Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006
Facts:
The Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Complex in Paraaque City under
Executive Order No. 903 (MIAA Charter), as amended. As such operator, it
administers the land, improvements and equipment within the NAIA
Complex. In March 1997, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
(OGCC) issued Opinion No. 061 to the effect that the Local Government Code
of 1991 (LGC) withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA
under Section 21 of its Charter.
Thus, MIAA paid some of the real estate tax already due. In June 2001,
it received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of
Paraaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. The City Treasurer
subsequently issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the airport lands
and buildings.
At the instance of MIAA, the OGCC issued Opinion No. 147 clarifying
Opinion No. 061, pointing out that Sec. 206 of the LGC requires persons
exempt from real estate tax to show proof of exemption. According to the
OGCC, Sec. 21 of the MIAA Charter is the proof that MIAA is exempt from real
estate tax. MIAA, thus, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to
restrain the City of Paraaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying
against, and auctioning for public sale the airport lands and buildings, but
this was dismissed for having been filed out of time.
Hence, MIAA filed this petition for review, pointing out that it is exempt
from real estate tax under Sec. 21 of its charter and Sec. 234 of the LGC. It
invokes the principle that the government cannot tax itself as a justification
for exemption, since the airport lands and buildings, being devoted to public
use and public service, are owned by the Republic of the Philippines. On the
other hand, the City of Paraaque invokes Sec. 193 of the LGC, which
expressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges of government-owned and
controlled corporations (GOCC) upon the effectivity of the LGC.
It asserts that an international airport is not among the exceptions
mentioned in the said law. Meanwhile, the City of Paraaque posted and
published notices announcing the public auction sale of the airport lands and
buildings. In the afternoon before the scheduled public auction, MIAA applied
with the Court for the issuance of a TRO to restrain the auction sale. The
Court issued a TRO on the day of the auction sale, however, the same was
received only by the City of Paraaque three hours after the sale.
Issue:
Whether or not the airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt
from real estate tax?
Held:
The airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax
imposed by local governments. Sec. 243(a) of the LGC exempts from real
estate tax any real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines. This
exemption should be read in relation with Sec. 133(o) of the LGC, which
provides that the exercise of the taxing powers of local governments shall
not extend to the levy of taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National
Government, its agencies and instrumentalities.
These provisions recognize the basic principle that local governments
cannot tax the national government, which historically merely delegated to
local governments the power to tax.
The rule is that a tax is never presumed and there must be clear
language in the law imposing the tax. This rule applies with greater force
when local governments seek to tax national government instrumentalities.
Moreover, a tax exemption is construed liberally in favor of national
government instrumentalities.
MIAA is not a GOCC, but an instrumentality of the government.
The Republic remains the beneficial owner of the properties. MIAA itself
is owned solely by the Republic. At any time, the President can transfer back
to the Republic title to the airport lands and buildings without the Republic
paying MIAA any consideration. As long as the airport lands and buildings are
reserved for public use, their ownership remains with the State. Unless the
President issues a proclamation withdrawing these properties from public
use, they remain properties of public dominion. As such, they are inalienable,
hence, they are not subject to levy on execution or foreclosure sale, and they
are exempt from real estate tax.
However, portions of the airport lands and buildings that MIAA leases
to private entities are not exempt from real estate tax. In such a case, MIAA
has granted the beneficial use of such portions for a consideration to a
taxable person.
Times Transportation Company, Inc. v. Santos Sotelo, et al.
G.R. No. 163786. February 16, 2005
FACTS:
FACTS:
Petitioners are incorporators and officers of MASAGANA GAS CORPORATION
(MASAGANA), an entity engaged in the refilling, sale and distribution of LPG
products. Private respondents Petron Corporation (Petron) and Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation (Pilipinas Shell) are two of the largest bulk suppliers
and producers of LPG in the Philippines. Petron is the registered owner in
the Philippines of the trademarks GASUL and GASUL cylinders used for its
LPG products. It is the sole entity in the Philippines authorized to
allow refillers and distributors to refill, use, sell, and distribute GASUL LPG
containers, products and its trademarks. Pilipinas Shell, on the other hand, is
the authorized user in the Philippines of the tradename, trademarks,
symbols, or designs of its principal, Shell International Petroleum Company
Limited (Shell International), including the marks SHELLANE and SHELL
device in connection with the production, sale and distribution of
SHELLANE LPGs. It is the only corporation in the Philippinesauthorized to
allow refillers and distributors to refill, use, sell and distribute SHELLANE LPG
containers
and
products.
On
3
April
2003,
(NBI)
agent Ritche N. Oblanca (Oblanca) filed two applications for search warrant
with the RTC, Cavite City, against petitioners and other occupants of the
MASAGANA compound for alleged violation of Section 155, in relation to
Section 170 of The Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines. The two
applications for search warrant uniformly alleged that per information, belief,
and personal verification of Oblanca, the petitioners are actually producing,
selling, offering for sale and/or distributing LPG products using steel cylinders
owned by, and bearing the tradenames, trademarks, and devices
of Petron and Pilipinas Shell, without authority and in violation of the rights of
the said entities. MASAGANA, as third party claimant, filed with the RTC a
Motion for the Return of Motor Compressor and LPG Refilling Machine. [15] It
claimed that it is the owner of the said motor compressor and LPG refilling
machine; that these items were used in the operation of its legitimate
business; and that their seizure will jeopardize its business interests. RTC
resolved that MASAGANA cannot be considered a third party claimant whose
rights were violated as a result of the seizure since the evidence disclosed
that petitioners are stockholders of MASAGANA and that they conduct their
business through the same juridical entity. CA affirmed RTCs decision
Issue:
Whether or not CA ERRED IN RULING THAT THE COMPLAINT IS DIRECTED
AGAINST MASAGANA GAS CORPORATION, ACTING THROUGH ITS OFFICERS
FACTS: This case involves two supposed transfers of the lot previously owned
by the spouses Cosio. The first transfer was a donation to petitioners alleged
predecessors-in-interest in 1959 while the second transfer was through a
contract of sale to respondents in 1980. A TCT was later issued in the name
of respondents. Claiming to be the alleged donees successors-in-interest,
petitioners filed a case for cancellation of title, quieting of ownership and
possession, declaratory relief and reconveyance with prayer for preliminary
injunction and damages against respondents. Respondents, on the other
hand, argued that at the time of the donation, petitioners predecessors-ininterest has no juridical personality to accept the donation because it was
not yet incorporated. Moreover, petitioners were not members of the local
church then.
The RTC upheld the sale in favor of respondents, which was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, on the ground that all the essential requisites of a
contract were present and it also applied the indefeasibility of title.
ISSUE: Whether or not the donation was void.
HELD: Yes, the donation was void because the local church had neither
juridical personality nor capacity to accept such gift since it was inexistent at
the time it was made.
The Court denied petitioners contention that there exists a de facto
corporation. While there existed the old Corporation Law (Act 1459), a law
under which the local church could have been organized, petitioners
admitted that they did not even attempt to incorporate at that time nor the
organization was registered at the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Hence, petitioners obviously could not have claimed succession to an entity
that never came to exist. And since some of the representatives of petitioner
Seventh Day Adventist Conference Church of Southern Philippines, Inc. were
not even members of the local church then, it necessarily follows that they
could not even claim that the donation was particularly for them.
Coastal Pacific Trading, Inc. vs. Southern Rolling Mills Co.
G.R. No. 118692
July 28, 2006
FACTS: Southern Rolling Mills was renamed into Visayan Integrated Steel
Corp (VISCO). On Dec. 11, 1961-VISCO obtained a loan from DBP amounting
to P836,000. It was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage covering VISCO's 3
parcels of land including the machinery and equipments therein. Second
Loan: VISCO entered a Loan Agreement with respondent banks ( referred as
"Consortium") to finance its importation for various raw materials. VISCO
executed a second mortgage over the previous properties mentioned,
however they were unrecorded VISCO was unable to pay its second
mortgage with the consortium, which resulted in the latter acquiring 90% of
the equity of VISCO giving the Consortium the control and management of
VISCO. Despite the acquisition, VISCO still remained indebted to the
Consortium.
Transaction to Coastal: Between 1964 to 1965, VISCO entered a processing
agreement with Coastal wherein Coastal delivered 3,000 metric tons of hot
rolled steel coils which VISCO would process into block iron sheets. However,
VISCO was only able to return 1,600 metric tons of those sheets.
On the loan to DBP: To pay its first mortgage with DBP, VISCO sold 2 of its
generators to FILMAG Phils, Inc. DBP executed a Deed of Assignment of the
mortgage in favor of the consortium. The Consortium foreclosed the
mortgage and was the highest bidder in an auction sale of VISCO's
properties. The Consortium later sold the properties in favor of National Steel
Corporation.
Coastal files a civil action for Annulment or Rescission of Sale, Damages with
Preliminary Injunction. Coastal imputes bad faith on the action of the
Consortium, the latter being able to sell the properties of VISCO despite the
attachment of the properties, placing them beyond the reach of VISCO's
other creditors.
The lower court ruled in favor of VISCO, declaring the sale valid and legal.
The CA affirmed this.
ISSUE 1: Whether the consortium disposed VISCO's assets in fraud of
creditors?
HELD: Yes. What the consortium did was to pay to them the proceeds from
the sale of the generator sets which in turn they used to pay DBP. Due to the
Deed of Assignment issued by DBP, the respondent banks recovered what
they remitted to DBP & it allowed the Consortium to acquire DBP's primary
lien on the mortgaged properties. Allowing them as unsecured creditors ( as
the mortgage was unrecorded) to foreclose on the assets of the corporation
without regard to inferior claims
ISSUE 2: Whether petitioner is entitled to moral damages?
No. As a rule, a corporation is not entitled to moral damages because, not
being a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or sentiments
like wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish and moral shock. The
only exception to this rule is when the corporation has a good reputation that
is debased, resulting in its humiliation in the business realm. In the present
case, the records do not show any evidence that the name or reputation of
petitioner has been sullied as a result of the Consortium's fraudulent acts.
Accordingly, moral damages are not warranted.
Petitioner was able to recover exemplary damages.