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Citation: 4 Unif. L. Rev. n.s. 164 1999

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Summaries of cases applying and interpreting


international uniform law instruments

UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL


COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS *
16 - UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES - As a means of interpreting the applicable domestic law Articles 3.5, 4.1 and 4.2.
ARBITRAL AWARD (Preliminary) - 25.XI. 1994 - Zurich Chamber of Commerce (Switzerland).
MEANS OF INTERPRETING THE APPLICABLE DOMESTIC LAW - UNIDROIT Principles
referred to by arbitral tribunal for confirmation that the relevant rule of domestic
applicable law reflects a worldwide consensus - Reasons.
INTERPRETATION of contractual provision - Parties to a contract are bound by the
meaning of the contractual provision as it must be understood by the average honest and
diligent business person - Articles 4. 1 and 4.2.
MISTAKE - Requirement that it relates to facts which the mistaken party, in accordance
with the rules of good faith in the course of business, considered to be a necessary basis
of the contract - Article 3.5.
The award concerned the validity of an arbitration clause in which the parties agreed to
submit their disputes to "international and trade arbitration organization in ZUrich, Switzerland." The respondent contested the jurisdiction of the Ztrich Chamber of Commerce as this
institution was not specifically named in the arbitration clause. The claimant argued that it
could rightfully assume that the arbitration clause, which had been drafted by the respondent,
referred to the only existing international trade arbitration organization in Ztrich, namely the
Zorich Chamber of Commerce.
In deciding in favour of the claimant the Arbitral Tribunal applied Article 18(1) of the
Swiss Code of Obligations according to which incorrect statements made in a contractual
provision have to be interpreted by having regard to the real intention of the parties, and to
Article 2 of the Swiss Civil Code laying down the principle of good faith. According to the
Arbitral Tribunal the combination of the two components of the principle of good faith, i.e. the
subjective and the objective one, leads to the conclusion that parties to a contract are bound by
the meaning of the contractual provision as it must be understood by the average honest and
diligent business person. In order to prove that this interpretation rule reflects a worldwide
consensus, the Arbitral Tribunal referred to Articles 4.1 and 4.2 of the UNIDROIT Principles
"which have been established by a large international working party consisting of specialists in
contract law selected from all different parts of the world [...]."

UNIDROIT,

164

The summaries reproduced hereunder were submitted by M.J. BONELL, Legal Consultant,
Professor of Law, University of Rome I (Italy).

Unif. L. Rev. 1999-1

Resumes de jurisprudence appliquant et interpretant


des instruments internationaux de droit uniforme

PRINCIPES D'UNIDROIT RELATIFS AUX CONTRATS


DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL *
16-

PRINCIPES D'UNIDROIT -

Moyen pour interpreter /a loi nationale applicable - Articles

3.5, 4.1 et 4.2.


SENTENCE ARBITRALE (Pr6l.) - 25.X1.1994 - Chambre de commerce de Zurich (Suisse).
MOYEN POUR INTERPRETER LA LOI NATIONALE APPLICABLE - Principes d'UNIDROIT
vis6s par le tribunal arbitral pour donner confirmation que /a r~gle correspondante du
droit interne applicable refl~te un consensus gdn6ral - Motifs.
INTERPRETATION d'une clause du contrat - Les parties sont lies par le sens de la clause
du contrat telle qu'elle doit 6tre comprise par le professionnel moyen honn~te et diligent
- Articles 4. 1 and 4.2.
ERREUR - Condition qu'elle se rapporte 5 des faits que la loyaut6 commerciale permettait
celui qui se prdvaut de son erreur de considdrer comme des 6lments essentiels du
contrat - Article 3.5.
La sentence concerne la validit6 d'une clause compromissoire par laquelle les parties sont
convenues de soumettre leurs diff~rends A "une organisation internationale et d'arbitrage commercial ,AZurich, Suisse". Le d~fendeur a contest6 la comptence de la Chambre de commerce
de Zurich au motif que cette institution n'6tait pas express~ment nomme dans la clause
compromissoire. Le demandeur pr~tendait qu'il 6tait fond6 A penser que la clause compromissoire, qui avait W6 r~dig~e par le d~fendeur, se r~f~rait A la seule organisation d'arbitrage
commercial international existant A Zurich, A savoir la Chambre de commerce de Zurich.
Se pronongant en faveur du demandeur, le tribunal arbitral a appliqu6 'article 18(1) du
Code suisse des obligations selon lequel les denominations inexactes d'une clause d'un contrat
doivent Otre interpr~t~es au regard de la r~elle intention des parties, et 'article 2 du Code civil
suisse 6tablissant le principe de la bonne foi. Selon le tribunal arbitral, la conjonction des deux
6lments de la bonne foi (subjectif et objectif), mne A la conclusion que les parties sont li~es
par le sens de la clause du contrat telle qu'elle doit Ltre comprise par le professionnel moyen
honntte et diligent. Pour prouver que cette r~gle d'interpr~tation refl~te un consensus general,
le tribunal arbitral s'est r~f~r6 aux articles 4.1 et 4.2 des Principes d'UNIoROIT "qui ont 6t6
6tablis par un groupe de travail international 6largi compos6 de spcialistes du droit des
contrats provenant de toutes les r~gions du monde [...]".

Les sommaires reproduits ci-dessous ont W soumis par M.J. BONELL, Consultant, UNIDROIT,

Professeur de droit, Universit6 de Rome I (Italie).

Rev. dr. unif. 1999-1

165

Case law summaries -

UNIDROIT Principles

Having established that a proper interpretation of the arbitration clause leads to the
conclusion that the parties designation of the arbitral institution in fact meant the designation of
the Zorich Chamber of Commerce, the Arbitral Tribunal addressed the question whether the
respondent could invoke a material mistake and thereby invalidate the agreement to arbitrate.
By denying such a possibility the Arbitral Tribunal referred again not only to Article 24(1) of the
Swiss Code of Obligations defining a material mistake as one relating to facts which the
mistaken party in accordance with the rules of good faith in the course of business considered
to be a necessary basis of the contract, but also to the similar rule contained in Article 3.5 of the
UNIDROIT

Principles.

Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Vol. 22-1997, 211-221; Bulletin of the Swiss Arbitration
Association, 1996, n' 2, 303-318.

17-

UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES - As a means of interpreting the applicable domestic law Articles 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3.
ARBITRAL AWARD -1995 - Auckland (New Zealand) (sole arbitrator).
MEANS OF INTERPRETING THE APPLICABLE DOMESTIC LAW - Issue at stake uncertain
under applicable domestic law - UNIDROIT Principles referred to by arbitral tribunal since
'[...] there could be no more definitive contemporary international statement governing
the interpretation of contractual terms than in the UNIDROIT Principles".
INTERPRETATION of ambiguous contractual provision - Whether post-contractual
conduct by parties was admissible as a means for resolving ambiguities (yes) - Articles
4.1, 4.2, 4.3.

The award concerned a contractual dispute involving a New Zealand company and an
Australian company. The question arose as to whether post-contractual conduct by the parties
was admissible as a means for resolving ambiguities which were found in the contractual
agreement. Since on this point the law of New Zealand, which the parties had chosen as the
law governing the dispute, was found to be uncertain ("in a somewhat unsettled state"), the sole
arbitrator, inclined to admit the taking into account of post-contractual conduct in cases of
contractual ambiguity, was seeking confirmation at a comparative level and in so doing referred
above all to Articles. 4.1, 4.2. and 4.3. of the UNIDROIT Principles, pointing out that "[...]
there
could be no more definitive contemporary international statement governing the interpretation
of contractual terms than in the UNIDROIT Principles."
The sole arbitrator, D.A.R. Williams, Q.C., Auckland, New Zealand, amply refers to the legal
aspects of the case in his essay: "Further Development of International Commercial Arbitration
through the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts", 2 New Zealand
Business Law Quarterly (1996), p. 7 et seq. (17-21).

166

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Ayant d~termin6 que l'interpr6tation appropri~e de la clause compromissoire permet de
conclure que la d6signation par les parties de 'institution arbitrale visait en fait la Chambre de
commerce de Zurich, le tribunal arbitral a examin6 la question de savoir si le d~fendeur
pouvait invoquer une erreur mat6rielle invalidant I'accord d'arbitrage. Ecartant une telle
possibilit6, le tribunal arbitral s'est r~f~r6 A l'article 24(1) du Code suisse des obligations
d~finissant 'erreur comme portant sur des faits que la loyaut6 commerciale permettait A celui
qui se pr6vaut de son erreur de consid~rer comme des 616ments essentiels du contrat, ainsi qu'A
la rfgle semblable contenue A I'article 3.5 des Principes d' UNIDROIT.
Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Vol. 22-1997, 211-221; Bulletin of the Swiss Arbitration
Association, 1996, n' 2, 303-318.

17-

PRINCIPES D'UNIDROIT - Moyen pour interpr6ter la loi nationale applicable - Articles


4.1, 4.2, and 4.3.
SENTENCE ARBITRAILE- 1995 -Auckland (Nouvelle Zlande) (arbitre unique).
MOYEN POUR INTERPRETER LA LOI NATIONALE APPLICABLE - Question en jeu incertaine
en vertu de la loi nationale applicable - Principes d'UNIDROIT vis6s par le tribunal arbitral au
motif que '[...] il n'existe actuellement aucun texte international plus concluant que les
Principes d'Unidroit pour r6gir l'interpr6tation des dispositions du contrat."
INTERPRETATION d'une clause contractuelle ambigue - Possibilit6 de prendre en consid&
ration le comportement des parties post6rieur A la conclusion du contrat pour r6soudre les
ambigu)t6s (oui) - Articles 4.1, 4.2, 4.3.

La sentence porte sur un diff~rend concernant un contrat entre une soci~t6 n6o-z6landaise
et une soci~t6 australienne. La question s'est posse de savoir s'il 6tait possible de prendre en
consid6ration le comportement des parties post6rieur A la conclusion du contrat pour r~soudre les
ambiguTt~s du contrat. Etant donnL que le droit n~o-zM1andais que les parties avaient choisi
comme loi applicable A leur diff6rend, a 6t6 consid~r6 incertain sur ce point ("en quelque sorte
irr~solu"), I'arbitre unique, enclin A accepter de prendre en consideration le comportement
post~rieur A la conclusion du contrat dans des cas d'ambiguit6 contractuelle, a cherch6
confirmation de cette solution au plan du droit compar6, et dans ce cadre s'est surtout r~f6r6
aux articles 4.1, 4.2. and 4.3 des Principes d'UNIDROIT, relevant que "[...] il n'existe
actuellement aucun texte international plus concluant que les Principes d'Unidroit pour r~gir
I'interpr6tation des dispositions du contrat."
L'arbitre unique 6tait A.R. Williams, Q.C., Auckland, Nouvelle Z1ande, qui fait largement
mention des points de droit de I'affaire dans son article "Further Development of International
Commercial Arbitration through the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts", 2 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly (1996), 7 et seq. (17-21).

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Case law summaries -

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UNIDROIT

Principles

UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES - As a means of interpreting the applicable domestic law Article 6.1.9(3).
ARBITRAL AWARD - 1995 - International Court of Arbitration of ICC, Award No. 8240.
MEANS OF INTERPRETING THE APPLICABLE DOMESTIC LAW - UNIDROIT Principles
referred to by arbitral tribunal as a confirmation at international level of a similar rule of
domestic applicable law.
INTEREST RATE applicable to buying back of inventories upon termination of the contract
by agreement - Article 6.1.9(3).

The award concerned a contract of distributorship between parties from Switzerland,


Singapore and Belgium. After termination of the contract by agreement, the question arose as to
how to regulate the buying back of the inventories. Although the parties had indicated Swiss law
as the law governing their contract, the arbitral tribunal, in deciding the rate of exchange to be
chosen for the payment in the local currency, referred to Article 6.1.9(3) of the UNIDROIT Principles
for a confirmation at international level of a similar rule of Swiss law.
Cited by K.P. Berger, "The Lex Mercatoria Doctrine and the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts", 28 Law and Policy in International Business 1997, 943 et seq. (at 982).

19-

UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES - As a means of interpreting the applicable domestic law Article 6.2.1.
ARBITRAL AWARD - 1996 - International Court of Arbitration of ICC, Award No. 8486.
MEANS OF INTERPRETING THE APPLICABLE DOMESTIC LAW - UNIDROIT Principles
referred to by arbitral tribunal as *prevailingview in the field of international commercial
contracts".
HARDSHIP - Exceptional character and requirement of a fundamental alteration in the original
contractual equilibrium, not a mere increase in the cost of performance - Article 6.2. 1.

The award concerned a contract between a Dutch and a Turkish party for the installation
of a machine for the production of lump sugar. The law applicable to the contract was Dutch
law. After the conclusion of the contract the Turkish buyer refused to pay the agreed amount of
the advance payment invoking financial difficulties due to a sudden drop in the market for
lump sugar. After the parties' failure to agree on a revision of the contract, the Dutch seller
declared the contract terminated and claimed damages from the Turkish buyer. The latter invoked
in his defence hardship under Article 6.258 of the new Dutch Civil Code as ground for relief.
In rejecting this argument, the arbitral tribunal stressed the exceptional character of
hardship which required a fundamental alteration in the original contractual equilibrium, not a
mere increase in the cost of performance as in the instant case. In confirmation of this
conclusion, the tribunal referred not only to Article 6.258 of the new Dutch Civil Code, which
was the applicable law, but also to Article 6.2.1 of the UNIDROIT Principles. The reference to the
latter was justified by the argument that in applying Dutch law in an international context attention
should be given to the "prevailing view in the field of international commercial contracts".
Journal du droit international, 1998, 1047. Note by Y. DERAINS.

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PRINCIPES D'UNIDROIT - Moyen pour interpr6ter la Ioi nationale applicable - Article


6.1.9(3).
SENTENCE ARBITRALE - 1995 - Cour internationale d'arbitrage d'ICC, Sentence No. 8240.
MOYEN POUR INTERPRETER LA LOI NATIONALE APPLICABLE - Principes d'UNIDROIT
vis6s par le tribunal arbitral comme confirmation au niveau international d'une r6gle
semblable de la loi nationale applicable.
TAUX D'INTERET applicable au rachat des stocks A la r6vocation amiable du contrat Article 6.1.9(3).

La sentence concerne un contrat de distribution entre des parties situ~es en Suisse, A


Singapour et en Belgique. A la revocation amiable du contrat, la question s'est posse de savoir
comment r~gler le rachat des stocks. Bien que les parties eussent indiqu6 la Ioi suisse pour r~gir
leur contrat, le tribunal arbitral, pour dcider le taux de change A appliquer au paiement en
monnaie locale, s'est r~fr6 A 'article 6.1.9(3) des Principes d'UNIDROIT comme confirmation au
niveau international d'une rfgle semblable en droit suisse.
Cit par K.P. Berger, "The Lex Mercatoria Doctrine and the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts", 28 Law and Policy in International Business 1997, 943 et seq. (at 982).

19-

PRINCIPES D'UNIDROIT - Moyen pour interpreter Ia loi nationale applicable - Article 6.2.1.
SENTENCE ARBITRALE - 1996 - Cour internationale d'arbitrage d'ICC, Sentence No. 8486.
MOYEN POUR INTERPRETER LA LOI NATIONALE APPLICABLE - Principes d'UNIDROIT
vis6s par le tribunal arbitral comme "conviction juridique en vigueur dans le droit des
contrats internationaux'.
HARDSHIP - Caract&e exceptionnel et exigence d'une alt&ation fondamentale dans
I'6quilibre des prestations A I'origine, non pas seulement une augmentation du coot de
I'ex~cution des prestations - Article 6.2. 1.

L'affaire porte sur un contrat conclu entre des parties n~erlandaise et turque pour
'installation d'une machine de production de sucre en morceaux. La loi applicable au contrat
6tait la loi des Pays-Bas. Apr~s la conclusion du contrat, 'acheteur turc a refus6 de verser
I'acompte convenu et a invoqu6 des difficult~s financi~res dues A une chute des prix sur le
march6 du sucre en morceaux. Aprs que les parties aient tent6 sans succ~s de s'accorder sur
une revision du contrat, le vendeur n~erlandais a dclar6 le contrat r~solu et a demand6 des
dommages-intrets A 'acheteur turc. Ce dernier a oppos6 le hardship en vertu de I'article 6:258
du nouveau Code civil nerlandais comme chef d'exon~ration.
Rejetant ce moyen, le tribunal arbitral a soulign6 le caract~re exceptionnel du hardship
qui exigeait une alteration fondamentale dans I'6quilibre des prestations A 'origine, non pas
seulement une augmentation du coOt de I'ex~cution des prestations, comme en I'esp~ce. A
l'appui de cette conclusion, le tribunal s'est r~f~r6 non seulement A I'article 6.258 du nouveau
Code civil hollandais, qui 6tait le droit applicable, mais A I'article 6.2.1 des Principes
d'UNIDROIT. La r~f~rence A ces derniers 6tait justifi~e par I'argument qu'en appliquant le droit
nerlandais A un contrat commercial international, il fallait prendre en consideration "la conviction
juridique en vigueur dans le droit des contrats internationaux".
Journal du droit international, 1998, 1047. Note de Y. DERAINS.

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Case law summaries - UNIDROIT Principles

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UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES - Rules of law governing the contract - Articles 4.6 and 4.8;
Articles 7.4.1, 7.4.7, 7.4.13.
ARBITRAL AWARD No. 8261.

27.IX.1996 -

International Court of Arbitration of ICC, Award

RULES OF LAW GOVERNING THE CONTRACT - References by the tribunal to provisions of


the UNIDROIT Principles, as implicit source of the lex mercatoria.
SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS REFERRED TO : SUPPLYING OMITTED TERMS - Article 4.8;
CONTRA PROFERENTEM RULE - Article 4.6; RIGHT TO DAMAGES - Article 7.4. 1; HARM
DUE IN PART TO AGGRIEVED PARTY - Article 7.4.7; AGREED PAYMENT FOR NONPERFORMANCE - Article 7.4.13.
The case concerned a contract between an Italian company and a governmental agency of
a Middle' East country. The contract did not contain any choice of law clause, since both parties
had insisted on the application of their own national law. In a previous partial award on the
question of the applicable law, the Arbitral Tribunal had declared that it would base its decision
on the "terms of the contract, supplemented by general principles of trade as embodied in the
lex mercatoria." Subsequently, when dealing with the merits of the dispute, it referred, with no
further explanation, to individual provisions of the UNIDROIT Principles, thereby implicitly
considering the latter a source of the lex mercatoria.
Thus, apart from another partial award on some preliminary questions of substance in
which it referred to Articles 4.8 ("Supplying omitted terms") and 4.6 ("Contra proferentem
rule"), in its final award the Arbitral Tribunal invoked Articles 7.4.1 ("Right to damages"), 7.4.7
("Harm due in part to aggrieved party") and 7.4.13 ("Agreed payment for non-performance") in
support of its reasoning.
Cited in M.J. BONELL, An International Restatement of Contract Law
Publications Inc., Ardsley, NY, 1997, 249.

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2 nd

ed., Transnational

UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES - As a means of interpreting the applicable domestic law Articles 1.2 and 1.7; 2.1, 2.6 and 2.12; 3.4, 3.5 and 3.8; 7.4.1-7.4.5, 7.4.7-7.4.9 and
7.4.12.
ARBITRAL AWARD - 4.XII. 1996 - Rome (Italy).
MEANS OF INTERPRETING THE APPLICABLE DOMESTIC LAW - Obligation for the arbitral
tribunal under national rules of procedure to take into account "[..] the trade usages" UNIDROIT Principles referred to by arbitral tribunal as a "parameterof the principles and
usages of international trade".
SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS REFERRED TO : FORMATION of contract - No ascertainable
sequence of offer and acceptance - Articles 1.2, 2.1, 2.6 and 2.12; VALIDITY of contract Mistake - Fraud - Articles 3.4, 3.5 and 3.8; GOOD FAITH - Duty of the parties
throughout the life of the contract - Article 1.7; DAMAGES - Determination - Articles
7.4.1-7.4.5, 7.4.7-7.4.9 and 7.4.12.

The award concerned a contract for the sale of fuel oil between an English and an Italian
company. The contract contained an express reference to Italian law as the law governing the

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PRINCIPES D'UNIDROIT - R6gles de droit r~gissant le contrat - Articles 4.6 et 4.8;


Articles 7.4.1, 7.4.7, 7.4.13.
SENTENCE ARBITRALE - 27.IX.1996 - Cour internationale d'arbitrage d'ICC, Sentence
No. 8261.
REGLES DE DROIT REGISSANT LE CONTRAT - R66rence par le tribunal aux dispositions
des Principes d'UNIDROIT comme source implicite de la lex mercatoria.
DISPOSITIONS MATERIELLES VISEES: OMISSIONS - Article 4.8; REGLE CONTRA PROFERENTEM - Article 4.6; DROIT AUX DOMMAGES-INTtRETS - Article 7.4.1; PREJUDICE PARTIELLEMENT IMPUTABLE AU CREANCIER - Article 7.4.7; INDEMNITE ETABLIE AU CONTRAT Article 7.4.13.

L'affaire porte sur un contrat entre une soci~t6 italienne et une agence gouvernementale
d'un pays du Moyen-Orient. Le contrat ne contenait pas de clause de loi applicable, car chaque
partie avait insist6 pour I'application de son propre droit national. Dans une sentence pr~alable
partielle sur la question du droit applicable, le tribunal arbitral avait d~clar6 qu'il fonderait sa
d6cision sur 'les termes du contrat, compl6t6s par les principes g~nraux du droit tels que
contenus dans la lex mercatoria". Par la suite, en tranchant le diffrend au fond, il s'est r6f&r,
sans autre forme d'explication, A plusieurs dispositions des Principes d'UNIDROIT, consid~rant
implicitement ces derniers comme une source de la lex mercatoria.
Ainsi, outre la r6f~rence faite dans une autre sentence partielle sur des questions pr6liminaires de fond aux articles 4.8 ("Omissions") and 4.6 ("R~gle Contra proferentem"), dans sa
sentence finale, le tribunal arbitral a invoqu6 les articles 7.4.1 ("Droit aux dommages-intrCts"),
7.4.7 ("Prejudice partiellement imputable au cr~ancier") and 7.4.13 ("lndemnit6 6tablie au
contrat") pour motiver sa d6cision.
Cit6 in M.J. BONELL, An International Restatement of Contract Law
Publications Inc., Ardsley, NY, 1997, 249.

21

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ed., Transnational

Moyen pour interpreter la loi nationale applicable - Articles 1.2 et


1.7; 2.1, 2.6 et 2.12; 3.4, 3.5 et 3.8; 7.4.1-7.4.5, 7.4.7-7.4.9 et 7.4.12.

PRINCIPES D'UNIDROIT -

SENTENCE ARBITRALE - 4.XlI. 1996 - Rome (Italie).


MOYEN POUR INTERPRETER LA LOI NATIONALE APPLICABLE - Obligation pour le
tribunal arbitral en vertu des r6gles de proc~dure nationales de prendre en considration
[ ...] les usages commerciaux" - Principes d'UNIDROIT vis6s par le tribunal arbitral comme
un "param~tredes principes et des usages du commerce international".
DISPOSITIONS MATERIELLES VISEES : FORMATION du contrat - Pas de succession certaine
d'offre et d'acceptation - Articles 1.2, 2.1, 2.6 et 2.12; VALIDITE du contrat - Erreur - Dol
- Articles 3.4, 3.5 et 3.8; BONNE FOI - Obligation des parties pendant toute la vie du
contrat - Article 1.7; DOMMAGES-INTERETS - D6termination - Articles 7.4.1-7.4.5,
7.4.7-7.4.9 et 7.4.12.
La sentence porte sur un contrat de vente de mazout entre des soci6t6s anglaise et
italienne. Le contrat contenait une r&f~rence expresse A la loi italienne pour r6gir le contrat.

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contract. However, also in view of the fact that according to Article 834 of the Italian Code of
Civil Procedure in an international arbitration the arbitral tribunal is required to take into
account 'the terms of the contract and the trade usages,' the arbitral tribunal repeatedly
referred to the UNIDROIT Principles - which it expressly defined as a "parameter of the
principles and usages of international trade" - in order to prove that the solutions provided by
Italian law were in conformity with international standards.
In particular, Articles 1.2, 2.1, 2.6 and 2.12 were cited to demonstrate the possibility of
the valid conclusion of a contract even without an ascertainable sequence of offer and
acceptance; Articles 3.4, 3.5 and 3.8 with respect to the extent to which a party may avoid the
contract for mistake or fraud; Article 1.7 to demonstrate the duty of the parties to act in good
faith throughout the life of the contract; and Articles 7.4.1 - 7.4.5, 7.4.7 - 7.4.9 and 7.4.12 for
the determination of damages.
Cited in M.J. BONELL, An International Restatement of Contract Law
Publications Inc., Ardsley, NY, 1997, 244.

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UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES - Rules of law governing the contract - Articles 7.3.1, 7.3.6,
7.4.5.
ARBITRAL AWARD - 20.1.1997 - International Arbitration Court of the Chamber of
Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation, Award No. 116.
RULES OF LAW GOVERNING THE CONTRACT - Agreement by parties that arbitral
tribunal should apply the UNIDROIT Principles.
SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS REFERRED TO : TERMINATION by buyer - Article 7.3. 1;
RESTITUTION of goods delivered - Article 7.3.6; REPLACEMENT TRANSACTION Recovery of price - Article 7.4.5.

The case concerned a sales contract entered into between a Russian trade organisation
and a Hong Kong company. The contract did not contain any choice of law clause, but when
the dispute arose, the parties agreed that the arbitral tribunal should apply the UNIDROIT
Principles to resolve any question not expressly regulated in the contract.
In its decision the Arbitral Tribunal applied a number of individual articles of the
UNIDROIT Principles. More precisely, Article 7.3.1 in order to affirm the right of the Russian
buyer to terminate the contract; Article 7.3.6 with respect to the restitution of the goods
already delivered; and Article 7.4.5 in regard of the buyer's right of to recover the difference
between the contract price and the price of the replacement transaction.
Cited in M.J. BONELL, An International Restatement of Contract Law
Publications Inc., Ardsley, NY, 1997, 252-253.

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Unif. L. Rev. 1999-1

R~sum~s de jurisprudence - Principes d'UNIDROIT

Toutefois, 6tant donn6 que 'article 834 du Code de procedure civile italien pr~voit que dans
'arbitrage commercial international, le tribunal arbitral est tenu de prendre en consideration
"les termes du contrat et les usages commerciaux", le tribunal arbitral s'est r~fr6 A plusieurs
reprises aux Principes d'UNIDROIT - qu'il a express~ment dMfinis comme un "param~tre des
principes et des usages du commerce international" - afin d'6tablir que les solutions du droit
italien 6taient conformes aux crit~res internationaux.
En particulier, les articles 1.2, 2.1, 2.6 et 2.12 furent cites pour appuyer la possibilit6 de la
conclusion valable d'un contrat en 'absence d'une succession certaine d'offre et d'acceptation;
les articles 3.4, 3.5 et 3.8 concernant la mesure dans laquelle une partie peut r~soudre le
contrat pour erreur ou dol; 'article 1.7 pour souligner l'obligation des parties d'agir de bonne
foi durant toute la vie du contrat; et les articles 7.4.1 - 7.4.5, 7.4.7 - 7.4.9 and 7.4.12 pour [a
d~termination des dommages-int~r~ts.
Cit6 in M.J. BONELL, An International Restatement of Contract Law
Publications Inc., Ardsley, NY, 1997, 244.

22-

PRINCIPES D'UNIDROIT 7.4.5.

2 nd

ed., Transnational

R6gles de droit r6gissant le contrat - Articles 7.3.1, 7.3.6,

SENTENCE ARBITRALE - 20.1.1997 - Cour internationale d'arbitrage de la Chambre de


Commerce et d'lndustrie de la F~d~ration de Russie, Sentence NO 116.
REGLES DE DROIT REGISSANT LE CONTRAT - Accord des parties que le tribunal arbitral
appliquera les Principes d'UNIDROIT.
DISPOSITIONS MATERIELLES VISEES : RESOLUTION par I'acheteur - Article 7.3. 1; RESTITUTION des marchandises fournies - Article 7.3.6; CONTRAT DE REMPLACEMENT Recouvrement de la difference de prix- Article 7.4.5.
L'affaire portait sur un contrat de vente conclu entre une organisation de commerce russe
et une soci~t6 de Hong Kong. Le contrat ne contenait pas de clause de loi applicable, mais
lorsque le diffsrend est surgi, les parties ont convenu que le tribunal arbitral appliquerait les
Principes d'UNIDROIT pour r~soudre toute question non express~ment r~gl~e par le contrat.
Dans sa decision, le tribunal arbitral a appliqu6 plusieurs dispositions des Principes
d'UNIDROIT. Plus particuli.rement, 'article 7.3.1 pour affirmer le droit de l'acheteur russe de
r~soudre le contrat; l'article 7.3.6 concernant la restitution des marchandises dsjA livrLes; et
'article 7.4.5 pour ce qui 6tait du droit de 'acheteur de recouvrer la difference entre le prix
prvu aui contrat et le prix du contrat de remplacement.
Cit6 in M.J. BONELL, An International Restatement of Contract Law
Publications Inc., Ardsley, NY, 1997, 252-253.

2 nded.,

Transnational

e466

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173

Case law summaries - Maritime law

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN RULES


RELATING TO BILL OF LADING (Brussels, 1924)
BRUSS. CONV. 1924 (BILLS OF LADING) - AUSTRALIA
Articles 3(1) and (2) and 4(2)(a) of the Convention.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA, 22.X.1998 - Great China Metal Industries Co Limited v
Malaysia International Shipping Corporation Bhd (The 'Bunga Seroja').
LIABILITY OF CARRIER - Damage to goods - "Perils of the sea' defence - Requirements Whether foreseeable or foreseen dangers perils of the sea (yes) - Australian position
compared to foreign case law - Carrier entitled to rely on defence.
In October 1989, plaintiff's cargo was loaded in Sydney for carriage to Keelung (Indonesia).
The vessel proceeded from Sydney to Melbourne and then to Burnie in Tasmania. While crossing
Bass Strait the vessel encountered heavy weather and some of its containers were lost from on
deck. Before leaving Burnie, the vessel received forecasts of heavy weather that it would
encounter crossing the Great Australian Bight to Fremantle. The heavy weather encountered by
the vessel was foreseeable in an area that is notorious for bad weather and was actually foreseen
before departure. The cargo was damaged by pounding during the crossing.
The consignee sued the carrier in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The trial judge
made three important findings of fact:
(a) the vessel was fit in all respects for the voyage when leaving port;
(b) the carrier had discharged its obligations under Article 3(2) of the Convention;
(c) there had been no negligence by the carrier, master or crew in the management of
the vessel. 1
Those findings of fact were challenged on appeal to the New South Wales Court of
Appeal, but upheld unanimously. 2 They were not disturbed on further appeal to the High Court
of Australia.
In one sense, that was sufficient to dispose of the appeal 3 since there had been no breach
of the carrier's obligations under Article 3 of the Convention. However, the court considered in
some detail the meaning of the perils of the sea defence, its history and place in the context of
the Convention as a whole, and the divergence of interpretation between the Anglo-Australian
view on the one hand and a number of decisions, mainly from North America but also some
from the United Kingdom, on the other. 4 The Australian position was also supported by
5
decisions in Germany and France.
The perils of the sea defence had been discussed by the High Court in Shipping Corp of
India v Gamlen Chemical Co. 6 The principal judgment was that of Mason and Wilson JJ in
1

[1994] 1 Lloyd's Law Reports 455 at 470-471.

2
(1996) 39 New South Wales Law Reports 683; see the summary of this decision in Uniform
Law Review 1997, 396.

3
See the joint judgment at 20; McHugh J at 23 and 39; Kirby Jat 49, 66.
4
It is clear that the law of the UK and that of Australia are not as consistent as may previously
have been thought.
5
See General Motors Overseas Operation v SS Goettingen, 225 F Supp 902 at 904-5; TETLEY,
Marine Cargo Claims, 3rd ed. (1988) at 441.
6
(1980) 147 Commonwealth Law Reports 142, 166.

174

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R6sum6s de jurisprudence - Droit maritime

CONVENTION INTERNATIONALE POUR L'UNIFICATION DE CERTAINES REGLES


EN MATIERE DE CONNAISSEMENT (Bruxelles, 1924)
CONV. BRUX. 1924 (CONNAISSEMENT) - AUSTRALIE
Articles 3(1) et (2) et 4(2)(a) de la Convention.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA, 22.X.1998 - Great China Metal Industries Co. Ltd. v
Malaysia International Shipping Corporation Bhd. (The 'Bunga Seroja').
RESPONSABILITE DU TRANSPORTEUR - Avarie de ]a marchandise - Cas except6 des 'perils
de la mer' - Conditions - Danger pr6visible ou danger pr6vu pouvant constituer un "p6ril
de la mer (oui) - Conception australienne au regard de /a jurisprudence 6trang~re Transporteur fond6 A invoquer le cas except6.
En octobre 1989, lacargaison fut remise au transport de Sydney A Keelung (Indon~sie). Le
navire quitta Sydney pour Melbourne, et proc~da vers Burnie (Tasmanie). En traversant le
d~troit de Bass, le navire rencontra gros temps et une partie des conteneurs amarr~s sur le pont
fut jet~e A ]a mer. Avant de quitter Burnie, le navire regut les previsions annon:ant gros temps,
entre le Great Australian Bight et Fremantle. Un temps pareil 6tait prvisible dans une zone
connue pour les perturbations m~t~orologiques, et 6tait de fait pr~vu avant le depart. La
cargaison fut endommag~e par heurts durant latravers~e.
Le destinataire a intent6 une action contre le transporteur devant laSupreme Court of
New South Wales. Le juge du fond a fait trois constatations de fait importantes:
a) le navire 6tait appropriL A tous 6gards pour latravers~e lorsqu'il a quitt6 le port;
b) le transporteur s'6tait acquitt6 de toutes ses obligations en vertu de I'article 3(2) de la
Convention;
c) iln'y avait eu faute ou negligence ni du transporteur, ni du capitaine, ni de I'6quipage dans I'administration du navire 1.
Ces faits furent contest~s en appel devant laNew South Wales Court ofAppeal, qui les confirma
Al'unanimit&2 ,et ils ne furent plus mis en cause dans le pourvoi devant laHigh Court of Australia.
En un sens, cela suffisait pour rejeter le pourvoi 3, puisque le transporteur n'avait pas
manqu6 A ses obligations en vertu de I'article 3 de laConvention. Cependant, laCour a examines de fa on assez approfondie le sens du cas exceptL des "prils de lamer", son historique
et sa place dans le contexte de 'ensemble de laConvention et ladivergence d'interpr~tation
entre laconception anslo-australienne, et celle qui r~sulte d'un certain nombre de d6cisions,
essentiellement en Am~rique du Nord, mais aussi au Royaume-Uni 4. L'approche australienne
est partag~e par des d(cisions rendues en Allemagne et en France 5.
Le cas except des perils de lamer a 6t6 discuts par laHigh Court dans Shipping Corp of India
v Gamlen Chemical Co 6.Le jugement rendu sur I'opinion desJuges Mason et Wilson d~clarait que
1
[1994] 1 Lloyd's Law Reports 455, pp. 470-471.
2
(1996) 39 New South Wales Law Reports 683; voir le r~sum de cette dcision dans laRevue
de droit uniforme 1997, 397.
3
Voir p. 20 du jugement conjoint; Juge McHugh pp. 23 et 39; Juge Kirby, 49, 66.
4
II est clair que lajurisprudence du Royaume-Uni et celle de I'Australie ne sont pas aussi
conformes qu'on pouvait auparavant le croire.
5
Voir General Motors Overseas Operation v SS Coettingen, 225 F Supp 902, p. 904-5; TETLEY,
Marine Cargo Claims, 3d ed. (1988), 441.
6
(1980) 147 Commonwealth Law Reports 142, 166.

Rev. dr. unif. 1999-1

17q

Case law summaries - Maritime law


which they stated at that "sea and weather conditions which may reasonably be foreseen and
guarded against may constitute a peril of the sea".
The Court stressed that the Convention had to be interpreted in a way that acknowledged
their international status, and that uniformity (so far as possible) was to be sought in interpreting
and applying its provisions. 7 A court should prefer the interpretation which has most general
international support. 8 However, an abandonment of Camlen in favour of the US and Canadian
approach would not have achieved uniformity as English, French and German law would have
been different. Otherwise, the desire for a uniform interpretation may well have led to a
different outcome, at least for McHugh J.9 Having considered the alternative interpretation in
detail, the High Court rejected it in favour of its own earlier interpretation in Camlen, which
was more in line with the history and text of the Convention. 10
Justice McHugh observed that the US view of perils of the sea restricts the carrier's
reliance on that defence by reference to the peril's foreseeability; the Australian approach is to
restrict it by reference to the carrier's negligence. 1 1
The High Court rejected a reading of "perils of the sea" that confined them to matters that
were wholly unforeseen. To do so would transform the obligation to use due diligence to make
the vessel seaworthy into an absolute obligation of seaworthiness. This was to deny the history
and development of the Convention in this regard. A seaworthy vessel is fit to encounter
conditions that can reasonably be foreseen and guarded against. If cargo is damaged when
forecast conditions are met by a seaworthy ship despite proper stowage and cargo handling, it
12
would be inconsistent with this history to hold the carrier liable.
The answer in any case is a factual enquiry that considers the seaworthiness of the vessel,
whether the cause of damage was the result of inadequate stowage by the carrier (in breach of
Article 3(2), whether it arose by an act, neglect or default of the master in the navigation or
management of the ship (providing a defence under Article 4(2)(a)), or whether it resulted from
some other cause peculiar to the sea, providing the basis of a peril of the sea defence.
The High Court endorsed the observation of Mason and Wilson JJ in Camlen that perils of
the sea could be foreseeable or, indeed, foreseen. However, the fact that the peril was foreseeable or foreseen, and the steps taken by the carrier *in response, will be important in
determining whether the carrier has discharged its obligations under Article 3 of the
Convention or has been negligent. If negligence is established, the carrier will not be entitled to
rely on the peril of the sea defence (or any other defence in Article 4(2) even if it is otherwise
13
established.
[1999] 1 Lloyd's Law Reports 512.
Summary kindly supplied by Mr Ian Davis.

7
8
9
10
11
12
13

176

See pp. 13ff. of the joint judgment; Kirby J at 58-61.


Kirby I at 59, 60.
See p. 27. See also Kirby ] at 60.
See McHugh I at 27; Kirby J at 65; Callinan J at 89-95.
At 41.
See p. 16 of the joint judgment; McHugh J at 41-42.
See McHugh I at 39.

Unif. L. Rev. 1999-1

R6sum6s de jurisprudence - Droit maritime

"la mer et les conditions m~t~orologiques pouvant 6tre raisonnablement pr6vues et pouvant faire
I'objet de mesures appropri6es sont susceptibles de constituer des perils de lamer".
La Cour a soulign6 que la Convention devait tre interpr6t~e de fagon A respecter son
caractre international, et qu'il fallait rechercher I'uniformit6 (autant que possible) lors de son
interpr6tation et de son application 7. Un tribunal doit pr6frer V'interpr~tation qui a le plus de
soutien au niveau international 8. Toutefois, 'abandon de la jurisprudence Gamlen en faveur
de la conception des USA et du Canada ne r6aliserait pas l'uniformit6 puisque la conception
anglaise, frangaise et allemande resterait divergente, du moins selon le Juge McHugh 9. Apr~s
avoir examin6 de fa on approfondie I'autre interpretation possible, la Cour l'a 6cart~e en faveur
de son interpretation pr6c~dente dans Camlen, qui 6tait plus conforme A 'historique de la
Convention et A son texte 10.
Le Juge McHugh a observ6 que la conception du peril de la mer pr~valant aux USA met la
possibilit6 pour le transporteur d'invoquer le cas except6 en relation avec la pr~visibilit6 du danger,
tandis que la conception austral ienne est de la rapporter , Iafaute ou n~gligence du transporteur 11.
La High Court a rejet6 V'interpr~tation de la notion des "p~rils de la mer" qui confinerait celleci aux 616ments totalement impr~vus. Une telle interpr6tation transformerait I'obligation d'exercer
une diligence raisonnable pour mettre le navire en 6tat de navigabilit6, en obligation absolue de
navigabilit6, ce qui irait A 'encontre des conditions historiques ayant pr~sid6 A [a Convention et qui
ont suivi. Un navire en 6tat de navigabilit6 est en mesure de faire face A des conditions qui peuvent
6tre raisonnablement pr~vues et contre lesquelles on peut prendre les mesures appropri6es. Si la
cargaison est endommag~e alors qu'un navire en 6tat de navigabilit6 fait face aux conditions
annonc6es en d6pit d'un arrimage et d'une manutention appropri~s, il ne serait pas conforme A
'histoire de la Convention de consid~rer que le transporteur est responsable 12.
La r~ponse est fournie en tous cas par 'examen des faits concernant I'6tat de navigabilit6 du
navire, par le fait que le dommage a ou non 6t6 caus6 par la d~fectuosit6 de 'arrimage du
transporteur (en violation de 'article 3(2)), ou par la n~gligence du capitaine dans la navigation
ou dans l'administration du navire (constitutif de cas except6 en vertu de l'article 4(2)(a)), ou par
toute autre cause sp~cifique A la mer permettant d'invoquer le cas except6 de p~ril de la mer.
La High Court a ent~rin6 I'observation des Juges Mason et Wilson dans la jurisprudence
Camlen que les perils de la mer pouvaient avoir 6t6 prvisibles, ou m~me prvus. Cependant,
le fait que le danger 6tait pr6visible ou pr6vu, et les mesures prises par le transporteur A cet
6gard, seront importants pour determiner si le transporteur s'est acquitt6 de ses obligations en
vertu de I'article 3 de la Convention ou bien s'il a 6t6 n~gligent. Si la faute est 6tablie, le
transporteur ne sera pas en droit de se pr~valoir du moyen des p~rils de [a mer (ou de tout autre
cas except6 prdvu A I'article 4(2)), m~me si de tels perils 6taient 6tablis. 13
[1999] 1 Lloyd's Law Reports 512.
Sommaire aimablement communiqu6 par M. Ian Davis.

7
8
9
10

Voir pp. 13 ff. du jugement conjoint; Juge Kirby p. 58-61 .V.


Juge Kirby, 59,60.
V. p. 27. Voir aussi Juge Kirby, 60.
V. Juge McHugh, 27; Juge Kirby, 65; Juge Callinan, 89-95.

11

V.p. 41.

12

V. p. 16 du jugement conjoint; Juge McHugh, 41-42.

13

Juge McHugh, 39.

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177

Case law summaries - Maritime law

BRUSS. CONV. 1924 (BILLS OF LADING) - FRANCE


Articles 1(c), 4(2)(c), 4(5)(e) of the Convention as amended by the 1968 Brussels Protocol.
COUR DE CASSATION (Com. Div.), 7.VII.1998 - GIE Concorde, branche maritime et
transport c/ St6 Des Grands Moulins des Antilles.
A West Indian company bought several grain silos. The sellers placed the transport
arrangements in the hands of a forwarding agent which in its turn contacted two maritime
carriers. The bill of lading was issued by the carriers in Belgium, where the goods were stowed
on deck in open containers. During the voyage, the vessel ran into heavy weather and the
goods were damaged.
(1) ON-DECK CARRIAGE - Clause in bill of lading giving carrier the option of on-deck
carriage - Statement of on-deck carriage (no) - Convention applicable.
The Court held that a clause in the bill of lading giving the maritime carrier the option of
stowing the containers entrusted to it either below or on deck without notifying the shipper of the
master's decision did not throw light, at the time when the bill of lading was made out, on the
decision which would ultimately be taken and hence such a clause did not constitute a statement
of on-deck carriage of the goods, even where these were placed in containers on an appropriately
equipped vessel. As a consequence, the carriage was governed by the Convention.
(2) LIABILITY OF CARRIER - Perils of the sea and carrier's fault - Causal link between
fault and damage (yes) - Carrier liable for full damage.
The court held that while it is true that perils of the sea constitute a defence as to liability,
no relief, not even partial relief, is possible on this ground if the carrier was negligent in not
stowing the containers below deck, and if a causal link has been established between its
negligence and the damage incurred.
(3) LIMITATION OF CARRIER'S LIABILITY - Irregular carriage of containers on deck Commercial negligence - Wilful misconduct or inexcusable negligence (no).
The Court held that the Appeal Court had not given a legal foundation for its decision that the
carrier's stowing of the goods on deck constituted commercial negligence without establishing
whether such negligence might be characterised as wilful misconduct or inexcusable
negligence within the meaning of Article 4(5)(e) of the Convention.
Le Droit Maritime Frangais, 1998, 826, Note P. Bonassies; Bulletin des Transports et de la Logistique, n' 2763,1998, 570; Revue de droit commercial, maritime, a6rien et des transports, 1998, 96.

BRUSS. CONV. 1924 (BILLS OF LADING) -

UNITED KINGDOM

Articles 3(3), 3(4) and 3(8) of the Convention as amended by the 1968 Brussels Protocol.
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION (Commercial Court), 22.V.1998 - Agrosin Pte. Ltd. v
Highway Shipping Co. Ltd. (The 'Mata K').
PARTICULARS IN BILL OF LADING - Bill of lading marked "shipped": 11,000 tonnes";
'gross weight" ... "unknown" - Evidence that 11,000 tonnes were shipped (no) - No
evidence that carrier was asked to issue a bill of lading without the qualification "weight

17

Unif. L. Rev. 1999-1

R6sumds de jurisprudence - Droit maritime

CONV. BRUX. 1924 (CONNAISSEMENT)

- FRANCE

Articles 1(c), 4(2)(c), 4(5)(e) de la Convention modifi6e par le Protocole de Bruxelles de 1968.
COUR DE CASSATION (Ch. com.), 7.V1.1998 - GIE Concorde, branche maritime et
transport c/ St Des Grands Moulins des Antilles.
Une societ6 antillaise a achet6 plusieurs silos A grains. Les vendeurs ont confi6 A un
commissionnaire 'organisation du transport et celui-ci s'est adress6 A deux societes de transport
maritime. Le connaissement a W 6mis par les transporteurs en Belgique ob les materiels ont
W charges sur le pont du navire dans des conteneurs ouverts. Au cours du voyage, le navire a
essuy6 une temp~te et les materiels ont W endommages.
1) TRANSPORT EN PONTEE - Clause du connaissement laissant au transporteur la
facultd de transporter ou non en pont6e - Declaration d'une mise sur le pont (non) Application de la Convention.
La Cour a considr6 que la clause du connaissement aux termes de laquelle le transporteur maritime a la facult6 de charger les conteneurs qui lui sont remis au transport soit en
cale, soit en pontee, sans avoir A aviser le chargeur de la decision du capitaine, ne permet pas,
lors de la creation du connaissement, de connaltre I'opinion qui sera finalement choisie et que
ds lors, une telle clause ne peut tenir lieu de declaration de mise sur le pont de [a marchandise, celle-ci fOt-elle placee en conteneurs sur un navire muni d'installations appropriees. En
consequence, le transport est soumis A la Convention.
2) RESPONSABILITE DU TRANSPORTEUR - P6rils de Ia mer et faute du transporteur- Lien
de causalit6 entre faute et prejudice (oui) - Transporteur responsable de la totalit6 du
pr6judice.
La Cour a relev6 que s'il est exact que les perils de la mer constituent un cas except6 de
responsabilit6, aucune exoneration pour ce motif n'est possible, fit-ce partiellement, d~s lors
que le transporteur a commis une faute en ne plagant pas les conteneurs en cale, et qu'il est
demontr6 le lien de causalit6 entre cette faute et le prejudice subi.
3) LIMITATION DE LA RESPONSABILITE DU TRANSPORTEUR - Transport irr6gulier de
conteneurs en pont6e - Faute commerciale - Faute dolosive ou inexcusable (non).
La Cour a consider que la Cour d'appel n'a pas donn6 de base lgale A sa decision en
qualifiant de faute commerciale le fait pour le transporteur d'avoir place la marchandise en
pontee, sans rechercher si un telle faute pouvait Atre qualifiee de dolosive ou inexcusable au
sens de I'article 4(5)(e) de la Convention.
Le Droit Maritime Frangais, 1998, 826, Note P. Bonassies; Bulletin des Transports et de la Logistique, no 2763, 1998, 570; Revue de droit commercial, maritime, a6rien et des transports, 1998,96.

CONV. BRUX. 1924 (CONNAISSEMENT)

- ROYAUME-UNI

Articles 3(3), 3(4) et 3(8) de la Convention modifi6e par le Protocole de Bruxelles de 1968.
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION (Commercial Court), 22.V.1998 - Agrosin Pte Ltd. v Highway
Shipping Co. Ltd. (The 'Mata K').
MENTIONS DU CONNAISSEMENT - Connaissement d6clarant: "embarqu&': "11.000
tonnes, "poidsbrut': "inconnu" - Preuve que 11.000 tonnes ont 6t6 embarqu6es (non) Preuve non rapportee qu'il a &L' demand6 au transporteur de delivrer un connaissement

Rev. dr. unif. 1999-1

Case law summaries - Maritime law


unknown" - Qualification "weight unknown" null and void (no) - Article 3(4) not
applicable - Grounds.
In 1996, in furtherance of a charterparty, a cargo of potash was shipped at Ventspils
(Latvia). In the bill of lading under "gross weight" there appeared the figure "11,000 MT". The
box marked "SHIPPED" included the words "weight, measure, quality, quantity, condition,
contents and value unknown". The carriage was subject to the provisions of the Hague Rules.
Plaintiffs, assignees of the consignees, claimed against defendants, owners of the ship, in
respect of the shortage of about 27.05 tonnes of final discharge at Sodeguara (Japan).
Defendants submitted that, if less than the total bill of lading quantity was discharged, the
explanation was that the total bill of lading quantity was not shipped. Plaintiffs argued that
defendants were bound by the bill of lading quantity and it was not open to them to say that the
whole quantity was not shipped.
The Commercial Court in the Queen's Bench Division held inter alia that
(1) a bill of lading which stated that 11,000 tonnes of cargo were shipped "quantity
unknown" was not a representation that 11,000 tonnes were shipped;
(2)

(3)
(4)

under Article 3(3) of the Hague Rules plaintiffs had to prove that they demanded a
bill of lading showing the weight of the goods as furnished in writing by them; there
was no suggestion or evidence that plaintiffs asked defendants to issue a bill or
lading showing the shipment of 11,000 tonnes without the qualification "weight ...
unknown";
that being so, there was no basis on which the "weight ... unknown" provision could
be treated as null and void and of no effect under Article 3(8); and
Article 3(4) had no application because the bill of lading was not "such a bill of
lading" (i.e. a bill of lading of the kind referred to in Article 3(3)) so that the bill was
not even prima facie evidence of receipt of 11,000 tonnes of cargo under
Article 3(4).

[1998] 2 Lloyd's Law Reports 454.


Summary kindly supplied by Dr Malcolm Clarke.

BRUSS. CONV. 1924 (BILLS OF LADING) -

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Articles 1(b) and 4(5) of the Convention as amended by the 1968 Brussels Protocol.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, Second Circuit, 21.VIII. 1997 - J.C.B. Sales Ltd., et
al v Wallenius Lines, et al.
(1) BILLS OF LADING OR SIMILAR DOCUMENT OF TITLE - Status of "datafreight
receipts" discussed.
For voyages from Belgium and England to Baltimore (United States of America), the
carrier issued a non-negotiable "datafreight receipt", characterizing it as a contract of carriage.
A Clause Paramount referred to the Hague Rules as enacted in the country of shipment.

180

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R6sum~s de jurisprudence - Droit maritime

sans la mention "poids inconnu" - Mention 'poids inconnu' nulle (non) - Article 3(4)
inapplicable - Raisons.
Le transport d'une cargaison de potasse fut organisd en 1996, sous couvert d'une chartepartie, au depart de Ventspils (Lettonie). Le connaissement portait sous la mention "poids brut" le
chiffre "11.000 MT". La mention indiqu~e comme 'embarqu6' reportait les declarations "poids,
mesure, qualit6, quantit6, 6tat, contenu et valeur inconnus". Le transport 6tait soumis aux R~gles
de La Haye. Les demandeurs subrog~s dans les droits des destinataires se sont pourvus contre les
d~fendeurs propri~taires du navire, pour manque d'environ 2705 tonnes au d~barquement final A
Sodeguara (Japon). Les d6fendeurs ont pr6tendu que si la quantit6 totale indiqu~e au
connaissement n'avait pas &6 d~charg~e, c'6tait parce qu'elle n'avait pas W embarquLe. Les
demandeurs ont invoqu6 que les d~fendeurs 6taient lis par la mention de la quantit6 port~e au
connaissement, et qu'ils n'6taient pas autoris~s A contester la quantit& embarqu~e.
La Commercial Court de la Queen's Bench Division a estim6 notamment:
1) qu'un connaissement d~clarant que 11.000 tonnes de marchandises 6taient embarqu~es "poids inconnu" ne fournit pas une indication que 11.000 tonnes avaient &6
embarqu6es;
2)
qu'en vertu de I'article 3(3) des R~gles de La Haye, les demandeurs devaient
prouver qu'ils avaient exig6 un connaissement faisant apparaltre le poids des
marchandises tel qu'ils I'avaient fourni eux-m~mes par 6crit; or rien n'indiquait ou
ne prouvait que les demandeurs aient exig6 des d6fendeurs qu'ils d~livrent un
connaissement faisant 6tat d'un chargement de 11.000 tonnes sans la mention
"poids ... inconnu";
3) qu'en consequence, il n'y avait aucune raison de consid~rer la clause "poids ...
inconnu" nulle et de nul effet en vertu de 'article 3(8); et
4)
que I'article 3(4) ne se s'appliquait pas en l'esp~ce puisque le connaissement n'6tait
pas "un tel connaissement" (c'est-A-dire un connaissement tel que vis6 A I'article
3(3)) de sorte que le connaissement ne fournissait m~me pas la preuve simple de la
reception de 11.000 tonnes de cargaison en vertu de I'article 3(4).
[1998] 2 Lloyd's Law Reports 454.
Sommaire aimablement communiqu6 par Dr Malcolm Clarke.

CONV. BRUX. 1924 (CONNAISSEMENT)

ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE

Articles 1(b) et 4(5) de la Convention modifi~e par le Protocole de Bruxelles de 1968.


UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, Second Circuit, 22.VIII.1997 - J.C.B. Sales Ltd., et
al v Wallenius Lines, et al.
1) CONNAISSEMENT OU DOCUMENT SIMILAIRE FORMANT TITRE
nique de fret' - Nature.

... -

"Regu 6lectro-

Pour des transports de Belgique en Angleterre et A Baltimore (Etats-Unis d'Am~rique), le


transporteur a 6mis un "regu 6lectronique de fret" ("datafreight receipt") en le qualifiant de
contrat de transport. Une clause Paramount pr6voyait I'application des R~gles de La Haye telles
qu'approuv~es dans le pays de chargement.

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181

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The Court of Appeals discussed, but did not decide, whether the datafreight receipts were
bills of lading.
(2) PACKAGE LIMITATION - Reference by the parties in their contract to the Hague
Rules included the Visby Amendments and displace COGSA even if it were otherwise
applicable.
By incorporating a Clause Paramount, the parties intended the Hague Rules to apply to
the datafreight receipt. Since the Visby Amendments were a variation of the Hague Rules and
had been enacted in both Belgium and England, the higher package limitation of the Visby
Amendments applied to cargo damage claims under the datafreight receipts, even if the latter
were regarded as bills of lading to which COGSA was compulsorily applicable.
124 Federal Reporter, 3d Series, 132; 1997 American Maritime Cases, 2705.
Summary kindly supplied by T.E. Willoughby, Esq.

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION RELATING TO THE LIMITATION OF


THE LIABILITY OF OWNERS OF SEA-GOING SHIPS (Brussels, 1957)
and
CONVENTION ON LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
FOR MARITIME CLAIMS (London, 1976)
BRUSS. CONV. 1957 (LIMITATION OF LIABILITY) - UNITED KINGDOM
LOND. CONV. 1976 (LLMC) - UNITED KINGDOM

Applicable law.
COURT OF APPEAL, 16.VII. 1998 - The 'Herceg Novi' and 'Ming Galaxy'.

APPLICABLE LAW - English forum seised of claim under 1976 Convention while action
brought before a foreign court under 1957 Convention - Inadmissibility of action in
England - Grounds.

In 1996, after a collision between plaintiff's ship 'Herceg Novi' and defendant's ship,
'Ming Galaxy' in Singapore territorial waters, the former sank. Each party made allegations of
fault against the other. Defendants began an action in rem in Singapore. Eight days later,
plaintiffs issued a writ in rem in England. In Singapore, the limitation funds (under the 1957
Convention) would be U.S.$ 2,900,000 unless the collision resulted from the actual fault or
privity of the defendants. In England (under the 1976 Convention), the funds would be about
U.S.$ 5,800,000 unless plaintiffs proved that the collision resulted from the personal act or
omission of defendants committed with intent to cause loss or recklessly and with knowledge
that such loss would probably result.
Plaintiffs' application to stay the action in Singapore failed. On defendants' application for
a stay of the English proceedings, the lower court held, inter alia, that as it might be unjust if
plaintiffs were deprived of the benefit of the 1976 Convention, the sensible course was to make

182

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La Cour a discut6 la question de savoir si les re us 6lectroniques de fret 6taient des


connaissements, mais ne s'est pas prononc(e sur ce point.
2) LIMITATION PAR COLIS - R6rence des parties dans leur contrat aux R~gles de La
Haye avec les amendements des R~gles de Visby 6carte la COOSA m~me si elle aurait dt6
normalement applicable.
En stipulant une clause Paramount, les parties entendaient rendre les R(gles de La Haye
applicables au regu 6lectronique de fret. Etant donn6 que les R~gles de Visby amendent les
R~gles de La Haye et ont 6t6 adopt~es tant en Belgique qu'en Angleterre, le montant de
limitation par colis plus 6lev6 pr(vu par le Protocole de Bruxelles s'applique aux cr(ances pour
dommages A la cargaison conform~ment aux stipulations du re(u 6lectronique de fret, m~me si
les re us 6lectroniques de fret devaient 8tre consid(r~s comme des connaissements auxquels la
COGSA est imp6rativement applicable.
124 Federal Reporter, 3d Series, 132; 1997 American Maritime Cases, 2705.
Sommaire aimablement communiqu6 par T.E. Willoughby, Esq.

CONVENTION INTERNATIONALE SUR LA LIMITATION DE LA RESPONSABILITE


DES PROPRIETAIRES DE NAVIRES DE MER (Bruxelles, 1957)
et
CONVENTION SUR LA LIMITATION DE RESPONSABILITE
EN MATIERE DE CREANCES MARITIMES (LONDRES, 1976)
CONV. BRUX. 1957 (LIMITATION DE RESPONSABILITE) - ROYAUME-UNI
CONV. LONDRES 1976 (LLMC) - ROYAUME-UNI
Loi applicable.
COURT OF APPEAL, 16.V11.1998 - The 'Herceg Novi' and 'Ming Galaxy'.
LOI APPLICABLE - For anglais saisi d'une demande en vertu de /a Convention de 1976
tandis qu'une action est engag6e devant un for 6tranger en vertu de /a Convention de
1957 - Irrecevabilit6 de l'action en Angleterre - Motifs.
En 1996, suite A un abordage entre le navire des demandeurs 'Herceg Novi' et celui des
d~fendeurs 'Ming Galaxy' dans les eaux territoriales de Singapour, le premier sombra. Chacune
des parties invoqua la faute de I'autre. Les d~fendeurs intentrent une action in rem A Singapour.
Huit jours apr(s, les demandeurs introduisirent une action in rem en Angleterre. A Singapour, le
fonds de limitation en vertu de la Convention de 1957 serait de 2.900.000 $US A moins que
'abordage ait r(sult6 de la faute personnelle des d~fendeurs. En Angleterre, en vertu de la
Convention de 1976, le fonds serait d'environ 5.800.000 $US, A moins que les demandeurs
prouvent que I'abordage a r~sult6 du fait ou de l'omission personnels des d6fendeurs, commis avec
I'intention de provoquer un tel dommage ou t(m(rairement et avec conscience qu'un tel
dommage en r6sulterait probablement.
Les demandeurs furent d(bout(s de leur requite de sursis A statuer A Singapour. En
r6ponse A la requete des d~fendeurs de sursis A statuer en Angleterre, le premier juge avait
estim6 entre autres, qu'6tant donn6 qu'il pourrait 6tre injuste de priver les demandeurs du
b6n6fice de la Convention de 1976, la proc6dure raisonnable serait de laisser la Cour de

Rev. dr. unif. 1999-1

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Case law summaries - Maritime law

an order which had the effect of leaving the Singapore court to determine the issue of
responsibility and quantum and then to reconsider the matter. Defendants appealed.
Allowing the appeal, the Court held
(1) that the 1976 Convention had not received anything like universal acceptance;
(2) that to accord a respect for the 1976 Convention beyond that degree of acceptance
would be to deprive sovereign States, to a large extent, of their right to stay with
some other regime: jurisdiction could often be obtained by arresting a vessel in a
1976 country but, if that action were allowed to proceed despite there being a more
appropriate forum where the 1957 Convention prevailed, the 1957 country would
be left with no effective use for its own law; and
(3) that it was impossible to say that substantial justice was not available in Singapore:
any preference for the 1976 Convention had no greater justification than for the
1957 regime for, whereas the 1976 Convention provided a greater degree of certainty, neither Convention was objectively more just than the other.
[1998] 2 Lloyd's Law Reports 454.
Summary kindly supplied by Dr Malcolm Clarke.

BRUSS. CONV. 1957 (LIMITATION OF LIABILITY) - UNITED KINGDOM

LOND. CONV. 1976 (LLMC) - UNITED KINGDOM


Applicable law.
COURT OF APPEAL, 24.V11.1998 - Bouygues Offshore S.A. v Caspian Shipping Co.
APPLICABLE LAW - English forum seised of a claim under the 1976 Convention while an
action is brought before a foreign court under the 1957 Convention - Inadmissibility of
action in England - Grounds.
In 1994 a barge, registered and owned in France, was under tow by a vessel owned by a
Russian company and managed by a Dutch company, from Pointe Noire (Congo) to Cape
Town (South Africa). The towline parted in stormy conditions as the vessels were approaching
Cape Town. The barge was driven ashore and became a total loss. Various applications for
injunctions and other relief were made to the High Court in England, from which leave to
appeal to the Court of Appeal was sought.
The Court of Appeal held inter alia
(1) that the appellate Court could and should look at the global situation in dealing with
the several appeals principally because that was the preferable method of showing
what were essentially interlocutory and procedural problems; and
(2) that proceedings between the time charterer of the barge and the owners of the
barge should be allowed to proceed in South Africa under a legal regime there on
the lines of the 1957 Convention on limitation of liability of shipowners; in that (a)
South Africa was the natural forum for the resolution of the factual disputes
regarding liability; (b) this was the only way in which to minimise the risk of
inconsistent decisions in different jurisdictions.
[19981 2 Lloyd's Law Reports 461.
Summary kindly supplied by Dr Malcolm Clarke.

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R6sumds de jurisprudence - Droit maritime

Singapour statuer sur la question de la responsabilit6 et de son montant, et ensuite de


r~examiner la question. Le d~fendeurs ont fait appel.
La Cour d'appel a fait droit aux pr~tentions des appelants, et a d6cid&
1)
que la Convention de 1976 n'avait regu aucune esp~ce d'acceptation universelle;
2)
qu'une reconnaissance de la Convention de 1976 au delA de ce degr6 d'acceptation
viendrait A priver dans une large mesure les Etats souverains de leur droit de se
soumettre A des regimes diff~rents: la competence du for est souvent obtenue en
saisissant un navire dans un pays soumis A la Convention de 1976 mais si l'on
d~clarait 'action recevable bien que le for le plus appropri6 soit celui ob la
Convention de 1957 est applicable, le pays soumis A la Convention de 1957 se
trouverait dans I'impossibilit6 d'appliquer son propre droit; et
3) que 'on ne peut invoquer I'impossibilit6 d'obtenir veritable justice A Singapour: une
6ventuelle preference pour la Convention de 1976 ne serait pas plus justifi~e que
pour le regime de 1957, car, si la Convention de 1976 offre une mesure plus grande
de certitude, aucune Convention n'est objectivement plus juste que I'autre.
[1998] 2 Lloyd's Law Reports 454.
Sommaire aimablement communiqu6 par Dr Malcolm Clarke.

CONV. BRUX. 1957 (LIMITATION DE RESPONSABILITE)

ROYAUME-UNI

CONV. LONDRES 1976 (LLMC) - ROYAUME-UNI


Loi applicable.
COURT OF APPEAL, 24.V11.1998 - Bouygues Offshore S.A. v Caspian Shipping Co.
LOI APPLICABLE - For anglais saisi d'une demande en vertu de la Convention de 1976
tandis qu'une action est engag6e devant un for 6tranger en vertu de la Convention de
1957 - Irrecevabilit6 de l'action en Angleterre - Motifs.
En 1994, une barge immatricul(e et poss(d(e en France, et exploit~e par une soci~t6
hollandaise, a W remorqu~e par un navire d'une soci~t6 russe de Pointe Noire (Congo) A la Ville
du Cap (Afrique du Sud). Le cAble de remorque se rompit pendant une temp~te A proximit6 de la
ville du Cap et la barge se perdit en haute mer. Plusieurs actions en r~f(r( et autres demandes furent
form(es devant la High Court en Angleterre, dont les decisions furent contest~es en appel.
La Court of Appeal a estim6 notamment:
1)
la juridiction d'appel pourrait et devrait examiner la situation globale en joignant les
diff~rents recours principalement parce que c'est la meilleure m(thode pour aborder
des problmes de nature essentiellement interlocutoire et proc~durale; et
2) que I'action entre l'affr(teur Atemps de la barge et les propri~taires de la barge engag~e en Afrique du Sud sur la base d'un r(gime juridique suivant celui de la Convention de 1957 sur la limitation de la responsabilit6 des propri(taires de navire de mer
devrait suivre son cours, puisque (a) I'Afrique du Sud 6tait le for naturel pour r~gler les
controverses de fait en mati~re de responsabilit6; et que (b) c'6tait IAla seule fa on de
r(duire le risque que soient rendues des d(cisions divergentes dans diff(rents pays.
[1998] 2 Lloyd's Law Reports 461.
Sommaire aimablement communiqu6 par Dr Malcolm Clarke.

Rev. dr. unif. 1999-1

Case law summaries - Maritime law

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE CARRIAGE


OF GOODS BY SEA (Hamburg Rules, 1978)
HAMBURG 1978 - FRANCE
Article 30(3) of the Convention.
COUR D'APPEL DE PARIS (5th Ch. Sect. A), 3.XII.1997 - M. le Capitaine du navire 'Teesta'
et autres contre S.A. Cargill International Antigua et autres.
APPLICATION OF CONVENTION - Non-ratification by France - Rules of application
under Article 30(3) - Convention not applicable - Jurisdiction governed by national law.
The instant case followed a decision by the Paris Tribunal de commerce of 4.11.1997,
which had declared itself competent under the Convention on the ground that the nonratification by France of the Hamburg Convention did not prevent its application (cf. Uniform
Law Review 1998, 191).
The Paris Cour d'appel reversed that decision on the grounds that since Article 30(3) of
the Hamburg Convention stipulates that "each Contracting State shall apply the provisions of
this Convention to contracts of carriage by sea concluded on or after the date of the entry into
force of this Convention in respect of that State", the Convention is not applicable in France
since France has not ratified it, no matter whether the French Parliament approved it. As a
consequence, the Court held that the Convention's rules of jurisdiction do not override French
domestic law.
Bulletin des Transport et de Ia Logistique, 1998, 478.

HAMBURG 1978 - UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


Articles 2, 20(1) and 23 of the Convention.
DISTRICT COURT, District of Maryland, 7.X.1996 - Compaffia Sud Americana de
Vapores, S.A. v I.T.O. Corp. of Baltimore, et al.
CONTRACT CLAUSE DEROGATING FROM THE CONVENTION - Clause Paramount in the
bill of lading designates COGSA as the applicable law - Transport from a non-Contracting
State (United States of America) to a Contracting State (Chile) - Application of two-year
limitation period under the Hamburg Convention - Grounds.
The bill of lading for a crane being shipped from Baltimore, Maryland to Chile contained
a COGSA Clause Paramount as well as provisions extending COGSA to the period before
loading and giving a stevedore the benefit of COGSA (Himalaya Clause).
A one-year statute of limitations for cargo claims applied under COGSA. The Hamburg
Rules, as enacted by Chile, applied to inbound cargoes, had a two-year time bar for cargo
claims, and nullified any bill of lading terms which diminished the rights of cargo owners.

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CONVENTION DES NATIONS UNIES SUR LE TRANSPORT


DE MARCHANDISES PAR MER (Rgles de Hambourg, 1978)
HAMBOURG 1978 - FRANCE

Article 30(3) de la Convention.


COUR D'APPEL DE PARIS (51" Ch. Sect. A), 3.X11.1997 - M. le Capitaine du navire
'Teesta' et autres contre S.A. Cargill International Antigua et autres.
APPLICATION DE LA CONVENTION - Non-ratification par la France - Rqgles d'application en vertu de Particle 30(3) - Convention non applicable - Juridiction comp~tente
d6termin~e en vertu du droit national.
Cette affaire fait suite A la dcision du Tribunal de commerce de Paris du 4.11.1997 qui s'6tait
dclar6 comptent en vertu de la Convention, puisque [a non-ratification par la France de la
Convention de Hambourg ne faisait pas obstacle A son application (voir Revue de droit
uniforme 1998, 191).
La Cour d'appel de Paris a r~form6 le jugement du Tribunal de commerce de Paris, en
consid~rant que I'article 30(3) de la Convention de Hambourg 6non ant que "chaque Etat
contractant appliquera les dispositions de la pr~sente Convention aux contrats de transport par mer
qui seront conclus A partir de I'entr~e en vigueur de la Convention Ason 6gard", la Convention ne
peut recevoir application en France au motif que ce pays ne I'a pas ratifi~e, peu important que le
Parlement frangais I'ait approuv~e. Par consequent, la Cour a consid~r6 que les r~gles de
competence de la Convention ne s'imposaient pas au regard de la loi interne frangaise.
Bulletin des Transports et de Ia Logistique, 1998, 478.

HAMBOURG 1978 - ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE


Articles 2, 20(1) et 23 de /a Convention.
DISTRICT COURT, District of Maryland, 7.X.1996 - CompaFifa Sud Americana de
Vapores, S.A. v I.T.O. Corp. of Baltimore, et al.
CLAUSE CONTRACTUELLE DEROGEANT A LA CONVENTION - Clause Paramount du
connaissement d6signant la COGSA comme loi applicable - Transport d'un Etat non
contractant (Etats-Unis d'Am6rique) vers un Etat contractant (Chili) - Application de la
priode de prescription de deux ans en vertu de la Convention de Hambourg - Motifs.
Le connaissement pour le transport d'une grue de Baltimore, Maryland (Etats-Unis) au
Chili contenait une clause Paramount d~signant la COGSA comme loi applicable ainsi que des
dispositions 6tendant la COGSA A la p~riode prc~dant le chargement et donnant A I'acconier le
b~n~fice de la COGSA (clause Himalaya).
La COGSA pr~voit une prescription annale pour les rclamations concernant la marchandise. Les R~gles de Hambourg, adoptes par le Chili, s'appliquent aux transports A destination
du Chili, pr~voient une prescription de deux ans pour les actions en responsabilit6 pour la
marchandise, et sanctionnent de nullit6 les clauses du connaissement qui r~duisent les droits
des propri~taires de la marchandise.

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Case law summaries - Maritime law /Air law


The crane was damaged by a stevedore on the pier in Baltimore while being positioned for lifting aboard ship, and was never loaded onto the vessel. When subrogated
cargo underwriters threatened to sue the carrier in Chile, the carrier settled with them more
than one year, but less than two years, after the casualty. The carrier then sued the
stevedore in the United States for indemnity of the settlement. The stevedore alleged that in
settling with the cargo underwriters the carrier was a volunteer because the underwriters'
claim was time-barred.
A Chilean court would have applied the two-year time bar of the Hamburg Rules to any
suit there by the cargo underwriters. Accordingly, the carrier had not been a volunteer since the
claim against it was not time-barred at the time of the settlement.
940 Federal Supplement 855, 1997 American Maritime Cases 362.
Summary kindly supplied by Michael Marks Cohen, Esq.

CONVENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN RULES RELATING TO


INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE BY AIR (Warsaw, 1929)
WARSAW CONV. 1929 - FRANCE
Articles 24 and 28 of the Convention.
COUR DE CASSATION (1 t Civ. Div.), 25.XI. 1997- Pakistan International Airlines c/Bejon.
COURT HAVING JURISDICTION - Convention's requirements as to jurisdiction for an
action against the air carrier not fulfilled - The court competent to rule on claims against
a defendant (the manufacturer of the aircraft) is also competent to rule on actions under
the Convention against an air carrier.
An Airbus A 300 aircraft operated by Pakistan International Airlines crashed in Nepal in
1992, killing all passengers and crew. The families of several of the victims applied to the High
Court of Justice at Toulouse (France), residence of Airbus Industrie, the aircraft manufacturer,
for a summary judgment against the manufacturer and the carrier for an advance on the
compensation to be paid.
The court held the claim against the carrier inadmissible and declined its jurisdiction on geographical grounds since the requirements set out in Article 28 of the Convention had not been met.
The Toulouse Courd'appel seised ofan appeal againstthis decision held I that the jurisdiction
of the lower court in Toulouse was not in question with respect to the claim against the aircraft
manufacturer, on the ground in particular of the latter's place of residence, and that "the jurisdiction
of that same court with regard to Pakistan International Airlines appeared to run counter to the
requirements of the Warsaw Convention ...
which in its Articles 24 and 28 provides that in
principle, any action for damages against the carrier can only be brought subject to the conditions
and limits set out in this Convention, before the court having jurisdiction where the carrier is
ordinarily resident, or has his principal place of business, or has an establishment by which the
contract has been made or before the Court having jurisd iction at the place of destination."
1

188

Cour d'appel de Toulouse (3 d Civ. Div.), 20.Vl.1995; Gazette du Palais -1998(1 'sem.), 286.

Unif. L. Rev. 1999-I

R6sum6s de jurisprudence - Droit maritime / Droit a6rien

La grue fut endommag~e par I'acconier sur le m6le A Baltimore alors qu'elle stait
pr~sent6e sous palan pour ktre hiss6e A bord du navire, et n'a pu ftre charg6e sur celui-ci.
Lorsque les ayants-droit subrog6s de la cargaison ont menac6 d'intenter I'action contre le
transporteur au Chili, celui-ci est parvenu A un r~glement amiable plus d'un an mais moins de
deux ans apr~s l'6vLnement. Le transporteur a ensuite intent6 une action contre I'acconier au
Etats-Unis pour obtenir paiement de l'indemnit6 de la transaction. L'acconier a invoqu6 que
dans I'arrangement intervenu avec les ayants-droit de la cargaison, le transporteur avait agi de
sa propre initiative parce que 'action 6tait prescrite.
Un tribunal chilien aurait applique la p6riode de prescription de deux ans des R~gles de
Hambourg A toute action intent6e sur cette base par les ayants-droit de la cargaison. En
cons6quence, le transporteur n'avait pas agi de sa propre initiative puisque 'action A son
encontre n'Ltait pas prescrite au moment de la transaction.
940 Federal Supplement 855, 1997 American Maritime Cases 362.
Sommaire aimablement communiqu6 par Michael Marks Cohen, Esq.

CONVENTION POUR L'UNIFICATION DE CERTAINES REGLES RELATIVES AU


TRANSPORT AERIEN INTERNATIONAL (Varsovie, 1929)
CONV. VARSOVIE 1929 - FRANCE

Articles 24 et 28 de /a Convention.
COUR DE CASSATION ("

Ch. civ), 25.XI.1997 - Pakistan International Airlines c/ Bejon.

TRIBUNAL COMPETENT - Chefs de competence pr~vus par la Convention pour agir


contre le transporteur a~rien non r6unis - Tribunal comp6tent pour statuer sur /a
demande dirigde contre un d6fendeur (le constructeur de l'aronef) est aussi competent
pour statuer sur une action en vertu de Ia Convention contre un transporteur a6rien.
Un avion Airbus A 300 exploit6 par la compagnie adrienne Pakistan International Airlines
s'est cras6 en 1992 au Npal, entrainant la mort de tous les passagers et membres d'6quipage. Les
ayants droit de plusieurs victimes ont saisi le Tribunal de grande instance de Toulouse (France),
domicile du constructeur de I'a&onef Airbus Industrie, d'une demande de r6f~r6 A 1'encontre du
constructeur et du transporteur afin d'obtenir une provision Avaloir sur 'indemnisation future.
Le juge des r~f6r6s a dclar6 la demande dirig6e contre le transporteur irrecevable et s'est
d~clar6 territorialement incompetent du fait que les chefs de competence 6nonc~s 'article 28
n'6taient pas r~unis.
La Cour d'appel de Toulouse, saisie d'un recours contre cette dscision, a relev6 1 que la
competence du tribunal de Toulouse n'6tait pas discut6e A I'6gard de la demande dirig~e contre
le constructeur de I'a6ronef, notamment en raison de son domicile, et que " la competence de
cette m~me juridiction A I'6gard de Pakistan International Airlines se heurte apparemment aux
dispositions de la Convention de Varsovie ... dont les articles 24 et 28 disposent en principe,
que les actions en responsabilit6 contre le transporteur a~rien ne peuvent 6tre exerc~es que
dans les conditions et limites de cette Convention, devant le tribunal soit du domicile de ce
transporteur, soit du si~ge principal de son exploitation, soit du lieu ob il poss~de un
6tablissement qui a conclu le contrat soit du lieu de destination".
1

Courd'appel deToulouse (3ech.civile), 20.Vi.1995; Gazettedu Palais-1998(1 sem.), 286.

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Case law summaries - Air law

However, in confirming its jurisdiction, the Cour d'appel held that "given the silence of
the Warsaw Convention, where there are related claims involving more than one defendant,
one of which comes under the jurisdiction of the French court seised, the rules of jurisdiction
applicable in French law under Article 42 of the new code of civil procedure are bound to
apply ... "
The Cour de Cassation upheld the decision of the Cour d'appel on this point, recalling
that "there exists no express provision in the Warsaw Convention according to which a court
competent to give a ruling on an action against a defendant ceases to be competent with regard
to a related action against an air carrier." 2
Revue franqaise de droit a~rien et spatial, 1998, 154.

WARSAW CONV. 1929 -

FRANCE

Article 17 of the Convention.


COUR D'APPEL DE PARIS (s" Civ. Div.), 29.IV.1998 - Look Voyages c/ Generali France,
Air Libert6 et autres.
CAPACITY OF CARRIER - Travel organiser - Liability for damage to passenger's luggage
during air transport - Convention applicable (no) - Common law applicable (yes).
A tour operator sold two plane tickets from Paris (France) to Teneriffe (Spain) to a travel
agency, which then sold them to a customer, indicating on the booking slip that the
passenger was permanently bound to an electric wheelchair. The flight was performed by an
airline company under a charter contract with the tour operator. The wheelchair was
damaged on the outward journey and destroyed on the return flight. The tour operator, which
asserted that it was acting as the contractual carrier, claimed limitation of its liability under
the Convention.
The cour d'appel held that the tour operator's business was to sell tourist services to
travel agencies which in their turn retailed them to private customers. As a consequence,
since the tour operator had acted as a travel agent and not as a carrier, its liability for damage
to passenger's luggage was not governed by the Warsaw Convention but by common law.
The court added that even if the operator were to be regarded as a carrier on the grounds of
the air charter contract and the issuing of tickets, it would nevertheless remain liable with
regard to these activities under the common law.
Revue franqaise de droit a~rien et spatial, 1998, 230.

2
See the decision on the merits of the Cour d'appel de Toulouse (7.V11.1998) in Revue fran~aise
de droit a~rien et spatial, 1998, 307, which held that evidence had been adduced of the carrier's
inexcusable negligence, rendering it fully liable.

190

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R~sums de jurisprudence - Droit a6rien

Cependant, pour se d~clarer comp~tente, la Cour d'appel a jug6 que "dans le silence de
la Convention de Varsovie, pour le cas de demandes connexes avec pluralit6 de d~fendeurs
dont I'un rel ve de la competence de la juridiction fran aise saisie, les r~gles de competence
du droit frangais pr~vues A I'article 42 du nouveau code de procedure civile ont vocation A
s'appliquer
La Cour de Cassation a confirm6 sur ce point I'arrCt de la Cour d'appel, en jugeant que "il
n'existe dans la Convention de Varsovie aucune disposition expresse selon laquelle la
juridiction comp~tente pour statuer sur la demande dirig~e contre un d~fendeur ne pourrait
1' tre pour se prononcer sur une demande connexe dirig~e contre un transporteur a~rien". 2
Revue frangaise de droit a~rien et spatial, 1998, 154.

CONV. VARSOVIE 1929 - FRANCE


Article 17 de la Convention.
COUR D'APPEL DE PARIS 0" Ch. civ), 29.IV.1998 - Look Voyages c/ Generali France,
Air Libert6 et autres.
QUALITE DE TRANSPORTEUR - Organisateur de voyages - Responsabilit6 pour
dommages au bagage' du voyageur pendant le transport a6rien - Application de /a
Convention (non) - Application du droit commun (oui).
Un organisateur de voyages (tour operator) vend A une agence de voyages deux billets
d'avion de Paris (France) ATnriffe (Espagne); celle-ci les revend A un client et mentionne sur
le coupon de reservation du billet que le passager utilisait en permanence un fauteuil roulant
6lectrique. Durant le transport, qui est effectu6 par une compagnie adrienne aux termes d'un
contrat d'affr~tement avec I'organisateur de voyages, le fauteuil roulant est endommag6 A l'aller
et d~truit au retour. L'organisateur de voyage, qui pr6tend avoir la qualit6 de transporteur
contractuel, invoque la limitation de sa responsabilit6 en vertu de la Convention.
La Cour d'appel consid~re que le tour operator avait pour activit6 la vente de prestations
touristiques A des agences de voyages qui les commercialisaient elles-m~mes aupr~s de la
clientele de particuliers; ds lors qu'il s'6tait comport6 en agence de voyages et non en
transporteur, sa responsabilit6 pour les dommages au bagage du passager est soumise non pas A
la Convention de Varsovie, mais au droit commun. La Cour ajoute que quand bien m~me la
qualit6 de transporteur lui serait reconnue sur le fondement de la convention d'affr~tement d'un
avion et de I'mission de billets, sa responsabilit6 resterait engag~e au regard de telles activit~s
sur la base du droit commun.
Revue frangaise de droit a6rien et spatial, 1998, 230.

666
2
V. i'arr~t au fond de la Cour d'appel de Toulouse (7.VII.1998) dans la Revue frangaise de droit
adrien et spatial, 1998, 307, qui a consid~r6 que la preuve avait &6 rapport~e de la faute inexcusable du
transporteur mettant en jeu sa responsabilit6 illimit~e.

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191

Case law summaries - Air law

WARSAW CONV. 1929 - UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


Articles 17, 22, 24 and 25(1) of the Convention.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, Second Circuit, 15.VI.1 998 - Shah v Pan American
World Services, Inc., et al.
(1) LIABILITY OF CARRIER - Death and bodily injury of passengers during a hijacking Fraudulent misrepresentation of effectiveness of security program - Wilful misconduct
(yes) - Cause of damage (no) - Limitation of carrier's liability.
Passengers who were injured, and the families of passengers killed in the hijacking of an
international flight, sought to recover damages above the Convention limit on liability, arguing
airline wilful misconduct because the airline had fraudulently misrepresented the effectiveness
of its security program. While such misrepresentation did constitute wilful misconduct,
recovery above the limit was denied since a jury found that the hijacking would have occurred
even if an effective security program had been in place.
(2) WILFUL MISCONDUCT - 'Si le dommage provient de son dol ... " - A potential
difference between the English translation and the authentic French text - Issue not
considered on appeal.
The argument was made that the authentic French text of the Convention had been
mistranslated as requiring injuries to be "caused" by wilful misconduct. Plaintiffs asserted that it
should be read as requiring injuries to "arise from" the wilful misconduct. Plaintiffs, however,
failed to raise the issue at trial in their requests for jury instructions and the issue was therefore
not before the court on appeal.
148 Federal Reporter, 3d Series, 84.
Summary kindly supplied by Michael Marks Cohen, Esq.

WARSAW CONV. 1929 -

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Article 17 of the Convention.


UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, Third Circuit, 23.VII.1998 - Terrafranca v Virgin
Atlantic Airways Ltd., et al.
CONVENTION SUPPLIES EXCLUSIVE REMEDY - In the absence of bodily injury, there can
be no recovery for psychic distress on board the aircraft.
During a flight from the United States to London (United Kingdom), the passengers were
informed of a bomb threat which later turned out to be a hoax. One of the passengers suffered
extreme emotional distress during the flight which carried over to a long period after the flight
had ended.
The Convention supplies the exclusive remedy for injuries while airborne. In the absence
of bodily injury, there can be no recovery for such psychic distress.
151 Federal Reporter, 3d Series, 108.
Summary kindly supplied by Michael Marks Cohen, Esq.

192

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R6sumes de jurisprudence - Droit a6rien

CONV. VARSOVIE 1929 - ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE


Articles 17, 22, 24 et 25(1) de /a Convention.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, Second Circuit, 15.V1.1998 - Shah v Pan American
World Services, Inc., et al.
1) RESPONSABILITE DU TRANSPORTEUR - Mort et lesions corporelles de voyageurs
pendant une prise d'otages - Apparence mensong6re donnde de l'efficacit6 du programme de s6curit6 - Dol (oui) - Cause du prejudice (non) - Limitation de /a responsabilit6 du transporteur.
Des passagers blesses et des families de passagers tu~s durant une prise d'otages sur un
vol international ont cherch6 A obtenir une indemnisation au-delA des limites de responsabilit6,
en invoquant le dol de la compagnie adrienne qui avait fait valoir de fagon mensongere
l'efficacit6 de son programme de securit6. Bien qu'une telle apparence soit constitutive de dol,
l'indemnisation au-delA des limites n'a pas Lts accord~e car le jury a estim6 que la prise
d'otages aurait eu lieu mme si un programme de securit6 efficace avait 6t6 mis en place.
2) DOL - "Si le dommage provient de son dol..." - Difference possible du sens de /a
traduction anglaise par rapport A la version frangaise authentique - Question non
examin6e en appel.
II fut observe que I'expression "si le dommage provient de son dol..." de version frangaise
authentique avait 6t6 traduite de fa(on incorrecte en anglais en exigeant que le dommage soit
caus6 par le dol ("caused by" au lieu de "arise from"). Les demandeurs n'ont pas soulev6 cette
question dans leurs conclusions A ['intention du jury, et la Cour d'appel n'a donc pas 6t6 saisie
de cette question.
148 Federal Reporter, 3d Series, 84.
Sommaire aimablement communiqu6 par Michael Marks Cohen, Esq.

CONV. VARSOVIE 1929 - ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE


Article 17 de la Convention.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, Third Circuit, 23.VII.1998 - Terrafranca v Virgin
Atlantic Airways Ltd., et al.
LA CONVENTION FOURNIT UN FONDEMENT EXCLUSIF A L'ACTION - En l'absence de
l6sions corporelles, le prejudice psychique A bord de t'adronef n'ouvre droit A aucune
r6paration.
Durant un vol entre les Etats-Unis et Londres, les passagers furent informes d'une alerte A
la bombe qui s'est av~ree &tre un canular. L'un des passagers a subi un choc 6motionnel
extreme qui s'est prolong6 longtemps apr~s la fin du vol.
La Convention fournit le fondement exclusif A I'action pour le prejudice subi durant le
vol. En I'absence de lesions corporelles, il ne peut y avoir aucune indemnisation pour le
prejudice psychique.
151 Federal Reporter, 3d Series, 108.
Sommaire aimablement communique par Michael Marks Cohen, Esq.

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193

Case law summaries - Air law / Carriage by road

WARSAW CONV. 1929 -

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Articles 17 and 24 of the Convention as amended by the 1975 Montreal Protocol No. 4.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 12.1.1999 - El Al Israel Airlines v Tseng.
(1) CONVENTION SUPPLIES EXCLUSIVE REMEDY - In the absence of bodily injury, there
can be no recovery for emotional distress caused during embarkation.
(2) MONTREAL PROTOCOL NO. 4 - Clarifies that the Convention's remedy was and is
exclusive for any injury during embarkation.
Plaintiff claimed for emotional harm arising from an intimate pre-boarding security search
in New York for a flight to Israel.
Reversing the Court of Appeals1 , the Supreme Court held that plaintiff was not entitled to
rely on domestic law for a remedy since the Convention, even before Montreal Protocol No. 4,
supplied the exclusive remedy for injury during embarkation and plaintiff suffered no bodily
injury which was required before a recovery for emotional harm too could be granted.
67 United States Law Week 4036.
Summary kindly supplied by Michael Marks Cohen, Esq.

CONVENTION ON THE CONTRACT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE


OF GOODS BY ROAD (CMR) (Geneva, 1956)
GENEVA CONV. 1956 (CMR) - GERMANY
Articles 9, 27 and 32(2) of the Convention.
OBERLANDESGERICHT HAMM (Final Judgment), 7.xI.1996 - (18 U 77/96).
The dispute arose out of an international transport operation in which plaintiff, a freight
forwarder, contracted with defendant carrier for the carriage of automobile parts by road from
Germany to Austria. On 11 July 1994, shortly before crossing the Austrian border, carrier's
lorry was implicated in a major road accident and its entire load lost. The very next day,
plaintiff lodged its prospective claims in a written notice to defendant, holding the latter
"precautionarily liable for any costs". After a preliminary expert assessment of the damage,
-defendant's insurers offered compensation on 9 May 1995 in the amount of DM 242,000, in
settlement of all claims arising out of the accident, while plaintiff's attorneys objected and
claimed a further DM 29,700. Since both defendant and its insurers denied any further
payment, suit was brought on 17 August 1995 for that part of the damage exceeding the upfront
compensation paid, but plaintiff now quoted excess damages of DM 44,750 to allow for bank
charges, interest and attorneys' fees (which were claimed at trial for the first time).
The District Court dismissed the case on its merits. On appeal, defendant denied liability
for any damages exceeding its upfront payment and pleaded the limitation period laid down in
Article 32 CMR. The appellate court eventually found for plaintiff.
1

See Uniform Law Review 1997, 624.

Unif. L. Rev. 1999-1

Rdsum6s de jurisprudence - Droit adrien / Transport routier

CONV. VARSOVIE 1929 - ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE


Articles 17 et 24 de /a Convention modifi6e par le Protocole de Montreal n' 4 de 1975.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 12.1.1999 - El Al Israel Airlines v Tseng.
1) LA CONVENTION FOURNIT UN FONDEMENT EXCLUSIF A L'ACTION - En I'absence
de I6sions corporelles, le pr6judice 6motionnel durant I'embarquement n'ouvre droit A
aucune r6paration.
2)
PROTOCOLE DE MONTREAL n 4 - Prgcise que la Convention fournissait et fournit
le fondement exclusif pour toute action pour 16sion corporelle durant I'embarquement.
La demanderesse a intent6 une action pour le pr~judice 6motionnel drivant des procedures
de s6curitd par fouille corporelle pr~c6dant l'embarquement ANew York d'un vol pour Israel.
Annulant I'arriat de la Court of Appeals 1, la Supreme Court juge que la demanderesse n'6tait
pas en droit de fonder son action en responsabilit6 sur le droit interne car la Convention, mgme
avant I'entr6e en vigueur du Protocole de Montr~al n14, fournit le fondement exclusif pour toute
action pour pr6judice durant l'embarquement, or la demanderesse n'a subi aucune I6sion
corporelle qui est une condition pour I'octroi d'une indemnit6 pour le pr6judice motionnel.
67 United States Law Week 4036.
Sommaire aimablement communiqu6 par Michael Marks Cohen, Esq.

CONVENTION RELATIVE AU CONTRAT DE TRANSPORT INTERNATIONAL DE


MARCHANDISES PAR ROUTE (CMR) (Geni~ve, 1956)
CONV. GENEVE 1956 (CMR) - ALLEMAGNE
Articles 9, 27 et 32(2) de la Convention.
OBERLANDESGERICHT HAMM (jugement final), 7.XI.1996 - (18 U 77/96).
Le litige derive d'un transport international dans lequel le demandeur, un commissionnaire de transport, a charg6 un transporteur, d~fendeur A 'action, de 'acheminement par
route de pi~ces d'automobiles d'Allemagne en France. Le 11 juillet 1994, peu avant la frontire
autrichienne, un accident mettant en cause le camion du transporteur a caus6 la perte de la
totalit6 de la cargaison. Le jour suivant, le demandeur a pr~sentL ses reclamations dans un avis
6crit au d~fendeur, indiquant qu'il se r6servait de tenir ce dernier responsable de tout le
prejudice caus6 par le dommage. Apr~s une premiere expertise du dommage, l'assureur du
d~fendeur a offert, le 9 mai 1995, une indemnitL de 242.000 DM, en r~glement de toutes les
rclamations d~rivant de 'accident, et les avocats du demandeur ont demand6 29.700 DM en
sus de ce montant. Le d~fendeur et son assureur refusant cette requ6te, l'action en justice a W
engag~e le 17 ao0t 1995 pour la partie du dommage en sus de I'indemnitd pay6e A I'amiable,
et le demandeur a pr~tendu A ce stade A une indemnit6 de 44.750 DM au titre de frais
bancaires, int~rgts et honoraires d'avocat (invoqu~s pour la premiere fois A 'instance).
La Cour de premiere instance a rejet6 'action. En appel, le dfendeur a conclu au rejet de sa
responsabilit6 pour tout dommage en sus du paiement amiable eta oppos6 le dslai de prescription
6tabli A 'article 32 de la Convention. La Cour d'appel a fait droit aux pr~tentions du demandeur.
1

V. Revue de droit uniforme 1997, 625.

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Case law summaries - Carriage by road


(1) CONSIGNMENT NOTE - Prima facie evidence of the parties to the contract of
carriage.
Under the relevant cause of action, Article 17(1) CMR, a first issue had arisen as to
whether plaintiff had any substantive claim against defendant at all, since the consignment note
designated two other companies as sender and carrier. However, the court looked at the true
facts of the case and considered as established by documentary evidence that the carriage
contract in question had been entered into by plaintiff and defendant. An action under Article
17 CMR lies between the actual parties to a carriage contract. German courts, in accordance
with Article 9 CMR, have consistently held consignment notes and any statements therein to be
no more than a rebuttable presumption.
(2) INTEREST ON COMPENSATION UNDER THE CONVENTION - Scope of Article 27(1)
provisions on rate of interest - No compound interest under CMR - Damage arising from
delayed payment of compensation (attorneys' fees) - Governed by Article 27 (no) Subject to compensation under national law (yes).
The second issue concerned the possible exclusive effect of Article 27 CMR, since the
defendant's initial refusal to pay full compensation had caused expenditure over and above
the conceded interest of 5 %. Most of all, an attorney's intervention had become necessary,
and so the question arose whether restitution of legal fees caused by delayed payment of
CMR compensation was barred by Article 27 CMR. While some German scholars hold that in
cases governed by CMR any compensation for loss of or damage to the goods (Article 17
CMR) is necessarily governed by the limitations in Article 23 et seq. of the Convention, the
court in the instant case expressly ruled to the contrary. Following a judgment by the
German Federal Supreme Court 1 and in line with mainstream thinking among German
scholars, the Hamm Court of Appeals held that Article 27(1) CMR only excluded claims for
interest on compensation exceeding the statutory rate of 5%, whereas all damage other than
interest caused by delayed payment of compensation remained unimpaired and might be
recovered under CMR or the appropriate provisions of national law. In the court's opinion,
the wording and scope of Article 27 CMR did not justify its application beyond the question
of interest. As a consequence, plaintiff's claim for compound interest could not be granted,
since Article 27(1) CMR only allowed for interest on the amount of compensation itself.
Attorney's fees, on the other hand, were not barred by that provision and were due as part of
plaintiff's damages under the principles governing non-performance of obligations under the
applicable German law.
(3) LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - Suspension by non-specific written claim - Plaintiff's
written claim seeking compensation for full damage - Limitation suspended for all claims
arising out of the accident except where otherwise provided in Article 32(2).
The Court likewise rejected defendant's reliance on the CMR limitation provisions
(Article 32), since the limitations period had been suspended by plaintiff's letter of 12 July
1994 (Article 32(2)). Since that letter had stated plaintiff's intent to seek compensation for the
full damage, its suspensive effect was held by the court to extend to all possible claims
arising out of the accident. Although plaintiff subsequently limited its claim to an amount
which did not cover the full extent of the damage, under the original comprehensive suspension of the limitation period all possible claims for damages continued to be enforceable,
whether specified or not. For the first time in a German court, it was held that the suspensive
1

196

BGH (1 ZR 193/89), 10.X.1991, VersR 1992, 383.

Unif. L. Rev. 1999-1

R6sumes de jurisprudence - Transport routier

1)

LETTRE DE VOITURE - Preuve simple des parties au contrat.

Une premiere question 6tait de savoir si 'action au fond du demandeur en vertu de


'article 17 contre le defendeur Ltait recevable puisque la lettre de voiture designait deux autres
soci~tes comme expediteur et transporteur. La Cour a examine les circonstances reelles de
I'affaire et a estim6 qu'il existait la preuve que le contrat de transport en question avait 6t6
conclu par le demandeur et le defendeur. L'article 17 fournit une action aux parties veritables A
un contrat de transport. Les tribunaux allemands, conformement A 'article 9 CMR ont
reguli~rement estims que la lettre de voiture et les mentions contenues dans celle-ci ne
constituent qu'une pr~somption simple.
2) INTERETS DE L'INDEMNITE VISEE PAR LA CONVENTION - Portee des dispositions de
'article 27(1) concernant le taux des intdr~ts - Pas d'int6r~ts compos6s en vertu de la
CMR - Pr6judice ddrivant du retard de paiement de l'indemnitd (honoraires d'avocat) Soumis 'article 27 (non) - Soumis A reparationen vertu du droit national (oui).
Le deuxi~me point portait sur la question de savoir si 'article 27 est d'application exclusive,
puisque le refus initial du defendeur de payer la totalit6 de l'indemnit6 a entrane des frais
depassant l'inter~t prevu de 5%. Surtout, les services d'un avocat ont W necessaires, et il fallait
6tablir si l'article 27 faisait obstacle A la restitution des honoraires d'avocat en rapport avec le
retard de paiement d'une indemnit6 due en vertu de la CMR. Tandis qu'une partie de la doctrine
allemande pense que dans les cas relevant de la CMR, l'indemnit6 pour perte ou avarie de la
marchandise (article 17) est imperativement soumise aux limites 6tablies aux articles 23 et
suivants de la Convention, la Cour a en I'esp~ce expressement tranch6 en sens contraire.
Conformement A une decision de la Cour supreme d'Allemagne federale 1 et , I'opinion
majoritaire de la doctrine allemande, la Cour d'appel de Hamm a decide que 'article 27(1) CMR
fait obstacle aux seules reclamations visant Ades interts de I'indemnitL superieurs au taux legal
de 5/o, tandis que le prejudice derivant du retard de paiement de l'indemnit6 n'est pas concern6
et ouvre droit A indemnisation en vertu de la CMR ou des dispositions pertinentes de la loi
applicable. De l'avis de [a Cour, eu 6gard aux termes et Ala portee de 'article 27 CMR, il n'est pas
justifi6 de reconnaitre A cette disposition des effets au-delA de la seule question des intrts. En
consequence, la pretention du demandeur concernant les inter~ts composes n'a pu 8tre accueillie
puisque 'article 27(1) ne traite que la question de l'indemnit6 m~me, en revanche, les honoraires
d'avocat ne sont pas exclus par cette disposition et sont dus comme partie du prejudice du
demandeur en vertu des principes de l'inexecution des obligations en droit applicable allemand.
(3) PRESCRIPTION DE L'ACTION - Suspension par r6clamation 6crite g6n6rale - R6clamation 6crite du demandeur visant /a reparation de l'entier pr6judice - Suspension de la
prescription pour toutes les creances r6sultant de l'accident sous reserve des seuls cas
vises Particle 32(2).
La Cour a rejet6 'exception invoquee par le defendeur concernant la prescription en vertu
de 'article 32 CMR, puisque celle-ci avait W suspendue par la lettre du demandeur du 12
juillet 1994 (article 32(2)). Puisque celle-ci avait fait 6tat de l'intention du demandeur d'obtenir
reparation de I'enti~ret6 du prejudice, la Cour a estim6 que 'effet suspensif s'6tendait A toutes
les creances resultant de I'accident. Quoique le demandeur ait par la suite limit6 sa reclamation
A une somme qui n'6puisait pas la totalit6 du prejudice subi, la suspension globale de la
prescription faite A 'origine maintenait le droit d'opposer toutes les demandes de reparation du
prejudice, qu'elles aient 6t6 ou non precisees. Pour la premiere fois dans la jurisprudence
allemande, il a &6 decide que 'effet suspensif d'une reclamation inconditionnelle faite
1

BGH (1ZR 193/89), 10.X.1991, VersR 1992, 383.

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197

Case law summaries - Carriage by road


effect brought about by an unconditional claim pursuant to Article 32(2) CMR cannot be
limited or terminated by any subsequent acts other than those expressly listed in sentences 1
and 2 of that provision.
Since plaintiff's claim was not formally rejected until defendant responded at trial, the
action for damages brought within the limitation period was therefore admissible.
Transportrecht 1998, 459.
Summary kindly supplied by Dr Christian Jung.

GENEVA CONV.1956 (CMR) - GERMANY

Article 29(1) of the Convention.


BUNDESGERICHTSHOF (final instance), 16.VII.1998 - (1 ZR 44/96).
DEFAULT EQUIVALENT TO WILFUL MISCONDUCT - Definition of qualified default under
new German transport law - Intentional recklessness a new standard - Requirements of
qualified default tightened by new legislation - Applicable to contracts concluded after 1
July 1998.
LIABILITY OF CARRIER - Gross negligence - Duty of care where the place of the damage
is uncertain - Presumption of causal link between negligence and damage.
The case before the German Federal Supreme Court arose out of a carriage of textiles by
road from Morocco to Germany at a fixed price, which the parties had contracted for in March
1994. The intended route ran from Morocco to Disseldorf (Germany) via Spain, France and
Belgium. Upon unloading the truck, the driver found that the back doors had been forced open
somewhere along the route and over 1,500 units of the consignment stolen. Exactly where the
damage occurred was never established. The consignee's transport insurers, which had paid full
compensation, sued the carrier for damages in excess of the limits set by Article 23(3) CMR on
the ground of gross negligence due to the lorry's insufficient security system and because the
carriage had been effected using only one driver. The carrier denied gross negligence, arguing
that it was impossible to assess how much security was needed since plaintiff was unable to
establish where the theft had actually occurred. Carrier's information indicated that Spain,
France and Belgium were not especially dangerous countries where a second driver was
needed. Moreover, the carrier disputed the element of causality, since plaintiff had never
established that the loss would not have occurred if the lorry had been equipped with
electronic anti-burglary devices and had been in the charge of two drivers.
The dispute eventually (16 July 1998) ended up before the German Federal Supreme
Court. In the interim, the German national transport law had been thoroughly amended and
one of the reforms in the new legislation which entered into force on 1 July 1998 concerned
the carrier liability rules relating to transport operations by road, rail, inland waterway and air.
As Article 29(1) CMR refers to the national law of the forum for purposes of defining the
degree of default sufficient to overcome the limitation of damages under Article 23(3), the court
was faced with the question of whether the amended German legislation had any impact on
that definition of qualified default. In a long-standing line of precedents, German courts have

198

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R~sum~s de jurisprudence - Transport routier

conform~ment A l'article 32(2) CMR ne peut tre limit6 ou termin6 par des actes autres que
ceux qui sont express~ment 6numrss dans les premiere et deuxi~me phrases de cette
disposition.
Etant donn6 en I'esp~ce que le rejet formel de la reclamation du demandeur n'est
intervenu que Iorsque le d~fendeur s'est constitu6 A 'action, l'action en r~paration engag~e
avant I'expiration du d~lai de prescription est recevable.
Transportrecht 1998, 459.
Sommaire aimablement communiqu6 par Dr Christian Jung.

CONV. GENEVE 1956 (CMR) - ALLEMAGNE


Article 29(1) de /a Convention.
BUNDESGERICHTSHOF (derni6re instance), 16.VII.1 998 - (1 Z 44/96).
FAUTE EQUIVALENTE AU DOL - D0finition en vertu de la nouvelle l6gislation allemande
en mati~re de transports - Tfm~rit6 intentionnelle retenue comme nouveau crit~re Conception plus restrictive de la faute dans la nouvelle l6gislation - Applicable aux
contrats conclus apr~s le I juillet 1998.
RESPONSABILITE DU TRANSPORTEUR - Faute grave - Precaution requise lorsque le lieu
du dommage est inconnu - Prdsomption de causalit6 entre /a faute et le dommage.
L'affaire portLe devant la Cour supreme d'Allemagne f~d~rale concernait un transport par
route Aforfait de textiles du Maroc en Allemagne, selon un contrat conclu par les parties en mars
1994. L'itin~raire pr~vu allait du Maroc A Disseldorf (Allemagne) via I'Espagne, la France et la
Belgique. Au moment du d~chargement du camion, le conducteur a d~couvert que les portes
arri~res avaient &6 fractur~es et que plus de 1500 unites du chargement avaient W voles.
L'assureur du destinataire pour le transport, qui a pay6 la totalit6 de l'indemnit6, a intentL 'action
contre le transporteur pour les dommages en sus des limites 6tablies par 'article 23(3) CMR, en
invoquant la faute grave en raison des syst~mes de scurit6 insuffisants du camion et parce que le
transport avait &6 effectu6 avec un seul conducteur. Le transporteur conclut A I'absence de faute
grave en invoquant I'incertitude quant au niveau de scurit6 exig6 puisque le demandeur n'6tait
pas en mesure d'indiquer pr~cis~ment le lieu du vol. Selon les informations du transporteur,
I'Espagne, la France et la Belgique n'6taient pas des pays r~put~s pour Otre particuli~rement
dangereux et demandant la presence d'un second conducteur. Par ailleurs le transporteur
contestait I'existence d'un lien de causalit6 puisque le demandeur n'avait pas 6tabli que la
presence d'un second conducteur ou d'un 6quipement contre le vol aurait vit la perte.
A 'issue des diff~rents recours I'affaire fut port~e, le 16 juillet 1998, devant la Cour supreme
d'Allemagne f~d~rale. Le 1 juillet 1998 6tait entree en vigueur une r~forme de fond de la I6gislation nationale allemande en matire de transport, concernant notamment la r~glementation de
la responsabilits du transporteur par route, rail, voies de navigation int~rieures et air.
Etant donn6 que 'article 29(1) se r~f~re A la loi nationale de la juridiction saisie pour d~finir
le degr6 de la faute de nature A franchir les limites de responsabilit6 en vertu de Particle 23(3), la
Cour devait trancher la question de savoir si la Iegislation allemande amend~e avait une incidence sur cette qualification. Dans la ligne de toute une srie de precedents, les tribunaux

Rev. dr. unif. 1999-1

Case law summaries - Carriage by road

always considered gross negligence as the degree of default equivalent to wilful misconduct
within the meaning of Article 29(1) CMR. Several of the new provisions under the 1998 reform,
however, are functionally equivalent to Article 29 CMR, all of which require "recklessness with
knowledge that damage would probably result". What the German legislator had in mind was
to harmonise carrier liability in national law and to bring it into line with prevailing standards in
international transport treaties such as the Visby Rules (Article 4(5)(e)) or the 1955 Protocol to
the Warsaw Convention (Article 25).
With this landmark decision, the German Federal Supreme Court announced a clear
break, for future cases, with the traditional definition of default equivalent to wilful misconduct
under German law. Damage claims based on carriage contracts entered into after 1 July 1998
will no longer be decided on the gross negligence standard. The benchmark for default
equivalent to wilful misconduct under Article 29(1) CMR will henceforth be "recklessness with
knowledge that damage is likely to result", which marks an overall tightening of the requirements for qualified default. In future, even a particularly severe violation of the duty to take
care, as in the case of gross negligence, will not suffice; it must be accompanied by the carrier's
knowledge that damage will probably result.
The case at hand was not affected by the new standard, the underlying contract having
been concluded in 1994 and the new rules do not apply retroactively. The traditional gross
negligence test therefore governed the court's decision, but under its stricter rules on liability
the carrier could certainly not be acquitted of the reproach of default equivalent to wilful
misconduct.
To begin with, the defence of uncertainty as to the safety measures required was thrown
out. The court held that in transport operations, where the scene of the damage cannot be
determined, the standard of precaution must be assessed according to the requirements for the
riskiest sector. Second, inability to adduce evidence of a causal link between breach of duty
and damage is no defence in transport cases of this kind. Where gross negligence on the part of
the carrier is established and if there are substantial odds that actual misconduct might have led
to the damage that in fact occurred, German courts will infer a presumption of causality. It is up
to defendant (here the carrier) to adduce counter-evidence for rebuttal. That argument
underlying previous decisions was in the instant case affirmed by the highest German civil
court.
Since the facts presented in trial court were not sufficient to settle the question of gross
negligence, the case was ultimately remanded.
Transportrecht 1999, 19.
Summary kindly supplied by Dr Christian Jung.

GENEVA CONV. 1956 (CMR) -

UNITED KINGDOM

Articles 1, 4 and 6 of the Convention.


COURT OF APPEAL, 9.VII.1998 - Gefco UK Ltd v Mason.
CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY ROAD - 'Umbrella" contract - Convention
applicable.

200

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Rdsum6s de jurisprudence - Transport routier

allemands ont toujours estim6 la faute lourde comme 6tant le degr6 de faute 6quivalant au dol au
sens de 'article 29(1) CMR. La r~forme du droit allemand des transports de 1998 a toutefois
introduit plusieurs dispositions fonctionnellement 6quivalentes A 'article 29 CMR, qui requi~rent
toutes la t~m6rit6 avec la conscience de la probabilits du dommage. Par ces amendements, le
l6gislateur allemand a express~ment voulu harmoniser la responsabilit6 du transporteur en droit
national avec le regime contenu dans les trait~s internationaux en matire de transport tels les
RLgles de Visby (article 4(5)(e)) ou le Protocole de 1955 Ala Convention de Varsovie (article 25).
Operant un revirement de jurisprudence, la Cour supreme d'Allemagne f~d~rale a 6nonc6
pour I'avenir une nouvelle d~finition de faute consid~r~e comme 6quivalente au dol en droit
allemand. Les actions en responsabilit6 d~rivant de contrats de transport conclus apr~s le 1
juillet 1998 ne se verront plus appliquer le crit~re de la faute grave, et Apartir de cette date, le
critre appropri6 aux fins de determiner si une faute est 6quivalente au dol en vertu de I'article
29(1) CMR, sera la tsmdrit6 avec la conscience de la probabilit6 du dommage en r6sultant.
Dans 'ensemble, cela implique des conditions plus restrictives concernant la faute. Certaines
violations particuli~rement graves de I'obligation de garde, incluses dans la faute grave, ne
suffiront plus d~sormais; A I'avenir, elles devront Otre accompagn~es de la conscience qu'un
dommage pourra probablement en r~sulter.
Le cas d'esp~ce n'est pas soumis Ala nouvelle qualification parce que le contrat de base a
6t6 conclu en 1994, et les amendements du droit allemand des transports ne s'appliquent pas
r6trospectivement. C'est pourquoi la Cour a appliqu6 le crit~re de la faute lourde, mais sous ce
regime plus s~vere de responsabilit6, le transporteur pouvait d'autant moins pr~tendre ne pas
avoir commis une faute 6quivalente au dol.
En premier lieu, 'incertitude invoqu~e du niveau de s6curit6 des 6quipements n'a pas &6
consid6re comme un argument fond6. La Cour a au contraire estim6 que dans les operations
de transport, lorsque le lieu oO s'est produit le dommage ne peut tre 6tabli, le degr6 requis
pour les mesures de s~curit6 sera appr6ci6 au regard des lieux pr~sentant les plus hauts risques.
En deuxi~me lieu, une absence de lien de causalit6 entre l'inex6cution d'une obligation et le
dommage ne constitue pas un moyen de defense dans des cas de transport comme celui
d'espce. D~s lors que la faute grave du transporteur est 6tablie, et que le comportement fautif
effectif pourrait avec une importante probabilit6 avoir caus6 le dommage survenu, les tribunaux
allemands en tirent une pr6somption de causalit6. C'est au d6fendeur, en 'occurrence le transporteur, qu'il appartient d'apporter la preuve contraire. Ce raisonnement qui a 6t6 expos6 dans
des d~cisions ant~rieures a 6t6 r6affirm6 par la plus haute juridiction civile allemande.
Etant donn6 que les faits pr~sent~s devant les juges du fond n'6taient pas suffisants pour
permettre de trancher sur la question de la faute lourde, I'affaire a en definitive W renvoy6e.
Transportrecht 1999, 19.
Sommaire aimablement communiqu6 par Dr Christian Jung.

CONV. GENEVE 1956 (CMR) -

ROYAUME-UNI

Articles 1, 4 et 6 de la Convention.
COURT OF APPEAL, 9.VI1.1998 - Gefco UK Ltd v Mason.
CONTRAT DE TRANSPORT DE MARCHANDISES PAR ROUTE - Contrat cadre - Convention
applicable.

Rev. dr. unif. 1999-1

201

Case law summaries - Carriage by road / Carriage by rail

The dispute was between plaintiff sub-carrier, G, and defendant carrier, M. The latter had
been engaged for a number of years by a large retail company to carry goods from Coventry
(Un'ted Kingdom) to the retailer's premises in France. The Court held that the "umbrella"
contract between G and M, a framework for individual contracts for each journey governed by
the CMR, was also governed by the CMR.
The Court reasoned that to call a contract an umbrella contract did not mean that it was
not governed by the CMR, because the CMR applied to "every" contract of carriage: Article 1(1).
On the one hand, by its very nature it was not a contract which could contain the particulars,
such as the description of goods and number of packages, required by Article 6. On the other
hand, Article 1(1) appeared to be a complete and self-contained description of contracts to
which the CMR applies. Moreover, the absence altogether of a consignment note does not
affect the applicability of the CMR: Article 4. The Court considered that a condition that it must
be possible to include particulars, should not be implied inter alia because to imply conditions
would be contrary to the purpose of harmonisation; and that, therefore, the CMR applied to the
umbrella contract.
[1998] 2 Lloyd's Law Reports 585.
Summary kindly supplied by Dr Malcolm Clarke.

COTIF 1980 - UNIFORM RULES CONCERNING THE CONTRACT FOR


INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY RAIL (CIM)
CIM 1980

GERMANY

Articles 34, 36, 37 and 40.


OBERLANDESGERICHT SAARLAND, 26.Xl.1996 - (4 U 403/95-176).
(1)

INABILITY TO DELIVER - Sale of the goods.

A consignment of tractors carried from Bulgaria to Germany by rail could not be delivered
owing to consignee's bankruptcy. After several attempts to inform the consignor, a Bulgarian
company, of this fact, the German railways arranged for the goods to be sold. Since the sale of
the tractors resulted in their loss to plaintiff (the consignor), the latter brought an action against
the railways to secure both the proceeds of the sale and damages.
The lower court (Landgericht) held that plaintiff had no claim other than payment of the
surplus proceeds of the sale.
(2)

LIABILITY OF RAILWAYS - Compensation for loss.

The court of appeals (Oberlandesgericht) found for plaintiff and upheld its right to
damages on the ground of strict liability of the railways in accordance with Article 36(1) CIM.
Defendant produced no evidence as to fault on plaintiff's part, unavoidable circumstances or
any other ground for exoneration. Since none of the messages sent to inform plaintiff of the

202

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R6sum=6s de jurisprudence - Transport routier / Transport ferroviaire

Le litige mettait en cause le sous-transporteur demandeur, G, et le transporteur d~fendeur,


M. Ce dernier avait 6t6 charg6 pendant plusieurs ann~es par une grande soci~t6 de distribution
de d~tail de transporter des marchandises de Coventry (Royaume-Uni) en France dans les
locaux du d~taillant. La Cour a estim6 que le contrat cadre entre G et M, servant de base aux
diffsrents contrats pour chaque transport soumis AlaCMR, 6tait lui
aussi r~gi par laCMR.
La Cour a estim6 que ce n'6tait pas parce que le contrat 6tait qualifi6 de contrat cadre
qu'il n'6tait pas soumis A laCMR d~s lors qu'en vertu de I'article 1(1) laCMR s'appliquait A
"tout" contrat de transport. D'une part, en raison de sa nature mme, ce contrat ne peut
contenir les mentions exig~es A I'article 6 concernant ia description des marchandises et le
nombre de colis. D'autre part, I'article 1(1) se pr~sente comme une description exhaustive des
contrats auxquels laCMR s'applique. En outre, en vertu de 'article 4, I'absence totale de lettre
de voiture n'affecte pas I'application de laCMR. La Cour a estim6 que la possibilit6 d'inclure
des mentions au contrat de devait pas 6tre comprise comme une condition, notamment parce
que les conditions implicites allaient A l'encontre de I'objectif d'harmonisation, et elle a en
consequence estim6 que laCMR 6tait applicable au contrat cadre.
[1998] 2 Lloyd's Law Reports 585.
Sommaire aimablement communiqud par Dr Malcolm Clarke.

COTIF 1980 - REGLES UNIFORMES CONCERNANT LE CONTRAT DE TRANSPORT


INTERNATIONAL FERROVIAIRE DES MARCHANDISES (CIM)
CIM 1980 -

ALLEMAGNE

Articles 34, 36, 37 et 40.


OBERLANDESGERICHT SAARLAND, 26.XI.1996 - (4 U 403/95-176).
1)

EMPECHEMENT A LA LIVRAISON

Vente de la marchandise.

Un envoi de tracteurs transport6 par chemin de fer de Bulgarie en Allemagne n'a pu Ctre
livr6 Acause de la faillite du destinataire. Apr~s quelques tentatives pour pr~venir I'exp~ditrice,
une entreprise bulgare, le chemin de fer allemand a procd6 A la vente de lamarchandise.
Comme lavente des tracteurs a provoqu6 laperte de lamarchandise pour lademanderesse,
exp~ditrice de la marchandise, celle-ci a intent6 une action contre le chemin de fer non
seulement pour obtenir le produit de lavente, mais 6galement les dommages-int~r~ts.
Le tribunal de premiere instance (Landgericht) a estim6 que la demanderesse ne pouvait
pas faire valoir des pr~tentions allant au-delA du versement de V'exc~dent du produit de la
vente.
2)

RESPONSABILITE DU CHEMIN DE FER - lndemnitd pour perte.

La Cour d'appel (Oberlandesgericht) a donn6 suite A I'appel de lademanderesse et


reconnu son droit aux dommages-intr ts eu 6gard A la responsabilits objective du chemin de
fer conform~ment Al'article 36(1) CIM. Le d6fendeur n'a pu prouver ni lafaute de I'exp~ditrice,
ni des circonstances in~vitables, ni un autre motif d'exon&ation. Comme aucun des messages

Rev. dr. unif. 1999-1

203

Case law summaries - Carriage by rail

inability to delivery reached the consignor, its failure to issue instructions could not be regarded
as fault having caused the damage.
Transportrecht 3/1998, 119; Bulletin des transports internationaux ferroviaires, 5/1998, 267.
Text of the decision and summary kindly supplied by Ms Eva Hammerschmiedov (Secretariat
of the Intergovernmental Organisation for International Railway Transport (OTIF) (Berne)).

COTIF 1980 - UNIFORM RULES CONCERNING THE CONTRACT FOR


INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS AND THEIR LUGGAGE BY RAIL (CIV)
CIV 1980 - AUSTRIA
Articles 41(49, 42 and 51(3).
SUPREME COURT OF AUSTRIA, 5.X11.1996 - (6 Ob 2200/961).
LIABILITY OF RAILWAYS - Transport of motor vehicles - Liability for articles left on the
vehicle - Loss of right to rely on limitation of liability.
Plaintiff brought an action against the railway to obtain compensation for damage
incurred after its car was burgled while travelling aboard a drive-on carriage. The Court held
the railways liable on the following grounds:
(1)

A railway company, not unaware that cars travelling on drive-on carriages are
frequently burgled during stops, is under an obligation to take whichever safety
measures are necessary.

(2)

In the case at hand, the fact that no precautions were taken to avoid the damage
constituted gross negligence. As a consequence, the railway is liable for theft
committed in the cars it is transporting, and cannot rely on the limitation of liability
provided for in Article 41(4) CIV.

(3)

The fact that the owner of the car involved in the theft booked his passage through a
travel agency cannot be relied upon to argue that by so doing, he waived his rights
against the railway company.

Zeitschrift fOr Verkehrsrecht, 6/1998, 190; Bulletin des transports internationaux ferroviaires,
6/1998, 387.
Text of the decision and summary kindly supplied by Ms Eva Hammerschmiedov (Secretariat
of the Intergovernmental Organisation for International Railway Transport (OTIF) (Berne)).

204

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Rdsum~s de jurisprudence - Transport ferroviaire

concernant I'emp~chement A la livraison n'est parvenu A l'exp6ditrice, son omission de donner


des instructions ne peut 6tre consid~rde comme une faute ayant caus6 le dommage.
Transportrecht 3/1998, 119; Bulletin des transports internationaux ferroviaires, 5/1998, 267.
Texte de l'arr~t et sommaire aimablement communiqu6s par Madame Eva HammerschmiedovJ
(Secretariat de l'Organisation intergouvernementale pour les transports internationaux ferroviaires (OTIF) (Berne)).

COTIF 1980 - REGLES UNIFORMES CONCERNANT LE CONTRAT DE TRANSPORT


INTERNATIONAL FERROVIAIRE DES VOYAGEURS ET DES BAGAGES (CIV)
CIV 1980 - AUTRICHE
Articles 41(4), 42 et 51(3).
COUR SUPREME D'AUTRICHE, 5.X11.1996 - (6 Ob 2200/961).
RESPONSABILITE DU CHEMIN DE FER - Transport des v6hicules automobiles - Responsabilit6 pour les objets plac6s dans le v6hicule - D&chance du droit d'invoquer les
limites de responsabilit6.
Le demandeur a intent6 une action en responsabilit6 contre le chemin de fer pour obtenir
une indemnisation du dommage caus6 A la suite d'un vol avec effraction dans sa voiture
pendant le transport par train autos accompagn~es. La Cour a conclu A la responsabilit6 du
chemin de fer en se basant sur les considerations suivantes:
1)

2)

3)

Une entreprise de chemin de fer, qui n'ignore pas que des vols avec effraction sont
r(gulirement commis pendant les arr~ts en cours de route dans les v~hicules
transport(s par train autos accompagn~es, est tenue de prendre les mesures de
pr(caution qui s'imposent.
Le fait d'omettre toute mesure de prevention contre le dommage constitue dans ce
cas une faute lourde de telle sorte que 'entreprise de chemin de fer r6pond des vols
commis dans les v(hicules transport~s sans pouvoir invoquer les limites de
responsabilit(! pr(vus A I'article 41(4) CIV.
On ne saurait se fonder sur le fait que le d(tenteur de la voiture concern~e par le vol
a r~serv6 son voyage dans une agence de voyage pour en d(duire qu'il a renonc6 A
faire valoir des droits contre 'entreprise de chemin de fer.

Zeitschrift for Verkehrsrecht, 6/1998, 190; Bulletin des transports internationaux ferroviaires,
6/1998, 387.
Texte de 'arr&t et sommaire aimablement communiqu6s Madame Eva HammerschmiedovA
(Secr6tariat de l'Organisation intergouvernementale pour les transports internationaux ferroviaires (OTIF) (Berne)).

Rev. dr. unif. 1999-1

205

Case law summaries - Carriage by rail /Travel contract

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON TRAVEL CONTRACTS (CCV)


(Brussels, 1970)
BRUSS. CONV. 1970 (CCV) - BELGIUM
Article 13 of the Convention.
VREDEGERECHT ANTWERPEN (1s' Distr.), 31.1.1996 - 0. Truyen, D. Vanhumbeeck
v D & D Reizen bvba, Belgium International Travel nv (Transcruise).
LIABILITY OF TRAVEL ORGANISER UNDER THE CONVENTION - Organiser relieved of
liability by proof that the service provider acted with due diligence - Whether travel
organiser entitled t6 limit its liability under the general conditions of the maritime carrier
- Conditions.
There is a travel contract and not merely a contract of carriage where, as the counterpart
for payment of a global sum, combined services are provided including carriage by sea,
carriage by road, meals, accommodation and entertainment. The Convention (CCV) is therefore
applicable.
Where a party acts as a "tour operator" or travel organiser, or at least gives the impression
of acting in that capacity, he cannot rely on the fact that he only acted as a travel agent. An
action can therefore be brought against him for damage suffered during a cruise unless he can
prove that, in accordance with Article 13 of the CCV, the person who provided the services to
his order acted with due diligence.
The travel organiser cannot rely on the limitation of liability mentioned by the carrier by
sea in the general written conditions on the travel ticket, where those conditions were not
brought to the attention of the traveller at the time of the conclusion of the travel contract.
European Transport Law, 1998, 694.
Summary reproduced by kind permission of European Transport Law.

BRUSS. CONV. 1970 (CCV)

ITALY

Article 15(1) of the Conventidn.


CORTE DI CASSAZIONE (Sez. Ill), 6.XI.1996 - Soc. Agenzia Viaggi Buonconsiglio c. De
Santis Rachele e De Santis Francesca.
LIABILITY OF THE TRAVEL ORGANISER UNDER THE CONVENTION - Liability for failure
by third party to perform its services in accordance with the provisions of Italian law.
LIABILITY OF TRAVEL ORGANISER UNDER THE CONVENTION - Organiser relieved of
liability by evidence of 'diligence' in its choice of service provider - Assessment of
notion of 'buon padre di famiglia' in Italian law - Notion - Travel organiser liable.

206

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R~sum~s de jurisprudence - Transport ferroviaire / Contrat de voyage

CONVENTION INTERNATIONALE RELATIVE AU CONTRAT DE VOYAGE (CCV)


(Bruxelles, 1970)
CONV. BRUXELLES 1970 (CCV) - BELGIQUE
Article 13 de /a Convention.
VREDEGERECHT ANTWERPEN (ler Arrond.), 31.1.1996 - 0. Truyen, D. Vanhumbeeck
v D & D Reizen bvba, Belgium International Travel nv (Transcruise).
RESPONSABILITE DE L'ORGANISATEUR DE VOYAGES EN VERTU DE LA CONVENTION Exoneration de la responsabilit6 de l'organisateur par la preuve que le prestataire de
service a agi avec diligence - Possibilit6 pour I'organisateurde voyages de se pr6valoir de
la limitation de responsabilit6 des conditions gdn~rales du transporteur maritime Conditions.
II faut admettre la conclusion d'un contrat de voyage et non d'un contrat de transport
Iorsque, en contrepartie du payement d'une somme globale, sont convenues des prestations
combin~es, comprenant entre autres le transport maritime, le transport routier, les repas, le
logement et les distractions; il y a donc lieu d'appliquer la Convention (CCV).
Celui qui intervient en qualit6 de "tour operator" ou d'organisateur de voyages, ou qui du
moins donne 'apparence d'intervenir en cette qualit6, ne peut se prvaloir du fait qu'il n'est
intervenu qu'en tant qu'interm~diaire de voyages; il peut donc tre poursuivi pour les
dommages subis pendant une croisi~re, sauf s'il prouve que, conform6ment A I'article 13 de la
CCV, la personne qui a ex~cut6 les prestations sur son ordre a agi avec diligence.
L'organisateur de voyages ne peut se pr~valoir de la limitation de responsabilit6
mentionn~e par le transporteur maritime dans les conditions g~n~rales 6crites sur le billet de
transport, parce que celles-ci n'ont pas 6t6 portes A la connaissance du voyageur lors de la
conclusion du contrat de voyage.
Droit europ~en des transports, 1998, 694.
Sommaire reproduit avec I'aimable autorisation de Droit europ~en des transports.

CONV. BRUXELLES 1970 (CCV) - ITALIE


Article 15(1) de la Convention.
CORTE DI CASSAZIONE (Sez. III), 6.XI.1996 - Soc. Agenzia Viaggi Buonconsiglio c. De
Santis Rachele e De Santis Francesca.
RESPONSABILITE DE L'ORGANISATEUR DE VOYAGES EN VERTU DE LA CONVENTION Responsabilit6 pour l'inex6cution par le tiers de ses prestations conform6ment aux
dispositions du droit italien.
RESPONSABILITE DE L'ORGANISATEUR DE VOYAGES EN VERTU DE LA CONVENTION Exon6ration de Ia responsabilitd de l'organisateur par la preuve de sa, diligence' dans le
choix du prestataire de service - Appr6ciation au regard de la notion de 'bon pore de
famille" du droit italien - Notion - Organisateur de voyages responsable.

Rev. dr. unif. 1999-1

207

Case law summaries - Travel contracts

A coach carrying passenger to Spain went off the road and overturned. Two of the
passengers injured brought an action for liability of the travel organiser under the Convention.
The lower court held the travel agency liable for damage to passengers.
The Corte di Cassazione upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal, which declared
Italian law (Article 1681 Civil Code) applicable to the liability of the party responsible for
performing the transport and found that the travel organiser, who was liable for the carrier in
accordance with Article 15(1) of the Convention, had not adduced proof that the carrier had
taken appropriate measures to avoid the damage.
In accordance with Article 15(1), second sentence, the travel organiser is relieved of its
liability by providing evidence of diligence in its choice of service provider; "diligence" should
be assessed with regard to the notion of "buon padre di famiglia" in Italian law (Article 1176
Civil Code). The Court stated that in assessing the organiser's choice account should be taken of
any fact that would establish that in the circumstances, the choice of the service provider in
question was a well-informed, sensible and careful decision one, and that it would therefore be
reasonable to expect the service to be performed to the customer's satisfaction and justifying his
confidence. Since no proof had been brought of such diligence in the instant case, the organiser
could not be relieved of its liability.
Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale, 1998, 185.

e6e66

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R6sum6s de jurisprudence - Contrat de voyage

Un autobus qui transportait des passagers en Espagne est sorti de la route et s'est renvers6.
Deux voyageurs ayant subi des dommages ont intent6 une action en responsabilit6 contre
I'organisateur de voyage en vertu de la Convention. Les juges du fond avaient tenu I'agence de
voyages pour responsable des dommages causes aux voyageurs.
La Corte di Cassazione a confirm6 I'arrt de [a Cour d'appel qui a recherch6 I'6ventuelle
responsabilit6 de la personne charg~e de l'excution du transport sur la base du droit italien
(article 1681 code civil) et a constat6 que I'organisateur de voyages qui r~pondait pour le
transporteur en vertu de I'article 15(1), ne rapportait pas la preuve que le transporteur avait pris
les mesures appropri~es pour 6viter le dommage.
En vertu de l'article 15(1), deuxi~me phrase, I'organisateur de voyages s'exon~re de sa
responsabilit6 en prouvant sa diligence dans le choix de la personne qui execute la prestation; la
diligence doit s'appr~cier au regard de la notion de "bon p~re de famille" du droit italien (article
1176 code civil); la Cour indique que le choix de l'organisateur sera appr6ci6 par le juge en
tenant compte de tout 6lment permettant de conclure que dans les circonstances, le choix du
prestataire de services en question a r~sult6 d'un comportement inform6, avis6 et prudent
permettant raisonnablement de pr~voir que le service serait rendu dans des conditions telles que
le voyageur pourrait avoir confiance A I'organisateur pour le contrat de voyage. Une telle
diligence n'ayant pas 6t6 prouv~e en I'esp&e, l'organisateur ne peut s'exon~rer de sa
responsabilit6.
Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale, 1998, 185.

Rev. dr. unif. 1999-1

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