Professional Documents
Culture Documents
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Journal of Philosophy, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal
of Philosophy.
http://www.jstor.org
812
BOOK REVIEWS
A Materialist Theory of the Mind. D.
manities Press, 1968. xii, 372 p. $8.50.
M. ARMSTRONG.
BOOK REVIEWS
8I3
8I4
the concept of desire, which is the clearest case of a mental state that
tends to produce behavior. Problems arise immediately, however.
Some desires do not really tend to cause behavior; for example, an
agent does not act upon a desire that he knows he cannot fulfill.
Armstrong tries to handle such cases by suitable counterfactuals,
saying what behavior would result from these desires if the agent
had certain beliefs. Secondly, desires are not the only mental states
that produce behavior; so distinguishing features of desires must
be introduced. Armstrong tries to do this by defining a purpose (or
desire) as a state whose behavioral effects depend on perceptual
feedback:
Purposive activity . .. is a train of activities initiated and sustained by
a mental 'thrust' or causal state. At the beginning of the activity, and
as the activity develops, perceptions of the current state of the agent
and his environment
. . . contained
in
The behavioral effects of perception tell only part of the story, however. Armstrong says that certain mental-state concepts must be analyzed partly in terms of the propensity to be caused by certain stimuli, and perception is the main example of this. To perceive an object or situation in the environment, he says, is to acquire a belief
about the environment. (This thesis was espoused in his earlier
BOOK REVIEWS
8i5
JOURNAL, LIX,
14 (July 5, 1962):
8i6
BOOK REVIEWS
8I7
Armstrong's causal analysis of mental concepts is a salutary development in the philosophy of mind. Its main importance, I think,
lies in its refutation of the oft-repeated dogma that logical connections and causal connections are incompatible. Armstrong is quite
right to point to concepts, such as the gene, whose analysis includes
a propensity to cause certain effects. He is also right, I think, in suggesting that the concept of desire or purpose is the concept of a
state whose analysis includes the propensity to cause behavior.
There is a sense, then, in which there is a conceptual, or logical, tie
between desire and action. Yet this logical tie is perfectly compatible with the fact that actions are caused by desires.
More dubious, however, is Armstrong's extension of this logical
connection thesis to all mental states. First, even where we can agree
that a certain kind of mental state characteristically produces certain behavior, it may not be evident that this is a logical truth. Secondly, there are many kinds of mental states that do not seem to be
associated with specific kinds of physical behavior. What sorts of
overt behavior are typically associated with entertaining a hypothesis, doubting a proposition, or daydreaming? The conceptual relationship between such states and overt behavior-even an indirect
relationship via other mental states-is, at best, extremely tenuous.
Armstrong's willingness to come to grips with the consequences of
his view is most in evidence in his treatment of noninferential
knowledge of mental states and his treatment of consciousness. He
clearly recognizes the implications of his causal-materialist position
on these issues, and his positions on them are original and refreshing. I remain unconvinced, however, by his support for noninferential knowledge of dispositions. He claims that pressure is a state apt
for producing movement in a body, so that noninferential knowledge of pressure on one's body is noninferential knowledge of a disposition. But this is dubious. His view of consciousness as a "selfscanning" process is also questionable. On his view, M is a conscious
mental event if it is the object of another mental event (the awareness of M). Otherwise it is unconscious. It follows that an awareness
is itself an unconscious mental event if it is not the object of a further awareness. Thus, an awareness of a pain is unconscious if it
goes unscanned by a "higher-level" awareness. This strikes me as
extremely counterintuitive.
There are other specific points where Armstrong's discussion is
inadequate, sometimes because he tries too hard to fit things into
his framework without full cognizance of the difficulties involved.
On the other hand, his development of the theory is always interest-
8i8
University of Michigan
The last item of the APA Program for Saturday, December 27, in
20 (Oct. 16, 1969): 725-735, page 726, was omitted. This line should
have read:
8:00 Smoker, Grand Ballroom
ERRATUM.
LXVI,
The editors regret the omission, and trust that many of our readers will
attend the Smoker.
THE
Undergraduate
Journal of
Philosophy
Founded and edited by students at Oberlin College, the journal
provides a forum for the presentation and criticism of philosophical articles, discussions, and book reviews written by undergraduates. Not committed to any branch or school of philosophy, the
Journal will continue to publish works on a wide variety of philosophically challenging subjects.
MANUSCRIPTS should be typed and not exceed 4000 words.
SUBSCRIPTIONS:
STUDENTS:
$1.00
INDIVIDUALS:
$1.50
INSTITUTIONS:
$2.00