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CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS

[G.R. No. 117040. January 27, 2000]


RUBEN SERRANO vs. NLRC
FACTS: Serrano was the head of the security checkers section of Isetann Department Store. He
was charged with the task of supervising security checkers in their. On October 11, 1991, the
management sent him a letter immediately terminating his services as security section head,
effective on the same day. The reason given by the management was retrenchment; they had
opted to hire an independent security agency as a cost-cutting measure. Serrano filed a complaint
for ID, illegal layoff, ULP, under paymentof wages and non payment of salary and OT pay with
the LA. The LA rendered a decision in favor of Serrano. It stated that Isetann failed to establish
that it had retrenched its security division, that the petitioner was not accorded due process, etc.
and even stated that the day after Serranos dismissal, Isetann employed a safety and security
supervisor with similar duties to that of the former. The NLRC on the other hand reversed the LA
but ordered Isetann to pay separation pay equivalent to one month per year of service, unpaid
salary, etal. It held that the phase-out of the security section was a valid exercise of management
prerogative on the part of Isetann, for which the NLRC cannot substitute its judgment in the
absence of bad faith or abuse of discretion on the part of the latter; and that the security and
safety supervisors position was long in place prior to Serranos separation from the company, or
the phase-out of the Security Section.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners dismissal was illegal.
RULING: Valid, but ineffectual (without legal effect) payment of backwages, separation pay and
other monetary claims
No. The Court held that the dismissal was due to an authorized cause under Art. 283 of the
Labor Code, i.e. redundancy. However, while an authorized cause exists, Isetann failed to follow
the procedural requirement provided byArt. 283 of LC. For termination due to authorized causes,
the employer must give a written notice of termination to the employee concerned and to the
DOLE at least 30 days prior to its effectivity. This Isetann failed to do. The question now arises
as to whether the failure of Isetann to comply with the procedural requirements renders the
dismissal invalid, or, in the event that it is valid, what the appropriate sanction or penalty must be
meted out. Prior to the doctrine laid down in the decision rendered in Wenphil Corp. NLRC in
1989, the termination of an employee, even for just cause but without following the requisite
procedure, renders such dismissal illegal, and therefore null and void. In the Wenphil doctrine,
this was reversed; the said rule was unjust to employers. Instead, the dismissal was held to be
still valid but the employerwas sanctioned by way of the payment of indemnity (damages) in that
case, P1,000. The amount of indemnity will be depended on the circumstances of each case,
taking into account the gravity of the offense committed by the employer.Now, the Court once
again examines the Wenphil doctrine. Puno says that the effect of the Wenphil doctrine was such
that there has been a dismissnow, pay later policy where the employers were able to
circumvent the procedural requisites of termination, which is more convenient than the
compliance with the 30-day notice. Panganiban said that the monetarysanctions were too
insignificant, niggardly, sometimes even late. Both justices are of the opinion that the deprivation
of due process which must be accorded to the employee renders the dismissal illegal.
Puno quoted that Legislative, Executive and Judicial proceedings that deny due process do
sounder the pain of nullity. Panganiban stated that such denial of due process renders decisions
and proceedings void for lack of jurisdiction. The present ruling of the Court held that the
dismissal of the employee is merely ineffectual, not void. The dismissal was upheld but it is

ineffectual. The sanction provided was the payment of backwages from the time of dismissal up
to the decision of the court finding just or authorized cause. This was thought to balance the
interests of both parties, recognizing the employees right to notice and at the same time the right
of the employer to dismiss for any of the just and authorized causes. The Court also responded to
the arguments of Justices Puno and Panganiban by stating that the violation in the procedural
requirement of termination is not a denial of the fundamental right to due process. This is
because of the ff reasons:1)
The due process clause is a limitation on governmental powers, inapplicable to the exercise of
private power, such as in this case. The provision No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
and property without due process of law pertains only to the State, as only it has the authority to
do the same.2) The purpose of the notice and hearing under the Due process clause is to provide
an opportunity for the employee to be heard before the power of the organized society is brought
upon the individual. Under Art. 283, however, the purpose is to give him time to prepare for the
eventual loss of his job and for DOLE to determine whether economic causes exist to justify
termination. It is not to give opportunity to be heard there is no charge against the employee
under Art. 2833)
The employer cannot be expected to be an impartial judge of hisown cause.4) Not all notice
requirements are requisites of due process. Someare simply a part of a procedure to be followed
before a rightgranted to party can be exercised; others are an application of the Justinian precept.
Such is the case here. The failure of the employer to observe a procedure for the termination of
employment which makes the termination of employment merelyineffectual.5)
Art. 279 of the LC provides that only dismissal without just orauthorized cause renders such
dismissal illegal. To consider termination without observing procedural reqts as also ID is to add
another ground for ID, thereby amending Art. 279.;
Further, there is a disparity in legal treatment, as employees who resignwithout giving due notice
are only liable for damages; it does notmake their resignation void.In this case, the separation
pay was a distinct award from the paymentof backwages as a way of penalty.Petition was denied.

[G.R. No. 158693 November 17, 2004]VIRGILIO AGABON, et al. v. NLRC


FACTS:
Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as
gypsum board and cornice installers.
They were dismissed for abandonment of work. Petitioners assert that they were dismissed
because Riviera refused to give them assignments unless they agreed to work on a "pakyaw"
basis.
They did not agree on this arrangement because it would mean losing benefits as Social Security
System (SSS) members. Petitioners also claim that Riviera did not comply with the twin
requirements of notice and hearing.
Riviera, on the other hand, maintained that petitioners were not dismissed but had abandoned
their work. In fact, Riviera sent two letters to the last known addresses of the petitioners advising
them to report for work.
Petitioners did not report for work because they had subcontracted to perform installation work
for another company.
ISSUES

Whether or not petitioners were dismissed based on a valid cause


RULING: Valid dismissal but violation of statutory due process = payment of nominal damages
(P30,000) & balance of 13th month pay, etc.
1.yes. There was just cause for their dismissal, i.e., abandonment. Art. 282specifies the grounds
for just dismissal, to wit:
a.Serious misconduct or willful disobedience of the lawful orders of the employer or his duly
authorized representative in connection with the employees work
b.Gross and habitual neglect of the by the employee of his duties(includes abandonment)
c.Fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed by the employer or hisduly authorized
representative to the employee.
d.Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against theperson of the employer or any
member of his immediate family orhis duly authorized representative.
e.Any other causes analogous to the foregoing.To establish abandonment, two elements must be
present:
a.The unjustified failure of the employee to report for work
b.A clear intention to sever e-e relationship, manifested by overt actsHere, the Agabons were
frequently absent from work for having performed installation work for another company,
despite prior warning given by Riviera. This clearly establishes an intention to sever the eerelationship between them, and which constitutes abandonment.
Petitioners were frequently absent having subcontracted for an installation work for another
company. Subcontracting for another company clearly showed the intention to sever the
employer-employee relationship with Riviera. This was not the first time they did this.
Previously, they did not report for work because they were working for another company. Riviera
at that time warned petitioners that they would be dismissed if this happened again. Petitioners
disregarded the warning and exhibited a clear intention to sever their employer-employee
relationship. The record of an employee is a relevant consideration in determining the penalty
that should be meted out to him.
Riviera did not follow the notice requirements and instead argued that sending notices to the last
known addresses would have been useless because they did not reside there anymore.
Unfortunately, this is not a valid excuse because the law mandates the twin notice requirements
to the employee's last known address. Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance with the
procedural requirements of due process.
After carefully analyzing the consequences of the divergent doctrines in the law on employment
termination, we believe that in cases involving dismissals for cause but without observance of
the twin requirements of notice and hearing, the better rule is to abandon the Serrano doctrine
and to follow Wenphil by holding that the dismissal was for just cause but imposing sanctions on
the employer. Such sanctions, however, must be stiffer than that imposed in Wenphil. By doing
so, this Court would be able to achieve a fair result by dispensing justice not just to employees,
but to employers as well. Riviera was ordered to pay each of the petitioners the amount of
P30,000.00 as nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory due process.
Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment.
It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the
employer. Requisites: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable

reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship, with the second as the
more determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that
the employees has no more intention to work. The intent to discontinue the employment must be
shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and unjustified.
For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Code:
(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination,
and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side;
(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel
if the employee so desires, is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or
rebut the evidence presented against him; and
(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration
of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination.
In case of termination, the foregoing notices shall be served on the employee's last known
address.
RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc
FACTS:
Pedro A. Tecson signed a contract of employment with Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.
(Glaxo) as medical representative in October 1995.
He agreed to study and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing
or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing
drug companies and should management find that such relationship poses a possible conflict of
interest, to resign from the company.
The same provision on disclosure of relationship is provided in the Employee Code of Conduct
of Glaxo and it further states that if management perceives a conflict of interest or a potential
conflict between such relationship and the employees employment, it could result in transfer to
another department in a non-counterchecking position or preparation for employment outside
the company after six months.
But Tecson, with all helplessness of the sort that often attends matters that concern the heart,
developed a forbidden liking for Bettsy, an employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals, a competitor of
Glaxo.
For reasons unmistakably attributable to feelings of love, their hearts refused to pump blood into
their brains and so they suffered from a major lapse of judgment and ended up marrying in 1998.
As conflict of interest arose according to his superiors, Tecson was pulled out of the Camarines
sales area and transferred to Butuan but he refused.
The matter was initially brought to Glaxos grievance committee but was not resolved and so the
NCMB had to come in, which upheld the validity of Glaxos policy on relationships.
The Court of Appeals likewise found for Glaxo citing the valid exercise of management
prerogatives.
ISSUE/S:
WON Glaxos policy against its employees marrying employees from competitor companies is a
valid exercise of management prerogative.
WON the policy violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

HELD:
YES.
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and
other confidential programs and information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are
rival companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.
The prohibition under the circumstances is reasonable because relationships of such nature might
compromise the interests of the company.
Glaxos right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied as no less than the Constitution
recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right to
reasonable returns on investment and to expansion and growth.
While protection is provided to labor, the law also recognizes managements rights which are
also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.
NO.
It is a settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the
state or those acting under the color of its authority.
The only exception occurs when the state in any of its manifestations or actions has been found
to have become entwined or involved in the wrongful private conduct.
The exception is not presented in this case.
The application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-handed manner, with due regard
for the lot of the employee.
From the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its employee handbook, it is
clear that Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships between its
employees and those of competitor companies.
It merely seeks to avoid a conflict of interest between the employee and the company that may
arise out of such relationships.
The company policy was clearly made known to Tecson prior to his employment; he is thus
estopped from questioning said policy.
A contract has the force of law between the contracting parties and must be complied with in
good faith.
Yrasuegui v. PALG.R. no. 168081. Oct. 17, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner Yrasuegui, an international flight steward of Philippine Airlines Inc. (PAL)
wasdismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.In
consequence thereof, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL before
theLabor Arbiter (LA). Te Labor Arbiter ruled that the petitioner was illegally dismissed. It also
issued a writof execution directing the reinstatement of the petitioner without loss of seniority
and other benefits, andalso the payment of backwages. Respondent PAL appealed to the NLRC
which affirmed the LAsdecision. Respondent PAL appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA
reversed the NLRC case.
Issue:
Was the dismissal of the petitioner valid?
Held:
Yes. The Court upheld the legality of the petitioners dismissal. Separation pay, however, should
beawarded in favor of the employee as an act of social justice or based on equity. This is so

because hisdismissal is not serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral character.The
obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight attendant, becomes
ananalogous cause under Article 282 (e) of the Labor ode. His obesity may not be unintended,
but isnonetheless voluntary. Voluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely
attributable to theemployee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions. This
element runs through all just causes under Art. 282, whether they be in nature of a wrongful
action or omission. Gross and habitualneglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary
although it lacks the element of intent found inArt. 282 (a), (c), and (d).Employment in particular
jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the
employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualificationfor performing
the job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).
[55]
Inthe United States, there are a few federal and many state job discrimination laws that contain
an exceptionallowing an employer to engage in an otherwise unlawful form of prohibited
discrimination when theaction is based on a BFOQ necessary to the normal operation of a
business or enterprise.
Argument that BFQQ is a statutory defense must fail.
Petitioner contends that BFOQ is a statutory defense. It does not exist if there is no statute
providing for it.
]
Further, there is no existing BFOQ statute that could justify his dismissal.First, the Constitution,
the Labor Code, and RA No. 7277 or the Magna Carta for DisabledPersons contain provisions
similar to BFOQ.Second, in
British Columbia Public Service Employee Commission (BSPSERC) v. The BritishColumbia
Government and Service Employees Union (BCGSEU)
, the Supreme Court of Canada adoptedthe so-called Meiorin Test in determining whether an
employment policy is justified. Under this test,(1) the employer must show that it adopted the
standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job; (2) the employer must
establish that the standard is reasonably necessary to theaccomplishment of that work-related
purpose; and (3) the employer must establish that the standard isreasonably necessary in order to
accomplish the legitimate work-related purpose. Similarly, in
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Manuel vs. n.c construction supply Gr. No. 127553 Nov. 28,1997
FACTS:
In June 1995, the security guards of N.C. Construction Supply caught an employee stealing from
the company premises. The said employee then admitted that the incident was part of a series of
theft involving four other employees, namely, Eddie Manuel, Romeo Bana, Rogelio Pagtama, Jr.,
and Joel Rea. The four were then invited to the police station for questioning. The owner of N.C.
Construction sent his lawyer, Atty. Ramon Reyes to interrogate the four employees.
Manuel et al admitted the crime imputed against them before Atty. Reyes. They agreed that in
exchange for N.C. Construction not filing a case, they will resign as employees instead. But after
resigning, the four former employees sued N.C. Construction for illegal dismissal. They now
claim that their admission made in the police station before Atty. Reyes was coerced by the
lawyer and that they were without the assistance of counsel which is violative of their
constitutional rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not Manuel et al were dismissed without valid cause.


HELD: No. Manuel et al were positively identified by witnesses as part of the series of theft.
This was not sufficiently controverted by them. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, such act
authorizes the employer to terminate the services of an employee for loss of trust and confidence,
provided that the loss of confidence arises from particular proven facts.
What is the quantum of proof needed?
Substantial evidence or such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion and not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal case.
Anent the issue of threat and intimidation, there was no sufficient proof presented by Manuel et
al to prove that the lawyer coerced them to make the admission.
Anent the issue that Atty. Reyess interrogation of them without the presence of counsel if
violative of their constitutional rights, such argument is misplaced. The right to counsel accorded
by the Constitution only applies to criminal cases and only on custodial investigations. In this
case, this is not a criminal case and Manuel et al were not under custodial investigation when
they were interrogated by Atty. Reyes. It is also of no moment that Atty. Reyess interrogation
happened in a police station. What Atty. Reyes did was a private administrative investigation for
the interest of his employer, the N.C. Construction.
However, Manuel et al are entitled to damages (P1,000.00 each) because it appears that although
they were dismissed for a just cause, their dismissal was without the proper procedure (twinnotice rule not observed by NC Construction). The two-notice rule provides:
The employer must furnish the worker with two written notices before termination of
employment can be legally effected:
(1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal
is sought, and
(2) the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employers decision to dismiss him.
Punzal vs. Etsi Technologies gr. No. 170384-85, march 9, 2007
RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION
Pascual Jr. vs. Board of Medical Examiners, G.R. No. L-25018, May 26, 1969
FACTS:
Arsenio
Pascual
Jr.
filed
an
action
against
the
Board
of
Medical
Examiners
alleging
that
in
the
initial
hearing
of
an
administrative
case
for
alleged
immorality,
counsel
for
complainants
announced
that
he
would
present
as
first
witness,
the
petitionerappellee,
who
was
the
respondent
in
the
malpractice
case.
Petitionerappellee
through
counsel,
made
an
objection
relying
on
the
constitutional
right
to
be
exempt
from
being
a
witness
against
himself.
Respondent-appellant,
the
Board
Examiners,
sated
that
on
the
next
scheduled
hearing,
the
petioner-appellee
would
be
called
as
a
witness
unless
he
secure
an
order
from
competent
authority.
Petitioner-appellee
alleged
that
thus
ruling
compels
him
to
take
the
witness stand; the Board of Examiners was guilty of grave abuse of
discretion
for
failure
to
respect
his
constitutional
right
against
self
incrimination,
the
administrative
proceeding
which
could
result
in
forfeiture
or
loss
of
privilege
being
quasi
criminal
in

character.
The
lower
court
ordered
a
writ
of
preliminary
injunction
against
the
respondent
Board
commanding
it
to
refrain
from
hearing
or
further
proceeding
until
judicial
order.
A
decision
ordered
by
the lower court finding the claim of the petitioner appellee to be
well founded and prohibiting the Board from compelling the petioner
to
testify
without
his
consent
and
against
himself.
ISSUE:
to

Whether

or
not
testify

the

petioner-appellee
against

can

be

compelled
himself.

HELD:
the
decision
of
the
lower
court
is
affirmed.
The
right
against
self-incrimination
extends
not
only
to
right
to
refuse
to answer questions put to the accused while on witness stand, but
also
to
forgo
testimony, to
remain
silent
and
refuse
to
take
the
witness stand when called by as a witness by the prosecution. The
reason
is
that
the
right
against
self
incrimination,
along
with
the
other rights granted to the accused, stands for believe that while a
crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed,
such
desirable
objective
should
not
be
accomplished
according
to
means and methjods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded
to
the
human
personality.
Judgment affirmed.
Cabal vs, Kapunan nasa downloads case digest 2nd exam doc.
RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Waterous Drugs Corp. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 113271, Oct. 16, 1997
Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp.
Catolico sold to YSP Inc. 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, the normal
selling price is P320 per unit. Catolico overcharged by P64 per unit for a total of P640. YSP sent
a check payable to Catolico as a refund for the jacked-up price. It was sent in an envelope
addressed to her. Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. opened the envelope and saw that
there was a check for P640 for Catolico.
Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty.
NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered
inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants.
Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of ones person from
interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so
as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
Issue: W/N the check is admissible as evidence
Held: Yes.
Ratio: (People vs. Marti) Marti ruling: The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals.
It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such
assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal

and civil liabilities. Despite this, the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for
the dismissal of Catolico from employment Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by
the Labor Code for the termination of Employment.