Journal of Cleaner Production 19 (2011) 1622e1630

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Journal of Cleaner Production

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jclepro

Stakeholders and environmental management systems: a synergistic inuence

on environmental imbalance
Javier Gonzlez-Benito*, Gustavo Lannelongue, Dolores Queiruga
Universidad de Salamanca, Administracion y Economia de la Empresa, Edicio FES, Campus Unamuno, 37007 Salamanca, Spain

a r t i c l e i n f o

a b s t r a c t

Article history:
Received 6 October 2010
Received in revised form
16 May 2011
Accepted 22 May 2011
Available online 2 June 2011

This article analyzes the combined effects of stakeholder pressure and the implementation of environmental management systems on organizations environmental behaviors. Beyond their individual effects,
the implementation of an environmental management system should enhance the effect of stakeholder
pressure on environmental imbalance, dened as the divergence between what the organization does
and what it should do. Information collected from 3748 industrial plants in seven countries provides
empirical evidence that supports the study propositions. Therefore, this study contributes to both the
debate about the effectiveness of environmental management systems and the effort to explain the
complex relationship between organizations and their stakeholders in environmental matters.
2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords:
Environmental management systems
Stakeholders
Environmental proactivity

1. Introduction
It has been more than two decades since authors rst predicted
a strategic role for the environmental position of rms (e.g., Hunt
and Auster, 1990; Winsemius and Guntram, 1992); studies in the
meantime have attempted to identify both contextual and organizational circumstances that might prompt some rms to commit to
protecting the natural environment while others ignore it altogether (e.g., Aragn-Correa, 1998; Arora and Cason, 1996; Bansal
and Roth, 2000; Gonzlez-Benito and Gonzlez-Benito, 2008).
Academic scholarship often focuses on pressures exerted by organizational stakeholders (Buysse and Verbeke, 2003; Darnall et al.,
2010; Henriques and Sadorsky, 1999) or implementations of environmental management systems (EMS) by organizations (Kim and
Darnall, in press; Nawrocka and Parker, 2009; Sroufe, 2003). To the
best of our knowledge though, only Darnall et al. (2008) link these
two variables by analyzing the inuence of stakeholder pressures
on the comprehensiveness of an EMS. No research has considered
their synergistic or complementary effects with regard to the
environmental commitment of organizations.
This study aims to help explain the environmental proactivity of
organizations by analyzing the combined effect of stakeholder
pressure and EMS implementation. According to previous research,
both variables contribute separately to the organizations decision
to take environmental actions; as our main contribution, we extend
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: javiergb@usal.es (J. Gonzlez-Benito).
0959-6526/$ e see front matter 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2011.05.013

this analysis to argue that the presence of an EMS intensies the

effect of stakeholder pressure. Our study adds to the debate about
the usefulness of EMS by elucidating the direct and indirect benets
of such a system. We also extend previous studies (e.g., Darnall
et al., 2010; Delmas and Toffel, 2008; Kassinis and Vafeas, 2006;
Sharma and Henriques, 2005) by identifying further elements
that inuence the relationship between organizations and stakeholders in the context of environmental issues.
We also achieve several methodological advances that enhance
the validity of our study results. Most prior research measures
environmental proactivity as the extent to which a rm implements a series of practices. In contrast, we consider this concept in
relation to environmental imbalance. Environmental imbalance
provides a measure of the limitations that the organization faces in
its efforts to address environmental problems, such that its environmental behavior is a relative attribute that we can assess as
a function of the rms polluting potential. By adopting this relative
approach, we acknowledge that proactivity that might be considered sufcient in one organization could be intolerable for others.
Our results have implications for not only business rms that
must design strategies to deal with stakeholder pressure but also
public administrations and regulating agencies. These latter groups
play roles as both stakeholders and promoters of policies that
inuence the behavior of other stakeholders and that condition or
encourage the implementation of EMS.
As empirical support for our proposals, we rely on data provided
by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD). This database has supported vast environmental

J. Gonzlez-Benito et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 19 (2011) 1622e1630

management research (e.g., Arimura et al., 2008, 2011; Darnall

et al., 2008, 2009, 2010; Johnstone and Labonne, 2009; Kim and
Darnall, in press; Testa and Iraldo, 2010) that helps elucidate the
effects of environmental stakeholder pressures and the implementation of EMS. We apply the database to the next step, that is, to
consider the interaction between these two variables as a means to
explain the environmental proactivity of organizations, according
to the concept of environmental imbalance.
We structure the remainder of this article in four sections. In
Section 2, we introduce the main concepts, review relevant
literature, and pose our working hypotheses. We describe the
methodology we used to test the hypotheses in Section 3, then
present the results in Section 4, along with their main implications and the research opportunities they offer. We conclude in
Section 5.

2. Environmental imbalance, stakeholders, and EMS:

research hypotheses
2.1. Environmental imbalance
An organizations attitude toward the natural environment
constitutes a competitive dimension with clear strategic interest.
Many organizations voluntarily undertake initiatives, programs, and
practices to reduce their negative impact on the environment, as
summarized by the terms proactive or committed environmental behaviors (Berry and Rondinelli, 1998; Hunt and Auster,
1990). Existing measures of environmental proactivity, raised
awareness, commitment, and involvement mainly reect the degree
to which a rm implements a series of predetermined practices (e.g.,
Alvarez Gil et al., 2001; Aragn-Correa, 1998; Christmann, 2000;
Darnall et al., 2010; Gonzlez-Benito and Gonzlez-Benito, 2005a;
Henriques and Sadorsky, 1999; Sharma and Vredenburg, 1998),
which assumes the same practices are useful and necessary for all
organizations. Such measures thereby prevent effective overall
assessments of the environmental commitment of a heterogeneous
sample of rms.
In particular, this approach cannot account for a rms pollution
potential, which refers to the potential impact that the organizations products, services, and processes could have on the environment. Failing to implement a certain environmental practice
may denote a lack of environmental awareness if the organizations
actions are very damaging to its natural environment, but it could
be considered appropriate and acceptable for an organization that
commits no such negative acts. Likewise, a particular environmental behavior may be acceptable and sufcient in organizations
with a certain pollution potential but insufcient in others with
greater environmental impacts. Therefore, a more effective
measure should determine not the absolute volume and variety of
environmental initiatives by an organization but rather the extent
to which its initiatives are reasonable and sufcient as a function of
the specic characteristics of that organization. It is thus a matter of
the balance or imbalance between what the organization does and
what it should do, according to its characteristics.
In line with these observations, we dene environmental
imbalance as the divergence between the environmental actions an
organization conducts and the initiatives it still needs to take to
address its environmental damages. Greater environmental
imbalance implies less interest or an inability by an organization to
broach environmental issues; lesser imbalance indicates the organization has an effective commitment to the environment. We use
the term effective in this context to mean that the rm does not
undertake superuous or unnecessary initiatives that do not really
address environmental problems.

1623

2.2. Stakeholder pressure and environmental imbalance

The stakeholders of an organization (e.g., public authorities,
consumers, suppliers, employees, nancial entities, social groups,
shareholders) can affect its performance or be affected by its
actions (Freeman, 1984). Strategic management theory suggests
that the success of an organization depends on its management of
its stakeholders, achieved by creating value and satisfying their
needs and expectations (Berman et al., 1999; Donaldson and
Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Hill and Jones, 1992; Jones, 1995).
The pressure that these stakeholders exert also constitutes
a fundamental explanation of rms environmental behaviors and
strategies. Research has established differences across various
classications of stakeholders, in which each segment inuences
the implementation of certain environmental practices differently
(Buysse and Verbeke, 2003; Clarkson, 1995; Harvey and Schaefer,
2001; Henriques and Sadorsky, 1999). Other studies emphasize
the importance of the internal heterogeneity (Kassinis and Vafeas,
2006) and inuence strategies (Sharma and Henriques, 2005) of
each stakeholder group, as well as the perceptions and beliefs of
managers (Fineman and Clarke, 1996; Murillo-Luna et al., 2008),
the economic environment surrounding the rm (RuedaManzanares et al., 2008), the internal dynamics of different functional units in the organization (Delmas and Toffel, 2008), and the
organizational size (Darnall et al., 2010). These studies note the
contingent role of other variables but also recognize, whether
implicitly or explicitly, that greater environmental pressure or
stakeholder inuence increases the organizations interest in
adopting practices and developing initiatives that will enable it to
address environmental issues. We therefore propose:
Hypothesis 1: The more environmental pressure from stakeholders that an organization perceives, the lower its environmental imbalance.
2.3. Implementation of EMS and environmental imbalance
An environmental management system (EMS) is part of an
organizations management system, used to develop and implement its environmental policy and manage its environmental
effects, including the activities, products, or services that interact
with the environment (ISO 14001, 2004). To develop an EMS, a rm
must establish mechanisms to identify, measure, and control its
environmental effects; dene an environmental policy and objectives; raise the environmental awareness of employees; document
procedures and operations related to environmental management;
determine responsibilities in all these areas; and establish mechanisms for coordinating and controlling environmental initiatives
within the organization (Annandale et al., 2004; Anton et al., 2004;
Melnyk et al., 2003; Morrow and Rondinelli, 2002). In short, it must
develop an infrastructure to manage the organizations interaction
with the environment.
More and more rms have implemented EMS, largely in
response to standards such as ISO 14001 or the European EcoManagement and Audit Scheme (EMAS) (Casadess et al., 2008;
Gimnez et al., 2003; Morrow and Rondinelli, 2002). Organizations often use these standards as a guide for developing their EMS,
which makes them candidates for certication (ISO 14001) or
registration (EMAS). That is, the standards were conceived as tools
to improve organizations environmental performance, but they
also support external recognition and legitimization of the rms
environmental responsibility, an issue of increasing interest to
society (Johnstone and Labonne, 2009; King et al., 2005). Thus
institutional theory often serves as an explanation for a rms
adoption of international standards (e.g., Darnall et al., 2008), and

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J. Gonzlez-Benito et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 19 (2011) 1622e1630

the search for legitimization appears to be a primary motivation for

proactive environmental behavior (Bansal and Roth, 2000;
Gonzlez-Benito and Gonzlez-Benito, 2005b). Accordingly, some
EMS implementations might involve a minimum level of commitment to the environment, in that they seek certication instead of
truly improved environmental performance (Christmann and
Taylor, 2006; Rondinelli and Vastag, 2000). In turn, the relation
between the implementation of an EMS in an organization and its
environmental performance, which seemingly should be automatic, is not tautological and instead has prompted signicant
research attention (e.g., Annandale et al., 2004; Arimura et al.,
2008; Hertin et al., 2008; Iraldo et al., 2009; Kim and Darnall, in
press; King et al., 2005; Melnyk et al., 2003; Sam et al., 2009;
Sroufe, 2003). Yet Arimura et al. (2011) show that an ISO
14001ecertied EMS affects the environmental actions of the
company that adopts the system, as well as those of other organizations in its supply chain.
Research about the effect of EMS on environmental performance
remains inconclusive though, perhaps because of the diversity of
approaches, methodologies, and contexts studied (Nawrocka and
Parker, 2009). For example, a distinction emerges between the
implementation of an EMS as an internal, private initiative versus
EMS certication or registration as a public act (King et al., 2005).
But the relevant antecedent of proenvironmental behavior is the
very presence of an EMS, not whether that EMS is certied or
registered or in accordance with a specic standard. Certication/
registration thus might be associated with a desire for external
recognition, but this motivation becomes blurred when we take
into account all EMS (certied/registered or not). Moreover, the
differentiating effect of certication/registration diminishes when
a sufcient number of rms obtain this status. Thus the proliferation of standards such as ISO 14001 (Casadess et al., 2008;
Marimn et al., 2006) helps minimize their adoption for exclusively commercial ends. Worldwide, more than 220,000 companies
have obtained ISO 14001 certication, a number increasing by
20,000 each year (ISO Survey, 2009), and close to 8000 have
obtained EMAS registration, increasing by 400 annually (http://ec.
europa.eu/environment/emas). From another perspective, rms
that already have initiated environmental actions or practices may
nd the implementation of an EMS easier or more useful (King
et al., 2005). Considering these ndings, as well as the theoretical
proposition that EMS provides a basis for developing specic
environmental initiatives, we posit:
Hypothesis 2: Firms that have implemented an EMS have
a lower environmental imbalance than rms that have not.
2.4. Interaction of stakeholder pressure and EMS implementation
Dutton and Duncan (1987) model how agents in an organization
interpret and respond to different, potentially inuential events
and circumstances. In many cases, stakeholders trigger strategic
diagnostic mechanisms that reect the organizations perception of
urgency and feasibility. Urgency refers to perceptions of costs or
lost opportunities associated with a failure to respond to new
circumstances; feasibility instead pertains to the extent to which
rm agents believe (1) they understand the problem and can
identify necessary actions and (2) the means to carry out appropriate actions are available and accessible. Change is more likely
when perceptions of urgency and feasibility are greater (Ginsberg
and Venkatraman, 1995; Julian et al., 2008).
In the specic context of environmental management, stakeholder pressure should increase perceptions of urgency and motivate organizational responses (H1). However, the intensity of that
response likely depends on perceptions of feasibility. When an

organization has implemented an EMS, it has access to the organizational infrastructure needed to implement its environmental
initiatives, so managers should consider their response to environmental demands feasible. Without such a system, this response
represents a bigger challenge, and the organization instead may
prioritize alternative strategies or postpone any reaction. Thus the
inuence of stakeholders should be greater in organizations that
have implemented an EMS, and we propose:
Hypothesis 3: Environmental pressures from stakeholders
reduce environmental imbalance more in rms that have
implemented an EMS (i.e., EMS implementation positively
moderates the relation between environmental pressure from
stakeholders and environmental imbalance).
In Fig. 1, we summarize our hypotheses. The relations in H1 and
H2 have received notable research attention; the interaction we
propose in H3 remains unexplored.
3. Methodology
3.1. Data
The data for this study come from the OECD, collected as part of
a broad project entitled Environmental Policy and Corporate
Behavior, which focused on the effects of governments environmental policies (and other factors) on corporate behavior. The
initial population consisted of manufacturing plants with more
than 50 employees from seven OECD countries (United States,
Canada, France, Norway, Hungary, Germany, and Japan). The
sample was stratied by plant size (number of employees) and
industrial sector (according to national codes).
The data collection used the Dillman (1978) method. A pretest in
three countries (Japan, Germany, and Canada) suggested revisions
to the questionnaire, as undertaken by the Business and Industry
Advisory Committee of the OECD. The survey then was sent to
general or environmental managers of rms at the beginning of
2003. Each potential respondent received an envelope with a letter
of introduction, a 12-page questionnaire, and a postage-paid return
envelope. Respondents could return completed questionnaires by
mail in the provided envelope (75%) or complete the questionnaire
online (25%) using unique security codes. Managers who had not
responded were contacted two more times at three-week intervals
(usually with a postcard, sometimes by phone). Johnstone et al.
(2007) provide more detailed information about the data collection procedure; it eventually resulted in a sample of 4186 plants, of
which 3748 provided full information related to the variables we
consider. We detail the distribution of these responses by country
in Table 1. The response rate was notably lower in the United States
and France, and the greatest number of responses came from Japan
and Germany (which account for more than half the sample).
Various authors who participated in the actual data collection
(e.g., Arimura et al., 2008; Darnall et al., 2008, 2010; Johnstone
et al., 2007) have reported various tests of the results, based
mainly on archival or wave analyses (Rogelberg and Stanton, 2007),

Fig. 1. Research model: working hypotheses.

J. Gonzlez-Benito et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 19 (2011) 1622e1630

Table 1
Response rate by country.
Posted
Received
%
Questionnaires Questionnaires
US
France
Hungary
Japan
Norway
Germany
Canada

3746
3000
1530
4757
981
5000
1033
20047

489
269
466
1499
309
898
256
4186

Valid Questionnaires %
(for this research)

13.1% 333
9.0% 229
30.5% 428
31.5% 1420
31.5% 295
18.0% 805
24.8% 238
20.9% 3748

8.9%
7.6%
28.0%
29.9%
20.1%
16.1%
23.0%
18.7%

Source: OCDE project Environmental Policy and Corporate Behavior (Johnstone et al.,
2007).

that reduce the risk of non-response bias. They also indicate that
common method bias (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986) is a relatively
minor concern for these data, though it always should be taken into
consideration. The data collection also guaranteed anonymity to
respondents to reduce reporting biases (Arimura et al., 2011).
Although Johnstone et al. (2007) note a potential bias related to the
choice of respondents, the data appear valid and reliable, according
to extensive tests in previous literature.
3.2. Measures
3.2.1. Dependent variable: environmental imbalance
The survey asked managers to assess the potential environmental impact of their products and processes as not negative,
moderately negative, or very negative for each of the environmental aspects in Table 2. The survey also asked whether they had
taken specic actions to reduce their environmental impacts. Using
both assessments, we built an index of environmental imbalance
according to Equation (1), in which n1 represents the number of
aspects for which the potential impact is moderately negative and
the facility has not taken specic actions to reduce it, and n2
represents the number of aspects for which the potential impact is
very negative and the facility has not taken specic actions.
Therefore, the imbalance increases when the rm does nothing in
situations that are potentially very serious compared with moderately serious situations.

Environmental imbalance 1  n1 2  n2

(1)

Table 2
Environmental aspects and stakeholders.
Environmental Aspects

Stakeholders

 Use of natural resources

(energy, water)
 Solid waste generation
 Wastewater efuent
 Local or regional air pollution
 Global pollutants
(greenhouse gases)
 Aesthetic effects
(noise, smell, landscape)
 Soil contamination
 Risk of severe accidents
 Other impact (please specify)

 Public authorities (government,

state, municipal)
 Corporate headquarters
 Household consumers
 Commercial buyers
 Suppliers of goods
and services
 Shareholders and investment
funds
 Banks and other lenders
 Management employees
 Non-management employees
 Labor unions
 Industry or trade associations
 Environmental groups or
organizations
 Neighborhood/community groups
and organizations
 Other groups or organizations
(please specify)

Source: OCDE project Environmental Policy and Corporate Behavior (Johnstone et al.,
2007).

1625

The survey allows each respondent to introduce another environmental aspect that may not have been included in the previous
categories. Thus, it addresses the potentially specic features of
various plants and organizations, which increases the validity of
this tool for capturing the imbalance between actions that should
be taken and those actually taken.
3.2.2. Independent variables
The survey asked the managers to assess stakeholder pressures,
or the inuence of each of the stakeholders listed in Table 2, on
their environmental behavior as not applicable, moderately
important, and very important. We built an index of the degree
of pressure exerted by stakeholders using Equation (2), in which m1
represents the number of stakeholders with moderately important
inuence, and m2 represents the number of stakeholders with very
important inuence:

Stakeholder pressure 1  m1 2  m2

(2)

With this approach, the pressure perceived by organizational

agents increases as the pressure of one stakeholder increases,
regardless of whether the rest of the stakeholders increase their
environmental demands too. Because stakeholders are heterogeneous, an increase in ones inuence is not necessarily accompanied by greater inuence by others. Stakeholder pressure is thus
a formative scale (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001),
captured with an algebraic index. Whereas prior literature empirically classies stakeholders into different categories according to
the pressure or inuence they exert (Buysse and Verbeke, 2003;
Henriques and Sadorsky, 1999), our aim is not to identify
different environmental behaviors associated with different environmental pressures but rather to nd organizational elements
that condition the activation of positive environmental actions in
response to greater environmental pressure, regardless of the
origin of the pressure or the nature of the actions.
The survey predenes 13 stakeholders but also allows respondents to add others. Thus, it can identify other possible sources of
pressure, which again increases the content validity of the
measurement instrument.
In addition, the survey asks whether the plant has implemented
an EMS. The resultant dichotomous variable takes a value of 1 is the
answer is afrmative and 0 otherwise.
3.2.3. Control variables
As its construction reveals, the environmental imbalance index
(Equation (1)) depends on the number of environmental aspects on
which the plants products and processes may have moderately or
very negative impacts. A facility that takes no initiative to reduce its
environmental impact but has no potential impact on any environmental aspects would have a null imbalance; if it has very
negative potential impacts on all nine aspects though, its environmental imbalance would reach 18. Thus, environmental
imbalance depends on the facilitys polluting potential or polluting
rank, so we control for this effect before studying the other variables that explain it. We constructed a control variable with
Equation (3) in which k1 represents the number of environmental
aspects for which the rms potential environmental impact is
moderately negative and k2 is the number of aspects for which the
potential environmental impact is very negative.

Polluting rank 1  k1 2  k2

(3)

To control for the effect of economies of scale or the greater

availability of resources that larger facilities enjoy, we also built
a facility size control variable that uses the number of employees of
the facility (in hundreds). Several prior studies have detected

1626

J. Gonzlez-Benito et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 19 (2011) 1622e1630

Table 3
Correlations among variables.

1. Polluting rank
2. Facility size
3. Environmental manager
4. Market scope
5. Business performance
6. Food, beverage, textiles (ISIC 15e19)
7. Pulp, paper, publishing, print (ISIC 20e22)
8. Nonmetallic minerals, metals (ISIC 26e28)
9. Machinery, transport equipment (ISIC 29e35)
10. Furniture, recycling (ISIC 36e37)
11. Stakeholder pressure
12. Implementation of an EMS
13. Environmental imbalance

Mean (S.D.) 1

4.86
3.28
.69
2.79
3.45
.15
.13
.23
.32
.02
9.17
.39
1.14

.15**
.12**
.07**
.03
.04**
.02
.07**
.00
.19**
.17**
.05**

.20**
.13**
.12**
.05**
.01
.03**
.01
.35**
.41**
.06**

.12**
.14**
.15**
.02
.18**
.03
.17**
.09**
.04**

.01
.02
.01
.05**
.03*
.12**
.04**
.08**

.16**
.23**
.28**
.06**
.02
.16**
.01

.21**
.26**
.05**
.02
.07**
.01

.37**
.08** .10**
.02
.04**
.02
.03*
.12 ** .00
.25**
.04* .02
.00 .03
.13**

(3.52)
(8.62)
(.46)
(1.05)
(.99)
(.356)
(.335)
(.421)
(.465)
(.138)
(5.30)
(.49)
(1.70)

.18**
.28**
.07**
.01
.02
.03*
.05**
.08**
.02
.35**
.25**
.43**

10

11

12

**p < .01; *p < .05.

Notes: Pearson tests.

a signicant relationship of size with environmental behavior (e.g.,

Alvarez Gil et al., 2001; Arora and Cason, 1996; Min and Galle,
2001).
An indicator of the resources a plant has to develop and
implement environmental policies is the presence of organizational
structures linked to environmental management, including an
environmental manager position. To control for the differences
among facilities regarding their investment in or commitment to
environmental matters, we considered a dichotomous variable that
takes a value of 1 if the facility has a manager explicitly responsible
for environmental issues and 0 if not.
The survey asked the plants to indicate their market scope by
classifying it as local, national, regional (neighboring countries), or
global. This scope may condition the explicit or tacit environmental
requirements to which facilities are subject, in terms of both
exigency and variety.1 Several authors similarly note the importance of internationalization for organizations environmental
performance (e.g., Christmann and Taylor, 2001, 2002; Kennelly
and Lewis, 2002). We therefore created an ordinal variable that
takes values from 1 to 4, according to the four levels of market
scope, from local to global.
Several studies have considered a relation between environmental performance and business performance (e.g., Christmann,
2000; Gonzlez-Benito and Gonzlez-Benito, 2005a; Klassen and
Whybark, 1999; Molina-Azorn et al., 2009; Russo and Fouts,
1997; Sharma and Vredenburg, 1998). Most assume environmental practices are independent variables that explain part of the
variance in organizational performance, but some authors (e.g.,
Gonzlez-Benito and Gonzlez-Benito, 2005a; Heras-Saizarbitoria
et al., 2011; Nishitani, 2009) also argue that the causal relationship could be inverse: Firms with the best performance may devote
part of their prots to developing environmental policies, whereas
less successful rms must forgo that effort. To control for this
possible effect, we created an ordinal variable that takes the
following values: (1) income so low it caused great losses, (2)
income insufcient to cover costs, (3) neutral income, (4) income
enough for a small prot, and (5) income that amply surpasses
costs. Each respondent assessed their rms overall performance in
the previous three years on this scale.
Finally, each industrial sector has specic characteristics that
may affect rms environmental behavior (Banerjee, 2002).
Although we expected that our polluting rank variable would

1
Multinational rms likely adapt their policies, products, and processes to t the
requirements of the most demanding destination (Magretta, 1997; Rugman and
Verbeke, 1998).

capture part of this effect, we introduced ve dummy variables to

control further for industrial divergences. Following Darnall et al.
(2009), we used a dummy variable to distinguish each of the
following industries: food, beverage and textiles (ISIC2 15e19);
pulp, paper, publishing and print (ISIC, 20e22); non metallic
minerals and metals (ISIC, 26e28); machinery and transport
equipment (ISIC, 29e35); and furniture and recycling (ISIC, 36e37).
To avoid linear relationships between the independent variables
and enable the estimation of our empirical models, we excluded
a sixth dummy variable group: petroleum, chemicals and plastics
(ISIC, 23e26).
3.3. Analysis
To test the hypotheses, we employed moderated regression
analysis (Arnold, 1982; Venkatraman, 1989), with environmental
imbalance as the dependent variable. Because the correlations
between the control and independent variables in Table 3 are
signicant, we estimated a rst model with only the control variables as independent variables. In a second model, we incorporated
stakeholder pressure as the independent variable, then compared it
with Model 1 to test H1. Next we entered the EMS implementation
to verify the validity of H2. Finally, we added the interaction term
formed by the product of stakeholder pressure and EMS implementation in Model 4 to test the validity of H3. If we combine the
estimates of the results of Models 3 and 4, we can distinguish pure
from quasi-moderation (Sharma et al., 1981): The former occurs
when the moderating variable does not affect the dependent
variable (in support of H3 but not H2), whereas quasi-moderation
exists when the moderating variable affects the dependent variable (in support of both H2 and H3).
Our methods require the construction of three indexes (Equations (1)e(3)), which imply the selection of certain weights. Therefore, we assessed the sensitivity of our results to changes in those
weights. For environmental imbalance (Equation (1)) for example,
we chose weight 1 for n1 and weight 2 for n2. In this case, a rm that
does nothing related to the aspects for which the potential impact is
very negative generates an environmental imbalance twice the
value it would earn if it did nothing related to aspects for which the
potential impact is moderately negative. In other words, the weight
of n2 is 100% higher than the weight of n1. We also replicated these
analyses with differences of 50% (weights of 1 and 1.5) and 200%
(weights of 1 and 3); the results remained consistent. For stakeholder pressure (Equation (2)) and pollution prevention (Equation

International Standard Industrialization Codes, review 3.1.

J. Gonzlez-Benito et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 19 (2011) 1622e1630

(3)), the results similarly did not change. Thus our results are robust
to the specic mathematical modeling used for the variables.
4. Results
The results of our model estimation appear in Table 4. According
to Model 1, some control variables explain signicant portions of
the environmental imbalance. As we expected due to the actual
construction of the variables, polluting potential has strong
explanatory power. If polluting potential is null, there is no possibility of environmental imbalance; greater polluting potential
increases the likelihood of environmental imbalance. Therefore, we
control for its effect before analyzing the hypotheses.
The effects of the other control variables are rather less evident.
The existence of an environmental manager, greater rm size, better
performance, and certain industrial activities all contribute to
reducing environmental imbalance. This result suggests economies
of scale in environmental matters, as well as the importance of welldened responsibilities. Moreover, it conrms the positive effect of
management committed to environmental and business performance (Klassen and Whybark, 1999; Russo and Fouts, 1997; Sharma
and Vredenburg, 1998). In this case, we posit that better business
performance may give the plant access to more resources that it can
use to address environmental problems; we therefore control for this
effect. Some sectors seem more inclined to reduce environmental
imbalance (e.g., ISIC from 26 to 35), which reveals the signicant
discrepancies in the way each industry approaches environmental
issues (Banerjee, 2002). The only variable without a statistically
signicant coefcient is market scope; it cannot explain any effects
that are not explained already by the other control variables.
Incorporating stakeholders in Model 2 (see Table 4) signicantly
increases (p < .01) model t. The coefcient of the variable has
a negative sign, in support of H1. Although the negative correlation
between stakeholder pressure and environmental imbalance is
weak (see Table 3), eliminating the effect of polluting potential from
the regression model reveals the full role that this variable plays.
Likewise, incorporating the variable that distinguishes the
facilities that have implemented an EMS increases the explained
variance in the model signicantly and gives rise to a negative
coefcient, in support of H2. The coefcient of stakeholder pressure
Table 4
Predictive power of control variables and independent variable for environmental
imbalance: moderated regression analysis.
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Polluting rank
.507**
.543**
.565**
.565**
Facility size
.113**
.100**
.085**
.081**
Environmental manager
.170**
.137**
.073**
.080**
Market scope
.027
.013
.022
.021
Business performance
.049**
.041**
.043**
.044**
Food, beverage, textiles
.022
.019
.009
.011
(ISIC 15e19)
Pulp, paper, publishing, print
.019
.016
.001
.001
(ISIC 20e22)
Nonmetallic minerals, metals
.046*
.035
.019
.019
(ISIC 26e28)
Machinery, transport
.065**
.053*
.058**
.056**
equipment (ISIC 29e35)
Furniture, recycling (ISIC 36e37)
.022
.025
.021
.022
Stakeholder pressure
.140**
.125**
.091**
Implementation of an EMS
.193**
.113**
Stakeholders pressure 
.101**
Implementation of an EMS
R2
.240
.255
.284
.286
F
117.955** 116.402** 123.554** 114.926**
DF
76.914** 150.867**
8.431**
**p < .01; *p < .05.
Notes: standardized coefcients.

1627

remains negative and signicant (p < .01) in Model 3; despite their

high correlation (see Table 3), the two independent variables
explain different aspects of the dependent variable.
Model 4 also represents an advance over Model 3, with significantly greater explanatory power (p < .01) and a negative sign for
the interaction term. The reduction in environmental imbalance
that results from stakeholder pressure is intensied in facilities that
have implemented an EMS. To illustrate this nding, in Fig. 2 we
depict the corresponding interaction plot, built according to the
procedure proposed by Aiken and West (1991). In the cases of all
facilities, whether they have an EMS or not, greater stakeholder
pressure reduces the imbalance between real and desirable environmental behavior, that is, the environmental imbalance. Yet the
slope of the relation is greater when facilities have an EMS, as we
proposed in H3. Because EMS implementation also has a direct
effect on environmental imbalance (H3), we can identify it as
a quasi-moderating variable of the relation between stakeholder
pressure and environmental imbalance (Sharma et al., 1981).
These results support our proposed model (Fig. 1) and in turn
suggest several implications, both academic and practical, as well
as opportunities for further research.
5. Discussion
5.1. Academic implications
In line with previous studies (e.g., Murillo-Luna et al., 2008), we
nd empirical evidence of the importance of stakeholders as
promoters of a greater environmental commitment by rms. Our
results are consistent with those of Darnall et al. (2010), who use
a subsample from the same database and reveal a positive relationship between the pressure exerted by different types of stakeholders and the implementation of a series of environmental
management practices. Although we realize that not all stakeholders exert inuence in the same way (Buysse and Verbeke, 2003;
Henriques and Sadorsky, 1999), nor act the same (Kassinis and
Vafeas, 2006; Sharma and Henriques, 2005), our analyses reveal
that the total amount of pressure, regardless of its origin, leads rms
to take environmental action. Achieving sustainability therefore
requires raising the environmental awareness of any groups that
inuence organizations, whether internally or externally.
Our study also aligns with defenses of the effectiveness of EMS.
Although EMS certication/registration may provide an added
attraction for rms (Christmann and Taylor, 2006; King et al., 2005;
Rondinelli and Vastag, 2000), our results show that rms that
implement these systems (certied/registered or not) also make
a greater effort to tackle environmental problems (Kim and Darnall, in
press). Such efforts do not mean necessarily that their environmental

Fig. 2. Interaction plot between stakeholder pressure and EMS implementation.

1628

J. Gonzlez-Benito et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 19 (2011) 1622e1630

performance will improve; however, Kim and Darnalls (in press)

results, again using the same database, indicate that such efforts
often translate into greater environmental performance. Thus, our
nding implies that EMS not only important for publicity but also can
represent an effective impetus for organizational sustainability.
As our main contribution, our results indicate that to understand
the mechanisms that lead to greater environmental proactivity, we
must identify explanatory variables as well as discover how they
interact. Adding to research initiated by other authors (e.g., Darnall
et al., 2010; Rueda-Manzanares et al., 2008), we provide further
evidence of the synergistic effects of EMS implementation and
stakeholder pressure. Whereas stakeholder pressure increases the
perception of urgency, the availability of an EMS increases the
perception of feasibility, and both are important for generating
a response by the organization (Dutton and Duncan, 1987).
To conrm the robustness of our ndings, we calculated the
pressure exerted by different subgroups of stakeholders in Table 2,
using Equation (2), and replicated our analyses (see Table 4) for
each type of pressure. For this test, we adopted Buysse and
Verbekes (2003) classication and distinguished the pressures
exerted by regulatory stakeholders (public authorities, industry or
trade associations), internal primary stakeholders (corporate
headquarters, shareholders and investment funds, management
employees, non-management employees, labor unions), external
primary stakeholders (household consumers, commercial buyers,
suppliers of goods and services, banks and other lenders), and
secondary stakeholders (environmental groups or organizations,
neighborhood/community groups and organizations).
Across all four cases and at a condence level of 90% (p  .1), the
results remain the same as those in Table 4. In Fig. 3 we depict the
respective interaction plots, which reveal a similar pattern for each
pressure source: Greater pressure leads to a signicant reduction of
environmental imbalance, and this reduction is signicantly
stronger when the facility already has implemented an EMS.

Therefore, the basic form of the relationship among stakeholder

pressure, EMS implementation, and environmental unbalance does
not depend on the origin of pressure. Neither the sign of the effect
of stakeholder pressure on the perception of urgency nor the sign of
the effect of the EMS on the perception of feasibility seems affected
by the origin of that pressure. Although the strength of such effects
might vary slightly depending on the type of stakeholder, they are
always statistically signicant, and greater pressure exerted by any
subgroup always generates reactions in the same direction. This
nding does not contradict previous research that associates
different environmental practices with different types of stakeholder pressure though (e.g., Buysse and Verbeke, 2003; Henriques
and Sadorsky, 1999). Environmental imbalance does not refer to the
implementation of any specic type of environmental practice; it
involves the relative effort exerted to eliminate environmental
problems, whichever practices that exertion entails. We think this
is the essence of environmental proactivity.
5.2. Practical implications
For businesses, our study provides information about the
possibilities offered by an EMS for channeling environmental
demands, which are useful instruments for establishing a necessary
organizational structure. For example, some rms may require high
levels of environmental performance across their supply chain; if
they choose suppliers that have implemented an EMS based on ISO
14001, it will be easier for the suppliers to meet environmental
requirements.
For public administrations, our study ndings suggest the need
to combine policies that motivate EMS implementation with those
that seek to raise environmental awareness and exert both direct
and indirect pressures (through other stakeholders) on business
rms. Although each of these policies on its own seems effective,
when used in combination, they can optimize performance.

Facilities
w ith EMS

1,6

Facilities
w ithout
EMS

1,2

0,8

0,4

Environmental Imbalance

Environmental Imbalance

Facilities
w ithout
EMS

1,2

0,8

0,4

mean - 1

mean

mean - 1

mean + 1

mean

mean + 1

Internal Primary Stakeholders' Pressure

Regulatory Stakeholders' Pressure

Facilities
w ith EMS

1,6

Facilities
w ithout
EMS

1,2

0,8

0,4

Environmental Imbalance

Environmental Imbalance

Facilities
w ith EMS

1,6

Facilities
w ith EMS

1,6

Facilities
w ithout
EMS

1,2

0,8

0,4

mean - 1

mean

mean + 1

External Primary Stakeholders' Pressure

mean - 1

mean

mean + 1

Secondary Stakeholders' Pressure

Fig. 3. Interaction plots between different types of stakeholder pressure and EMS implementation.

J. Gonzlez-Benito et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 19 (2011) 1622e1630

5.3. Further research

Our results are limited in certain respects, leaving room for
further research to extend our ndings. First, organizations are
usually reluctant to provide information about their environmental
activities. Although the OECD has followed strict procedures for
collecting the data, the reliability of self-administered subjective
questionnaires is always questionable. The questionnaire was sent
to general or environmental managers, but it is not possible to
control the actual respondent within each facility. Thus, replicating
our study with other databases and different sources of information
would be helpful, especially in this area, to assess the robustness of
the results and generate valid scientic knowledge. Second, our
study distinguishes plants that have implemented an EMS from
those that have not; distinguishing certied/registered from
noncertied/nonregistered EMS implementations, as well as the
type of certication/registration awarded, might provide additional
information regarding the motivations that underlie its implementation. Third, we have concentrated on two variables
frequently studied as antecedents or determinants of a more
proactive environmental management, but many others could be
incorporated into our model to enrich these results. Other interactions between potential determinants of environmental
commitment also remain unstudied.
6. Conclusions
This research enables us to conclude that both stakeholder
pressure and EMS implementation offer signicant predictive
power with regard to organizations proactive environmental
behaviors. However, their predictions become notably more precise
in combination. Thus EMS appear to provide useful tools for rms
that want to satisfy the environmental demands of their stakeholders. Moreover, in line with Dutton and Duncan (1987), our
analyses suggest that the environmental transformation of organizations depends on not only a sense of urgency, as motivated by
stakeholder pressure, but also the perception of feasibility, as
derived from the existence of an EMS. To understand the mechanisms behind the formulation and implementation of environmental strategies more fully, it is necessary to study both the direct
effect of and the interactions among different explanatory
variables.
Role of funding source
This research was funded by the Spanish Government and
FEDER funds through research projects SEJ2007-63879/ECON and
ECO2010-21078.
Acknowledgments
We thank the responsible parties for the OECD project Environmental Policy and Firm-Level Management (www.oecd.org/
env/cpe/rms) for providing the data used in our research.
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