SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 133303. February 17, 2005]

BERNARDO VALDEVIESO, petitioner, vs. CANDELARIO DAMALERIO AND AUREA
C. DAMALERIO,respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to set aside the 25 September 1997 Decision and the 10 February 1998
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43082 entitled, Candelario
Damalerio and Aurea Damalerio v. Honorable Antonio S. Alano, et al.[1]
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
On 05 December 1995, Bernardo Valdevieso (petitioner) bought from spouses
Lorenzo and Elenita Uy a parcel of land consisting of 10,000 square meters, more or
less, located at Bo. Tambler, General Santos City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-30586.[2]
The deed of sale was not registered, nor was the title of the land transferred to
petitioner.[3]
On 07 December 1995, the said property was immediately declared by petitioner for
taxation purposes as Tax Declaration No. l6205 with the City Assessors Office. [4]
It came to pass that on 19 April 1996, spouses Candelario and Aurea Damalerio
(respondents) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City, a
complaint for a sum of money against spouses Lorenzo and Elenita Uy docketed as
Civil Case No. 5748 with application for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment.[5]
On 23 April 1996, the trial court issued a Writ of Preliminary Attachment by virtue of
which the property, then still in the name of Lorenzo Uy but which had already been sold
to petitioner, was levied. The levy was duly recorded in the Register of Deeds of
General Santos City and annotated upon TCT No. T-30586. [6]

On 06 June 1996, TCT No. T-30586 in the name of Lorenzo Uy was cancelled and,
in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-74439 was issued in the name of petitioner. [7] This new TCT
carried with it the attachment in favor of respondents.
On 14 August 1996, petitioner filed a third-party claim in Civil Case No. 5748 to
discharge or annul the attachment levied on the property covered by TCT No. T-74439
on the ground that the said property belongs to him and no longer to Lorenzo and
Elenita Uy.[8]
In a resolution dated 21 October 1996, the trial court ruled for the petitioner.
Citing Manliguez v. Court of Appeals[10] and Santos v. Bayhon,[11] it held that the levy of
the property by virtue of attachment is lawful only when the levied property indubitably
belongs to the defendant. Applying the rulings in the cited cases, it opined that although
defendant Lorenzo Uy remained the registered owner of the property attached, yet the
fact was that he was no longer the owner thereof as it was already sold earlier to
petitioner, hence, the writ of attachment was unlawful.
[9]

Respondents sought reconsideration thereof which was denied by the trial court in a
resolution dated 03 January 1997.[12]
From the unfavorable resolution of the trial court in the third-party claim,
respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the
resolution and by judgment promulgated on 25 September 1997, it declared that an
attachment or levy of execution, though posterior to the sale, but if registered before the
sale is registered, takes precedence over the sale. [13] The writ of attachment in favor of
the respondents, being recorded ahead of the sale to petitioner, will therefore take
precedence.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in
its Resolution of 10 February 1998.[14]
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
The sole issue in this case is whether or not a registered writ of attachment on the
land is a superior lien over that of an earlier unregistered deed of sale.
Petitioner maintains that he has a superior right over the questioned property
because when the same was attached on 23 April 1996, this property was no longer
owned by spouses Uy against whom attachment was issued as it was already sold to
petitioner on 05 December 1995. The ownership thereof was already transferred to
petitioner pursuant to Article 1477[15] in relation to Article 1498[16] of the Civil Code.

Dismissing the allegation that he slept on his rights by not immediately registering at
least an adverse claim based on his deed of sale, petitioner avers that he promptly
worked out for the transfer of registration in his name. The slight delay in the
registration, he claims was not due to his fault but attributable to the process involved in
the registration of property such as the issuance of the Department of Agrarian Reform
clearance which was effected only after compliance with several requirements.
Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in this case, petitioner
submits it would be in accord with justice and equity to declare him as having a superior
right to the disputed property than the respondents.
Respondents maintain the contrary view. They aver that registration of a deed of
sale is the operative act which binds the land and creates a lien thereon. Before the
registration of the deed, the property is not bound insofar as third persons are
concerned. Since the writ of attachment in favor of respondents was registered earlier
than the deed of sale to petitioner, respondents were of the belief that their registered
writ of attachment on the subject property enjoys preference and priority over
petitioners earlier unregistered deed of sale over the same property. They also contend
that Articles 1477 and 1498 of the Civil Code as cited by petitioner are not applicable to
the case because said provisions apply only as between the parties to the deed of sale.
These provisions do not apply to, nor bind, third parties, like respondents, because what
affects or binds third parties is the registration of the instrument in the Register of
Deeds. Furthermore, respondents argue that petitioner cannot invoke equity in his favor
unless the following conditions are met: (a) the absence of specific provision of a law on
the matter; and (b) if the person who invokes it is not guilty of delay. Both conditions
have not been met, however, since there is a law on the subject matter, i.e., Section 51
of Presidential Decree No. 1529, and that petitioner allegedly slept on his rights by not
immediately registering an adverse claim based on his deed of sale.
We agree with the respondents.
The law applicable to the facts of this case is Section 51 of P.D. No. 1529. Said
Section provides:
Sec. 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. - An owner of registered
land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge, or otherwise deal with the same in
accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or
other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or
other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land,
shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract

between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make
registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as
third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be
made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.
It is to be noted that though the subject land was deeded to petitioner as early as 05
December 1995, it was not until 06 June 1996 that the conveyance was registered, and,
during that interregnum, the land was subjected to a levy on attachment. It should also
be observed that, at the time of the attachment of the property on 23 April 1996, the
spouses Uy were still the registered owners of said property. Under the cited law, the
execution of the deed of sale in favor of petitioner was not enough as a succeeding step
had to be taken, which was the registration of the sale from the spouses Uy to him.
Insofar as third persons are concerned, what validly transfers or conveys a persons
interest in real property is the registration of the deed. Thus, when petitioner bought the
property on 05 December 1995, it was, at that point, no more than a private transaction
between him and the spouses Uy. It needed to be registered before it could bind third
parties, including respondents. When the registration finally took place on 06 June
1996, it was already too late because, by then, the levy in favor of respondents,
pursuant to the preliminary attachment ordered by the General Santos City RTC, had
already been annotated on the title.
The settled rule is that levy on attachment, duly registered, takes preference over a
prior unregistered sale.[17] This result is a necessary consequence of the fact that the
property involved was duly covered by the Torrens system which works under the
fundamental principle that registration is the operative act which gives validity to the
transfer or creates a lien upon the land. [18]
The preference created by the levy on attachment is not diminished even by the
subsequent registration of the prior sale. This is so because an attachment is a
proceeding in rem.[19] It is against the particular property, enforceable against the whole
world. The attaching creditor acquires a specific lien on the attached property which
nothing can subsequently destroy except the very dissolution of the attachment or levy
itself.[20] Such a proceeding, in effect, means that the property attached is an indebted
thing and a virtual condemnation of it to pay the owners debt. [21] The lien continues until
the debt is paid, or sale is had under execution issued on the judgment, or until the
judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in some manner
provided by law.

Thus, in the registry, the attachment in favor of respondents appeared in the nature
of a real lien when petitioner had his purchase recorded. The effect of the notation of
said lien was to subject and subordinate the right of petitioner, as purchaser, to the lien.
Petitioner acquired ownership of the land only from the date of the recording of his title
in the register, and the right of ownership which he inscribed was not absolute but a
limited right, subject to a prior registered lien of respondents, a right which is preferred
and superior to that of petitioner.[22]
Anent petitioners reliance on the rulings laid down in Manliguez v. Court of
Appeals and Santos v. Bayhon, we find the same to be misplaced. These cases did not
deal at all with the dilemma at hand, i.e. the question of whether or not a registered writ
of attachment on land is superior to that of an earlier unregistered deed of sale.
In Santos, what was involved were machinery and pieces of equipment which were
executed upon pursuant to the favorable ruling of the National Labor Relations
Commission. A third party claimed that the machinery were already sold to her, but it
does not appear in the facts of the case if such sale was ever registered. Manliguez is
similar toSantos, except that the former involved buildings and improvements on a piece
of land. To stress, in both cited cases, the registration of the sale, if any, of the subject
properties was never in issue.
As to petitioners invocation of equity, we cannot, at this instance, yield to such
principle in the presence of a law clearly applicable to the case. We reiterate that this
Court, while aware of its equity jurisdiction, is first and foremost, a court of law. [23] While
equity might tilt on the side of one party, the same cannot be enforced so as to overrule
positive provisions of law in favor of the other.[24] Equity cannot supplant or contravene
the law.[25] The rule must stand no matter how harsh it may seem. Dura lex sed lex.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
43082 dated 25 September 1997, and its Resolution dated 10 February 1998, are
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
RURAL BANK OF STA.
BARBARA
[PANGASINAN],
INC.,
Petitioner,
- versus -

G.R. No. 130223

Present:
CARPIO MORALES,* J.,
CHICO-NAZARIO,**
Acting Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

THE MANILA MISSION OF

THECHURCH OF JESUS
CHRIST OF
LATTER
DAY
Promulgated:
SAINTS, INC.,
Responden
August 19, 2009
t.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to set aside the Decision[1] dated 29 July 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 41042 affirming the Orders dated 9 October 1995 and 27 February 1996 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43, of Dagupan City, in Civil Case No. D-10583.
Spouses Tomas and Maria Soliven (spouses Soliven) were the registered
owners, under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-125213, of a parcel of land
located in Barangay Maninding, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan (subject property). On 18
May 1992, the spouses Soliven sold the subject property to respondent Manila Mission
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, Inc. (Manila Mission). However, it
was only on 28 April 1994 when TCT No. T-125213 in the name of the spouses Soliven
was cancelled, and TCT No. 195616 was issued in the name of respondent.
In the meantime, on 15 April 1993, petitioner Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara
(Pangasinan), Inc. filed with the RTC a Complaint against the spouses Soliven for a
sum of money, docketed as Civil Case No. D-10583. The Complaint of petitioner
included a prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment.
In an Order dated 7 May 1993, the RTC ordered the issuance of the Writ of
Attachment petitioner prayed for, to wit:

WHEREFORE, let a Writ of Attachment be issued against all the

properties of [Spouses Soliven] not exempt from execution or so much
thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the [herein petitioners] principal
claim of P338,000.00 upon filing of [petitioners] bond in the amount
of P100,000.00.[2]
Upon the filing by petitioner of the required bond, the RTC issued the Writ of
Attachment on 21 May 1993. Acting on the authority of said Writ, Sheriff Reynaldo C.
Daray attached the subject property, which was then still covered by TCT No. T-125213
in the name of the spouses Soliven. The Writ of Attachment was annotated on TCT No.
T-125213 on 24 May 1993. Thus, when TCT No. T-125213 of the spouses Soliven was
cancelled and TCT No. 195616 of petitioner was issued on 28 April 1994, the annotation
on the Writ of Attachment was carried from the former to the latter.
While Civil Case No. D-10583 was still pending before the RTC, respondent
executed an Affidavit claiming title and ownership over the subject property, and
requested the Ex-Officio Provincial and City Sheriff to release the said property from
attachment. The Sheriff, however, advised respondent to file a motion directly with the
RTC.
On 16 March 1995, respondent filed with the RTC, in Civil Case No. D-10583, a
Motion to Release Property from Attachment, to which petitioner, in turn, filed an
Opposition. After hearing, the RTC issued an Order on 9 October 1995discharging the
subject property from attachment. The RTC decreed in said Order:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby directs the Ex-Officio Provincial
Sheriff of Pangasinan and City Sheriff of Dagupan to discharge and
release the subject land from attachment and orders the notice of
attachment on T.C.T. No. 195616 of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan
be cancelled.[3]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 9 October 1995 Order of the
RTC, arguing that it had a better right over the subject property and that the filing by
respondent with the RTC, in Civil Case No. D-10583, of a Motion to Release Property
from Attachment, was the improper remedy. In an Order dated 27 February 1996, the
RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner for lack of merit.
On 12 April 1997, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with this Court, alleging
that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, in canceling the Writ of Attachment and ordering the release of the subject
property. The Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 124343. In a Resolution dated 27
May 1997, this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action.

The Court of Appeals docketed the Petition for Certiorari as CA-G.R. SP No.
41042. On 29 July 1997, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Decision dismissing
the Petition.
Hence, petitioner again comes before this Court via the present Petition for
Review, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC when the latter directed the release of the subject
property from attachment. Petitioner insists that it has a better right to the subject
property considering that: (1) the attachment of the subject property in favor of petitioner
was made prior to the registration of the sale of the same property to respondent; and
(2) respondent availed itself of the wrong remedy in filing with the RTC, in Civil Case
No. D-10583, a Motion to Release Property from Attachment. We shall discuss ahead
the second ground for the instant Petition, a matter of procedure, since its outcome will
determine whether we still need to address the first ground, on the substantive rights of
the parties to the subject property.
Propriety of the Motion to Release Property
from Attachment
According to petitioner, the Motion to Release Property from Attachment filed by
respondent before the RTC, in Civil Case No. D-10583, is not the proper remedy under
Section 14, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court,[4] which provides:
SEC. 14. Proceedings where property claimed by third person.
If the property attached is claimed by any person other than the party
against whom attachment had been issued or his agent, and such person
makes an affidavit of his title thereto, or right to the possession thereof,
stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves such affidavit upon the
sheriff while the latter has possession of the attached property, and a copy
thereof upon the attaching party, the sheriff shall not be bound to keep the
property under attachment, unless the attaching party or his agent, on
demand of the sheriff, shall file a bond approved by the court to indemnify
the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property
levied upon. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be
decided by the court issuing the writ of attachment. No claim for damages
for the taking or keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond
unless the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days
from the date of the filing of the bond.
The sheriff shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping
of such property, to any such third-party claimant, if such bond shall be
filed. Nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third
person from vindicating his claim to the property, or prevent the attaching
party from claiming damages against a third-party claimant who filed a
frivolous or plainly spurious claim, in the same or a separate action.

When the writ of attachment is issued in favor of the Republic of

the Philippines, or any officer duly representing it, the filing of such bond
shall not be required, and in case the sheriff is sued for damages as a
result of the attachment, he shall be represented by the Solicitor General,
and if held liable therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the court shall
be paid by the National Treasurer out of the funds to be appropriated for
the purpose.
Petitioner argues that, pursuant to the aforequoted section, the remedy of a third
person claiming to be the owner of an attached property are limited to the following: (1)
filing with the Sheriff a third-party claim, in the form of an affidavit, per the first paragraph
of Section 14; (2) intervening in the main action, with prior leave of court, per the second
paragraph of Section 14, which allows a third person to vindicate his/her claim to the
attached property in the same x x x action; and (3) filing a separate and independent
action, per the second paragraph of Section 14, which allows a third person to vindicate
his/her claim to the attached property in a separate action.
Respondent explains that it tried to pursue the first remedy, i.e., filing a thirdparty claim with the Sheriff. Respondent did file an Affidavit of Title and Ownership with
the Sheriff, but said officer advised respondent to file a motion directly with the RTC in
the main case. Respondent heeded the Sheriffs advice by filing with the RTC, in Civil
Case No. D-10583, a Motion to Release Property from Attachment. The Court of
Appeals recognized and allowed said Motion, construing the same as an invocation by
respondent of the power of control and supervision of the RTC over its officers, which
includes the Sheriff.
We agree with the Court of Appeals on this score. The filing by respondent of
the Motion to Release Property from Attachment was made on the advice of the Sheriff
upon whom respondent served its Affidavit of Title and Ownership. Respondent should
not be faulted for merely heeding the Sheriffs advice. Apparently, the Sheriff, instead of
acting upon the third-party claim of respondent on his own, would rather have some
direction from the RTC. Indeed, the Sheriff is an officer of the RTC and may be directed
by the said court to allow the third-party claim of respondent. Therefore, the filing of the
Motion in question can be deemed as a mere continuation of the third-party claim of
respondent, in the form of its Affidavit of Title and Ownership, served upon the Sheriff, in
accord with the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.
Alternatively, we may also consider the Motion to Release Property from
Attachment, filed by respondent before the RTC, as a Motion for Intervention in Civil
Case No. D-10583, pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 14, Rule 56, in relation
to Rule 19 of the Rules of Court. Respondent, to vindicate its claim to the subject
property, may intervene in the same case, i.e., Civil Case No. D-10583, instituted by
petitioner against the spouses Soliven, in which the said property was
attached. Respondent has the personality to intervene, as it is so situated as to be

adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the

court or of an officer thereof. [5] The RTC, in acting upon and granting the Motion to
Release Property from Attachment in its Order dated 9 October 1995, is deemed to
have allowed respondent to intervene in Civil Case No. D-10583.
Moreover, it may do petitioner well to remember that rules of procedure are
merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They were conceived and
promulgated to effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not
slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice,
courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that
on the balance, technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and not the other
way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than
promote justice, it is always within the power of the Court to suspend the rules, or
except a particular case from its operation. [6] Hence, even if the Motion to Release
Property from Attachment does not strictly comply with Section 14, Rule 56 of the Rules
of Court, the RTC may still allow and act upon said Motion to render substantive justice.
This leads us to the substantive issue in this case, on which between the two
transactions should be given priority: the previous yet unregistered sale of the subject
property by the spouses Soliven to respondent, or the subsequent but duly annotated
attachment of the same property by petitioner.
Previous yet unregistered sale versus
subsequent but duly annotated attachment
Petitioner does not dispute the allegation of respondent that the subject property
was sold by the spouses Soliven to respondent on 18 May 1992, before petitioner
instituted Civil Case No. D-10583 against the spouses Soliven on 15 April 1993; the
RTC ordered the issuance of the Writ of Attachment on 7 May 1993; and the attachment
of the subject property pursuant to the Writ on 27 May 1993.
Neither did petitioner offer evidence to counter the following documents
presented by respondent establishing the fact of the sale of the subject property to the
latter by the spouses Soliven: (1) the notarized Deed of Sale dated 18 May 1992; (2)
BPI Managers Check No. 010685 dated 8 May 1992 in the sum of P42,500.00 to
represent the tender of payment of capital gains tax; (3) BIR Official Receipt No.
0431320 dated 18 May 1992 of BPI Check No. 010625 for the payment of the sum
of P8,5000.00; and (4) a letter dated 11 August 1992 of Manila Missions former
counsel, Lim Duran & Associates, to the Revenue District Officer, District 7, Bureau of
Internal Revenue, relative to its request for the reconsideration/condonation of the
assessment of the capital gains tax on its purchase of the subject property.
Petitioner, however, invokes jurisprudence wherein this Court in a number of
instances allegedly upheld a subsequent but duly annotated attachment, as opposed to

a previous yet unregistered sale of the same property. Petitioner particularly calls our
attention to the following paragraph in Ruiz, Sr. v. Court of Appeals[7]:
[I]n case of a conflict between a vendee and an attaching creditor, an
attaching creditor who registers the order of attachment and the sale of
the property to him as the highest bidder acquires a valid title to the
property, as against a vendee who had previously bought the same
property from the registered owner but who failed to register his deed of
sale. This is because registration is the operative act that binds or affects
the land insofar as third persons are concerned. It is upon registration that
there is notice to the whole world.
In the more recent case Valdevieso v. Damalerio,[8] we have expounded on our
foregoing pronouncement in Ruiz.
On 5 December 1995, therein petitioner Bernardo Valdevieso (Valdevieso)
bought a parcel of land from spouses Lorenzo and Elenita Uy (spouses Uy), the
registered owners thereof. On 19 April 1996, therein respondents, spouses Candelario
and Aurea Damalerio (spouses Damalario), filed a Complaint against the spouses Uy
for a sum of money before the RTC of General Santos City. On 23 April 1996, the RTC
issued a Writ of Preliminary Attachment by virtue of which the subject parcel of land was
levied. The levy was duly recorded in the Register of Deeds, and annotated on the TCT
of the spouses Uy over the subject parcel of land. It was only on 6 June 1996 that the
TCT in the name of the spouses Uy was cancelled, and a new one issued in the name
of Valdevieso. As in the case at bar, the annotation on the attachment was carried over
to Valdeviesos TCT. Valdevieso filed a third-party claim before the RTC seeking to
annul the attachment. In a resolution, the RTC ruled in Valdeviesos favor, but the Court
of Appeals reversed said RTC resolution. On appeal, we adjudged:
The sole issue in this case is whether or not a registered writ of
attachment on the land is a superior lien over that of an earlier
unregistered deed of sale.
xxxx
The settled rule is that levy on attachment, duly registered, takes
preference over a prior unregistered sale. This result is a necessary
consequence of the fact that the property involved was duly covered by
the Torrens system which works under the fundamental principle that
registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or
creates a lien upon the land.
The preference created by the levy on attachment is not diminished
even by the subsequent registration of the prior sale. This is so because
an attachment is a proceeding in rem. It is against the particular property,

enforceable against the whole world. The attaching creditor acquires a

specific lien on the attached property which nothing can subsequently
destroy except the very dissolution of the attachment or levy itself. Such a
proceeding, in effect, means that the property attached is an indebted
thing and a virtual condemnation of it to pay the owners debt. The lien
continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had under execution issued on
the judgment, or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment
discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law.
Thus, in the registry, the attachment in favor of respondents
appeared in the nature of a real lien when petitioner had his purchase
recorded. The effect of the notation of said lien was to subject and
subordinate the right of petitioner, as purchaser, to the lien. Petitioner
acquired ownership of the land only from the date of the recording of his
title in the register, and the right of ownership which he inscribed was not
absolute but a limited right, subject to a prior registered lien of
respondents, a right which is preferred and superior to that of petitioner.[9]
It is settled, therefore, that a duly registered levy on attachment takes preference
over a prior unregistered sale.
Nonetheless, respondent argues that there is a special circumstance in the case
at bar, which should be deemed a constructive registration of the sale of the subject
property in its favor, preceding the attachment of the same property by petitioner.
Knowledge of previous yet unregistered
sale
In Ruiz, the very case cited by petitioner, we made a qualification of the general
rule that a duly annotated attachment is superior to an unregistered prior sale. In fact,
we resolved Ruiz in favor of the vendee in the unregistered prior sale, because
knowledge of the unregistered sale by the attaching creditor is deemed equivalent to
registration. We explained in Ruiz:
But where a party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which
is unregistered at that time he acquired a right to the same land,his
knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of
registration as to him. Knowledge of an unregistered sale is equivalent
to registration. As held in Fernandez v. Court of Appeals [189 SCRA 780
(1990)],
Section 50 of Act No. 496 (now Sec. 51 of P.D. 1529),
provides that the registration of the deed is the operative act
to bind or affect the land insofar as third persons are

concerned. But where the party has knowledge of a prior

existing interest which is unregistered at the time he
acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior
unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to
him. The torrens system cannot be used as a shield for the
commission of fraud (Gustillo v. Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442). As
far as private respondent Zenaida Angeles and her husband
Justiniano are concerned, the non-registration of the affidavit
admitting their sale of a portion of 110 square meters of the
subject land to petitioners cannot be invoked as a defense
because (K)nowledge of an unregistered sale is equivalent
to registration (Winkleman v. Veluz, 43 Phil. 604).
This knowledge of the conveyance to Honorato Hong can not be
denied. The records disclose that after the sale, private respondent was
able to introduce improvements on the land such as a concrete two-door
commercial building, a concrete fence around the property, concrete floor
of the whole area and G.I. roofing. Acts of ownership and possession
were exercised by the private respondent over the land. By these overt
acts, it can not therefore be gainsaid that petitioner was not aware that
private respondent had a prior existing interest over the land. [10]
In the case at bar, respondent averred in its Motion to Release Property from
Attachment that the construction of a church edifice on the subject property was about
to be finished at the time the Writ of Preliminary Attachment was implemented on 24
May 1993, and that the construction of the church was actually completed by mid1993. Respondent asserts that since petitioner did not deny these allegations, much
less adduce evidence to the contrary, then the latter tacitly recognized the construction
of the church.
Petitioner contends, on the other hand, that respondent failed to present
evidence to prove the fact that a church had already been constructed on the subject
property by the time the said property was attached, thus, constituting notice to
petitioner of the claim or right of respondent to the same.
Was there, at the time of the attachment, knowledge on the part of petitioner
Rural Bank of the interest of respondent Manila Mission on the subject property?
If the allegation of respondent Manila Mission anent the building of the chapel
even before the issuance of the writ of attachment is true, this case would be similar
to Ruiz where the vendee of the subject property was able to introduce
improvements. However, respondent Manila Mission presented no evidence of the
building of the chapel other than its bare allegation thereof. More importantly, even
assuming for the sake of argument that the chapel was indeed being built at the time of
the attachment of the property, we cannot simply apply Ruiz and conclude that this
confirms knowledge of a previous conveyance of the property at that time. In Ruiz, the
attaching party was the wife of the vendor of the subject property, whom she sued for
support. It was thus very probable that she knew of the sale of the property to the

vendee therein, considering that the vendee had already introduced improvements
thereon. In the case at bar, there is no special relationship between petitioner Rural
Bank and the spouses Soliven sufficient to charge the former with an implied knowledge
of the state of the latters properties. Unlike in the sale of real property, an attaching
creditor is not expected to inspect the property being attached, as it is the sheriff who
does the actual act of attaching the property.
Neither did respondent Manila Mission present any evidence of knowledge on
the part of petitioner Rural Bank of the prior existing interest of the former at the time of
the attachment. Respondent Manila Mission merely argues that there was a tacit
recognition on the part of petitioner Rural Bank of the construction of the chapel when
the latter did not deny this allegation in its Opposition to the Motion to Discharge
Property from Attachment.
The Motion, however, merely mentions the construction of the chapel and does
not charge petitioner Rural Bank with knowledge of the construction. There was,
therefore, nothing to deny on the part of petitioner Rural Bank, as the mere existence of
such construction at that time would not affect the right of petitioner Rural Bank to its
lien over the subject property. Also, the mention in the Motion of the construction of the
chapel would have the effect of being a notice of an adverse third-party claim only at the
time of such Motion. Since such notice, which was deemed in Ruiz as constructive
registration of the sale, was effected onlyafter the attachment of the subject property, it
could not affect the validity of the attachment lien.
In sum, our decisions in Ruiz v. Court of Appeals and Valdevieso v.
Damalerio oblige us to rule that the duly registered levy on attachment by petitioner
Rural Bank takes preference over the prior but then unregistered sale of respondent
Manila Mission. There was likewise no evidence of knowledge on the part of petitioner
Rural Bank of any third-party interest in the subject property at the time of the
attachment. We are, therefore, constrained to grant the instant Petition for Review and
nullify the Orders of the RTC discharging the subject property from attachment.
Nevertheless, respondent Manila Mission would not be left without remedy. It
could file a counter-bond pursuant to Section 12, Rule 57 [11] of the Rules of Court in
order to discharge the attachment. If respondent Manila Mission fails to do the same
and the property ends up being subjected to execution, respondent can redeem the
property and seek reimbursement from the spouses Soliven.
WHEREFORE,
the
instant
Petition
for
Review
on Certiorari is
hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 29 July 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R.
SP
No.
41042
affirming
the
Orders
of
the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City dated 9 October 1995 and 27 February
1996 issued in Civil Case No. D-10583 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-27587 February 18, 1970

AMADO CARUMBA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SANTIAGO BALBUENA and ANGELES BOAQUIA as
Deputy Provincial Sheriff,respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Amado Carumba petitions this Supreme Court for a certiorari to review a decision of the
Court of Appeals, rendered in its Case No. 36094-R, that reversed the judgment in his
favor rendered by the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur (Civil Case 4646).
The factual background and history of these proceedings is thus stated by the Court of
Appeals (pages 1-2):
On April 12, 1955, the spouses Amado Canuto and Nemesia Ibasco, by
virtue of a "Deed of Sale of Unregistered Land with Covenants of
Warranty" (Exh. A), sold a parcel of land, partly residential and partly
coconut land with a periphery (area) of 359.09 square meters, more or
less, located in the barrio of Santo Domingo, Iriga, Camarines Sur, to the
spouses Amado Carumba and Benita Canuto, for the sum of P350.00.
The referred deed of sale was never registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur, and the Notary, Mr. Vicente Malaya,
was not then an authorized notary public in the place, as shown by Exh. 5.
Besides, it has been expressly admitted by appellee that he is the brotherin-law of Amado Canuto, the alleged vendor of the property sold to him.
Amado Canuto is the older brother of the wife of the herein appellee,
Amado Carumba.
On January 21, 1957, a complaint (Exh. B) for a sum or money was filed
by Santiago Balbuena against Amado Canuto and Nemesia Ibasco before
the Justice of the Peace Court of Iriga, Camarines Sur, known as Civil
Case No. 139 and on April 15, 1967, a decision (Exh. C) was rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants. On October 1, 1968,
the ex-officioSheriff, Justo V. Imperial, of Camarines Sur, issued a
"Definite Deed of Sale (Exh. D) of the property now in question in favor of
Santiago Balbuena, which instrument of sale was registered before the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur, on October 3, 1958.
The aforesaid property was declared for taxation purposes (Exh. 1) in the
name of Santiago Balbuena in 1958.

The Court of First instance, finding that after execution of the document Carumba had
taken possession of the land, planting bananas, coffee and other vegetables thereon,
declared him to be the owner of the property under a consummated sale; held void the
execution levy made by the sheriff, pursuant to a judgment against Carumba's vendor,
Amado Canuto; and nullified the sale in favor of the judgment creditor, Santiago
Balbuena. The Court, therefore, declared Carumba the owner of the litigated property
and ordered Balbuena to pay P30.00, as damages, plus the costs.
The Court of Appeals, without altering the findings of fact made by the court of origin,
declared that there having been a double sale of the land subject of the suit Balbuena's
title was superior to that of his adversary under Article 1544 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, since the execution sale had been properly registered in good faith and the
sale to Carumba was not recorded.
We disagree. While under the invoked Article 1544 registration in good faith prevails
over possession in the event of a double sale by the vendor of the same piece of land to
different vendees, said article is of no application to the case at bar, even if Balbuena,
the later vendee, was ignorant of the prior sale made by his judgment debtor in favor of
petitioner Carumba. The reason is that the purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriff's
execution sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor, and merely acquires
the latter's interest in the property sold as of the time the property was levied upon. This
is specifically provided by section 35 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
second paragraph of said section specifically providing that:
Upon the execution and delivery of said (final) deed the purchaser,
redemptioner, or his assignee shall be substituted to and acquire all the
right, title, interest, and claim of the judgment debtor to the property as of
the time of the levy, except as against the judgment debtor in possession,
in which case the substitution shall be effective as of the time of the
deed ... (Emphasis supplied)
While the time of the levy does not clearly appear, it could not have been made prior to
15 April 1957, when the decision against the former owners of the land was rendered in
favor of Balbuena. But the deed of sale in favor of Canuto had been executed two years
before, on 12 April 1955, and while only embodied in a private document, the same,
coupled with the fact that the buyer (petitioner Carumba) had taken possession of the
unregistered land sold, sufficed to vest ownership on the said buyer. When the levy was
made by the Sheriff, therefore, the judgment debtor no longer had dominical interest nor
any real right over the land that could pass to the purchaser at the execution
sale.1 Hence, the latter must yield the land to petitioner Carumba. The rule is different in
case of lands covered by Torrens titles, where the prior sale is neither recorded nor

known to the execution purchaser prior to the levy; 2but the land here in question is
admittedly not registered under Act No. 496.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the Court of
First Instance affirmed. Costs against respondent Santiago Balbuena.

FIRST DIVISION
THE PHILIPPINE COTTON
CORPORATION,
Petitioner-Appellant,

G.R. No. 130389

Present:

- versus -

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
LEONARDO- DE CASTRO, JJ.

NARAINDAS GAGOOMAL and

ENGRACIO ANG,
Respondents-Appellees,
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION,
Intervenor-Appellee.

Promulgated:
February 11, 2008

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) promulgated on August 29, 1997 in CA-G.R. CV No. 50332.
The facts of record would indicate that Pacific Mills, Inc. (Pacific Mills) originally
owned five parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 136640,
136441, 222370 and 134249. These properties were subsequently purchased by
respondents on an installment basis from Pacific Mills on July 19, 1979.[3]

On June 23, 1983, petitioner filed a collection case against Pacific Mills before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Branch 162 on the ground of alleged failure to
fulfill its obligation under a contract of loan. After hearing, the trial court issued a writ of
preliminary attachment in favor of petitioner. Thereafter, on August 17, 1983, the writ of
preliminary attachment was annotated on TCT Nos. 136640, 136441, 222370 and
134249.
On December 27, 1985, the RTC of Pasig rendered a decision ordering Pacific
Mills to pay its obligation under the loan agreement plus interest, penalty charges,
attorneys fees and costs of suit. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Not satisfied with the judgment of the appellate court, Pacific Mills filed a petition
for review before this Court.
During the pendency of the appeal or on June 11, 1988, the Quezon City
Hall was razed by fire thereby destroying the records of the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City, including the TCTs of Pacific Mills.
Sometime in 1992, Pacific Mills filed a petition for reconstitution of the burned
TCTs through administrative reconstitution, in accordance with Republic Act No. 6732.
[4]
On March 23, 1992, the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City issued to Pacific Mills the
reconstituted TCTs, namely: No. RT-55702 (for TCT No. 136640), No. RT-55704 (for
TCT No. 134249), No. RT-55703 (for TCT No. 136441) and No. RT-55705 (for TCT No.
222370). However, the aforesaid alleged annotations of the preliminary attachment in
favor of petitioner were not incorporated in the reconstituted TCTs, but annotated
therein was the sale made by Pacific Mills to respondents and their payment in full. On
even date, the reconstituted TCTs were cancelled in favor of the respondents.
Respondents were given the following clean TCT Nos. 56683[5] (for RT-55703),
56684[6] (for RT-55702), 56685[7] (for RT-55704) and 56686[8] (for RT-55705).
On February 8, 1993, petitioner wrote the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City
requesting for the annotation of the notice of levy, and, subsequently, the annotation of a
favorable decision of this Court rendered on August 3, 1992, on the new TCTs issued to
respondents.
On February 10, 1993, Samuel C. Cleofe, the Quezon City Register of Deeds,
informed respondents that the letter-request for re-annotation of notice of levy had been
entered in the Primary Entry Book 574/Volume 24, and asked them to surrender their
owners duplicate copies of TCT Nos. 56683 to 56686. [9]
Immediately upon receipt of the said letter, respondents verified the original
copies of titles in the possession of the Registry of Deeds and discovered that the
following annotations were included at the back of the titles: Request for Re-Annotation
of Notice of Levy and Letter Request for Annotation of Entry of Judgment of Supreme
Court.

Thereafter, respondents filed on March 3, 1993, a Petition for the Cancellation of

Annotations in Land Titles before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 100, docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-6056(93). Later on, petitioner was impleaded as an additional
respondent, while China Banking Corporation filed a complaint-in-intervention for being
a mortgagee of the real properties, together with all the improvements thereon.
On March 29, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises above considered, there being no
justification for the Quezon City Register of Deeds in making the
annotation on petitioners original TCT Nos. 56683 (RT-55703), 56684
(RT-55702), 56685 (RT-55748) and 56686 (RT-55705), said respondent
is hereby ordered to DELETE therefrom the said annotation request for
annotation and the annotated Supreme Court decision against the Pacific
Mills, Inc. and to desist from its request for petitioners to submit their
owners duplicate of titles to annotate such request of the Philippine
Cotton Corporation.
There being no justiciable issue in the complaint-in-intervention,
let the annotations of a mortgage executed by petitioners on December
18, 1992 in favor of intervenor China Banking Corporation remain on
petitioners subject TCTs.
SO ORDERED.[10]
The trial court ratiocinated that:
Under the circumstances, respondent [the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City] should and could have properly refused such request
instead of immediately annotating it. In the same light, The Register of
Deeds may likewise properly refuse registration of an order
attachment when it appears that the title involved is not in the name of
the defendant and there is no evidence submitted to indicate that the said
defendant has any present or future interest in the property covered by
the titles. (Gotauco vs. Register of Deeds of Tayabas, 59 Phil. 756, 1934
and Geonanga vs. Hodges, 55 O.G. p. 2891, April 21, 1958).
(Underscoring Supplied)[11]
Unsatisfied with the outcome of the case, petitioner filed a notice of appeal
before the CA, contending that:
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY HAS THE AUTHORITY
TO RE-ANNOTATE THE NOTICE OF LEVY AND TO ANNOTATE THE
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT ON TRANSFER
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE NOS. 56683, 56684, 56685 AND 56686, ALL

ISSUED IN THE NAME OF THE PETITIONERS-APPELLEES AS A

RESULT OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE RECONSTITUTION OF TITLES. [12]
In its August 29, 1997 decision, the appellate court dismissed the appeal
because the issue raised by the petitioner was a pure question of law, over which the
CA had no jurisdiction.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner presents the following assignment of errors:
FIRST ERROR
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING THE AUTHORITY
OF THE QUEZON CITY REGISTER OF DEEDS TO VALIDLY REANNOTATE THE INCUMBRANCE/LIENS AND ANNOTATE THE
SUPREME COURT DECISION ON THE ADMINISTRATIVELY
RECONSTITUTED TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLES (TCTs) IN
FAVOR OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT.
SECOND ERROR
THE LOWER COURT, IN CONSEQUENCE THEREOF, LIKEWISE
ERRED IN ORDERING THE QUEZON CITY REGISTER OF DEEDS TO
DELETE THE ANNOTATION THAT READS: REQUEST FOR
ANNOTATION AND THE ANNOTATED SUPREME COURT DECISION
AGAINST PACIFIC MILLS, INC., FROM PETITIONERS ORIGINAL TCT
NOS. 96683 [sic] (RT-55703), 56684 (RT-55702), 56685 (RT-55748) AND
56686 (RT-55705) AND TO DESIST FROM REQUESTING
RESPONDENTS/APPELLEES
TO
SUBMIT
THEIR
OWNERS
DUPLICATE OF TITLES FOR ANNOTATION OF PETITIONER
PHILIPPINE COTTON CORPORATIONS REQUEST.[13]
Petitioner asserts that a cursory reading of Section 71 of Presidential Decree No.
1529 shows that it is the ministerial duty of the Register of Deeds, in the matter of an
attachment or other liens in the nature of involuntary dealing in registered land, to send
notice by mail to a registered owner requesting him to produce his duplicate certificate
so that a memorandum of attachment or other lien may be made thereon. This
provision, according to petitioner, actually applies whenever a writ of attachment has
been issued by a court of competent jurisdiction after hearing on the issuance of the
said writ. The notice of attachment not having been dissolved, it was ministerial on the
part of the Register of Deeds to record the notice on the TCTs he issued.

Petitioner would persuade this Court that it is the ministerial duty of the Register
of Deeds to record any encumbrance or lien on respondents existing TCTs. It cites, as
proof of its supposition, Sections 10 and 71 of the Property Registration Decree (P.D.
No. 1529), which are quoted as follows:
Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. The office
of the Register of Deeds constitutes a public repository of records of
instruments affecting registered or unregistered lands and chattel
mortgages in the province or city wherein such office is situated.
It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately
register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or
personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration.
He shall see to it that said instrument bears the proper documentary and
science stamps and that the same are properly cancelled. If the
instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof
and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or
reason therefor, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in
accordance with Section 117 of this Decree.
xxx
Section 71. Surrender of certificate in involuntary dealings. If an
attachment or other lien in the nature of involuntary dealing in registered
land is registered, and the duplicate certificate is not presented at the
time of registration, the Register of Deeds, shall, within thirty-six hours
thereafter, send notice by mail to the registered owner, stating that such
paper has been registered, and requesting him to send or produce his
duplicate certificate so that a memorandum of the attachment or other
lien may be made thereon. If the owner neglects or refuses to comply
within a reasonable time, the Register of Deeds shall report the matter to
the court, and it shall, after notice, enter an order to the owner to produce
his certificate at a time and place named therein, and may enforce the
order by suitable process. (Underscoring supplied)
The Court is not in accord with the stance of petitioner. Section 10 of P.D. No.
1529 merely involves the general functions of the Register of Deeds, while Section 71
thereof relates to an attachment or lien in a registered land in which the duplicate
certificate was not presented at the time of the registration of the said lien or
attachment.
A special law specifically deals with the procedure for the reconstitution
of Torrens certificates of title lost or destroyed. Under Section 4 of Act No. 26: [14]

Liens and other encumbrances affecting a destroyed or lost

certificate of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources
hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:
(a)

Annotations or memoranda appearing on the owners,

co-owners, mortgagees or lessees duplicate;

(b)

Registered documents on file in the registry of deeds,

or authenticated copies thereof showing that the originals
thereof had been registered; and

(c)

Any other document which, in the judgment of the

court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the
liens or encumbrances affecting the property covered by the
lost or destroyed certificate of title. (Underscoring supplied)

Furthermore, Sections 8 and 11 of the same Act provide for the procedure for the
notation of an interest that did not appear in the reconstituted certificate of title,
mandating that a petition be filed before a court of competent jurisdiction:
Section 8. Any person whose right or interest was duly noted in
the original of a certificate of title, at the time it was lost or destroyed, but
does not appear so noted on the reconstituted certificate of title, which is
subject to the reservation provided in the preceding section, may, while
such reservation subsists, file a petition with the proper Court of First
Instance for the annotation of such right or interest on said reconstituted
certificate of title, and the court, after notice and hearing, shall determine
the merits of the petition and render such judgment as justice and equity
may require. The petition shall state the number of the reconstituted
certificate of title and the nature, as well as a description, of the right or
interest claimed. (Underscoring supplied)
xxx
Section 11. Petitions for reconstitution of registered interests, liens
and other encumbrances, based on sources enumerated in sections 4(b)
and/or 4(c) of this Act, shall be filed, by the interested party, with the
proper Court of First Instance. The petition shall be accompanied with the
necessary documents and shall state, among other things, the number of
the certificate of title and the nature as well as a description of the
interest, lien or encumbrance which is to be reconstituted, and the court,
after publication, in the manner stated in section nine of this Act, and
hearing shall determine the merits of the petition and render such
judgment as justice and equity may require. (Underscoring supplied)

Clearly, therefore, it is not the ministerial function of the Register of Deeds to

record a right or an interest that was not duly noted in the reconstituted certificate of
title. As a matter of fact, this task is not even within the ambit of the Register of Deeds
job as the responsibility is lodged by law to the proper courts. The foregoing quoted
provisions of the law leave no question nor any doubt that it is indeed the duty of the
trial court to determine the merits of the petition and render judgment as justice and
equity may require.
This conclusion is bolstered by Chapter X, [15] Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529, which
provides:
Sec. 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. No
erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the
registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a
memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same by the
Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First
Instance. A registered owner or other person having an interest in
registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with
the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply
by petition to the court upon the ground that the registered interests
of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant inchoate
appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new
interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been
created; or that an omission or error was made in entering the
certificate or any memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate
certificate; or that the name of any person on the certificate has been
changed; or that the registered owner has married, or, if registered as
married, that the marriage has been terminated and no right or interest of
heirs or creditors will thereby be affected, or that a corporation which
owned registered land and has been dissolved has not yet conveyed the
same within three years after its dissolution; or upon any other
reasonable ground; and the court may hear and determine the petition
after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or
cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a
memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such
terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may
consider proper: Provided, however, That this section shall not be
construed to give the court authority to reopen the judgment or decree of
registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court
which shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a
certificate for value and in good faith, or his heirs and assigns, without
his or their written consent. Where the owners duplicate certificate is not
presented, a similar petition may be filed as provided in the preceding
section,

All petitions or motions filed under this section as well as under

any other provision of this Decree after original registration shall be filed
and entitled in the original case in which the decree or registration was
entered. (Underscoring supplied)
The courts intervention in the amendment of the registration book after the entry
of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon is categorically stated in the
Property Registration Decree and cannot be denied by the mere allegations of
petitioner. Hence, the contentions that the Register of Deeds may validly re-annotate
the incumbrance/liens and annotate the Supreme Court decision on the administratively
reconstituted transfer certificates of titles (TCTs) have no basis in law and
jurisprudence.
Petitioner further submits that the issuance of the TCTs to respondents is
fraudulent. It suggests that under Sections 69 and 73 of P.D. No. 1529, any person
whose interest does not appear on a reconstituted title may file a request directly with
the Register of Deeds.
As correctly observed by respondents, P.D. No. 1529 principally pertains to the
registration of property, while R.A. No. 26 is a special law on the procedure for the
reconstitution of Torrens certificates of title that were lost or destroyed. Specifically,
Section 69[16] of P.D. No. 1529 refers to an attachment that arose after the issuance of a
certificate of title; while Section 71[17] of the same law pertains to the registration of the
order of a court of an attachment that was continued, reduced, dissolved or otherwise
affected by a judgment of the court. Undoubtedly, the foregoing provisions find no
application in the present case since petitioner insists that its interest was
annotated prior to the reconstitution of the disputed certificates of title.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 50332, dated August 29, 1997, and the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, in Civil Case No. Q-6056(93), [18] are
herebyAFFIRMED.