Penera vs. Commission on Elections, et al.

G.R. No. 181613

25 November 2009
(motion for reconsideration)
Facts:
On 11 September 2009, the Supreme Court affirmed the COMELECs
decision to
disqualify petitioner Rosalinda Penera (Penera) as mayoralty
candidate in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, for engaging in election
campaign outside the campaign period, in violation of Section 80 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code).
Penera moved for reconsideration, arguing that she was not yet a
candidate at the time of the supposed premature campaigning, since
under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436 (the law authorizing the
COMELEC to use an automated election system for the process of
voting, counting of votes, and canvassing/consolidating the results of
the national and local elections), as amended by Republic Act No.
9369, one is not officially a candidate until the start of the campaign
period.
Issue:
Whether or not Peneras disqualification for engaging in premature
campaigning should be reconsidered.
Holding:
Granting Peneras motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court En
Banc held that
Penera did not engage in premature campaigning and should, thus,
not be disqualified as a mayoralty candidate. The Court said
(A) The Courts 11 September 2009 Decision (or the assailed
Decision) considered a
person who files a certificate of candidacy already a candidate even
before the start of the campaign period. This is contrary to the clear
intent and letter of Section 15 of Republic Act 8436, as amended,
which states that a person who files his certificate of candidacy will
only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period,
and unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take
effect only upon the start of such campaign period.
Thus, applying said law:
(1) The effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as
to a
candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the
campaign
period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.
(2) Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an election offense only for
acts done during the campaign period, not before. In other words,
election
offenses can be committed by a candidate only upon the start of the
campaign
period. Before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses
cannot be
so committed. Since the law is clear, the Court has no recourse but to
apply it. The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting
remedial measures, is not the Court but the Legislature.
(B) Contrary to the assailed Decision, Section 15 of R.A. 8436, as
amended, does not
provide that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the
campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the
start of the campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan
political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are
temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of the
campaign period. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision,
which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and
speech, would be void for vagueness.
(C) That Section 15 of R.A. 8436 does not expressly state that
campaigning before the start of the campaign period is lawful, as the
assailed Decision asserted, is of no moment. It is a basic principle of
law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law.
The mere fact that the law does not declare an act unlawful ipso facto
means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to
declare in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that partisan political activities
before the start of the campaign period are lawful. It is sufficient for
Congress to state that any unlawful act or omission applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period.
The only inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if done
before the start of the campaign period, are lawful.
(D) The Courts 11 September 2009 Decision also reversed Lanot vs.
COMELEC (G.R.
No. 164858; 16 November 2006). Lanot was decided on the ground
that one who files a
certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the

campaign period. This ground was based on the deliberations of the

legislators who explained that the early deadline for filing certificates of
candidacy under R.A. 8436 was set only to afford time to prepare the
machine-readable ballots, and they intended to preserve the existing
election periods, such that one who files his certificate of candidacy to
meet the early deadline will still not be considered as a candidate.
When Congress amended R.A. 8436, Congress decided to expressly
incorporate
the
Lanot doctrine into law, thus, the provision in Section 15 of R.A. 8436
that a person who files his certificate of candidacy shall be considered
a candidate only at the start of the campaign period. Congress wanted
to insure that no person filing a certificate of candidacy under the early
deadline required by the automated election system would be
disqualified or penalized for any partisan political act done before the
start of the campaign period. This provision cannot be annulled by the
Court except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality.
The assailed Decision, however, did not claim that this provision is
unconstitutional. In fact, the assailed Decision considered the entire
Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision was self-contradictory
reversing Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality of the said
provision.
Quinto V. COMELEC
COMELEC issued a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed
their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions.
FACTS:
Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a
resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of
candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions. In this defense,
the COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of
R.A. 9369.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.
HELD:
NO.
In the Farias case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006
repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for giving
undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with appointive
officials. Incidentally, the Court upheld the substantial distinctions
between the two and pronounced that there was no violation of the
equal protection clause.
However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on the
equal protection clause was an obiter dictum since the issue raised
therein was against the repealing clause. It didnt squarely challenge
Sec. 66.
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective
officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a valid classification, the proviso
does not comply with the second requirement that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use
of a governmental position to promote ones candidacy, or even to
wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate. The measure
is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of
the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of
official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than
the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the
proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while
still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of
duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to
their office work.
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive
posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in
government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will
also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his certificate
of candidacy for the election. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is
unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield
influence in the political world.
The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices,
whether they be partisan or non partisan in character, whether they be
in the national, municipal or brgy. level. Congress has not shown a
compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on
such a sweeping scale.

Marquez vs COMELEC GR 112889 (April 18, 1995)

Posted on October 3, 2012

GR
No.
112889
243
SCRA
538
April 18, 1995
FACTS:
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate in the Province of Quezon
filed a petition for certiorari praying for the reversal of the COMELEC
Resolution which dismissed his petition for quo warranto against
Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from justice.
It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of
candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten (10) counts of
insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending
before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of
Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court
for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent
on account of his alleged flight from that country.
Petitioners subsequent recourse (in G.R. No. 105310) from the
COMELECs May 8, 1992 resolution was dismissed without prejudice,
however, to the filing in due time of a possible post-election quo
warranto proceeding against private respondent.

Issue:
Whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by
operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to
have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.
Held:
The Court ruled in favor of Capco. The term served must therefore be
one for which the official concerned was elected. If he is not serving a
term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the
service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered
to have fully served the term notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation
of office prior to its expiration. There is a difference between the case
of a vice-mayor and that of a member of the House of Representatives
who succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is
removed from office. The vice-mayor succeeds to the mayorship by
operation of law. On the other hand, the Representative is elected to fill
the vacancy. In a real sense, therefore, such representative serves a
term for which he was elected. To consider Capco to have served the
first term in full (when he succeeded the mayorship upon demise of
Cesar Borja) and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection
would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of
the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. Hence, the
petition was dismissed.

Before the 11th May 1992 elections, petitioner filed a petition with the
COMELEC for cancellation of respondents CoC on account of the
candidates disqualification under Sec. 40 (e) of the LGC.

Adormeo vs Comelec

Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29

May 1992. Forthwith, petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings
(EPC 92-28) against private respondent before the COMELEC.

Ramon Talaga, Jr. served as mayor of Lucena City during terms 19921995 and 1995-1998. During the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to Bernard
G. Tagarao. However, before Tagaraos 1998-2001 term ended, a
recall election was conducted in May 2000 wherein Talaga won and
served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001. When Talaga
ran for mayor in 2001, his candidacy was challenged on the ground he
had already served as mayor for three consecutive terms for violation
of the three term-limit rule.

ISSUE:
Whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy (and to date), is said to be facing a criminal
charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant for his arrest
comes within the term fugitive from justice contemplated by Section
40(e) of the LGC and is, therefore, disqualified from being a candidate
for, and thereby ineligible from holding on to, an elective local office.
HELD:
Section 40(e) of the LGC (RA 7160) provide that a Fugitive from
justice in criminal cases here and abroad are disqualified from
running for any elective local position.
It has been held that construction placed upon law by the officials in
charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight
(Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA
166,181). However, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in
an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An
administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the
law but must remain congruent to it.
The confinement of the term fugitive from justice in Article 73 of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC of 1991 to refer only to a
person who has been convicted by final judgment is an inordinate
and undue circumscription of the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on
whether or not private respondent is in fact a fugitive from justice as
such term must be interpreted and applied in the light of the Courts
opinion. The omission is understandable since the COMELEC
outrightly dismissed the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead
of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight
Committee. The Court, not being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to
remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this
unresolved factual matter.
Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC GR 133495 (September 3, 1998)
Posted on October 4, 2012
G.R. No. 133495; 295 SCRA 157
September 3, 1998
Facts:
Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected Vice Mayor of Pateros on January 18,
1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he
became Mayor upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May
11, 1992, he ran and was elected Mayor for a term of three years
which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was re-elected
Mayor for another term of three years ending July 30, 1998. On March
27, 1998, Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Pateros
relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin Borja, Jr.,
who was also a candidate for Mayor, sought Capcos disqualification
on the theory that the latter would already have served as mayor for
three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would thereafter be
ineligible to serve for another term after that. The COMELEC ruled in
favor of Capco saying that In both the Constitution and the Local
Government Code, the three-term limitation refers to the term of office
for which the local official was elected. It made no reference to
succession to an office to which he was not elected. Capco won in the
elections against Borja.

Facts:

COMELEC on April of 2001 found Talaga as disqualified to run for

mayor. Talaga filed MR which COMELEC granted. Talaga was then
elected Mayor.
Issue:
WON Talaga was disqualified to run as mayor given that he had
already served two full terms and he won in 2000 recall elections.
Held:
No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to
the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same
elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has
served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also
have
been
elected
to
the
sameposition for
the
same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
For nearly two years Talaga was a private citizen. The continuity of his
mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. The time
between his second term and the recall election is
sufficient interruption. Thus, there was no three consecutive terms as
contemplated in the disqualifications in the LGC.
Talaga only served two consecutive full terms. There was a disruption
when he was defeated in the 1998 elections. His election during the
2000 recall election is not a continuation of his two previous terms
which could constitute his third term thereby barring him for running for
a fourth term. Victory in the 2000 recall election is not the voluntary
renunciation contemplated by the law. (Adormeo vs Comelec, G.R.
No. 147927. February 4, 2002)

The remainder of Tagaraos term after the recall election during

which Talaga served as mayor should not be considered for purposes
of applying the three-term limit rule. The Court emphasized that the
continuity of Talagas mayorship was disrupted by his defeat during the
1998 elections.
Dizon vs Comelec
FACTS:
Roberto L. Dizon, a resident and taxpayer of Mabalacat, Pampanga,
filed a case with the COMELEC to disqualify Marino P. Morales, the
incumbent mayor of Mabalacat on the ground that the latter was
elected and had fully served three previous consecutive terms in
violation of Section 43 of the Local Government Code. Dizon alleged
that Morales was municipal mayor in 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004.
Thus, Morales should not have been allowed to have filed his
Certificate of Candidacy on March 2007 for the same position and
same municipality.

Morales, on the other hand, contended that he is still eligible and

qualified to runas mayor of Mabalacat because he was not elected for
the said position in the 1998 elections. He averred that the COMELEC
en banc affirmed the decision of the RTC declaring Anthony D. Dee as
the duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat in the 1998 elections. Thus, he
was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. His term
should be reckoned from 2001. He added that his election in 2004 is
only for his second term.
COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of Morales and denied the
petition. It took judicial notice of SCs ruling in the Rivera case
promulgated on May 9, 2007 where it was held that Morales was
elected as mayor of Mabalacat in 1995, 1998 and 2001
(notwithstanding the RTC Decision in an electoral protest case that the
thenproclamation of Morales was void). The SC ruled in that case that
Morales violated the three-term limit under Section 43 of the LGC.
Hence, Morales was considered not a candidate in the 2004 elections,
and this failure to qualify for the 2004 elections is a gap and allows
him to run again for the same position in 2007 elections.
Dizon filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En
Banc. COMELEC En Banc: affirmed. The three-term limit is not
applicable here for: 1) Morales was not the duly-elected mayor of
Mabalacat for the July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007 term primordially
because he was not even considered a candidate thereat; and 2)
Morales has failed to serve the entire duration of the term of office
because he has already relinquished the disputed office on May 16,
2007 which is more than a month prior to the end of his supposed
term.
ISSUES:
1. WON the period served by Morales in the 2004-2007 term (although he
was ousted from his office as Mayor on May16, 2007) should be
considered his fourth term

However, because of his disqualification, Morales was not the duly

elected mayor for the 2004-2007 term. Neither did Morales hold the
position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full term. Morales cannot be
deemed to have served the full term of 2004-2007 because he was
ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Morales
occupancy of the position of mayor of Mabalacat from 1 July 2004 to
16 May 2007 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing
the three-term limit. Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June
2007 served as a gap for purposes of the three-term limit rule. Thus,
the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively
Morales first term for purposes of the three-term limit rule.
Dizon alleges that Morales "was able to serve his fourth term as
mayor through lengthy litigations. In other words, he was violating the
rule on three-term limit with impunity by the sheer length of litigation
and profit from it even more by raising the technicalities arising
therefrom." To this, we quote our ruling in Lonzanida v. COMELEC:
The respondents harp on the delay in resolving the election protest
between petitioner and his then opponent Alvez which took roughly
about three years and resultantly extended the petitioners incumbency
in an office to which he was not lawfully elected. We note that
such delay cannot be imputed to the petitioner. There is neither
specific allegation nor proof that the delay wasdue to any political
maneuvering on his part to prolong his stay in office.
Moreover, protestant Alvez, was not without legal recourse to move for
the early resolution of the election protest while it was pending before
the regional trial court or to file a motion for the execution of the
regional trial courts decision declaring the position of mayor vacant
and ordering the vice-mayor to assume office while the appeal was
pending with the COMELEC. Such delay which is not here shown to
have been intentionally sought by the petitioner to prolong his stay in
office cannot serve as basis to bar his right to be elected and to serve
his chosen local government post in the succeeding mayoral
election. (Dizon v. Comelec, G.R. No. 182088, January 30, 2009)

2. WON the 2007-2010 term of Morales is his 5th term

HELD:
1. NO. In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court
unseated Morales during his fourth term. We cancelled his Certificate
of Candidacy dated 30 December 2003. This cancellation disqualified
Morales from being a candidate in the May 2004 elections. The votes
cast for Morales were considered stray votes.
Both Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the
Local Government Code state that the term of office of elective local
officials, exceptbarangay officials, shall be three years, and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of
the disqualification: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for
three consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2)
that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
In the Rivera case, we found that Morales was elected as mayor of
Mabalacat for four consecutive terms: 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998, 1
July 1998 to 30 June 2001, 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004, and 1 July
2004 to 30 June 2007. We disqualified Morales from his candidacy in
the May 2004 elections because of the three-term limit. Although
the trial court previously ruled that Moralesproclamation for the 19982001 term was void, there was no interruption of the continuity of
Morales service with respect to the 1998-2001 term because the trial
courts ruling was promulgated only on 4 July 2001, or after the expiry
of the 1998-2001 term.
Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales involuntary severance
from office with respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance
from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. Our decision in the
Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective
immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vicemayors office of
our decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 17
May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice mayor of
the office of the mayor, no matter how short it may seem to Dizon,
interrupted Morales continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not hold
office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. (4th term)

2. Dizon claims that the 2007-2010 term is Morales fifth term in office.
NO. Morales occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the
following periods:
1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998
1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001
1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004, and
1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007.

LONZANIDA versus COMELEC (G.R. No. 135150)

Facts:
Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida duly elected and served two consecutive
terms as municipal mayor ofSan Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8
1995 elections where he ran for the mayoralty position ofSan Antonio,
Zambales and was again proclaimed the winner. He then assumed
office and discharged said duties therof. His proclamation in the year
1995 was however contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez who
later on filed an election protest.
In the year 1997, the RTC of Zambales declared a failure of elections.
After a revision and re-appreciation of the contested ballot, COMELEC
declared Alvarez the duly elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and
ordered petitioner to vacate the post.
On the 11th of May in the year 1998 elections again, Lonzanida ran for
mayor wherein his contender Eufemio Muli filed a petition to disqualify
the former from running for mayor of San Antonio in the 1998 elections
on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same
post.
Lonzanidas assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May
1995, although he was later unseated before the expiration of the term,
should be counted as service for one full term in computing the three
term limit under the Constitution and the Local Government Code.
Issue:
Whether or not tit may be considered that the petitioner had served
three consecutive terms, granting that he did not finish his term in
1995.
Held:
NO. By reason of his involuntary relinquishment of office, petitioner did
not fully serve the 1995 to 1998 mayoral term and became a private
citizen. The said disqualification was primarily intended to forestall the
accumulation of massive political power by an elective local
government official in a given locality in order to perpetuate his tenure
in office. The court set two conditions which must concur in order to
disqualify an elective local official from serving more than three
consecutive terms such as that 1.) the official concerned has been
elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post
and that 2.) he has fully served three consecutive terms.