Professional Documents
Culture Documents
COMPUTATION OF TAX
Conjugal Real Property (Sch. 1)
Conjugal Personal Property (Sch.2)
Taxable Transfer (Sch. 3)
Gross Conjugal Estate
Less: Deductions (Sch. 4)
Net Conjugal Estate
Less: Share of Surviving Spouse
Net Share in Conjugal Estate
xxx
Net Taxable Estate
Estate Tax Due
P10,855,020.00
3,460,591.34
14,315,611.34
187,822,576.06
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
.[11]
.
.
On April 27, 1990, BIR Regional Director for San Pablo City, Osmundo G.
Umali issued Certification Nos. 2052[12] and 2053[13] stating that the taxes due on
the transfer of real and personal properties [14] of Jose had been fully paid and said
properties may be transferred to his heirs. Sometime in August 1990, Justice Dizon
passed away. Thus, on October 22, 1990, the probate court appointed petitioner as
the administrator of the Estate.[15]
Petitioner requested the probate court's authority to sell several properties
forming part of the Estate, for the purpose of paying its creditors, namely:
Equitable Banking Corporation (P19,756,428.31), Banque de L'Indochine et. de
Suez (US$4,828,905.90 as of January 31, 1988), Manila Banking Corporation
(P84,199,160.46 as of February 28, 1989) and State Investment House, Inc.
(P6,280,006.21). Petitioner manifested that Manila Bank, a major creditor of
the Estate was not included, as it did not file a claim with the probate court since it
had security over several real estate properties forming part of the Estate.[16]
However, on November 26, 1991, the Assistant Commissioner for Collection
of the BIR, Themistocles Montalban, issued Estate Tax Assessment Notice No.
FAS-E-87-91-003269,[17] demanding the payment of P66,973,985.40 as deficiency
estate tax, itemized as follows:
P31,868,414.48
7,967,103.62
7,967,103.62
19,121,048.68
25,000.00
25,000.00
15.00
300.00
P66,973,985.40[18]
In his letter[19] dated December 12, 1991, Atty. Gonzales moved for the
reconsideration of the said estate tax assessment. However, in her
letter[20] datedApril 12, 1994, the BIR Commissioner denied the request and
reiterated that the estate is liable for the payment of P66,973,985.40 as deficiency
estate tax. On May 3, 1994, petitioner received the letter of denial. On June 2,
1994, petitioner filed a petition for review [21] before respondent CTA. Trial on the
merits ensued.
As found by the CTA, the respective parties presented the following pieces
of evidence, to wit:
In the hearings conducted, petitioner did not present testimonial
evidence but merely documentary evidence consisting of the following:
Nature
of
(sic)
1.
Document
Exhibits
2.
3.
4.
"A"
"C"
"C-1" to "C-17"
5.
6.
7.
"E" to "E-3"
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
"F" to "F-3"
"H" to "H-16"
"I"
"J"
"K" to "K-5"
13.
14.
"L"
Certification of Payment of
estate taxes Nos. 2052 and
2053, both dated April 27, 1990,
issued by the Office of the
Regional Director, Revenue
Region No. 4-C, San Pablo
City, with attachments
(pp. 103-104, CTA records.).
"M" to "M-5"
1.
2.
3.
Documents/
Signatures
BIR Record
p. 138
-do-
Maximino V. Tagle
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
pp. 143-144
Signature of Alberto S.
Enriquez appearing at the
lower portion on p. 2 of Exh. "2";
-do-
-do-
Signature of Raymund S.
Gallardo appearing at the
Lower portion on p. 2 of Exh. "2";
-do-
Signature of Maximino V.
Tagle also appearing on
p. 2 of Exh. "2";
-do-
Summary of revenue
Enforcement Officers Audit
Report, dated July 19, 1991;
p. 139
Signature of Alberto
Enriquez at the lower
portion of Exh. "3";
-do-
-do-
Signature of Raymond S.
Gallardo at the lower
portion of Exh. "3";
-do-
Signature of Maximino
V. Tagle at the lower
portion of Exh. "3";
-do-
14.
p. 169
pp. 169-170[22]
Nevertheless, the CTA did not fully adopt the assessment made by the BIR and it
came up with its own computation of the deficiency estate tax, to wit:
Conjugal Real Property
Conjugal Personal Prop.
Gross Conjugal Estate
Less: Deductions
Net Conjugal Estate
Less: Share of Surviving Spouse
Net Share in Conjugal Estate
Add: Capital/Paraphernal
Properties P44,652,813.66
Less: Capital/Paraphernal
Deductions
Net Taxable Estate
P 5,062,016.00
33,021,999.93
38,084,015.93
26,250,000.00
P 11,834,015.93
5,917,007.96
P 5,917,007.96
44,652,813.66
P 50,569,821.62
============
Estate Tax Due P 29,935,342.97
Add: 25% Surcharge for Late Filing
Add: Penalties for-No notice of death
No CPA certificate
Total deficiency estate tax
7,483,835.74
15.00
300.00
P 37,419,493.71
=============
exclusive of 20% interest from due date of its payment until full payment
thereof
[Sec. 283 (b), Tax Code of 1987].[25]
On April 30, 1999, the CA affirmed the CTA's ruling. Adopting in full the
CTA's findings, the CA ruled that the petitioner's act of filing an estate tax return
with the BIR and the issuance of BIR Certification Nos. 2052 and 2053 did not
deprive the BIR Commissioner of her authority to re-examine or re-assess the said
return filed on behalf of the Estate.[28]
On May 31, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration [29] which the
CA denied in its Resolution[30] dated November 3, 1999.
Hence, the instant Petition raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not the admission of evidence which were not formally
offered by the respondent BIR by the Court of Tax Appeals which
was subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeals is contrary to the
Rules of Court and rulings of this Honorable Court;
2. Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals and the Court of Appeals
erred in recognizing/considering the estate tax return prepared and
filed by respondent BIR knowing that the probate court appointed
administrator of the estate of Jose P. Fernandez had previously filed
one as in fact, BIR Certification Clearance Nos. 2052 and 2053 had
been issued in the estate's favor;
3. Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals and the Court of Appeals
erred in disallowing the valid and enforceable claims of creditors
against the estate, as lawful deductions despite clear and convincing
evidence thereof; and
4. Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals and the Court of Appeals
erred in validating erroneous double imputation of values on the very
same estate properties in the estate tax return it prepared and filed
which effectively bloated the estate's assets. [31]
The petitioner claims that in as much as the valid claims of creditors against
the Estate are in excess of the gross estate, no estate tax was due; that the lack of a
formal offer of evidence is fatal to BIR's cause; that the doctrine laid down in Vda.
de Oate has already been abandoned in a long line of cases in which the Court
held that evidence not formally offered is without any weight or value; that Section
34 of Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence requiring a formal offer of evidence is
mandatory in character; that, while BIR's witness Alberto Enriquez (Alberto) in his
testimony before the CTA identified the pieces of evidence aforementioned such
that the same were marked, BIR's failure to formally offer said pieces of evidence
and depriving petitioner the opportunity to cross-examine Alberto, render the same
The CTA and the CA rely solely on the case of Vda. de Oate, which
reiterated this Court's previous rulings in People v. Napat-a[35] and People v.
Mate[36]on the admission and consideration of exhibits which were not formally
offered during the trial. Although in a long line of cases many of which were
decided afterVda. de Oate, we held that courts cannot consider evidence which
has not been formally offered,[37] nevertheless, petitioner cannot validly assume
that the doctrine laid down in Vda. de Oate has already been abandoned.
Recently, in Ramos v. Dizon,[38] this Court, applying the said doctrine, ruled that the
trial court judge therein committed no error when he admitted and considered the
respondents' exhibits in the resolution of the case, notwithstanding the fact that the
same were not formally offered. Likewise, in Far East Bank & Trust Company v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,[39] the Court made reference to said doctrine in
resolving the issues therein. Indubitably, the doctrine laid down in Vda. De
Oate still subsists in this jurisdiction. In Vda. de Oate, we held that:
From the foregoing provision, it is clear that for evidence to be
considered, the same must be formally offered. Corollarily, the mere fact
that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not
mean that it has already been offered as part of the evidence of a party.
In Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles [186 SCRA 385], we had the
occasion to make a distinction between identification of documentary
evidence and its formal offer as an exhibit. We said that the first is done
in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the
evidence as an exhibit while the second is done only when the party rests
its case and not before. A party, therefore, may opt to formally offer his
evidence if he believes that it will advance his cause or not to do so at
all. In the event he chooses to do the latter, the trial court is not
authorized by the Rules to consider the same.
However, in People v. Napat-a [179 SCRA 403] citing People v.
Mate [103 SCRA 484], we relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed
evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the
trial court provided the following requirements are present, viz.:
first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly
recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the
records of the case.[40]
While the CTA is not governed strictly by technical rules of evidence, [45] as
rules of procedure are not ends in themselves and are primarily intended as tools in
the administration of justice, the presentation of the BIR's evidence is not a mere
procedural technicality which may be disregarded considering that it is the only
means by which the CTA may ascertain and verify the truth of BIR's claims against
the Estate.[46] The BIR's failure to formally offer these pieces of evidence, despite
CTA's directives, is fatal to its cause.[47] Such failure is aggravated by the fact that
not even a single reason was advanced by the BIR to justify such fatal omission.
This, we take against the BIR.
Per the records of this case, the BIR was directed to present its evidence [48] in
the hearing of February 21, 1996, but BIR's counsel failed to appear.[49] The CTA
denied petitioner's motion to consider BIR's presentation of evidence as waived,
with a warning to BIR that such presentation would be considered waived if BIR's
evidence would not be presented at the next hearing. Again, in the hearing of
March 20, 1996, BIR's counsel failed to appear.[50] Thus, in its Resolution[51]dated
March 21, 1996, the CTA considered the BIR to have waived presentation of its
evidence. In the same Resolution, the parties were directed to file their respective
memorandum. Petitioner complied but BIR failed to do so. [52] In all of these
proceedings, BIR was duly notified. Hence, in this case, we are constrained to
apply our ruling in Heirs of Pedro Pasag v. Parocha:[53]
A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest
their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the
evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the
trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is
presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties
to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it
facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required to review
documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court.
Strict adherence to the said rule is not a trivial matter. The Court
in Constantino v. Court of Appeals ruled that the formal offer of one's
evidence is deemed waived after failing to submit it within a
considerable period of time. It explained that the court cannot admit
an offer of evidence made after a lapse of three (3) months because
to do so would "condone an inexcusable laxity if not non-compliance
Verily, the second issue in this case involves the construction of Section
79 of the National Internal Revenue Code[59] (Tax Code) which provides for the
allowable deductions from the gross estate of the decedent. The specific question is
whether the actual claims of the aforementioned creditors may be fully allowed as
deductions from the gross estate of Jose despite the fact that the said claims were
reduced or condoned through compromise agreements entered into by the Estate
with its creditors.
[58]
Claims against the estate, as allowable deductions from the gross estate
under Section 79 of the Tax Code, are basically a reproduction of the deductions
allowed under Section 89 (a) (1) (C) and (E) of Commonwealth Act No. 466 (CA
466), otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code of 1939, and which
was the first codification of Philippine tax laws. Philippine tax laws were, in turn,
based on the federal tax laws of the United States. Thus, pursuant to established
rules of statutory construction, the decisions of American courts construing the
federal tax code are entitled to great weight in the interpretation of our own tax
laws.[60]
It is noteworthy that even in the United States, there is some dispute as to
whether the deductible amount for a claim against the estate is fixed as of the
decedent's death which is the general rule, or the same should be adjusted to reflect
post-death developments, such as where a settlement between the parties results in
the reduction of the amount actually paid. [61] On one hand, the U.S. court ruled that
the appropriate deduction is the value that the claim had at the date of the
decedent's death.[62] Also, as held in Propstra v. U.S., [63] where a lien claimed
against the estate was certain and enforceable on the date of the decedent's death,
the fact that the claimant subsequently settled for lesser amount did not preclude
the estate from deducting the entire amount of the claim for estate tax
purposes. These pronouncements essentially confirm the general principle that
post-death developments are not material in determining the amount of the
deduction.
On the other hand, the Internal Revenue Service (Service) opines that postdeath settlement should be taken into consideration and the claim should be
were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of
both Houses of Congress.1
In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor Leader Francis G.
Escudero delivered a privilege speech, "Tale of Two Tapes," and set in motion a congressional
investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety,
National Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and
Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the
wiretapped conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director Samuel
Ong submitted to the respondent House Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of the
supposed three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee
members on the admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in
the chambers of the House.2
On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the hearings indefinitely.
Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports based on the said recordings and the
testimonies of the resource persons.3
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a
Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction4docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent House
Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped
conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose. He further implored that the said
recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the
respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of the
House proceedings.5
Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the "Garci tapes" abruptly
stopped.
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the slumbering issue with a
privilege speech, "The Lighthouse That Brought Darkness." In his discourse, Senator Lacson
promised to provide the public "the whole unvarnished truth the whats, whens, wheres, whos and
whys" of the alleged wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the perceived willingness of
telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious wiretapping activities.
On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacsons speech was referred to the Senate
Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who had
previously filed two bills6 seeking to regulate the sale, purchase and use of wiretapping equipment
and to prohibit the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral duties. 7
In the Senates plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued when Senator Richard
Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200 8 if the body
were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam DefensorSantiago delivered a privilege speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution
absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication of the contents of the "Hello Garci"
tapes. However, she recommended a legislative investigation into the role of the Intelligence Service
of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other government entities in the alleged illegal
wiretapping of public officials.9
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the
Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, 10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275,
seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main
that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the
Constitution.11
As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its public hearings on the
"Hello Garci" tapes on September 7,12 1713 and October 1,14 2007.
Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Benigno Noynoy C. Aquino,
Rodolfo G. Biazon, Panfilo M. Lacson, Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal and Antonio F.
Trillanes filed their Comment16on the petition on September 25, 2007.
The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument. 17
On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of the resource
persons summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings, moved to intervene as
petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.18
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 and 179275. 19
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, they have different
objectivesthe first is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their
subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the
conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.
The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.
-IBefore delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first resolve the issue on the parties
standing, argued at length in their pleadings.
In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that "[l]egal standing or locus standi refers to a personal
and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury
because of the challenged governmental act x x x," thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable action.21
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions."22
However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the Court, in recent cases,
has relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo23 articulates that a "liberal
policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations
to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings." 24 The
fairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales25 even permitted a non-member of the broadcast media, who failed
to allege a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, to challenge the acts of the Secretary
of Justice and the National Telecommunications Commission. The majority, in the said case, echoed
the current policy that "this Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural
barriers as impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact
on public interest, in keeping with the Courts duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether
or not other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and
the laws, and that they have not abused the discretion given to them."26
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate the petition by alleging that
he is the person alluded to in the "Hello Garci" tapes. Further, his was publicly identified by the
members of the respondent committees as one of the voices in the recordings. 27 Obviously,
therefore, petitioner Garcillano stands to be directly injured by the House committees actions and
charges of electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his standing to institute the petition for prohibition.
In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing by alleging that they are
concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP. They are of the firm conviction that any
attempt to use the "Hello Garci" tapes will further divide the country. They wish to see the legal and
proper use of public funds that will necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing public hearings. They are
worried by the continuous violation of the laws and individual rights, and the blatant attempt to abuse
constitutional processes through the conduct of legislative inquiries purportedly in aid of legislation. 28
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to
attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the
publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the
intended legislation which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing
the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned
hearings.29
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution of the laws and that
intervenor Sagge asserts his constitutional right to due process,30 they satisfy the requisite personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic.
Following the Courts ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,31 we find sufficient
petitioners Ranadas and Agcaoilis and intervenor Sagges allegation that the continuous conduct by
the Senate of the questioned legislative inquiry will necessarily involve the expenditure of public
funds.32 It should be noted that inFrancisco, rights personal to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. had been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, yet the
Court granted standing to the petitioners therein for, as in this case, they invariably invoked the
vindication of their own rightsas taxpayers, members of Congress, citizens, individually or in a class
suit, and members of the bar and of the legal professionwhich were also supposedly violated by the
therein assailed unconstitutional acts.33
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the petitioners and intervenor
Sagge advance constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. The issues are of transcendental and paramount
importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved for the
guidance of all.34
Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it has shown in prior cases
climaxing in the more recent case of Chavez, the Court recognizes the legal standing of petitioners
Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor Sagge.
- II The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic. Repeatedly stressed
in our prior decisions is the principle that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the
determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies.35 By actual cases, we mean existing
conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise
the decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not
extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. 36 Neither will the Court
determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. A case becomes
moot when its purpose has become stale.37 It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a
case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in
the nature of things, cannot be enforced.38
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as aforementioned, the issuance
of an injunctive writ to prohibit the respondent House Committees from playing the tape recordings
and from including the same in their committee report. He likewise prays that the said tapes be
stricken off the records of the House proceedings. But the Court notes that the recordings were
already played in the House and heard by its members.39 There is also the widely publicized fact that
the committee reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in
plenary by the respondent committees.40 Having been overtaken by these events, the Garcillano
petition has to be dismissed for being moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive
remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an
act already accomplished.41
- III -
As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to
continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of
procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is
intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.42 Publication is indeed imperative, for it
will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or
rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. 43 What constitutes
publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after
15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines."44
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in
newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. 45 With respect to the present Senate of
the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007,
no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v. Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,46 we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise
violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in
accordance with the "duly published rules of procedure." We quote the OSGs
explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every
Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation
because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial
elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senates membership, the
composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may
thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published
its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by
the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, reinforces this ruling with the
following rationalization:
The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing legislative body.
The present Senate has twenty-four members, twelve of whom are elected every three years
for a term of six years each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators expires every three years,
leaving less than a majority of Senators to continue into the next Congress. The 1987
Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires a majority of Senators to "constitute a
quorum to do business." Applying the same reasoning inArnault v. Nazareno, the Senate
under the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing body because less than majority of the
Senators continue into the next Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of
Proceduremust be republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve
Senators.47
The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution48 (On the Motion for
Reconsideration) in the same case, viz.:
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to issue a clarification.
Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing," as it is not
dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its
members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress
acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of the
Senate itself confirms this when it states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the
next session in the same status.
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of
one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for
the first time.
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and
even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are
considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the
Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same
status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is
readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically
have a different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the
acts and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing
body even with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending matters will not be
deemed terminated with the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course,
continue into the next Congress with the same status.
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the opposite nature of
the conduct of its business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the
Senates main rules of procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the preceding
elections shall begin their term of office, the President may endorse the Rules to the
appropriate committee for amendment or revision.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be presented
at least one day before its consideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senators
present in the session shall be required for its approval.
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall
remain in force until they are amended or repealed.
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new composition of
the Senate after an election and the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at
the start of each session in which the newly elected Senators shall begin their term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are intended to be
valid from the date of their adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such language is
conspicuously absent from theRules. The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect
seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." The latter does
not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended or
repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot
be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the next Congress.
The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries
which come within the rule on unfinished business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be
conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is
incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress
or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in
subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on
notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective
even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its
main rules regarding effectivity.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing
that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet
form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page. 49
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senates
defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The
organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any
distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional
mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the
Senate.
Justice Carpios response to the same argument raised by the respondents is illuminating:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form
available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Taada v. Tuvera ruling which requires
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules
of Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in
two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form of publication.
Publication in accordance with Taada is mandatory to comply with the due process
requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a persons liberty at risk. A person who
violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, 50 otherwise known as the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all
the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as
the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes.51 In other words, the
law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data
messages and/or electronic documents.52 It does not make the internet a medium for publishing
laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the
Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases.
The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have
caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure."
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we
take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought
to be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the
legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate
Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised in
the consolidated petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275
is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the
Philippines and/or any of its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on
the "Hello Garci" tapes.
SO ORDERED.
security guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of the Webbs household,
police officer Biongs former girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellitas husband.
For their part, some of the accused testified, denying any part in the crime and saying they were
elsewhere when it took place. Webbs alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was
then across the ocean in the United States of America. He presented the testimonies of witnesses as
well as documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense presented witnesses
to show Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony.
But impressed by Alfaros detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it, the trial court
found a credible witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank
testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations. The trial court remained unfazed by
significant discrepancies between Alfaros April 28 and May 22, 1995 affidavits, accepting her
explanation that she at first wanted to protect her former boyfriend, accused Estrada, and a relative,
accused Gatchalian; that no lawyer assisted her; that she did not trust the investigators who helped
her prepare her first affidavit; and that she felt unsure if she would get the support and security she
needed once she disclosed all about the Vizconde killings.
In contrast, the trial court thought little of the denials and alibis that Webb, Lejano, Rodriguez, and
Gatchalian set up for their defense. They paled, according to the court, compared to Alfaros
testimony that other witnesses and the physical evidence corroborated. Thus, on January 4, 2000,
after four years of arduous hearings, the trial court rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty
as charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four
months, and one day to twelve years. The trial court also awarded damages to Lauro Vizconde. 3
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision, modifying the penalty imposed on
Biong to six years minimum and twelve years maximum and increasing the award of damages to
Lauro Vizconde.4 The appellate court did not agree that the accused were tried by publicity or that
the trial judge was biased. It found sufficient evidence of conspiracy that rendered Rodriguez,
Gatchalian, Fernandez, and Estrada equally guilty with those who had a part in raping and killing
Carmela and in executing her mother and sister.
On motion for reconsideration by the accused, the Court of Appeals' Special Division of five
members voted three against two to deny the motion, 5 hence, the present appeal.
On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a Resolution
granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmelas
cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping of the NBI. The Court
granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence 6 to give the accused and the
prosecution access to scientific evidence that they might want to avail themselves of, leading to a
correct decision in the case.
Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the
specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows, however, that
the specimen was not among the object evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in the
case.
This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the
governments failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial of his right to due
process.
Issues Presented
Accused Webbs motion to acquit presents a threshold issue: whether or not the Court should acquit
him outright, given the governments failure to produce the semen specimen that the NBI found on
Carmelas cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that would prove his innocence.
In the main, all the accused raise the central issue of whether or not Webb, acting in conspiracy with
Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed Carmela
and put to death her mother and sister. But, ultimately, the controlling issues are:
1. Whether or not Alfaros testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying
Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as the persons
who committed it, is entitled to belief; and
2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaros
testimony that he led the others in committing the crime.
The issue respecting accused Biong is whether or not he acted to cover up the crime after its
commission.
The Right to Acquittal
Due to Loss of DNA Evidence
Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland,7 that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of
violation of his right to due process given the States failure to produce on order of the Court either
by negligence or willful suppression the semen specimen taken from Carmela.
The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and, consistent with this, semen
specimen was found in her. It is true that Alfaro identified Webb in her testimony as Carmelas rapist
and killer but serious questions had been raised about her credibility. At the very least, there exists a
possibility that Alfaro had lied. On the other hand, the semen specimen taken from Carmela cannot
possibly lie. It cannot be coached or allured by a promise of reward or financial support. No two
persons have the same DNA fingerprint, with the exception of identical twins. 8 If, on examination, the
DNA of the subject specimen does not belong to Webb, then he did not rape Carmela. It is that
simple. Thus, the Court would have been able to determine that Alfaro committed perjury in saying
that he did.
Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the semen specimen at
this late stage. For one thing, the ruling in Brady v. Maryland 9 that he cites has long be overtaken by
the decision in Arizona v. Youngblood,10 where the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process does
not require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful to the accused
unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police. Here, the State
presented a medical expert who testified on the existence of the specimen and Webb in fact sought
to have the same subjected to DNA test.
For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist,
the country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had
as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen
secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither
Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime.
Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webbs application for DNA testing, he allowed the
proceeding to move on when he had on at least two occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals or
the Supreme Court to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and the other
accused.11 They raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as an error committed
by the trial court in rendering its decision in the case. None of the accused filed a motion with the
appeals court to have the DNA test done pending adjudication of their appeal. This, even when the
Supreme Court had in the meantime passed the rules allowing such test. Considering the accuseds
lack of interest in having such test done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that
it would be required to produce the semen specimen at some future time.
Now, to the merit of the case.
Alfaros Story
Based on the prosecutions version, culled from the decisions of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, on June 29, 1991 at around 8:30 in the evening, Jessica Alfaro drove her Mitsubishi
Lancer, with boyfriend Peter Estrada as passenger, to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center parking
lot to buy shabu from Artemio "Dong" Ventura. There, Ventura introduced her to his friends: Hubert
Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez,
Michael Gatchalian, and Joey Filart. Alfaro recalled frequently seeing them at a shabu house in
Paraaque in January 1991, except Ventura whom she had known earlier in December 1990.
As Alfaro smoked her shabu, Webb approached and requested her to relay a message for him to a
girl, whom she later identified as Carmela Vizconde. Alfaro agreed. After using up their shabu, the
group drove to Carmelas house at 80 Vinzons Street, Pitong Daan Subdivision, BF Homes,
Paraaque City. Riding in her car, Alfaro and Estrada trailed Filart and Rodriguez who rode a Mazda
pick-up and Webb, Lejano, Ventura, Fernandez, and Gatchalian who were on a Nissan Patrol car.
On reaching their destination, Alfaro parked her car on Vinzons Street, alighted, and approached
Carmelas house. Alfaro pressed the buzzer and a woman came out. Alfaro queried her about
Carmela. Alfaro had met Carmela twice before in January 1991. When Carmela came out, Alfaro
gave her Webbs message that he was just around. Carmela replied, however, that she could not go
out yet since she had just arrived home. She told Alfaro to return after twenty minutes. Alfaro relayed
this to Webb who then told the group to drive back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center.
The group had another shabu session at the parking lot. After sometime, they drove back but only
Alfaro proceeded to Vinzons Street where Carmela lived. The Nissan Patrol and the Mazda pick-up,
with their passengers, parked somewhere along Aguirre Avenue. Carmela was at their garden. She
approached Alfaro on seeing her and told the latter that she (Carmela) had to leave the house for a
while. Carmela requested Alfaro to return before midnight and she would leave the pedestrian gate,
the iron grills that led to the kitchen, and the kitchen door unlocked. Carmela also told Alfaro to blink
her cars headlights twice when she approached the pedestrian gate so Carmela would know that
she had arrived.
Alfaro returned to her car but waited for Carmela to drive out of the house in her own car. Alfaro
trailed Carmela up to Aguirre Avenue where she dropped off a man whom Alfaro believed was
Carmelas boyfriend. Alfaro looked for her group, found them, and relayed Carmelas instructions to
Webb. They then all went back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center. At the parking lot, Alfaro
told the group about her talk with Carmela. When she told Webb of Carmelas male companion,
Webbs mood changed for the rest of the evening ("bad trip").
Webb gave out free cocaine. They all used it and some shabu, too. After about 40 to 45 minutes,
Webb decided that it was time for them to leave. He said, "Pipilahan natin siya [Carmela] at ako ang
mauuna." Lejano said, "Ako ang susunod" and the others responded "Okay, okay." They all left the
parking lot in a convoy of three vehicles and drove into Pitong Daan Subdivision for the third time.
They arrived at Carmelas house shortly before midnight.
Alfaro parked her car between Vizcondes house and the next. While waiting for the others to alight
from their cars, Fernandez approached Alfaro with a suggestion that they blow up the transformer
near the Vizcondes residence to cause a brownout ("Pasabugin kaya natin ang transformer na ito").
But Alfaro shrugged off the idea, telling Fernandez, "Malakas lang ang tama mo." When Webb,
Lejano, and Ventura were already before the house, Webb told the others again that they would line
up for Carmela but he would be the first. The others replied, "O sige, dito lang kami, magbabantay
lang kami."
Alfaro was the first to pass through the pedestrian gate that had been left open. Webb, Lejano, and
Ventura followed her. On entering the garage, Ventura using a chair mounted the hood of the
Vizcondes Nissan Sentra and loosened the electric bulb over it ("para daw walang ilaw"). The small
group went through the open iron grill gate and passed the dirty kitchen. Carmela opened the
aluminum screen door of the kitchen for them. She and Webb looked each other in the eyes for a
moment and, together, headed for the dining area.
As she lost sight of Carmela and Webb, Alfaro decided to go out. Lejano asked her where she was
going and she replied that she was going out to smoke. As she eased her way out through the
kitchen door, she saw Ventura pulling out a kitchen drawer. Alfaro smoked a cigarette at the garden.
After about twenty minutes, she was surprised to hear a womans voice ask, "Sino yan?" Alfaro
immediately walked out of the garden to her car. She found her other companions milling around it.
Estrada who sat in the car asked her, "Okay ba?"
After sitting in the car for about ten minutes, Alfaro returned to the Vizconde house, using the same
route. The interior of the house was dark but some light filtered in from outside. In the kitchen, Alfaro
saw Ventura searching a ladys bag that lay on the dining table. When she asked him what he was
looking for, he said: "Ikaw na nga dito, maghanap ka ng susi." She asked him what key he wanted
and he replied: "Basta maghanap ka ng susi ng main door pati na rin ng susi ng kotse." When she
found a bunch of keys in the bag, she tried them on the main door but none fitted the lock. She also
did not find the car key.
Unable to open the main door, Alfaro returned to the kitchen. While she was at a spot leading to the
dining area, she heard a static noise (like a television that remained on after the station had signed
off). Out of curiosity, she approached the masters bedroom from where the noise came, opened the
door a little, and peeked inside. The unusual sound grew even louder. As she walked in, she saw
Webb on top of Carmela while she lay with her back on the floor. Two bloodied bodies lay on the
bed. Lejano was at the foot of the bed about to wear his jacket. Carmela was gagged, moaning, and
in tears while Webb raped her, his bare buttocks exposed.
Webb gave Alfaro a meaningful look and she immediately left the room. She met Ventura at the
dining area. He told her, "Prepare an escape. Aalis na tayo." Shocked with what she saw, Alfaro
rushed out of the house to the others who were either sitting in her car or milling on the sidewalk.
She entered her car and turned on the engine but she did not know where to go. Webb, Lejano, and
Ventura came out of the house just then. Webb suddenly picked up a stone and threw it at the main
door, breaking its glass frame.
As the three men approached the pedestrian gate, Webb told Ventura that he forgot his jacket in the
house. But Ventura told him that they could not get in anymore as the iron grills had already locked.
They all rode in their cars and drove away until they reached Aguirre Avenue. As they got near an
old hotel at the Tropical Palace area, Alfaro noticed the Nissan Patrol slow down. Someone threw
something out of the car into the cogonal area.
The convoy of cars went to a large house with high walls, concrete fence, steel gate, and a long
driveway at BF Executive Village. They entered the compound and gathered at the lawn where the
"blaming session" took place. It was here that Alfaro and those who remained outside the Vizconde
house learned of what happened. The first to be killed was Carmelas mother, then Jennifer, and
finally, Carmella. Ventura blamed Webb, telling him, "Bakit naman pati yung bata?" Webb replied
that the girl woke up and on seeing him molesting Carmela, she jumped on him, bit his shoulders,
and pulled his hair. Webb got mad, grabbed the girl, pushed her to the wall, and repeatedly stabbed
her. Lejano excused himself at this point to use the telephone in the house. Meanwhile, Webb called
up someone on his cellular phone.
At around 2:00 in the morning, accused Gerardo Biong arrived. Webb ordered him to go and clean
up the Vizconde house and said to him, "Pera lang ang katapat nyan." Biong answered, "Okay lang."
Webb spoke to his companions and told them, "We dont know each other. We havent seen each
otherbaka maulit yan." Alfaro and Estrada left and they drove to her fathers house. 12
1. The quality of the witness
Was Alfaro an ordinary subdivision girl who showed up at the NBI after four years, bothered by her
conscience or egged on by relatives or friends to come forward and do what was right? No. She
was, at the time she revealed her story, working for the NBI as an "asset," a stool pigeon, one who
earned her living by fraternizing with criminals so she could squeal on them to her NBI handlers. She
had to live a life of lies to get rewards that would pay for her subsistence and vices.
According to Atty. Artemio Sacaguing, former head of the NBI Anti-Kidnapping, Hijacking, and Armed
Robbery Task Force (AKHAR) Section, Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI since November
or December 1994 as an "asset." She supplied her handlers with information against drug pushers
and other criminal elements. Some of this information led to the capture of notorious drug pushers
like Christopher Cruz Santos and Orlando Bacquir. Alfaros tip led to the arrest of the leader of the
"Martilyo gang" that killed a police officer. Because of her talent, the task force gave her "very special
treatment" and she became its "darling," allowed the privilege of spending nights in one of the rooms
at the NBI offices.
When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her about it and she was
piqued. One day, she unexpectedly told Sacaguing that she knew someone who had the real story
behind the Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing showed interest. Alfaro promised to bring that someone
to the NBI to tell his story. When this did not happen and Sacaguing continued to press her, she told
him that she might as well assume the role of her informant. Sacaguing testified thus:
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. Atty. Sacaguing, how did Jessica Alfaro become a witness in the Vizconde murder case?
Will you tell the Honorable Court?
xxxx
A. She told me. Your Honor, that she knew somebody who related to her the circumstances, I
mean, the details of the massacre of the Vizconde family. Thats what she told me, Your
Honor.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. And what did you say?
xxxx
A. I was quite interested and I tried to persuade her to introduce to me that man and she
promised that in due time, she will bring to me the man, and together with her, we will try to
convince him to act as a state witness and help us in the solution of the case.
xxxx
Q. Atty. Sacaguing, were you able to interview this alleged witness?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. No, sir.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. Why not?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. Because Jessica Alfaro was never able to comply with her promise to bring the man to
me. She told me later that she could not and the man does not like to testify.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. All right, and what happened after that?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. She told me, "easy lang kayo, Sir," if I may quote, "easy lang Sir, huwag kayong"
COURT:
How was that?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. "Easy lang, Sir. Sir, relax lang, Sir, papapelan ko, papapelan ko na lang yan."
xxxx
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. All right, and what was your reaction when Ms. Alfaro stated that "papapelan ko na lang
yan?"
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. I said, "hindi puwede yan, kasi hindi ka naman eye witness."
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. And what was the reply of Ms. Alfaro?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. Hindi siya nakakibo, until she went away.
spilling the contents, when they had already gotten into the house. It is a story made to fit in with the
crime scene although robbery was supposedly not the reason Webb and his companions entered
that house.
c. It is the same thing with the garage light. The police investigators found that the bulb had been
loosened to turn off the light. The confessions of the Barroso gang claimed that one of them climbed
the parked cars hood to reach up and darken that light. This made sense since they were going to
rob the place and they needed time to work in the dark trying to open the front door. Some
passersby might look in and see what they were doing.
Alfaro had to adjust her testimony to take into account that darkened garage light. So she claimed
that Ventura climbed the cars hood, using a chair, to turn the light off. But, unlike the Barroso "akyatbahay" gang, Webb and his friends did not have anything to do in a darkened garage. They
supposedly knew in advance that Carmela left the doors to the kitchen open for them. It did not
make sense for Ventura to risk standing on the cars hood and be seen in such an awkward position
instead of going straight into the house.
And, thirdly, Alfaro was the NBIs star witness, their badge of excellent investigative work. After
claiming that they had solved the crime of the decade, the NBI people had a stake in making her
sound credible and, obviously, they gave her all the preparations she needed for the job of becoming
a fairly good substitute witness. She was their "darling" of an asset. And this is not pure speculation.
As pointed out above, Sacaguing of the NBI, a lawyer and a ranking official, confirmed this to be a
cold fact. Why the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to see this is mystifying.
lavvphil
At any rate, did Alfaro at least have a fine memory for faces that had a strong effect on her, given the
circumstances? Not likely. She named Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez as one of the culprits in the
Vizconde killings. But when the NBI found a certain Michael Rodriguez, a drug dependent from the
Bicutan Rehabilitation Center, initially suspected to be Alfaros Miguel Rodriguez and showed him to
Alfaro at the NBI office, she ran berserk, slapping and kicking Michael, exclaiming: "How can I forget
your face. We just saw each other in a disco one month ago and you told me then that you will kill
me." As it turned out, he was not Miguel Rodriguez, the accused in this case. 13
Two possibilities exist: Michael was really the one Alfaro wanted to implicate to settle some score
with him but it was too late to change the name she already gave or she had myopic vision, tagging
the wrong people for what they did not do.
3. The quality of the testimony
There is another thing about a lying witness: her story lacks sense or suffers from inherent
inconsistencies. An understanding of the nature of things and the common behavior of people will
help expose a lie. And it has an abundant presence in this case.
One. In her desire to implicate Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart, who were
supposed to be Webbs co-principals in the crime, Alfaro made it a point to testify that Webb
proposed twice to his friends the gang-rape of Carmela who had hurt him. And twice, they (including,
if one believes Alfaro, her own boyfriend Estrada) agreed in a chorus to his proposal. But when they
got to Carmelas house, only Webb, Lejano, Ventura, and Alfaro entered the house.
Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez supposedly stayed around Alfaros car, which was
parked on the street between Carmelas house and the next. Some of these men sat on top of the
cars lid while others milled on the sidewalk, visible under the street light to anyone who cared to
watch them, particularly to the people who were having a drinking party in a nearby house.
Obviously, the behavior of Webbs companions out on the street did not figure in a planned gangrape of Carmela.
Two. Ventura, Alfaros dope supplier, introduced her for the first time in her life to Webb and his
friends in a parking lot by a mall. So why would she agree to act as Webbs messenger, using her
gas, to bring his message to Carmela at her home. More inexplicably, what motivated Alfaro to stick
it out the whole night with Webb and his friends?
They were practically strangers to her and her boyfriend Estrada. When it came to a point that Webb
decided with his friends to gang-rape Carmela, clearly, there was nothing in it for Alfaro. Yet, she
stuck it out with them, as a police asset would, hanging in there until she had a crime to report, only
she was not yet an "asset" then. If, on the other hand, Alfaro had been too soaked in drugs to think
clearly and just followed along where the group took her, how could she remember so much details
that only a drug-free mind can?
Three. When Alfaro went to see Carmela at her house for the second time, Carmella told her that
she still had to go out and that Webb and his friends should come back around midnight. Alfaro
returned to her car and waited for Carmela to drive out in her own car. And she trailed her up to
Aguirre Avenue where she supposedly dropped off a man whom she thought was Carmelas
boyfriend. Alfaros trailing Carmela to spy on her unfaithfulness to Webb did not make sense since
she was on limited errand. But, as a critical witness, Alfaro had to provide a reason for Webb to freak
out and decide to come with his friends and harm Carmela.
Four. According to Alfaro, when they returned to Carmelas house the third time around midnight,
she led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura through the pedestrian gate that Carmela had left open. Now,
this is weird. Webb was the gang leader who decided what they were going to do. He decided and
his friends agreed with him to go to Carmelas house and gang-rape her. Why would Alfaro, a
woman, a stranger to Webb before that night, and obviously with no role to play in the gang-rape of
Carmela, lead him and the others into her house? It made no sense. It would only make sense if
Alfaro wanted to feign being a witness to something she did not see.
Five. Alfaro went out of the house to smoke at the garden. After about twenty minutes, a woman
exclaimed, "Sino yan?" On hearing this, Alfaro immediately walked out of the garden and went to her
car. Apparently, she did this because she knew they came on a sly. Someone other than Carmela
became conscious of the presence of Webb and others in the house. Alfaro walked away because,
obviously, she did not want to get involved in a potential confrontation. This was supposedly her
frame of mind: fear of getting involved in what was not her business.
But if that were the case, how could she testify based on personal knowledge of what went on in the
house? Alfaro had to change that frame of mind to one of boldness and reckless curiosity. So that is
what she next claimed. She went back into the house to watch as Webb raped Carmela on the floor
of the masters bedroom. He had apparently stabbed to death Carmelas mom and her young sister
whose bloodied bodies were sprawled on the bed. Now, Alfaro testified that she got scared (another
shift to fear) for she hurriedly got out of the house after Webb supposedly gave her a meaningful
look.
Alfaro quickly went to her car, not minding Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart
who sat on the car or milled on the sidewalk. She did not speak to them, even to Estrada, her
boyfriend. She entered her car and turned on the engine but she testified that she did not know
where to go. This woman who a few minutes back led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house,
knowing that they were decided to rape and harm Carmela, was suddenly too shocked to know
where to go! This emotional pendulum swing indicates a witness who was confused with her own
lies.
4. The supposed corroborations
Intending to provide corroboration to Alfaros testimony, the prosecution presented six additional
witnesses:
Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims,
testified on the stab wounds they sustained14 and the presence of semen in Carmelas
genitalia,15 indicating that she had been raped.
Normal E. White, Jr., was the security guard on duty at Pitong Daan Subdivision from 7 p.m. of
June 29 to 7 a.m. of June 30, 1991. He got a report on the morning of June 30 that something
untoward happened at the Vizconde residence. He went there and saw the dead bodies in the
masters bedroom, the bag on the dining table, as well as the loud noise emanating from a television
set.16
White claimed that he noticed Gatchalian and his companions, none of whom he could identify, go in
and out of Pitong Daan Subdivision. He also saw them along Vinzons Street. Later, they entered
Pitong Daan Subdivision in a three-car convoy. White could not, however, describe the kind of
vehicles they used or recall the time when he saw the group in those two instances. And he did not
notice anything suspicious about their coming and going.
But Whites testimony cannot be relied on. His initial claim turned out to be inaccurate. He actually
saw Gatchalian and his group enter the Pitong Daan Subdivision only once. They were not going in
and out. Furthermore, Alfaro testified that when the convoy of cars went back the second time in the
direction of Carmelas house, she alone entered the subdivision and passed the guardhouse without
stopping. Yet, White who supposedly manned that guardhouse did not notice her.
Surprisingly, White failed to note Biong, a police officer, entering or exiting the subdivision on the
early morning of June 30 when he supposedly "cleaned up" Vizconde residence on Webbs orders.
What is more, White did not notice Carmela arrive with her mom before Alfaros first visit that night.
Carmela supposedly left with a male companion in her car at around 10:30 p.m. but White did not
notice it. He also did not notice Carmela reenter the subdivision. White actually discredited Alfaros
testimony about the movements of the persons involved.
Further, while Alfaro testified that it was the Mazda pick-up driven by Filart that led the three-vehicle
convoy,17White claimed it was the Nissan Patrol with Gatchalian on it that led the convoy since he
would not have let the convoy in without ascertaining that Gatchalian, a resident, was in it. Security
guard White did not, therefore, provide corroboration to Alfaros testimony.
1avvphi1
Justo Cabanacan, the security supervisor at Pitong Daan Subdivision testified that he saw Webb
around the last week of May or the first week of June 1991 to prove his presence in the Philippines
when he claimed to be in the United States. He was manning the guard house at the entrance of the
subdivision of Pitong Daan when he flagged down a car driven by Webb. Webb said that he would
see Lilet Sy. Cabanacan asked him for an ID but he pointed to his United BF Homes sticker and said
that he resided there. Cabanacan replied, however, that Pitong Daan had a local sticker.
Cabanacan testified that, at this point, Webb introduced himself as the son of Congressman Webb.
Still, the supervisor insisted on seeing his ID. Webb grudgingly gave it and after seeing the picture
and the name on it, Cabanacan returned the same and allowed Webb to pass without being logged
in as their Standard Operating Procedure required. 18
But Cabanacan's testimony could not be relied on. Although it was not common for a security guard
to challenge a Congressmans son with such vehemence, Cabanacan did not log the incident on the
guardhouse book. Nor did he, contrary to prescribed procedure, record the visitors entry into the
subdivision. It did not make sense that Cabanacan was strict in the matter of seeing Webbs ID but
not in recording the visit.
Mila Gaviola used to work as laundry woman for the Webbs at their house at BF Homes Executive
Village. She testified that she saw Webb at his parents house on the morning of June 30, 1991
when she got the dirty clothes from the room that he and two brothers occupied at about 4.a.m. She
saw him again pacing the floor at 9 a.m. At about 1 p.m., Webb left the house in t-shirt and shorts,
passing through a secret door near the maids quarters on the way out. Finally, she saw Webb at 4
p.m. of the same day.19
On cross-examination, however, Gaviola could not say what distinguished June 30, 1991 from the
other days she was on service at the Webb household as to enable her to distinctly remember, four
years later, what one of the Webb boys did and at what time. She could not remember any of the
details that happened in the household on the other days. She proved to have a selective
photographic memory and this only damaged her testimony.
Gaviola tried to corroborate Alfaro's testimony by claiming that on June 30, 1991 she noticed
bloodstains on Webb's t-shirt.20 She did not call the attention of anybody in the household about it
when it would have been a point of concern that Webb may have been hurt, hence the blood.
Besides, Victoria Ventoso, the Webbs' housemaid from March 1989 to May 1992, and Sgt. Miguel
Muoz, the Webbs' security aide in 1991, testified that Gaviola worked for the Webbs only from
January 1991 to April 1991. Ventoso further testified that it was not Gaviola's duty to collect the
clothes from the 2nd floor bedrooms, this being the work of the housemaid charged with cleaning the
rooms.
What is more, it was most unlikely for a laundrywoman who had been there for only four months to
collect, as she claimed, the laundry from the rooms of her employers and their grown up children at
four in the morning while they were asleep.
And it did not make sense, if Alfaros testimony were to be believed that Webb, who was so careful
and clever that he called Biong to go to the Vizconde residence at 2 a.m. to clean up the evidence
against him and his group, would bring his bloodied shirt home and put it in the hamper for
laundrywoman Gaviola to collect and wash at 4 a.m. as was her supposed habit.
Lolita De Birrer was accused Biongs girlfriend around the time the Vizconde massacre took place.
Birrer testified that she was with Biong playing mahjong from the evening of June 29, 1991 to the
early morning of June 30, when Biong got a call at around 2 a.m. This prompted him, according to
De Birrer, to leave and go to BF. Someone sitting at the backseat of a taxi picked him up. When
Biong returned at 7 a.m. he washed off what looked like dried blood from his fingernails. And he
threw away a foul-smelling handkerchief. She also saw Biong take out a knife with aluminum cover
from his drawer and hid it in his steel cabinet.21
The security guard at Pitong Daan did not notice any police investigator flashing a badge to get into
the village although Biong supposedly came in at the unholy hour of two in the morning. His
departure before 7 a.m. also remained unnoticed by the subdivision guards. Besides, if he had
cleaned up the crime scene shortly after midnight, what was the point of his returning there on the
following morning to dispose of some of the evidence in the presence of other police investigators
and on-lookers? In fact, why would he steal valuable items from the Vizconde residence on his
return there hours later if he had the opportunity to do it earlier?
At most, Birrers testimony only established Biongs theft of certain items from the Vizconde
residence and gross neglect for failing to maintain the sanctity of the crime scene by moving around
and altering the effects of the crime. Birrers testimony failed to connect Biong's acts to Webb and
the other accused.
Lauro Vizconde testified about how deeply he was affected by the loss of her wife and two
daughters. Carmella spoke to him of a rejected suitor she called "Bagyo," because he was a
Paraaque politicians son. Unfortunately, Lauro did not appear curious enough to insist on finding
out who the rejected fellow was. Besides, his testimony contradicts that of Alfaro who testified that
Carmela and Webb had an on-going relation. Indeed, if Alfaro were to be believed, Carmela wanted
Webb to come to her house around midnight. She even left the kitchen door open so he could enter
the house.
5. The missing corroboration
There is something truly remarkable about this case: the prosecutions core theory that Carmela and
Webb had been sweethearts, that she had been unfaithful to him, and that it was for this reason that
Webb brought his friends to her house to gang-rape her is totally uncorroborated!
For instance, normally, if Webb, a Congressmans son, courted the young Carmela, that would be
news among her circle of friends if not around town. But, here, none of her friends or even those
who knew either of them came forward to affirm this. And if Webb hanged around with her, trying to
win her favors, he would surely be seen with her. And this would all the more be so if they had
become sweethearts, a relation that Alfaro tried to project with her testimony.
But, except for Alfaro, the NBI asset, no one among Carmelas friends or her friends friends would
testify ever hearing of such relationship or ever seeing them together in some popular hangouts in
Paraaque or Makati. Alfaros claim of a five-hour drama is like an alien page, rudely and
unconnectedly inserted into Webb and Carmelas life stories or like a piece of jigsaw puzzle trimmed
to fit into the shape on the board but does not belong because it clashes with the surrounding
pieces. It has neither antecedent nor concomitant support in the verifiable facts of their personal
histories. It is quite unreal.
What is more, Alfaro testified that she saw Carmela drive out of her house with a male passenger,
Mr. X, whom Alfaro thought the way it looked was also Carmelas lover. This was the all-important
reason Webb supposedly had for wanting to harm her. Again, none of Carmelas relatives, friends, or
people who knew her ever testified about the existence of Mr.X in her life. Nobody has come forward
to testify having ever seen him with Carmela. And despite the gruesome news about her death and
how Mr. X had played a role in it, he never presented himself like anyone who had lost a special
friend normally would. Obviously, Mr. X did not exist, a mere ghost of the imagination of Alfaro, the
woman who made a living informing on criminals.
Webbs U.S. Alibi
Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi.
a. The travel preparations
Webb claims that in 1991 his parents, Senator Freddie Webb and his wife, Elizabeth, sent their son
to the United States (U.S.) to learn the value of independence, hard work, and money.22 Gloria
Webb, his aunt, accompanied him. Rajah Tours booked their flight to San Francisco via United
Airlines. Josefina Nolasco of Rajah Tours confirmed that Webb and his aunt used their plane tickets.
Webb told his friends, including his neighbor, Jennifer Claire Cabrera, and his basketball buddy,
Joselito Orendain Escobar, of his travel plans. He even invited them to his despedida party on March
8, 1991 at Faces Disco along Makati Ave.23 On March 8,1991, the eve of his departure, he took
girlfriend Milagros Castillo to a dinner at Bunchums at the Makati Cinema Square. His basketball
buddy Rafael Jose with Tina Calma, a blind date arranged by Webb, joined them. They afterwards
went to Faces Disco for Webb's despedida party. Among those present were his friends Paulo
Santos and Jay Ortega.24
he met Armando Rodriguez with whom he spent time, playing basketball on weekends, watching
movies, and playing billiards.51 In November 1991, Webb met performing artist Gary Valenciano, a
friend of Jack Rodriguez, who was invited for a dinner at the Rodriguezs house. 52 He left the
Rodriguezs home in August 1992, returned to Anaheim and stayed with his aunt Imelda Pagaspas.
He stayed there until he left for the Philippines on October 26, 1992.
d. The second immigration checks
As with his trip going to the U.S., Webb also went through both the U.S. and Philippine immigrations
on his return trip. Thus, his departure from the U.S. was confirmed by the same certifications that
confirmed his entry.53 Furthermore, a Diplomatic Note of the U.S. Department of State with enclosed
letter from Acting Director Debora A. Farmer of the Records Operations, Office of Records of the USINS stated that the Certification dated August 31, 1995 is a true and accurate statement. And when
he boarded his plane, the Passenger Manifest of Philippine Airlines Flight No. 103, 54 certified by
Agnes Tabuena55 confirmed his return trip.
When he arrived in Manila, Webb again went through the Philippine Immigration. In fact, the arrival
stamp and initial on his passport indicated his return to Manila on October 27, 1992. This was
authenticated by Carmelita Alipio, the immigration officer who processed Webbs reentry.56 Upon his
return, in October 1992, Paolo Santos, Joselito Erondain Escobar, and Rafael Jose once again saw
Webb playing basketball at the BF's Phase III basketball court.
e. Alibi versus positive identification
The trial court and the Court of Appeals are one in rejecting as weak Webbs alibi. Their reason is
uniform: Webbs alibi cannot stand against Alfaros positive identification of him as the rapist and
killer of Carmela and, apparently, the killer as well of her mother and younger sister. Because of this,
to the lower courts, Webbs denial and alibi were fabricated.
But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the accused is truly
innocent, he can have no other defense but denial and alibi. So how can such accused penetrate a
mind that has been made cynical by the rule drilled into his head that a defense of alibi is a
hangmans noose in the face of a witness positively swearing, "I saw him do it."? Most judges
believe that such assertion automatically dooms an alibi which is so easy to fabricate. This quick
stereotype thinking, however, is distressing. For how else can the truth that the accused is really
innocent have any chance of prevailing over such a stone-cast tenet?
There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard against slipping into hasty
conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a case. A positive
declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not automatically
cancel out the accuseds claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can make as positive an
identification as a truthful witness can. The lying witness can also say as forthrightly and
unequivocally, "He did it!" without blinking an eye.
Rather, to be acceptable, the positive identification must meet at least two criteria:
First, the positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness. She is credible
who can be trusted to tell the truth, usually based on past experiences with her. Her word has, to one
who knows her, its weight in gold.
And second, the witness story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently
contrived. A witness who testifies about something she never saw runs into inconsistencies and
makes bewildering claims.
Here, as already fully discussed above, Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet the above criteria.
She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience. She had
been hanging around that agency for sometime as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with
criminals and squealing on them. Police assets are often criminals themselves. She was the
prosecutions worst possible choice for a witness. Indeed, her superior testified that she volunteered
to play the role of a witness in the Vizconde killings when she could not produce a man she
promised to the NBI.
And, although her testimony included details, Alfaro had prior access to the details that the
investigators knew of the case. She took advantage of her familiarity with these details to include in
her testimony the clearly incompatible act of Webb hurling a stone at the front door glass frames
even when they were trying to slip away quietlyjust so she can accommodate this crime scene
feature. She also had Ventura rummaging a bag on the dining table for a front door key that nobody
needed just to explain the physical evidence of that bag and its scattered contents. And she had
Ventura climbing the cars hood, risking being seen in such an awkward position, when they did not
need to darken the garage to force open the front doorjust so to explain the darkened light and
foot prints on the car hood.
Further, her testimony was inherently incredible. Her story that Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada,
Rodriguez, and Filart agreed to take their turns raping Carmela is incongruent with their indifference,
exemplified by remaining outside the house, milling under a street light, visible to neighbors and
passersby, and showing no interest in the developments inside the house, like if it was their turn to
rape Carmela. Alfaros story that she agreed to serve as Webbs messenger to Carmela, using up
her gas, and staying with him till the bizarre end when they were practically strangers, also taxes
incredulity.
To provide basis for Webbs outrage, Alfaro said that she followed Carmela to the main road to watch
her let off a lover on Aguirre Avenue. And, inexplicably, although Alfaro had only played the role of
messenger, she claimed leading Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house to gang-rape Carmella,
as if Alfaro was establishing a reason for later on testifying on personal knowledge. Her swing from
an emotion of fear when a woman woke up to their presence in the house and of absolute courage
when she nonetheless returned to become the lone witness to a grim scene is also quite
inexplicable.
Ultimately, Alfaros quality as a witness and her inconsistent, if not inherently unbelievable, testimony
cannot be the positive identification that jurisprudence acknowledges as sufficient to jettison a denial
and an alibi.
f. A documented alibi
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence 57 that (a) he
was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. 58
The courts below held that, despite his evidence, Webb was actually in Paraaque when the
Vizconde killings took place; he was not in the U.S. from March 9, 1991 to October 27, 1992; and if
he did leave on March 9, 1991, he actually returned before June 29, 1991, committed the crime,
erased the fact of his return to the Philippines from the records of the U.S. and Philippine
Immigrations, smuggled himself out of the Philippines and into the U.S., and returned the normal
way on October 27, 1992. But this ruling practically makes the death of Webb and his passage into
the next life the only acceptable alibi in the Philippines. Courts must abandon this unjust and
inhuman paradigm.
If one is cynical about the Philippine system, he could probably claim that Webb, with his fathers
connections, can arrange for the local immigration to put a March 9, 1991 departure stamp on his
passport and an October 27, 1992 arrival stamp on the same. But this is pure speculation since
there had been no indication that such arrangement was made. Besides, how could Webb fix a
foreign airlines passenger manifest, officially filed in the Philippines and at the airport in the U.S. that
had his name on them? How could Webb fix with the U.S. Immigrations record system those two
dates in its record of his travels as well as the dates when he supposedly departed in secret from the
U.S. to commit the crime in the Philippines and then return there? No one has come up with a logical
and plausible answer to these questions.
The Court of Appeals rejected the evidence of Webbs passport since he did not leave the original to
be attached to the record. But, while the best evidence of a document is the original, this means that
the same is exhibited in court for the adverse party to examine and for the judge to see. As Court of
Appeals Justice Tagle said in his dissent,59 the practice when a party does not want to leave an
important document with the trial court is to have a photocopy of it marked as exhibit and stipulated
among the parties as a faithful reproduction of the original. Stipulations in the course of trial are
binding on the parties and on the court.
The U.S. Immigration certification and the computer print-out of Webbs arrival in and departure from
that country were authenticated by no less than the Office of the U.S. Attorney General and the State
Department. Still the Court of Appeals refused to accept these documents for the reason that Webb
failed to present in court the immigration official who prepared the same. But this was unnecessary.
Webbs passport is a document issued by the Philippine government, which under international
practice, is the official record of travels of the citizen to whom it is issued. The entries in that passport
are presumed true.60
The U.S. Immigration certification and computer print-out, the official certifications of which have
been authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, merely validated the arrival and
departure stamps of the U.S. Immigration office on Webbs passport. They have the same
evidentiary value. The officers who issued these certifications need not be presented in court to
testify on them. Their trustworthiness arises from the sense of official duty and the penalty attached
to a breached duty, in the routine and disinterested origin of such statement and in the publicity of
the record.61
The Court of Appeals of course makes capital of the fact that an earlier certification from the U.S.
Immigration office said that it had no record of Webb entering the U.S. But that erroneous first
certification was amply explained by the U.S. Government and Court of Appeals Justice Tagle stated
it in his dissenting opinion, thus:
While it is true that an earlier Certification was issued by the U.S. INS on August 16, 1995 finding "no
evidence of lawful admission of Webb," this was already clarified and deemed erroneous by no less
than the US INS Officials. As explained by witness Leo Herrera-Lim, Consul and Second Secretary
of the Philippine Embassy in Washington D.C., said Certification did not pass through proper
diplomatic channels and was obtained in violation of the rules on protocol and standard procedure
governing such request.
The initial request was merely initiated by BID Commissioner Verceles who directly communicated
with the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, USA, bypassing the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
which is the proper protocol procedure. Mr. Steven Bucher, the acting Chief of the Records Services
Board of US-INS Washington D.C. in his letter addressed to Philip Antweiler, Philippine Desk Officer,
State Department, declared the earlier Certification as incorrect and erroneous as it was "not
exhaustive and did not reflect all available information." Also, Richard L. Huff, Co-Director of the
Office of Information and privacy, US Department of Justice, in response to the appeal raised by
Consul General Teresita V. Marzan, explained that "the INS normally does not maintain records on
individuals who are entering the country as visitors rather than as immigrants: and that a notation
concerning the entry of a visitor may be made at the Nonimmigrant Information system. Since
appellant Webb entered the U.S. on a mere tourist visa, obviously, the initial search could not have
produced the desired result inasmuch as the data base that was looked into contained entries of the
names of IMMIGRANTS and not that of NON-IMMIGRANT visitors of the U.S..62
The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy of travel
documents like the passport as well as the domestic and foreign records of departures and arrivals
from airports. They claim that it would not have been impossible for Webb to secretly return to the
Philippines after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the U.S., and
openly return to the Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel between the U.S. and the
Philippines, said the lower courts took only about twelve to fourteen hours.
If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view, it might as well tear the rules of
evidence out of the law books and regard suspicions, surmises, or speculations as reasons for
impeaching evidence. It is not that official records, which carry the presumption of truth of what they
state, are immune to attack. They are not. That presumption can be overcome by evidence. Here,
however, the prosecution did not bother to present evidence to impeach the entries in Webbs
passport and the certifications of the Philippine and U.S. immigration services regarding his travel to
the U.S. and back. The prosecutions rebuttal evidence is the fear of the unknown that it planted in
the lower courts minds.
7. Effect of Webbs alibi to others
Webbs documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to him, but
also with respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court
accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaros testimony will
not hold together. Webbs participation is the anchor of Alfaros story. Without it, the evidence against
the others must necessarily fall.
CONCLUSION
In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts about the
innocence of the accused since an open mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it
entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send an
innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to ones inner being, like a piece of meat
lodged immovable between teeth.
Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the testimony of an NBI
asset who proposed to her handlers that she take the role of the witness to the Vizconde massacre
that she could not produce?
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December 15, 2005 and
Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and
ACQUITS accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian,
Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which
they were charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They
are ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless they are confined for another lawful
cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for
immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to report the
action he has taken to this Court within five days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 140160. January 13, 2004]
Before the Court are consolidated petitions, the first seeking the review of
the February 9, 1999 Decision and the September 22, 1999 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 39913, which modified the
Decision of Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 23, acting as a
Special Agrarian Court in Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF); and the second for
mandamus to compel the said trial court to issue a writ of execution and to
direct Judge Rodrigo S. Caspillo to inhibit himself from Agrarian Case No. 91
(AF).
[1]
[2]
[3]
[7]
[8]
[9]
On March 29, 1993, DARAB required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda or position papers in support of their claim. Wycoco, however,
decided to forego with the filing of the required pleadings, and instead filed on
April 13, 1993, the instant case for determination of just compensation with
the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 23, docketed as Agrarian
Case No. 91 (AF). Impleaded as party-defendants therein were DAR and
LBP.
[10]
[11]
On April 30, 1993, Wycoco filed a manifestation in VOS Case No. 232 NE
93, informing the DARAB of the pendency of Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF) with
the Cabanatuan court, acting as a special agrarian court. On March 9, 1994,
the DARAB issued an order dismissing the case to give way to the
determination of just compensation by the Cabanatuan court. Pertinent
portion thereof states:
[12]
SO ORDERED.
[13]
Meanwhile, DAR and LBP filed their respective answers before the special
agrarian court in Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF), contending that the valuation of
Wycocos property was in accordance with law and that the latter failed to
exhaust administrative remedies by not participating in the summary
administrative proceedings before the DARAB which has primary jurisdiction
over determination of land valuation.
[14]
After conducting a pre-trial on October 3, 1994, the trial court issued a pretrial order as follows:
The parties manifested that there is no possibility of amicable settlement, neither are
they willing to admit or stipulate on facts, except those contained in the pleadings.
The only issue left is for the determination of just compensation or correct valuation
of the land owned by the plaintiff subject of this case.
The parties then prayed to terminate the pre-trial conference.
AS PRAYED FOR, the pre-trial conference is considered terminated, and instead of
trial, the parties are allowed to submit their respective memoranda.
WHEREFORE, the parties are given twenty (20) days from today within which to file
their simultaneous memoranda, and another ten (10) days from receipt thereof to file
their Reply/Rejoinder, if any, and thereafter, this case shall be deemed submitted for
decision.
SO ORDERED.
[15]
[17]
[18]
The DAR and the LBP filed separate petitions before the Court of
Appeals. The petition brought by DAR on jurisdictional and procedural issues,
docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP No. 39234, was dismissed on May 29, 1997.
The dismissal became final and executory on June 26, 1997. This
prompted Wycoco to file a petition for mandamus before this Court, docketed
as G.R. No. 146733, praying that the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 23, in Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF) be executed, and
that Judge Rodrigo S. Caspillo, the now presiding Judge of said court, be
compelled to inhibit himself from hearing the case.
[19]
[20]
94.1690 hectare land which was found to have been previously sold by
Wycoco to the Republic, thus
WHEREFORE, and conformably with the above, Our decision of February 9, 1999 is
hereby MODIFIED in the sense that the value corresponding to the aforesaid 3.3672
hectares and all the awards appertaining thereto in the decision a quo are ordered
deducted from the totality of the awards granted to the private respondent. In all other
respects, the decision sought to be reconsidered is hereby RE-AFFIRMED and
REITERATED.
SO ORDERED.
[22]
In its petition, LBP contended that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling:
I
The issues for resolution are as follows: (1) Did the Regional Trial Court,
acting as Special Agrarian Court, validly acquire jurisdiction over the instant
case for determination of just compensation? (2) Assuming that it acquired
jurisdiction, was the compensation arrived at supported by evidence? (3) Can
Wycoco compel the DAR to purchase the entire land subject of the voluntary
offer to sell? (4) Were the awards of interest and damages for unrealized
profits valid?
Anent the issue of jurisdiction, the laws in point are Sections 50 and 57 of
Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) which,
in pertinent part, provide:
Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
[25]
Section 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just
Compensation. The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary
determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board
but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special
Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party
shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 405, Series of 1990, the Land
Bank of the Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of determining
the value of lands placed under land reform and the just compensation to be
paid for their taking. Through a notice of voluntary offer to sell (VOS)
submitted by the landowner, accompanied by the required documents, the
[26]
DAR evaluates the application and determines the lands suitability for
agriculture. The LBP likewise reviews the application and the supporting
documents and determines the valuation of the land. Thereafter, the DAR
issues the Notice of Land Valuation to the landowner. In both voluntary and
compulsory acquisition, where the landowner rejects the offer, the DAR opens
an account in the name of the landowner and conducts a summary
administrative proceeding. If the landowner disagrees with the valuation, the
matter may be brought to the Regional Trial Court acting as a special agrarian
court. This in essence is the procedure for the determination of just
compensation.
[27]
It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners. This original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC
would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials original
jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate court for the
review of administrative decisions. Thus, although the new rules speak of directly
appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts,
it is clear from Sec. 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such
cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to
convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into an appellate jurisdiction would be
contrary to Sec. 57 and therefore would be void. Thus, direct resort to the
SAC [Special Agrarian Court] by private respondent is valid. (Emphasis supplied)
[29]
In the case at bar, therefore, the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction
over Wycocos complaint for determination of just compensation. It must be
stressed that although no summary administrative proceeding was held before
the DARAB, LBP was able to perform its legal mandate of initially determining
the value of Wycocos land pursuant to Executive Order No. 405, Series of
1990. What is more, DAR and LBPs conformity to the pre-trial order which
[32]
In arriving at the valuation of Wycocos land, the trial court took judicial
notice of the alleged prevailing market value of agricultural lands in Licab,
Nueva Ecija without apprising the parties of its intention to take judicial notice
thereof. Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 3. Judicial Notice, When Hearing Necessary. During the trial, the court, on its
own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial
notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After trial and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative, or
on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be
heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.
Inasmuch as the valuation of the property of Wycoco is the very issue in
the case at bar, the trial court should have allowed the parties to present
evidence thereon instead of practically assuming a valuation without basis.
While market value may be one of the bases of determining just
compensation, the same cannot be arbitrarily arrived at without considering
the factors to be appreciated in arriving at the fair market value of the
property e.g., the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its
size, shape, location, as well as the tax declarations thereon. Since these
factors were not considered, a remand of the case for determination of just
compensation is necessary. The power to take judicial notice is to be
exercised by courts with caution especially where the case involves a vast
tract of land. Care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every
reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the
[33]
negative. To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely
another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if
knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court
assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But
judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the
judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to
make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known,
the basis of his action.
[34]
Anent the third issue, the DAR cannot be compelled to purchase the entire
property voluntarily offered by Wycoco. The power to determine whether a
parcel of land may come within the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program is essentially lodged with the DAR. That Wycoco will suffer
damages by the DARs non-acquisition of the approximately 10 hectare
portion of the entire land which was found to be not suitable for agriculture is
no justification to compel DAR to acquire the whole area.
We find Wycocos claim for payment of interest partly meritorious. In Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, this Court struck down as void
DAR Administrative Circular No. 9, Series of 1990, which provides for the
opening of trust accounts in lieu of the deposit in cash or in bonds
contemplated in Section 16 (e) of RA 6657.
[35]
It is very explicit from [Section 16 (e)] that the deposit must be made only in
cash or in LBP bonds. Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the
deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a trust
account among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at
least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced
that a trust account is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA
6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term deposit.
xxx
xxx
xxx
In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its powers to enact
rules and regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis
in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as compensation
for his property because, as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very
specific that the deposit must be made only in cash or in LBP bonds. In the same
vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these
implementing regulations can not outweigh the clear provision of the law. Respondent
court therefore did not commit any error in striking down Administrative Circular No.
9 for being null and void.
[36]
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
All trust accounts issued pursuant to Administrative Order No. 1, S. 1993 covering
landholdings not yet transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines as of
July 5, 1996 shall immediately be converted to deposit accounts in the name of the
landowners concerned.
All Provincial Agrarian Reform Officers and Regional Directors are directed to
immediately inventory the claim folders referred to in the preceding paragraph,
wherever they may be found and request the LBP to establish the requisite deposit
under this Administrative Order and to issue a new certification to that effect. The
Original Certificate of Trust Deposit previously issued should be attached to the
request of the DAR in order that the same may be replaced with a new one.
All previously established Trust Deposits which served as the basis for the transfer of
the landowners title to the Republic of the Philippines shall likewise be converted to
deposits in cash and in bonds. The Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution shall
coordinate with the LBP for this purpose.
In light of the foregoing, the trust account opened by LBP in the name of
Wycoco as the mode of payment of just compensation should be converted to
a deposit account. Such conversion should be retroactive in application in
order to rectify the error committed by the DAR in opening a trust account and
to grant the landowners the benefits concomitant to payment in cash or LBP
bonds prior to the ruling of the Court in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals. Otherwise, petitioners right to payment of just and valid
compensation for the expropriation of his property would be violated. The
[37]
[39]
Accordingly, the just compensation due Wycoco should bear 12% interest
per annum from the time LBP opened a trust account in his name up to the
time said account was actually converted into cash and LBP bonds deposit
accounts. The basis of the 12% interest would be the just compensation that
would be determined by the Special Agrarian Court upon remand of the
instant case. In the same vein, the amount determined by the Special
Agrarian Court would also be the basis of the interest income on the cash and
bond deposits due Wycoco from the time of the taking of the property up to
the time of actual payment of just compensation.
The award of actual damages for unrealized profits should be
deleted. The amount of loss must not only be capable of proof, but must be
proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. The claim must be premised
upon competent proof or upon the best evidence obtainable, such as receipts
or other documentary proof. None having been presented in the instant case,
the claim for unrealized profits cannot be granted.
[40]
SECOND DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
-versus-
ANTONIO
LAUGA
Y
PINA ALIASTERIO,
Accused-Appellant.
Promulgated:
March 15, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before Us for final review is the trial courts conviction of the appellant for
the rape of his thirteen-year old daughter.
Consistent with the ruling of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto,[1] the real
name and the personal circumstances of the victim, and any other information
tending to establish or compromise her identity, including those of her immediate
family or household members, are not disclosed in this decision.
The Facts
their grandmother and uncle of the incident,[22] after which, they sought the
assistance of Moises Boy Banting.[23]
Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his
underwear.[24] He invited appellant to the police station, [25] to which appellant
obliged. At the police outpost, he admitted to him that he raped AAA because he
was unable to control himself.[26]
The following day, AAA submitted herself to physical examination.
Dra. Josefa Arlita L. Alsula, Municipal Health Officer of x x x, Bukidnon,
issued the Medical Certificate, which reads:
[27]
On the other hand, only appellant testified for the defense. He believed that
the charge against him was ill-motivated because he sometimes physically abuses
his wife in front of their children after engaging in a heated argument, [29] and beats
the children as a disciplinary measure.[30] He went further to narrate how his day
was on the date of the alleged rape.
He alleged that on 15 March 2000, there was no food prepared for him at
lunchtime.[31] Shortly after, AAA arrived.[32] She answered back when confronted.
[33]
This infuriated him that he kicked her hard on her buttocks.[34]
Appellant went back to work and went home again around 3 oclock in the
afternoon.[35] Finding nobody at home,[36] he prepared his dinner and went to sleep.
[37]
Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a
bantay bayan, the confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not
assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such requirement.[54]
The case of People v. Malngan[55] is the authority on the scope of the
Miranda doctrine provided for under Article III, Section 12(1)[56] and (3)[57] of the
Constitution. In Malngan, appellant questioned the admissibility of her
extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman and a neighbor of the
private complainant. This Court distinguished. Thus:
Arguably, the barangay tanods,
including
the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may be deemed as
law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section
12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought
to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a
suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses
x x x. She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the
rights guaranteed by x x x [the] Constitution should have already been
observed or applied to her. Accused-appellants confession to Barangay
Chairman x x x was made in response to the interrogation made by the
latter admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant
of her rights under the Constitution or done in the presence of
counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to
Barangay Chairman x x x, as well as the lighter found x x x in her bag
are inadmissible in evidence against her x x x.
[But such does] not automatically lead to her acquittal. x x x [T]he
constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to
those not elicited through questioning by the police or their
agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally
admits x x x as x x x in the case at bar when accused-appellant admitted
to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors x x x [of the private
complainant].[58] (Emphasis supplied)
Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this Court needs to
ascertain whether or not a bantay bayan may be deemed a law enforcement
officer within the contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution.
In People of the Philippines v. Buendia,[59] this Court had the occasion to
mention the nature of a bantay bayan, that is, a group of male residents living in
[the] area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their community[,which
is] an accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP.[60]
Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive
Order No. 309 issued on 11 November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order
Committee in each barangay shall be organized to serve as implementing arm of
the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at the Barangay level.[61] The
composition of the Committee includes, among others: (1) the Punong
Barangay as Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a
Member of theLupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at least three
(3) Members of existing Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch
Groups or a Non Government Organization Representative well-known in his
community.[62]
This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer
organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the bantay bayan,
are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions relating to the
preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the
legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of
duties and responsibilities delegated to a bantay bayan, particularly on the
authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color
of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to
his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the
Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.
We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was
taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.
Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of
the appellant was not deduced solely from the assailed extrajudicial confession but
from the confluence of evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[63]
Credibility of the Witnesses for the Prosecution
Appellant assails the inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her
brother BBB. AAA testified that BBB accompanied her to the house of their
grandmother. Thereafter, they, together with her relatives, proceeded to look for a
bantay bayan. On the other hand, BBB testified that he brought her sister to the
house of their bantay bayan after he learned of the incident.
Citing Bartocillo v. Court of Appeals,[64] appellant argues that where the
testimonies of two key witnesses cannot stand together, the inevitable conclusion is
that one or both must be telling a lie, and their story a mere concoction.[65]
The principle, however, is not applicable in the case at bar. In Bartocillo, the
two testimonies could not simply stand together because:
On one hand, if we are to believe Susan, Orlando could not have
possibly seen the hacking incident since he had accompanied Vicente
home. On the other hand, if we are to accept the testimony of Orlando,
then Susan could not have possibly witnessed the hacking incident since
she was with Vicente at that time.
Here, the testimony of AAA does not run contrary to that of BBB. Both
testified that they sought the help of a bantay bayan. Their respective
testimonies differ only as to when the help was sought for, which this Court could
well attribute to the nature of the testimony of BBB, a shortcut version of AAAs
testimony that dispensed with a detailed account of the incident.
At any rate, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the assailed
inconsistency is too trivial to affect the veracity of the testimonies. [66] In fact,
inconsistencies which refer to minor, trivial or inconsequential circumstances even
strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as they erase doubts that such
testimonies have been coached or rehearsed.[67]
Appellants contention that AAA charged him of rape only because she bore
grudges against him is likewise unmeritorious. This Court is not dissuaded from
giving full credence to the testimony of a minor complainant by motives of feuds,
resentment or revenge.[68] As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals:
Indeed, mere disciplinary chastisement is not strong enough to
make daughters in a Filipino family invent a charge that would not only
bring shame and humiliation upon them and their families but also bring
their fathers into the gallows of death. [69] The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that it is unbelievable for a daughter to charge her own
father with rape, exposing herself to the ordeal and embarrassment of a
public trial and subjecting her private parts to examination if such
heinous crime was not in fact committed. [70] No person, much less a
woman, could attain such height of cruelty to one who has sired her, and
from whom she owes her very existence, and for which she naturally
feels loving and lasting gratefulness. [71] Even when consumed with
revenge, it takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young
woman to concoct a story which would put her own father to jail for the
most of his remaining life and drag the rest of the family including
herself to a lifetime of shame. [72] It is highly improbable for [AAA]
against whom no proof of sexual perversity or loose morality has been
shown to fake charges much more against her own father. In fact her
testimony is entitled to greater weight since her accusing words were
directed against a close relative.[73]
Elements of Rape
Having established the credibility of the witnesses for the
prosecution, We now examine the applicability of the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 [74] to
the case at bar.
The law provides, in part, that rape is committed, among others, [b]y a man
who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat or
intimidation.[75] The death penalty shall be imposed if it is committed with
aggravating/qualifying circumstances, which include, [w]hen the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent.[76]
The consistent and forthright testimony of AAA detailing how she was
raped, culminating with the penetration of appellants penis into her vagina,
suffices to prove that appellant had carnal knowledge of her. When a woman states
that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape
was committed.[77] Further, when such testimony corresponds with medical
findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that the essential requisites of carnal
knowledge have been established.[78]
The Court of Appeals pointed out that the element of force or intimidation is
not essential when the accused is the father of the victim, inasmuch as his superior
moral ascendancy or influence substitutes for violence and intimidation. [79] At any
rate, AAA was actually threatened by appellant with his fist and a knife allegedly
placed above AAAs head.[80]
It may be added that the self-serving defense of appellant cannot prevail
over the positive and straightforward testimony of AAA. Settled is the rule that,
alibi is an inherently weak defense that is viewed with suspicion because it is easy
to fabricate.[81] Alibi and denial must be supported by strong corroborative
evidence in order to merit credibility.[82] Moreover, for the defense of alibi to
prosper, the accused must establish two elements (1) he was not at
the locus delicti at the time the offense was committed; and (2) it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of its commission. [83] Appellant
failed in this wise.
Aggravating/Qualifying Circumstances
The presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship
with the offender in the instant case has likewise been adequately established. Both
qualifying circumstances were specifically alleged in the Information, stipulated on
and admitted during the pre-trial conference, and testified to by both parties in their
respective testimonies. Also, such stipulation and admission, as correctly pointed
out by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court because they are judicial
admissions within the contemplation of Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules
of Court. It provides:
Penalty
Finally, in increasing the amount of civil indemnity and damages each
from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, the Court of Appeals correctly considered
controlling jurisprudence to the effect that where, as here, the rape is committed
with any of the qualifying/aggravating circumstances warranting the imposition of
the death penalty, the victim is entitled to P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity ex delicto[84] and P75,000.00 as moral damages.[85] However, the award
of exemplary damages should have been increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.
[86]
Also, the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death was correctly imposed
considering that the imposition of the death penalty upon appellant would have
been appropriate were it not for the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, or An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.[87] We further
affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals on appellants non-eligibility for
parole. Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 clearly provides that persons convicted
of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced
to reclusion perpetua by reason of the law, shall not be eligible for parole.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September
2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00456-MIN is hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant
Antonio Lauga is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape, and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole and to pay AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
PHILIPPINE
TELEPHONE
COMPANY,
LONG
DISTANCE
Petitioner,
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
- versus -
Promulgated:
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE,
Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT),
claiming that it terminated in 1995 the employment of several rank-and-file,
supervisory, and executive employees due to redundancy; that in compliance with
labor law requirements, it paid those separated employees separation pay and other
benefits; and that as employer and withholding agent, it deducted from the
separation pay withholding taxes in the total amount of P23,707,909.20 which it
remitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), filed on November 20, 1997
with the BIR a claim for tax credit or refund of the P23,707,909.20, invoking
Section 28(b)(7)(B) of the 1977 National Internal Revenue Code [1] which excluded
from gross income
[a]ny amount received by an official or employee or by his
heirs from the employer as a consequence of separation of such
official or employee from the service of the employer due to death,
As the BIR took no action on its claim, PLDT filed a claim for judicial
refund before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
In its Answer,[3] respondent, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
contended that PLDT failed to show proof of payment of separation pay and
remittance of the alleged withheld taxes.[4]
PLDT later manifested on March 19, 1998 that it was reducing its claim
to P16,439,777.61 because a number of the separated employees opted to file their
respective claims for refund of taxes erroneously withheld from their separation
pay.[5]
PLDT thereafter retained Sycip Gorres Velayo and Company (SGV) to
conduct a special audit examination of various receipts, invoices and other long
accounts, and moved to avail of the procedure laid down in CTA Circular No. 1-95,
as amended by CTA Circular No. 10-97, allowing the presentation of a certification
of an independent certified public accountant in lieu of voluminous documents.
[6]
The CTA thereupon appointed Amelia Cabal (Cabal) of SGV as Commissioner
of the court.[7] Cabals audit report, which formed part of PLDTs evidence,
[8]
adjusted PLDTs claim to P6,679,167.72.[9]
By Decision[10] of July 25, 2000, the CTA denied PLDTs claim on the
ground that it failed to sufficiently prove that the terminated employees received
separation pay and that taxes were withheld therefrom and remitted to the BIR.[11]
PLDT filed a Motion for New Trial/Reconsideration, praying for an
opportunity to present the receipts and quitclaims executed by the employees and
prove that they received their separation pay.[12] Justifying its motion, PLDT
alleged that
x x x [t]hese Receipts and Quitclaims could not be presented during
the course of the trial despite diligent efforts, the files having been
misplaced and were only recently found. Through excusable mistake
PLDT argues against the need for proof that the employees received their
separation pay and proffers the issue in the case in this wise:
It is not essential to prove that the separation pay benefits were
actually received by the terminated employees. This issue is not for
the CTA, nor the Court of Appeals to resolve, but is a matter that falls
within the competence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Labor and Employment and/or the National Labor Relations
Commission. x x x
Proving, or submitting evidence to prove, receipt of separation
pay would have been material, relevant and necessary if its
deductibility as a business expense has been put in issue. But this has
never been an issue in the instant case. The issue is whether or not the
withholding taxes, which Petitioner remitted to the BIR, should be
refunded for having been erroneously withheld and paid to the latter.
For as long as there is no legal basis for the payment of taxes to
the BIR, the taxpayer is entitled to claim a refund therefore. Hence,
any taxes withheld from separation benefits and paid to the BIR
constitute erroneous payment of taxes and should therefore, be
refunded/credited to the taxpayer/withholding agent, regardless of
whether or not separation pay was actually paid to the concerned
employees.[21] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
PLDTs position does not lie. Tax refunds, like tax exemptions, are
construed strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority,
and thetaxpayer bears the burden of establishing the factual basis of his claim for a
refund.[22]
Under the earlier quoted portion of Section 28 (b)(7)(B) of the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1977 (now Section 32(B)6(b) of the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1997), it is incumbent on PLDT as a claimant for refund on
behalf of each of the separated employees to show that each employee did
x x x reflect in his or its own return the income upon which any
creditable tax is required to be withheld at the source. Only when
there is an excess of the amount of tax so withheld over the tax due on
the payees return can a refund become possible.
A taxpayer must thus do two things to be able to successfully
make a claim for the tax refund: (a) declare the income payments it
received as part of its gross income and (b) establish the fact of
withholding. On this score, the relevant revenue regulation provides
as follows:
Section 10. Claims for tax credit or refund.
Claims for tax credit or refund of income tax deducted
and withheld on income payments shall be given due
course only when it is shown on the return that the
income payment received was declared as part of the
gross income and the fact of withholding is established
by a copy of the statement duly issued by the payer to
the payee (BIR Form No. 1743.1) showing the amount
paid
and
the
amount
of
tax
withheld
therefrom.[23] (Underscoring supplied)
In fine, PLDT must prove that the employees received the income payments
as part of gross income and the fact of withholding.
The CTA found that PLDT failed to establish that the redundant employees
actually received separation pay and that it withheld taxes therefrom and remitted
the same to the BIR, thus:
With respect to the redundant rank and file employees final
payment/terminal pay x x x, the cash salary vouchers relative
thereto have no payment acknowledgement receipts. Inasmuch as
these cash vouchers were not signed by the respective employees to
prove actual receipt of payment, the same merely serves as proofs of
authorization for payment and not actual payment by the Petitioner of
the redundant rank and file employees separation pay and other
benefits. In other words, Petitioner failed to prove that the rank and
file employees were actually paid separation pay and other benefits.
Exhibit
D
E to E-3-d
E-6
E-6-a
E-6-b to E-6-e
The appellate court affirmed the foregoing findings of the CTA. Apropos is
this Courts ruling in Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Court of Appeals:[25]
The findings of fact of the CTA, a special court exercising
particular expertise on the subject of tax, are generally regarded as
final, binding, and conclusive upon this Court, especially if these are
substantially similar to the findings of the C[ourt of] A[ppeals] which
is normally the final arbiter of questions of fact. [26] (Underscoring
supplied)
While SGV certified that it had been able to trace the remittance of the
withheld taxes summarized in the C[ash] S[alary] V[ouchers] to the Monthly
Remittance Return of Income Taxes Withheld for the appropriate period covered
by the final payment made to the concerned executives, supervisors, and rank and
file staff members of PLDT,[27] the same cannot be appreciated in PLDTs favor as
the courts cannot verify such claim. While the records of the case contain the
Alphabetical List of Employee from Whom Taxes Were Withheld for the year 1995
and the Monthly Remittance Returns of Income Taxes Withheld for December
1995, the documents from which SGV traced the former to the latter have not
been presented. Failure to present these documents is fatal to PLDTs case. For
the relevant portions of CTA Circular 1-95 instruct:
summary and schedules were based, the court cannot verify the
authenticity and veracity of the independent auditors
conclusions. (Italics in the original; Emphasis and underscoring
supplied).[30]
On the denial of PLDTs motion for new trial: new trial may be granted on
either of these grounds:
a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary
prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which
such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights; or
b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial, and which if
presented would probably alter the result. [31]
Newly discovered evidence as a basis of a motion for new trial should be supported
by affidavits of the witnesses by whom such evidence is expected to be given, or by
duly authenticated documents which are proposed to be introduced in evidence.
[32]
And the grant or denial of a new trial is, generally speaking, addressed to the
sound discretion of the court which cannot be interfered with unless a clear abuse
thereof is shown.[33] PLDT has not shown any such abuse, however.
The affirmance by the appellate court of the CTAs denial of PLDTs motion
for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, viz:
xxxx
The petitioner appended to its Motion for New Trial, etc. ,
unnotarized copies of Receipts, Release and Quitclaim bearing
the signatures purportedly of those employees for whom the Petitioner
filed the Petition before the CTA, dated December 28, 1995
x
[34]
x x[.]
xxxx
is thus in order.
Finally, on PLDTs plea for a liberal application of the rules of procedure,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. A. Soriano Corporation [37] furnishes
acaveat on the matter:
[36]
Perhaps realizing that under the Rules the said report cannot be
admitted as newly discovered evidence, the petitioner invokes a
liberal application of the Rules. He submits that Section 8 of the
Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals declaring that the latter shall not
be governed strictly by technical rules of evidence mandates a
relaxation of the requirements of new trial on the basis of newly
discovered evidence. This is a dangerous proposition and one which
we refuse to countenance. We cannot agree more with the Court of
Appeals when it stated thus,
application of the Rules. For it should not be forgotten that the first
and fundamental concern of the rules of procedure is to secure a just
determination of every action. In the case at bench, a liberal
application of the rules of procedure to suit the petitioners purpose
would clearly pave the way for injustice as it would be rewarding an
act of negligence with undeserved tolerance. [38] (Underscoring
supplied)
At all events, the alleged newly discovered evidence that PLDT seeks to
offer does not suffice to establish its claim for refund, as it would still have to
comply with Revenue Regulation 6-85 by proving that the redundant employees,
on whose behalf it filed the claim for refund, declared the separation pay received
as part of their gross income. Furthermore, the same Revenue Regulation requires
that the fact of withholding is established by a copy of the statement duly issued
by the payor to the payee (BIR Form No. 1743.1) showing the amount paid and the
amount of tax withheld therefrom.
FIRST DIVISION
SILKAIR
LTD.,
(SINGAPORE)
PTE.
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus -
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE,
Promulgated:
Respondent.
February 25, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
xxxx
Philippine
between
ART. 4. x x x.
xxxx
II
Furthermore, Section 204(C) of the NIRC provides a twoyear prescriptive period within which a taxpayer may file an
administrative claim for refund or tax credit, to wit:
xxxx
been rendered unfit for use and refund their value upon
proof of destruction. No credit or refund of taxes or
penalties shall be allowed unless the taxpayer files
in writing with the Commissioner a claim for credit
or refund within two (2) years after the payment of
the tax or penalty: Provided, however, That a return
filed showing an overpayment shall be considered as a
written claim for credit or refund. (Emphasis supplied.)
Time and again, we have held that tax refunds are in the
nature of tax exemptions which represent a loss of revenue to the
government. These exemptions, therefore, must not rest on
vague, uncertain or indefinite inference, but should be granted
only by a clear and unequivocal provision of law on the basis of
language too plain to be mistaken.[24] Such exemptions must be
strictly construed against the taxpayer, as taxes are the lifeblood
of the government.
WHEREFORE,
the
instant
petition
for
review
is DENIED. We AFFIRM the assailed Decision dated May 27,
2008 and the Resolution dated September 5, 2008 of the Court of
Tax Appeals En Banc in C.T.A. E.B. No. 267. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.