Case No.

9
Radiola Toshiba Philippines vs Intermediate Appellate Court
GR No. 75222, July 18, 1991

Case No. 10 | Midterms Case No. 1

Manuel T. De Guia vs Commission on Elections
GR No. 104712, May 6, 1992

Statutory rule: In interpreting a statute, care should be taken that

every part be given effect.
Facts:
The levy on attachment against the subject properties of
spouses Carlos and Teresita Gatmaytan was issued on March 4, 1980
by the Court of First Instance of Pasig. However, an insolvency
proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Angeles City was
commenced four months after the issuance of the said attachment.
Petitioner contends that its lien on the subject properties overrode the
insolvency proceeding and was not dissolved thereby.
Issue: W/N the levy on attachment dissolved the
proceedings against the respondent spouses even
commenced four months after said attachment.

insolvency
though it

Statutory Rule: A construction that gives to the language in a statute

meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute
was enacted should be rejected.
Facts:
Petitioner Manuel De Guia is a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of the Municipality of Paranaque. He contends that under par(d)
of Sec. 3 of Ra 7166, members of the Sangguaniang Panglungsod and
Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large in the May 1992
elections.
Issue: W/N par(d) Sec. 3 of RA 7166 should be interpreted to mean that
elective officials of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and SB shall be
elected at large.

Held:

Held:

No. Sec. 32 of the Insolvency Law is clear that there is a cut off
period - one month in attachment cases and thirty days in judgments
entered in actions commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings.
Also, there is no conflict between Sec. 32 and Sec. 79. Where a statute
is susceptible to more than one interpretation, the court should adopt
such reasonable and beneficial construction that will render the
provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each
other.

No. Par (d) Sec. 3 of RA 7166 refers only to elective officials of

the Sangguniang Panlungsod which are single district cities and
Sangguniang Bayan for municipalities outside Metro Manila. The law
specifically stated that provinces with only one legislative district
should be divided into two and therefore should necessarily be elected
by districts. Par (d) should be interpreted in line with the rest of the
statute and to follow the interpretation of the petitioner would make
the act of the statute in singling out the single district provinces as
useless or meaningless. The key to open the door to what the
legislature intended in the language of a state is its purpose or reason
which induced it to enact the statute. Statutes should then be
construed in light of the object to be achieved. A construction should
be rejected that gives the language used in a statute a meaning that
does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted.

Case No. 11 | Midterms Case No. 2

Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas vs CA
GR No. 78687, January 31, 1989
Statutory Rule: Between two statutory interpretations, that which
better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.

Case No. 12 | Midterms Case No. 3

B/Gen Jose Commendador, et al. vs B/Gen Demetrio Camera, et al.
GR No. 96948, August 2, 1991
Statutory rule: When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself
ceases.

Facts:
The parents of Elena Salenillas, one of the petitioners, were
grantees of free patent. The subject property was later sold to Elena
Salenillas and her husband, petitioners in the instant case. On
December 4, 1973, the property of petitioners was mortgaged to
Philippine National bank as security for a loan of P2,500. For failure to
pay their loan, the property was foreclose by PNB and was bought at a
public auction by private respondent. Petitioner maintains that they
have a right to repurchase the property under Sec. 119 of the Public
Land Act. Respondent states that the sale of the property disqualified
petitioner from being legal heirs vis-a-vis the said property.
Issue:
W/N petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under Sec.
119 of the Public Land Act.
Held:
Yes. Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act provides that "every
conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead
provisions shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow or
legal heirs within a period of five years from the date or conveyance."
The provision makes no distinction between the legal heirs. The
distinction made by respondent contravenes the very purpose of the
act. Between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves
the purpose of the law should prevail.

Facts:
Petitioners are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and were charged with violations of Articles of War in relation with their
alleged participation in a failed coup detat. Their case was referred to
General Court Martial No. 14. At a hearing, petitioners manifested their
desire to exercise their right to raise peremptory challenges against
the President and the members of the general court martial invoking
Art. 18 of CA No. 408. GCM No. 14 ruled that peremptory challenges
had been discontinued under PD 39.
Issue: W/N the right to peremptory challenge provide by Art. 18 of CA
No. 408 has been discontinued under PD 39.
Held:
No. Although PD 39 disallowed peremptory challenged allowed
under CA No. 408, PD 39 however was issued to implement General
Order No. 8 issued during martial law to create military tribunals. With
the lifting of Martial Law, General Order No. 8 was revoked and military
tribunals were dissolved. As such, the reason for the existence of PD 39
ceased automatically. When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself
ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex.

Case No. 13| Midterms Case No. 4

Lydia O. Chua vs The Civil Service Commission, NIA
GR No. 88979, February 7, 1992
Statutory rule: Doctrine of necessary implications. What is implied in a
statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.

Case No. 14 | Midterms Case No. 5

City of Manila and City Treasurer vs Judge Amador E. Gomez, Et Al.
GR No. L-37251, August 31, 1981
Statutory rule: Doctrine of necessary implications. What is implied in a
statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.

Facts:
RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary
separation as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization.
Sec. 2 provides for who are qualified to avail of the benefits of RA 6683
which includes, "all regular, temporary, casual and emergency
employees." Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to
avail of the benefits of the program filed and application with the
respondent NIA which was denied due to the fact that she is a coterminus employee. Her appeal with respondent Commission was
likewise denied.
Issue: W/N petitioner's status as a co-terminus employee is excluded
from the benefits of Ra 6683 (Early Retirement Law)
Held: No. There is no substantial difference between a co-terminus
employee and a contractual, casual or emergency employee for all are
tenurial employees with no fixed term, non-career and temporary. The
Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause of the
constitution if the SC were to sustain respondent's submission that the
benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees
who are similarly situated as those covered by the said law. The
doctrine of necessary implications should be applied in this case.

Facts:
The Revised Charter of Manila fixes the annual realty tax at
1.5%. On the other hand, the Special Education Fund Law imposed an
annual additional tax of 1% on the assessed value of real property in
addition to the real property tax regularly levied thereon but the total
real property tax shall not exceed 3% Since the maximum limit
imposed is 3%, the municipal board of Manila imposed an additional .
5% to fix the total imposable tax on real property at 3% which is
divided into the following: 1.5% as per charter of Manila, 1% as per
Special Education Fund law and .5% as per order of the municipal
board. Private respondent Esso Philippines paid the additional one-half
percent realty tax under protest and later filed a complaint for recovery
of the said amount. It contended that the additional one-half percent is
void because it is not authorized by the city charter or any law.
Issue: W/N the additional one-half percent imposed by the City of
Manila is valid or legal.
Held:
Yes. The Real Property Tax Law imposes that a city council, by
ordinance, may impose a realty tax of not less than one-half perfect
but not more than two percent of the assessed value of real property.
The additional one-half percent then is legal. Furthermore, the doctrine
of implications sustains the contention of the City of Manila that the
additional one-half percent is sanctioned by the Special Education Fund
Law when the same states that the total real property tax shall not
exceed a maximum of three per centum. The doctrine of necessary
implications means that that which is plainly implied in the language
of a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed.

Case No. 15 | Midterms Case No. 6

People of the Philippines vs Guillermo Manantan
GR No. L-14129, July 31, 1962
Statutory rule: The rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est
can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly
established.
Facts:
Defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of
the Section 54 of the Revised Election Code which provides that No
justice, judge, fiscal. shall aid any candidate in any manner in any
election, except to vote. Defendant contends that this provision
excludes justice of the peace and as such, he is excluded from this
prohibition. Because of this, the lower court dismissed the case against
him. The Solicitor General appealed.
Issue: W/N a justice of the peace is included in the prohibition of
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
Held: Yes. Although petitioner argues that when Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code omitted the words justice of peace from the
Revised Administrative Code provision from which it was taken and
thus making the intention of the legislature clear in the omission, the
word judge in the former provision was qualified or modified by the
phrase of first instance. The term judge in Section 54 is not
modified or qualified, making it broader and more generic to
comprehend all kinds of judges, like judges of the Courts of First
Instance, Courts of Agrarian Relations, Courts of Industrial Relations
and justices of the peace. The rule of casus omissus has no
applicability to the case at bar for the maxim only applies and operate
if and when the omission has been clearly established.

Case No. 16 | Midterms Case No. 7

JM Tuason and Co., et al. vs Hon. Herminio Mariano, et al.
GR No. L-33140, October 23, 1978
Statutory rule: Stare Decisis. Follow past precedents and do not disturb
what has been settled. Matters already decided on the merits cannot
be relitigated again and again.
Facts:
Respondents Aquial claimed ownership of a parcel of land
located in Quezon City having an area of 383 hectares. They alleged
that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of
the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names
of Petitioners Tuason pursuant to a decree issued on July 6, 1914 in
Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration. Plaintiffs Aquial
prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared
void due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding.
Issue: W/N OCT No. 735 is valid.
Held:
OCT No. 735 is valid. The validity of OCT No. 735 was already
decided upon by the Supreme Court in the cases of Benin vs Tuason,
Alcantara vs Tuason and Pili vs Tuason. The ruling in these cases was
also applied in other cases involving the validity of OCT No. 735.
Considerng the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta
movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been
settled), the court ruled that respondents cannot maintain their action
without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735
is valid and no longer open to attack.

judgment" which may be charged against a counter bond, it should be

interpreted to refer not only to a final and executory judgment but also
a judgment pending appeal.

Case No. 17 | Midterms Case No. 8

Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. vs Intermediate Appellate Court
GR No. L-72005, May 29, 1987
Statutory rule: When the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. The rule, founded on logic, is corollary of the principle that
general words and phrases of a statute should ordinarily be accorded
their natural and general significance.

Case No. 18 | Midterms Case No. 9

Juanito Pilar vs Commission on Elections
GR No. 115245, July 11, 1995
Statutory rule: The rule is well recognized that where the law does not
distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
Facts:

Facts:
Private respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires Inc. filed a
complaint for a collection of money against Varian Industrial
Corporation. During the pendency, private respondent attached some
of the properties of Varian Industrial corporation upon the posting of a
supersedes bond. The latter in turn posted a counter bond through
Petitioner Philippine British Assurance so the attached properties were
released. The trial court then rendered a decision favorable to the
private respondent and Writ of execution was issued in favor of private
respondent. The same was however returned unsatisfied as varian
failed to deliver the attached personal properties upon demand.
Sycwin thus prayed that petitioner corporation be ordered to pay the
value of its bond which was granted.

On March 22, 1992, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy

for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
Province of Isabela. Three days later, he withdrew his certificate of
candidacy. As a result, respondent Commission imposed a fine of
P10,000.00 for failure to file his statement of contributions and
expenditures. Petitioner contends that it is clear from the law that the
candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have
either won or lost.
Issue: W/N petitioner can be held liable for failure to file a statement of
contributions and expenditures since he was a "non-candidate", having
withdrawn his certificate of candidacy three days after its filing.
Held:

Issue: W/N the counter bond issued through petitioner corporation

covers execution of a judgment pending appeal.
Held:
The counter bond was issued in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule
57 of the Rules of Court. Neither the rules nor provisions of the counter
bond limited its application to a final and executory judgment. It
applies to the payment of any judgment that may be recovered by
plaintiff. It is a recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish,
courts should not distinguish. Since the law did not make any
distinction nor intended any exception, when it speaks of "any

Yes. Sec. 14 of Ra 7166 states that "every candidate" has the

obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. As
the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the
candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term
"every candidate" must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate
who pursued his campaign, but also to who who withdrew his
candidacy. Sec. 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to "all
candidates who filed their certificate of candidacy".

Case No. 19 | Midterms Case No. 10

People vs Judge Antonio Evangelista and Guildo Tugonon
GR No. 110898, February 20, 1996
Statutory rule: If the law makes no distinction, neither should the court.
Facts:
Private respondent Guildo Tugonon was charged and convicted
of frustrated homicide. He filed a petition for probation. However, the
Chief Probation and Parole Officer recommended denial of private
respondent's application for probation on the ground that by appealing
the sentence of the trial, he had already waived his right to make his
application for probation. The RTC set aside the Probation Officer's
recommendation and granted private respondent's application on April
23, 1993.

Case No. 20 | Midterms Case No. 11

Cecilio De Villa vs Court of Appeals
GR No. 87416, April 8, 1991
Statutory rule: When the law does not make any exception, courts may
not except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it.
Facts:
Petitioner Cecilio De Villa was charged before the RTC of Makati
for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, the Bouncing Checks Law.
Petitioner contends that the check in question was drawn against his
dollar account with a foreign bank and as such, it is not covered by the
Bouncing Checks Law..

Issue: W/N respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion by

granting private respondent's application for probation despite the
appeal filed by the private respondent.

Issue: W/N a foreign check drawn against a foreign account is covered

by BP 22.

Held:

Held:

Yes. Private respondent filed his application for probation on

December 28, 1992, after PD 1990 had taken effect. It is thus covered
by the prohibition that "no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfect the appeal from
the judgment of conviction" and that "the filing of the application shall
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal." having appealed from the
judgment of the trial court and applied for probation after the Court of
Appeals had affirmed his conviction, private respondent was clearly
precluded from the benefits of probation. Furthermore, the law makes
no distinction between meritorious and unmeritorious appeals so
neither should the court.

Yes. The law does not distinguish the currency involved in the
case since what the law only specifies is that checks drawn and issued
in the Philippines, though payable outside thereof are within the
coverage of the law. It is a cardinal rule that where the law does not
distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is
that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not
except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it.

Yes. The refusal to deny refund was based on the argument

that all the items enumerated for the tax exemption fall under one
specific class, namely: food products, book supplies/materials and
medical supplies and that for petitioners to be exempt, the stabilizers
and flavors they use must fall under the category of food products.
Respondent contends that since petitioners use these as toothpaste,
the same is not a food product. Court ruled that although stabilizers
and flavors are preceded by items that might fall under food products,
the following which were also included are hardly such: fertilizer,
poultry feed, industrial starch and more. Therefore, the law must be
seen in its entirety. The rule of construction that general and unlimited
terms are restrained and limited by a particular recital does not require
the rejection of general terms entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in
ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is to be taken in
connection with other rules of construction.
Case No. 21 | Midterms Case No. 12
Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. vs Pedro Jimenez
GR No. L-14787, January 28, 1961
Statutory rule: General terms may be restricted by specific word, with
the result that the general language will be limited by specific
language which indicates the statutes object and purpose. The rule is
applicable only to cases wherein, except for one general term, all the
items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class.
Facts:
Petitioner corporation engages in manufacturing toilet
preparations and household remedies. They import materials including
stabilizers and flavors is among those petitioner imports. For every
importation, petitioner pays 17% special excise tax on the foreign
exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and other
charges pursuant to RA 601, the Exchange Tax Law. However the same
law also provides that foreign exchanged used for xxx importation to
the Philippines of xxx stabilizers and flavors xxx shall be refunded to
any importer making application therefore. Petitioner now seeks a
refund of the 17% special excise tax they paid in the total sum of
P113,343.99.
Issue: W/N the foreign exchange used by petitioner in the importation
of dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special
excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law so as to entitle it to a
refund.
Held:

Case No. 22 | Midterms Case No. 13

RP vs Eutropio Migrinio and Troadio Tecson
GR No. 89483, August 30, 1990
Statutory rule: Applying the rule in statutory construction known as
ejusdem generis, that is where general words follow an enumeration of
persons or things, such general words are not to be construed in their
widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things
of the same kind or class as those especially mentioned.
Facts:
Acting on information received which indicated the acquisition
of wealth beyond his lawful income, the Philippine Anti-Graft Board
required private respondent Lt. Col. Tecson to submit his explanation or
comment, together with supporting evidence thereto. Private
respondent was unable to provide supporting evidence because they
were allegedly in the custody of his bookkeeper who ha gone abroad.
The anti-graft Board was created by the PCGG to "investigate the
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both
retired and in active service." Private respondent mainly argues that he
is not one of the subordinates contemplated in Executive Orders No. 1,
2, 14 and 14-A are acts of his alone and not connected with being a
crony, business associate or subordinate. Hence, the PCGG has no
jurisdiction to investigate him.

Issue: W/N private respondent may be investigated and prosecuted by

the Board, an agency of the PCGG, for violation of RA 3019 and 1379.
Held:
No. Applying the rule in statutory construction, the term
"subordinate" as used in EO 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys
close association or relation with former President Marcos and/or his
wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative and close
associate in E) 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy,
agent or nominee in EO 2.

Held:
No. PD 772 does not apply to pasture lands because its
preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban
communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter
areas made by well-to-do individuals. But the Supreme Court
disagreed with the lower courts usage of the maxim Ejusdem Generis
because the intent of the decree is unmistakeable. It stated that the
rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool for statutory construction
which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain.

Note: Ejusdem Generis General words followed by an enumeration of

persons or things by words of a particular and specific meaning, such
general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to
be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class
as those specifically mentioned.

Case No. 23 | Midterms Case No. 14

PP vs Vicente Echavez, Jr. et al.
GR Nos. L-47757-61, January 28, 1990
Statutory rule: Rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory
construction resorted to when legislative intent is uncertain.
Facts:
16 persons were charged with squatting which is penalized by
Presidential Decre No. 772 which provides that any person who with
the use of force, xxx succeeds in occupying or possessing the property
of another against his will for residential, commercial or any other
purposes, shall be punished by imprisonment xxx The lower court
denied the motion and ruled that agricultural land is not part of PD 772
on the basis of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) since its
preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture.

Case No. 24 | Midterms Case No. 15

Vera vs Cuevas, Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of the
PH
Rule: The familiar rule of Ejusdem Generis
Facts: Defendant Commissioner on Internal Revenue required the
private respondents Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers
and Consolidated Milk Company and Milk Industries, Inc. to withdraw
from the market all of their filled milk products which do not bear the
inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code, which essentially
imposes this requirement on all milk products from which the fatty
party has been removed totally or in part. Private respondents protest
by alleging that filled milk is not skimmed milkwhich is required under
the law. The lower court favored the private respondents on the ground
of ejusdem generis.

Issue: W/N PD 772 applies to agricultural lands

Issue: W/N Section 169 of the Tax Code applies to filled milk.

Issue: W/N SPMC is exempted from the payment of 3% millers tax.

Held:
No. Section 169 of the Tax Code does not apply to filled milk.
The use of the specific and qualifying terms skimmed milk in the
headnote and condensed skimmed milk in the text of the cited
section, would restrict the scope of the general clause all milk, in
whatever form, from which the fatty part has been removed totally or
in part. In other words, the general clause is restricted by the specific
term skimmed milk under the familiar rule of ejusdem generis that
general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by the
particular terms they follow in the statute. Furthermore, there is a
difference between skimmed milk and filled milk in that skimmed milk
is milk wherein all fatty part is removed while filled milk is milk wherein
all fatty part is likewise removed but replaced by a fat substitute like
coconut oil.

Case No. 25 | Midterms Case No. 16

San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation vs Commissioner of Internal
Revenue
GR No. 147749, June 22, 2006
Statutory Rule: The express mention of one person, thing, act or
consequence excludes all other. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius
Facts:
SPMC is a corporation engaged in the business of milling,
manufacturing and exporting of coconut oil and other similar products.
It was assessed and ordered by the Commission of Internal Revenue to
pay the total amount of P8,182,182.85 representing deficiency in
millers tax and manufacturers sales tax. SPMC opposed on the ground
that they are exempted under Section 168 of the Tax Code on the
ground that the purchaser of their products, UNICHEM, exports their
products.

Held:
No. The language of the exemption did not warrant the
interpretation advanced by SPMC for nowhere did it provide that the
exportation made by the purchaser of the materials was covered by
the exemption. The proposes interpretation of SPMC unduly enlarged
the scope of the exemption clause. Where the law enumerate the
subject or condition upon which it applies, it is to be construed as
excluding from its effects all those not expressly mentiond. Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius. Anything that is not included in the
enumeration is excluded therefrom. The rule proceeds from the
premise that the legislature would not have made specific
enumerations in a statute if it had intention not to restrict its meaning
and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

Case No. 26 | Midterms Case No. 17

Dra. Brigida Buenaseda vs Secretary Juan Flavier
GR No. 106719, September 21, 1993
Statutory Rule: Noscitur a socciis. Where a particular word is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made
specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or
with which it is associated.
Facts:
The private respondents filed an administrative complaint with
the Ombudsman against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. In response, the Ombudsman filed an order
directing the preventive suspension of the petitioner, who were
employees of the national center for mental health. The respondents
argue that the preventive suspension laid by the Ombudsman under

Sec. 24 of RA 6770 is contemplated in by Sec. 13(8) of Art. 9 of the

1987 Constitution, while petitioner contends that the Ombudsman can
only recommend to the Heads of Departments and other agencies the
preventive suspension of officials and employees facing administrative
investigation conducted by his office.
Issue: W/N the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend
government officials working in other offices other than that of the
Ombudsman pending the investigation of administrative complaints.
Held:
Yes. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend the employees
of the said institution may it be in punitive or preventive suspension.
When the Constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power to
"recommend the suspension" of a public official or employees, it
referred to "suspension" as a punitive measure. All the words
associated with the word "suspension" in said provision referred to
penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine,
censure. Under the rule of Noscitur a sociis, the word "suspension"
should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is
associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by
considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it
is associated.

Case No. 28 | Midterms Case No. 18

Manolo P. Fule vs Court of Appeals
GR No. L-79094, June 22, 1988
Statutory rule: Negative words and phrases regarded as mandatory
while those in the affirmative are mere directory.
Facts:
Petitioner, an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation,
issued and made out check No. 26741 in favor of Roy Nadera. Said
check was dishonored for the reason that the said checking account
was already closed, thus in violation of BP 22, the Bouncing Checks
Law. Upon the hearing, prosecution presented its evidence and the
petitioner waived his right. Instead, he submitted a memorandum

confirming the stipulation of facts which was not signed by both

petitioner nor by his counsel. He was convicted by the trial court, and
on appeal, the appellate court.
Issue: W/N the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC based on
the stipulation of facts that was not signed by the Petitioner nor his
counsel.
Held:
Yes. The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 4, states that
No agreement or admission made or entered during pre-trial shall be
used against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him
and counsel. By its very language, the rule is mandatory. Negative
words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the
affirmative are merely directory. Therefore, the signature of the
petitioner and counsel is mandatory. Also, penal statutes are to be
liberally construed in favor of the accused. Case is re-opened to
receive evidence in favor of the accused.

Case No. 29 | Midterms Case No. 19

Purita Bersabal vs Hon. Judge Serafin Salvador
Gr No. L-35910, July 21, 1978
Statutory rule: Use of word may in the statute generally connotes a
permissible thing while the word shall is imperative.
Facts:
Private respondents filed an ejectment suit against the
petitioner. The subsequent decision was appealed by the petitioner and
during its pendency, the court issued an order stating that counsels
for both parties are given 30 days from receipt of this order within

which to file their memoranda in order for this case to be submitted for
decision by the court. After receipt, petitioner filed a Motion Ex Parte
to Submit Memorandum within 30 days from receipt of Notice of
Submission of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the
hearing of the case which was granted by the court. But the
respondent judge issued an order dismissing the case for failure to
prosecute petitioners appeal. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration citing the submitted ex parte motion but the court
denied it.
Issue: W/N the mere failure of an appellant to submit the mentioned
memorandum would empower the CFI to dismiss the appeal on the
ground of failure to prosecute.
Held:
The court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on
the mere failure of an appellant to submit his memorandum. The law
provides that Courts shall decide.. cases on the basis of the
evidence and records transmitted from the city courts: provided
parties may submit memorandum.. if so requested. It cannot be
interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memorandum is
optional. Being optional, a party may choose to waive submission of
the memoranda. As a general rule, the word may when used in a
statute is permissive only and operates to confer discretion; while the
word shall is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be
enforced.

Case No. 30
Jenette Marie Crisologo vs Globe Telecom, Cesar Maureal
GR No. 167631, December 16 2005
Statutory rule: Statutory rule: Use of word may in the statuted
generally connotes a permissible thing while the word shall is
imperative

Case No. 31 | Midterms Case No. 20

Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association (South) vs Court of
Appeals
GR No. 117188, August 7, 1997
Statutory rule: The word must in a statute like shall is not always
imperative and may be consistent with an exercise of discretion.
Facts:

The Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association (North

Association) was registered with private respondent Home Insurance
and Guaranty Corporation as the sole homeowners organization in the
said subdivision but it did not file its corporate by-laws. Later, it was
discovered that there were two organizations within the subdivision:
the North and South Associations. Respondent HIGC then informed the
president of North Association that the latter has been automatically
dissolved because of non-submission of its by-laws as required by the
Corporation Code. This resulted in the registration of the South
Association, herein petitioner. The North Association complained and
got a favorable result from respondent HIGC declaring the registration
of petitioner association (the South Assocciation) cancelled and
respondent CA subsequently affirmed the said decision. Hence,
petitioner association filed a petition for certiorari.
Issue: W/N the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one
month from the date of its incorporation results in its automatic
dissolution.
Held:
No. The legislatures intent is not to automatically dissolve a
corporation for its failure to pass its by-laws. The wor must in a
statute is not always imperative but it may be consistent with an
exercise of discretion. The language of the statuted should be
considered as a whole while ascertaining the intent of the legislature in
using the word must or shall.

Statutory rule: A week means a period of seven consecutive days

without regard to the day of the week on which it begins.
Facts:
To secure payments of his loan, private respondent mortgages
two lots to petitioner bank. For failure to pay the obligation, petitioner
bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged property and won the
highest bidder at the auction sale. Then, a final deed of sale was
registered in the Registry of Property in favor of the Petitioner bank and
later sold the said lots to a third party.
The notices of sale of private respondents foreclosed
properties were published on March 28, April 11 and April 12, 1969
issues of a newspaper Daily Record. The date March 28, 1969 falls on
a Friday, while the dates April 11 and 12 fall on a Friday and a
Saturday respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the
notice of auction sale shall be published once a week for at least three
consecutive weeks.
Issue: W/N the petitioner bank complied with the requirements of
weekly publication of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages.
Held:
No. it must be conceded that Article 13 of the NCC is
completely silent as to the definition of what is a week. In Concepcion
vs Andueta, the term week was interpreted to mean as a period of
time consisting of seven consecutive days without regard to the day of
the week on which it begins. The petitioner bank failed to comply with
the legal requirement of publication. Auction sale of petitioner bank is
void and of no legal effect.

Case No. 32 | Midterms Case No. 21

PNB vs Court of Appeals
222 Scra 134, May 17, 1993
Case No. 33 | Midterms Case No. 22
ALU-TUCP vs NLRC, National Steel Corporation

GR No. 109902, August 2, 1994

Statutory rule:

Case No. 34
Acting Commissioner of Customs vs Manila Electric Company, CTA
Gr No. L-23623, June 30, 1977

Statutory Rule: