Adminstrative Law

Arellano Univeristy School of Law

aiza ebina/2015

LOVINA vs MORENO
9 SCRA 557
Restriction on Grant of Judicial Power
FACTS: This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila enjoining the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications from causing the removal of certain dams and dikes in a fishpond
owned by Primitivo and Nelly Lovina in the Municipality of Macabebe Province of Pampanga.
The cause started by a petition of numerous residents of the said municipality to the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, complaining that appellees had blocked the "Sapang Bulati", a navigable river
in Macabebe, Pampanga, and asking that the obstructions be ordered removed, under the provisions of
Republic Act No. 2056. After notice and hearing to the parties, the said Secretary found the constructions
to be a public nuisance in navigable waters, and, in his decision dated 11 August 1959, ordered the land
owners, spouses Lovina, to remove five (5) closures of Sapang Bulati; otherwise, the Secretary would order
their removal at the expense of the respondent. After receipt of the decision, the respondent filed a
petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila to restrain the Secretary from enforcing his decision. The
trial court, after due hearing, granted a permanent injunction, which is now the subject of the present
appeal.
The position of the plaintiffs-appellees in the court below was that Republic Act No. 2056 is
unconstitutional because it invests the Secretary of Public Works and Communications with sweeping,
unrestrained, final and unappealable authority to pass upon the issues of whether a river or stream is
public and navigable, whether a dam encroaches upon such waters and is constitutive as a public
nuisance, and whether the law applies to the state of facts, thereby Constituting an alleged unlawful
delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
ISSUE: Whether or not the objections to the unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 2056, not only as an
undue delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works but also for being unreasonable and
arbitrary, tenable
RULING: No. It will be noted that the Act (R.A. 2056) merely empowers the Secretary to remove
unauthorized obstructions or encroachments upon public streams, constructions that no private person
was anyway entitled to make, because the bed of navigable streams is public property, and ownership
thereof is not acquirable by adverse possession.
It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's power under the Act necessarily involves the determination of
some questions of fact, such as the existence of the stream and its previous navigable character; but these
functions, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely incidental to the exercise of the power granted by
law to clear navigable streams of unauthorized obstructions or encroachments, and authorities are clear
that they are, validly conferable upon executive officials provided the party affected is given opportunity to
be heard, as is expressly required by Republic Act No. 2056, section 2.
Appellees invoke American rulings that abatement as nuisances of properties of great value can not be
done except through court proceedings; but these rulings refer to summary abatements without previous
hearing, and are inapplicable to the case before us where the law provides, and the investigator actually
held, a hearing with notice to the complainants and the, appellees, who appeared therein. It is noteworthy
that Republic Act 2605 authorizes removal of the unauthorized dikes either as "public nuisances or as
prohibited constructions" on public navigable streams, and those of appellees clearly are in the latter class.
Considering the well-established rule that findings of fact in executive decisions in matters within their
jurisdiction are entitled to respect from the courts in the absence of fraud, collusion, or grave abuse of
discretion, none of which has been shown to exist in this case, we agree with appellant that the court
below erred in rejecting the findings of fact of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
RATIO: The judicial power which may be exercises by administrative agencies is a restricted one, limited
to what is incidental and reasonably necessary to the proper and efficient administration of the statutes
that are committed to them for administration.
Arbitrary powers or uncontrolled discretion may not be conferred upon administrative agencies either in
the exercise of rule-making or adjuticatory functions.
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