UMBERTO ECO

MEANING

AND DENOTATION

HISTORICAL REMARKS

Today "denotation" (along with its counterpart, "connotation") is

alternatively considered as a Property or function of (i) single terms,
(ii) declarative sentences (iii) noun phrases and definite descriptions. In
each case one has to decide whether this term has to be taken intensionally
or extensionally: is "denotation" tied to meaning or to referents? Does
one mean by "denotation" what is meant by the term or the named thing
and, in the case of sentences, what is the case?
As far as connotation is concerned, if denotation has an extensional
scope, it becomes the equivalent of intension; if, on the contrary,
denotation has an intensional scope, then connotation becomes a sort
of further meaning depending on the first one. These terminological
discrepancies are such that Geach (1962, p. 65) suggested that this
term should be "withdrawn from philosophical currency" since it
produces "a sad tale of confusion".
In the framework of structural linguistics denotation is intensional.
Such is the case of Hjelmslev (1943), where the difference between a
denotative semiotics and a connotative one lies in the fact that the
former is a semiotics whose expression plane is not a semiotics, while
the latter is a semiotics whose expression plane is a semiotics. The
denotative relationship has to do with the correlation between the
form of expression and the form of content: an expression does not
denote a content-substance. Likewise Barthes (1964) elaborates upon
Hjelmslev's suggestions and develops a merely intensional approach
to denotation. A denotative relationship always occurs between a
signifier and a first (or zero) degree signified. In the framework of
componential analysis, "denotation" has been used for the senserelationships expressed by a lexical term - such as 'father's brother'
expressed by 'uncle' (see, for instance, Leech 1974, p. 238). Prieto
(1975, p. 67, 109) means by "(de)notative" or "notative" anY conception of a linguistic term or of a significant object in so far as it appears
Synthese 73 (1987) 549-568.
O 1987 by D. Reidel Publishing Company

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as the member of a class of objects fulfilling the same purpose

("membre de la classe du systbme d'intercompr6hension qui le d6termine"), where such a class belongs to the universe of sense.
Thus one can say that in the structuralistic milieu, denotation, (if we
assume as a parameter Frege's triangle), is more similar to the Sinn
than to the Bedeutung, that is, more similar to the sense than to the
reference.
The whole picture changes radically in the anglosaxon tradition of
philosophy of language and truth conditional semantics: in Russell's
"On denoting" denotation is undoubtedly different- from meaning. This
usage is followed by the whole of anglo-saxon philosophical tradition
(see, for instance, Ogden and Richards, 1923 and Morris, 1946).
In this sense an expression denotes the individuals of which it is the
name, while it means (and for certain authors "connotes") the properties by virtue of which these individuals are recognized as members of
a given class. If we substitute (as Carnap 1955, does) the couple
denotation/connotation with the couple extension/intension, we can
say that denotation is a function of connotation (except if one follows
the theory of rigid designation).
In order to avoid such a growing terminological confusion somebody has preferred to use "designation" in place of "denotation" and
recently Lyons (1977, p. 208) has proposed to use "denotation" in a
neutral way as between extension and intension.
However the situation is more complicated than that. Even when
denotation recognizably stands for extension it may refer (i) to a class
of individuals, (ii) to an actually existing individual (as in the case of
the rigid designation of proper names), (iii) to each member of a class
of individuals, (iv) to the truth value corresponding to an assertive
proposition (so that, in these frameworks, the denotatum of a proposition is what is the case or the fact that 'p' is the case).
The first case in which "denotation" has been blatantly used in an
extensional sense was, as far as I know, the one of John Stuart Mill (I,
II, v): "the word 'white' denotes all white things, as snow, paper, the
foam of the sea, and so forth, and implies, or as it was termed by the
schoolmen, connotes the attribute whiteness".
Peirce was probably the first one to realize that there was something
odd in this usage. Peirce always used "denotation" to mean "the direct
reference of a symbol to its object" (1.559). According to him a
Rhematic Indexical Sinsign is affected "by the real camel it denotes"

MEANING

AND DENOTATION

551

(2.261), a sign must denote an individual and must signify a character

(2.293), "a general term denotes whatever there may be which possesses the characters it signifies" (2.434), "every assertion contains
such a denotative or pointing-out function" (5.429), signs are designative or denotative or indicative, insofar as they, like a demonstrative pronoun, or a pointing finger, "brutely direct the mental
eyeballs of the interpreter to the object in question" (8.350).
However, Peirce understood clearly that - as far as "connotation"
was concerned - Mill was not following, as he claimed, the traditional
scholastic usage. The Schoolmen distinguished (at least until the
fourteenth century) between meaning (significare) and naming (appellare), and used "connotation" not as opposed to "denotation" but
in order to define an additional form of signification.
It has been, indeed, the opinion of all the students of the logic of the fourteenth,
fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries, that connotation was in those ages used exclusively for
the reference to a second significate, that is (nearly), for a reference to a relative sense
(such as father, brighter, etc.) to the correlate of the object it primarily denotes .... Mr.
Mill has however considered himself entitled to deny this upon his simple dictum, without
the citation of a simple passage from any writer of that time (2.393).

Peirce remarks that the common opposition in the Middle Ages was
between "significare" and "nominare" ("to mean" and "to refer to").
He then remarks that Mill uses "to connote" instead of "to signify",
and "to denote" for naming or referring to. He recalls the quotation
from John of Salisbury (Metalogicus II, 20), according to whom
nominantur singularia sed universalia significantur. "It unfortunately
happened t h a t . . , the precise meaning recognized as proper to the
word 'signify' at the time of John of Salisbury... was never strictly
observed, either before and since, and on the contrary the meaning
tended to slip towards that of 'denote'" (2.434).
In this discussion Peirce is right (and perceptive) and wrong at the
same time. On one side he lucidly realized that at a certain moment
"significare" partially shifted from an intensional to an extensional
framework, but he did not acknowledge the fact that, during the
following centuries, it mainly retained, its intensional sense. On the
other side he accepted "denotation" as an extensional category
(arguing with Mill only a propos of "connotation") while it was only
very late that "denotare", originally used mid-way between extension
and intension, took over as an extensional category.

552

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THE

FIRST

ECO

SEMANTIC

TRIANGLE

In De interpretatione, Aristotle implicitly but clearly designs a semiotic

triangle, in which words are related on one side to concepts (or
passions of the soul) and on the other to things. Aristotle says that
words are symbols of the passions and by symbol means a conventional and arbitrary device.
He adds that words can be taken as symptoms (semefa) of the
passions, since every verbal utterance can be, first of all, the symptom
of the fact that the utterer has something in his mind. As for the
passions of the soul, they are likenesses, or icons, of the thing. We
know the things through the passions of the soul and there is no direct
connection between symbols and things. We name things by meaning
their icons, that is, the corresponding ideas they arouse in our minds.
Aristotle does not use, for this symbolic relation, the word sematnein
(that could be, as it was, translated by "significare") but in many other
circumstances he uses this verb to indicate the relation between words
and concepts.
Aristotle says (as Plato did) that single terms taken in isolation do
not assert anything about what is the case. They only 'mean' a
thought. Also, sentences or complex expressions mean a thought but
only a particular kind of sentence (a statement, or a proposition,
apbphasis or Ibgos apophantik6s) asserts a true or false state of affairs.
He does not say that statements 'signify' what is true or false but
rather that they 'say' (the verb is ldgein) that something A belongs (the
verb is yp?trchein) to something B.
Boethius translated "sema~nein" with "significare" but he followed
the Augustinian line of thought, according to which "significatio" is
the power that a word has to arouse in the mind of the hearer a
thought, through the mediation of which one can implement an act of
reference to things. He says that single terms signify the corresponding concept or the universal idea and takes "significare" - as well as,
less frequently, "designare" - in an intensional sense. Words are
conventional instruments used to make known one's thoughts (sense
or sententias).
Words do not designate things or states of the world but concepts of
the mind. The designated thing is at most called "underlying the
concept of it"(significationisupposita or suppositum, see de Rijk, 1967,
pp. 180-81).

MEANING

AND DENOTATION

553

As for "denotatio", Boethius uses extensively "note", but we know

how vague the meaning of this term was in the Latin Lexicon - at least
as vague as the meaning of the equivalent Greek "symbolon". It must
be reminded that Boethius, in the translation of De Interpretatione
used "nota" for both "symbolon" and "semeion", thus creating a first
"sad tale of confusion".
A more clear-cut distinction between signifying and referring is posited
by Anselm of Canterbury in his De Grammatico with the theory of
appellation. By elaborating upon Aristotle's theory of paronyms, Anselm
puts forth the idea that when we call a given person a 'grammarian', we
use this word paronymically. The word still signifies the quality of being
a grammarian, but is used to refer to a given man. Thus for 'reference'
Anselm uses "appellatio", and for 'meaning' uses "significatio',.
Such a distinction between signification and appellation (or naming)
will be followed by Abelard.

SIGNIFICATIO,

DENOTATIO,

APPELLATIO

It has been remarked that in Abelard the logical terminology is not

definitely assessed and that he frequently uses the same terms in an
equivocal sense. Nevertheless Abelard is the first author in which the
distinction between the intensional and extensional aspects of semantics is substantially (if not always terminologically) posited with a great
care. It is true that he speaks indifferently of "significatio de rebus"
and "significatio de intellectibus", but it is equally true that for him
the primary sense of "significatio" is an intensional one, on the
Augustinian line of thought - where "significare" is "constituere" or
"generare" a concept of the mind.
Abelard in Ingredientibus (Geyer, p. 307) makes clear that the
intellectual plane is the necessary intermediary between things and
concepts. "Not only is the 'significatio intellectuum' a priviledged
'significatio', but it is also the only legitimate semantic function of a
noun, the only function which a dialectician should bear in mind in
examining speech" (Beonio-Brocchieri, 1969, p. 31).
By considering various contexts in which such terms as "significare,
designare, denotare, nominare, appellare" confront each other, one
can maintain that Abelard is using "significare" to refer to the

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intellectus generated in the mind of the hearer, "nominare" for the

referential function, and - at least in some pages of Dialectica, but
with unmistakeable clarity - "designare" and "denotare" for the
relationship between the word and his definition or sententia (the
sententia, or sense, being an 'encyclopedical' meaning, of which the
definition represents a particular 'dictionary-like' selection, provided
for the purposes of a given act of disambiguation). In Dialectica (p.
594) it is clear that a name is "determinativum" of all the possible
differences of something, and by hearing the name we can understand
("intelligere") all of them; the sententia (sense) contains all those
differences and the definitio posits only those who are useful in
determining the sense of a name in a sentence without ambiguities.
Such an interpretation is not universally accepted. De Rijk (1970,
LIV) says that for Abelard "designation" is "the semantic relation
between a term and its extra-linguistic object", and Nuchelmans
(1973, p. 140) equates "denotare" with "nominare". In fact many
quotations in Dialectica seem to support his assumption. (See for
instance p. 119, where Abelard seems to use "designare" for the first
imposition of names upon things (intended as a sort of baptismal
ceremony in which there is a rigid designative link between the namer
and the thing named); also p. 114: "ad res designandas imposite".)
But it is also true that in other pages (for instance, p. 123) "designare" and "denotare" seem not to have the same meaning, and on p.
97 and p. 121 "designare" suggests an intensional interpretation.
Arguing with those who assumed that the things to which the vox has
been imposed are directly signified by that vox, Abelard stresses the
fact that words do not signify everything they can name but only what
they designate, that is, those things that are denoted by the voice and
are contained in the corresponding sense (Dialectica, pp. 112-13).
Words signify what they designate by a definition, as "animal" signifies
a sensitive animate substance, and this is exactly what is denoted by
(or in) the word. Likewise, signification has nothing to do with naming
because the former remains "nominatis rebus destructis", so that it is
possible to understand the meaning of "nulla rosa est" (Ingredientibus,
p. 309). Thus we can say that for Abelard a vox signifies a state of the
mind, designates or denotes a sense, and names a thing or a state
of the world.
The same mtensional trend is followed by Aquinas who remains

MEANING

AND

DENOTATION

555

absolutely faithful to the position of Aristotle. In his commentary of De

interpretatione he uses "significare" for nouns and verbs (I, II, 14) as
well as for these voices that mean naturally, such as the wail of infirms
and the sounds emitted by animals, and makes clear that by
"significatio" he means an intensional phenomenon. A name signifies
its definition (I, II, 20). It is true that when speaking of composition
and division, that is, of affirmation and negation, he says that the
former "significat .... coniunctionem" and the latter "significat . . .
rerum separationem" (I, III, 26), but it is clear that even at this point,
what is 'meant' is an operation of the intellect ("intellectus dicitur
verum secundum quod conformatur rei", I, III 28). An expression is
neither true nor false, it is only the sign which "significat" a true or false
operation of the intellect: "unde haec vox, 'homo est asinus', est vere
vox et vere signum; sed quia est signum falsi, ideo dicitur falsa" (I, III,
31). Names signify simple concepts of composite things (I, III, 34).
Signification is so far from reference that, when a verb is used in a
sentence (say, "This man is white") the verb does not signify a state of
affairs but at most is the sign (in the sense of symptom) that something
is predicated of something else and that, at the end, a state of affairs is
in some way indicated (I, V, 60)." (Aristotle) had said that the word
does not signify whether something is or is not the case, for no word
signifies the being or the non-being of a thing" (I, V, 69). The verb
"est" signifies the compositio, that is the predication of a predicate a
propos of a subject (I, VI, 75).
As for "denotare" in all its forms, this term recurs 105 times in the
tomistic lexicon (plus 2 instances of "denotatio"). Even a cursory
probing suggests that Aquinas never used it in the strong extensional
sense, that is, he never used it to say that a given proposition denotes a
state of affairs or that a term denotes a thing. " D e n o t a r e " is always
used in a weak sense.
It is clear that such authors as Boethius, Abelard or Aquinas, tied to
the problem of signification more than to the one of appellation, were
mainly interested in the psychological and ontological aspects of
language. We would say today that their semantics was oriented
toward a cognitive approach. It is interesting to remark how certain
modern scholars, interested in rediscovering the first medieval manifestation of a modern truth conditional semantics, find the whole
business of signification a very embarrassing one, which disturbs the
purity of the extensional approach, such as it is definitely settled by the

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ECO

theory of supposition. For instance, de Rijk (1967, p. 206) says that in

Abelard "the non-logical point of view seems to prevail" and the term
"impositio" mostly stands for prima intentio: "it is rarely found to
denote some actual imposition in this or that sentence pronounced by
some actual speaker. When even the voces are separated from the res,
their connection with the intellectus brings the author to the domain of
psychology or confines him to that of ontology, since the intellectus
are said to refer, in their turn, to reality. His theory of predication, too,
seems to suffer from the prevalence of some non-logical point of
view". De Rijk (1982, p. 173) also suggests that medieval logicians
"would have done a better j o b . . . [if] they had abandoned their notion
of signification in itself". This means to ask medieval philosophers
(who were not pure logicians in the modern sense of the word) to have
done a different job. The kind of job the supporters of an extensional
approach are looking for is the one performed by the theoreticians of
suppositiones.
THE

EXTENSIONAL

APPROACH

In its more mature formulation, the supposition is the role played by a

term, when inserted into a proposition, in order to refer to extralinguistic things. From the first vague notions of "suppositum" to the
most elaborate theories, such as the one of Ockham, the way was a
long one, and there is a consistent literature on this topic (see de Rijk
1967 and 1982).
With the theory of supposition the cognitive approach was overwhelmed by the extensional one: "in the later stages a term's actual
meaning was the focus of interest and reference and denotation was
far more important than the m o r e abstract notion of signification.
What is primarily meant by a term is the concrete individual object the
term can be correctly applied to" (de Rijk, 1982, p. 167).
Nevertheless this new attitude is not frequently expressed by such
terms as "denotatio", which keeps going very indeterminate in its
scope. For instance, Peter of Spain uses "denotari" in Summulae
Logicales (VII, 68) where he says that in the expression "sedentem
possibile est ambulare" what is denoted is not the concomitance
between 'to sit' and 'to walk' but rather the concomitance between
'being seated' and 'having the possibility ('potentia') of walking'. Once
again it is difficult to tell whether "denotare" has an intensional or an

MEANING

AND

557

DENOTATION

extensional function. Moreover Peter also takes "significare" in a very

broad sense, since (Summulae VI, 2)~'significatio termini, prout hic
sumitur, est rei per vocem secundum placitum representatio" and it is
undetermined whether this res ought to be an invididual thing or a
universal nature (de Rijk, 1982, p. 169). Peter implements a clear
extensional theory where his notion of suppositio is distinguished from
signification (see also Ponzio, pp. 134-35, with an interesting
reference to Peirce, 5.320).
However in Peter's theory there is a difference between extensionally standing for a class and extensionally standing for an individual. In
the first case we have a natural supposition, in the second case an
accidental one (p. 4). In the same vein Peter distinguishes between
"suppositio" and "appellatio": we can "appellare" (to refer to) only an
existing thing while we can signify and suppose for both existing and
unexisting things (X, 1).
De Rijk says (p. 169) that "Peter's natural supposition is really the
denotative counterpart of signification". But, if denotation is taken in the contemporary sense - as the function performed by a proper
name pointing towards a single object, then Peter's supposition is still
larger in its scope. " H o m o " signifies a certain universal nature and
"supponit" naturally for all the (possibly) existing men or for the class
of men, and accidentally for an individual man.
One can say that his terminological landscape is pretty confused
since"significatio" stands both for 'meaning' and for the reference to a
class; "suppositio naturalis" stands for a class; "suppositio accidentalis" stands for an individual, along with "appellatio" and "nominatio"; while "denotatio" and "designatio" are used in an even more
indeterminate way.
There is a first radical change with William of Sherwood who
"unlike Peter and the majority of thirteenth-century logicians . . .
identifies a term's significative character with its referring solely to
actually existing things" (de Rijk, 1982, pp. 170--71).
This will be the position of Roger Bacon.
THE

TURNING

POINT:

BETWEEN

BACON

AND

OCKHAM

In De signis. Bacon uses "significare, significatio, significatum" in a

sense that is radically different from the traditional one.
In DS II, 2 he says that "signum autem est illud quod oblatum

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sensui vel intellectui aliquid designat ipsi intellectui". Apparently the

Baconian "designat" stands for the Augustinian "faciens in cogitationem venire" (De doctrina christiana I, 1, 1). However, for
Augustine the sign produces something in the mind, while for Bacon a
sign shows something (probably outside the mind) to the mind.
For Bacon signs are not referred to their referent through the
mediation of a mental species, but point directly or are posited in
order to refer immediately to an object. It does not matter whether
this object is an individual (a concrete thing), a species, a feeling, or a
passion of the soul. What counts is that between a sign and the named
object there is no mental mediation. Thus Bacon uses "significare" in a
mere extensional sense.
In his classification of signs Bacon had distinguished natural signs
(or physical symptoms, such as the Stoic semeM, or as icons - which
refer directly by a sort of natural virtue to the objects they are like)
from signs "ordinate ab anima et ex intentione animae", that is,
produced for some purpose by a living being. Among the signa
ordinata ab anima stand words and other conventional visual signs,
such as the circulus vini used as an emblem for taverns, and even
commodities exposed in windows, insofar as they mean that other
members of the class to which they belong are sold inside the shop.
In all these cases Bacon speaks of "impositio", that is, of a conventional act by which a given entity is appointed to name something
else. It is clear that convention for Bacon is not the same as arbitrariness: commodities exposed in a window are chosen conventionally but
not arbitrarily (they act as a sort of metonimy, the member for the
class). Likewise the circulus vini is appointed as a sign conventionally
but not arbitrarily, since in fact the circle is a barrel-hoop, and thus it
acts synecdochically and metonimically at the same time, and
represents a part of the barrel which is the container of the wine ready
to be sold. However in De signis most of the examples are drawn from
vocal language and it will be better to follow Bacon's train of thoughts
by remaining tied to this paramount example of conventional (and
arbitrary) signs. Bacon is not so naive to say that words only mean
individual and physical things. He says that they name objects but
these objects can also be in the mind. Signs can also name nonentities, "non entia sicut infinitum, vacuum, et chimaera, ipsum nichil
sive pure non ens" (DS, II, 2, 19; but see also II, 3, 27 and V, 162).
This means that, even when words signify species, they do so by

MEANING

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pointing extensionaUy to a class of mental objects. But when, to name

a species, we use a name previously used to name the corresponding
thing, then we have an instance of second imposition. In any case the
relationship is an extensional one and the correctness of the reference
is guaranteed only by the actual presence of the signified object (be it
a physical or a mental one). A word signifies truly if and only if the
object it signifies is the case. Bacon (DS I, 1) does n o t s a y that, if there
is the sign, then there must necessarily be the thing, since words can
signify both entities and non-entities. However he is not suggesting, as
Abelard did, that the expression "nulla rosa est" still signifies something because it m e a n s the concept of the thing (even though the
thing did not exist or had ceased to exist). For Bacon when one says
"there is a rose" and there is no rose, then the word rose (which
cannot refer to the actual rose) instead of meaning the corresponding
concept, refers - as to an object - to the image of the supposed rose
that the utterer has in his mind. There are two different referents and
in fact the same sound rose is a token of two different lexical types. To
use, in order to name a species (or any other mental passion), the same
expression previously used to name the correspondent thing, one must
implement a second 'impositio' (DS, V, 162). When one says "homo
currit" one does not use the word homo in the same sense of the
expression "homo est animal". These are two equivocal ways to use
the same expression. When a customer sees the circle that in a tavern
advertizes the wine, if there is wine the circle signifies the actual wine.
If there is no wine and the customer is deceived by a sign which refers
to something which is not the case, then the referent of the sign is the
idea or image of wine which took form (erroneously) in the mind of
the customer. For those who know that there is no wine the circle has
lost its significance. When we say that Socrates is dead, the expression
Socrates is used equivocally in respect to the sense it had when
Socrates was alive (DS, IV, 2, 147). "Corrupta re cui facta est
impositio, non remanebit vox significativa" (DS, IV, 2, 147). The
linguistic term remains as mere substance deprived of the 'ratio', or of
the semantic correlation that made a word of this material token. In
the same sense, when the son dies what remains of the father is
"substantia", but not the "relatio paternitatis" (DS I, 1, 38). Bacon
definitely destroys the semiotic triangle that was formulated since
Plato, by which the relationship between words and referents is
mediated by the idea, or the concept, or the definition. With Bacon the

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left side of the triangle (that is, the relationship between words and
meanings) is reduced to a mere symptomatic phenomenon.
Bacon was able to read Aristotle in Greek and realized that
Boethius, by using twice the term "nota", disregarded the fact that,
for Aristotle, words were "first of all" or "primarily" (see Kretzmann,
1974) symptoms of the passions of the soul. Thus (DS, V, 166) he
interprets the Aristotelian passage according to his personal position:
words are essentially in a symptomatic relation with species and at
most they can signify them only vicariously (by a second impositio).
The very relation of signification is the one between words and things.
He disregards the fact that for Aristotle words, even though they were
symptoms of the mental passions, also signify them, to such an extent
that we can understand the named things only through the mediation
of the understood species. For Aristotle - and for the medieval
tradition before Bacon - extension was still a function of intension.
For Bacon the only signification of the statement is the fact that the
referent is the case.
It is thus clear why in his terminological framework the sense of
"significatio" undergoes a radical change. Before Bacon "nominantur
singularia sed universalia significantur", with Bacon "significantur
singularia", or at least "significantur res" (even though a "res" can
also be a class, a feeling, a species).
Duns Scotus seems to have been more imprecise on this matter. On
one side he says that words are signs of the thing and not of the
concept (Ordinatio I, 27, 1; see also Nuchelmans, 1973, p. 196), on
the other side he says that to signify is :"alicujus intellectum constituere" (Quaestiones in Perihermeneia II, 541a). Heidegger (1916, in
the reliable first part of his book, devoted to the 'real' Scotus and not
to Thomas of Erfurt) says that Scotus is very close to a
phenomenological view of meaning as a mental object. Other scholars
confess their perplexity. Boehner (1958, p. 219) says that "Scotus
already broke with this interpretation of Aristotle's text, maintaining
that the significate of the word, generally speaking, is not the concept
but the thing", but in footnote 29 adds that a student of him, John B.
Vogel, disco,ered a considerable discrepancy between the treatment
of this problem in the Oxoniense and the Quaestiones in Perihermeneias opus primum and secundum". (For a more decisive intensionalistic interpretation, see Marmo, 1981-82 and 1984.)
As far as Ockham is concerned, it has been argued whether the

MEANING

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561

extensionalist theory of Ockham is really as straightforward as it

seems. Given his four senses of "significare" (STL I, xxxiii), only the
first one has a clear extensional sense. Only in this first sense terms
loose their signification when the object they stand for does not exist.
Nevertheless, even if Ockham used "significare" and "denotari" also
in an intensional sense (see for "significare" Boehner, 1958 and for
"denotari" Marmo, 1984), it is evident that in many places he used
them in an extensional context.
With Ockham the semantic triangle assumes the following format:
there is a direct relation between concepts and things, since concepts
are the natural signs that signify things (STL I, xii), and there is a
direct relation between words and those things they are imposed to
name, while the relation between words and concepts is disregarded
(cf. Tabarroni, 1984; cf. also Boehner, 1958, p. 221). Words signify
the same things signified by concepts, but do not signify concepts
(Summa totius logicae, I, i).
There are persuasive demonstrations of the fact that Ockham also
used "significare" in a intensional sense (Boehner, 1958 and Marmo,
1984, with a discussion of all these cases in which propositions still
retain their meaning independently of the fact whether they are true or
false). However, it is clear that he used "supponere" in an extensional
sense, since there is suppositio "quando terminus stat in propositione
pro aliquo" (STL I, lxii). It is equally evident that Ockham repeatedly
equates "significare" (in the first sense of the term, see STL I, xxxiii)
with "supponere": "aliquid significare, vel supponere vel stare pro
aliquo" (lb., I, iv). (See also Pinborg, 1972.)
Now, it is in the context of the discussion on propositions and
suppositions that Ockham uses the expression "denotari". See for
instance: "terminus supponit pro illo, de quo vel de pronomine
demonstrante ipsum, per propositionem denotatur praedicatum
praedicari, si supponens sit subjectum" (ib., I, lxxii). If the term is the
subject of a proposition then the thing of which the term has the
"suppositio" is that of which the proposition denotes that the predicate is predicated.
In "homo est albus" both terms suppose for the same thing and by
the whole proposition is denoted that it is the case that the same thing
is both man and white (Exp. in Porph. I, lxxii). By the proposition a
"significatum" is denoted and this significatum is a state of affairs
(Expositio aurea in Periherm., prooem.). Likewise, "denotari" is used

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for what is demonstrated t o be by the conclusion of a syllogism:

"propter quam its est a parte rei sicut denotatur esse per conclusionem
demonstrationis" (STL III, 2, xxiii; see also Moody, 1935, 6, 3). One
could find in Ockham many instances of such an usage. The constant
use of the passive suggests that a proposition does not denote a state
of affairs, but rather that by a proposition a state of affairs is denoted. It
is thus arguable whether the "denotatio" is a relation between a
proposition and what is the case or between a proposition and what is
understood to be the case. Marmo (1984) has decided to translate
"denotatur" as 'dare ad intendere'. By a proposition something is
denoted even though this something does not suppose for anything
(STL I, 2, cxii-cxxi).
However, considering that (i) the supposition is an extensional
category and that the verb "denotari" occurs so frequently in conjunction with the mention of the supposition, and (ii) maybe the
proposition does not denote necessarily its truth value but at least it
denotes to somebody that something is or is not the case, one is lead to
suppose that the ockhamist example has encouraged some to use
"deriotatio" in extensional contexts.
Because of the radical shift undergone by "significare" between
Bacon and Ockham, "denotare" is now ready to be intended extensionally.
It is curious to remark that, according to Bacon and Ockham, this
terminological "revolution" concerned first of all "significatio" and
(involved "denotatio" only as a sort of side-effect). But "significatio"
was so strongly linked to meaning from the times of Boethius that, so
to speak, it held out more bravely against the attack of the extensionalistic point of view. In the following centuries we find
"significatio" used again in an intensional sense (see, for instance,
Locke). Truth-conditional semantics succeeded better in capturing
"denotatio", whose semantic status was more ambiguous.

FROM

OCKHAM

TO MILL

It remains, however, difficult to tell by which process, in the course of

five centuries, "denotatio" results in acquiring the unquestionable
extensional status established by Mill. Is there any reason to believe
that Mill borrowed from Ockham that idea? There are indeed many

MEANING

AND

DENOTATION

563

reasons to think that Mill elaborated his System of Logic referring to

the ockhamistic tradition:
(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(v)

Even though paying a remarkable attention to the intensional aspects of language, Mill developed a theory of
the denotation of terms in a proposition which is similar to
the ockhamistic theory of supposition. See for instance: "a
name can only be said to stand for, or to be the name of,
the thing of which it can be predicated" (1843, II, v).
Mill borrows from the Schoolmen (as he says in II, v) the
term "connotation" and, when distinguishing between
connotative and non-connotative terms, he says that the
latter were called "absolute". Gargani (1971, p. 95) traces
this terminology back to the ockhamistic distinction between connotative and absolute terms.
Mill uses "significare" in the ockhamistic way, at least when
it is taken in Ockham first sense. "A non-connotative term
is one which signifies a subject only or an attitude only. A
connotative term is one which denotes a subject, and
implies an attribute" (II, v). Since the denotative function
(in Mill's terms) is first of all performed by non-connotative
terms, it is clear that Mill equates "signify" with "denote".
See also: "the n a m e . . . i s said to signify the subjects
directly, the attributes indirectly; it denotes the subjects and
implies, or involves, or as we shall say henceforth, connotes
the attributes... The only names of objects which connote
nothing are proper names, and these have, Strictly speaking,
no signification" (v).
Probably Mill accepts "denote" as a more technical term,
less prejudiced than "signify", because of its etymological
opposition to "connote".

Nevertheless we have said that Ockham at most influenced, but by no

means encouraged, the extensional use of "denotare". Where can we
find, in this history of the natural evolution of a term, the missing link?
Probably we should look at Hobbes' De corpore I, better known as
Computatio sive logica. It is generally acknowledged that Hobbes
depends on Ockham as well as Mill depends on Hobbes. As a matter
of fact Mill opens his discussion on names with a close examination of
Hobbes' ideas.

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We should however remark that Hobbes does follow Ockham as far

as the theories of universals and propositions are concerned, but he
develops a different theory of signification. For Hobbes there is a clear
cut distinction between signifying (that is, to express the speaker's
ideas in the course of an act of communication), and naming (in the
classical sense of "appellare" or "supponere" - see Hungerland and
Vick, 1981).
Mill realizes that for Hobbes, names are, first of all, names of our
ideas about things, but he also finds in Hobbes evidence of the fact
that " n a m e s . . . shall always be s p o k e n . . , as the names of things
themselves (1843, II, i)," and that "all names are names of something,
real or imaginary.... A general name is familiarly defined, a name
which is capable of being truly affirmed, in the same sense, of each of
an indefinite number of things (II, iii)." Mill is here close to Hobbes,
with the marginal difference that he calls "general" those names that
Hobbes called "universal". ButMill uses"signify" - as we have seen not in the sense of Hobbes but in the sense of Ockham - and for
Hobbes' notion of "significare" he uses rather "connote". Being
strongly intersted in connotation, and without realizing that his own
connotation is not so dissimilar from Hobbes' signification, Mill believes Hobbes privileged naming (Mill's denotation) over signifying
(Mill's connotation). He says that Hobbes, like the Nominalists in
general, "bestowed little or no attention upon the connotation of
words; and sought for their meaning exclusively in what they denote
(v)." This very curious way of reading Hobbes as if he were Bertrand
Russell is due to the fact that Mill read him as if he were an orthodox
ockhamist.
However, even though Mill took Hobbes for an ockhamist, why did
he attribute to him the idea that names denote? Mill says that Hobbes
used "to name" instead of "to denote" (v) but he probably remarked
that Hobbes in De corpore I used "denotare" in at least four cases five in the English translation that Mill probably read, since he quoted
Hobbes' work as Computation or logic (see Ungerland and Vick, 1981,
p. 22 and p, 157).
A p r o p o s of the difference between abstract and concrete names
Hobbes says that "abstractum est quod in re supposita existentem
nominis concreti causam den0tat, ut 'esse corpus', 'esse m o b i l e ' . . , et
similia... Nomina autem abstracta causam nominis concreti denotant,
non ipsam rem" (De corpore I, iii, 3). It must be noted that for Hobbes

MEANING

AND

DENOTATION

565

abstract names do denote a cause, but this cause is not an entity: it is

the criterion according to which an expression is employed (see
Gargani, 1971, p. 86; Hungerland and Vick, 1881, p. 21). Mill
rephrases Hobbes' text in this way: "a concrete name is a name which
stands for a thing; an abstract name is a name which stands for an
attribute of a thing" ( 1843, II, v) where "stands for" is the
ockhamistic "stare pro aliquo". He also adds that he is using such
words as 'concrete' and 'abstract' "in the sense annexed to them by
the Schoolmen".
Probably Mill extrapolated from Hobbes's quotation that, if abstract
names do not denote a thing, the concrete ones certainly do. In fact
for Hobbes "concretum est quod rei alicujus quae existere supponitur
nomen est, ideoque quandoque suppositum, quandoque subjectum,
graece ypokeimenon appellatur", and two lines above he wrote that in
the proposition corpus est mobile "quandoque rem ipsam cogitamus
utroque nomine designatum" (De corpore, I, iii, 3). Thus "designare"
appears in a context where it is linked on one side to the idea of
supposition and on the other side to the idea of denotation.
It is true that concrete names can be proper either to a singular
thing or to a set of individuals, so that we can say that Hobbes' idea of
denotation, if any, is still mid-way between the "suppositio naturalis"
and the "suppositio accidentalis" of Peter of Spain. For this reason it
has been remarked (Hungerland and Vick 1981, p. 51 fig) that
certainly "to denote" has not for Hobbes the same sense that it
acquires in contemporary philosophy of language, because it does not
only apply to logical proper names but also to class names and even to
unexisting entities. But Mill accepts this view. Therefore he could
have intended Hobbes' "denote" in an extensional way.
In De corpore (1, ii, 7) Hobbes says that "homo quemlibet e multis
hominibus, philosophus quemlibet e multis philosophis denotat propter
omnium similitudinem". Thus the denotation concerns again any one
of a multitude of singular individuals, insofar as "homo" and
"philosophus" are concrete names of a class. In De corpore (I, vi, 112)
Hobbes says that words are useful for proving through syllogisms
because by them we denote the conceptions of singular things. Mill
translated in a clear extensional sense: "a general n a m e . . , is capable
of being truly affirmed of each of an indefinite number of things" (II,
iii).
In De corpore (II, ii, 12) it is said that the name "parabola" can

566

UMBERTO

ECO

denote both an allegory and a geometrical figure, and it is uncertain if

Hobbes meant "significat" or "nominat".
Thus (i) Hobbes uses "denotare" at least three times in a way that
encourages an extensional interpretation, and in contexts that recall
the ockhamistic use of "significare" and "supponere"; (ii) even though
he does not use "denotare" as a technical term, he does consistently
employ it in a way which precludes its interpretation as a synonym of
"significare", as Hungerland and Vick (1881, p. 153) persuasively
remark; (iii) it is verisimilar that he did so under the influence of the
otherwise ambiguous "denotari" that he found either in Ockham or in
some logicians of the nominalistic tradition; (iv) Mill disregarded
Hobbes' theory of signification and read Computatio sive logica as if it
belonged to a totally ockhamistic line of thought; (v) it is verisimilar
that Mill, under the influence of Hobbes' "denotare", decided to
oppose denotation (instead of "naming") to connotation.
These are obviously mere hypotheses. To tell the whole story of
what really happened between Ockham and Hobbes and between
Hobbes and Mill is beyond the possibilities of a single scholar. I only
tried to single out a turning point in the history of the philosophy of
language, of semiotics, and of logic, where something happened that
broke a long lasting tradition, thus explaining why we are today still
embarrassed when facing such a term as "denotation".
The embarrassment is not only a terminological one. The 'turning
point' represented by Bacon and Ockham has not in fact eliminated
the opposition between meaning and reference. Such an opposition
keeps going, from Carnap to Montague, from the 'structural semantics' and componential analysis to Searle, from the so-called 'dictionary-like semantics' to the semantics conceived in a format of an
encyclopedia, from 'instructional semantics' to Artificial Intelligence
(see Eco, 1984, p. 2). In a way the opposition between "significare"
and "denotare" is still embarrassing the recent theories of rigid
designation. Is a proper name something that points to the original
baptismal ceremony as to a state of the world, or something that
signifies what was meant by the original namer? From this point of
view one can still find some consistent discrepancies among the
various approaches.
I hope that my revisitation of the origins of the debate can help to
better identify the different standpoints.

M E A N I N G AND D E N O T A T I O N

567

NOTE
* I thank Maria Teresa Beonio Brocchieri Fumagalli for her many useful suggestions. I
also thank Andrea Tabarroni, Roberto Lambertini and Costantino Marmo for having
discussed with me some passages of this paper, whose origin was a seminar on the
medieval theory of signs, University of Bologna, Chair of Semiotics, Academic Year
1982-83.

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