SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 93707. January 23, 2001]

ROSITA TAN, petitioner, vs., ATTY. JOSE L. LAPAK, respondent.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint filed by Rosita Tan against Atty. Jose L. Lapak for misconduct, based on
respondents failure to file with this Court a petition for review on certiorari of a resolution of the
Court of Appeals dismissing complainants appeal. Complainant alleged that despite the fact
that this Court had granted respondent an extension of the time to file the petition for review on
certiorari and she had paid respondent his fee, the latter nonetheless failed to file the petition in
this Court. Complainants letter, dated January 10, 1991, addressed to then Chief Justice Marcelo
B. Fernan, stated:
Ako po ay sumusulat sa iyo upang ihingi ng tulong ang aking suliranin na may kaugnayan sa
aking kaso, G.R. No. 93707 ROSITA TAN v. CA, et al. na dahilan sa kapabayaan ng aking abogado
na si Atty. Jose Lapak ay hindi nakapagfile ng Certiorari nasa ngayon kanyang inihihinging palugit
ay naibigay naman, at ako po ay nagbigay naman ng halagang P4,000.00 upang gawain lamang
ang petition sa pagrerepaso ng Certiorari subalit inuulit pang hindi gawain.
Kgg. Na Chief Justice ako poy pinaasa lamang ng aking abogado na wala man lamang nagawa
kung ano ang nararapat. Ako naman ay isang walang karanasan sa bagay na ito ay naniwala at
naghintay. Nang makausap ko po siya ay aking tinapat kung ano na at walang nadating na
resulta sa ginawa niya ang sagot sa aking maghintay na lamang daw ako. Ngunit ng ako po ay
pumunta sa Maynila at napadaan ako sa Korte Suprema saka ko pa lamang napag-alaman na
ang aking abogado ay hindi nakapaggawa ng brief ng Certiorari at kaya napawalaan ng bisa ang
aking apelasyon.
Akin pong naisip na idulog ang aking kaapihan sa Pangulo ng IBP ng Camarines Norte ang mga
bagay na ito ang sagot po sa aking ay maari akong maghain ng demanda laban sa aking
abogado na si Atty. Jose L. Lapak ngunit ako po ay mahirap lamang at isa pa wala akong
matutustos sa aking abogado. Isa pa po wala akong pera at sapat na pinag-aralan kaya po hindi
ko alam kung sino ang aking dudulungan para tumulong sa mahihirap. Kaya naisip ko pong
sumulat sa opisina ninyo, para ihain ang aking karaingan. Kung inyo pong mamarapatin ako ay
humihingi ng tulong sa iyo bilang pinakamataas na hustisya ang aking kaapihan.
Respondent denied the allegations against him. In his manifestation and comment, dated
March 4, 1991, he contended:
a) Ms. Rosita Tan was formerly represented by Atty. Juanito Subia in Civil Case No. 5295,
Rosita Tan vs. Wilfredo Enriquez before the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Norte;
said case was dismissed due to failure of Rosita Tan and his (sic) counsel to appear
during the scheduled Pre-Trial of the case; . . .said Order of dismissal was however
reconsidered;
b) On November 11, 1986, Atty. Marciano C. Dating, Jr. entered his appearance for the
said Rosita Tan as her original counsel, Atty. Juanito Subia, had withdrawn for reasons
only known to her; . . .Atty. Marciano C. Dating, Jr. filed an Amended Complaint;

c) That on September 20, 1988, the Court, through Hon. Luis Dictado, who heard the
case, rendered a decision dismissing Rosita Tans complaint;
d) That on October 13, 1988, Atty. Dating, Rosita Tans counsel, appealed from the
adverse decision against her to the Court of Appeals;
e) That Atty. Marciano Dating also withdrew later as Rosita Tans counsel and certain
Leopoldo P. San Buenaventura entered his appearance as new counsel for the said
Rosita Tan in the appealed case before the Court of Appeals which was docketed as
C.A. G.R. CV No. 20669;
f) On October 26, 1989, Atty. Leopoldo E. San Buenaventura filed a Motion for Extension
of Time to File Brief for Rosita Tan; however, for reasons only known to said lawyer,
he failed to file his Appellants Brief; hence, on February 20, 1990, the Court of
Appeals issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal for failure of Rosita Tans counsel to
file Appellants Brief despite extension of time granted to him;
g) That upon receipt by Ms. Rosita Tan of said Resolution dismissing her appeal due to
the failure of her Manila lawyer to file Appellants Brief, she came to the law office of
undersigned counsel in the company of her friend, Mrs. Gloria Gatan, to employ the
latters services to seek reconsideration of the Order of dismissal and file Appellants
Brief to enable her to pursue her appeal; Rosita employed the legal services of
undersigned counsel not to file a Petition for Review but to seek reconsideration of the
order of dismissal of her appeal; considering then that she does not have the papers to
the case on appeal, Rosita Tan agreed to pay counsel P5,000.00 to go to Manila, study
the records of the case in the Court of Appeals, file a Motion for Reconsideration and
prepare Appellants Brief for her; she was able to pay P3,000.00 only instead of
P5,000.00 promising to pay the balance later; consequently, the undersigned counsel
filed an URGENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION with the Court of Appeals.;
h) Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals denied said Motion for Reconsideration in a
Resolution promulgated on May 2, 1990 .;
I) That upon receipt by the undersigned counsel of said Resolution of the Court of
Appeals denying the Motion for Reconsideration, the undersigned counsel summoned
the appellant Rosita Tan and requested her to bring the balance of P2,000.00 so that a
Petition for Review on Certiorari could be filed with the Supreme Court; however, the
said appellant Rosita Tan upon knowing of the adverse Resolution of the Court of
Appeals became apathetic and when she came to the law office of the undersigned
she expressed her misgivings of bringing the case to the Supreme Court and told
counsel that she has no more money; despite her indifference and lukewarm attitude,
the undersigned counsel filed a Motion for Extension of Time to file a Petition for
Review with the Supreme Court paying the docket fees therefore in behalf of said
appellant; in the meantime the undersigned counsel went to Manila to make
researches preparatory to the filing of the Petition for Review with the Supreme Court;
The undersigned counsel then requested the appellant Rosita Tan to pay him the
balance of P2,000.00 as per agreement for him to be able to prepare the Petition for
review in Manila and file it with the Supreme Court; but said appellant hesitantly paid
only P1,000.00 which was her only money available promising to pay the balance of
P1,000.00 later; therafter, the undersigned counsel went to the Court of Appeals to get
certified true copies of the Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration; he then
learned that there was already an Entry of Judgment in the case as the Resolution
dismissing the appeal had already become final; the undersigned then informed Rosita
Tan of her misfortune and informed her that he would study the propriety of filing an
action for annulment of the decision because of his discovery of an anomaly which
resulted in a mistrial; because of continuous setbacks she suffered from beginning to
end; Rosita Tan said she had lost all hope and was unwilling to go any further; she then

demanded the refund of P4,000.00 from the undersigned; when the undersigned gave
back the P1,000.00 he received from her, she refused to receive the amount insisting
that the whole amount of P4,000.00 be returned to her claiming that the undersigned
counsel had not done anything for her anyway; hence the misunderstanding which
culminated in her sending a letter complaint to the Honorable Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court.
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report, and
recommendation. On July 29, 2000, the IBP passed a resolution aadopting the report and
recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner Jaime M. Vibar that respondent be
reprimanded and ordered to restitute to complainant the amount of P1,000.00.
In finding respondent guilty of betrayal of his clients trust and confidence, the investigating
commissioner said in his report:
Regardless of the agreement on the total amount of fees, it is clear that respondent committed
to prepare and file a petition with the Supreme Court and for which he received P1,000.00 from
the complainant (annex B, Sagot, dated May 31, 1991). Despite such commitment, he failed to
file the petition.
It is not explained why the payment of PHP1,000.00 was made by complainant for the petition
on August 8, 1990. At that time, the period to file the petition for review as contemplated by
respondent and which was the subject of an extension motion, dated May 18, 1990, filed with
and granted by the Hon. Supreme Court, had already expired. It is to be noted that respondents
motion sought an extension of thirty (30) days from May 26, 1990 or up to June 25, 1990. It
would appear that respondent received P1,000.00 on August 8, 1990 from complainant at a time
when the remedy of a review of the dismissal order of the Court of Appeals was no longer
available. Yet, complainant was never informed or favored with an explanation that a petition for
review was no longer possible, or perhaps that another remedy was still open to the
complainant. To aggravate his situation, respondent alleges in his comment to the complaint (at
page 3) that after he received P1,000.00 from the complainant he immediately went to the Court
of Appeals to get certified copies of the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration and
that thereat he discovered that an Entry of Judgment had already been issued. Respondent
should have known that when he went to the Court of Appeals after reciept of P1,000.00, or after
August 8, 1990. The period he requested from the Hon. Supreme Court to institute the petition
for review had long expired.
But the silence of respondent at the time of receipt of the amount of P1,000.00 on august 8,
1990 and the petition with the Supreme Court was no longer an available remedy smacks of a
betrayal of a clients cause and the trust and confidence reposed in him. If indeed his clients
cause was no longer worth fighting for, the lawyer should not have demanded a feeand made
representations that there is merit in her case. He should have dealt with his client with all
candor and honesty by informing her that on August 8, 1990 the period to file the petition had
already expired.
Complainant has been a victim of negligence on the part of the law firm of San Buenaventura, et
al., or particularly Atty. Leopoldo San Buenaventura, for their failure to file the Appellants Brief in
behalf of complainant within the period allowed. The dismissal of the appeal gave complainant a
slim chance, if not a futile remedy, with the Hon. Supreme Court. Atty. Lapak would have been
shackled in any disquisition for complainants cause considering that she alredy lost in the trial
court and her appeal had been dismissed without any argument being advanced in her
behalf. Atty. Lapak should have been candid with complainant. He should not have asked more
at a time when nothing fruitful could be done anymore.
With respect to respondents offer to return the amount of P1,000.00 paid to him to file the
petition for review on certiorari, the investigating commissioner stated:

[T]his willingness to return P1,000.00 does not erase his breach of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for lacking in honesty, diligence and fairness in dealing with his client as shown by
the very fact that he received the amount at a time when he could no longer file the petition
with the Supreme Court. His client deserved the information that on such date the decision of
the Court of Appeals was already final. Respondents actuation of filing an extension motion with
the Hon. Supreme Court and yet not filing an extension motion with the Hon. Supreme Court and
yet not filing the pleading within the period requested and granted speaks well of respondents
lack of candor, honesty and judicious conduct in dealing with his client or in the handling of his
case. This conduct violates Canon 17, & Rule 18.03, Rule 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The investigating commissioner recommends that respondent only be reprimanded
considering his old age and the negligent conduct of complainants previous counsel. The
commissioner reasoned that it was the negligent conduct of complainants previous counsel
which caused the dismissal of the appeal and rendered inutile any further legal action before the
Supreme Court.
The investigating commissioners findings are supported by the evidence. However, we hold
that the appropriate sanction should be reprimand and order respondent to return the amount of
P4,000.00 which he received from complainant.
Respondent advances two reasons why he did not file a petition for review on certiorari in
this Court, to wit: (1) because he found that the resolution of the Court of Appeals to be appealed
to the Supreme Court had become final on May 27, 1990 and (2) because complainant failed to
pay the balance of P1,000.00 of his fee.
First. With respect to the first reason, Rule 18.03 thereof which provides that A lawyer shall
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable. Respondent alleges that upon receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration which he had filed, he summoned complainant and told
her that it was imperative that a petition for review on certiorari be filed with this Court.
At this point, it is important to note the material dates on record to determine if respondents
justification for his failure to file a petition for review is tenable. The resolution of the Court of
Appeals dismissing complainants appeal for failure to file an appellants brief was promulgated
on February 20, 1990. Within the reglementary period for filing an appeal, respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied on May 2, 1990. Respondent
received a copy of this resolution (denying the motion for reconsideration) on May 11, 1990 so
that respondent had 15 days from May 11, 1990, or until May 26, within which to file a petition
for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. Respondent therafter asked for, and was granted
by this Court, an extension of 30 days counted from the reglementary period, or until June 25,
1990, within which to file the petition. As respondent failed to file the petition within the
extended period, the Supreme Court issued a resolution on August 20, 1990 declaring the
judgment sought to be reviewed to have become final and executory.
It is not true, therefore, that respondent failed to file a petition for review on certiorari
because the judgment sought to be reviewed had become final on May 27, 1990.
When respondent summoned complainant and told her that in view of the denial of his
motion for reconsideration it was imperative that a petition for review be filed with this Court, the
resolution of the Court of Appeals was not yet final. In fact, this Court granted respondents
motion for extension of time to file the petition for review, because the resolution of the Court of
Appeals denying the motion for reconsideration had not yet attained finality. Despite having
been granted an extension, however, respondent failed to file the petition within the
reglementary period. This constitutes a serious breach. Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so.

The filing of a petition for review is similar to the filing of an appellants or appellees
brief. In Mariveles v. Mallari,[1] it was held that the lawyers failure to file an appellants brief
despite numerous extensions of time to file the same constitutes a blatant violation of Rule 12.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As already noted, this Rule provides that after
obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda, or briefs, a lawyer should not let the
period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
In Re: Santiago F. Marcos,[2] the Court considered a lawyers failure to file a brief for his client
as amounting to inexcusable negligence. Said the Court:
An attorney is bound to protect his clients interest to the best of his ability and with utmost
diligence. (Del Rosario v. CA, 114 SCRA 159). A failure to file a brief for his client certainly
constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. (People v. Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The respondent
has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as to the
Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of justice. (People v. Daban,
43 SCRA 185; People v. Estocada, 43 SCRA 515).
At any rate, even assuming that the resolution of the Court of Appeals expired on May 27,
1990, he should not have asked on August, 8, 1990 for the balance of P5,000.00 which
complainant had agreed to pay since the resolution had already become final at that time. As
the investigating commissioner pointed out in his report:
To aggravate his situation, respondent alleges in his comment to the complaint (at page 3) that
after he received P1,000.00 from the complainant he immediately went to the Court of Appeals
to get certified copies of the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration and that thereat
he discovered that an Entry of Judgment had already been issued. Respondent should have
known that when he went to the Court of Appeals after receipt of P1,000.00, or after August 8,
1990, (t)he period he requested from the Hon. Supreme Court to institute the petition for review
had long expired.[3]
It would, therefore, appear that if an entry of judgment had been made in the Court of
Appeals, it was precisely because respondent failed to file a petition for review with the Supreme
Court within the extended period granted him. He cannot, therefore, excuse his breach of the
duty to his client by his own negligent act.
Second. Respondent asserts that complainant only engaged his services to pursue her
appeal in the Court of Appeals which was dismissed due to the failure of complainants former
counsel, Atty. Leopoldo E. San Buenaventura, to file the appellants brief. Whether or not he was
engaged to represent complainant only in the Court of Appeals and not also in the Supreme
Court is immaterial. For the fact is that respondent already commenced the representation of
complainant in the Supreme Court by filing a motion for extension of the time to file a petition for
review. In fact, according to respondent, upon receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution denying
reconsideration of the dismissal of complainants appeal, respondent summoned complainant to
his office precisely to tell her that it was imperative that a petition for review be filed with the
Supreme Court. Once he took the cudgels of his clients case and assured her that he would
represent her in the Supreme Court, respondent owed it to his client to do his utmost to ensure
that every remedy allowed by law was availed of. As this Court has held:
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who
may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment, subject, however, to
Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a
client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and
champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Elsewise stated, he
owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of
his clients rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be
taken or withheld from his client, saved by the rules of law legally applied. This simply means

that his cleint is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized
by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. [4]
Third. Nor can respondent excuse himself for his failure to file the petition for review on
certiorari on the ground that complainant failed to pay what she promised to pay. Complainant
agreed to pay P5,000.00. Of this amount, she paid respondent P3,000.00 and later P1,000.00,
leaving only a balance of P1,000.00. Even if this balance had not been paid, this fact was not
sufficient to justify the failure of respondent to comply with his professional obligation which does
not depend for compliance on the payment of a lawyers fees.
As respondent utterly failed to comply with his professional commitment to complainant, it is,
therefore, not just for him to keep the legal fee of P4,000.00 which complainant paid him. He
has not rightfully earned that fee and should return it to complainant.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose L. Lapak is REPRIMANDED and ORDERED to refund to complainant
Rosita Tan the amount of P4,000.00. He is admonished henceforth to exercise greater care and
diligence in the performance of his duties towards his clients and the courts and warned that
repetition of the same or similar offense will be more severely dealt with.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 6836
January 23, 2006
LETICIA GONZALES, Complainant, vs.
ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA, Respondent.
x----------------------------------------------------------- x
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before this Court is a complaint filed by Leticia Gonzales (Gonzales) praying that Atty.
Marcelino Cabucana, (respondent) be disbarred for representing conflicting interests.
On January 8, 2004, Gonzales filed a petition before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) alleging that: she was the complainant in a case for sum of money and damages filed
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Santiago City, docketed as Civil Case No. 1567 where she was represented by the law firm CABUCANA, CABUCANA, DE GUZMAN AND
CABUCANA LAW OFFICE, with Atty. Edmar Cabucana handling the case and herein respondent as
an associate/partner; on February 26, 2001, a decision was rendered in the civil case ordering
the losing party to pay Gonzales the amount of P17,310.00 with interest and P6,000.00 as
attorneys fees; Sheriff Romeo Gatcheco, failed to fully implement the writ of execution issued in
connection with the judgment which prompted Gonzales to file a complaint against the said
sheriff with this Court; in September 2003, Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife went to the house of
Gonzales; they harassed Gonzales and asked her to execute an affidavit of desistance regarding
her complaint before this Court; Gonzales thereafter filed against the Gatchecos criminal cases
for trespass, grave threats, grave oral defamation, simple coercion and unjust vexation;
notwithstanding the pendency of Civil Case No. 1-567, where respondents law firm was still
representing Gonzales, herein respondent represented the Gatchecos in the cases filed by
Gonzales against the said spouses; respondent should be disbarred from the practice of law since
respondents acceptance of the cases of the Gatchecos violates the lawyer-client relationship
between complainant and respondents law firm and renders respondent liable under the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) particularly Rules 10.01, [1] 13.01,[2] 15.02,[3] 15.03,[4] 21.01[5] and
21.02.[6]
On January 9, 2004, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline ordered Atty. Marcelino
Cabucana, Jr. to submit his Answer to the complaint. [7]
In his Answer, respondent averred: He never appeared and represented complainant in
Civil Case No. 1-567 since it was his brother, Atty. Edmar Cabucana who appeared and
represented Gonzales in said case. He admitted that he is representing Sheriff Gatcheco and his
wife in the cases filed against them but claimed that his appearance is pro bono and that the
spouses pleaded with him as no other counsel was willing to take their case. He entered his
appearance in good faith and opted to represent the spouses rather than leave them
defenseless. When the Gatchecos asked for his assistance, the spouses said that the cases filed
against them by Gonzales were merely instigated by a high ranking official who wanted to get
even with them for their refusal to testify in favor of the said official in another case. At first,
respondent declined to serve as counsel of the spouses as he too did not want to incur the ire of
the high-ranking official, but after realizing that he would be abdicating a sworn duty to delay no
man for money or malice, respondent entered his appearance as defense counsel of the spouses
free of any charge. Not long after, the present complaint was crafted against respondent which
shows that respondent is now the subject of a demolition job. The civil case filed by Gonzales
where respondents brother served as counsel is different and distinct from the criminal cases
filed by complainant against the Gatcheco spouses, thus, he did not violate any canon on legal
ethics. [8]
Gonzales filed a Reply contending that the civil case handled by respondents brother is
closely connected with the cases of the Gatchecos which the respondent is handling; that the
claim of respondent that he is handling the cases of the spouses pro bono is not true since he
has his own agenda in offering his services to the spouses; and that the allegation that she is
filing the cases against the spouses because she is being used by a powerful person is not true
since she filed the said cases out of her own free will. [9]
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP sent to the parties a Notice of Mandatory
Conference dated March 1, 2004.[10] On the scheduled conference, only a representative of
complainant appeared.[11] Commissioner Demaree Raval of the IBP-CBD then directed both
parties to file their respective verified position papers. [12]
Complainant filed a Memorandum reiterating her earlier assertions and added that
respondent prepared and notarized counter-affidavits of the Gatcheco spouses; that the highranking official referred to by respondent is Judge Ruben Plata and the accusations of respondent
against the said judge is an attack against a brother in the profession which is a violation of the
CPR; and that respondent continues to use the name of De Guzman in their law firm despite the

fact that said partner has already been appointed as Assistant Prosecutor of Santiago City, again
in violation of the CPR.[13]
Respondent filed his Position Paper restating his allegations in his Answer. [14]
On August 23, 2004, Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes issued an Order notifying both
parties to appear before his office on October 28, 2004 for a clarificatory question regarding said
case.[15] On the said date, only respondent appeared [16] presenting a sworn affidavit executed by
Gonzales withdrawing her complaint against respondent. It reads:
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY
TUNGKOL SA PAG-UURONG NG DEMANDA
Ako, si LETICIA GONZALES, nasa tamang edad, Pilipino, may asawa, at
nakatira sa Barangay Dubinan East, Santiago City, makaraang manumpa ayon sa
batas ay nagsasabing:
Ako ang nagdedemanda o petitioner sa CBD Case No. 04-1186 na may
pamagat na Leticia Gonzales versus Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. na
kasalukuyang nahaharap sa Commission on Bar Discipline ng Integrated Bar of
the Philippines
Ang pagkakahain ng naturang demanda ay nag-ugat sa dipagkakaintindihan na namamagitan sa akin at nina Mr. and Mrs. Romeo and Anita
Gatcheco.
Dahil sa aking galit sa naturang mag-asawa, idinawit ko si Atty. Marcelino C.
Cabucana,
Jr. sa
sigalot
na
namamagitan
sa
akin
at
sa
magasawang Gatcheco, gayong nalalaman ko na si Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana ay
walang nalalaman sa naturang di pagkakaintindihan.
Makaraang pag-isipang mabuti ang paghain ko ng demanda kontra kay Atty.
Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr., nakumbinsi ako na ang pagdedemanda ko kay Atty.
Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. ay isang malaking pagkakamali dahil siya ay walang
kinalalaman (sic) sa di pagkakaintindihan naming(sic) ng mag-asawang Gatcheco.
Si Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. ay di ko rin naging abogado sa Civil Case
No. 1-567 (MTCC Br. I Santiago City) na inihain ko kontra kay Eduardo Mangano.
Nais kong ituwid ang lahat kung kayat aking iniuurong ang naturang kasong
inihain ko kontra kay Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. at dahil dito ay hindi na ako
interesado pang ituloy and naturang kaso, at aking hinihiling sa kinauukulan na
dismisin na ang naturang kaso.
Ginawa ko ang sinumpaang salaysay na ito upang patotohanan sa lahat ng
nakasaad dito.[17]
Commissioner Reyes issued an Order dated October 28, 2004 requiring Gonzales to appear
before him on November 25, 2004, to affirm her statements and to be subject to clarificatory
questioning.[18] However, none of the parties appeared.[19] On February 17, 2005, only
respondent was present. Commissioner Reyes then considered the case as submitted for
resolution.[20]
On February 24, 2005, Commissioner Reyes submitted his Report and Recommendation,
portions of which are quoted hereunder:
The Undersigned Commissioner believes that the respondent made a
mistake in the acceptance of the administrative case of Romeo Gatcheco, however,
the Commission (sic) believes that there was no malice and bad faith in the said
acceptance and this can be shown by the move of the complainant to unilaterally
withdraw the case which she filed against Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. However,
Atty. Cabucana is reminded to be more careful in the acceptance of cases as conflict
of interests might arise.

It is respectfully recommended that Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. (be)

sternly warned and reprimanded andadvised to be more circumspect and careful
in accepting cases which might result in conflict of interests. [21]
On June 25, 2005, a Resolution was passed by the Board of Governors of the IBP, to wit:
RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2005-153
CBD CASE NO. 03-1186
Leticia Gonzales vs.
Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr.
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering that respondent made (a) mistake in the acceptance of
the administrative case of Romeo Gatcheco, Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. is hereby
WARNED and REPRIMANDED and advised to be more circumspect and careful in
accepting cases which might result in conflict of interests. [22]
Before going to the merits, let it be clarified that contrary to the report of Commissioner
Reyes, respondent did not only represent the Gatcheco spouses in the administrative case filed
by Gonzales against them. As respondent himself narrated in his Position Paper, he likewise
acted as their counsel in the criminal cases filed by Gonzales against them. [23]
With that settled, we find respondent guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
It is well-settled that a lawyer is barred from representing conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. [24] Such prohibition is
founded on principles of public policy and good taste as the nature of the lawyer-client relations
is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. [25] Lawyers are expected not only to keep
inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and doubledealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which
is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. [26]
One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation
would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client
or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. [27]

As we expounded in the recent case of Quiambao vs. Bamba,[28]

The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a
situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an
unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to
contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or
that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from
one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is
enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are
present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyers respective retainers with
each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both
clients.[29]
The claim of respondent that there is no conflict of interests in this case, as the civil case
handled by their law firm where Gonzales is the complainant and the criminal cases filed by
Gonzales against the Gatcheco spouses are not related, has no merit. The representation of
opposing clients in said cases, though unrelated, constitutes conflict of interests or, at the very
least, invites suspicion of double-dealing which this Court cannot allow. [30]
Respondent further argued that it was his brother who represented Gonzales in the civil
case and not him, thus, there could be no conflict of interests. We do not agree. As respondent
admitted, it was their law firm which represented Gonzales in the civil case. Such being the
case, the rule against representing conflicting interests applies.
As we explained in the case of Hilado vs. David:[31]
[W]e can not sanction his taking up the cause of the adversary of the
party who had sought and obtained legal advice from his firm; this, not necessarily
to prevent any injustice to the plaintiff but to keep above reproach the honor and
integrity of the courts and of the bar. Without condemning the respondents
conduct as dishonest, corrupt, or fraudulent, we do believe that upon the admitted
facts it is highly inexpedient. It had the tendency to bring the profession, of which
he is a distinguished member, into public disrepute and suspicion and undermine
the integrity of justice.[32]
The claim of respondent that he acted in good faith and with honest intention will also not
exculpate him as such claim does not render the prohibition inoperative. [33]
In the same manner, his claim that he could not turn down the spouses as no other lawyer
is willing to take their case cannot prosper as it is settled that while there may be instances
where lawyers cannot decline representation they cannot be made to labor under conflict of
interest between a present client and a prospective one. [34] Granting also that there really was
no other lawyer who could handle the spouses case other than him, still he should have
observed the requirements laid down by the rules by conferring with the prospective client to
ascertain as soon as practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client
then seek the written consent of all concerned after a full disclosure of the facts. [35] These
respondent failed to do thus exposing himself to the charge of double-dealing.
We note the affidavit of desistance filed by Gonzales. However, we are not bound by such
desistance as the present case involves public interest. [36] Indeed, the Courts exercise of its
power to take cognizance of administrative cases against lawyers is not for the purpose of
enforcing civil remedies between parties, but to protect the court and the public against an
attorney guilty of unworthy practices in his profession. [37]
In similar cases where the respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting interests
a penalty ranging from one to three years suspension was imposed. [38]

We shall consider however as mitigating circumstances the fact that he is representing the
Gatcheco spouses pro bono and that it was his firm and not respondent personally, which
handled the civil case of Gonzales. As recounted by complainant herself, Atty. Edmar Cabucana
signed the civil case of complainant by stating first the name of the law firm CABUCANA,
CABUCANA, DE GUZMAN AND CABUCANA LAW OFFICE, under which, his name and signature
appear; while herein respondent signed the pleadings for the Gatcheco spouses only with his
name,[39] without any mention of the law firm. We also note the observation of the IBP
Commissioner Reyes that there was no malice and bad faith in respondents acceptance of the
Gatchecos cases as shown by the move of complainant to withdraw the case.
Thus, for violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
taking into consideration the aforementioned mitigating circumstances, we impose the penalty of
fine ofP2,000.00.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVI-2005-153 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
is APPROVED with MODIFICATION that respondent Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. is FINED the
amount of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that a commission of the
same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 5303
June 15, 2006
HUMBERTO C. LIM, JR., in behalf of PENTA RESORTS CORPORATION/Attorney-in-Fact of
LUMOT A. JALANDONI, Complainant,
- versus ATTY. NICANOR V. VILLAROSA, Respondent.
x---------------------------------------- x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.
Humberto C. Lim Jr.[1] filed a verified complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty.
Nicanor V. Villarosa on July 7, 2000. [2] On February 19, 2002, respondent moved for the
consolidation of the said complaint with the following substantially interrelated cases earlier filed
with the First Division of this Court:
1.
2.

Administrative Case No. 5463: Sandra F. Vaflor v. Atty. Adoniram P.

Pamplona and Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa;
Administrative Case No. 5502: Daniel A. Jalandoni v. Atty. Nicanor V.
Villarosa.

In a resolution dated February 24, 2003, this Court considered Administrative Case No. 5463
closed and terminated.[3] On February 4, 2004, considering the pleadings filed in Administrative
Case No. 5502, the Court resolved:
(a)

to NOTE the notice of the resolution dated September 27, 2003 of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines dismissing the case against respondent for
lack of merit; and

(b)

to DENY, for lack of merit, the petition filed by complainant praying that
the resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dismissing the instant
case be reviewed and that proper sanctions be imposed upon respondent. [4]

No motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid denial in Administrative Case No. 5502
appears in the records. The Court is now called upon to determine the merits of this remaining
case (A.C. No. 5303) against respondent.
The complaint read:
AS FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
That respondent is a practicing lawyer and a member of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental Chapter. That sometime on
September 19, 1997, Lumot A. Jalandoni, Chairman/President of PRC was sued
before RTC, Branch 52 in Civil Case No. 97-9865, RE: Cabiles et al. vs. Lumot
Jalandoni, et al. The latter engaged the legal services of herein respondent who
formally entered his appearance on October 2, 1997 as counsel for the defendants
Lumot A. Jalandoni/Totti Anlap Gargoles. Respondent as a consequence of said
Attorney-Client relationship represented Lumot A. Jalandoni et al in the entire
proceedings of said case. Utmost trust and confidence was reposed on said
counsel, hence delicate and confidential matters involving all the personal
circumstances of his client were entrusted to the respondent. The latter was
provided with all the necessary information relative to the property in question and
likewise on legal matters affecting the corporation (PRC) particularly [involving]
problems [which affect] Hotel Alhambra. Said counsel was privy to all transactions
and affairs of the corporation/hotel.

That it was respondent who exclusively handled the entire proceedings of

afore-cited Civil Case No. 97-9865 [and] presented Lumot A. Jalandoni as his witness
prior to formally resting his case. However, on April 27, 1999 respondent, without
due notice prior to a scheduled hearing, surprisingly filed a Motion to withdraw as
counsel, one day before its scheduled hearing on April 28, 1999. A careful perusal
of said Motion to Withdraw as Counsel will conclusively show that no copy thereof
was furnished to Lumot A. Jalandoni, neither does it bear her conformity. No
doubt, such notorious act of respondent resulted to (sic) irreparable damage and
injury to Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al since the decision of the court RTC, Branch 52
proved adverse to Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. The far reaching effects of the
untimely and unauthorized withdrawal by respondent caused irreparable damage
and injury to Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al; a highly meritorious case in favor of his client
suddenly [suffered] unexpected defeat.
That the grounds alleged by respondent for his withdrawal as counsel of
Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. was that he is [a] retained counsel of Dennis G. Jalbuena
and the Fernando F. Gonzaga, Inc. It was Dennis G. Jalbuena who recommended him
to be the counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. It is worthy to note that from the
outset, respondent already knew that Dennis G. Jalbuena is the son-in-law of Lumot
A. Jalandoni being married to her eldest daughter, Carmen J. Jalbuena. The other
directors/officers of PRC were comprised of the eldest sibling of the remaining
children of Lumot A. Jalandoni made in accordance with her wishes, with the
exception of Carmen J. Jalbuena, the only daughter registered as one of the
incorporators of PRC, obviously, being the author of the registration itself [sic].
Respondent further stated that he cannot refuse to represent Dennis G. Jalbuena in
the case filed against the latter before the City Prosecutors Office by PRC/Lumot A.
Jalandoni due to an alleged retainership agreement with said Dennis G. Jalbuena.
[He] likewise represented Carmen J. Jalbuena and one Vicente Delfin when PRC filed
the criminal complaint against them. On April 06, 1999, twenty-one (21) days
prior to respondents filing of his Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Lumot A.
Jalandoni, et al., respondent entered his appearance with Bacolod City Prosecutor
OIC-Vicente C. Acupan, through a letter expressly stating that effective said date
he was appearing as counsel for both Dennis G. Jalbuena and Carmen J. Jalbuena
and Vicente Delfin in the Estafa case filed by the corporation (PRC) against
them. Simply stated, as early as April 6, 1999 respondent already appeared for
and in behalf of the Sps. Carmen and Dennis Jalbuena/Vicente Delfin while
concurrently representing Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. in Civil Case No. 97-9865.
However, despite being fully aware that the interest of his client Lumot A. Jalandoni
[holding an equivalent of Eighty-two (82%) percent of PRCs shares of stocks] and
the interest of PRC are one and the same, notwithstanding the fact that Lumot A.
Jalandoni was still his client in Civil Case No. 97-9862, respondent opted to
represent opposing clients at the same time. The corporations complaint for estafa
(P3,183,5525.00) was filed against the Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena together
with UCPB bank manager Vicente Delfin. Succeeding events will show that
respondent instead of desisting from further violation of his [lawyers] oath
regarding fidelity to his client, with extreme arrogance, blatantly ignored our laws
on Legal Ethics, by palpably and despicably defending the Sps. Dennis and Carmen
J. Jalbuena in all the cases filed against them by PRC through its duly authorized
representatives, before the Public Prosecutors Office, Bacolod City (PP vs. Sps.
Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena for False Testimony/Perjury, viol. of Art. 183 RPC
under BC I.S. No. 2000-2304; viol. of Art. 363, 364, 181 and 183 RPC under BC I.S.
2000-2343, PP vs. Carmen J. Jalbuena for viol. of Art. 315 under BC I.S. 2000-2125
and various other related criminal cases against the Sps. Dennis and Carmen
Jalbuena).
AS SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
There is no dispute that respondent was able to acquire vast resources of
confidential and delicate information on the facts and circumstances of [Civil Case
No. 97-9865] when Lumot A. Jalandoni was his client which knowledge and
information was acquired by virtue of lawyer-client relationship between respondent
and his clients. Using the said classified information which should have been
closely guarded respondent did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously
conspired and confabulated with the Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena in
concocting the despicable and fabricated charges against his former clients
denominated as PP vs. Lumot A. Jalandoni, Pamela J. Yulo, Cristina J. Lim and Leica J.

Lim for viol. of Art. 172 of Revised Penal Code due to a board resolution executed by
the corporation which the Sps. Jalbuena, with the assistance of herein respondent,
claimed to have been made without an actual board meeting due to an alleged lack
of quorum, [among other things]. Were it not for said fiduciary relation between
client and lawyer, respondent will not be in a position to furnish his conspirator
spouses with confidential information on Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC, operator of
Alhambra Hotel.
Adding insult to injury, respondent opted to deliberately withhold the entire
case file including the marked exhibits of the Cabiles case for more than three (3)
months after his untimely unilateral withdrawal therefrom, despite repeated
demands from [his] client. On July 26, 1999, capitalizing on his knowledge of the
indispensability of said documents particularly the marked exhibits, which deadline
to file the formal offer of exhibits was continually impressed upon the new counsel
by the court, respondent suddenly interposed an amount of five thousand
(P5,000.00) pesos as consideration prior to or simultaneous to the turnover of said
documents. [On] July 29, 1999, left with no other alternative owing to the urgency
of the situation, PRC issued Check No. 2077686 for P5,000.00 in payment
thereof. This was duly received by respondents office on the same date. Such
dilatory tactics employed by respondent immensely weakened the case of Lumot A.
Jalandoni eventually resulting to (sic) an adverse decision against [her].
Further demonstrating before this Honorable Court the notoriety of
respondent in representing conflicting interest which extended even beyond the
family controversy was his improper appearance in court in Civil Case No. 99-10660,
RE: Amy Albert Que vs. Penta Resorts Corp., this time favoring the party opponent
of defendant who is even outside the family circle. During the pre-trial hearing
conducted on May 5, 1999, while still [holding] exclusive possession of the entire
case file of his client in Civil Case No. 97-9865, respondent brazenly positioned
himself beside Atty. Adoniram P. Pamplona, counsel of plaintiff [in] a suit against his
client Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC, coaching said counsel on matters [he was privy to] as
counsel of said client. Facts mentioned by said counsel of the plaintiff starting from
the last par. of page 25 until and including the entire first par. of page 26 were the
exact words dictated by respondent. The entire incident was personally witnessed
by herein complainant [who was] only an arms length away from them during the
hearing. However, the particular portion showing the said irregular acts of
respondent was deliberately excluded by the court stenographer from the
transcript, despite her detailed recollection and affirmation thereof to herein
complainant. This prompted the new counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC to complain
to the court why Atty. Nicanor Villarosa was coaching Atty. Pamplona in such
proceedings. Said corrections were only effected after repeated demands to
reflect the actual events which [transpired] on said pre-trial. [5] (emphasis ours)
In an addendum to the July 4, 2000 complaint, Lim also pointed to certain acts of
respondent which allegedly violated the Rules of Court perpetration of falsehood and abuse of
his influence as former public prosecutor. These supposedly affected the status of the cases that
Lim filed against the clients of respondent. [6]
In a motion to dismiss dated October 30, 2000, respondent claimed that the complainant
violated Circular No. 48-2000 because, in his verification, Lim stated:
3. That [he] prepared this instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Nicanor V.
Villarosa, read its contents, the same are all true and correct to [his] own
personal knowledge and belief.[7] (emphasis ours)
Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that:
SEC. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required by law or
rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit. (5a)
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading
and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or
based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains verification based
on information and belief or upon knowledge, information and belief,

or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. (As

amended, A.M. 00-2-10, May 1, 2000.) (emphasis ours)
While the Rules provide that an unsigned pleading produces no legal effect, [8] the court
may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it appears that the same was due
to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. [9] We find that Lim was not shown to have
deliberately filed the pleading in violation of the Rules.
In his comment dated December 1, 2000, respondent, reiterating his ground for the
dismissal of the complaint, added:
[that] complainant Humberto C. Lim, Jr. has not only violated the Rule on Civil
Procedure but he was/is NOT duly authorize[d] by the Penta Resorts Corp. (PRC) nor
[by] Lumot A. Jalandoni to file this complaint against [him]. Neither [was Lim] a
proper party to file this complaint. This fact is an additional ground to have his case
dismissed because Humberto C. Lim Jr. exceeded whatever authority was granted to
him as embodied in a resolution and the Special Power of Attorney allegedly granted
to him by the complainants.[10]
To bolster his assertion that the complaint against him was unfounded, respondent
presented the following version in his defense:
FACTS OF THE CASE
That Mrs. Jalandoni has two sons-in-law, namely Dennis G. Jalbuena married
to her daughter, Carmen J. Jalbuena, and Humberto C. Lim Jr., the herein
complainant married to her daughter, Cristina J. Lim.
That Mrs. Lumot Jalandoni organized a corporation namely the Penta Resorts
Corporation (PRC) where she owned almost ninety seven percent (97%). In other
words, in reality, Penta Resorts Corporation is a single proprietorship belonging to
Mrs. Jalandoni. That the only property of the corporation is as above-stated, the
Alhambra Hotel, constructed solely through the effort of the spouses Jalbuena on
that parcel of land now claimed by the Cabiles family.
That sometime on the year 1997 the case above-cited (Civil Case No. 979865) was filed before the court against the sisters.
That [he], being RETAINED counsel of the spouses Dennis and Carmen J.
Jalbuena was RECOMMENDED by the spouses to the sisters to answer the
complaint filed against them.
That as counsel to the sisters, [he] filed a Motion for Extension Of Time To
File Answer and ultimately, [he] filed an Answer With Counter-Claim And Prayer
For Issuance Of Writ Of Preliminary Injunction.
That reading the Answer it is clear that the defense of the sisters totally
rest on public documents (the various titles issued to the land in question because
of the series [of changes] in ownership) and the sisters and their parents actual
occupation and possession thereof. xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Lim[s] accusation against [him] in the light of the above-facts is the best
evidence of Humberto C. Lim, Jr.s penchant for exaggeration and distortion of the
truth. Since the defense of the sisters to retain ownership of the land in question is
based on PUBLIC documents, what delicate and confidential matters involving
personal circumstances of the sisters allegedly entrusted to [him], is Mr. Humberto
C. Lim, Jr. talking about in paragraphs I and II of his Complaint? What [privity] to all
transactions and affairs of the corporation/hotel is he referring to? Whatever
transactions the corporation may have been involved in or [may be getting involved
into], is totally immaterial and irrelevant to the defense of the sisters.
There was nothing personal [about the] circumstances of the sisters nor
transactions of the corporation [which were] discussed. The documents being
offered as evidence, [he] reiterate[s] for emphasis, are public; the presumption is
that the whole world knows about them.

That [he] [also] vehemently den[ies] another distorted allegation of Mr. Lim
that [he] represented Mrs. Jalandoni [in] the entire proceedings of [the] case. [Lim]
himself attested that [he] [filed] [his] Motion to Withdraw As Counsel, dated April
26, 1999 , before the trial court, sometime on April 27, 1999. How then could
[he] have represented Mrs. Jalandoni for [the] entire proceedings of the case?
Further, Mr. Lim intentionally hid from this Honorable Court the important fact that
[his] Motion to Withdraw was APPROVED by the trial court because of
the possibility of a conflict of interest. xxx xxx xxx.[11]
Respondent discredited Lims claim that he deliberately withheld the records of the cited
civil case. He insisted that it took him just a few days, not three months, to turn over the records
of the case to Lim.[12] While he admitted an oversight in addressing the notice of the motion to
withdraw as counsel to Mrs. Totti Anlap Gargoles instead of Mrs. Jalandoni at Hotel Alhambra, he
maintained that it was the height of hypocrisy to allege that Mrs. Jalandoni was not aware of his
motion to withdraw[13]since Mrs. Gargoles is Mrs. Jalandonis sister and Hotel Alhambra is owned
by PRC which, in turn, actually belongs to Mrs. Jalandoni. Respondent also argued that no
prejudice was suffered by Mrs. Jalandoni because she was already represented by Atty. Lorenzo S.
Alminaza from the first hearing date. [14] In fact, respondent contended, it was he who was not
notified of the substitution of counsels. [15]
As to the bill of P 5,000, respondent stated:
That Mr. Lim begrudge[s] [him] for billing Mrs. Jalandoni Five Thousand
(Php5,000.00) Pesos. Mr. Humberto C. Lim Jr. conveniently forgets that the net
worth of the property together with its improvements, under litigation in that
Cabiles, et al. vs. Gargoles et al. case, is a minimum of THIRTY MILLION
(Php30,000,000.00) PESOS then, and more so now. [He] cannot find any law
which prohibits a counsel from billing a client for services in proportion to the
services he rendered.[16]
In view of these developments, respondent was adamant that:
the only real question to be answered in this complaint is why Mr. Lim so
consistently [determined] to immerse the Jalandoni family [in] a series of criminal
and civil suits and to block all attempts to reconcile the family by prolonging
litigations, complaints and filing of new ones in spite of the RESOLUTION of the
corporation and the UNDERTAKING of the members.[17]
On June 18, 2001, the Court resolved to refer the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation. Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro made the following report and
recommendation:
After going over the [pieces of evidence] submitted by the parties[,] the
undersigned noted that from the onset, PRC had a case wherein respondent was its
counsel. Later on, complainant had a case against spouses Jalbuena where the
parties were related to each other and the latter spouses were represented by the
respondent as their retained counsel; after respondent had allegedly withdrawn as
counsel for the complainant in Civil Case No. 97-9865.
Being the husband of one of the complainants which respondent himself
averred in his answer, it is incumbent upon Humberto Lim Jr. to represent his wife as
one of the representatives of PRC and Alhambra Hotel in the administrative
complaint to protect not only her interest but that of the [familys].
From the facts obtaining, it is evident that complainant had a lawyer-client
relationship with the respondent before the latter [was] retained as counsel by the
Spouses Jalbuena when the latter were sued by complainants representative.
We cannot disregard the fact that on this situation for some reason or
another there existed some confidentiality and trust between complainants and
respondent to ensure the successful defense of their cases.
Respondent for having appeared as counsel for the Spouses Jalbuena when
charged by respondents former client Jalandoni of PRC and Alhambra Hotel,

represented conflicting interests in violation of the Canon of Professional

Responsibility.
As such therefore, the Undersigned has no alternative but to respectfully
recommend the suspension of the respondent from the practice of law for a period
of six (6) months from receipt hereof.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
Pasig City, June 20, 2002.[18]
The IBP Board of Governors (Board), however, reversed the recommendation of the
investigating commissioner and resolved to dismiss the case on August 3, 2002. [19] Lumot A.
Jalandoni filed a motion for reconsideration (MR) on October 18, 2002 but the Board denied the
MR since it no longer had jurisdiction to consider and resolve a matter already endorsed to this
Court.[20]
Before delving into the core issues of this case, we need to address some preliminary
matters.
Respondent argues that the alleged resolution of PRC and the special power of attorney
given by Lumot A. Jalandoni to Humberto did not contemplate the filing of an administrative
complaint.[21] Citing the Rules of Court, respondent said that:
[s]uch complaints are personal in nature and therefore, the filing of the same,
cannot be delegated by the alleged aggrieved party to any third person unless
expressly authorized by law.
We must note, however, the following:
SECTION 1. How instituted. Proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of
attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu propio, or by the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint
shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by
affidavits or persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged
and/or by such documents a may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu propio or upon referral by the
Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any
person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against any erring attorneys.
[22]
(emphasis ours)
Complaints against members of the Bar are pursued to preserve the integrity of the legal
profession, not for private vendetta. Thus, whoever has such personal knowledge of facts
constituting a cause of action against erring lawyers may file a verified complaint with the Court
or the IBP.[23] Corollary to the public interest in these proceedings is the following rule:
SEC. 11. Defects. No defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in the
proceeding or the Investigators Report shall be considered as substantial
unless the Board of Governors, upon considering the whole record, finds that
such defect has resulted or may result in a miscarriage of justice, in which
event the Board shall take such remedial action as the circumstances may warrant,
including invalidation of the entire proceedings. [24] (emphasis ours)
Respondent failed to substantiate his allegation that Lims complaint was defective in form
and substance, and that entertaining it would result in a miscarriage of justice. For the same
reason, we will no longer put in issue the filing at the onset of a motion to dismiss by respondent
instead of an answer or comment.[25]
The core issues before us now are:
1.
2.

whether there existed a conflict of interest in the cases represented and

handled by respondent, and
whether respondent properly withdrew his services as counsel of record
in Civil Case No. 97-9865.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST
Petitioners alleged that as an offshoot of representing conflicting interests, breach of
attorney-client confidentiality and deliberate withholding of records were committed by
respondent. To effectively unravel the alleged conflict of interest, we must look into the cases
involved.
In Civil Case No. 97-9865, respondent represented Lumot A. Jalandoni and Totti Anlap
Gargoles. This was a case for the recovery of possession of property involving Hotel Alhambra, a
hotel owned by PRC.
In BC I.S. No. 99-2192, Lim v. Vicente Delfin, Spouses Dennis and Carmen Jalbuena,
respondent was counsel for Delfin and the spouses Jalbuena. In this case, plaintiff Cristina Lim
sued the spouses Jalbuena and Delfin on the basis of two checks issued by PRC for the
construction of Hotel Alhambra.[26] The corporate records allegedly reflected that the contractor,
AAQ Sales and Construction (AAQSC), was already paid in full yet Amy Albert Que of AAQSC still
filed a collection case against PRC for an unpaid balance. [27] In her complaint-affidavit, Cristina
averred:
11. That it was respondent Carmen J. Jalbuena, who took advantage of [her]
signatures in blank in DBP Check Nos. 0865590 and 0865591, and who filled up the
spaces of the payee, date and amount without the knowledge and consent of any
officer of the corporation and [herself], after which she caused the delivery of the
same checks to her husband Dennis Jalbuena, who encashed without [their]
knowledge and consent, and received the proceeds of the same checks (as
evidenced by his signature in receipt of payment on the dorsal side of the said
checks) with the indispensable participation and cooperation of respondent Vicente
B. Delfin, the Asst. Vice President and Branch Head of UCPB. [28]
Notably, in his comment, respondent stated:
There was a possibility of conflict of interest because by this time, or one
month before [he] filed [his] Motion to Withdraw, Mrs. Jalandoni /Penta Resorts
Corporation, Mr. Lim, through his wife, Cristina J. Lim, by another counsel, Atty.
Lorenzo S. Alminaza, filed a criminal complaint against the spouses Dennis and
Carmen J. Jalbuena on March 26, 1999 under BC-I.S. Case No. 99-2192. [29]
Similarly, in BC I.S. Nos. 00-1370, 2000-2304, 2000-2343, 00-2125, 00-2230, 00-880,
respondent positioned himself against PRCs interests.
And, in Civil Case No. 99-10660, a collection case against PRC, Atty. Alminaza of PRC was
alarmed by the appearance of respondent at the table in court for AAQSCs counsel. [30]
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) highlights the need for candor,
fairness and loyalty in all the dealings of lawyers with their clients. Rule 15.03 of the CPR aptly
provides:
Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
It is only upon strict compliance with the condition of full disclosure of facts that a lawyer
may appear against his client; otherwise, his representation of conflicting interests is
reprehensible.[31] Conflict of interest may be determined in this manner:
There is representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new
retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously
affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether
he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection. [32] (emphasis ours)
The rule on conflict of interests covers not only cases in which confidential communications
have been confided but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. [33]
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided

fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or doubledealing in the performance thereof, and also whether he will be called upon in his
new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquire in the previous
employment. The first part of the rule refers to cases in which the opposing parties
are present clients either in the same action or in a totally unrelated case; the
second part pertains to those in which the adverse party against whom the attorney
appears is his former client in a matter which is related, directly or
indirectly, to the present controversy.[34] (emphasis ours)
The rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a
former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or in totally
unrelated cases. The cases here directly or indirectly involved the parties connection to PRC,
even if neither PRC nor Lumot A. Jalandoni was specifically named as party-litigant in some of the
cases mentioned.
An attorney owes to his client undivided allegiance. After being retained and
receiving the confidences of the client, he cannot, without the free and intelligent
consent of his client, act both for his client and for one whose interest is adverse to,
or conflicting with that of his client in the same general matter. The prohibition
stands even if the adverse interest is very slight; neither is it material that
the intention and motive of the attorney may have been honest.[35] (emphasis
ours)
The representation by a lawyer of conflicting interests, in the absence of the written consent
of all parties concerned after a full disclosure of the facts, constitutes professional misconduct
which subjects the lawyer to disciplinary action. [36]
Even respondents alleged effort to settle the existing controversy among the family
members[37] was improper because the written consent of all concerned was still required. [38] A
lawyer who acts as such in settling a dispute cannot represent any of the parties to it. [39]
WITHDRAWAL AS COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASE NO. 97-9865
The next bone of contention was the propriety of respondents withdrawal as counsel for
Lumot A. Jalandoni in Civil Case No. 97-9865 to fulfill an alleged retainership agreement with the
spouses Jalbuena in a suit by PRC, through Cristina Lim, against the Jalbuenas and Delfin (BC I.S.
No. 99-2192). In his December 1, 2000 comment, respondent stated that it was he who was not
notified of the hiring of Atty. Alminaza as the new counsel in that case and that he withdrew from
the case with the knowledge of Lumot A. Jalandoni and with leave of court.
The rule on termination of attorney-client relations may be summarized as follows:
The relation of attorney and client may be terminated by the client, by the lawyer or
by the court, or by reason of circumstances beyond the control of the client or the
lawyer. The termination of the attorney-client relationship entails certain duties on
the part of the client and his lawyer. [40]
Accordingly, it has been held that the right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the
relation other than for sufficient cause is considerably restricted. Canon 22 of the CPR reads:
Canon 22 A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon
notice appropriate in the circumstances.
An attorney may only retire from a case either by written consent of his client or by
permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney should see to it
that the name of the new lawyer is recorded in the case. [41] A lawyer who desires to retire from an
action without the written consent of his client must file a petition for withdrawal in court. [42] He
must serve a copy of his petition upon his client and the adverse party at least three days before
the date set for hearing, otherwise the court may treat the application as a mere scrap of
paper.[43] Respondent made no such move. He admitted that he withdrew as counsel on April 26,
1999, which withdrawal was supposedly approved by the court on April 28, 1999. The conformity
of Mrs. Jalandoni was only presumed by Atty. Villarosa because of the appearance of Atty.
Alminaza in court, supposedly in his place.
[A client] may discharge his attorney at any time with or without cause and
thereafter employ another lawyer who may then enter his appearance. Thus, it has

been held that a client is free to change his counsel in a pending case and
thereafter retain another lawyer to represent him. That manner of changing a
lawyer does not need the consent of the lawyer to be dismissed. Nor does it require
approval of the court.[44]
The appearance of Atty. Alminaza in fact was not even to substitute for respondent but to
act as additional counsel.[45] Mrs. Jalandonis conformity to having an additional lawyer did not
necessarily mean conformity to respondents desire to withdraw as counsel. Respondents
speculations on the professional relationship of Atty. Alminaza and Mrs. Jalandoni find no support
in the records of this case.
Respondent should not have presumed that his motion to withdraw as counsel [46] would be
granted by the court. Yet, he stopped appearing as Mrs. Jalandonis counsel beginning April 28,
1999, the first hearing date. No order from the court was shown to have actually granted his
motion for withdrawal. Only an order dated June 4, 1999 had a semblance of granting his motion:
When this case was called for hearing Atty. Lorenzo Alminaza appeared for the
defendants considering that Atty. Nicanor Villarosa has already withdrawn
his appearance in this case which the Court considered it to be
approved as it bears the conformity of the defendants. [47] (emphasis ours)
That Mrs. Jalandoni continued with Atty. Alminazas professional engagement on her behalf
despite respondents withdrawal did not absolve the latter of the consequences of his
unprofessional conduct, specially in view of the conflicting interests already discussed.
Respondent himself stated that his withdrawal from Civil Case No. 97-9865 was due to the
possibility of a conflict of interest.[48]
Be that as it may, the records do not support the claim that respondent improperly
collected P5,000 from petitioner. Undoubtedly, respondent provided professional services to
Lumot A. Jalandoni. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the documents belonging to Mrs.
Jalandoni were deliberately withheld. The right of an attorney to retain possession of a clients
documents, money or other property which may have lawfully come into his possession in his
professional capacity, until his lawful fees and disbursements have been fully paid, is wellestablished.[49]
Finally, we express our utter dismay with Lims apparent use of his wifes community tax
certificate number in his complaint for disbarment against respondent. [50]This is not, however, the
forum to discuss this lapse.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa is hereby
found GUILTY of violating Canon 15 and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, effective upon receipt of this decision,
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be entered into the records of respondent and furnished to the
Office of the Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and all courts in the Philippines, for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
ADM. CASE NO. 6876
March 7, 2008
HEIRS OF LYDIO JERRY FALAME, namely: MELBA FALAME, LEO FALAME and
JERRY FALAME, Complainants - versus - ATTY. EDGAR J. BAGUIO, Respondent.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
On Petition for Review[1] is the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Board of Governors dismissing the disbarment complaint filed by the Heirs of Lydio Jerry

Falame (complainants) against Atty. Edgar J. Baguio (respondent), docketed as CBD Case No. 041191.
In their Complaint[2] against respondent, complainants alleged that on 15 July 1991, their
father, the late Lydio Jerry Falame (Lydio), engaged the services of respondent to represent him
in an action for forcible entry docketed as Civil Case No. A-2694 (the first civil case) and
entitled Heirs of Emilio T. Sy, represented by Anastacia Velayo Vda. De Sy and Belen V. Sy
vs. Lydio Jerry Falame, RaleighFalame and Four (4) John Does, in which Lydio was one of the
defendants.[3]
Complainants recounted that respondent, as counsel for the defendants, filed the answer
to the complaint in the first civil case. Subsequently, when the parties to the first civil case were
required to file their respective position papers, respondent used and submitted in evidence the
following: (1) a special power of attorney dated 1 July 1988 executed by Lydio in favor of his
brother, Raleigh Falame, appointing the latter to be his attorney-in-fact; and (2) the affidavit of
Raleigh Falame dated 23 July 1988, executed before respondent, in which Raleigh stated that
Lydio owned the property subject of the first civil case. [4]
Complainants claimed that even after the Municipal Trial Court of Dipolog City had ruled in
favor of the defendants in the first civil case, Lydio retained the services of respondent as his
legal adviser and counsel for his businesses until Lydios death on 8 September 1996.[5]
However, on 23 October 2000, in representation of spouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame,
respondent filed a case against complainants allegedly involving the property subject of the first
civil case, entitledSpouses Rally F. Falame and Noemi F. Falame v. Melba A. Falame, Leo A.
Falame, Jerry A. Falame, Jr., Sugni Realty Holdings and Development Corporations, their
representatives, agents and persons acting in their behalf and docketed as Civil Case No. 5568
(the second civil case) before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 6. The complaint
sought the declaration of nullity of the deed of sale, its registration in the registry of deeds,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20241 issued as a consequence of the registration of the deed of
sale, and the real estate mortgage on the said property. Alternatively, it prayed for specific
performance and reconveyance or legal redemption and damages with preliminary injunction
and restraining order.[6]
Firstly, complainants maintained that by acting as counsel for the spouses Falame in the
second civil case wherein they were impleaded as defendants, respondent violated his oath of
office and duty as an attorney. Plainly, they contended that the spouses Falames interests are
adverse to those of his former client, Lydio. [7]
Secondly, complainants claimed that respondent knowingly made false statements of
fact in the complaint in the second civil case to mislead the trial court. In so doing, respondent
violated paragraph (d), Section 20 [8] of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, [9] complainants asserted
further.
Lastly,
complainants
alleged
that
the
second
civil
case
is
a
baseless and fabricated suit which respondent filed as counsel for
complainants
uncle
against the heirs of respondents deceased
client.
Specifically,
they averred that respondent filed the case for
the sole purpose
of
retaining, maintaining and/or withholding the possession of the subject property from
complainants who are its true owners. Complainants concluded that respondent violated
paragraph (g), Section 20[10] of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. [11]
In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss, [12] respondent controverted complainants
allegations. He emphasizes that it was only Raleigh Falame who personally engaged his legal
services for him and on Lydios behalf and that, in fact, it was Raleigh who paid him the
attorneys fees. He also stated that he signed the jurat in Raleighs affidavit, which was
submitted as evidence in the first civil case, believing to the best of his knowledge that there is
good ground to support it. Insisting that he did not betray the confidence reposed in him by Lydio
as the latters counsel in the first civil case, respondent maintained that he did not reveal or use
any fact he acquired knowledge of during the existence of the attorney-client relation in the first
civil case as he had never even conferred with nor talked to Lydio in the first place. Respondent
likewise contended that he did not knowingly make any misleading or untruthful statement of
fact in the complaint in the second civil case and neither did he employ any means inconsistent
with truth and honor in the hearing of the case. [13]

Respondent vigorously averred that Lydio had not retained him as counsel in any case or
transaction. Stressing the long interval of twelve years separating the termination of the first civil
case and his acceptance of the second civil case, respondent pointed out that the first civil case
was not between Lydio and Raleigh but rather between the heirs of Emilio T. Sy on one hand
and Lydio and Raleigh on the other where physical possession of property was at stake.
Respondent further averred that in contrast the second civil case is one involving the spouses
Raleigh and Noemi Falame as plaintiffs, and Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr., all surnamed Falame,
and Sugni Realty Holdings and Development Corporation, as defendantsa case which arose
from the wrongful acts committed by Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr. after Lydios death. [14]
Respondent maintained that since the second civil case was still pending before the trial
court, the IBP had no jurisdiction over the instant administrative case. He added that
complainants filed this administrative case when Raleigh could no longer testify in his own favor
as he had died a year earlier.[15]
In their Position Paper[16] dated 7 September 2004, in addition to their previous charges
against respondent, complainants claimed that respondent violated Rule 15.03 [17] of the Code
of Professional Responsibility when he represented the cause of the spouses Falame against that
of his former client, Lydio.[18]
On 25 June 2005, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2005-167 adopting
and approving Investigating Commissioner Winston D. Abuyuans report and recommendation for
the dismissal of this administrative case, thus: [19]
x x x The charge lacks specification as to what part of the lawyers oath was
violated by the respondent and what confidence was disclosed. The complainants
may have in mind the prohibition against disclosure of secret information learned in
confidence, but there is no specification in the complaint what secret or information
learned in confidence under Civil Case No. A-2694 was disclosed or will be disclosed
by respondent in Civil Case No. 5568. In administrative complaints for disbarment or
suspension against lawyers, the complainant must specify in the affidavit-complaint
the alleged secrets or confidential information disclosed or will be disclosed in the
professional employment (Uy v. Gonzalez, 426 SCRA 422; 431). In the absence of
such specification, the complaint must fail.
In the complaint, there is no specific charge against respondent for violation
of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility about the
prohibition against representation of conflicting interest. So, the allegation in
paragraph 1, page 8 and 9 of complainants position paper stating: With all due
respect, it is submitted that respondent violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility cannot be countenanced. The reason being that it is
an elementary principle of due process to which the respondent is entitled that only
those charged in the complaint can be proved by the complainants. A charge not
specified in the complaint cannot be proved (Uy v. Gonzales, id.)

x x x But still this charge will not proper for lack of sufficient bases.
x x x Civil Case No. 5568, which was commenced on 03 October 2000, or
three years since the complainants became owners of Lydio Falames properties, is
a suit against the complainants, not as representatives of Lydio Falame, but as
owners of their respective aliquot interests in the property in question (Gayon v.
Gayon, 36 SCRA 104; 107-108). The complainants are sued not on the basis of the
acts, rights, obligations and interest of Lydio Falame on the material possession of
the improvements found on Lot 345 litigated in Civil Case No. A-2694 nor even on
such land itself, but rather on the facts alleged in the second amended and
supplemental complaint which give rise to their cause of action against them.
While the complainants could not specify under what circumstances the
respondent committed [the] alleged breach of confidence, breach of secrecy or
revelation of secret or confidential information[,] the respondent has shown that he
did not commit any violation of such duties or obligations of an attorney.
It is clear that only Raleigh Falame engaged the legal services of the
respondent for his and Lydio Falames defense in Civil Case No. A-2694.
x x x The other allegations of the complainants that the respondent violated
paragraph (d), Section 20 of Rule 139, Rules of Court, and his lawyers oath when he
allegedly betrayed the trust and confidence of his former client by denying
knowledge of the fact that the land was owned by Lydio Falame and when he did not
disclose to the Court that at one time his present clients categorically declared and
unconditionally recognized the full ownership of the late Lydio Falame and
complainant Melba Falame over subject matter of both cases equally lacks
evidentiary basis.
x x x It is beyond the competence of the complainants to conclude and is
outside the jurisdiction of this Honorable Commission to rule as to whether or nor
(sic) the complaint in Civil Case No.5568 is baseless or fabricated. It is only the
Honorable Court which has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the same and
cannot be the subject of an administrative complaint against the respondent.
x x x WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that
this complaint be dismissed on grounds of prescription, the same having been filed
four (4) years after the alleged misconduct took place and for lack of merit.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[20]
Dissatisfied, complainants filed the instant petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court reiterating their allegations in the complaint and their position paper. [21] They likewise
assert that the IBP erred in holding that the instant administrative complaint had been filed out
of time since it was filed on 16 January 2004, or three (3) years, four (4) months and sixteen (16)
days after the second civil case was filed on 23 October 2000. [22] In addition, in their Consolidated
Comment (should be Consolidated Reply), [23] complainants invoke the Courts ruling in Frias v.
Bautista-Lozada[24] to support their contention that administrative complaints against members of
the bar do not prescribe.[25]
In his Comment,[26] respondent principally maintains that the charges imputed to him have
never been proven by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence which is the quantum of proof
required in administrative cases against lawyers, and that complainants have the burden to
prove their accusations as he enjoys the presumption of innocence. [27] Respondent likewise
asserts that in accusing him of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
only in their position paper and in the instant petition, complainants infringed his right to due
process and to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. [28]
There is merit in the petition.
At the outset, the Court holds that the instant administrative action is not barred by
prescription. As early as 1947, the Court held in Calo, Jr. v. Degamo,[29] to wit:
The ordinary statutes of limitation have no application to disbarment
proceedings, nor does the circumstance that the facts set up as a ground for

disbarment constitute a crime, prosecution for which in a criminal proceeding is

barred by limitation, affect the disbarment proceeding x x x (5 AM. JUR. 434)[30]
This doctrine was reaffirmed in the relatively recent case of Frias v. BautistaLozada[31] where the Court held that Rule VII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP,
which provides for a prescriptive period for the filing of administrative complaints against
lawyers, should be struck down as void and of no legal effect for being ultra vires.[32]
Prescinding from the unavailability of the defense of prescription, the Court concurs with
the Investigating Commissioners opinion that some of the charges raised by complainants in
their complaint are unsubstantiated.
There is, however, sufficient basis to hold respondent accountable for violation of Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. While this charge was not raised in the initiatory
pleading, it was put forward in complainants position paper filed with the IBP and in the petition
filed with the Court. In fact, respondent proffered his defenses to the charge in his position paper
before the IBP and likewise in his comment before the Court. In his very first pleading before the
IBP, the answer with motion to dismiss, he denied having Lydio as his client. Such absence of
attorney-client relationship is the essential element of his defense to the charge of conflict of
interest, as articulated in his subsequent submissions.
The Court, therefore, rules and so holds that respondent has been adequately apprised of
and heard on the issue. In administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not
connote full adversarial proceedings. Actual adversarial proceedings only become necessary for
clarification when there is a need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague
testimonies. Due process is fulfilled when the parties were given reasonable opportunity to be
heard and to submit evidence in support of their arguments. [33]
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a
person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. [34] The test is whether, on
behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to contest for that which his duty to another client
requires him to oppose or when the possibility of such situation will develop. [35] The rule covers
not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which
no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. [36] In addition, the rule holds even if the
inconsistency is remote or merely probable or the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no
intention to represent conflicting interests. [37]
The rule concerning conflict of interest prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if that
representation will be directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. In the same way, a
lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially related
matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after
consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty. [38] In the course of a
lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the clients case,
including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore,
one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. [39]
The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to
represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The clients
confidence once reposed should not be divested by mere expiration of professional employment.
Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything which will injuriously
affect his former client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor should he
disclose or use any of the clients confidences acquired in the previous relation. [40]
In relation to this, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed on him. His highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards
and costs even to himself. [41] The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease
with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to employ the
attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even
survives the death of the client.[42]

In the case at bar, respondent admitted having jointly represented Lydio and Raleigh as
defendants in the first civil case. Evidently, the attorney-client relation between Lydio and
respondent was established despite the fact that it was only Raleigh who paid him. The case
of Hilado v. David[43] tells us that it is immaterial whether such employment was paid, promised
or charged for.[44]
As defense counsel in the first civil case, respondent advocated the stance
that Lydio solely owned the property subject of the case. In the second civil case involving the
same property, respondent, as counsel for Raleigh and his spouse, has pursued the inconsistent
position that Raleigh owned the same property in common with Lydio, with complainants, who
inherited the property, committing acts which debase respondents rights as a co-owner.
The fact that the attorney-client relation had ceased by reason of Lydios death or through
the completion of the specific task for which respondent was employed is not reason for
respondent to advocate a position opposed to that of Lydio.[45] Precedents tell us that even after
the termination of his employment, an attorney may not act as counsel against his client in the
same general matter, even though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no knowledge
which could operate to his clients disadvantage in the subsequent adverse employment. [46] And
while complainants have never been respondents clients, they derive their rights to the property
from Lydios ownership of it which respondent maintained in the first civil case.
For representing Raleighs cause which is adverse to that of his former clientRaleighs
supposed co-ownership of the subject property respondent is guilty of representing conflicting
interests. Having previously undertaken joint representation of Lydio and Raleigh, respondent
should have diligently studied and anticipated the potential conflict of interest. Accordingly,
disciplinary action is warranted.[47] Heretofore, respondent is enjoined to look at any
representation situation from the point of view that there are possible conflicts; and further, to
think in terms of impaired loyalty that is to evaluate if his representation in any way will impair
loyalty to a client.[48] Considering, however, that this is respondents first offense, the Court
resolves to reprimand respondent, with admonition to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the
practice of his profession.[49]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edgar J. Baguio is found GUILTY of representing conflicting
interests and meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND. He is further admonished to observe a
higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession and to bear in mind that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5804. July 1, 2003]

BENEDICTO HORNILLA and ATTY. FEDERICO D. RICAFORT, complainants, vs.

ATTY. ERNESTO S. SALUNAT, respondent.

RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On November 21, 1997, Benedicto Hornilla and Federico D. Ricafort filed an administrative
complaint[1] with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, against
respondent Atty. Ernesto S. Salunat for illegal and unethical practice and conflict of
interest. They alleged that respondent is a member of the ASSA Law and Associates, which was
the retained counsel of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA). Respondents
brother, Aurelio S. Salunat, was a member of the PPSTA Board which approved respondents
engagement as retained counsel of PPSTA.
Complainants, who are members of the PPSTA, filed an intra-corporate case against its
members of the Board of Directors for the terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1997 before the Securities
and Exchange Commission, which was docketed as SEC Case No. 05-97-5657, and a complaint
before the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed as OMB Case No. 0-97-0695, for unlawful
spending and the undervalued sale of real property of the PPSTA. Respondent entered his
appearance as counsel for the PPSTA Board members in the said cases. Complainants contend
that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest because he was engaged by the PPSTA, of which
complainants were members, and was being paid out of its corporate funds where complainants
have contributed. Despite being told by PPSTA members of the said conflict of interest,
respondent refused to withdraw his appearance in the said cases.
Moreover, complainants aver that respondent violated Rule 15.06 [2] of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he appeared at the meeting of the PPSTA Board and assured its
members that he will win the PPSTA cases.
In his Answer,[3] respondent stressed that he entered his appearance as counsel for the
PPSTA Board Members for and in behalf of the ASSA Law and Associates. As a partner in the said
law firm, he only filed a Manifestation of Extreme Urgency in OMB Case No. 0-97-0695. [4] On
the other hand, SEC Case No. 05-97-5657 was handled by another partner of the firm, Atty.
Agustin V. Agustin. Respondent claims that it was complainant Atty. Ricafort who instigated,
orchestrated and indiscriminately filed the said cases against members of the PPSTA and its
Board.
Respondent pointed out that his relationship to Aurelio S. Salunat was immaterial; and that
when he entered into the retainer contract with the PPSTA Board, he did so, not in his individual
capacity, but in representation of the ASSA Law Firm. He denied that he ensured the victory of
the PPSTA Board in the case he was handling. He merely assured the Board that the truth will
come out and that the case before the Ombudsman will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
considering that respondents therein are not public officials, but private employees. Anent the
SEC case, respondent alleged that the same was being handled by the law firm of Atty. Eduardo
de Mesa, and not ASSA.
By way of Special and Affirmative Defenses, respondent averred that complainant Atty.
Ricafort was himself guilty of gross violation of his oath of office amounting to gross misconduct,
malpractice and unethical conduct for filing trumped-up charges against him and Atty. De
Mesa. Thus, he prayed that the complaint against him be dismissed and, instead, complainant
Ricafort be disciplined or disbarred.
The complainant was docketed as CBD Case No. 97-531 and referred to the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline. After investigation, Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended that

respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. The Board of Governors
thereafter adopted Resolution No. XV-3003-230 dated June 29, 2002, approving the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Respondent filed with this Court a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Resolution of the
IBP Board of Governors.
The pertinent rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
RULE 15.03. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to
fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues
for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client. [5] This
rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also
those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. [6] Also, there is conflict of
interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which
will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he
will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection.[7] Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing
in the performance thereof.[8]
In this jurisdiction, a corporations board of directors is understood to be that body which (1)
exercises all powers provided for under the Corporation Code; (2) conducts all business of the
corporation; and (3) controls and holds all property of the corporation. [9] Its members have been
characterized as trustees or directors clothed with a fiduciary character. [10] It is clearly separate
and distinct from the corporate entity itself.
Where corporate directors have committed a breach of trust either by their frauds, ultra
vires acts, or negligence, and the corporation is unable or unwilling to institute suit to remedy
the wrong, a stockholder may sue on behalf of himself and other stockholders and for the benefit
of the corporation, to bring about a redress of the wrong done directly to the corporation and
indirectly to the stockholders. [11] This is what is known as a derivative suit, and settled is the
doctrine that in a derivative suit, the corporation is the real party in interest while the
stockholder filing suit for the corporations behalf is only nominal party. The corporation should
be included as a party in the suit.[12]
Having thus laid a suitable foundation of the basic legal principles pertaining to derivative
suits, we come now to the threshold question: can a lawyer engaged by a corporation defend
members of the board of thesame corporation in a derivative suit? On this issue, the following
disquisition is enlightening:
The possibility for conflict of interest here is universally recognized. Although early cases found
joint representation permissible where no conflict of interest was obvious, the emerging rule is
against dual representation in all derivative actions. Outside counsel must thus be retained to
represent one of the defendants. The cases and ethics opinions differ on whether there must be
separate representation from the outset or merely from the time the corporation seeks to take an
active role. Furthermore, this restriction on dual representation should not be waivable by
consent in the usual way; the corporation should be presumptively incapable of giving valid
consent.[13] (underscoring ours)
In other jurisdictions, the prevailing rule is that a situation wherein a lawyer represents both
the corporation and its assailed directors unavoidably gives rise to a conflict of interest. The
interest of the corporate client is paramount and should not be influenced by any interest of the

individual corporate officials.[14] The rulings in these cases have persuasive effect upon us. After
due deliberation on the wisdom of this doctrine, we are sufficiently convinced that a lawyer
engaged as counsel for a corporation cannot represent members of the same corporations board
of directors in a derivative suit brought against them. To do so would be tantamount to
representing conflicting interests, which is prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the case at bar, the records show that SEC Case No. 05-97-5657, entitled Philippine Public
School Teachers Assn., Inc., et al. v. 1992-1995 Board of Directors of the Philippine Public School
Teachers Assn. (PPSTA), et al., was filed by the PPSTA against its own Board of
Directors. Respondent admits that the ASSA Law Firm, of which he is the Managing Partner, was
the retained counsel of PPSTA. Yet, he appeared as counsel of record for the respondent Board of
Directors in the said case. Clearly, respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he
represented the parties against whom his other client, the PPSTA, filed suit.
In his Answer, respondent argues that he only represented the Board of Directors in OMB
Case No. 0-97-0695. In the said case, he filed a Manifestation of Extreme Urgency wherein he
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint against his clients, the individual Board Members. By
filing the said pleading, he necessarily entered his appearance therein. [15] Again, this constituted
conflict of interests, considering that the complaint in the Ombudsman, albeit in the name of the
individual members of the PPSTA, was brought in behalf of and to protect the interest of the
corporation.
Therefore, respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Considering however,
that this is his first offense, we find the penalty of suspension, recommended in IBP Resolution
No. XV-2002-230 dated June 29, 2002, to be too harsh. Instead, we resolve to admonish
respondent to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Ernesto Salunat is found GUILTY of representing conflicting
interests and is ADMONISHED to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his
profession. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
Adm. Case No. 6708
August 25, 2005
FELICITAS S. QUIAMBAO, Complainant, - versus AT TY. NESTOR A . BAMBA , Respondent.
X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
We are aware of the hapless fact that there are not enough lawyers to serve
an exploding population. This unfortunate state of aff airs, however, will not seize
this Court f rom exercising its disciplinary power over lawyers culpable of serious
indiscretions. The incidence of public force must be deployed to bear upon the
community to eventually forge a legal p rofession that provides quality, ethical,
accessible, and cost-eff ective legal service to our people and whose members are
willing and able to answer the call to public service.
In this administrative case for disbarment, complainant Felicitas S. Quiambao
charges resp ondent Atty. Nestor A. Bamba with violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for rep resenting confl icting interests when the latter

fi led a case against her while he was at that time rep resenting her in another
case, and for committing other acts of disloyalty and double-dealing.
From June 2000 to January 2001, the complainant was the p resident and
man aging director of Allied Investigation Bu reau, Inc. (AIB), a family- owned
corporation engaged in p roviding security and investigation services. She avers
that she procured the legal services of the respondent not only for the corporate
aff airs of AIB but also for her personal case. Parti cularly, the re spondent acted as
her counsel of record in an ejectment case against Spouses Santiag o and Florita
Torroba fi led by her on 29 December 2000 before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Paraaque City, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 11928. She paid
attorneys fees for respondents legal services in that case. [ 1 ] About six months
after she re signed as AIB president, or on 14 June 2001, the re spondent fi led on
behalf of AIB a complaint for replevin and damages against her before the MeTC of
Quezon City for the purpose of recovering from her the car of AIB assigned to her
as a service vehicle. This he did without withdrawing as counsel of record in the
ejectment case, which was then still pending. [ 2 ]
Apart from the foregoing litigation matter, the complainant, in her Position
Paper, charges the resp ondent with acts of disloyalty and double-dealing. She
avers that the resp ondent proposed to her that she organize her own security
agency and that he would assist her in its org anization, causing her to resign as
president of AIB. The respondent indeed assisted her in December 2000 in the
formation of another security agency, Quiambao Risk Management Specialists,
Inc., (QRMSI), which was later registered under complainants name, with the
re spondent as a silent partner rep resented by his associate Atty. Gerard o P.
Hernandez. The respondent was paid attorneys fees for his legal services in
org anizing and incorporating QRMSI. He also planned to steal or pirate some
of the more important clients of AIB. While serving as legal counsel for AIB and a
silent partner of QRMSI, he convinced complainants brother Leodegario
Quiamb ao to organize another security agency, San Esteban Security Services,
Inc. (SESSI) where he (the respondent) served as its incorporator, di rector, and
president. The re spondent and Leodegario then illegally diverted the funds of AIB
to fund the incorp oration of SESSI, and likewise planned to eventually close down
the operations of AIB and transfer the business to SESSI. [ 3 ]
For his part, the resp ondent admits that he represented the complainant in
the afore mentioned ejectment case and later rep resented AIB in the replevin case
against he r. He, however, denies that he was the person al lawye r of the
complainant, and avers that he was made to believe that it was part of his
function as counsel for AIB to handle even the personal cases of its offi cers.
Even assuming that the complainant confi ded to him privileged information about
her legal inte rests, the ejectment case and the replevin case are un related cases
involving diff erent issues and parties and, therefore, the privileged information
which might have been gathered from one case would have no use in the othe r. At
any rate, it was the complainant herself who insisted that he stay as her counsel
despite the pe rceived diff erences among her, her brother, and AIB over the motor
vehicle subject of the replevin case. The complainant even asked him to assist
her in her monetary claims ag ainst AIB. [ 4 ]
The re spondent also denies the charge raised by the complainant in her
position paper that he ag reed to be a silent partne r of QRMSI through his
nominee, Atty. Gerard o P. Hernandez, who was his former law partne r. He declined
complainants off er to assume that role and suggested Atty. Hernandez in his
place; thus, 375 share s of stock we re registe red in Atty. Hernandezs name as
consideration of his (Atty. Hernandezs) legal services as corporate secretary and
legal counsel of QRMSI.
The re spondent also denies that he convinced
complainants brother Leodegario to organize another security agency and that
the funds of AIB we re unlawfully diverted to SESSI. It was to complement the
business of AIB, which was then in danger of collapse, that SESSI was established.
Leodegarios wife and her son have the eff ective control over SESSI.
Respondents subscribed shareholdings in SESSI comprise only 800 shares out of
12,500 subscribed shares. He serves AIB and SESSI in diff erent capacities: as
legal counsel of the former and as president of the latte r. [ 5 ]
In his Report and Recommendation [ 6 ] dated 31 August 2004, the investigating
commissioner of the IBP found the re spondent guilty of repre senting confl icting
inte rests based on the following undisputed facts: fi rst, the re spondent was still
complainants counsel of re cord in the ejectment case when he fi led, as legal
counsel of AIB, the replevin case against her; and second, the re spondent was still
the legal counsel of AIB when he advised the complainant on the incorporation of

another security agency, QRMSI, and re commended his former law partner, Atty.
Gerardo Hernandez, to be its corporate secre tary and legal counsel and also when
he conferred with Leodegario to organize another security agency, SESSI, where
the re spondent became an incorp orator, stockholder, and p resident. Thus, the
investigating commissioner re commended that the resp ondent be suspended from
the practice of law for one year.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the investigating
commissioners report and re commendation, but reduced the penalty from one
year to a stern reprimand. [ 7 ]
The issue in this case is whether the respondent is guilty of
misconduct for representing confl icting interests in contravention of the
basic tenets of the legal profession.
Rule 15.03, Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Resp onsibility provides: A
lawyer shall not represent confl icting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. This prohibition is founded
on principles of public policy and good taste. [ 8 ] In the course of a lawye r-client
relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the clients case,
including the weak and strong points of the case. The natu re of that relationship
is, the refore, one of trust and confi dence of the highest degree. [ 9 ] It behooves
lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confi dence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice. [ 1 0 ]
In b road terms, lawyers are deemed to repre sent con fl icting interests
when, in behalf of one client, it is their duty to contend for that which duty to
another client requires them to oppose. [ 1 1 ] Developments in jurisprudence have
parti cularized various tests to determine whether a lawyer s conduct lies within
this proscription. One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fi ght for an issue
or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the
other client. [ 1 2 ] Thus, if a lawyers argument for one client has to be opposed by
that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of inte rests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided fi delity
and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in
the performance of that duty. [ 1 3 ] Still another test is whether the lawyer would be
called upon in the new relation to use ag ainst a former client any confi dential
information acqui red through their connection or previous employment. [ 1 4 ]
The proscription against representation of confl icting inte rests applies to a
situation whe re the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in
an un related action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon
to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client,
or that there would be no occasion to use the con fi dential information acqui red
from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly
unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would
lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyers
re spective retainers with each of them would aff ect the performan ce of the duty of
undivided fi delity to both clients. [ 1 5 ]
In this case, it is undisputed that at the time the respondent fi led the
replevin case on behalf of AIB he was still the counsel of record of the complainant
in the pending ejectment case. We do not sustain re spondents theory that since
the ejectment case and the replevin case are unrelated cases fraught with
diff e rent issues, parties, and subject matters, the p rohibition is inapplicable. His
rep resentation of opposing clients in both cases, though unrelated, obviously
constitutes confl ict of interest or, at the least, invites suspicion of doubledealing.
While the re spondent may assert that the complainant exp ressly
consented to his continued representation in the ejectment case, the respondent
failed to show that he fully disclosed the facts to both his clients and he failed to
present any written consent of the complainant and AIB as required under Rule
15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Neither can we accept respondents plea that he was duty-bound to handle
all the cases referred to him by AIB, including the personal cases of its offi cers
which had no connection to its corp orate aff airs. That the rep resentation of
confl icting interest is in good faith and with honest intention on the part of the
lawyer does not make the prohibition inoperative. [ 1 6 ] Moreover, lawyers are not

obliged to act either as an adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to
become their client. They have the right to decline such employment, subject,
however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. [ 1 7 ] Although there
are instances where lawyers cannot decline rep resentation, [ 1 8 ] they cannot be
made to labor under confl ict of interest between a present client and a
prospective one. [ 1 9 ]
Additionally, in his position paper, the respondent alleges that when the
complainant invited the resp ondent to join QRMSI, he vehemently refused to join
them due to his perception of confl icting interest as he was then (and still is at
present) the Legal Counsel of AIB, which is also a security agency. [ 2 0 ] To bolster
his allegation, he invoked the affi davits of complainants witnesses which
contained statements of his apprehension of confl ict of interest should he join
QRMSI. [ 2 1 ]
Surprisingly, despite his apprehension or awareness of a possible confl ict of
inte rest should he join QRMSI, the re spondent later allowed himself to become an
incorporator, stockholder, and president of SESSI, which is also a security agency.
He justifi ed his act by claiming that that while both AIB and SESSI are engaged in
security agency business, he is serving in diff erent cap acities. As the in-house
legal counsel of AIB, he serves its legal interest the parameter of which evolves
around legal matters such as protecting the legal rights and interest of the
corporation; conducting an investigation or a hearing on violations of company
rules and regulations of their offi ce employees and security guard s; sending
demand letters in collection cases; and rep resenting the corporation in any
litigation for or against it. And as p resident of SESSI, he serves the operational
aspects of the business such as how does it operate[], how much do they price
their services, what kind or how do they train[] their security guards, how they
solicit clients. Thus, confl ict of inte rest is far-fetched. Moreover, the re spondent
argues that the complainant, not being a stockholder of AIB and SESSI, has no
right to question his alleged confl ict of interest in serving the two security
agencies. [ 2 2 ]
While the complainant lacks personality to question the alleged confl ict of
inte rests on the part of the respondent in serving both security agencies, we
cannot just turn a blind eye to respondents act. It must be noted that the
proscription against rep resentation of confl icting inte rests fi nds application where
the confl icting inte rests arise with respect to the same general matter however
slight the adverse interest may be. It applies even if the confl ict pertains to the
lawyers private activity or in the performance of a function in a non-professional
capacity. [ 2 3 ] In the process of determining whether there is a confl ict of inte rest,
an important criterion is probability, not certainty, of con fl ict.
Since the re spondent has fi nancial or pecuniary interest in SESSI, which is
engaged in a business competing with his clients, and, more importantly, he
occupies the highest position in SESSI, one cannot help entertaining a doubt on
his loyalty to his client AIB. This kind of situation passes the second test of
confl ict of interest, which is whether the acceptance of a new relationship would
prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided fi delity and loyalty to
the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performan ce of that duty. The close relationship of the majority stockholders of
both comp anies does not negate the confl ict of interest. Neither does his
protestation that his shareholding in SESSI is a mere pebble among the sands.
In view of all of the foregoing, we fi nd the respondent guilty of
serious
misconduct
for
representing
confl icting
interests.
Furthermore, it must be noted that Republic Act No. 5487, otherwise known
as the Private Security Agency Law , prohibits a person from organizing or having
an interest in more than one security agency. From re spondents position paper, it
can be culled that Leodegario Quiambao is the president and man aging director of
AIB, holding 60% of the outstanding shares; while his four other siblings who are
permanent residents in the United States own the remaining 40%. [ 2 4 ] This
prohibition notwithstanding, the respondent organized SESSI, with Leodegarios
wife and son as majority stockholders holding about 70% of the outstanding
shares and with him (the resp ondent), as well as the rest of the stockholders,
holding minimal shares. [ 2 5 ] In doing so, the resp ondent virtually allowed
Leodegario and the latters wife to violate or circumvent the law by having an
inte rest in more than one security agency. It must be noted that in the
affi davit [ 2 6 ] of Leodegarios wife, she mentioned of their conjugal property. In the
absence of evidence to the contrary, the property relation of Leodegario and his

wife can be presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of gains; hence, the

majority share s in AIB and SESSI are the conjugal p roperty of Leodegario and his
wife, the reby placing themselves in possession of an interest in more than one
security agency in contravention of R.A. No. 5487. Thus, in organizing SESSI, the
re spondent violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which mandates lawyers to p romote re spect for the law and refrain f rom
counseling or abetting activities aimed at defi an ce of the law.
As to the recommendation that the penalty be reduced from a suspension of
one year to a stern warning, we fi nd the same to be without basis. We are
disturbed by the reduction made by the IBP Board of Governors of the penalty
re commended by the investigating commissioner without clearly and distinctly
stating the facts and re asons on which that reduction is based.
Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court reads in part as follows:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors .
(a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP
Board of Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by
the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such
review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts
and the reasons on which it is based.
We may consider the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors as a
memorandum decision adopting by reference the report of the investigating
commissione r. However, we look with disfavor the change in the re commended
penalty without any explanation therefor. Again, we remind the IBP Board of
Governors of the importan ce of the requi rement to announce in plain terms its
legal re asoning, since the requirement that its decision in disciplinary proceedings
must state the facts and the reasons on which its decision is based is akin to what
is required of the decisions of courts of re cord. [ 2 7 ] The reasons for handing down a
penalty occupy no lesser station than any other portion of the ratio.
In similar cases where the resp ondent was found guilty of representing
confl icting inte rests a penalty ranging from one to three years suspension was
imposed. [ 2 8 ] In this case, we fi nd that a suspension from the practice of law for
one year is warranted.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nestor A. Bamba is hereby held GUILTY of
violation of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 and Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of ONE (1) YEAR eff ective f rom receipt of this Resolution, with a warning
that a similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Offi ce of the Bar Confi dant
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 2040. March 4, 1998]

IMELDA A. NAKPIL, complainant, vs. ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES, respondent.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

The friendship of JOSE NAKPIL and respondent CARLOS J. VALDES dates back to the 50s
during their schooldays in De La Salle and the Philippine Law School. Their closeness extended to
their families and respondent became the business consultant, lawyer and accountant of the
Nakpils.
In 1965, Jose Nakpil became interested in purchasing a summer residence in Moran Street,
Baguio City.[1] For lack of funds, he requested respondent to purchase the Moran property for him.
They agreed that respondent would keep the property in thrust for the Nakpils until the latter
could buy it back. Pursuant to their agreement, respondent obtained two (2) loans from a bank
(in the amounts of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00) which he used to purchase and renovate the
property. Title was then issued in respondents name.

It was the Nakpils who occupied the Moran summer house. When Jose Nakpil died on July 8,
1973, respondent acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his widow, complainant IMELDA
NAKPIL. On March 9, 1976, respondents law firm, Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, handled the
proceeding for the settlement of Joses estate. Complainant was appointed as administratix of
the estate.
The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate proceedings. It
appears that respondent excluded the Moran property from the inventory of Joses estate. On
February 13, 1978, respondent transferred his title to the Moran property to his company, the
Caval Realty Corporation.
On March 29, 1979, complainant sought to recover the Moran property by filing with the then
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Baguio City an action for reconveyance with damages against
respondent and his corporation. In defense, respondent claimed absolute ownership over the
property and denied that a trust was created over it.
During the pendency of the action for reconveyance, complainant filed this administrative
case to disbar the respondent. She charged that respondent violated professional ethics when
he:

I.

Assigned to his family corporation the Moran property (Pulong Maulap) which
belonged to the estate he was settling as its lawyer and auditor.

II.

Excluded the Moran property from the inventory of real estate properties he
prepared for a client-estate and, at the same time, charged the loan secured to
purchase the said excluded property as a liability of the estate, all for the
purpose of transferring the title to the said property to his family corporation.

III.

Prepared and defended monetary claims against the estate that retained him as
its counsel and auditor.[2]

On the first charge, complainant alleged that she accepted respondents offer to serve as
lawyer and auditor to settle her husbands estate. Respondents law firm then filed a petition for
settlement of the estate of the deceased Nakpil but did not include the Moran property in the
estates inventory. Instead, respondent transferred the property to his corporation, Caval Realty
Corporation, and title was issued in its name. Complainant accused respondent of maliciously
appropriating the property in trust knowing that it did not belong to him. She claimed that
respondent has expressly acknowledged that the said property belonged to the late Nakpil in his
correspondences[3] with the Baguio City Treasurer and the complainant.
On the second charge, complainant alleged that respondents auditing firm (C. J. Valdes and
Co., CPAs) excluded the Moran property from the inventory of her husbands estate, yet included
in the claims against the estate the amounts of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00, which respondent
represented as her husbands loans applied probably for the purchase of a house and lot in
Moran Street, Baguio City.
As to the third charge, complainant alleged that respondents law firm (Carlos J. Valdes and
Associates) filed the petition for the settlement of her husbands estate in court, while
respondents auditing firm (C. J. Valdes & Co., CPAs) acted as accountant of both the estate and
two of its creditors. She claimed that respondent represented conflicting interests when his
accounting firm prepared the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against her
husbands estate which was represented by respondents law firm. Complainant averred that
there is no distinction between respondents law and auditing firms as respondent is the senior
and controlling partner of both firms which are housed in the same building.

We required respondent to answer the charges against him. In hisANSWER, [4] respondent
initially asserted that the resolution of the first and second charges against him depended on the
result of the pending action in the CFI for reconveyance which involved the issue of ownership of
the Moran property.
On the merit of the first charge, respondent reiterated his defense in the reconveyance case
that he did not hold the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils as he is its absolute owner.
Respondent explained that the Nakpils never bought back the Moran property from him, hence,
the property remained to be his and was rightly excluded from the inventory of Nakpils estate.
As to the second charge, respondent denied preparing the list of claims against the estate
which included his loans of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 for the purchase and renovation of the
Moran property. In charging his loans against the estate, he stressed that the list drawn up by his
accounting firm merely stated that the loans in respondents name were applied probably for
the purchase of the house and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City. Respondent insisted that this
was not an admission that the Nakpils owned the property as the phrase probably for the
purchase did not imply a consummated transaction but a projected acquisition.
Respondent also disclaimed knowledge or privity in the preparation of a letter (Exhibit H) of
his accounting firm to the Baguio City treasurer remitting the real estate taxes for the Moran
property on behalf of the Nakpils. He contended that the letter could be a mere error or
oversight.
Respondent averred that it was complainant who acknowledged that they did not own the
Moran property for: (1) complainants February 1979 Statement of Assets and Liabilities did not
include the said property, and; (2) complainant, as administratrix, signed the Balance Sheet of
the Estate where the Moran property was not mentioned.
Respondent admitted that complainant retained the services of his law and accounting firms
in the settlement of her husbands estate.[5] However, he pointed out that he has resigned from
his law and accounting firms as early as 1974. He alleged that it was Atty. Percival Cendaa (from
the law firm Carlos Valdes & Associates) who filed the inestate proceedings in court in 1976.
As to the third charge, respondent denied there was a conflict of interest when his law firm
represented the estate in the inestate proceedings while his accounting firm (C. J. Valdes & Co.,
CPAs) served as accountant of the estate and prepared the claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and
ENORN, Inc. against the estate. He proffered the following reasons for his thesis: First, the two
claimants were closely related to the late Nakpil. Claimant ENORN, Inc. is a family corporation of
the Nakpils of which the late Nakpil was the President. Claimant Angel Nakpil is a brother of the
late Nakpil who, upon the latters death, became the President of ENORN, Inc. These two
claimants had been clients of his law and accounting firms even during the lifetime of Jose
Nakpil. Second, his alleged representation of conflicting interests was with the knowledge and
consent of complainant as administratrix. Third, there was no conflict of interests between the
estate and the claimants for they had forged a modus vivendi, i.e., that the subject claims would
be satisfied only after full payment of the principal bank creditors. Complainant, as
administratrix, did not controvert the claims of Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. Complainant has
started paying off the claims of Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. after satisfying the banks claims.
Complainant did not assert that their claims caused prejudice to the estate. Fourth, the work of
Carlos J. Valdes and Co. as common auditor redounded to the benefit of the estate for the firm
prepared a true and accurate amount of the claim. Fifth, respondent resigned from his law and
accounting firms as early as August 15, 1974. [6] He rejoined his accounting firm several years
later. He submitted as proof the SECs certification of the filing of his accounting firm of an
Amended Articles of Partnership. Thus, it was not he but Atty. Percival Cendaa, from the firm
Carlos J. Valdes and Associates, who filed the intestate proceedings in court. On the other hand,
the claimants were represented by their own counsel Atty. Enrique O. Chan. Sixth, respondent
alleged that in the remote possibility that he committed a breach of professional ethics, he

committed such misconduct not as a lawyer but as an accountant who acted as common
auditor of the estate and its creditors. Hence, he should be held accountable in another forum.
On November 12, 1979, complainant submitted her REPLY. [7] She maintained that the
pendency of the reconveyance case is not prejudicial to the investigation of her disbarment
complaint against respondent for the issue in the latter is not the ownership of the Moran
property but the ethics and morality of respondents conduct as a CPA-lawyer.
Complainant alleged that respondents Annexes to his Reply (such as the Statement of
Assets & Liability of the Nakpils and the Balance Sheet of the Estate) which showed that
complainant did not claim ownership of the Moran property were all prepared by C. J. Valdes and
Co. as accountant of the estate of Jose Nakpil and filed with the intestate court by C. J. Valdes
and Associates as counsel for the estate. She averred that these Annexes were not proofs that
respondent owned the Moran property but were part of respondents scheme to remove the
property from the estate and transfer it to his family corporation. Complainant alleged that she
signed the documents because of the professional counsel of respondent and his firm that her
signature thereon was required. Complainant charged respondent with greed for coveting the
Moran property on the basis of defects in the documents he himself prepared.
Complainant urged that respondent cannot disown unfavorable documents (the list of claims
against the estate and the letter regarding Nakpils payments of realty tax on the Moran
property) which were prepared by his law and accounting firms and invoke other documents
prepared by the same firms which are favorable to him. She averred that respondent must
accept responsibility not just for some, but for all the representations and communications of his
firms.
Complainant refuted respondents claim that he resigned from his firms from March 9, 1976
to several years later. She alleged that none of the documents submitted as evidence referred
to his resignation from his law firm. The documents merely substantiated his resignation from his
accounting firm.
In his REJOINDER,[8] respondent insisted that complainant cannot hold him liable for
representing the interests of both the estate and the claimants without showing that his action
prejudiced the estate. He urged that it is not per se anomalous for respondents accounting firm
to act as accountant for the estate and its creditors. He reiterated that he is not subject to the
jurisdiction of this Court for he acted not as lawyer, but as accountant for both the estate and its
claimants.
He alleged that his accounting firm merely prepared the list of claims of the creditors Angel
Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. Their claims were not defended by his accounting or law firm but by Atty.
Enrique Chan. He averred that his law firm did not oppose these claims as they were legitimate
and not because they were prepared by his accounting firm. He emphasized that there was no
allegation that the claims were fraudulent or excessive and that the failure of respondents law
firm to object to these claims damaged the estate.
In our January 21, 1980 Resolution,[9] we deferred further action on the disbarment case until
after resolution of the action for reconveyance between the parties involving the issue of
ownership by the then CFI of Baguio. Complainant moved for reconsideration on the ground that
the issue of ownership pending with the CFI was not prejudicial to her complaint which involved
an entirely different issue, i.e., the unethical acts of respondent as a CPA-lawyer. We granted her
motion and referred the administrative case to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for
investigation, report and recommendation.[10]
In 1983, the CFI of Baguio dismissed the action for reconveyance. The trial court ruled that
respondent held the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils but found that complainant waived
her right over it.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The appellate court held that
respondent was the absolute owner of the Moran property. The Decision was elevated to this
Court.
On February 18, 1986, during the pendency of complainants appeal to this Court, the OSG
submitted its Report[11] on the disbarment complaint. The OSG relied heavily on the decision of
the Court of Appeals then pending review by this Court. The OSG found that respondent was not
put on notice of complainants claim over the property. It opined that there was no trust
agreement created over the property and that respondent was the absolute owner thereof. Thus,
it upheld respondents right to transfer title to his family corporation. It also found no conflict of
interests as the claimants were related to the late Jose Nakpil. The OSG recommended the
dismissal of the administrative case.
Prefatorily, we note that the case at bar presents a novel situation as it involves the
disbarment of a CPA-lawyer for his demeanor in his accounting profession and law practice in
connection with the property of his client.
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction
must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. [12] The measure of good faith which
an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with his client is a much higher standard than
is required in business dealings where the parties trade at arms length. [13] Business
transactions between an attorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of
the law. Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to assure that no advantage is taken by
a lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by virtue of his office, an
attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client.
Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorneys
favor. [14]
In the case at bar, we cannot subscribe to the findings of the OSG in its Report. These
findings were based mainly on the decision of the Court of Appeals in the action for
reconveyance which was reversed by this Court in 1993. [15]
As to the first two charges, we are bound by the factual findings of this Court in the
aforementioned reconveyance case. [16] It is well-established that respondent offered to the
complainant the services of his law and accounting firms by reason of their close relationship
dating as far back as the 50s. She reposed her complete trust in respondent who was the
lawyer, accountant and business consultant of her late husband. Respondent and the late Nakpil
agreed that the former would purchase the Moran property and keep it in trust for the latter. In
violation of the trust agreement, respondent claimed absolute ownership over the property and
refused to sell the property to complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. To place the property
beyond the reach of complainant and the intestate court, respondent later transferred it to his
corporation.
Contrary to the findings of the OSG, respondent initially acknowledged and respected the
trust nature of the Moran property. Respondents bad faith in transferring the property to his
family corporation is well discussed in this Courts Decision, [17] thus:

x x x Valdes (herein respondent) never repudiated the trust during the lifetime
of the late Jose Nakpil. On the contrary, he expressly recognized it. x x x (H)e
repudiated the trust when (he) excludedPulong Maulap from the list of properties of the
late Jose Nakpil submitted to the intestate court in 1973. x x x
xxx
The fact that there was no transfer of ownership intended by the parties x x x can be
bolstered by Exh. I-2, an annex to the claim filed against the estate proceedings of the

late Jose Nakpil by his brother, Angel Nakpil, which was prepared by Carlos J. Valdes &
Co., the accounting firm of herein respondent. Exhibit I-2, which is a list of the
application of the proceeds of various FUB loans contracted as of 31 December 1973
by the late Jose Nakpil, x x x contains the two (2) loans contracted in the name of
respondent. If ownership of Pulong Maulap was already transferred or ceded
to Valdes, these loans should not have been included in the list.

Indeed, as we view it, what the parties merely agreed to under the arrangement
outlined in Exh. J was that respondent Valdes would x x x take over the total
loan of P140,000.00 and pay all of the interests due on the notes while the
heirs of the late Jose Nakpil would continue to live in the disputed property for
five (5) years without remuneration save for regular maintenance expenses.
This does not mean, however, that if at the end of the five-year period
petitioner (Nakpil) failed to reimburse Valdes for his advances, x x x Valdes
could already automatically assume ownership of Pulong Maulap. Instead, the
remedy of respondents Carlos J. Valdes and Caval Realty Corporation was to
proceed against the estate of the late Jose M. Nakpil and/or the property
itself. (emphasis supplied)

In the said reconveyance case, we further ruled that complainants documentary evidence
(Exhibits H, J and L), which she also adduced in this administrative case, should estop
respondent from claiming that he bought the Moran property for himself, and not merely in trust
for Jose Nakpil.[18]
It ought to follow that respondents act of excluding Moran property from the estate which his
law firm was representing evinces a lack of fidelity to the cause of his client. If respondent truly
believed that the said property belonged to him, he should have at least informed complainant of
his adverse claim. If they could not agree on its ownership, respondent should have formally
presented his claim in the intestate proceedings instead of transferring the property to his own
corporation and concealing it from complainant and the judge in the estate proceedings.
Respondents misuse of his legal expertise to deprive his client of the Moran property is clearly
unethical.
To make matters worse, respondent, through his accounting firm, charged the two loans
of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 as liability of the estate, after said loans were obtained by
respondent for the purchase and renovation of the property which he claimed for himself.
Respondent seeks to exculpate himself from this charge by disclaiming knowledge or privity in
the preparation of the list of the estates liabilities. He theorizes that the inclusion of the loans
must have been a mere error or oversight of his accounting firm. It is clear that the information
as to how these two loans should be treated could have only come from respondent himself as
the said loans were in his name. Hence, the supposed error of the accounting firm in charging
respondents loans against the estate could not have been committed without respondents
participation. Respondent wanted to have his cake and eat it too and subordinated the interest
of his client to his own pecuniary gain. Respondent violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to his clients cause and enjoins him to
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.
As regards the third charge, we hold that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting
interests. It is generally the rule, based on sound public policy, that an attorney cannot represent
adverse interests. It is highly improper to represent both sides of an issue. [19] The proscription
against representation of conflicting interests finds application where the conflicting interests
arise with respect to the same general matter [20] and is applicable however slight such adverse
interest may be. It applies although the attorneys intentions and motives were honest and he
acted in good faith.[21] However, representation of conflicting interests may be allowed where the

parties consent to the representation, after full disclosure of facts. Disclosure alone is not enough
for the clients must give their informed consent to such representation. The lawyer must explain
to his clients the nature and extent of conflict and the possible adverse effect must be
thoroughly understood by his clients.[22]
In the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of the estate and that of it creditors
are adverse to each other. Respondents accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities
of the estate and, at the same time, computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is
clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that of the
two claimants who are creditors of the estate. In fact, at one instance, respondents law firm
questioned the claims of creditor Angel Nakpil against the estate.
To exculpate himself, respondent denies that he represented complainant in the intestate
proceedings. He points out that it was one Atty. Percival Cendaa, from his law firm Carlos J.
Valdes & Associates, who filed the intestate case in court. However, the fact that he did not
personally file the case and appear in court is beside the point. As established in the records of
this case and in the reconveyance case, [23] respondent acted as counsel and accountant of
complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. Respondents defense that he resigned from his law
and accounting firms as early as 1974 (or two years before the filing of the intestate case) is
unworthy of merit. Respondents claim of resignation from his law firm is not supported by any
documentary proof. The documents on record [24] only show respondents resignation from his
accounting firm in 1972 and 1974. Even these documents reveal that respondent returned to his
accounting firm on July 1, 1976 and as of 1978, the intestate proceedings for the settlement of
Joses estate had not yet been terminated. It does not escape us that when respondent
transferred the Moran property to his corporation on February 13, 1978, the intestate
proceedings was still pending in court. Thus, the succession of events shows that respondent
could not have been totally ignorant of the proceedings in the intestate case.
Respondent claims that complainant knew that his law firm Carlos J. Valdes & Associates was
the legal counsel of the estate [25] and his accounting firm, C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs, was the auditor
of both the estate and the two claimants against it. [26] The fact, however, that complainant, as
administratrix, did not object to the set-up cannot be taken against her as there is nothing in the
records to show that respondent or his law firm explained the legal situation and its
consequences to complainant. Thus, her silence regarding the arrangement does not amount to
an acquiescence based on an informed consent.
We also hold that the relationship of the claimants to the late Nakpil does not negate the
conflict of interest. When a creditor files a claim against an estate, his interest is per se adverse
to the estate. As correctly pointed out by complainant, if she had a claim against her husbands
estate, her claim is still adverse and must be filed in the intestate proceedings.
Prescinding from these premises, respondent undoubtedly placed his law firm in a position
where his loyalty to his client could be doubted. In the estate proceedings, the duty of
respondents law firm was to contest the claims of these two creditors but which claims were
prepared by respondents accounting firm. Even if the claims were valid and did not prejudice the
estate, the set-up is still undesirable. The test to determine whether there is a conflict of interest
in the representation is probability, not certainty of conflict. It was respondents duty to inhibit
either of his firms from said proceedings to avoid the probability of conflict of interest.
Respondent advances the defense that assuming there was conflict of interest, he could not
be charged before this Court as his alleged misconduct pertains to his accounting practice.
We do not agree. Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively practicing both professions. He
is the senior partner of his law and accounting firms which carry his name. In the case at bar,
complainant is not charging respondent with breach of ethics for being the common accountant
of the estate and the two creditors. He is charged for allowing his accounting firm to represent
two creditors of the estate and, at the same time, allowing his law firm to represent the estate in
the proceedings where these claims were presented. The act is a breach of professional ethics

and undesirable as it placed respondents and his law firms loyalty under a cloud of doubt. Even
granting that respondents misconduct refers to his accountancy practice, it would not prevent
this Court from disciplining him as a member of the Bar. The rule is settled that a lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as
it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. [27] Possession
of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing
requirement to the practice of law.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a
manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members of
the bar are expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility as the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature
and demands utmost fidelity and good faith. [28] In the case at bar, respondent exhibited less
than full fidelity to his duty to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings and
transactions with his clients. [29]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds respondent ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES guilty of
misconduct. He is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective from
receipt of this Decision, with a warning that a similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely
in the future.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, as well as the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 6691

April 27, 2007

ATTY. GEORGE C. BRIONES, Complainant, vs.

ATTY. JACINTO D. JIMENEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The root of herein administrative complaint for Disbarment 1 dated August 12, 2004 filed by Atty.
George S. Briones charging Atty. Jacinto D. Jimenez with violation of Revised Circular No. 28-91 on
forum-shopping and Rule 19.01 and Rule 12.08 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, is the April
3, 2002 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in SP Proc. No. 99-92870, entitled, "In the
Matter of the Petition for the Allowance of the Will of Luz J. Henson", to wit:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court hereby:
1. Reiterates its designation of the accounting firm of Messrs. Alba, Romeo & Co. to
immediately conduct an audit of the administration by Atty. George S. Briones of the estate of
the late Luz J. Henson, the expenses of which shall be charged against the estate.
2. Suspends the approval of the report of the special administrator except the payment of his
commission which is hereby fixed at 1.8% of the value of the estate.
3. Directs the special administrator to deliver the residue to the heirs in proportion to their
shares. From the share of Lilia J. Henson-Cruz, there shall be deducted the advances made to
her.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Complainant Atty. Briones is the Special Administrator of the Estate of Luz J. Henson. Respondent Atty.
Jacinto D. Jimenez is the counsel for the Heirs of the late Luz J. Henson (Heirs).
On April 9, 2002, Atty. Jimenez filed with the RTC a notice of appeal from the Order dated April 3,
2002, questioning the payment of commission to Atty. Briones. 2
On April 29, 2002, Atty. Jimenez filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition andMandamus, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 70349 assailing the Order dated March 12,

2002, appointing the firm of Alba, Romeo & Co. to conduct an audit at the expense of the late Luz J.
Henson, as well as the Order dated April 3, 2002, insofar as it denied their motion for
recommendation.3
On July 26, 2002, Atty. Jimenez filed with the CA a Petition for Mandamus, docketed as CA-G.R. No.
71844,4alleging that the respondent Judge therein unlawfully refused to comply with his ministerial
duty to approve their appeal which was perfected on time.5
Atty. Briones, in his Comment, contends that the heirs of the late Luz J. Henson, represented by Atty.
Jimenez, are guilty of forum shopping for which reason, the petition should be dismissed. 6
On February 11, 2003, the CA without touching on the forum shopping issue, granted the petition and
ordered the respondent Judge to give due course to the appeal taken by Atty. Jimenez from the Order
dated April 3, 2002, insofar as it directed the payment of commission to Atty. Briones. 7
Atty. Briones then filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, docketed as G.R. No. 159130, praying for the dismissal of the appeal from the Order dated
April 3, 2002, insofar as it ordered the payment of commission to him, as the Special Administrator of
the estate of the deceased Luz J. Henson.8
The Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective
memoranda.
Atty. Briones (hereinafter referred to as complainant) filed his "Memorandum with Administrative
Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Jacinto Jimenez, Counsel for Respondents", 9 for violation of
Rule 19.01 and Rule 12.08 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Revised Circular No. 28-91
on forum shopping.
Complainant claims that Atty. Jimenez (hereinafter referred to as respondent) and the Heirs engaged
again in forum shopping when respondent, as counsel for the Heirs, filed a criminal complaint and
executed an affidavit against complainant for resisting and seriously disobeying the RTC Order dated
April 3, 2002 which directed complainant to deliver the residue of the estate to the Heirs in proportion
to their shares, punishable under Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code.
Complainant further claims that respondent violated Rules 19.01 and 12.08 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal
charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case of proceeding.
Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:
(a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument, and the like;
or
b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which
event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel.
by filing the unfounded criminal complaint against him to obtain an improper advantage in Special
Proceedings No. 99-92870 before the RTC, Branch 46, and coerce complainant to deliver to the Heirs
the residue of the estate of the late Luz J. Henson without any writ of execution or any
pronouncement from the RTC as to the finality of the Order dated April 3, 2002; 10 and in executing an
affidavit in support of the criminal complaint.
The Court in its Resolution dated January 24, 2005, in G.R. No. 159130, resolved to docket the
complaint against Atty. Jimenez as a regular administrative complaint; referred said Complaint to the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC); and required Atty. Jimenez to comment. 11

Respondent filed his Comment on April 6, 2005. He contends that when he assisted the Heirs in filing
a criminal case against complainant, he was merely fulfilling his legal duty to take the necessary
steps to protect the interests of his clients; that it cannot serve as basis for filing an administrative
case against him.12 Respondent further cites Santiago v. Rafanan13 where the Court absolved the
respondent lawyer from administrative liability in submitting an affidavit in a preliminary investigation
in defense of his clients.
On January 31, 2007, the OBC submitted its Report and Recommendation recommending that the
administrative complaint against Atty. Jimenez be dismissed for lack of merit. 14
The Court agrees with the OBC that respondent is not guilty of forum shopping. Records show that
respondent, as counsel for the heirs of the late Luz J. Henson, filed a special civil action docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 70349 assailing the Order of March 12, 2002 appointing the accounting firm of Alba,
Romeo and Co. as auditor; and, a regular appeal docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71488 assailing the
Order of April 3, 2002, insofar as it directed the payment of commission to complainant. It is evident
that there is identity of parties but different causes of action and reliefs sought. Hence,
respondent is not guilty of forum shopping. 15 The Court likewise finds no fault on the part of
respondent in executing an affidavit in support of the criminal complaint as held in the Santiagocase.
However, there is sufficient ground in support of complainants claim that respondent violated Rule
19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Records reveal that before respondent assisted the
Heirs in filing the criminal complaint against herein complainant, he sent demand letters to the latter
to comply with the Order of Judge Tipon to deliver the residue of the estate to the heirs of the late Luz
J. Henson. Considering that complainant did not reply to the demand letters, respondent opted to file
said criminal complaint in behalf of his clients for refusal to obey the lawful order of the court.
The Order referred to is the third part of the assailed Order dated April 3, 2002 which directs
complainant to deliver the residue to the Heirs in proportion to their shares. As aptly pointed out by
complainant, respondent should have first filed the proper motion with the RTC for execution of the
third part of said Order instead of immediately resorting to the filing of criminal complaint against
him. A mere perusal of the rest of the Order dated April 3, 2002 readily discloses that the approval of
the report of complainant as Special Administrator was suspended prior to the audit of the
administration of complainant. Consequently, the RTC would still have to determine and define the
residue referred to in the subject Order. The filing of the criminal complaint was evidently premature.
Respondent claims that he acted in good faith and in fact, did not violate Rule 19.01 because he
assisted the Heirs in filing the criminal complaint against herein complainant after the latter ignored
the demand letters sent to him; and that a lawyer owes his client the exercise of utmost prudence
and capability. The Court is not convinced. Fair play demands that respondent should have filed the
proper motion with the RTC to attain his goal of having the residue of the estate delivered to his
clients and not subject complainant to a premature criminal prosecution.
As held in Suzuki v. Tiamson:16
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer to represent his client with zeal.
However, the same Canon provides that a lawyers performance of his duties towards his client must
be within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 of the same Canon requires, among others, that a lawyer
shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client. Canon 15, Rule
15.07 also obliges lawyers to impress upon their clients compliance with the laws and the principle of
fairness. To permit lawyers to resort to unscrupulous practices for the protection of the supposed
rights of their clients is to defeat one of the purposes of the state the administration of justice.
While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their
clients right, they should not forget that they are, first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to
exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. 17
Although respondent failed to live up to this expectation, there is no evidence that he acted with
malice or bad faith. Consequently, it is but fit to reprimand respondent for his act of unfair dealing
with complainant. It must be stressed that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary
sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution for only the
most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character

of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not
be decreed where any punishment less severe such as reprimand, suspension, or fine would
accomplish the end desired.18
WHEREFORE, Atty. Jacinto D. Jimenez is found guilty of and REPRIMANDED for violation of Rule
19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. NO. 6711 : July 3, 2007]
MA. LUISA HADJULA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROCELES F. MADIANDA, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Under consideration is Resolution No. XVI-2004-472 of the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), relative to the complaint for disbarment filed by herein complainant Ma.
Luisa Hadjula against respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda.

The case started when, in an AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT1 bearing date September 7, 2002 and filed
with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant charged Atty. Roceles F. Madianda with
violation of Article 2092 of the Revised Penal Code and Canon Nos. 15.02 and 21.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
In said affidavit-complaint, complainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as
they both worked at the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) whereat respondent was the Chief Legal
Officer while she was the Chief Nurse of the Medical, Dental and Nursing Services. Complainant
claimed that, sometime in 1998, she approached respondent for some legal advice. Complainant
further alleged that, in the course of their conversation which was supposed to be kept

confidential, she disclosed personal secrets and produced copies of a marriage contract, a birth
certificate and a baptismal certificate, only to be informed later by the respondent that she
(respondent) would refer the matter to a lawyer friend. It was malicious, so complainant states,
of respondent to have refused handling her case only after she had already heard her secrets.
Continuing, complainant averred that her friendship with respondent soured after her filing, in
the later part of 2000, of criminal and disciplinary actions against the latter. What, per
complainant's account, precipitated the filing was when respondent, then a member of the BFP
promotion board, demanded a cellular phone in exchange for the complainant's promotion.
According to complainant, respondent, in retaliation to the filing of the aforesaid actions, filed a
COUNTER COMPLAINT3 with the Ombudsman charging her (complainant) with violation of Section
3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019,4 falsification of public documents and immorality, the last two
charges being based on the disclosures complainant earlier made to respondent. And also on the
basis of the same disclosures, complainant further stated, a disciplinary case was also instituted
against her before the Professional Regulation Commission.
Complainant seeks the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent for the latter's act of
disclosing personal secrets and confidential information she revealed in the course of seeking
respondent's legal advice.
In an order dated October 2, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline required respondent to
file her answer to the complaint.
In her answer, styled as COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT,5 respondent denied giving legal advice to the
complainant and dismissed any suggestion about the existence of a lawyer-client relationship
between them. Respondent also stated the observation that the supposed confidential data and
sensitive documents adverted to are in fact matters of common knowledge in the BFP. The
relevant portions of the answer read:
5. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in paragraph 4 of her
AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT for reason that she never WAS MY CLIENT nor we ever had any LAWYERCLIENT RELATIONSHIP that ever existed ever since and that never obtained any legal advice from
me regarding her PERSONAL PROBLEMS or PERSONAL SECRETS. She likewise never delivered to
me legal documents much more told me some confidential information or secrets. That is
because I never entertain LEGAL QUERIES or CONSULTATION regarding PERSONAL MATTERS since
I know as a LAWYER of the Bureau of Fire Protection that I am not allowed to privately practice
law and it might also result to CONFLICT OF INTEREST. As a matter of fact, whenever there will be
PERSONAL MATTERS referred to me, I just referred them to private law practitioners and never
entertain the same, NOR listen to their stories or examine or accept any document.
9. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in paragraph 8 of her
AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT, the truth of the matter is that her ILLICIT RELATIONSHIP and her illegal
and unlawful activities are known in the Bureau of Fire Protection since she also filed CHILD
SUPPORT case against her lover - where she has a child '.
Moreover, the alleged DOCUMENTS she purportedly have shown to me sometime in 1998, are all
part of public records '.
Furthermore, F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA, is filing the instant case just to get even with me or
to force me to settle and withdraw the CASES I FILED AGAINST HER since she knows that she will
certainly be DISMISSED FROM SERVICE, REMOVED FROM THE PRC ROLL and CRIMINALLY
CONVICTED of her ILLICIT, IMMORAL, ILLEGAL and UNLAWFUL ACTS.
On October 7, 2004, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
came out with a Report and Recommendation, stating that the information related by
complainant to the respondent is "protected under the attorney-client privilege communication."
Prescinding from this postulate, the Investigating Commissioner found the respondent to have

violated legal ethics when she "[revealed] information given to her during a legal consultation,"
and accordingly recommended that respondent be reprimanded therefor, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty. Roceles
Madianda be reprimanded for revealing the secrets of the complainant.
On November 4, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-472 reading as
follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part
of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering the actuation of revealing
information given to respondent during a legal consultation, Atty. Roceles Madianda is
hereby REPRIMANDED.
We AGREE with the recommendation and the premises holding it together.
As it were, complainant went to respondent, a lawyer who incidentally was also then a friend, to
bare what she considered personal secrets and sensitive documents for the purpose of obtaining
legal advice and assistance. The moment complainant approached the then receptive
respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two.
Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the
profession. Among the burdens of the relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in
this instance, to keep inviolate confidential information acquired or revealed during legal
consultations. The fact that one is, at the end of the day, not inclined to handle the client's case
is hardly of consequence. Of little moment, too, is the fact that no formal professional
engagement follows the consultation. Nor will it make any difference that no contract whatsoever
was executed by the parties to memorialize the relationship. As we said in Burbe v. Magulta,6 A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked
respondent for legal advise regarding the former's business. To constitute professional
employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any
previous occasion.
It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the
attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought.
It a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to
obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces
with the consultation, then the professional employments is established.
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship
between the lawyer and the complainant or the non-payment of the former's fees.
Dean Wigmore lists the essential factors to establish the existence of the attorney-client privilege
communication, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity
as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the
client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal
advisor, (8) except the protection be waived. 7
With the view we take of this case, respondent indeed breached his duty of preserving the
confidence of a client. As found by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, the documents shown
and the information revealed in confidence to the respondent in the course of the legal
consultation in question, were used as bases in the criminal and administrative complaints
lodged against the complainant.

The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the client from possible breach of
confidence as a result of a consultation with a lawyer.
The seriousness of the respondent's offense notwithstanding, the Court feels that there is room
for compassion, absent compelling evidence that the respondent acted with ill-will. Without
meaning to condone the error of respondent's ways, what at bottom is before the Court is two
former friends becoming bitter enemies and filing charges and counter-charges against each
other using whatever convenient tools and data were readily available. Unfortunately, the
personal information respondent gathered from her conversation with complainant became
handy in her quest to even the score. At the end of the day, it appears clear to us that
respondent was actuated by the urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing that, in the process of
giving vent to a negative sentiment, she was violating the rule on confidentiality.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda is hereby REPRIMANDEDand
admonished to be circumspect in her handling of information acquired as a result of a lawyerclient relationship. She is also STERNLY WARNED against a repetition of the same or similar act
complained of.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[Adm. Case No. 2417. February 6, 2002]

ALEX ONG, complainant, vs. ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO, respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:
This is a disbarment[1] case filed by Alex Ong, a businessman from Dumaguete City, against
Atty. Elpidio D. Unto, for malpractice of law and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP-Pasig City)
found Atty. Unto guilty of malpractice and recommended the penalty of one-month suspension
from the practice of law or, at the very least, a severe reprimand against him. [2]
First, we look at the antecedent facts. The records show that the complainant received a
demand-letter from the respondent, in the latters capacity as legal counsel of one Nemesia
Garganian. The full text of respondents letter[3] reads:
Dear Mr. Ong:
This is in connection with the claim of support of Miss Nemesia Garganian (my client) from you
for your only child, Anson Garganian, with her (Miss Nemesia Garganian) and other claims which
Miss Garganian is demanding from you. It is now about two months that you have abandoned
your legal and moral obligations to support your only child with her (Miss Nemesia Garganian)
and up to this moment you have not given said financial support.
I am doing this as a preliminary basis to a possible amicable settlement, if you desire so, so that
you will not be dragged unnecessarily to a court proceeding in connection with your legal and
moral obligations to your son with Miss Garganian.
May I advise you that within three (3) days from your receipt of this letter, you should return to
her house her television and betamax which you got from her house during her absence and
without her knowledge and consent. Your failure to comply with this demand, this office will be
constrained to file the proper action in court against you.
I hope within three (3) days from your receipt of this letter you may come to my Law Office at the
above address or you may send your lawyer and/or representative to discuss with me about the
preliminary matters in connection with all the claims of Miss Garganian against you.
I hope that you will not fail us, so that we can thresh out this matter smoothly, otherwise your
intentional failure or refusal to discuss these claims amicably with our office might be construed
as your absolute refusal really.
Expecting you then.
Very truly yours,
ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO
Counsel for Miss Nemesia Garganian
Dumaguete City
WITH MY CONSENT:
NEMESIA GARGANIAN
A few days thereafter, the respondent wrote a letter addressed to Dr. Jose Bueno (Agaw), an
emissary of the complainant. In this letter, the respondent listed down the alleged additional
financial demands of Ms. Garganian against the complainant and discussed the courses of action
that he would take against the complainant should the latter fail to comply with his obligation to
support Ms. Garganian and her son. The relevant portion of the respondents second letter
reads: [4]

These are the demands which my client would want to be complied (with):
1.
P1,500.00 monthly For the sustenance of Mr. Ongs son. x x x (Note: That this amount of
P1,500.00 should be up to the completion of Mr. Ongs son in the elementary course and this is
subject to adjustment when the son is already in the secondary course or up to his college
course).
2.
P50,000.00 - This amount should be given to Miss Garganian as her starting capital for her
planned business venture to give her a source of her living since she cannot anymore be a
teacher in any government position because of her status, having a child without being lawfully
wedded. x x x.
3.
The TV and the Betamax should be returned and delivered to the house of Miss Garganian,
without the presence of Mr. Alex Ong x x x.
4.
The amount of P5,000.00 as my attorneys fees should be given or paid to me tomorrow
before noon in my Law Office, through my cousin, Dr. Jose Bueno.
Criminal, civil and administrative actions that I am contemplating to file against Mr.
Alex Ong will be withheld pending the compliance by Mr. Ong of these compromise
agreements.
Gaw, if not of (sic) your representation I believe that one-week time as grace period for Mr. Ong
is too long a time.
Thank you very much.
Very truly yours,
ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO
Counsel for Miss Nemesia Garganian
It was alleged that the real father of Ms. Garganians son was the complainants brother and
that the complainant merely assumed his brothers obligation to appease Ms. Garganian who was
threatening to sue them. The complainant then did not comply with the demands against him.
Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint[5] with the Office of the City Fiscal (now
Prosecutors Office) of Dumaguete City against the complainant, his wife, Bella Lim, and one
Albina Ong, for alleged violation of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law and the Anti-Dummy Law.
The next day, the respondent filed another criminal complaint against the complainant, Lim,
Ong and Adela Peralta for their alleged violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.
In addition, the respondent commenced administrative cases against the complainant before
the Bureau of Domestic Trade, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, and the Office of
the Solicitor General.[6]According to the complainant, these cases were subsequently denied due
course and dismissed by the aforesaid government agencies.
The foregoing prompted the complainant to file the present case for disbarment. Essentially,
the complainant alleged that the respondent manufactured the criminal and administrative
cases against him to blackmail him or extort money from him. He claimed that the respondent
solicited for any information that could be used against him in the aforementioned cases by
offering any informer or would-be witness a certain percentage of whatever amounts they could
get from him. The complainant branded the respondents tactics as highly immoral,
unprofessional and unethical, constitutingmalpractice of law and conduct gravely unbecoming
of a lawyer.

In support of his accusations, the complainant submitted the following documents: (1) the
afore-quoted letters of the respondent addressed to the complainant and Dr.
Bueno; (2) Nemesia Garganians affidavit where she denied any knowledge regarding the
demands listed in the letter addressed to Dr. Bueno; (3) an unsigned affidavit allegedly prepared
by the respondent for the complainant, wherein the latter was acknowledging that he sired Ms.
Ganganians son illegitimate child; (4) the criminal complaints filed against the complainant for
alleged violation of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law and the Anti-Dummy Law; and (5) an
affidavit of Manuel Orbeta, a neighbor of the complainant who claimed that a representative of
the respondent had asked him to sign an affidavit allegedly prepared by the respondent, with an
offer to give any informer 20% and witness, 10%, of any amount he can get from Mr. Alex
Ong. To further bolster the disbarment case against the respondent, the complainant also
included a Supplemental Affidavit, [7] citing several cases previously filed against the respondent
by other parties.[8]
The records show that the respondent was directed to submit his comment on the complaint
lodged against him.[9] He did not file any. Subsequently, the case was endorsed to the Office of
the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. In turn, the OSG forwarded
the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Negros Oriental, authorizing said
office to conduct the investigation.
It appears that the respondent did not appear before the investigating officer, then Provincial
Fiscal Jacinto Bautista, to answer the charges against him. Instead, he moved for
postponement. After denying the respondents third request for postponement, Fiscal Bautista
proceeded with the reception of the complainants evidence. The respondent was duly
notified of the on-going investigation but he did not show up. When it was the
respondents turn to present evidence, notices of the preliminary investigation were sent to his
home address in Valenzuela, Negros Oriental, his law office in Dumaguete City and his last known
address inQuezon City. The return cards showed that he could not be located, although his wife
received some of the notices sent to his home in Dumaguete.
Meanwhile, the case was transferred from one investigating officer to another, with some of
them inhibiting from the investigation. Finally, the case was assigned to 2nd Asst. Provincial
Prosecutor Cristino Pinili. Atty. Pinili deemed the respondents absence as waiver of his right to
present his evidence. Finding merit in the complainants cause, the investigator recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one month, or, at the very least, be
severely reprimanded.
The records of the case were endorsed to the Office of the Solicitor General. [10] Thereafter,
the OSG transmitted the records to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in Manila, for proper
disposition, conformably with adopted policies and procedures. [11] The IBPs Commission on Bar
Discipline adopted Atty. Pinilis report and recommendation in toto.[12]
We affirm with modification.
The complainant seeks the disbarment of the respondent. Thus, it is meet to revisit the
importance of the legal profession and the purpose of the disbarment as aptly discussed
in Noriega vs. Sison.[13] We then held:
In resolving this disbarment case, (w)e must initially emphasize the degree of integrity and
respectability attached to the law profession. There is no denying that the profession of an
attorney is required after a long and laborious study. By years of patience, zeal and ability, the
attorney acquires a fixed means of support for himself and his family. This is not to say,
however, that the emphasis is on the pecuniary value of this profession but rather on the social
prestige and intellectual standing necessarily arising from and attached to the same by reason of
the fact that every attorney is deemed an officer of the court.
The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been wisely put by Chief Justice
Marshall of the United States Court when he said:

On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great importance to an individual and the prosperity
of his life may depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or
capriciously taken from him. On the other hand, it is extremely desirable that the respectability
of the Bar should be maintained and that its harmony with the bench should be preserved. For
these objects, some controlling power, some discretion ought to be exercised with great
moderation and judgment, but it must be exercised.
The purpose of disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of
livelihood but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those
who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in order that the courts
and clients may rightly repose confidence in them.
The relevant rule to the case at bar is Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
It mandates lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law. Rule
19.01 further commands that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the
lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate or threaten to present
unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.
[14]

Considering the facts of this case, we find that respondent has not exercised the good faith
required of a lawyer in handling the legal affairs of his client. It is evident from the records that
he tried to coerce the complainant to comply with his letter-demand by threatening to file
various charges against the latter. When the complainant did not heed his warning, he made
good his threat and filed a string of criminal and administrative cases against the
complainant. We find the respondents action to be malicious as the cases he instituted against
the complainant did not have any bearing or connection to the cause of his client, Ms.
Garganian. Clearly, the respondent has violated the proscription in Canon 19, Rule 19.01. His
behavior is inexcusable.
The records show that the respondent offered monetary rewards to anyone who could
provide him any information against the complainant just so he would have a leverage in his
actions against the latter. His tactic is unethical and runs counter to the rules that a lawyer shall
not, for corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding [15] and he shall not do any
act designed primarily to solicit legal business. [16] In the case ofChoa vs. Chiongson,[17] we held:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine
interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his right, as well as the exercise of his
utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. He must give a
candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his clients case with the end
view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain such actions
or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be
honestly debatable under the law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took
upon admission to the Bar that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; Needless to
state, the lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense. A
lawyers responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not
warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against
the other party.
(emphases ours)
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be
disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity.
[18]
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a
manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. [19]

Finally, we note that during the investigation of the case, despite being duly notified thereof
as evidenced by the motions for postponement he filed on several occasions, the respondent
chose not to participate in the proceedings against him. His nonchalance does not speak well of
him as it reflects his utter lack of respect towards the public officers who were assigned to
investigate the case. He should be watchful of his conduct. [20]The respondent should keep in
mind the solemn oath[21] he took before this Court when he sought admission to the bar. The
lawyers oath should not be reduced to mere recital of empty words for each word aims to
promote the high standard of professional integrity befitting a true officer of the court.
The recommended penalty for the unprofessional conduct of the respondent was one (1)
month suspension or reprimand. We believe that the same is too light vis--vis the misconduct
of the respondent.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO is hereby declared guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of five (5)
months and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Untos personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and a copy thereof be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
SO ORDERED.