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A petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of the Guidelines

in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of


Residence[2] (Guidelines) issued on January 31, 2003, by respondent Hermogenes E. Ebdane,
Jr., Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP).
In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech before the members of
the PNP stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crime
incidents. She directed the then PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to suspend the issuance of
Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR). Acting on President Arroyos
directive, respondent Ebdane issued the assailed Guidelines which stated that all PTCFOR are
revoked. Authorized holders of licensed firearms covered with valid PTCFOR may re-apply for a
new PTCFOR in accordance with the certain conditions and all holders of licensed or
government firearms are hereby prohibited from carrying their firearms outside their residence
except in certain cases allowed by the guidelines.
In his petition, Francisco I. Chavez stated that the president has no power or authority,
much less by a mere speech in imposing a gun ban and canceling existing PTCFOR. He stated
that the said speech never invoked police power to justify the gun ban and assuming that it is
otherwise, the same is an invalid exercise since the means used are unreasonable and
unnecessary for the accomplishment of its purpose. The declaration, according to petitioner,
violated the peoples right to protect life and their property right to carry firearms. Also, the PNP
Chief has no power or authority to issue the said guidelines. He also questioned the PD 1866
which was also the basis for the said guidelines. He also added that the guidelines violated the
due process and equal protection clause of the constitution; are unjust oppressive, and unfair;
and are effectively an ex post facto law.
The Solicitor General seek the dismissal of the petition pursuant to the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. Nonetheless, in refutation of petitioners arguments, he contended that: (1) the PNP
Chief is authorized to issue the assailed Guidelines; (2) petitioner does not have a constitutional
right to own and carry firearms; (3) the assailed Guidelines do not violate the due process
clause of the Constitution; and (4) the assailed Guidelines do not constitute an ex post facto law.
The five (5) major issues are:
First, whether respondent Ebdane is authorized to issue the assailed Guidelines;
Second, whether the citizens right to bear arms is a constitutional right?;
Third, whether the revocation of petitioners PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed Guidelines is a
violation of his right to property?;
Fourth, whether the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is a valid exercise of police power?;
and
Fifth, whether the assailed Guidelines constitute an ex post facto law?

I.

II.

III.

IV.

Relying on the principle of separation of powers, petitioner argues that only


Congress can withhold his right to bear arms. the power to make laws the
legislative power is vested in Congress. The rule which forbids the delegation of
legislative power, however, is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions like
the delegation of its licensing power to certain persons, municipal corporations,
towns, boards, councils, commissions, commissioners, auditors, bureaus and
directors. Since the early days, the certain statutes had delegated the GovernorGeneral and then the President the authority to approve or disapprove the
application for license to deal and possess firearms. Subsequently, the growing
complexity in the Office of the Governor-General (now the President) resulted in the
delegation of his authority to the Chief of the Constabulary (now the PNP chief). The
questioned PD 1866 empowered the Chief of the Constabulary to promulgate rules
and regulations concerning firearms to carry outside the residence. The Supreme
Court said PD 1866 remains to be effective.
The Supreme Court employed American jurisprudence which decreed that it is
erroneous to assume that the US Constitution grants upon the American people the
right to bear arms. In United States vs. Cruikshank: The right of the people to keep
and bear arms is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any way
dependent upon that instrument. The right to bear arms cannot be classified as
fundamental under the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Evidently, possession of
firearms by the citizens in the Philippines is the exception, not the rule. The right to
bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right. It is a mere
statutory creation.
In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be
whether life, liberty or property interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a
license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor
property right. In Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr., the court held that: Needless to say, all
licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.
The PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. just like
ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It does not
confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing
restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed.[41] A licensee takes
his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one
of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen
at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a revocation of it does not
deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege within the meaning of
these words in the Declaration of Rights.
The Supreme had laid down the test to determine the validity of a police measure,
thus: (1) The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the exercise of the police power; and (2) The means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not

unduly oppressive upon individuals. Deeper reflection will reveal that the test merely
reiterates the essence of the constitutional guarantees of substantive due process,
equal protection, and non-impairment of property rights. It is apparent from the
assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order
in the society. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the issuance of the assailed
Guidelines is the interest of the public in general.
The only question that can then arise is whether the means employed are
appropriate and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
are not unduly oppressive. According to the Supreme Court, since the assailed
Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of firearms as those who wish to carry
their firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR, the said
guideline is a reasonable regulation. In addition, with the revocation of all PTCFOR, it
would be difficult for criminals to roam around with their guns. On the other hand, it
would be easier for the PNP to apprehend them.
Laws regulating the acquisition or possession of guns have frequently been upheld
as reasonable exercise of the police power.
V.

An ex post facto law has been defined as one (a) which makes an action done
before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and
punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was
when committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which
alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
defendant. The assailed Guidelines cannot be considered as an ex post facto
law because it is prospective in its application.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

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