices or employment in the government
subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the
Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate
another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting
the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants from holding any other office or
employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in
the Constitution itself.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are
allowed to hold other office or employment in the government
13 | P a g e
during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the

primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly
authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7,
Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to
all elective and appointive public officials and employees,
while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception
applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members
of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot
possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section
7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or

employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution
must not, however, be construed as applying to posts
occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided
by law and as required by the primary functions of said
officials' office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise
"any other office" within the contemplation of the
constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of
additional duties and functions on said officials.
[T]he prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be
interpreted as covering positions held without additional
compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and
as required by the primary functions of the concerned official's
office. The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office."
It refers to an "authority derived from official character merely, not
expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather
annexed to the official position." Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act
done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and
without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by
the office." An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a
member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without
further warrant or appointment. To illustrate, by express
provision of law, the Secretary of Transportation and
Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of the Board of the
Philippine Ports Authority, and the Light Rail Transit Authority.
The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation
part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned
has no right to receive additional compensation for
his services in the said position. The reason is that these
services are already paid for and covered by the compensation
attached to his principal office. x x x
[E]x-officio posts held by the executive official concerned
without additional compensation as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of his office do not fall under
the definition of "any other office" within the contemplation of
the constitutional prohibition... G.R. No. 83896 February 22,
14 | P a g e
1991 CIVIL
SECRETARY,
LIBERTIES
UNION, vs.
THE
EXECUTIVE
Case We hold that the position of petitioner NAC is against the law
and jurisprudence. The COA is correct that there is no legal basis
to grant per diem, honoraria or any allowance whatsoever to the
NAC ex officio members' official representatives.
In Civil Liberties Union, we elucidated on the two constitutional
prohibitions against holding multiple positions in the government
and receiving double compensation: (1) the blanket prohibition of
paragraph 2, Section 7, Article IX-B on all government employees
against holding multiple government offices, unless otherwise
allowed by law or the primary functions of their positions, and (2)
the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII on the President
and his official family from holding any other office, profession,
business or financial interest, whether government or private,
unless allowed by the Constitution.
The NAC ex officio members' representatives who were all
appointive officials with ranks below Assistant Secretary are
covered by the two constitutional prohibitions.
First, the NAC ex officio members' representatives are not exempt
from the general prohibition because there is no law or
administrative order creating a new office or position and
authorizing additional compensation therefor. G. R. No. 156982
September 8, 2004 NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION, vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Case: In 1994, petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. was
appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the
Department of Labor and Employment.
In a Letter dated May 11, 1995, Acting Secretary Jose S. Brilliantes
of the Department of Labor and Employment designated the
petitioner to be the DOLE representative to the Board of Directors
of PEZA. in pursuance to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7916,
otherwise known as the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995,
As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA, the
petitioner was receiving a per diem for every board meeting he
attended during the years 1995 to 1997
After a post audit of the PEZAs disbursement transactions, the
COA disallowed the payment of per diems to the petitioner
The uniform reason for the disallowance was stated in the Notices,
as follows:
Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants holding other
offices in addition to their primary office and to receive
compensation therefore was declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court in the Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary.
Disallowance is in pursuance to COA Memorandum No. 97-038
15 | P a g e
dated September 19, 1997 implementing Senate Committee Report

No. 509
Hence, this petition.
The issue in this case is whether or not the COA correctly
disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his
attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors meetings as
representative of the Secretary of Labor.
Rule: We rule in the affirmative.
The COA anchors the disallowance of per diems in the case of Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary where the Court declared
Executive Order No. 284 allowing government officials to hold
multiple positions in government, unconstitutional. Thus, Cabinet
Secretaries, Undersecretaries, and their Assistant Secretaries, are
prohibited to hold other government offices or positions in addition
to their primary positions and to receive compensation therefor,
except in cases where the Constitution expressly provides
It must be noted that the petitioners presence in the PEZA Board
meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity as representative of the
Secretary of Labor. As the petitioner himself admitted, there was no
separate or special appointment for such position. Since the
Secretary of Labor is prohibited from receiving compensation for his
additional office or employment, such prohibition likewise applies to
the petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf of the Secretary of
Labor.
In Dela Cruz v. Commission on Audit., it was held that "The exofficio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the
principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to
receive additional compensation for his services in the said
position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and
covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. It
should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a
meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he
is actually and in legal contemplation performing the primary
function of his principal office in defining policy in monetary banking
matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his department. For
such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra
compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or
an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism.
By whatever name it is designated, such additional compensation is
prohibited by the Constitution."
Similarly in the case at bar, we cannot allow the petitioner who sat
as representative of the Secretary of Labor in the PEZA Board to
have a better right than his principal. As the representative of the
Secretary of Labor, the petitioner sat in the Board in the same
capacity as his principal. Whatever laws and rules the member in
the Board is covered, so is the representative; and whatever
prohibitions or restrictions the member is subjected, the
representative is, likewise, not exempted. Thus, his position as
Director IV of the DOLE which the petitioner claims is not covered
by the constitutional prohibition set by the Civil Liberties Union case
16 | P a g e
is of no moment. The petitioner attended the board meetings by the

authority given to him by the Secretary of Labor to sit as his
representative. If it were not for such designation, the petitioner
would not have been in the Board at all. G.R. No. 147392 March
12, 2004 BENEDICTO ERNESTO R. BITONIO, JR., , vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT and CELSO D. GANGAN, CHAIRMAN
OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
b. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any
other profession
c. Shall not participate in any business, or be financially interested in
any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted
by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries.
As to the spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth
civil degree of the President (during his tenure)
Shall not be appointed as
a. Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or
b. the Office of the Ombudsman, or
c. as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus
or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries
In comparison to the following;

Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term
without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office
which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during
the term for which he was elected. (Art VI)
Section 2. No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his
tenure, hold any other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in
the practice of any profession or in the active management or control of
any business which, in any way, may be affected by the functions of his
office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any
contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government,
any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. (Art IX
A)
Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his
tenure (art IX B )
17 | P a g e
Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative function. (Art VIII)
Exceptions to prohibitions on holding additional positions:

1. Section 3. xxx
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet.
Such appointment requires no confirmation. (Art VII)
2. Section 8.
1. A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision
of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and
a representative of the private sector. Xxx (Art VIII)
3. Ex Officio Positions
Section 7. xxx
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
Any appointive official (including cabinet members) may hold any
other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries if otherwise allowed
1. by law or
2. by the primary functions of his position
d. Succession
Case: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph
Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President.
In the heat of people power , At about 12:00 noon, Chief
Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo
as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and
his family hurriedly left Malacaang Palace.29 He issued the
following press statement:
"20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria MacapagalArroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines.
While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have
strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of
18 | P a g e
her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will

prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of
the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our
people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to
our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come
ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in to promotion of
a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath,

respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers the
duties of the Presidency On February 6, respondent Arroyo
nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice
President.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the
President on leave while respondent Gloria MacapagalArroyo claims she is the President..
Issue: 1. Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable
controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on
leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President
Rule: Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a
factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there
must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled
by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not
governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be
oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied.
As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal
effect.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as
President.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot
be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In
the press release containing his final statement, (1) he
acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as
President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its
legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the
seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he
was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that he
was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the
disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the
people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he
was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the
people as President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from
any future challenge that may come ahead in the same
19 | P a g e
service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future

challenge after occupying the office of the president which
he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join
him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did
not give up the presidency. The press release was
petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His
presidency is now in the part tense.
It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but
only took a temporary leave dated January 20, 2001 of the
petitioner sent to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker
Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer to the said letter, viz:
"Sir.
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of
the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers
and duties of my office. By operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting
president.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada"
To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery. The
pleadings filed by the petitioner in the cases at bar did not
discuss, may even intimate, the circumstances that led to its
preparation. Neither did the counsel of the petitioner reveal
to the Court these circumstances during the oral argument. It
strikes the Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal
value, was never referred to by the petitioner during the
week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint
of its existence when he issued his final press release. It was
all too easy for him to tell the Filipino people in his press
release that he was temporarily unable to govern and that he
was leaving the reins of government to respondent Arroyo
for the time bearing. Under any circumstance, however, the
mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the
petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the
petitioner clearly as a later act. If, however, it was prepared
after the press released, still, it commands scant legal
significance. Petitioner's resignation from the presidency
cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a
whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of his
reputation by the people.
Issue 2: Was Estrada merely temporarily unable to perform
the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a
President on leave
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice
President has no power to adjudge the inability of the
petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the
presidency. His significant submittal is that "Congress has
the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine
20 | P a g e
whether the President is incapable of performing his

functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of article
VII.
Considering the operative facts:
1. Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter
claiming inability to the Senate President and Speaker
of the House;
2. Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath
of office as President on January 20, 2001 at about
12:30 p.m.;
3. Despite receipt of the letter, the House of
Representatives passed on January 24, 2001 House
Resolution No. 175
4. Also, House of the Representatives passed House
Resolution No. 176 stating that expressed its support to
the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the
Philippines,
5. Further, bills were already sent by the Congress to the
Office of GMA as president.
6. Despite the lapse of time and still without any
functioning Cabinet, without any recognition from any
sector of government, and without any support from the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police, the petitioner continues to claim that
his inability to govern is only momentary.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both
houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as
the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the
premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada. Is no longer
temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim
of inability.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign,
still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on
leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern
temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress
and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure,
president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot
be reviewed by this Court. G.R. No. 146710-15 March 2,
2001 JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO,
1. At the Beginning of the Term

Section 7. The President-elect and the Vice President-elect shall
assume office at the beginning of their terms. 3
If the President-elect fails to qualify4, the Vice President-elect
shall act as President until the President-elect shall have
qualified.
3
4
Here, the President and Vice-President are elected in the regular election
He was unable to take his oath of office on June 30
21 | P a g e
If a President shall not have been chosen 5, the Vice Presidentelect shall act as President until a President shall have been
chosen and qualified.
If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect
shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled 6, the
Vice President-elect shall become President.
Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or
shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or become
permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of
his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall
act as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have
been chosen and qualified.7
The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one
who is to act as President shall be selected until a President or a
Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent
disability, or inability of the officials mentioned in the next
preceding paragraph. (Art VII)
Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of
the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and
Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules
without need of a call and within seven days, enact a law calling
for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to
be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days
from the time of such call. The bill calling such special election
shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article
V1 of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on
third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special
election shall be charged against any current appropriations and
shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25,
Article V1 of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress
cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No
special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within
eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election.
(Art VII)
2. During the Term

Section 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from
office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall
become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of
death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of
both the President and Vice-President, the President of the
As in case of a tie which has yet to be broken by Congress
Death or permanent disability at the beginning of the term of the president will result to the
Vice President as becoming the president
7
This applies when both the president and the vice president shall have been chosen or shall
have qualified, or where both shall have died or become permanently disabled. ( In case both
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House are unable to act as President, then
Congress shall by law, provide for the "manner of selecting" the one who will act as President
until a President of Vice-President shall have (been either "chosen" or "elected" pursuant to the
special election referred to in VII, 10, and qualified.)
5
6
22 | P a g e
Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of

Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or
Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President
in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting
President. He shall serve until the President or the Vice-President
shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject to the same
restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting
President. (Art VII)
3. Temporary Disability
Temporary Vacancy in the Presidency during the term
A vacancy in the Presidency arising from his disability can occur as
follows;
1. A written declaration by the President
Whenever the President transmits to the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a
written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties
shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
(Section 11, Ph 1, Art VII)
2. Written declaration by the Cabinet
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet
transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the
powers and duties of the office as Acting President. (Section
11, Ph 2, Art VII)
3. Finding by Congress by 2/3 vote that the President is disabled
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of
the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall
reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile,
should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit
within five days to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the
issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not
in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its
rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written
declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is
required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both
23 | P a g e
Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to

discharge the powers and duties of his office, the VicePresident shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall
continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.
(Section 11, Ph 3 -4, Art VII)
Serious Illness of the President
Section 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the
public shall be informed of the state of his health. The
members of the Cabinet in charge of national security and
foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, shall not be denied access to the President
during such illness. (Art VII)
e. Removal
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions,
and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but
not by impeachment.
Section 3.
1. The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment.
2. A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of
all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration
by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
3. A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House
shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the
Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
4. In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is
filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the
same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by
the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
5. No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year.
6. The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all
cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of
the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted
without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate.
24 | P a g e
7. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further

than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office
under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted
shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and
punishment, according to law.
8. The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.
f. Powers and Functions of the President

(1) Executive Power
Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of
the Philippines. (Art VII)
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. (Art VII)
Case: The Petitioners asks the to direct the Respondents to
issue travel documents in their favor and to enjoin them from
carrying out the President's decision barring their return to the
Philippines.
Issue: The issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the
exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of
the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the
following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same
within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided
by law
Rule: the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1].
However, it does not define what is meant by executive power"
although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain
powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws,
the appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-chief
clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons,
the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the
power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter
into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the
25 | P a g e
budget to Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art. VII,

Sec. 14-23].
The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers
of the President did the framers of the Constitution intend that the
President shall exercise those specific powers and no other? Are
these enumerated powers the breadth and scope of "executive
power"?
Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise
of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is
traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power."
Corollary, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited
only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other
words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated,
The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he
prime duty of theGovernment is to serve and protect the people"
and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order,the protection of
life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare
are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance
of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and
the promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide
governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty
words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a
plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these
plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as
President of the Republic, the President has to consider these
principles, among other things, and adhere to them.
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general
welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of
certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual
power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on
the duty of the President, as steward of the people. G.R. No. 88211
September 15, 1989 FERDINAND E. MARCOS, vs.HONORABLE
RAUL MANGLAPUS
Case: Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the
President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated
residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive
power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties
under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited
to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive
Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is
so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the
President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr.
Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the
President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief
clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive
26 | P a g e
power. G.R. No. 88211 October 27, 1989 FERDINAND E.

MARCOS vs. HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS
Case: Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative
Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional
grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to
legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's
protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights
sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers
against further erosion.
Rule: As head of the Executive Department, the President is the
Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole and
sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees
of his department. He has control over the executive department,
bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to
assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau
and office or interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to
the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising
the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and
public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus
and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties
effectively.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying
policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform
standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct
of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders,
rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308
involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an
administrative order. An administrative order is:
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which
relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in
pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be
promulgated in administrative orders.
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the
President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in
harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of
implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the
legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. The
Code is a general law and "incorporates in a unified
document the major structural, functional and procedural
principles of governance." and "embodies changes in
administrative structure and procedures designed to serve
the people." The Code is divided into seven (7) Books: Book
I deals with Sovereignty and General Administration, Book II
with the Distribution of Powers of the three branches of
Government, Book III on the Office of the President, Book IV
27 | P a g e
on the Executive Branch, Book V on Constitutional

Commissions, Book VI on National Government Budgeting,
and Book VII on Administrative Procedure. These Books
contain provisions on the organization, powers and general
administration of the executive, legislative and judicial
branches of government, the organization and administration
of departments, bureaus and offices under the executive
branch, the organization and functions of the Constitutional
Commissions and other constitutional bodies, the rules on
the national government budget, as well as guideline for the
exercise by administrative agencies of quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial powers. The Code covers both the internal
administration of government,i.e, internal organization,
personnel and recruitment, supervision and discipline, and
the effects of the functions performed by administrative
officials on private individuals or parties outside
government.
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely
implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the
first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System.
Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various
contending state policies the primacy of national security, the
extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government,
the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice
Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important
freedom of thought. As said administrative order redefines the
parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State
as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the
President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it
ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be
covered by law.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.D. No. 308 is
not a law because it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no
proctection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen
cannot transact business with government agencies delivering
basic services to the people without the contemplated identification
card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one
can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that
without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and
enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O.
No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
Again, with due respect, the dissenting opinions unduly expand the
limits of administrative legislation and consequently erodes the
plenary power of Congress to make laws. This is contrary to the
established approach defining the traditional limits of administrative
legislation. As well stated by Fisher: ". . . Many regulations
however, bear directly on the public. It is here that administrative
legislation must he restricted in its scope and application.
Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general
policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a public law.
Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the
authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent
source of power to make laws." G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998
BLAS F. OPLE, vs RUBEN D. TORRES,
28 | P a g e
Case: Due to massive irregularities during the Nursing Board

Exam, on 8 September 2006, President Arroyo issued EO 566
which authorized the CHED to supervise the establishment and
operation of all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines.
On 3 November 2006, the CHED, through its then Chairman Carlito
S. Puno (Chairman Puno), approved CHED Memorandum Order
No. 49, series of 2006 (IRR)
The Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), an
organization of independent review centers, asked the CHED to
"amend, if not withdraw" the IRR arguing, among other things, that
giving permits to operate a review center to Higher Education
Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional
organizations will effectively abolish independent review centers.
Rule: The OSG argues that President Arroyo was merely
exercising her executive power to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed. The OSG further argues that President Arroyo was
exercising her residual powers under Executive Order No. 292 (EO
292), particularly Section 20, Title I of Book III, thus:
Section 20. Residual Powers. - Unless Congress provides
otherwise, the President shall exercise such other
powers and functions vested in the President which are
provided for under the laws and which are not specifically
enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the
President in accordance with law. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 20, Title I of Book III of EO 292 speaks of other powers
vested in the President under the law. The exercise of the
Presidents residual powers under this provision requires
legislation, as the provision clearly states that the exercise of the
Presidents other powers and functions has to be "provided for
under the law." There is no law granting the President the power to
amend the functions of the CHED. The President may not amend
RA 7722 through an Executive Order without a prior legislation
granting her such power.
The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to
amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722. Legislative
power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them,
and this power is vested with the Congress under Section 1, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution which states:
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum.
In Ople v. Torres, the Court declared void, as a usurpation of
legislative power, Administrative Order No. 308 (AO 308) issued by
the President to create a national identification system. AO 308
mandates the adoption of a national identification system even in
the absence of an enabling legislation. The Court distinguished
between Legislative and Executive powers, as follows:
29 | P a g e
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is

not indistinct. Legislative power is "the authority, under the
Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them."
The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original,
sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in
the Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative
power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive.
The legislative body possesses plenary power for all
purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be
legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed
by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it
elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution,
either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all
subjects and extends to matters of general concern or
common interest.
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the
President executes the laws. The executive power is vested in the
President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce and
administer laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical
operation and enforcing their due observance.
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief
Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to it
that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his
department. He has control over the executive department, bureaus
and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly
the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or
interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of
control, the President also has the duty of supervising the
enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and
public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus
and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties
effectively.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying
policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform
standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct
of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules
and regulations.
x x x. An administrative order is:
"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which
relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in
pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be
promulgated in administrative orders."
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President
which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of
government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for
the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the
legislative policy. x x x.
Just like AO 308 in Ople v. Torres, EO 566 in this case is not
supported by any enabling law. The Court further stated in Ople:
30 | P a g e
x x x. As well stated by Fisher: "x x x Many regulations

however, bear directly on the public. It is here that
administrative legislation must be restricted in its scope and
application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute
for the general policy-making that Congress enacts in the
form of a public law. Although administrative regulations are
entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and
regulations is not an independent source of power to make
laws."
Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power, the RIRR
is also an invalid exercise of the CHEDs quasi-legislative power.
Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rulemaking power through the promulgation of rules and regulations.
The CHED may only exercise its rule-making power within the
confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722. The RIRR covers review
centers and similar entities which are neither institutions of higher
education nor institutions offering degree-granting programs. G.R.
No. 180046 April 2, 2009 REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF
THE PHILIPPINES, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
ERMITA
(2) Control of executive departments

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. (Art VII
"Control" is the power to substitute one's own judgment in that of a
subordinate.
This presidential power of control over the executive branch of
government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet
Secretary to the lowliest clerk and has been held by us, in the
landmark case of Mondono vs. Silvosa to mean "the power of [the
President] to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter." It is
said to be at the very "heart of the meaning of Chief Executive".
Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of
the President, is the "Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency." As the
President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all the
same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to
his Cabinet members
Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, department
secretaries are alter egos or assistants of the President and their
acts are presumed to be those of the latter unless disapproved or
reprobated by him8
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, "all executive and administrative organizations are
8
G.R. No. 140717 April 16, 2009 ANNIE L. MANUBAY,vs. HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO,
31 | P a g e
adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various

executives departments are assitants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or law to act in person o[r] the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless dissapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive". . . .
Thus, and in short, "the President's power of control is directly
exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and
by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their
respective jurisdictions in the executive department." 9
Case: On June 30, 1987, former President Corazon C. Aquino,
issued Executive Order No. 127 establishing the Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB)
Eleven years after, or on January 7, 2000, President Joseph
Estrada issued Executive Order No. 191 entitled "Deactivation of
the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau."
Then the day feared by the EIIB employees came. On March 29,
2000, President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 223 providing
that all EIIB personnel occupying positions specified therein shall
be deemed separated from the service effective April 30, 2000,
pursuant to a bona fide reorganization resulting to abolition,
redundancy, merger, division, or consolidation of positions
Agonizing over the loss of their employment, petitioners now come
before this Court invoking our power of judicial review of Executive
Order Nos. 191 and 223.
Rule: The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a
public office is lodged with the legislature. This proceeds from the
legal precept that the power to create includes the power to
destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, by
statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the office was
created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same
legislature that brought it into existence.
The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or
offices in the executive department are concerned, the President's
power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a
particular office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority
to carry out reorganization measures The case in point is Larin v.
Executive Secretary In this case, it was argued that there is no
law which empowers the President to reorganize the BIR. In
decreeing otherwise, this Court sustained the following legal basis,
thus:
Carpio v. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290, 295-296 (1992), citing Mondano v. Silvosa, 97
Phil, 143 (1955); Villena v. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451 (1939); Lacson-Magallanes Co.,
Inc. v. Pano, 21 SCRA 895 (1967); De Leon v. Carpio, 178 SCRA 457 (1989).
9
32 | P a g e
"Initially, it is argued that there is no law yet which empowers the

President to issue E.O. No. 132 or to reorganize the BIR.
We do not agree.
xxx
xxx
Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:

'Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of Agencies
Within the Executive Branch. The heads of departments, bureaus
and offices and agencies are hereby directed to identify their
respective activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of
public services and which may be scaled down, phased out or
abolished, subject to civil service rules and regulations. X x x. Actual
scaling down, phasing out or abolition of the activities shall be
effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the
Office of the President.'
Said provision clearly mentions the acts of "scaling down, phasing
out and abolition" of offices only and does not cover the creation of
offices or transfer of functions. Nevertheless, the act of creating and
decentralizing is included in the subsequent provision of Section 62
which provides that:
'Sec. 62. Unauthorized organizational charges. - Unless otherwise
created by law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no
organizational unit or changes in key positions in any department or
agency shall be authorized in their respective organization structures
and be funded from appropriations by this Act.' (italics ours)
The foregoing provision evidently shows that the President is
authorized to effect organizational changes including the
creation of offices in the department or agency concerned.
xxx
xxx
Another legal basis of E.O. No. 132 is Section 20, Book III of E.O. No.
292 which states:
'Sec. 20. Residual Powers. Unless Congress provides otherwise,
the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested
in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are
not specifically enumerated above or which are not delegated by the
President in accordance with law.' (italic ours)
This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the
President under the law. What law then gives him the power to
reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended
Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the
President of the Philippines the continuing authority to
reorganize the national government, which includes the power to
group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to
transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and
activities and to standardize salaries and materials. The validity of
these two decrees are unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly
provides that "all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations,
letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent
with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed
or revoked. So far, there is yet no law amending or repealing said
decrees." (Emphasis supplied)
33 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. No costs. G.R. Nos.

142801-802 July 10, 2001 BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB,
CESAR POSADA, REMEDIOS G. PRINCESA, BENJAMIN KHO,
BENIGNO MANGA, LULU MENDOZA vs. HON. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY RONALDO B. ZAMORA
Case: Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies
and instrumentalities are allowed to source their printing services
from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the
condition that the services offered by the private supplier be of
superior quality and lower in cost compared to what was offered by
the NPO. Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPOs appropriation
in the General Appropriations Act to its income
Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of
tenure as employees of the NPO, petitioners now challenge its
constitutionality, contending that: (1) it is beyond the executive
powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order
No. 285 issued by former President Aquino when the latter still
exercised legislative powers; and (2) Executive Order No. 378
violates petitioners security of tenure, because it paves the way for
the gradual abolition of the NPO.
Rule: We dismiss the petition
It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has
the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive
department in line with the Presidents constitutionally granted
power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous
delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices
under existing statutes.
It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office
of the Press Secretary (which in various times has been an agency
directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an
agency under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of the
Office of the President. G.R. No. 166620 April 20, 2010 ATTY.
SYLVIA BANDA,VS .ERMITA
(3) General supervision of local governments and Autonomous Regions

Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise
general supervision over local governments. Provinces with
respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and
municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall
ensure that the acts of their component units are within the
scope of their prescribed powers and functions. (Art X)
Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision
over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed. (Art X)
34 | P a g e
Case: Can the President, acting through the Secretary of Local

Government, have the power to suspend and/or remove local
officials
Rule: It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding
the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend
to divest the legislature of its right or the President of her
prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide
administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that
the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing
more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from
congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government
affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of
local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over
municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.
The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has
left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly
excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which
allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken
impression because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with
disciplinary authority.
"Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for test of the latter.""Supervision" on the other hand means
"overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. As we held, however,
"investigating" is not inconsistent with "overseeing", although it is a
lesser power than "altering". G.R. No. 93252 August 5, 1991
RODOLFO T. GANZON, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS
Case: At bottom, the present petition inquires into the essential
nature of the Liga ng mga Barangay and questions the extent of the
power of Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG), as alter ego of the President. More
immediately, the petition disputes the validity of the appointment of
the DILG as the interim caretaker of the Liga ng mga Barangay
Rule: The controlling provision on the issues at hand is Section 4,
Article X of the Constitution, which reads in part:
Sec. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions uniformly differentiate the
Presidents power of supervision over local governments and his
power of control of the executive departments bureaus and
offices. Similar to the counterpart provisions in the earlier
Constitutions, the provision in the 1987 Constitution provision has
been interpreted to exclude the power of control.
In the early case of Mondano v. Silvosa, et al., this Court defined
supervision as "overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to
see that subordinate officers perform their duties, and to take such
35 | P a g e
action as prescribed by law to compel his subordinates to perform

their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an
officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter. In Taule v.
Santos, the Court held that the Constitution permits the President to
wield no more authority than that of checking whether a local
government or its officers perform their duties as provided by
statutory enactments. Supervisory power, when contrasted with
control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does
not include any restraining authority over such body.
The case of Drilon v. Lim clearly defined the extent of supervisory
power, thus:
The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the
rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such
rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace
them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work
done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules.
He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the
act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see that
the rules are followed
In Section 4, Article X of the Constitution applicable to the Liga ng
mga Barangay? Otherwise put, is the Liga legally susceptible to
DILG suspension?
This question was resolved in Bito-Onon v. Fernandez where the
Court ruled that the Presidents power of the general supervision,
as exercised therein by the DILG Secretary as his alter ego,
extends to the Liga ng mga Barangay.
Does the Presidents power of general supervision extend to the
liga ng mga barangay, which is not a local government unit?
We rule in the affirmative. In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the
Department of Justice ruled that the liga ng mga barangay is a
government organization, being an association, federation, league
or union created by law or by authority of law, whose members are
either appointed or elected government officials. The Local
Government Code defines the liga ng mga barangay as an
organization of all barangays for the primary purpose of
determining the representation of the liga in the sanggunians, and
for ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting
barangay government administration and securing, through proper
and legal means, solutions thereto.
The rationale for making the Liga subject to DILG supervision is
quite evident, whether from the perspectives of logic or of
practicality. The Liga is an aggroupment of barangays which are in
turn represented therein by their respective punong barangays. The
representatives of the Liga sit in an ex officio capacity at the
municipal, city and provincial sanggunians. As such, they enjoy all
the powers and discharge all the functions of regular municipal
councilors, city councilors or provincial board members, as the case
may be. Thus, the Liga is the vehicle through which the barangay
participates in the enactment of ordinances and formulation of
policies at all the legislative local levels higher than the
36 | P a g e
sangguniang barangay, at the same time serving as the

mechanism for the bottom-to-top approach of development. G.R.
No. 130775 September 27, 2004 THE NATIONAL LIGA NG
MGA BARANGAY vs. HON. VICTORIA ISABEL A. PAREDES
(4) Power of Appointment

1.
With
Appointments
the
Consent
of
the
Commission
on
a.
Heads of the executive departments10
b.
Ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls 11
c.
Officers of the Armed Forces from the rank of colonel or naval

captain12
d.
Chairman and members of 3 Constitutional Commissions ,

(CSC13, COMELEC14,COA15
e.
Regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council 16
10
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also
appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress. Art VII)
11
Id
12
id
13
Civil Service Commission Art IX B Section 1. 2.The Chairman and the Commissioners shall
be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term
of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office
for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three years,
without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
14
COMELEC Art IX C. Section 1.2 The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed
by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven
years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
15
D. THE COMMISSION ON Art IX D, Section 1.2The Chairman and the Commissioners shall
be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term
of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office
for seven years, one Commissioner for five years, and the other Commissioner for three years,
without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of
the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
16
Art VIII, Section 8, . 2 The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the
President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the
37 | P a g e
f.
Sectoral representatives17
Case: This petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality

and legality of the permanent appointments extended by the
President of the Philippines to the respondents Chairman and
Members of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
without submitting the same to the Commission on Appointments
for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as
amended by said RA 6715.
The only issue to be resolved by the Court in the present case is
whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of appointments extended by the
president to government officers additional to those expressly
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
Rule: There are four (4) groups of officers whom the President
shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter
refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the president may be authorized by law
to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
The second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII refers to all other officers
of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law and those whom the President may be authorized by law
to appoint.
Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the
second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more
Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the
professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the
private sector for one year.
17
Art. VII, Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also
appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
38 | P a g e
specifically under the "third groups" of appointees referred to

in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be authorized by law
to appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC
are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of
Section 16, Article VII whose appointments requires confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments. To the extent that RA 6715
requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the
appointments of respondents Chairman and Members of the
National Labor Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional
because:
1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of
the Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and
2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII
of the Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of the Commission
on Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted
only with the President.
Deciding on what laws to pass is a legislative prerogative.
Determining their constitutionality is a judicial function. The Court
respects the laudable intention of the legislature. Regretfully,
however, the constitutional infirmity of Sec. 13 of RA 6715
amending Art. 215 of the Labor Code, insofar as it requires
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments over
appointments of the Chairman and Member of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) is, as we see it, beyond redemption
if we are to render fealty to the mandate of the Constitution in Sec.
16, Art. VII thereof. G.R. No. 91636
April 23, 1992 PETER
JOHN D. CALDERON vs. BARTOLOME CARALE
Case: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A.
7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard
J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA),
is challenged in this original petition with prayer for prohibition,
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order "to prevent
useless and unnecessary expenditures of public funds by way of
salaries and other operational expenses attached to the office
Rule: Petitioners
assail the legislative encroachment on the
appointing authority of the President. Section 13, par. (d), itself
vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of the
Board and the Chief Executive Officer of SBMA, although he really
has no choice under the law but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo
City.
As may be defined, an "appointment" is "[t]he designation of a
person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to
discharge the duties of some office or trust," or "[t]he selection or
designation of a person, by the person or persons having authority
therefor, to fill an office or public function and discharge the duties
of the same. In his treatise, Philippine Political Law, Senior
Associate Justice Isagani A. Cruz defines appointment as "the
39 | P a g e
selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual

who is to exercise the functions of a given office."
Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the appointing
power necessarily exercises a discretion. According to Woodbury,
J., "the choice of a person to fill an office constitutes the essence
of his appointment," and Mr. Justice Malcolm adds that an
"[a]ppointment to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the
exercise of discretion." In Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v.
Intermediate Appellate Court we held:
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing
power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely
according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified
among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.
It is a prerogative of the appointing power . . . .
Indeed, the power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint.
Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint;
it is not a ministerial act of issuing appointment papers to the
appointee. In other words, the choice of the appointee is a
fundamental component of the appointing power.
Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to
appoint an officer, it (Congress) cannot at the same time limit the
choice of the President to only one candidate. Once the power of
appointment is conferred on the President, such conferment
necessarily carries the discretion of whom to appoint. Even on the
pretext of prescribing the qualifications of the officer, Congress may
not abuse such power as to divest the appointing authority, directly
or indirectly, of his discretion to pick his own choice. Consequently,
when the qualifications prescribed by Congress can only be met by
one individual, such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion
of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular
restriction on the power of appointment.
In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject posts be
filled with a presidential appointee for the first year of its operations
from the effectivity of R.A. 7227, the proviso nevertheless limits the
appointing authority to only one eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor
of Olongapo City. Since only one can qualify for the posts in
question, the President is precluded from exercising his discretion
to choose whom to appoint. Such supposed power of appointment,
sans the essential element of choice, is no power at all and goes
against the very nature itself of appointment. G.R. No. 104732
June 22, 1993 ROBERTO A. FLORES, DANIEL Y. FIGUEROA,
ROGELIO T. PALO, DOMINGO A. JADLOC, CARLITO T. CRUZ
and MANUEL P. REYES, vs.HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON
Case: This is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner as a
"taxpayer," questioning the appointment of respondent Gabriel
Singson as Governor of the Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas for not
having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The
petition seeks to enjoin respondent Singson from the performance
of his functions as such official until his appointment is confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments and respondent Salvador M.
Enriquez, Secretary of Budget and Management, from disbursing
40 | P a g e
public funds in payment of the salaries and emoluments of

respondent Singson.
Rule: We dismiss the petition.
1. The instant petition is in the nature of a quo
warranto proceeding as it seeks the ouster of respondent Singson
and alleges that the latter is unlawfully holding or exercising the
powers of Governor of the Bangko Sentral (Cf. Castro v. Del
Rosario, 19 SCRA 196 [1967]). Such a special civil action can only
be commenced by the Solicitor General or by a "person claiming to
be entitled to a public office or position unlawfully held or exercised
by another" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 66, Sec. 6; Acosta v.
Flor, 5 Phil. 18 [1905]).
It is obvious that the instant action was improvidently brought by
petitioner. To uphold the action would encourage every disgruntled
citizen to resort to the courts, thereby causing incalculable
mischief and hindrance to the efficient operation of the
governmental machinery (See Roosevelt v. Draper, 7 Abb. Pr.
108, 23 N.Y. 218).
2. We call attention to our decision in Calderon v. Carale, 208
SCRA 254 (1992), with Justice Isagani A. Cruz dissenting, where
we ruled that Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation
powers of the Commission on Appointments and require
confirmation of appointment of other government officials not
expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article
VII of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. G.R. No. 111243 May 25,
1994 JESUS ARMANDO A.R. TARROSA, vs. GABRIEL C.
SINGSON
Case: due to the opposition of some congressmen-member of the
Commission on Appointments, the Petitioner and three others
were unable to take their seats as Sectoral Representatives, as
appointed by the President.
Issue: The issue is, whether the Constitution requires the
appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of
Representatives to be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution
enumerates among others, the officers who may be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, as follows:
SEC. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of
the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
41 | P a g e
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers

lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
The President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only
until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of the Congress.
In Sarmiento vs. Mison, et al. (156 SCRA 549 [19871), we
construed Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution to mean that
only appointments to offices mentioned in the first sentence of the
said Section 16, Article VII require confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments,
Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph
2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President
by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it
is undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of
Representatives are among the "other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution,"
referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose
appointments are subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments G.R. No. 83216 September 4, 1989 TERESITA
QUINTOS-DELES, GLORIA T. ARAGON (M.D.), LOURDES V.
MASTURA, TRINIDAD A. GOMEZ, ADUL DE LEON, JOSEFINA
AZARCON-DELA CRUZ, TRINIDAD M. DOMINGO, MARIA
MAYET
T.
LEDANO,
LOLIT
ANTONIO,
ET
AL.
vs. THE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS,
2.
Upon the Recommendation of the Judicial and Bar

Council
a. Members of the Supreme Court and all the other courts
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and
judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least three nominees prepared
by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such
appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the
appointment within ninety days from the submission of
the list. (Art VIII)
b. Ombudsman and his Deputies
Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least six
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and
from a list of three nominees for every vacancy
thereafter. Such appointments shall require no
confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled within three
months after they occur. (Art XI)
42 | P a g e
3.
Appointment of the Vice President as member of the

cabinet
Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the
same qualifications and term of office and be elected with,
and in the same manner, as the President. He may be
removed from office in the same manner as the President.
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the
Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation (Art VII)
4.
Appointment Solely by the President

Section 16. . He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. (Art VII)
1. Those appointments not otherwise provided for by law,
and
2. those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint
Case The validity and legality of the appointment of respondent

Conrado Quiaoit to the post of Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac by then
President Fidel V. Ramos is assailed in this petition on the ground that
the appointment lacks the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice
prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987.
Issue: Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the
Secretary of Justice to the President can be held fatal to the
appointment of respondent Conrado Quiaoit.
Rule: An "appointment" to a public office is the unequivocal act of
designating or selecting by one having the authority therefor of an
individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an
office or trust. The appointment is deemed complete once the last act
required of the appointing authority has been complied with and its
acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render it effective.
Appointment necessarily calls for an exercise of discretion on the part
of the appointing authority. In Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng
Maynila vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, reiterated in Flores
vs.Drilon, this Court has held:
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing
power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according
to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among
those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is a
prerogative of the appointing power . .
Indeed, it may rightly be said that the right of choice is the heart of the
power to appoint. In the exercise of the power of appointment,
discretion is an integral part thereof.
When the Constitution or the law clothes the President with the power
to appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must be understood
as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint.
43 | P a g e
It should be here pertinent to state that the President is the head of

government whose authority includes the power of control over all
"executive departments, bureaus and offices." Control means the
authority of an empowered officer to alter or modify, or even nullify or
set aside, what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of
his duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of the latter, as and
when the former deems it to be appropriate. Expressed in another
way, the President has the power to assume directly the functions of
an executive department, bureau and office. It can accordingly be
inferred therefrom that the President can interfere in the exercise of
discretion of officials under him or altogether ignore their
recommendations.
It is the considered view of the Court, given the above disquisition,
that the phrase "upon recommendation of the Secretary," found in
Section 9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV, of the Revised Administrative
Code, should be interpreted, as it is normally so understood, to be a
mere advise, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially
persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to
whom it is made. The recommendation is here nothing really more
than advisory in nature. The President, being the head of the
Executive Department, could very well disregard or do away with the
action of the departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise of
discretionary authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said as having
acted beyond the scope of his authority.G.R. No. 131429 August 4,
1999 OSCAR BERMUDEZ vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN
TORRES,
Case: The consolidated petitions in the case at bar stem from a quo
warranto proceeding involving two sets of CCP Boards. The
controversy revolves on who between the contending groups, both
claiming as the rightful trustees of the CCP Board, has the legal right
to hold office. The resolution of the issue boils down to the
constitutionality of the provision of PD 15 on the manner of filling
vacancies in the Board.
The Endriga group refused to accept that the CCP was under the
supervision and control of the President. The Endriga group cited
Section 3 of PD 15, which states that the CCP "shall enjoy autonomy
of policy and operation x x x."
Rule: The clear and categorical language of Section 6(b) of PD 15
states that vacancies in the CCP Board shall be filled by a majority
vote of the remaining trustees. Should only one trustee survive, the
vacancies shall be filled by the surviving trustee acting in
consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP. Should the
Board become entirely vacant, the vacancies shall be filled by
the President of the Philippines acting in consultation with the same
ranking officers of the CCP. Thus, the remaining trustees, whether
one or more, elect their fellow trustees for a fixed four-year term. On
the other hand, Section 6(c) of PD 15 does not allow trustees to
reelect fellow trustees for more than two consecutive terms.
The source of the President's power to appoint, as well as the
Legislature's authority to delegate the power to appoint, is found in
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
44 | P a g e
The power to appoint is the prerogative of the President, except in

those instances when the Constitution provides otherwise. Usurpation
of this fundamentally Executive power by the Legislative and Judicial
branches violates the system of separation of powers that inheres in
our democratic republican government.
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President
appoints three groups of officers.
The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the
Constitution.
The second group refers to those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint.
The third group refers to all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided by law.
Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked
officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads
of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The present case
involves the interpretation of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution with respect to the appointment of this fourth group of
officers.
The President appoints the first group of officers with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the second
and third groups of officers without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. The President appoints the third group of officers if the
law is silent on who is the appointing power, or if the law authorizing
the head of a department, agency, commission, or board to appoint is
declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is
found unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the trustees of the
CCP Board because the trustees fall under the third group of officers.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is thus irreconcilably inconsistent with
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 6(b) and (c) of
PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees of the CCP Board to fill
vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing them to elect their fellow
trustees. On the other hand, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution allows heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards to appoint only "officers lower in rank" than such "heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards." This excludes a
situation where the appointing officer appoints an officer equal in rank
as him. Thus, insofar as it authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to
elect their co-trustees, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
It does not matter that Section 6(b) of PD 15 empowers the remaining
trustees to "elect" and not "appoint" their fellow trustees for the effect
is the same, which is to fill vacancies in the CCP Board. A statute
cannot circumvent the constitutional limitations on the power to
45 | P a g e
appoint by filling vacancies in a public office through election by the

co-workers in that office. Such manner of filling vacancies in a public
office has no constitutional basis.
Further, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP trustees the
independent appointing power of their fellow trustees. The creation of
an independent appointing power inherently conflicts with the
President's power to appoint. This inherent conflict has spawned
recurring controversies in the appointment of CCP trustees every time
a new President assumes office. G.R. No. 139554 July 21, 2006
ARMITA B. RUFINO, vs. BALTAZAR N. ENDRIGA,
5.
Limitations on the Appointing power of the President

otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest
in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the
fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure,
be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or
the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices,
including government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries. (Art VII)
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
(Art VII)
Case: The question presented for resolution in the administrative
matter at bar is whether, during the period of the ban on appointments
imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the, Constitution, the President is
nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of
Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII. A corollary question is whether he
can make appointments to the judiciary during the period of the ban in
the interest of public service.
Rule: The relevant Constitutional provisions being
Sec. 15, Article VII:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
46 | P a g e
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions

when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
The Court's view is that during the period stated in Section 15. Article
VII of the Constitution "(t)wo months immediatey before the next
presidential elections and up to the end his term" the President is
neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do
so.
Now, it appears that Section 15, Article VI is directed against two
types of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those
made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those
appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential
election and are similar to those which are declared elections offenses
in the Omnibus Election Code
The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII
consist of the so-called "midnight" appointments
As indicated, the Court recognized that there may well be
appointments to important positions which have to be made even after
the proclamations of a new President. Such appointments, so long as
they are "few and so spaced as to afford some assurance of
deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the
appointment and the appointee's qualifications," 10 can be made by the
outgoing President.
The appointments of Messrs. Valenzuela and Vallarta on March 30,
1998 (transmitted to the Office of the Chief Justice on May 14, 998)
were unquestionably made during the period of the ban.
Consequently, they come within the operation of the first prohibition
relating to appointments which are considered to be for the purpose of
buying votes or influencing the election. While the filling of vacancies
in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no
showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of
the appointments during the period of the ban. On the other hand, as
already discussed, there is a strong public policy for the prohibition
against appointments made within the period of the ban.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court Resolved to
DECLARE VOID the appointments signed by His Excellency the
President under date of March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela
and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta. A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC November 9,
1998 In Re Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A.
Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the
Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24,
Cabananatuan City, respectively
Case: Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and
Salvador M. Viari (petitioners) filed with this Court a Petition to
Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the
Senate. Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the
Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while respondent is Chairman of
the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.
Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC
Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the
47 | P a g e
Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution,

which reads:
Rule:
PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public
Functions. The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva
Conventions, established the PNRC as a voluntary organization for
the purpose contemplated in the Geneva Convention of 27 July
1929. in order to be recognized as a National Society, the PNRC
has to be autonomous and must operate in conformity with the
Fundamental Principles of the National Society of the Movement.
The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be accepted by
warring belligerents as neutral workers during international or
internal armed conflicts, the PNRC volunteers must not be seen as
belonging to any side of the armed conflict.. To ensure and
maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC
cannot be owned or controlled by the government. Indeed, the
Philippine government does not own the PNRC. The PNRC
Chairman is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate
government official. Neither does the head of any department,
agency, commission or board appoint the PNRC Chairman. Thus,
the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive
branch since his appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is not an
official or employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This leads us to
the obvious conclusion that the PNRC Chairman is not an official or
employee of the Philippine Government. Not being a government
official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not hold a
government office or employment.
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the
Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an
office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for
purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. G.R. No. 175352 DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M.
BERNARDO, and SALVADOR M. VIARI, vs.RICHARD J.
GORDON,
Case: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential
elections on May 10, 2010.. May the incumbent President appoint
his successor, considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive
Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting
President from making appointments within two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety?
Rule: As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive
Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the
Constitution in the President. The presidential power of
appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article.
Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the
duties and qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court, among
others. Section 4(1) and Section 9 of this Article are the provisions
48 | P a g e
specifically providing for the appointment of Supreme Court

Justices. In particular, Section 9 states that the appointment of
Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President upon
the submission of a list of at least three nominees by the JBC;
Section 4(1) of the Article mandates the President to fill the
vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in
Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not
have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would
have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself,
most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was
not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within two months before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President's
or Acting President's term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.
In this connection, PHILCONSA's urging of a revisit and a review of
Valenzuela is timely and appropriate. Valenzuela arbitrarily ignored
the express intent of the Constitutional Commission to have Section
4 (1), Article VIII stand independently of any other provision, least
of all one found in Article VII. It further ignored that the two
provisions had no irreconcilable conflict, regardless of Section 15,
Article VII being couched in the negative. As judges, we are not to
unduly interpret, and should not accept an interpretation that
defeats the intent of the framers.
Consequently, prohibiting the incumbent President from appointing
a Chief Justice on the premise that Section 15, Article VII extends
to appointments in the Judiciary cannot be sustained. A
misinterpretation like Valenzuela should not be allowed to last after
its false premises have been exposed. It will not do to merely
distinguish Valenzuela from these cases, for the result to be
reached herein is entirely incompatible with what Valenzuela
decreed. Consequently, Valenzuela now deserves to be quickly
sent to the dustbin of the unworthy and forgettable.
We reverse Valenzuela. Second. Section 15, Article VII does not
apply as well to all other appointments in the Judiciary. There is no
question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section
15 as part of Article VII was to eliminate midnight appointments
from being made by an outgoing Chief Executive
Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section
15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional
Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the
Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend the
prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their
establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and
screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and
deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no
longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. If midnight
appointments in the mold of Aytona were made in haste and with
49 | P a g e
irregularities, or made by an outgoing Chief Executive in the last

days of his administration out of a desire to subvert the policies of
the incoming President or for partisanship, the appointments to the
Judiciary made after the establishment of the JBC would not be
suffering from such defects because of the JBC's prior processing
of candidates. Indeed, it is axiomatic in statutory construction that
the ascertainment of the purpose of the enactment is a step in the
process of ascertaining the intent or meaning of the enactment,
because the reason for the enactment must necessarily shed
considerable light on "the law of the statute," i.e., the intent; hence,
the enactment should be construed with reference to its intended
scope and purpose, and the court should seek to carry out this
purpose rather than to defeat it.
Also, the intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that
appointments to the Judiciary can be made for the purpose of
buying votes in a coming presidential election, or of satisfying
partisan considerations. The experience from the time of the
establishment of the JBC shows that even candidates for judicial
positions at any level backed by people influential with the
President could not always be assured of being recommended for
the consideration of the President, because they first had to
undergo the vetting of the JBC and pass muster there. Indeed, the
creation of the JBC was precisely intended to de-politicize the
Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the Commission on
Appointments. This insulating process was absent from the Aytona
midnight appointment.
As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15, Article VII to
appointments in the Judiciary was confirmed by then Senior
Associate Justice Regalado to the JBC itself when it met on March
9, 1998 to discuss the question raised by some sectors about the
"constitutionality of xxx appointments" to the Court of Appeals in
light of the forthcoming presidential elections. He assured that "on
the basis of the (Constitutional) Commission's records, the election
ban had no application to appointments to the Court of Appeals
The fault of Valenzuela was that it accorded no weight and due
consideration to the confirmation of Justice Regalado. Valenzuela
was weak, because it relied on interpretation to determine the intent
of the framers rather than on the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.
To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to
appointments to the Judiciary further undermines the intent of the
Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial
Department from the Executive and Legislative Departments. Such
a holding will tie the Judiciary and the Supreme Court to the
fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency
in a presidential election. Consequently, the wisdom of having the
new President, instead of the current incumbent President, appoint
the next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and cannot ensure judicial
independence, because the appointee can also become beholden
to the appointing authority. In contrast, the appointment by the
incumbent President does not run the same risk of compromising
judicial independence, precisely because her term will end by June
30, 2010. G.R. No. 191002
March 17, 2010 ARTURO M. DE
50 | P a g e
CASTRO, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and

PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL - ARROYO, .
Case (Motions for Reconsideration) Judicial decisions assume the
same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are
applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of
those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to
enforce obedience to them.3 In a hierarchical judicial system like
ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts, but
the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind each other. The one
highest court does not bind itself, being invested with the innate
authority to rule according to its best lights. The Court, as the
highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by
precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is
not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines,
after re-examination, to call for a rectification.
It has been insinuated as part of the polemics attendant to the
controversy we are resolving that because all the Members of the
present Court were appointed by the incumbent President, a
majority of them are now granting to her the authority to appoint the
successor of the retiring Chief Justice.
The insinuation is misguided and utterly unfair.
The Members of the Court vote on the sole basis of their
conscience and the merits of the issues. Any claim to the contrary
proceeds from malice and condescension. Neither the outgoing
President nor the present Members of the Court had arranged the
current situation to happen and to evolve as it has. None of the
Members of the Court could have prevented the Members
composing the Court when she assumed the Presidency about a
decade ago from retiring during her prolonged term and tenure, for
their retirements were mandatory. Yet, she is now left with an
imperative duty under the Constitution to fill up the vacancies
created by such inexorable retirements within 90 days from their
occurrence. Her official duty she must comply with. So must we
ours who are tasked by the Constitution to settle the
controversy.G.R. No. 191002
April 20, 2010 ARTURO M. DE
CASTRO, , vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL - ARROYO, .
6.
Interim or Recess Appointment
Section 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on

Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the
Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been
organized with the election of the President and the Speaker. The
Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the
Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority
of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as
are herein conferred upon it. (Art VI)
51 | P a g e
Section 16. xxx The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
(VII)
Appointments requiring confirmation are

(i) Regular18, when Commission on Appointments / Congress, is in
session, or
(ii) during Recess19
Case: Petitioner was appointed Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights on December 17, 1988. She took her oath of office
and entered into the discharge of her functions and duties. on the
same month. However, on January 9, 1989, , she was required by
the Commission on Appointments to submit documents needed for
the confirmation of her appointment. Alleging that appointment
was not subject to confirmation, she refused compliance therewith.
On January 14, 1989, the President submitted petitioner's ad
interim appointment to the CA. However, considering petitioner's
refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the CA, it disapproved her
appointment. Hence, this Petition
1. Whether or not the appointment by the resident of the Chairman
of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), an "independent
office" created by the 1987 Constitution, is to be made with or
without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments (CA,
for brevity)
Since the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of
Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, appointments to which
are to be made with the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments, it follows that the appointment by the President of
the Chairman of the (CHR), is to be made without the review or
participation of the Commission on Appointments.
To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and
Members of the Commission on Human Rights is not specifically
provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and
Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose appointments are
expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments.
The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the second sentence in
Section 16, Art. VII, that is, without the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments because they are among the officers
of government "whom he (the President) may be authorized by law
18
CA Confirmation is required before post is assumed
Or ad-interim . Need no confirmation to be effective and is effective until it is

disapproved by the Commission or until the next adjournment of Congress
19
52 | P a g e
to appoint." And Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, 5 May

1987, authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and
Members of the Commission on Human Rights. It provides:
(c) The Chairman and the Members of the
Commission on Human Rights shall be appointed
by the President for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall
be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor.
2. Whether the President, subsequent to her act of 17 December
1988, and after petitioner Bautista had qualified for the office to
which she had been appointed, by taking the oath of office and
actually assuming and discharging the functions and duties thereof,
could extend another appointment to the petitioner on 14
January 1989, an "ad interim appointment" as termed by the
respondent Commission on Appointments or any other kind of
appointment to the same office of Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights that called for confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
The Court, with all due respect to both the Executive and
Legislative Departments of government, and after careful
deliberation, is constrained to hold and rule in the negative. When
Her Excellency, the President converted petitioner Bautista's
designation as Acting Chairman to a permanent appointment as
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights on 17 December
1988, significantly she advised Bautista (in the same appointment
letter) that, by virtue of such appointment, she could qualify and
enter upon the performance of the duties of the office (of Chairman
of the Commission on Human Rights). All that remained for
Bautista to do was to reject or accept the appointment. Obviously,
she accepted the appointment by taking her oath of office before
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Hon. Marcelo B. Fernan
and assuming immediately thereafter the functions and duties of
the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. Bautista's
appointment therefore on 17 December 1988 as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights was a completed act on the part of
the President.
Ex gratia argumenti, that the Executive may voluntarily allow the
Commission on Appointments to exercise the power of review over
an appointment otherwise solely vested by the Constitution in the
President. Yet, as already noted, when the President appointed
petitioner Bautista on 17 December 1988 to the position of
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights with the advice to
her that by virtue of such appointment (not, until confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments), she could qualify and enter upon
the performance of her duties after taking her oath of office, the
presidential act of appointment to the subject position which, under
the Constitution, is to be made, in the first place, without the
participation of the Commission on Appointments, was then and
there a complete and finished act, which, upon the acceptance by
Bautista, as shown by her taking of the oath of office and actual
assumption of the duties of said office, installed her, indubitably and
unequivocally, as the lawful Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights for a term of seven (7) years. There was thus no
53 | P a g e
vacancy in the subject office on 14 January 1989 to which an

appointment could be validly made. In fact, there is no vacancy in
said office to this day.
Nor can respondents impressively contend that the new
appointment or re-appointment on 14 January 1989 was an ad
interim appointment, because, under the Constitutional design, ad
interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely for the
President to make, i.e., without the participation of the Commission
on Appointments. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature
under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to appointments where
the review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is
why ad interim appointments are to remain valid until disapproval
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment
of Congress; but appointments that are for the President solely to
make, that is, without the participation of the Commission on
Appointments, can not be ad interim appointments. G.R. No. 86439
April 13, 1989 MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, vs.
SENATOR JOVITO R. SALONGA,
7.
Temporary Designations
Sec. 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. - (1) The
President may temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent person to perform the
functions of an office in the executive branch, appointment to
which is vested in him by law, when:
(a) the officer regularly appointed to the office is unable to perform
his duties by reason of illness, absence or any other cause; or
(b) there exists a vacancy;
xxx
In no case shall a temporary designation exceed one (1) year. 20
8.
Limitations of the Appointing power of the Acting

resident
Section 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President
shall remain effective, unless revoked by the elected
President, within ninety days from his assumption or
reassumption of office.
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
Section 16. xxx The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
20
Administrative Code of 1987, Book III
54 | P a g e
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be

effective only until disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
(Art VII)
(5) Executive Clemencies

Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
(Art VII)
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of
sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations
shall be granted by the President without the favorable
recommendation of the Commission. (Art IX, C.)
A "reprieve" or "respite" is the withholding of the sentence for an

interval of time (4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 394), a
postponement of execution (Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R. [N.
Y.], 272), a temporary suspension of execution (Butler vs. State, 97
Ind., 373).
"Commutation" is a remission of a part of the punishment; a
substitution of a less penalty for the one originally imposed (Lee vs.
Murphy, 22 Grat. [Va.] 789; 12 Am. Rep., 563; Rich vs.
Chamberlain, 107 Mich., 381; 65 N. W., 235).
A "pardon" is an act of grace, proceeding from the power intrusted
with the execution of the laws which exempts the individual on
whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime
he has committed (United States vs. Wilson, 7 Pet., 150; 8 Law.
ed., 640); It is a remission of guilt. (State vs. Lewis, 111 La., 693;
35 So., 816), a forgiveness of the offense (Cook vs. Middlesex
County, 26 N. J. Law, 326; Ex parte Powell, 73 Ala., 517; 49 Am.
Rep., 71).
Amnesty commonly denotes the "general pardon to rebels for their
treason and other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which
one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended
by some breach of the law of nations." (1 Bish. Cr. L., sec. 898.)
The term "amnesty" belongs to international law, and is applied to
rebellions which by their magnitude are properly within international
law, but has no technical meaning in the common law. It is a
synonym of oblivion, which in the English law is the synonym of
pardon. (Bouvier, "Amnesty.")
Amnesty is a sovereign act of oblivion for past acts, granted by
government generally to a class of persons who have been guilty
usually of political offenses (treason, sedition, rebellion), and who
55 | P a g e
are subject to trial but have not yet been convicted, and often
conditioned upon their return to obedience and duty within a
prescribed time. (Black; Brown v Walker, 161 US 602).
Probation is defined by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 968,
the Probation Law as "a disposition under which a defendant, after
conviction and sentence, is released subject to conditions imposed
by the court and to the supervision of a probation officer."
Parole is a conditional release of a prisoner with an unexpired
sentence, or suspension of his sentence, without remitting the
penalty imposed upon him
Parole is the suspension of the sentence of a convict granted by a
Parole Board after serving the minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence penalty, without granting a pardon, prescribing the terms
upon which the sentence shall be suspended.
1.
Pardon distinguished from Probation
Case: Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the
same. They are actually district and different from each other, both
in origin and in nature. . In probation, the probationer is in no true
sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and completely
exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment which the
law inflicts. Under the Probation Act, the probationer's case is not
terminated by the mere fact that he is placed on probation. Section
4 of the Act provides that the probation may be definitely terminated
and the probationer finally discharged from supervision only after
the period of probation shall have been terminated and the
probation officer shall have submitted a report, and the court shall
have found that the probationer has complied with the conditions of
probation. The probationer, then, during the period of probation,
remains in legal custody subject to the control of the probation
officer and of the court; and, he may be rearrested upon the nonfulfillment of the conditions of probation and, when rearrested, may
be committed to prison to serve the sentence originally imposed
upon him. G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937 THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.JOSE O. VERA
In both, there must be a final judgment of conviction, and the

convict must be exempted from service of sentence.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive for any crime, while
probation is granted by the court after investigation by a probation
officer only for cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed
6 years and 1 day (prision mayor), where the crime is not against
the security of the State, where there was no previous conviction
for an offense punished by arresto mayor, and where there was
no previous availment of probation.
In absolute pardon, the sentence and its effects, including the
accessory penalties, are abolished upon the grant of pardon. In
probation, the restoration of the probationer to his civil rights
takes places only after his final discharge after the period of his
56 | P a g e
probation. (Secs. 14 & 16)
2.
Pardon distinguished from Parole
Case: Tesoro, a convict of the crime of Falsification of Public

Documents, accepted the parole granted by the governor general.
The same included the condition that he shall not commit any crime
and will conduct himself in an orderly manner. Subsequently, he
was charged with adultery. He was arrested and recommitted to
prison.
Rule: 1. Appellant also contends that the Board of Indeterminate
Sentence has no legal authority to investigate the conduct of the
petitioner, and recommend the revocation of his parole. By the
terms of his parole, petitioner agreed to report the executive
secretary of the board once a month during the first year of his
parole, and, thereafter, once every three months. By his consent to
this condition, petitioner has placed himself under the supervision
of the board. The duty to report on the part of the petitioner implies
a corresponding power on the part of the board to inquire into his
conduct, and a fortiori to make recommendations to the President
by whose authority it was acting. Besides, the power to revoke
paroles necessarily carries with it the power to investigate and to
inquire into the conduct of the parolees, if such power of revocation
is to be rational and intelligent. In the exercise of this incidental
power of inquiry and investigation, the President of the Philippines
is not precluded by law or by the Constitution from making use of
any agency of the government, or even of any individual, to secure
the necessary assistance.
2. Appellant further contends that judicial pronouncement to the
effect that he has committed a crime is necessary before he can be
properly adjudged as having violated his conditional parole. Under
condition No. 2 of his parole, petitioner agreed that he "will not
commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly
manner." (Emphasis ours.) It was, therefore, the mere commission,
not his conviction by court, of any other crime, that was necessary
in order that the petitioner may be deemed to have violated his
parole. And under section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code, the
Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and reincarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to
comply with the condition, or conditions, of his pardon, parole, or
suspension of sentence."
3. Appellant impugns the findings of the President regarding the
violation of the conditional parole. He claims that, according to the
weight of the evidence, the violation took place, not "in the latter
part of September, 1937," as found by the President, but after
October 28, 1937, the date when the parole was supposed to
expire. But that as it may, where, as in the instant case, the
determination of the violation of the conditional parole rests
exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, the courts
will not interfere, by way of review, with any of his findings. The
petitioner herein having consented to place his liberty on parole
upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, he cannot
57 | P a g e
invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may
be upon which his recommitment was ordered.
4. When a conditional pardon is violated, the prisoner is placed in
the same state in which he was at the time the pardon was granted.
He may be rearrested and recommitted to prisons (See U.S. vs.
Ignacio [1916}, 33 Phil., 202, 204; U.S. vs. Villalon [1917], 37 Phil.,
322.) And the rule is well-settled that, in requiring the convict to
undergo so much of the punishment imposed by his original
sentence as he had not suffered at the time of his release, the court
should not consider the time during which the convict was at large
by virtue of the pardon as time served on the original sentence. (20
R.C.L., p. 570; State vs. Horne [1906], 52 Fla., 125; 42 So., 388; 7
L.R.A. [N.S.}, 719, 725. Vide, also, Ex parte Bell [1879], Miss.,
282.) G.R. No. L-46437 May 23, 1939 EUFEMIO P. TESORO vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
Case: 1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms
and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts
which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of
a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be
either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a
judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a
conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code.
Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of
a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by
final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et unique judicial process,
and because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been
accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the
offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of
the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional
vice. G.R. No. 76872 July 23, 1987 WILFREDO TORRES Y
SUMULONG, vs. HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES,
3.
Pardon distinguished Amnesty
Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon.

a. Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a
private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while
amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the
concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts
should take judicial notice.
b. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is
granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of
58 | P a g e
political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the

criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
c. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the
consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that
is, it abolished or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it
does ""nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or
the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by
the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from
the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence" article 36, Revised Penal Code). while amnesty looks
backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it
so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged
that the person released by amnesty stands before the law
precisely as though he had committed no offense. (Barrioquinto et
al v. Fernandez 82 Phil 642)
In the case of People vs. Casido, the difference between pardon

and amnesty is given:
"Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a
private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while
amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the
concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts
should take judicial notice. x x x G.R. No. 137891 July 11,
2001 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUS
PATRIARCA -
4.
Effects of Pardon
Issue: Is Santos disqualified for his elective public office despite

having been pardoned?
Rule: It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the
exercise of this constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive,
namely: (a) that the power be exercised after convictions; and (b)
that such power does not extend to cases of impeachment. Subject
to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power
does not extend to cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations
imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be
restricted or controlled by legislative action. It must remain where
the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the
highest authority to whom it is entrusted. An absolute pardon not
only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities
resulting from the convictions. In the present case, the disability
is the result of conviction without which there would no basis for
disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only
punishment which the law imposes upon those who violate its
command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the
pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities. When
granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute
pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. In
the present case, while the pardon extended to respondent Santos
is conditional in the sense that "he will be eligible for appointment
59 | P a g e
only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature involving no

money or property responsibility," it is absolute insofar as it
"restores the respondent to full civil and political rights." G.R. No. L47941 December 7, 1940 MIGUEL CRISTOBAL vs. ALEJO
LABRADOR, ET AL
Issue: Is Palatino disqualified from the elective position as Mayor
despite having been formerly pardoned and have been restored of
his enjoyment of full civil and political rights., the criminal conviction
having been made unde the then Election Code, and the pardon
having been granted after the election but before the date fixed by
law for assuming office?
Rule: we adopt the broad view expressed in Cristobal vs. Labrador,
G. R. No. 47941, promulgated December 7, 1940, that subject to
the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power
cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action; that an
absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but
removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction, and that when
granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute
pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction,
While there may be force in the argument which finds support in
well considered cases that the effect of absolute pardon should not
be extended to cases of this kind, we are of the opinion that the
better view in the light of the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction
is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief
Executive who, after inquiry into the environmental facts, should be
at liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving
completely the party or parties concerned from the accessory and
resultant disabilities of criminal conviction. In the case at bar, it is
admitted that the respondent mayor-elect committed the offense
more than 25 years ago; that he had already merited conditional
pardon from the Governor-General in 1915; that thereafter he had
exercised the right of suffrage, was elected councilor of Torrijos,
Marinduque, for the period 1918 to 1921; was elected municipal
president of that municipality three times in succession (19221931); and finally elected mayor of the municipality in the election
for local officials in December, 1940. Under these circumstances, it
is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon was to
enable him to assume the position in deference to the popular will;
and the pardon was thus extended on the date mentioned
hereinabove and before the date fixed in section 4 of the Election
Code for assuming office. We see no reason for defeating this
wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial interpretation of the
constitutional grant to the Chief Executive. We, therefore, give
efficacy to executive action and disregard what at bottom is a
technical objection. G.R. No. L-48100 June 20, 1941
Florencio
Pelobello vs. Gregorio Palatino
Case: Despite the interim grant of pardon, Petitioner was
disqualified to file his candidacy on the ground of a former
conviction for the offense of counterfeiting, and thus the
consequent disqualification from suffrage...
Issue: Whether or not a plenary pardon, granted after election but
before the date fixed by law for assuming office, had the effect of
60 | P a g e
removing the disqualifications prescribed by both the criminal and

electoral codes.
Rule: Certain authorities (67 C.J.S. 578) do hold that a pardon is
not retrospective. But the view consistently adopted in this
jurisdiction is that the pardon's effects should not be unnecessarily
limited as it would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power,
which was not contemplated in the Constitution (Cristobal vs.
Labrador, 71 Phil. 34, 39; Pelobello vs. Palatino, 72 Phil. 4,11;
Mijares vs. Custorio, 73 Phil. 507).
More specifically, this Court, in Pelobello vs. Palatino, 72 Phil. 441,
through Justice Laurel, stated:
... Without the necessity of inquiring into the historical
background of the benign prerogative of mercy, we adopt the
broad view expressed in Cristobal vs. Labrador, G.R. No.
47941, promulgated December 7, 1940 that subject to the
limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power
cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action; that
an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed
but removes all disabilities resulting from conviction; and that
when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired,
absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences
of conviction. While there may be force in the argument
which finds support in well considered cases that the effect
of absolute pardon should not be extended to cases of this
kind, we are of the opinion that the better view in the light of
the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to
unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief
Executive who, after inquiry into the environmental facts,
should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of law to the extent
of relieving completely the party or parties concerned from
the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal
conviction. . Under these circumstances, it is evident that
the purpose in granting him absolute pardon was to enable
him to assume the position in deference to the popular will;
and the pardon was thus extended on the date mentioned
herein above and before the date fixed for assuming
office. We see no reason for defeating this wholesome
purpose by a restrictive judicial interpretation of the
constitutional grant to the Chief Executive. We, therefore,
give efficacy to executive action and disregard that at bottom
is a technical objection. (Emphasis supplied).
Upon the, authority of the three cases previously cited, we conclude
that the pardon granted to appellee Abes has removed his
disqualification, and his election and assumption of office must be
sustained. G.R. No. L-28613 August 27, 1968 AMBROCIO
LACUNA vs. BENJAMIN H. ABES
Case: Was Petitioner entitled as a consequence of Pardon to
reinstatement as assistant city treasurer
Rule: While we are prepared to concede that pardon may remit all
the penal consequences of a criminal indictment if only to give
meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative,
61 | P a g e
should not be circumscribed by legislative action, we do not

subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon blots out the guilt of an
individual and that once he is absolved, he should be treated as if
he were innocent. For whatever may have been the judicial dicta in
the past, we cannot perceive how pardon can produce such "moral
changes" as to equate a pardoned convict in character and conduct
with one who has constantly maintained the mark of a good, lawabiding citizen.
Pardon cannot mask the acts constituting the crime. These are
"historical" facts which, despite the public manifestation of mercy
and forgiveness implicit in pardon, "ordinary, prudent men will take
into account in their subsequent dealings with the actor."
Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the
penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights.
But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence (which is
rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and
fair dealing
We are in full agreement with the commonly-held opinion that
pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office
necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction
although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for
appointment to that office.
Finally, petitioner has sought exemption from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence. The Court
cannot oblige her. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by
the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of
sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon,
amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may
only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil
Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the
debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and
novation. G.R. No. 78239 February 9, 1989 Salvacion A.
Monsanto vs. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.
5.
Sanctions for Violations
Rule: Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has

been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached
the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two
options:
(i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) 21 of the Revised
Administrative Code; or
to grant to convicted prisoners reprieves or pardons, either plenary or partial, conditional or

unconditional; to suspend sentences without parole, remit fines, and order the discharge of any
convicted person upon parole, subject to such conditions as he may impose; and to authorize
the arrest and recommitment of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with
the condition or conditions, of his pardon, parole or suspension of sentence. (Emphasis
supplied)
21
62 | P a g e
(ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised Penal
Code which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum
period, upon a convict who "having been granted conditional
pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of
such pardon.
6.
Pardon and Administrative cases
Issues: 1. Ca pardon be allowed for convictions in Administrative

cases?
2. May the Executive Secretary grant clemencies?
Rule:: We do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why
the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative
cases. It is Our considered view that if the President can grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant
executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less
serious than criminal offenses.
Under the doctrine of Qualified Political Agency, the different
executive departments are mere adjuncts of the President. Their
acts are presumptively the acts of the President until
countermanded or reprobated by her (Vinena v. Secretary, 67 Phil.
451; Free Telephone Workers Union vs. Minister of Labor and
Employment, 108 SCRA 767 [1981]). Replying upon this view, it is
urged by the Solicitor General that in the present case, the
President, in the exercise of her power of supervision and control
over all executive departments, may substitute her decision for that
of her subordinate, most especially where the basis therefor would
be to serve the greater public interest. It is clearly within the power
of the President not only to grant "executive clemency" but also to
reverse or modify a ruling issued by a subordinate against an erring
public official, where a reconsideration of the facts alleged would
support the same. It is in this sense that the alleged executive
clemency was granted, after adducing reasons that subserve the
public interest. G.R. No. 99031 October 15, 1991 RODOLFO D.
LLAMAS, vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR ORBOS
7.
Who may avail of amnesty?
Case: Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for

their treason or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness
which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have
offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks
backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it
so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged,
that the person released by amnesty stands before the law
precisely as though he had committed no offense. (395 Phil.690
(2000), citing People v. Casido, 336 Phil. 344 (1997). )G.R. No.
137891 July 11, 2001 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
JESUS PATRIARCA
63 | P a g e
(6) Powers of the Commander in Chief

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of
all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he
may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines
or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours
from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall
submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The
Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation
or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if
the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires
it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians
where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically
suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in
or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person
thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within
three days, otherwise he shall be released. (Art VII)
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses

punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required. (Art III)
64 | P a g e
Section 1. xxx
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Art VIII)
The commander in chief powers of the president include the power
to;
1. call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.
2. suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or
3. proclaim martial law over the entire Philippines or any part
thereof.
Section 18 grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, the power
to call out the armed forces in cases of (1) lawless violence, (2)
rebellion and (3) invasion In the latter two cases, i.e., rebellion or
invasion, the President may, when public safety requires, also (a)
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or (b) place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. However, in the
exercise of this calling out power as Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces, the Constitution does not require the President to
make a declaration of a "state of rebellion" (or, for that matter, of
lawless violence or invasion). The term "state of rebellion" has no
legal significance. It is vague and amorphous and does not give the
President more power than what the Constitution says, i.
e, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
As Justice Mendoza observed during the hearing of this case, such
a declaration is "legal surplusage." But whatever the term means, it
cannot diminish or violate constitutionally-protected rights, such as
the right to due process, the rights to free speech and peaceful
assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances, and
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, among
others.22
The exceptional character of Commander-in-Chief powers dictate
that they are exercised by one president
Springing from the well-entrenched constitutional precept of One
President is the notion that there are certain acts which, by their
very nature, may only be performed by the president as the Head of
the State. One of these acts or prerogatives is the bundle of
Commander-in-Chief powers to which the "calling-out" powers
constitutes a portion. The Presidents Emergency Powers, on the
other hand, is balanced only by the legislative act of Congress, as
embodied in the second paragraph of Section 23, Article 6 of the
Constitution:
Article 6, Sec 23(2). In times of war or other national
emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such
22
G.R. No. 147780 May 10, 2001 PANFILO LACSON, vs. SECRETARY
65 | P a g e
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers

necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy.
Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress,
such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
The power to declare a state of martial law is subject to the
Supreme Courts authority to review the factual basis thereof. By
constitutional fiat, the calling-out powers, which is of lesser gravity
than the power to declare martial law, is bestowed upon the
President alone. As noted in Villena, "(t)here are certain
constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the
Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of
approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those
powers by any other person. Such, for instance, is his power to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law x x x. 23
A.
Call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion
This is intended to suppress disorder.
In the case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, (392
Phil. 618.) the Court had occasion to rule that the calling-out
powers belong solely to the President as commander-in-chief:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in
his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and
from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus,
cannot be called upon to overrule the Presidents wisdom or
substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised
in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of
the constitutional intent to give the President full
discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out
the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show
that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis.
There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to
bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the
armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of
such power. 24
B.
Suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, or proclaim martial law over the entire
Philippines or any part thereof.
Common grounds:
67 Phil. 451 (1939). G.R. No. 187298 July 03, 2012 JAMAR M. KULAYAN, TEMOGEN S.
TULAWIE, HJI. MOH. YUSOP ISMI, JULHAJAN AWADI, and SPO1 SATTAL H. JADJULI, vs.
GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN,
24
G.R. No. 187298 July 03, 2012 JAMAR M. KULAYAN vs. GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN
23
66 | P a g e
1. There must be an (actual) invasion or rebellion, and

2. The public safety requires the suspension.
Limitations:
1. Effective only for 60 days
2. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in
person or in writing to the Congress
3. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session,
may revoke such proclamation or suspension,
4. Revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
5. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may
extend such proclamation or suspension
a. SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE

OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
A "writ of habeas corpus" is an order from the court commanding
a detaining officer to inform the court
1.
2.
If he has the person in custody,

Of his basis in detaining that person.
The herein suspension applies only in cases of persons judicially
charged with rebellion or offenses directly or inherently related with
invasion. Such persons suspected of the above crimes can be
arrested and detained without a warrant of arrest. Further, anyone
arrested or suspended during the suspension must be charged
within three days, otherwise, release must be made. Further
detention without the charges made shall hold the detaining person
liable under the Revised penal code under Art. 125 or for "delay in
the delivery of detained persons.
The suspension of the privilege does not make the arrest without
warrant legal. But the military is, in effect, enabled to make the
arrest, anyway since, with the suspension of the privilege, there is
no remedy available against such unlawful arrest (arbitrary
detention). The arrest without warrant is justified by the emergency
situation and the difficulty in applying for a warrant considering the
time and the number of persons to be arrested. But the crime for
which he is arrested must be one related to rebellion or the invasion.
As to other crimes, the suspension of the privilege does not apply.
The effect of the suspension of the privilege, therefore, is only to
extend the periods during which he can be detained without a
warrant.25
The right to bail shall not be impaired during the suspension.
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
25
Adopted (Mendoza)
67 | P a g e
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on

recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required. (Art. III, Sec. 13.)
In case of imprisonment or restraint by an officer, the writ shall be
directed to him, and shall command him to have the body of the
person restrained of his liberty before the court or judge designated
in the writ at the time and place therein specified. In case of
imprisonment or restraint by a person not an officer, the writ shall be
directed to an officer, and shall command him to take and have the
body of the person restrained of his liberty before the court or judge
designated in the writ at the time and place therein specified, and to
summon the person by whom he is restrained then and there to
appear before said court or judge to show the cause of the
imprisonment or restraint.
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that
the individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom
of movement or place under some form of illegal restraint. If an
individuals liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of
habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the
grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in
the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of
action.
In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine
whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime
specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is
an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal
restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists
as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom. xxx The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if
such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of
action is sufficient.
In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must
first inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his
liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of
detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged
cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be
granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if
otherwise, again the writ will be refused.
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of
course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the
petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be
clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie,
the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied
that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the
petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not
detaining or restraining the applicant of the person in whose behalf
the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed. G.R. No.
68 | P a g e
190108 October 19, 2010 DAVID E. SO, vs. HON. ESTEBAN A.

TACLA, JR
b. PROCLAIM MARTIAL LAW

OVER THE ENTIRE PHILIPPINES
OR ANY PART THEREOF.
Effects of the proclamation of martial law

The President can:
1. Legislate
2. Order the arrest of people who obstruct the war effort.
But the following cannot be done (Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 4)
1. Suspend the operation of the Constitution.
2. Supplant the functioning of the civil courts and the
legislative assemblies.
3. Confer jurisdiction upon military courts and agencies over
civilians, where civil courts are unable to function.
4. Automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
How is the proclamation or suspension to be lifted:

1) By the President himself
2) Revocation by Congress
3) Nullification by the Supreme Court
4) Operation of law, after 60 days
The role of Congress.

Congressional ratification or approval of the proclamation or
suspension is not necessary. However, Congress, voting jointly, by
a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, may
-
revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall

not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner,
extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be

determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall
persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours

following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance
with its rules without need of a call.
The role of the Court

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed
by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation
69 | P a g e
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the

extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing.26
Case: The issue there raised was whether in suspending the
privilege of the writ in 1971, Marcos had a basis for doing so. The
Court, in considering the fact that the President based his decision
on (a) the Senate report on the condition in Central Luzon and (b) a
closed door briefing by the military showing the extent of subversion,
concluded that the President did not act arbitrarily. One may
disagree with his appreciation of the facts, but one cannot say that it
is without basis. [In this case of Lansang vs. Garcia, the Court held
unanimously that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of
the factual basis in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency
thereof. This holding is now found in Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 3.]
Lansang v Garcia, 42 SCRA 446 (1971).27
Case: Petitioners seek the annulment of a directive from
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo enjoining them and
other military officers from testifying before Congress without
the Presidents consent. Petitioners also pray for injunctive
relief against a pending preliminary investigation against
them, in preparation for possible court-martial proceedings,
initiated within the military justice system in connection with
petitioners violation of the aforementioned directive.
A few hours after Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had
concluded their testimony, the office of Gen. Senga issued a
statement which noted that the two had appeared before the
Senate Committee "in spite of the fact that a guidance has
been given that a Presidential approval should be sought
prior to such an appearance;" that such directive was "in
keeping with the time[-]honored principle of the Chain of
Command;" and that the two officers "disobeyed a legal
order, in violation of A[rticles of] W[ar] 65 (Willfully
Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they will be subjected to
General Court Martial proceedings x x x" Both Gen. Gudani
and Col. Balutan were likewise relieved of their assignments
then.
In an Investigation Report dated 6 October 2005, the OPMG
recommended that petitioners be charged with violation of
Article of War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior officer, in
Using the test of arbitrariness which seeks to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the measure. The question is not whether the President or Congress acted correctly, but
whether he acted arbitrarily in that the action had no basis in fact. i.e. ... that judicial inquiry into
the basis of the questioned proclamation can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the
President's decision is correct and that public safety was endangered by the rebellion and
justified the suspension of the writ, but that in suspending the writ, the President did not act
arbitrarily.
27
The noted the growth of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the organization of
Communist fronts among youth organizations such as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the
emergence of the New People's Army. After meticulously reviewing the evidence, the Court
said: "We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of men who
have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are
engaged in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.
26
70 | P a g e
relation to Article of War 97, on conduct prejudicial to the

good order and military discipline
It was from these premises that the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition was filed, particularly seeking that
(1) the order of President Arroyo coursed through Gen.
Senga preventing petitioners from testifying before Congress
without her prior approval be declared unconstitutional; (2)
the charges stated in the charge sheets against petitioners
be quashed; and (3) Gen. Senga, Col. Galarpe, Col. Roa,
and their successors-in-interest or persons acting for and on
their behalf or orders, be permanently enjoined from
proceeding against petitioners, as a consequence of their
having testified before the Senate on 28 September 2005
Rule: The vitality of the tenet that the President is the
commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces is most crucial to
the democratic way of life, to civilian supremacy over the
military, and to the general stability of our representative
system of government. The Constitution reposes final
authority, control and supervision of the AFP to the
President, a civilian who is not a member of the armed
forces, and whose duties as commander-in-chief represent
only a part of the organic duties imposed upon the office, the
other functions being clearly civil in nature. Civilian
supremacy over the military also countermands the notion
that the military may bypass civilian authorities, such as civil
courts, on matters such as conducting warrantless searches
and seizures.
As earlier noted, we ruled in Senate that the President may
not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on
executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a
congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the
considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed
that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified
grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent
military officers from testifying before Congress does
not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief
Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the
actions and speech of members of the armed forces.
The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are
not hampered by the same limitations as in executive
privilege.
Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require
military officers to seek presidential approval before
appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion
that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the
President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant
control over the armed forces in matters such as budget
appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions,
yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title
as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and
functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies
of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that
the Presidents ability to control the individual members of
71 | P a g e
the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a

military officer is torn between obeying the President and
obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm
that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the
Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the
Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
G.R. No. 170165
August 15, 2006 B/GEN. (RET.)
FRANCISCO V. GUDANI vs. LT./GEN. GENEROSO S.
SENGA
Case: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the
20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President
Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of
the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested
upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution
which states that: "The President. . . whenever it becomes
necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or
suppress. . .rebellion. . .," and in my capacity as their
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as
well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;
and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do
hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
Allegedly, elements in the political opposition have conspired
with authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the
NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by
military adventurists the historical enemies of the
democratic Philippine State who are now in a tactical
alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic
conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly
constituted Government elected in May 2004;
Rule: Calling-out Power -Under the calling-out power, the
President may summon the armed forces to aid him in
suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion.
This involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes
beyond the Presidents calling-out power is considered
illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be
careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a
greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser power.
There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the
power, the greater are the limitations.
It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction
between the Presidents authority to declare a "state of
rebellion" (in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state
of national emergency. While President Arroyos authority to
72 | P a g e
declare a "state of rebellion" emanates from her powers as

Chief
Executive,
the
statutory
authority
cited
in Sanlakas was Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:
SEC. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the
President fixing a date or declaring a status or
condition of public moment or interest, upon
the existence of which the operation of a
specific law or regulation is made to depend,
shall be promulgated in proclamations which
shall have the force of an executive order.
President Arroyos declaration of a "state of rebellion" was
merely an act declaring a status or condition of public
moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4
cited above. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is
harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written.
In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a
state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only
rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision
calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article
XII, a provision on the States extraordinary power to take
over privately-owned public utility and business affected with
public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of
an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot
be deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not
written, as in the case of Sanlakas.
Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is
actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is no so. What
defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain
therein that what the President invoked was her calling-out
power.
The declaration of Martial Law is a "warn[ing] to citizens that
the military power has been called upon by the executive to
assist in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while
the emergency lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and
punishment, not commit any acts which will in any way
render more difficult the restoration of order and the
enforcement of law."
It is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It
is merely an exercise of President Arroyos calling-out
power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or
suppressing lawless violence.
"Take Care" Power - As the Executive in whom the
executive power is vested, the primary function of the
President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate
policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all
laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his
department. Before assuming office, he is required to take
an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the
Philippines, he will, among others, "execute its laws." In the
73 | P a g e
exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may

employ the powers attached to his office as the Commanderin-Chief of all the armed forces of the country, including the
Philippine National Police under the Department of Interior
and Local Government.
The enabling clause of PP 1017 issued by President Arroyo
is: to enforce obedience to all the laws and to
all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction."
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo
the authority to promulgate "decrees." Legislative power
is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1,
Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives." To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a
state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify
President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing
decrees.
President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows
that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be
enforced. With respect to "laws," she cannot call the military
to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws,
laws governing family and property relations, laws on
obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order
the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its
duty to suppress lawless violence.
Power to Take Over - Sec. 17. In times of national
emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State
may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms
prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation
of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with
public interest.
A distinction must be drawn between the Presidents
authority to declare "a state of national emergency" and
toexercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by
the Court, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such
power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be
raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues
arise.
Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both
Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall
have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of
war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited
period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
74 | P a g e
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a

declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the
next adjournment thereof.
It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above
provision refers not only to war but also to "other national
emergency." If the intention of the Framers of our
Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority
to declare a "state of national emergency" pursuant to
Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to
Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state of
war), then the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they
did not intend that Congress should first authorize the
President before he can declare a "state of national
emergency." The logical conclusion then is that President
Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of
national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional
enactment.
But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking
over of privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation
from Congress.
Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari
materia are to be construed together. Otherwise stated,
different clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution
which relate to the same subject matter will be construed
together and considered in the light of each other.
Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of
Article VI, previously quoted, relate to national emergencies,
they must be read together to determine the limitation of the
exercise of emergency powers.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency
powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article
VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the
President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not
reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave
emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for
Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our
Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant
emergency powers to the President, subject to certain
conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as
the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a
national policy declared by Congress.
75 | P a g e
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the

emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business
affected with public interest is just another facet of the
emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus,
when Section 17 states that the "the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest," it refers to Congress, not the President. Now,
whether or not the President may exercise such power is
dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him
pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms
thereof. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. et al. v. Sawyer, held:
It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order
he did, it must be found in some provision of the Constitution.
And it is not claimed that express constitutional language
grants this power to the President. The contention is that
presidential power should be implied from the aggregate of his
powers under the Constitution. Particular reliance is placed on
provisions in Article II which say that "The executive Power
shall be vested in a President . . . .;" that "he shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed;" and that he "shall be
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States.
The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the
Presidents military power as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces. The Government attempts to do so by citing a
number of cases upholding broad powers in military
commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of
war. Such cases need not concern us here.Even though
"theater of war" be an expanding concept, we cannot with
faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces has the
ultimate power as such to take possession of private
property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping
production. This is a job for the nations lawmakers, not
for its military authorities.
Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the
several constitutional provisions that grant executive
power to the President. In the framework of our
Constitution, the Presidents power to see that the laws
are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a
lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the
lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he
thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the
Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who
shall make laws which the President is to execute. The
first section of the first article says that "All legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States. . ."
Petitioner Cacho-Olivares, et al. contends that the term
"emergency" under Section 17, Article XII refers to "tsunami,"
76 | P a g e
"typhoon," "hurricane"and"similar occurrences." This is a

limited view of "emergency."
Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of
conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing danger
to life or well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal.
Implicit in this definitions are the elements of intensity, variety,
and perception. Emergencies, as perceived by legislature or
executive in the United Sates since 1933, have been
occasioned by a wide range of situations, classifiable under
three (3) principal heads: a)economic, b) natural disaster,
and c) national security.
"Emergency," as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the
same breadth. It may include rebellion, economic crisis,
pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar
catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked
by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that
such Proclamation does not authorize her during the
emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can
declare a state of national emergency, however, without
legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest. The
President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances
exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility
or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine
when such exceptional circumstances have ceased.
Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to
point out the types of businesses affected with public interest
that should be taken over. In short, the President has no
absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under
Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers
act passed by Congress. G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006
PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID,vs. GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO,
Case: In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President
issued later in the day Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4, both declaring "a state of rebellion" and calling
out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion
It is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling out
power the Constitution does not require the President to make
a declaration of a state of rebellion.
The above provision grants the President, as Commander-inChief, a "sequence" of "graduated power[s]." From the most to
the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus, and the
power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter two
77 | P a g e
powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two

conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that
public safety requires the exercise of such power. However,
as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,
"[t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the
calling out power. The only criterion is that 'whenever it
becomes necessary,' the President may call the armed forces
'to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.'"
Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII
does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a
state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the
President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first
and foremost, with Executive powers.
in calling out the armed forces, a declaration of a state of
rebellion is an utter superfluity. At most, it only gives notice to
the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces
may be called to prevent or suppress it. Perhaps the
declaration may wreak emotional effects upon the perceived
enemies of the State, even on the entire nation. But this
Court's mandate is to probe only into the legal consequences
of the declaration. This Court finds that such a declaration is
devoid of any legal significance. For all legal intents, the
declaration is deemed not written.
Should there be any "confusion" generated by the issuance of
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, we clarify
that, as the dissenters in Lacson correctly pointed out, the
mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or
violate constitutionally protected rights. Indeed, if a state of
martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution
or automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, then it is with more reason that a simple declaration of
a state of rebellion could not bring about these conditions. At
any rate, the presidential issuances themselves call for the
suppression of the rebellion "with due regard to constitutional
rights."
For the same reasons, apprehensions that the military and
police authorities may resort to warrantless arrests are
likewise unfounded. In Lacson vs. Perez, supra, majority of the
Court held that "[i]n quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the
authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons
suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113
of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The
warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on
the declaration of a 'state of rebellion.'" n other words, a
person may be subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime
of rebellion whether or not the President has declared a state
of rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless
arrest are present.
It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary
power to call out the armed forces and to determine the
necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may
78 | P a g e
examine whether the power was exercised within

constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof,
supported their assertion that the President acted without
factual basis.
The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion
amounts to a declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a
circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of logic.
There is no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil
courts in the "theater of war" or that military authorities have
taken over the functions of civil government. There is no
allegation of curtailment of civil or political rights. There is no
indication that the President has exercised judicial and
legislative powers. In short, there is no illustration that the
President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial
law powers. G.R. No. 159085
February 3, 2004
SANLAKAS, vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
(7) Emergency Powers

Section 23. xxx In times of war or other national emergency,
the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry
out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
next adjournment thereof. (Art VI)
The emergency powers of the President is distinct from the
Commander-in- Chief clause. Under the Commander-in-Chief
clause, the President acts under a constitutional grant of military
power, (including the law-making power). Under the emergency
power, the President acts under a Congressional delegation of
lawmaking power.
Case: On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome
massacre of 57 men and women, including some news reporters,
then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946,
placing "the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the
City of Cotabato under a state of emergency." She directed the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National
Police (PNP) "to undertake such measures as may be allowed by
the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of
lawless violence" in the named places.,
Issue: Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised
emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP to
prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City;
Rule: Petitioners contend that the President unlawfully exercised
emergency powers when she ordered the deployment of AFP and
PNP personnel in the places mentioned in the proclamation. But
such deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers
79 | P a g e
as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution,

which provides:
SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other
national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease
upon the next adjournment thereof.
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state
of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act
pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to
exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power
that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not
need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence springs from the power vested in her under
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides.
SECTION 18. The President shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he
may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. x x x
While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for
the Presidents exercise of the above power it would generally
defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly to the
President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the
need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress
lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was
attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect
to the Presidents judgment. G.R. No. 190259
June 7, 2011
DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, ANSARUDDIN ADIONG, REGIE
SAHALI-GENERALE vs. HON. RONALDO PUNO
(8) Contracting and guaranteeing foreign loans

Section 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign
loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the
prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board
shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the
calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its
decision on applications for loans to be contracted or
guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and
controlled corporations which would have the effect of
increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as
may be provided by law. (Art VII)
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Section 21. Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance

with law and the regulation of the monetary authority.
Information on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the
Government shall be made available to the public. Art. XII
Case: This Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
assails said contracts which were entered into pursuant to the
Philippine Comprehensive Financing Program for 1992 ("Financing
Program" or "Program"). It seeks to enjoin respondents from
executing additional debt-relief contracts pursuant thereto. It also
urges the Court to issue an order compelling the Secretary of
Justice to institute criminal and administrative cases against
respondents for acts which circumvent or negate the provisions Art.
XII of the Constitution.
Issues: Petitioners raise several issues before this Court.
First, they object to the debt-relief contracts entered into pursuant
to the Financing Program as beyond the powers granted to the
President under Section 20,
Second, according to petitioners even assuming that the contracts
under the Financing Program are constitutionally permissible, yet it
is only the President who may exercise the power to enter into
these contracts and such power may not be delegated to
respondents.
Rule: 1. For their first constitutional argument, petitioners submit
that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes do not constitute
the loan "contract" or "guarantee" contemplated in the Constitution
and are consequently prohibited.
The language of the Constitution is simple and clear as it is broad.
It allows the President to contract and guarantee foreign loans. It
makes no prohibition on the issuance of certain kinds of loans or
distinctions as to which kinds of debt instruments are more onerous
than others. This Court may not ascribe to the Constitution
meanings and restrictions that would unduly burden the powers of
the President. The plain, clear and unambiguous language of the
Constitution should be construed in a sense that will allow the full
exercise of the power provided therein. It would be the worst kind of
judicial legislation if the courts were to misconstrue and change the
meaning of the organic act.
2. Petitioners assert that the power to pay public debts lies with
Congress and was deliberately withheld by the Constitution from
the President. It is true that in the balance of power between the
three branches of government, it is Congress that manages the
countrys coffers by virtue of its taxing and spending powers.
However, the law-making authority has promulgated a law
ordaining an automatic appropriations provision for debt servicing
by virtue of which the President is empowered to execute debt
payments without the need for further appropriations. Regarding
these legislative enactments, this Court has held, viz: ,
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Congress deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of

the President, and Congress in the exercise of its own
judgment and wisdom formulates an appropriation act
precisely following the process established by the
Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid
from the Treasury except in accordance with an
appropriation made by law.
Specific legal authority for the buyback of loans is established
under Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 240, The afore-quoted
provisions of law specifically allow the President to pre-terminate
debts without further action from Congress. More fundamentally,
when taken in the context of sovereign debts, a buyback is simply
the purchase by the sovereign issuer of its own debts at a discount.
Clearly then, the objection to the validity of the buyback scheme is
without basis.
3. Petitioners position is negated both by explicit constitutional and
legal imprimaturs, as well as the doctrine of qualified political
agency.
The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement
the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is
made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and
executing a strategy for managing the governments debt is deep
within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance,
primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its
risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt
management goals.
If, as petitioners would have it, the President were to personally
exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would
have to pause from running the country long enough to focus on a
welter of time-consuming detailed activitiesthe propriety of
incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among the
many methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting
countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining
the concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending
the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to
the agreed place of execution to sign the documents. This sort of
constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of
cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders
thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the Presidents
effectivity in running the government.
Constantino, Jr. v.
Cuisia, G.R. No. 106064, October 13, 2005,
(9) Powers over foreign affairs

(a) Treaty-making power
Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid
and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all
the Members of the Senate. (Art VII)
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Unlike treaties or international agreements, executive agreements

entered into by the President need no concurrence of Legislature.
The same is by the fact that Executive agreements are not among
those expressly mentioned in Section 21.
Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the
approval of two thirds of the Senate. Executive agreements become
binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the
Senate or by Congress.
International agreements involving political issues or changes of
national policy and those involving international arrangements of a
permanent character usually take the form of treaties. But
international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying
out well-established national policies and traditions and those
involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature usually
take the form of executive agreements.28
Case: This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel
the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign
Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its
concurrence in accordance with Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under
both domestic law and international law, is a function of the Senate.
Hence, it is the duty of the executive department to transmit the
signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise
its discretion with respect to ratification of treaties. Moreover,
petitioners submit that the Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify
the Rome Statute under treaty law and customary international law.
Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
enjoining the states to refrain from acts which would defeat the
object and purpose of a treaty when they have signed the treaty
prior to ratification unless they have made their intention clear not to
become parties to the treaty
The core issue in this petition for mandamus is whether the
Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have
a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome
Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the United
Nations even without the signature of the President.
Rule: In our system of government, the President, being the head
of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external
relations and is the countrys sole representative with foreign
nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts
as the countrys mouthpiece with respect to international affairs.
Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign
states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain
diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the
business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the
President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
28
(Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 351)
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Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate

and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his
power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the
Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate."
The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making
process was deemed essential to provide a check on the executive
in the field of foreign relations. By requiring the concurrence of the
legislature in the treaties entered into by the President, the
Constitution ensures a healthy system of checks and balance
necessary in the nations pursuit of political maturity and growth
Justice Isagani Cruz, in his book on International Law, describes the
treaty-making process in this wise:
The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation,
signature, ratification, and exchange of the instruments of
ratification. The treaty may then be submitted for registration and
publication under the U.N. Charter, although this step is not
essential to the validity of the agreement as between the parties.
Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the head of state but
he now usually assigns this task to his authorized
representatives. These representatives are provided with
credentials known as full powers, which they exhibit to the other
negotiators at the start of the formal discussions. It is standard
practice for one of the parties to submit a draft of the proposed
treaty which, together with the counter-proposals, becomes the
basis of the subsequent negotiations. The negotiations may be
brief or protracted, depending on the issues involved, and may
even "collapse" in case the parties are unable to come to an
agreement on the points under consideration.
If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the
treaty, the same is opened for signature. This step is primarily
intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and for the
purpose of symbolizing the good faith of the parties; but,
significantly, it does not indicate the final consent of the state
in cases where ratification of the treaty is required. The
document is ordinarily signed in accordance with the alternat,
that is, each of the several negotiators is allowed to sign first on
the copy which he will bring home to his own state.
Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a
state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded
by its representatives. The purpose of ratification is to enable
the contracting states to examine the treaty more closely
and to give them an opportunity to refuse to be bound by it
should they find it inimical to their interests. It is for this
reason that most treaties are made subject to the scrutiny
and consent of a department of the government other than
that which negotiated them.
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The last step in the treaty-making process is the exchange of the

instruments of ratification, which usually also signifies the
effectivity of the treaty unless a different date has been agreed
upon by the parties. Where ratification is dispensed with and no
effectivity clause is embodied in the treaty, the instrument is
deemed effective upon its signature.
Petitioners arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the
Philippine representative with ratification. It should be underscored
that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two separate
and distinct steps in the treaty-making process. As earlier discussed,
the signature is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the
instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is
usually performed by the states authorized representative in the
diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act
by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty
concluded by its representative. It is generally held to be an
executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the
government.
Petitioners submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty
law and international law to ratify the treaty which it has signed is
without basis. The signature does not signify the final consent of the
state to the treaty. It is the ratification that binds the state to the
provisions thereof. In fact, the Rome Statute itself requires that the
signature of the representatives of the states be subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states.
Ratification is the act by which the provisions of a treaty are formally
confirmed and approved by a State. By ratifying a treaty signed in its
behalf, a state expresses its willingness to be bound by the
provisions of such treaty. After the treaty is signed by the states
representative, the President, being accountable to the people, is
burdened with the responsibility and the duty to carefully study the
contents of the treaty and ensure that they are not inimical to the
interest of the state and its people. Thus, the President has the
discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine
representative whether or not to ratify the same. The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties does not contemplate to defeat
or even restrain this power of the head of states. If that were so, the
requirement of ratification of treaties would be pointless and futile. It
has been held that a state has no legal or even moral duty to ratify a
treaty which has been signed by its plenipotentiaries. There is no
legal obligation to ratify a treaty, but it goes without saying that the
refusal must be based on substantial grounds and not on superficial
or whimsical reasons. Otherwise, the other state would be justified in
taking offense.
It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to
ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the
Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or
withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it
is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to
the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse
to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has
been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken
lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President
alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of
85 | P a g e
mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to

enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. The
Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by
the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive
branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome
Statute to the Senate. G.R. No. 158088 July 6, 2005 Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., et al. vs. Office of the Executive
Secretary
(10) Deportation of undesirable aliens

Case: Spouses Galang were charged of having purchased and
remitted abroad some $130,000.00 US Dollars without the
necessary permit from the Central Bank. Warrants of Arrest were
issued following the charges. They question the authority of the
President and the Deportation Borad.
Rule: Under Commonwealth Act No. 613 (Immigration Act of 1940),
the Commissioner of Immigration was empowered to effect the
arrest and expulsion of an alien, after previous determination by the
Board of Commissioners of the existence of ground or grounds
therefor (Sec- 37). With the enactment of this law, however, the
legislature did not intend to delimit or concentrate the exercise of
the power to deport on the Immigration Commissioner alone
While it may really be contended that the aforequoted provision did
not expressly confer on the President the authority to deport
undesirable aliens, unlike the express grant to the Commissioner of
Immigration under Commonwealth Act No. 613, but merely lays
down the procedure to be observed should there be deportation
proceedings, the fact that such a procedure was provided for before
the President can deport an alien-which provision was expressly
declared exempted from the repealing effect of the Immigration Act
of 1940-is a clear indication of the recognition, and inferentially a
ratification, by the legislature of the existence of such power in the
Executive. And the, exercise of this power by the chief Executive
has been sanctioned by this Court in several decisions
Under the present and existing laws, therefore, deportation of an
undesirable alien may be effected in two ways: by order of the
President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code, and by the Commissioner of
Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of
Commissioners, under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.
There seems to be no doubt that the President's power of
investigation may be delegated. This is clear from a reading of
Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides for a
"prior investigation, conducted by said Executive (the President) or
his authorized agent." The first executive order on the subject was
that of Governor General Frank Murphy (No. 494, July 26, 1934),
constituting a board to take action on complaints against foreigners,
to conduct investigations and thereafter make recommendations.
By virtue of Executive Order No. 33 dated May 29, 1936, President
Quezon created the Deportation Board primarily to receive
complaints against aliens charged to be undesirable, to conduct
86 | P a g e
investigation pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative

Code and the rules and regulations therein provided, and make the
corresponding recommendation. Since then, the Deportation
Board has been conducting the investigation as the authorized
agent of the President.
The exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual
demands the exercise of discretion by the one issuing the same, to
determine whether under specific circumstances, the curtailment of
the liberty of such person is warranted. The fact that the
Constitution itself, as well as the statute relied upon, prescribe the
manner by which the warrant may be issued, conveys the intent to
make the issuance of such warrant dependent upon conditions the
determination of the existence of which requires the use of
discretion by the person issuing the same. In other words, the
discretion of whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or not is
personal to the one upon whom the authority devolves. And
authorities are to the effect that while ministerial duties may be
delegated, official functions requiring the exercise of discretion and
judgment, may not be so delegated. Indeed, an implied grant of
power, considering that no express authority was granted by the
law on the matter under discussion, that would serve the
curtailment or limitation on the fundamental right of a person, such
as his security to life and liberty, must be viewed with caution, if we
are to give meaning to the guarantee contained in the Constitution.
If this is so, then guarantee a delegation of that implied power,
nebulous as it is, must be rejected as inimical to the liberty of the
people. The guarantees of human rights and freedom can not be
made to rest precariously on such a shaky foundation. Qua Chee
Gan vs. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 (1963)
Case: It was alleged in the complaint that in December, 1963
certain agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
searched an office located at 1439 O'Donnel Street, Sta. Cruz,
Manila believed to be the headquarters of a guerilla unit of the
"Emergency Intelligence Section, Army of the United States" and
that among those arrested thereat was Go Tek an alleged sector
commander and intelligence and record officer of that guerilla unit.
It was further alleged that fake dollar checks were found in Go
Tek's possession and that, therefore, he had violated article 168 of
the Revised Penal Code and rendered himself an undesirable alien.
As deportation proceedings were underway, he filed for the
prohibition of the same against the Deportation Board.
Issue: The issue is whether the Deportation Board can entertain a
deportation proceeding based on a ground which is not specified in
section 37 of the Immigration Law and although the aliens has not
yet been convicted of the offense imputed to him.
Rule: We hold that the Board has jurisdiction to investigate Go Tek
for illegal possession of fake dollar checks (as well as his alleged
"guerilla" activities) in spite of the fact that he has not yet been
convicted of illegal possession thereof under article 168 of the
Revised Penal Code and notwithstanding that act is not the
87 | P a g e
grounds for the deportation of undesirable aliens as enumerated in

section 37 of the Immigration Law. The charge against Go Tek
before- the Board was not premature.
The aforementioned obiter dictum the Qua Chee Gan case invoked
by Go Tek and relied upon by the trial court, is not of this case. In
the Qua Chee Gan case the aliens were with economic sabotage
which is a ground for deportation under Republic Act No. 503.
Under existing law; the deportation of an undesirable alien may be
effected (1) by order of the President, after due investigation,
pursuant to section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and (2)
by the Commissioner of Immigration upon recommendation of the
Board of Commissioners under section 37 of the immigration Law
(Qua Chee Gan vs- Deportation Board,).
The President's power to deport aliens derives from Sec. 69 of the
Rev. Adm. Code which does not specify the grounds for deportation
of aliens but only provides that it be ordered after due investigation.
The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens
(Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil.
1122, 1125). That power may be exercise by the Chief Executive
"when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic
tranquility of the nation Justice Johnson's is that there the Chief
Executive rinds that there are aliens whose continued in the country
is injurious to the public interest he may, even in the absence of
express law, deport them (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield
16 Phil. 534, 568, 569; In reMcCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41). G.R. No.
L-23846 September 9, 1977 GO TEK petitioner-appelle, vs.
DEPORTATION BOARD
Case: The Department of Foreign Affairs received from the German
Embassy in Manila Note Verbale No. 369/95 dated July 26, 1995,
informing it that the respondent was wanted by the German Federal
Police; that a warrant of arrest had been issued against him; and
that the respondent will be served with an official document
requesting him to turn over his German passport to the Embassy
which was invalidated on July 2, 1995. The Embassy requested the
Department of Foreign Affairs to inform the competent Philippine
authorities of the matter. The Board of Commissioners thereafter
issued a Summary Deportation Order dated September 27, 1997.
Meanwhile, on February 15, 1996, the District Court of Straubing
rendered a Decision dismissing the criminal case against the
respondent for physical injuries. The German Embassy in Manila,
thereafter, issued a temporary passport to the respondent. In a
Letter dated March 1, 1996, the respondent informed
Commissioner Verceles that his passport had been renewed
following the dismissal of the said criminal case. He reiterated his
request for the cancellation of the Summary Deportation Order
dated September 27, 1995 and the restoration of his permanent
resident status.
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At about midnight on June 6, 2002, Marine operatives and BID

agents apprehended the respondent in his residence on orders of
the petitioner.
Rule: In this case, the BOC ordered the private respondents
deportation on September 27, 1995 without even conducting
summary deportation proceedings. The BOC merely relied on the
June 29, 1995 Letter of the German Vice Consul and of the
German Embassys Note Verbale No. 369/95 dated July 26, 1995.
It issued the Summary Deportation Order on September 27, 1995
However, as gleaned from the Summary Deportation Order, the
respondent was ordered deported not only because his passport
had already expired; the BOC speculated that the respondent
committed insurance fraud and illegal activities in the Philippines
and would not, thus, be issued a new passport. This, in turn,
caused the BOC to conclude that the respondent was an
undesirable alien.
The respondent was not afforded any hearing at all. The BOC
simply concluded that the respondent committed insurance fraud
and illegal activities in Palawan without any evidence. The
respondent was not afforded a chance to refute the charges. He
cannot, thus, be arrested and deported without due process of law
as required by the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. In Lao Gi v.
Court of Appeals, we held that:
Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature
of a criminal action, however, considering that it is a harsh and
extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and
liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due
process should not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of
Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are
applicable to deportation proceedings. G.R. No. 154745 January
29, 2004
COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO vs.
HERBERT MARKUS EMIL SCHEER
(12) Power over legislation

(a) Message to Congress
Section 23. The President shall address the Congress at the
opening of its regular session. He may also appear before it at
any other time. (Art VII)
(b) Prepare and submit the budget
Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress, within
thirty days from the opening of every regular session as the
basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of
expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from
existing and proposed revenue measures. (Art VII)
(c) Veto power
Section 27.
89 | P a g e
1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes

a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the
same he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return
the same with his objections to the House where it
originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its
Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such
House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together
with the objections, to the other House by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of
all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all
such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined
by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for
or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President
shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it
originated within thirty days after the date of receipt
thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed
it.
2. The President shall have the power to veto any particular
item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but
the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does
not object.(Art VI)
Case: The issue in this petition is the constitutionality of the veto by
the President of certain provisions in the General Appropriations
Act for the Fiscal Year 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted
pensions of retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals.
Hence, the instant petition filed by the petitioners with the
assertions that:
1) The subject veto is not an item veto;
2) The veto by the Executive is violative of the doctrine of
separation of powers;
3) The veto deprives the retired Justices of their rights to the
pensions due them;
4) The questioned veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy guaranteed by
the Constitution.
Rule: The petitioners' contentions are well-taken.
The Constitution expressly confers or the judiciary the power to
maintain inviolate what it decrees. As the guardian of the
Constitution we cannot shirk the duty of seeing to it that the officers
in each branch of government do not go beyond their
constitutionally allocated boundaries and that the entire
Government itself or any of its branches does not violate the basic
liberties of the people. The essence of this judicial duty was
emphatically explained by Justice Laurel in the leading case
of Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139 [1936]) to wit:
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is
to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
90 | P a g e
allocate constitutional boundaries it does not assert any superiority

over the other department, it does not in reality nullify or invalidate
an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument
secures and guarantees to them. (Emphasis supplied)
The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an
exercise of a constitutionally vested power. But even as the
Constitution grants the power, it also provides limitations to its
exercise. The veto power is not absolute.
The pertinent provision of the Constitution reads:
The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or
items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill but the veto shall not
affect the item or items to which he does not object. (Section 27(2),
Article VI, Constitution)
The OSG is correct when it states that the Executive must veto a
bill in its entirety or not at all. He or she cannot act like an editor
crossing out specific lines, provisions, or paragraphs in a bill that he
or she dislikes. In the exercise of the veto power, it is generally all
or nothing. However, when it comes to appropriation, revenue or
tariff bills, the Administration needs the money to run the machinery
of government and it can not veto the entire bill even if it may
contain objectionable features. The President is, therefore,
compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its
undesirable parts. It is for this reason that the Constitution has
wisely provided the "item veto power" to avoid inexpedient riders
being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue
measure.
The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may
be vetoed. The power to disapprove any item or items in an
appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item
and to approve the remaining portion of the same item. (Gonzales
v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452, 464 [1990])
We distinguish an item from a provision in the following manner:
The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and
practice are concededly different. An item in a bill refers to
the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts . .
. of the bill (Bengzon,supra, at 916.) It is an indivisible sum of
money dedicated to a stated purpose (Commonwealth v.
Dodson, 11 S.E. 2d 120, 124, 125, etc., 176 Va. 281) The
United States Supreme Court, in the case ofBengzon v.
Secretary of Justice (299 U.S. 410, 414, 57 Ct. 252, 81 L.
Ed, 312) declared "that an"tem" of an appropriation bill
obviously means an item which in itself is a specific
appropriation of money, not some general provision of
law, which happens to be put into an appropriation bill." (id.
at page 465)
91 | P a g e
The President did not veto this item. What were vetoed were
methods or systems placed by Congress to insure that permanent
and continuing obligations to certain officials would be paid when
they fell due.
An examination of the entire sections and the underlined portions of
the law which were vetoed will readily show that portions of the item
have been chopped up into vetoed and unvetoed parts. Less than
all of an item has been vetoed. Moreover, the vetoed portions are
not items. They are provisions. G.R. No. 103524 April 15, 1992
CESAR BENGZON, QUERUBE MAKALINTAL, LINO M.
PATAJO, JOSE LEUTERIO, ET AL. vs HON. FRANKLIN N.
DRILON
(d) Emergency Power

Section 23. xxx In times of war or other national emergency,
the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry
out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
next adjournment thereof. (Art VI)
(e) Fixing of tariff rates
Section 28.
The Congress may, by law, authorize the
President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government. (Art VI)
(13) Immunity from suits

Case: 1. On April 3, 2007, armed men belonging to the 301st Air
Intelligence and Security Squadron (AISS, for short) based in
Fernando Air Base in Lipa City abducted Lourdes D. Rubrico After
Lourdes release, the harassment, coming in the form of being
tailed on at least two occasions at different places, i.e.,
Dasmarias, Cavite and Baclaran in Pasay City, by motorcycleriding men in bonnets, continued;
The petition for the writ of amparo dated October 25, 2007 was
originally filed before the Supreme Court. After issuing the desired
writ and directing the respondents to file a verified written return,
the Court referred the petition to the CA for summary hearing and
appropriate action.
Rule : In Affirming the dropping of President Gloria MacapagalArroyo from the petition for a writ of amparo;
. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our
system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present
constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986
92 | P a g e
Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision

on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already
understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued
during his or her tenure. The Court subsequently made it
abundantly clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, a case likewise
resolved under the umbrella of the 1987 Constitution, that indeed
the President enjoys immunity during her incumbency, and why this
must be so:
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office
or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case,
and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It
will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head
of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as
such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to
the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the
legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive
branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge
of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the
Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. x
xx
And lest it be overlooked, the petition is simply bereft of any
allegation as to what specific presidential act or omission violated
or threatened to violate petitioners protected rights. G.R. No.
183871
February 18, 2010 LOURDES D. RUBRICO, JEAN
RUBRICO APRUEBO vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
Case: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th
Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued
PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency,
Allegedly, elements in the political opposition have conspired with
authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPPNPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists
the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State who are
now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and
systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly
constituted Government elected in May 2004;
Rule: This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus
standi.
Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as
respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his
tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil
or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of
the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court
litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he
be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to
enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties
and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one
constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his
usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties
93 | P a g e
imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the

operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that the
President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he
remains accountable to the people but he may be removed from
office only in the mode provided by law and that is by
impeachment.
From the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the intent
of the framers is clear that the immunity of the President from suit is
concurrent only with his tenure and not his term. (De
Leon, Philippine Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, 2004 Ed., p. 302). G.R.
No. 171396 May 3, 2006 PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID,vs. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
Case: Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases

filed against him before the respondent Ombudsman should be
prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment
proceedings
against
him;
and second,
he
enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.
Issues: Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.
Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity
Rule: We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the
reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment
proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was
aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that
led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the
Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the
Impeachment Court is Functus Officio." 1 Since, the Impeachment
Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand
that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can
be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar
against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to
commend itself for it will place him in a better situation than a nonsitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment
proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution.
This is in accord with our ruling In Re: Saturnino Bermudez that
'incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought
to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not
beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the
impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and
thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand
as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the
Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by
petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filed against
petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder,
bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination
can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death
penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a nonsitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court
licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him
with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold
94 | P a g e
that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and

conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not
acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as
such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser. G.R. No.
146710-15 March 2, 2001 JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, vs. ANIANO
DESIERTO,
2. The Vice- President

a. Qualifications, election, term and oath
Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same
qualifications and term of office and be elected with, and in the same
manner, as the President. He may be removed from office in the
same manner as the President.
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet.
Such appointment requires no confirmation. (Art VII)
Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by

direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the
election and shall end at noon of the same date, six years thereafter.
The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No person who
has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than
four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any
time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for
the full term for which he was elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President
and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly
certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be
transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate.
Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the
Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election,
open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House
of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon
determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the
manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed
elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest
number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote
of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress,
voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the
certificates.
95 | P a g e
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose. (Art VII)
Section 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the
President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President shall take the
following oath or affirmation:
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and
conscientiously fulfill my duties as President (or VicePresident or Acting President) of the Philippines, preserve and
defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every
man, and consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So
help me God." (In case of affirmation, last sentence will be
omitted.) (Art VII)
b. Privilege and salary

Section 6. The President shall have an official residence. The
salaries of the President and Vice-President shall be
determined by law and shall not be decreased during their
tenure. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the term of the incumbent during which
such increase was approved. They shall not receive during
their tenure any other emolument from the Government or any
other source. (Art VII)
c. Prohibitions
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office
or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted
by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall
strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within
the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his
tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as
Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus
or offices, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries.
Section 3. xxx The Vice-President may be appointed as a
Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no
confirmation. (Art VII)
d. Succession
96 | P a g e
Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the

Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the
President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the
Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who
shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all
the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately. (Art VII)
Note here that there is no acting vice president to speak of.
e. Removal
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of
the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from
office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. (Art XI)
Section 3.
1. The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
2. A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter. The Committee, after
hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall
submit its report to the House within sixty session days
from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from
receipt thereof.
3. A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House
shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution
with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or
override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member
shall be recorded.
4. In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment
is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the
House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith
proceed.
5. No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year.
6. The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all
cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the
President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No
person shall be convicted without the concurrence of twothirds of all the Members of the Senate.
7. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further
than removal from office and disqualification to hold any
97 | P a g e
office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party

convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law.
8. The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment
to effectively carry out the purpose of this section. (Art XI)
f. Functions
(1) Right of succession
Section 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from
office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall
become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of
death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of
both the President and Vice-President, the President of the
Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or
Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President
in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting
President. He shall serve until the President or the Vice-President
shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject to the same
restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting
President.
(2) Membership in Cabinet

Section 3 The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of
the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation (Art VII)
98 | P a g e

Part V B

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Part V B

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B.

Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

Election and Term

With necessary changes in points of detail (Blacks Law Dictionary)

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

question became a political question because it was overtaken by

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

academic by its abandonment or withdrawal by the Protestant as a

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of

b. Privilege and salary

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

and settlement, improvement of the business environment, and general

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

declared that we must have "open covenants, openly arrived

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

[D]oes the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the

The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

dated September 19, 1997 implementing Senate Committee Report

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

is of no moment. The petitioner attended the board meetings by the

In comparison to the following;

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

Exceptions to prohibitions on holding additional positions:

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will

On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath,

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

whether the President is incapable of performing his

1. At the Beginning of the Term

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

2. During the Term

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

7. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further

f. Powers and Functions of the President

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

budget to Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art. VII,

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

power. G.R. No. 88211 October 27, 1989 FERDINAND E.

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

on the Executive Branch, Book V on Constitutional

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

Case: Due to massive irregularities during the Nursing Board