Kemalism and Post-Kemalism. Turkish State in Search of Palatable Citizen Forever

TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 5 No.
2 Winter 2014
Kemalism and Post-Kemalism:

Turkish State in Search of Palatable Citizen
Forever
Sevgi Kuru Akgz
Fatih University, sevgiku@gmail.com
Abstract
Homo-LASTus was the constructed palatable citizen model of Kemalist tutelary regime. It did
not include all the segments in the society. Identities exclusion was implemented in several ways.
The exclusion of Turkeys identities from Turkeys political system has been an obstacle on Turkish
democratic consolidation. AKPs emergence to power flourished the expectation of Turkey becoming more democratic and embracing all its citizens equally. However, after a decade of AKP rule,
Turkey seemed to enter a post-Kemalist tutelary era which has its own criteria for the palatable
citizen and which, just like Kemalism, tries to exclude and oppress some parts of the society. Either
Kemalist or post-Kemalist Islamist, it seems that the states reflex to shape the citizen identity
does not alter for Turkey.
Keywords
Kemalism, Post-Kemalism, Identity, AKP, Homo-LASTus.
33
TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 5 No. 2 Winter 2014
Introduction
Each nation-state came up with certain
values that constructed its identity. The
identity of Turkish republic was defined
through Kemalism, Turkish nationalism
and Lausannian Islam which gave birth to
the palatable citizen, Homo-LASTus. It is
important to define the building blocks of
this identity since some ethnic and religious
groups in the country were excluded from
Homo-LASTus. The first part of the paper
will give a definition of Homo-LASTus and
seek to explain the history of this identity
and how it was constructed through judicial,
social, political instruments.
The modern Turkey inherited the territories of the Ottoman Empire, the Anatolia and eastern Thrace. These territories
were hosting divergent ethnic and religious
identities. Beside the Sunni Turks, there
were Armenians, Greeks, Jews, Alevites and
Kurds in the region. The second part of the
paper will try to focus on the fate of these
identities during and after the formation
of Homo-LASTus. Another focus will be on
practising Muslim population who preferred
to put Islam on the centre of their social life
but were constrained with the establishment of the secular Republic.
With the experience of AKP rule in 2002,
Homo- LASTus began to lose its importance,
while the identities which were vilified, oppressed, ignored throughout the Republican era, started to be more visible and relatively tolerable. This visibility and tolerance
had firstly been regarded as a step towards
democratization. Therefore, different segments of the society that personally did not
share the way of life of the AKP rulers, gave
support to the party for the sake of more
democratization. With a continuous and increasing support from different segments of
the society, AKP managed to overcome the
34
tutelary regime of Kemalism; some indicative incidents in this struggle were the 27
April e-memorandum, the Sledgehammer
and Ergenekon trials and the referendum
for a new Constitution in 2010. The period
from 2002 to 2010 can be marked as an era
in which Kemalism got weakened and the
state took some steps to normalize its relation with the identities that were excluded
previously.

In 2011 general elections AKP took
49.9% of the votes in Turkey. The party which
had already been criticized for one man authoritative behaviour, began to intense its
majoritarian policies and regulations. The
education system was changed in such a way
that the only state secondary school alternative to the regular secondary school became
the imam-hatip schools which aimed to raise
imams and preachers in the country. No other profession, science or language based secondary schools were promoted in the 4+4+4
system. Erdoan repeatedly declared that
AKPs aim was to raise a pious generation.
While some progressive negotiation had
seemingly been taking place with the Kurds,
the government could not come to compromise with the Alevis demands in the country. Polarization and ideational- political
exclusion intensified with the Gezi incidents
of June 2013, the regulation of prep-schools
closure and lastly the corruption probes of
December 2013. Each of these topics could
be a paper on their own. This paper is just a
brief comparison of two identity imposition
periods of Turkish republic; the Kemalist
tutelary, the transition, the post Kemalist
tutelary.
The First Steps of A New Nation

in the Late Ottoman Times
The building blocks of Homo-LASTus
can be rooted back to the late Ottoman pe-
riod. The first interaction of the empire with

nationalism was through uprises in Balkan
territories. The populations demanded autonomy and insurrection mainly due to the
abuses of local Muslim landowners and the
janissaries.1 Nationalism has flourished in
the nineteenth century throughout the Empire (including the Asiatic provinces) and
proved to be the most important factor for
destruction of the Empire (Zrcher 2007:
26). Competing ideological debates were
brought up by the Ottoman elites in order
to cope with this destruction. Some people
favored Ottomanism, which supported that
different communities could unite around
the Ottoman throne. Pan Islamists argued,
on the other hand, that the empire could
regenerate on the basis of Islamic practises
and solidarity could be maintained within
the Islamic mmet (Community), whereas pan Turks sought to the union of Turkic
people under the Ottoman Empire (Zrcher
2007: 127) .
I.A. Turkish Nationalism before

the Republic
Turkish had already become the states
official language in 1876 Constitution. But
it was after the Second Constitutional Period in 1908 that Turkish nationalism became
publicly more visible under the rule of Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) (lker
2005: 617).
Actually the official ideology of 1908
was Ottomanism. The new constitutional
state was expected to promote equal rights
to all loyal citizens regardless of their ethnic
or religious differences. However in 1912,
1 The uprises began in Serbia in 1808. It was not

a coincidence that the movements leader was a rich pig
exporter called Kara George. (see details in Zrcher,
2007: 26. )
the Balkan War took place upon which the

Empire lost its richest and most developed
provinces (Macedonia, Albania, Thrace)
which it used to hold for 500 years. Numerically the loss was 60 000 square miles
with about 4 million inhabitants. After this
event, first time in Ottoman history, Turks
became the majority ethnic group in the remaining country (Zrcher 2007: 109). Especially the loss of Albania made the CUP (the
Young Turks) conclude that Ottomanism
would not be capable to unite the empire
(Ibid.: 130). Under these circumstances, the
Young Turks turned their face more towards
Turkification.
Turkification has been implemented
in several areas. One of the most important issues was the nationalization of the
economy. The national economy was to be
led by the Muslim- Turk bourgeoisie. This
bourgeoisie, in the end, should supplant the
dominance of Armenian and Greek commercial classes. The Language Reform of 1915
prohibited the use of foreign languages in
economic transactions. Non- Muslim traders were boycotted. The locals non- Turkish
names were replaced by Turkish names (lker 2005: 622-624).
Another important implementation of
Turkification was the settlement and forced
migration policies. The aim of this policy was
to purify the demographic structure of Anatolia in favour of the Muslim Turks. A population exchange was formulated in the treaty
signed after the second Balkan War. Upon
this formulation, in 1913 and 1914, more
than 45 000 Muslims from Bulgaria came to
the Empire and more than 45 000 Bulgarians
migrated from the Empire to Bulgaria. The
CUP suggested a similar agreement also to
Greece. In order to force the Greek government to consent population exchange, the
CUP immediately started to drive forcefully
the Greek population of Thrace and Aegean
35
coast to interior parts of Anatolia. Shortly after, the Greek government announced
that population exchange could take place
voluntarily and simultaneously, but the Ottoman Empire entered WWI and the negotiations were suspended. Before and during
WWI, about 435 000 Muslim immigrants
entered the Ottoman territory. These were
mainly settled to the villages of non- Muslim
populations, especially of the Greeks (Ibid.:
625). In May 1915 the CUP passed a law regulating the relocation of the groups which
were seen as potential traitors. Many Armenians died during these deportations due to
disease, starvation, plunder of bandit.2 As a
result of this policy, about at least 700,000
Armenians and 500,000 Greeks were forced
to leave their homes and hometowns.
The deportation policy was implemented in another way to the Muslim non- Turk
immigrants. The immigrants from Bosnia
and Albania, were not allowed to settle near
the Balkans, also not to those cities where
the overall population of the Muslim Turks
would fell below 90 percent. They were rather scattered to Anatolian towns where they
would not make more than 10 percent of the
population. The governments major concern in this policy was to assimilate this population into the Turkish culture (Ibid.:627).
The Arab and Kurdish refugees were settled
to places where they would not make the
majority. The already settled refugees of
Diyarbakr, Erzurum, Elaz and Sivas were
also sent to inner Anatolia.
ly.3 The policies were only implemented in

Anatolia and sought to create a lebensraum
for the Turkish nation which was challenged
by the Greeks in the west, and the Armenians in the east.
The Sevres Treaty in 1920, which was
regarded as born death due to several reasons including disagreements within the
Entente and the Ottoman governments
lack of legitimacy in eyes of its people, foresaw an independent Armenia in eastern
Anatolia, whereas left Aegean coastal region to Greece. This treaty has partly been
attempted to realize and could not succeed,
but it has become a source for threat perception throughout the Republican history
until recently. Serves Treaty has been made
reference in the history books within the
educational system to remember the growing generation on the ambitious intentions
of the outside world on Turkeys territorial
integrity.
I.B. Citizen Constructing

Instruments in the late Ottoman
Period
In 1910, in the Ottoman Assembly
Grand Vizier brahim Hakk expressed that:
In almost ten years, the CUP policies together with war conditionalities, altered the
demographic structure of Anatolia drastical-
Coming to the point of citizen, learning

Turkish has greatest importance in that case
too. Since, a person who does not know Turkish will be deprived of some rights [hukuk].
For example, he will not be able to be deputy. But there is one more important thing.
What is it? Citizens should be of the same
opinion on the matters that are connected
2 Famine was a regular situation in those years, especially in Lebanon, Syria, Palestine. In Autumn 1916,
only due to famine, 60 thousand people were reported
to have died in Lebanon. In the winter of 1916, a total
of 150 thousand people were reported to have died. (see
details Lewy, 2011: 95-105).
3 The territories of Turkey lost about 90 percent

of both its Greek and Armenian population between
1913 and 1923. Muslim percentage before the wars was
80 percent and by 1923 it has reached 98 percent due
to the immigrations and deportations. (Zrcher 2007:
170-172).
36
to the life of the state. Namely, they should

interpret and view the future of the state in
the same manner and they should possess
the same sentiment. This is absolutely the
objective that the Government and Kanuni Esasi are looking for. The homogeneity of
education and culture (terbiye) is desired.
(lker 2005: 619)
which started in the CUP period have been

rewritten and shaped in the treaty of Laussanne. A few hundred thousand immigrants
entered Turkey from the Balkans within a
decade. Not all were Turkish speaking. But
they were Muslim and the state considered
that they had the potential to cope with
Turkish identity. (lker 2007: 10- 12)
In the late Ottoman period, there was an

effort to define the rights and duties of the
citizens who were previously seen as mere
tax giving subjects of the Sultan. Citizenship
was tried to be standardized by law in order
to build a collective identity and a qualified
united public sphere. Secular celebration
days (The Day of Constitutional Declaration,
The Day of Assembly) were invented after
the declaration of the Second Constitution
to lessen the level of distinction between
religions (and religious feast days). (stel
2004: 28)
A national enclosure defines also the

cultural- national boundaries of a particular
citizenship identity. The more a nationstate
could built an integrated homogenous national political identity, the more a genuine
basis it would have for legitimacy (duygu
and Kaygusuz 2004: 34). Turkish nationstate building was a process of constructing
Kemalism through social practices, norms
and institutions.
There were two important institutions

in modern central state building process
(the community of citizens); the military
and education (Ibid. : 29). A law has passed
which made military duty obligatory also for
the non-Muslim males. In case they wanted
to get exemption, they had to pay money.
After the Second Constitutional period,
school courses were formulated to give collective consciousness through Ottoman Geography, Ottoman History and Turkish.
II. Building the Kemalist Nation State
and Constructing Its Citizens: The Identity
of Turkish Republic

After the War of Independence in
which Mustafa Kemal made emphasis on
Islamic brotherhood to mobilize all Muslim
entities in Anatolia, the Turkish Republic
was established in 1923 with the treaty of
Laussanne which defined not only the territorial but also the ideational borders of
the new Republic. The population exchanges
Mustafa Kemal and his comrades were

from the Young Turk tradition. The early periods of the Turkish Republic was economically, politically and ideologically much more
a continuation of the Young Turk era4. However, despite this continuation, the Kemalists did not want the Empire to be regarded
as the ancestor of the Republic. The aim was
a Western type rapid modernization which
would decrease the differences between Turkey and the West and avoid the Western orientalist mind set and imperialist ambitions.5
The process of modernization was also the
process of identity building for Turkey, and
Kemalism was to construct the path and the
citizens of the Turkish Republic.
4 Zrcher points to the similarity between the
Young Turk II. Constitutional Era and the first years of
the Turkish republic. He points that in each phase the
governments began with a pluralistic and rather free
environment (1908- 1913 and 1922-1925 respectively)
but finally get engaged establishing a hegemony (19131918 and 1925-1945) (Zrcher 2007: 163- 172).
5 Identity differences increased otherness, where
as similarities diminished this otherness and become a
means of survival. See details in Bilgin, 2008; 39; pp.
593-613.
37
II.A. Instruments of Kemalism

and Turkification
The path for construction was multidimensional. There were economic, political, cultural and geographical means which
served the construction of Kemalist state
and citizenship. By these means, different
identities and subjectivities were articulated into a common project, and a new social order was brought by, out of a variety
of dislocated elements. So both the political
practises and the outcomes had hegemonic
characters (elik 2009: 224-225). Kemalism
was a top- down project in which the ruling
elite aimed to shape people accordingly.
The 1924 Constitution defined all people
of Turkey as Turks regardless of their racial
or religious basis (eker 2005: 64). This definition goes parallel with the above formulation and gives the first idea on the common
element of Kemalism. Turkish has already
been declared as the official language in the
Ottoman Empire. In 1928, a campaign has
been mobilized: Citizen! Speak Turkish.
With this campaign, the usage of other languages in public was banned.
In the Ottoman Empire, the economic facilities were mainly concentrated in
the hands of non-Muslim minorities, the
Greeks, the Armenians, the Jews. Starting
with the CUP era, the economy was tried to
be nationalized (Turkified) and this continued during the Republican era. Due to
the population exchanges and deportations,
the country has lost much of its economically qualified class and the replacement of
this class by a Muslim Turkish one was both
seen necessary and desired in the Kemalist
regime. In 1923, non-Muslim traders were
excluded from Istanbul Trade Chamber. In
1926, a law has passed which made the use
of Turkish language in the trade- business
transactions obligatory. The same year, with
38
informal notifications, the foreign companies were dictated to employ at least 75%
Muslim Turk employee in their companies.
The Surname Law of 1934 banns the usage
of surnames which make reference to other
ethnicities (Aktoprak 2010). Indeed, it is
still the case in Turkey, that by taking Turkish citizenship, a person has to take a Turkish name.
The geographical reconstruction of the
country continued after Lausanne since
the Turkish government agreed on population exchange with Greece. These exchanges
were made on the basis of religion. Christians were exchanged with Muslims regardless of the language they spoke natively. A
Turk was presupposed to be Muslim and a
Muslim was foreseen to become a Turk. The
immigrant Muslim non-Turkish populations
were settled as such proportions that they
could be assimilated within the majority
Turkish speaking inhabitants. Especially the
Settlement Law of 1934 was a very detailed
process of assimilation in which all ethnic
groups were classified and redefined and decided to be settled accordingly.6
The educational system was one of the
crucial chains of the identity construction
process. The aim was to build a duty- based
citizen consciousness. The Malumat- Medeniye (Acknowledgment of Civilization) lectures in schools were renamed as Malumat-
Vataniye (Acknowledgment of Homeland).
Although the books of these lectures were
teaching a rather constitutional civic citizen
model between 1924 and 1926, after the
Sheih Said rebellion in 1925 the citizenship
expression has changed to a more authoritative one. The new lecture books made more
emphasis on the duties of the citizens. The
accession of the citizen into the political
6 For a clear prescription of the Law in 1934, see
lker, 2008.
system was only through vote, tax and military duty (for the male). Acknowledgement
on Homeland books did not include direct
vilification of other ethnic groups, instead
they ignored and made the others invisible
(Altnrs 2010: 44-45). Moreover, a lot of
emphasis has been made on Turks moral virtues. These definitions were formulated and
institutionalized in the Turkish History Thesis which made the Turks the descendants of
all important civilizations of Mesopotamia,
Egypt, Aegean and Anatolia. Additionally,
the Sun Language Theory was formulated
which claimed that most major languages
in the world originated from Turkish (eker
2005: 65). The elementary school education was seen as particularly important and
Turkification elements in teaching history
and identity consciousness were given carefully and constantly. National consciousness
was tried to be strengthened and supported
through the celebration of national feast
days. Institutions like the Public Houses
(Halkevleri) and Village Institutes (Ky Enstitleri) aimed to mobilize people as modern, loyal and productive7 citizens. In 1928,
the Latin alphabet was adopted which
caused a clear cut break with the previous
tradition (the Ottoman Empire). This break
was also one of the steps towards Laicism.
II.B. Laicism (Secularism) and

Kemalism
Religion was the most centrifugal determinant of the social and political life in the
1920s Turkey. This centrality of religion was
regarded as an obstacle for the economic and
social transformation of the Republic. The
founders of the Republic wanted to diminish the role of religion in political sphere and
7 Productive in the sense that he/ she becomes
useful to state. It was not an individualist productiveness.
convert it into a solely private life issue (Glalp 2005: 356). Laicism aimed to distance
the state from religion and serve as a means
for modern civilization. The social, cultural,
economic and educational programs had to
be introduced without the influence of religion. This was believed to be the ideal path
which could serve the Republic catch up the
civilized world. Religion had to be controlled, so that it did not burden the transformation (Bilgin, 2008).
Laicism was a process which began with
the abolishment of the Caliphate in 1924.
In 1925, the Western Style Dress Code
was passed as a constitutional code which
brought the hat as headgear to social life.
The message of this law was to show the
civilized world that the Turks were not different, but similar to them. Although it was
argued that it would help to unify society
since it banned religious symbols as markers of difference (Bilgin 2008: 602), the perception in the society had become that laicism was something against religion since it
banned the religious symbols (Saygn- nal
2008: 39). In 1926, the new Civil Code was
introduced from Switzerland together with
the Gregorian Calendar. Two years later,
Islam was written out of Constitution and
the Latin alphabet was adopted. In the beginning of 1930s the Western metric system
and Sunday as holiday was recognized. Finally in 1937, Laicism was introduced in the
Constitution as one of the key elements of
the Republic. It was a constructed and controlled project which aimed to fulfill the goal
of modernization and westernization of the
country (Kadolu 2010: 492).
The acceptance of Laicism was tried to
be fortified by vilification of the other, Islam.
Incidents such as Menemen Vakas8 were told
8 It is a unique case in the early years of Republic where a hodja was claimed to have killed brutally
39
over and over to make people threatened of

Islam and of practicing Muslim people, so
that they would refer to shelter under Laicism. Domestic threat was constructed in order to make masses define the Kemalist elite
as the safe guardians. Vilifications were supported by the high censored press.
It is also argued that Laicism has been
adopted in order to position the state equally distant to all belief systems and avoid the
Western powers interference into domestic
issues for Christian minorities (Bilgin 2008).
However, it is a question whether this point
was in favour of the non-Muslims. For example, with the adoption of Civil Code, nonMuslims marriages in their churches and
synagogues would not be legitimate without
the stately defined marriage.
II.C. Sunni Identity or the

Lausannian Islam
Our real citizens are Muslims, belong to
Hanefi denomination and speak Turkish.
Celal Nuri Bey, National Assembly
(TBMM), 1924 Constitution Discussions.
(Bayr 2010: 141)
Although melted distinctively, it was impossible to completely exterminate religion
from social life. Therefore it was crucial to
control, shape and teach the religion, Islam,
so that the poor folk would be informed on
how much and what kind of religiosity to be
proper. Islam was to be formulated in such
a modern way that it would serve the establishment of Kemalist regime. This modern
version was found to be within the Sunni tradition and named as the Lausannian Islam
which makes emphasis on its unique charac-
an army officer. Many speculative scenarios have been

drawn about the incident.
40
ter shaped by the Kemalist rhetoric(Ylmaz

2005: 389). So the state based a religion in
order not to become a religion- based state
(Altan 2010: 92). It is a contradiction within
itself since laicism means the separation of
state from religious affairs, and then the
state does conduct in religious affairs in favour of a certain type.
Actually in 1920, Turkeys founder and
first president Mustafa Kemal Atatrk defined the basis of nation over religion, since
the War of Independence was fought with
the Muslim Kurds of Anatolia. But after the
Lausanne Treaty and the formation of the
Turkish Republic, the emphasis for national
identity shifted to secularism and Turkish
nationalism.
The Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet) was established in order to formulate
Islam in such a way that it would become a
servant of the Kemalist ideology. Diyanet9
became an instrument of the Regime to implement state politics (Kadolu 2010: 493).
At an environment where all other religious
orders and lodges were formally prohibited, Diyanet was the only alternative possible for the moderate Muslim population of
Turkish Republic. Islam which was not controlled by the state began to be perceived as
a symbol of backwardness (Ibd.: 497) and
as a path which was not equally legitimate
as the stately palatable Lausannian Islam.
Thus an entity which couldnt be equally
legitimate, would likely be suspected as a
potential threat in the country. Therefore,
the formally prohibited, but informally existing religious orders and lodges of Turkey
were to be accused as being a source of reactionarism and a domestic security threat
for the Turkish Republic whenever the state
9 For the year 2013, Diyanet had a budget more
than 2.5 billion USD with emplyees exceding 115 thousand and mosques 85 thousand. See details Ylmaz
2013, 116.
tended to be more oppressive, which was

very often the case since Turkey faced military interventions of several types almost
within each ten years of time.10 The content
of the Friday sermons were (and still are)
centrally delivered by the Diyanet to all the
mosques in Turkey, even to the mosques in
Europe which are operating under Diyanet.
The state, be it civil or military, has been determining the contents of these sermons.11
Turkification has been an important
characteristic of Lausannian Islam, especially in the one party era, when the (prayer call)
ezan was made in Turkish. Just as referring
to a Turk meant that he/she was Muslim,
calling a person Muslim would automatically
recall that he/she was Sunni. So Lausannian
Muslims would make up the preferred palatable subject citizen model in the Kemalist
Republic of Turkey. They would satisfy their
religious affiliations as much as the state
allowed. They would pray in private, but
would refrain to do so in public, for example in their official work places. The most favoured Sunni Muslims were those ones who
would call themselves Muslims but were not
practising at all.12 The women were expected
to be unveiled in order to exist in the public as educated and professional citizens.
10 The 1960 Coup, the 1971 Memorandum, the
1980 Coup, the February 28 1997 intervention, the
April 2007 E-Memorandum. One should also note that
several extra-ordinary and unsolved violant incidents
took place in between each intervention which became
a justification for the state to remain oppressive continuesly.
11 After February 28 1997, the military not only
determined the content of the sermons, but also illegally monitored religous communities and individuals
by using Diyanet bureaucracy and facilities. Accessed
November 5, 2014. http://haber.stargazete.com/guncel/buda-28-subatin-balyozu/haber-711592.
12 If they would feel free to consume alcoholic
beverages under certain occasions and celebrities, this
could well be regarded as a further positive characteristics for the image of the citizens in the eyes of the
Kemalist state.
So the citizens would call themselves Sunni

Muslims however would not carry any visible characteristics about this identity. The
identity would refer more to secular, cultural
and socio political basis, than piety (Ylmaz
2013: 110).
II.4.The Homo-LASTus
After all, Kemalism managed to establish its own middle class, the good citizen,
the Homo-LASTus, laic, Ataturkist, Sunni,
Turk citizen (Ylmaz 2013: 108). Each element of Homo-LASTus is a self in relation
to another ideational element. Laicism
aimed to serve the citizens modernization
which was identical with westernization. It
would make the Muslims as modern as the
non-Muslims. Since it has been impossible
to eliminate religion totally, it should serve
Kemalism and should have an urban structure. This was established with the Laussanian type Sunni Islam.
Although they are often used synonymously, Kemalism and Ataturkism refer to
different identities. A Kemalist has more
hostile affiliations towards Islam and supports an elitist top down construction of the
society. An Ataturkist, on the other hand,
can also be a practising Muslim. He/she
doesnt have to be, but this is a possibility.
Ataturkism stands for the respect to Ataturk
and what he has done for the independence
and reconstruction of Turkey.13

Turkishness, as an identity, aimed
to homogenize the societys divergent
ethnicity. All other ethnic identities were
aimed to get assimilated or at least invisi13 Ylmaz, 2013: 110. Kemalist and Ataturkist are
generally used interchangebly. However a Kemalist has
a more assertive secularist characteristic, while an Ataturkist can have a deep respect not only to Ataturk but
also to Islam.
41
ble through Turkification. In the Laussanne

Treaty, minorities were defined on religious
basis. So non-Muslims were minorities, but
Muslims that had immigrated from different
lands like, Caucasus, Crimea, Balkans were
all regarded as Turks, even if they hadnt an
ethnic root for Turkishness.14 Some of these
populations kept their mother language, but
most of them were totally assimilated. It is
a usual case that these non-ethnic Turks advocating Turkishness in a very enthusiastic
manner. This can be regarded as a success of
the Kemalist nation-building policies (Ylmaz 2013: 110).

Overall, the Homo-LASTus people
can be defined as the successful outcome
of the hegemonic imposition of the Kemalist regime. They believed sincerely and enthusiastically to what they have been told.
According to Homo-LASTus people, Turkey
has had many outside and inside enemies15
and protecting the country from these enemies needed and needs a lot qualification.
This qualification was only seen present in
their identity as being western, enlightened,
modern, civilized and loyally bound to Turkish nationality. So, together with the assistance of the army16, the Homo-LASTus elites
were the masters and the guardians of the
country, the Republic of Turkey.17
14 lker, 2007. Thus as the non-Muslims were
minorities and the aim was a homogenous society, having less minority was a preferred condition. Therefore
Christians who were linguistically speaking Turkish
were exchanged with Greece, while Muslims who spoke
no Turkish were welcomed.
15 An anonymous saying: A Turk has no other friend
than another Turk (Trkn Trkten baka dostu yoktur.).
Also Ataturk in his Address to Youth speech states that
Turkey would always have enemies abroad and inside.
16 Turkey has had 2 direct (1960, 1980) military
intervention to its parliamentary system alongside
with an ultimatom in 1971. Thereafter the military was
on the scene in 1997 with a post modern intervention
and in 2007 with a post modern cyber ultimatom.
17 A much refered sentence within the elite: My
Ata! We are the loyal watchmen of the Republic that you
42
There are threat perceptions based on

past, like what the others did to Turks.
There are also threat perceptions of present, that each identity that does not fit to
Homo-LASTus is a potential danger for the
Republic. Combining the past and the present, an average Homo-LASTus is likely to
construct a threat perception of the future.
These threat perceptions, in the end, formulate the attitudes and actions of the identity. The education of the identity started in
elementary with the daily oath18, continues
in middle school with Vatandalk Dersi (Citizenship Course) and nkilap Tarihi (History
of Revolution), finally ends up in university
with the rereading of nkilap Tarihi (History
of Revolution) regardless of the faculty the
student attends.
III. The Others of Turkey: The

Identities of Turkish Society
The Homo-LASTus, the white Turks of
the country, had to govern the country inside and represent it respectfully outside.
There were also the Negro Turks and the
mountain Turks in Turkey19, and also those
unfortunates who could not be put to any
category of Turks at all. All of these have to
be focused on, in order to understand contemporary Turkish society and politics.
commended us (Atam! Emanetin olan Cumhuriyetin sadk

bekileriyiz)
18 The daily oath ceremony was lifted recently; it
started with the words I am a Turk, I am hard working ended up saying how happy the one who calls
himself a Turk!
19 See Akyol, 2011. Akyol roughly classified the
Muslim citizens of Turkey as White Turks (the elitist
Seculars), Negro Turks (the practising Muslim periphery) and Mountain Turks (the Kurds).
III.A. The non- Muslims

On the one hand, we say citizens of [the
state]are completely Turk. On the other hand,
the government is struggling to make sure foreign companies will dismiss Greek and Armenian workers. When we attempt that.[and] if
we are told that No, in line with the law passed
by your parliament they are Turks what would
your answer be? The word citizenship would not
be enough to abate a desire which is in the mind
and heart there is one reality, they cannot be
Turk there is no possibility
(Hamdullah Suphi Bey, TBMM, 1924 Constitution Discussions)
(Bayr 2010: 142)
Based on this assumption, Turkish parliament passed a law in 1926, which stated
that only Turks can become state officers.
The law was under practise until 1965, when
the precondition was changed to Turkish
citizenship.
The non- Muslims, Armenians, Greeks,
Jews were citizens but did not belong to the
national community. They were seen as the
potential collaborators of foreign states who
were seen as not giving up their ambitions
on Turkey. So the real national community
should always be alert against the collaborators.
Until recently, the Land Registry Law
referred to non- Muslims as the foreigners whose existence has been recognized by
the Turkish Republic (Ibid.: 142). Although
they were foreigners, they were forced to
pay the highest taxes between 1942 and
1944. The Wealth Tax (Varlk Vergisi) aimed
to deal with the war profiteers. But it was
not applied properly and resulted in the discrimination of the non-Muslim community.
The 55 percent of the total tax revenue has
been taken from the non-Muslim business
people in Istanbul and Izmir. If they could

not pay, they were deported or sentenced to
forced labour in countryside. Most of them
sold their properties and businesses to Muslim businessmen in order to pay. This period
caused an irreparable damage on the confidence of non-Muslims to the Turkish state
(Zrcher 2007: 208).

III.A.1.The Armenians
The Armenian population has declined
dramatically due to the 1915 deportations.
Among the discursive Armenian inhabitant
numbers, the Armenian population in Ottoman Empire, before 1915, can concluded
to be more or less 1,5 million (Lewy 2011:
366-367). In 1923, the Turkish Republic
had about 65 thousand Armenians left. The
properties (houses) of the deported Armenians were given to the new immigrant Turks
(Muslims) with the Settlement regulations
of the Republican era. The Armenians who
left their homes by deportation and survived the bad conditions, did not return.
They instead settled to western countries
and formulated the Armenian Diaspora.
The Armenian Diaspora constructed its
identity on 1915 events. Beginning with
1965, the Diaspora tried to make the international community recognize the deportations as genocide. In the 1970s, the armed
reactionary Armenian group, ASALA, attacked and killed several Turkish diplomats
all over the world. ASALA also attacked civilian international targets like the Orly
Airport in 1983. Thereafter it ceased fire
and concentrated more on the recognition
of genocide in the international arena (Lewy
2011: 397-398). Today 20 countries some
of whom are Turkeys significant trade partners (such as Germany, Netherlands, Italy)
are recognizing the 1915 events as genocide.
Most of the US federal states (42 out of 50)
43
have also recognized the 1915 events as

the Armenian genocide. This situation puts
much burden on Turkish foreign policy and
is likely to intensify as 2015 marks the 100th
anniversary of the deportations.
The remaining Armenians in Turkey
avoided confrontation with the Turkish
state. They rather preferred to be invisible
until recent, when issues like minority rights
have begun to be discussed in public. They
have most of the time tried to differentiate
themselves from the Diaspora. But still they
could not avoid to become target of Turkish
nationalism. Hrant Dink, a leading journalist of Turkish Armenian community, was trialled on the law of Insulting Turkishness.20
During the trials he was harshly accused by
the mainstream media as being a betrayer.
In January 2007, he was killed by a Turkish
ultra nationalist boy who was afterwards
sentenced with lifelong imprisonment. By
October 2014, the Case have not concluded
yet, since the investigations showed that the
boy was not alone.
In 2012, the Armenian elementary
school students visited the Education minister and requested the removal of humiliating expressions about Armenians from the
school text books.21 But in the school text
books of 2014 there were still problematic
expressions and descriptions about the Armenian identity.22
III.A.2. The Greeks

The Greek population of Anatolia was
about 2 million in the late Ottoman era. The
population shrunk to 120 thousand due to
immigrations and population exchanges
(Zrcher 2007: 172). As mentioned above,
they were mostly seen as the collaborators of
Greece. Although their rights were defined
in Laussanne, these were easily suspended
whenever relations deteriorated with Greece
(Aktoprak 2010: 37-38).
One of the most traumatic events which
the community experienced took place in
September 6-7, 1955. The Cyprus issue was
an unsolved problematic between Turkey
and Greece which put tension on the relations on those days. The press had a significant role in increasing the tension and
preparing the conditions for September 6-7
(Lengerli 2006: 103). The events were based
on an information that a bomb has exploded
near the Turkish consulate in Salonika and
that the house in which Atatrk was born
had been burned. This news have ignited a
serious of uncontrolled demonstrations in
Istanbul and Izmir in which thousands of
buildings of Greek citizens were damaged.
Several Greeks lost their life and 35 were injured. After this event, another wave of immigration took place.
20 Insulting is very interpretive in Turkey, especially if the issue in concern is Turkishness or Atatrk.
For the insulting articles of Hrant Dink see, --------- Hrant Dinki yakan yazlar, Radikal, October 10,
2005. Accessed January 13, 2012. http://www.radikal.
com.tr/haber.php?haberno=166485
21 See detail Todayszaman, January 5, 2012. Accessed January 13, 2012. http://www.todayszaman.com/
news-267705-dincer-listens-to-armenian-studentsclaim-of-misrepresentation-in-textbooks.html
Turkey was left with even a smaller Greek

community, which was still regarded as a potential threat. As the Cyprus crisis peaked in
the first half of 1970s with armed confrontations, the Turkish government closed the
Clergy School of Greek community which
was seen crucial for the Greek community
to continue their religious traditions. The
education in the Clergy School of Heybeliada, actually, was formulated and permitted under the Treaty of Laussanne. How-
22 See Taraf, September 2014. http://www.taraf.

com.tr/yazilar/taner-akcam/kasitla-nefret-sucu-islen-
mektedir/30841/ . Accessed November 3, 2014.
44
ever, in time, Turkish public has developed

a perception that held the reopening of the
Clergy School equivalent to loosing national
sovereignty and promoting missionary activity. Whereas for the Greek community of
Turkey, the reopening of the Clergy School is
one of the most important elements of cultural continuation.
III.A.3. The Jews

The population of the Jews were not as
much as the Armenians or the Greeks. They
were settled in Istanbul as well as in Thrace,
Tekirda, anakkale, Edirne and Krklareli.
They were traders and economically well off.
They were keeping their cultural diversity
which meant that they could not have been
successfully Turkified until 1930s. It is important to note that 1930s were the years
when Europe was experiencing the Hitler
rule and anti-semitism.
In 1933, Nihal Atsz who became one of
the leading names of radical nationalism in
Turkey later on, was appointed as Turkish
literature teacher from Malatya to Edirne.
After he arrived in Edirne, he started to
write provocative articles in local journals
and held meetings within the Turkish community saying that they had to get rid of
the Jews who were exploiting the Turkish
people. This was one side of the coin. The
other side was that Turkey wanted to establish a military brigade in Thrace. The Turkish
government did not want to have the Jews
in the region who were trade partners of
American companies. The Turkish government did not trust the Jews because they
were not Turkified. The propaganda of Atsz
was successful. The Jewish people were first
economically boycotted. Then the businesses of the Jews were plundered and they were
threatened to be killed if they dont leave.
Several Jews became victims of brutal physi-
cal violence between June 28 and July 4,

1934. Thereafter, all Jews left Thrace. Most
of them settled to Istanbul, where as some
immigrated to Greece (Bali 1999).
In 1942 they became subjects of the
Wealth tax, upon which they lost their confidence to Turkish state. Thousands of Jews
immigrated to Israel after 1950.23
III.B. The Practising Muslims

They were the Negro Turks of the system
(Akyol 2011). The Kemalist regimes secular
identity put hegemonic restrictions on the
visibility and practibility of Islam in daily
life. An officer of state, be it military or public, should not be a practising Muslim. This
would be regarded as a challenge to Laicism.
Until recent, the army officers who were
daily practising Muslims and who had veiled
wife could have been dismissed from duty
without any indemnity or retirement salary.
It was the case, even if they had a CV full
with honour rolls. The army officers head
scarfed family members, be it mother or
wife, were not allowed to enter any building
within the army by headscarf. Especially after February 28 199724, they were even not
allowed to military hospitals if they had not
covered their head in a traditional way.25
In the 1925 the educations in Medrese
and Tekke were banned saying that these
were serving reactionary activities and hin23 See Gndem, 2012. Valuable information about the experiences of Turkeys Jews can be find in the
biographical book of a well known successful Jewish
businessman of Turkey, Ishak Alaton.
24 The post modern coup of Turkey.
25 Interesting terminologies have been developed
for the so-called traditional way: rabbit-ear, granny
style etc. The state in this way tried to decompose its
proper citizens from improper ones: the beneath
message aimed was: the state is not against religion.
But the religion should exist the way the state defines
it; all others are source of threat.
45
dering Turkeys path to modern civilization.

Many religious leading figures were trialled
and jailed during the Republic. The first ones
were those who opposed to wear the hat
and insisted on their headgear sark. Many
people were sentenced to death in the Independence Courts of 1920s. Thus sark and
veil has been perceived as a major challenge
to Kemalist modernization since they were
visibly differentiating Turkey from Europe.
According to Homo-LASTus, the practising Muslims were regarded as primitive and
periphery. As long as they stayed at the periphery, there was no problem. The conflicts
began when the periphery challenged the
core socially, economically and politically. In
the 1980s, with the changing economic and
political structure of Turkey, the practising
Muslims became more visible at the border
of the core, in the big cities of the country.
They were taking higher education and began taking office in important state institutions. This has been regarded as a threat to
Laicism.
More threatening was the issue of the
practising Muslim women. Their unmodernity, their contradiction with laicism, the
headscarf, was so much visible, that it was
impossible for the state to have them in the
public sphere. The only way practising Muslim women to be in public sphere could be
either as subordinate and uneducated but
veiled, or educated but unveiled. After the
coup 28 February 1997, some universities
established convince rooms for the head
scarfed women who were to apply to the
universities. In these rooms, the university
teachers tried to convince the headscarf
women that their appearance were improper. They further claimed that it could not be
the womens own preference, but their families oppression on them that make them
cover their head. It has been only a few years
that women can attend to universities with
46
headscarf in Turkey. Now they have become

also more visible in public duties.
Even at the top of Turkish state hierarchy, the headscarf faced embargo from the
guardians of the regime. When in 2002 the
AKP came to power with its leading figures
wifes wearing headscarf, they were looked
upon in suspicion and were invited to official
receptions of President Ahmet Necdet Sezer without wife, which was contrary to the
usual practises. Also a silent civic embargo
exists on the identity in certain non-state
areas. In 2011, a top company, Borusan,
cancelled the sponsorship of the woman
rally champion, Burcu etinkaya after her
appearance on the news while giving an interview to a head scarfed journalist.26
III.C. The Alevis

Some of them define themselves as a sect
of Islam, while some of them define themselves as a separate religious practise. They
make up about 10 percent of current Turkeys population. They took their share from
laicism with the closure of Bektai dervish
lodge in 1920s. The establishment of the Directorate of the Religious Affairs, Diyanet,
continues to be a further obstacle for the
Alevis since it is based on Sunni belief and
ignores any other belief.
The Alevis are not one homogenous entity. There are Alevi Kurds, Alevi Zazas and
Alevi Turks. But the way they have been perceived by the Sunnis did not differ much according to the different ethnicities because
they were mostly defined over their religious
identity. However, in respect to the official
26 See detail, Todayszaman. 2011.Borusan cancels sponsorship allegedly over company image concerns, December 28. http://www.todayszaman.com/
news-267001-borusan-cancels-sponsorship-allegedlyover-company-image-concerns.html
perception, Zaza and Kurd Alevis were more

disadvantageous than the Turks (Koannc 2004).
Alevis faced several violent confrontation and discrimination both by state and
by public throughout the Republican era.
The first to mention would be the Dersim
events of 1937. The cultural heterogeneity and resistance of Dersim to the state
was supressed harshly by the government
in 1937- 1938. Turkish war planes bombed
the region for days. Villages were evacuated.
Thousands of people were lost in the events.
Many families were forcefully send and settled to different places of Turkey where they
would be all alone with their identity within
the Sunni majority. Girls were taken away
from their families and were given to army
officers as home servants where they were
believed to be brought up in a proper manner. Recently a documentary has been made
on the lifes of these girls in the aim of trying
to find them.27
On the eve of the last military coup
in 1980, the Alevis faced two destructive confrontation with the Sunni population in two middle range cities of Turkey,
Kahramanmara and orum. In both cases
the events lasted for days and the government was unable to settle them down. After
the events, the populations in the respected
regions immigrated to more cosmopolitan
cities where they would not be visible and
known through their identity.
The religious education in schools of Turkey are still Sunni based. The cemevis of the
Alevis are not recognised as worship places.
Since cemevis arent recognized by Diyanet
as worship places, they are not able to get
financial aid from the state. Each year the
27 For detail see the documentary http://www.

youtube.com/watch?v=295tyDGsDYI
government specifies a significant amount

to the Diyanet from the annual budget. The
Diyanet budget has been criticized for serving in favour of just one part of the society
(the Sunni Muslims), although the budget is
a result of the taxes collected from all Turkeys citizens including the Alevis.
III.D. The Kurds

They were initially, the Muslim brothers
who fought the Independence War together
with the Turks against the non-Muslims. After the establishment of the Republic, they
became the second biggest population. Their
differentiation began with the abolishment
of the caliphate in 1924 which alienated
their common identity (Muslimhood) inside
Turkey. Immediately after this, the Constitution changed the definition of people living in Turkey. In 1921 Constitution it was
stated as the peoples of Turkey which was
an inclusive statement that also covered the
Kurdish identity. In 1924 the sentence was
changed as The people of Turkey, regardless
of religion and race, are Turks as regard to
citizenship. The Sheihk Said Kurdish rebellion erupted upon this change.28 This event
marked the end of brotherhood between
the Kurds and the Turks. The Dersim events
fortified the polarization. Beginning with
Dersim they were defined as the men (the
bandit) in the mountains; they were regarded as the uncivilized mountain Turks which
the state needed to oppress for the sake of
integrity.
Kurds were not and are still not allowed
to learn their mother tongue in state schools.
Recently there has been a new regulation to
allow private schools teaching Kurdish which
doesnt seem very realistic. Because most of
the population is not in the condition to ef28 Esayan, 2010.
47
fort private education. Indeed, in 2014, a

few private school declared that said they
would start Kurdish courses. The majority
of the children of Kurdish citizens still have
unequal educational conditions when they
start school since they have no language
that they can speak.29 The denial of Kurdish
identity has been so strong throughout the
Republican period, that the Turkish state
and society would regard any reference to
Kurdishness as a threat to sovereignty and
integrity. So when a protest singer, Ahmet
Kaya, at a music dinner in 1999 stated that
he would like to sing Kurdish songs, he was
lynched immediately. Thereafter he was accused for being a betrayer in the mainstream
media and the court opened a trial on the issue. He went to exile where he died a year
later.
The major problematic attached to the
Kurdish identity emerged after the 1980
coup. The 1980 military coup was a brutally traumatic experience to many people
in Turkey, and especially to Kurds (Matur
2011). All kinds of torture and insult were
practised on the imprisoned people which
included also insult on identity. After they
were released from prisons, they went to
mountains and PKK was formed. An armed
confrontation between PKK and the Turkish
army has been going on for three decades
which took the lifes of more than 30 thousand people.
Many unknown murder cases took place
in 1990s in the Southeast region of Turkey
which decreased the peoples confidence to
state. Many Kurds immigrated to western
cities or to the cities in the region when their
villages were burned or evacuated.
29 For detail see, ki Dil Bir Bavul: a documentary film on a Turkish teacher from western Anatolia
attending a Kurdish village school in eastern Anatolia.
http://www.perisanfilm.com/school/trailer.php
48
IV. The Recurrence of History:

From Pluralism to Hegemony
Again
Eric Zrcher claims that Turkish politics had gone through similar phases under
Young Turks and under the rule of Mustafa
Kemal and his comrades. In both cases, the
political movements initially started to govern with a pluralistic stance and ended up
with oppressive hegemonic politics which
were based on exclusion of some parts of the
society. In each oppressive era, the state had
a threat perception which served as a justification for the authoritarian policies. The
threat perception was fortified through vilification in written, oral and visual communication instruments (i.e. books, newspapers,
magazines and movies). Rules were regulated according to this constructed perception.
The same path can also be observed today
with the AKP rule which has been governing
the country for twelve years. AKP, in early
years of its rule, seemed to have a pluralistic
structure. After it felt sure that the military
would not make a coup and the Constitutional Court could not close the party, AKP
began to give an increasingly majoritarian
hegemonic outlook.
IV.A.The Challenge of the Core

and Expectations for Equal
Citizenship
The first four years (from 2003 to 2007)
of AKP rule can be characterized having
a willingness towards more democratization and for more inclusion of the others in
the society. Coming from an Islamist background whose representative parties were
closed down by the Constitutional Court
for several times, AKP in this era, tried to
convince the public as well as the guardians
of the Republic that it had no intention of
challenging the basic elements of the Republic. The party gave a determinant image for
more democratization. In this era, Turkey
seemed enthusiastically trying to make progress in democratization and EU membership. Therefore it gained the support of different segments in the country which would
normally not vote for an Islamic rooted party. In the absence of productive opposition
parties, AKP became a catchall party which
promised relative improvement conditions
for all the disadvantageous ethnic and religious identities that were excluded from Homo-LASTus. In this era, the partys policies
were pretty much constrained by the President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, as well as by a
threat of closure on the party. AKP was seen
as the supporter of the peripheral identities
and its rule was regarded as a challenge to
the core. The 2007 Presidential election was
one of the most important confrontations
of the core statist elites and the peripheral
AKP. The government faced an e-memorandum from the military after nominating
Abdullah Gl for presidency. However AKP
showed a determinant stance against the ememorandum, which in return, increased its
public support.
In the second era, from 2007 to 2011,
most of the aggrieved identities in Turkey
continued supporting AKP with an expectation of more democratization and equal
citizenship for all. This support was significant when high military officers had begun
to be trialled in Sledgehammer and Ergenekon probes that accused them for coup attempts and constructing terror organization
against the government. Support for AKP
continued in 2010 Referandum for Constitutional Change which was perceived as a
hope for Turkeys democratization. With
this referendum, closure of political parties became harder in Turkey. From 2007
to 2011, Turkey experienced the weakening of Kemalist tutelary regime. While the
weakening of tutelary was expected to be

replaced by a more democratic system, it
turned out that the elitist tutelary was being replaced by a majoritarian tutelary, the
post-Kemalist Erdoanist regime, and this
new tutelary regime had its own definition
for the palatable citizen.
IV.B. 2011-2014: The New Palatable Identity of post-Kemalist

Turkey
Regulations in education and judiciary
systems and the discourses of Erdoan, show
what the palatable citizen for the AKP has
become. Erdoan repeatedly declared that
they were aiming to raise a pious generation.
He condemned the university students who
were living in boys and girls together apartment flats and said that as a conservative
democrat government they were determinant to bring a new legal regulation about
the issue.30 He said he was tolerating those
who had improper dressing.
Today, any social resistance or critique
to any of the decisions of the government
is being regarded as a threat to peace and
stability in the country. Erdoan repeatedly
claims that those who criticized or resisted
AKPs politics were not willing the country
develop and prosper. People, especially journalists are losing their jobs, being targeted31
30 Hrriyet Dailynews November 7, 2013. Accessed November 5, 2014 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.
com/regulation-on-mixed-student-houses-would-beunconstitutional.aspx?PageID=238&NID=57504&Ne
wsCatID=341
31 There are many cases where journalists (and
academicians) have been targeted personally in the
speeches of Erdoan. Two latest examples are the cases of Amberin Zaman and Ihsan Ylmaz. See details
in http://www.todayszaman.com/blog/turkish-mediawatch/journalists-react-to-erdogans-targeting-ofzaman_355020.html and http://www.todayszaman.
com/columnist/ihsan-yilmaz/erdogan-made-me-a-
49
or even are being imprisoned.32 Businessmen who criticized the government politics
were facing additional financial checks on
their business and obliged to some extra
payment. The discourse of Erdoan has become increasingly externalizing especially
after 2010; vilification has become an instrument used against almost all segments
of the society.
In 2012, the AKP government came up
with a new structural change in the education system, the 4+4+4 System. The system
was bringing back the secondary school
in the aim of promoting the Imam-Hatip
schools which had initially been opened
to raise Sunni preachers and Imams in the
1950s. Then in decades the Imam-Hatip
schools had become an alternative for the
pious conservative citizens who wanted
their students to take Islamic knowledge
together with social and physical sciences.
But not all of the Imam-Hatip high school
graduates became imams and preachers. Instead, in the university, they began to enter
departments other than Islamic sciences. In
the 1990s they have been accused for being
the backyard of the political Islam in Turkey.
They were seen as a threat for the secular
state. Upon this accusation the Imam-Hatip
schools secondary parts were shut down
during February 28 Coup of 1997. This
regulation did not only affected the ImamHatip schools, but all secondary schools. So,
the secondary schools for physical or social
sciences were also closed down in 1997, in
the intention to close down the secondary
schools of Imam Hatip schools. This change
target-of-fanatics_363638.html , accessed November
6, 2014.
32 Turkey, in the last years scored as one of the
top countries for imprisoned journalists on the world.
Together with the closure of twitter and youtube in the
beginning of 2014, Freedom House Report of 2014
described Turkish press as not Free and internet as
partly free.
50
in the education system was criticised then

for delaying the students specialization in
physical or social sciences education to the
high school years. In 2012 AKP changed
the education system so that the secondary
schools were reopened. But instead of opening all the closed schools, the government
promoted only the Imam-Hatip secondary
education. Thus a student attending to a
state secondary school had two alternatives:
the vocational or the Imam-Hatip. Especially in the metropolitan cities, the government converted the primary schools of the
previous system to Imam-Hatip secondary
schools without taking the opinions of the
parents or the residents in that region.
If a student wants to attend a state school,
she is registered to the nearest school to his/
her home. Recently, in increasing number of
cases, the students only school nearby has
become an Imam-Hatip school which has
often not been the preferred choice of the
majority families in that region. So there
were several cases in which the parents protested the conversions of their schools and
their childrens nearest option becoming an
Imam-Hatip school.33
The education system has become more
a mass after 2014 high school entrance examinations. The state automatically emplaced thousands of students who didnt
make a school preference to an Imam-Hatip
high school. It has been declared that about
40 thousand students were placed involun33 Protests didnt take place in a few discrete places, but in several schools of the metropolitan cities.
See, Milliyet, August 26, 2014. Accessed November 4
2014 http://www.milliyet.com.tr/kadikoy-de-imamhatip-protestosu-gundem-1930899/. Also see different
protest cases under http://ohaber.com/videogaleri/
ogrenci-ve-velilerden-imam-hatip-protestosu-v-42066
,
http://ohaber.com/videogaleri/velilerden-imamhatip-protestosu-v-21834, http://ohaber.com/videogaleri/bursa-da-imam-hatip-protestosu-v-39920
tarily to Imam-Hatip high schools.34 Not all

were Sunni teenagers; there were Alevis, Armenian, Jewish Turkish citizens who were
automatically enrolled to Imam-Hatip high
schools. Some students didnt make a state
high school choice because they had already
decided for a private school. In this case, the
system again automatically placed them to
some state, mostly Imam-Hatip schools. Ludicrous incidents took place at this stage; the
grandchild of a Jewish Rabbi, Ishak Haleva,
was placed in an Imam-Hatip High school.
A famous secular journalist, Fatih Altayls
daughter was also placed to Imam-Hatip
High school. Moreover, the schools to which
the students were automatically placed were
not close to their home district; instead, in
several cases they were as far as 90 km away
from their home.35 Of course neither the
grandchild of Ishak Haleva, nor the daughter of Fatih Altayl went to Imam-Hatip high
school, since they had previously decided on
private schools of their world view. However, they were symbolic examples for how
chaotic and pro-Imam Hatip the education
system had become.
crete step in favour of Alevi demands has

been taken afterwards. On the contrary,
the new education system brought further
courses on Sunni dialect. The 2012 regulation on education system put Quran and
Prophet Muhammeds Life as elective courses to secondary schools. One has to keep in
mind that elective courses are not many in
Turkish schools and if the majority of a class
decides on something, the others have to go
with that decision occasionally.
The Federation of Alevi-Bektai Associations called on parents to resist the

Imam-Hatip emplacements. The Alevis were
already very dissatisfied with the way the education system had transformed after 2012.
In the pre-2010 era, some Alevis hoped that
AKP might respond to the demands of the
Alevi community. The AKP then gave a more
democratic outlook. The government held
several workshops with the Alevi community between 2009 and 2010 but no con-
All the politics showed that AKP didnt

really intent an equal recognition to the Alevi citizens of Turkey. The Alevis werent accepted in the way they defined themselves,
but were tried to be convinced to the definition of AKP. If a state does have respect
for individual liberties, then it is expected
that it accepts its citizen the way the citizen
wants to define his/ herself. Turkeys domestic threat perceptions and hegemonic
impositions for palatable citizen hinder the
respect for individual liberties. Thus one of
Alevis main demands, having Cemevis recognized as worship places was not accepted
by the government. Moreover, it became
likely the case that Alevi people being physically and orally discriminated.36 The Gezi
Events, which started as a demonstration
to protect a public park but turned into an
uncontrollable violent protestation, has become an incident where the Alevi population
was harmed at most. The confrontation between the Gezi people and the government
increased the tension in the society. Interestingly, many of the dead casualties of the
Gezi protests had an Alevi background.
34 Todayszaman August 26, 2014. Accessed

November 4, 2014 http://www.todayszaman.com/
national_automatic-imam-hatip-enrollments-reach-40000_356823.html
35 See Al-Monitor September 5, 2014. Accessed
November 4, 2014 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/09/turkey-education-system-nonmuslims-islamic-schools.html#
36 In several public election speeches Prime Minister Erdoan referred to the Alevi identity of the opposition leader Kldarolu and permitted the crowds
booing Kldarolu afterwards. Suspicously, in Gezi
Events and in the street demonstrations thereafter,
the proportion of killed or arrested Alevi citizens were
more than the others.
51
While vilifying all who supported the

Gezi protests, the rhetoric of Erdoan became extremely polarizing. He abused Islam
to strengthen his supporters attachment to
AKP. Religion, Islam, was instrumentalised.
He claimed that the protesters had entered
a mosque with their shoes and had drunk
alcohol in there. He insisted that there
were videos about the incident. The reality
was that the people got into the mosque,
because they were injured and affected by
massive tear gas. In the released videos
about the incident, the mosque looked like
a hospitals emergency department. Another
claim of Erdoan was that a veiled woman
was abused and assaulted by the Gezi protesters brutally and that there were again,
videos about the issue. Even an interview
with the subject woman was published in
one of the pro-government newspapers. But
the videos about the incident couldnt approve that such an event took place. The aim
of Erdoan in both cases was to justify his
harsh Gezi politics in the eyes of his pious
conservative voters; indeed, he partly succeeded.
the AKP rule were not perceived as justly trialled, either. Although the murderers were
caught and imprisoned, they were released
after a recent change in law. On the other
hand, Erdoans statement at an interview,
excuse me saying, they have said even uglier things -- they have called me Armenian,
was very much criticized by the democratic
circles, as well as by the Armenians in Turkey.39
Issues concerning the non-Muslim populations have not been solved, either in the
AKP decade. The Halki Seminary has not
been opened. Only a small amount of the
properties of non-Muslim Foundations were
given back; and that after long and exhausting trials. This process has been criticized by
the non-Muslim,37 as well as Muslim journalists. The murder cases against the nonMuslim citizens38 which happened during
Although AKP seemed to be promoting

Islamic lifestyle and thereby recruiting the
living standard of the practising Muslims,
with the recent events before and after December 17 2013, AKP and Erdoan began to
target also some of the practising Muslims
in Turkey, the Hizmet movemet. Erdoan
began to defame the Movement and its spiritual leader Fethullah Glen because they
have opposed the closure of backup study
rooms and they gave support to the investi-
37 See Radikal July 29, 2013. Accessed November

4, 2014 http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/yetvart_
danzikyan/onde_25_milyar_dolar_arkada_uzun_koridorlar-1143793 . Also See Agos October 11, 2013.
Accessed November 4, 2014 http://www.agos.com.tr/
rober-koptas-yazdi-basbakan-azinliklar-konusundaiyi-niyetli-mi-5905.html .
38 The Case of Hrant Dink, the Case of Priest Santaro, the Case of Zirve Publishing house.
39 Todayszaman August 6, 2014. Accessed November 4, 2014. http://www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa_pm-uses-offensive-racist-language-targetingarmenians_354746.html . For a comment together
with Erdoans video on the issue see Washingtonpost August 6, 2014. Accessed November 4, 2014.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/
wp/2014/08/06/is-armenian-an-insult-turkeys-primeminister-seems-to-think-so/
52
Meanwhile, after all the dialogs and

seemingly continuing Kurdish democratic
process, the government by November
2014, appeared to be stuck and unable to
reach a societal compromise; neither with
the Kurds, nor with the rest of the country concerning the Kurdish issue. Actually
the so-called democratic process took place
without the acknowledgment of main political opposition parties, even without giving
information to the military, let alone the
public. While tension increases in the southeast Anatolia once more, a peaceful settlement of the Kurdish issue looks very much
unlikely.
gation of corruption probes of December 17

and December 25. After December 25, the
Hizmet movement has become the biggest
enemy and traitor for Erdoan. Each single
day a dozen of TV channels gave Erdoans
speeches live. Additionally, the government financed 7-8 newspapers which are
published with similar headlines.40 Not just
through press, but also economically, businessmen who were known to sympathize or
support the Hizmet movement have been
facing additional sanctions and controls.
The government altered legal procedures
specifically to violate and discriminate the
functions and operations of the private
schools attached to Hizmet movement, as
well as the institutions like Bankasya and
KimseYokmu.
The AKP didnt just targeted the practising Muslims of Hizmet movement, but
many others. With a recent news published,
it came out that civil servants were labelled
according to their ethnic and religious preferences also during the AKP rule, just as it
has been the case before the AKP rule. The
civil servants religious community preferences were given in details in these labels.
Meanwhile, dozens of publishing houses
which previously published the books of
Said Nursi, a popular Islamic scholar of the
last century, were banned from doing so
since eight months.
AKPs regulations give the impression
that it tries to homogenize and monopolize
even civil religious movements in the country. The criteria for religious communities
not becoming targeted by the state, is to declare support to the government under each
circumstance. Questioning or criticizing any
policy is not a preferred and expected be40 A new terminology developed for the pro-AKP
media; it was called the pool media, because of the claims that it was backed up by a financial pool constructed for them.
haviour from the citizen. Although having

an Imam-Hatip background is an important
criteria, it is not absolutely determinant.
The determinant element of AKPs palatable
citizen is its praise for Erdoan and his politics; be it Armenian, secular or Islamist.
Conclusion
Identity is the way a person defines himherself and wants to be defined by others.
There is a conditionality in relation to the
past, the present and the environment in
the definition of identity. Identities demand
recognition, respect, preservation of culture
and belongingness (Ergil 2010). Turkey is a
country which is the motherland of several
divergent identities. Citizen is the way the
state defines and accepts the people living
within a country. Both the Kemalist and the
post-Kemalist Erdoanist state had palatable citizens and these had narrow definitions
which excluded, oppressed and vilified some
identities in the country. Aiming a palatable
citizen on an identity or some ideology basis
is likely to be problematic also in the future
and is likely to increase the rate of discontent in Turkey. However, it seems also likely
that governments having authoritative tendencies will have intentions to shape the
people according to their world views. A government is likely to be more authoritarian if
the country has an illiberal democracy with
immature institutions inclined to grafts,
and a majoritarian rule which lacks a political culture for compromise. Unfortunately,
this has been the case in Turkey in the last
years. But to what extend an authoritarian
state can manage to rule when the citizens
become furious and polarized is a question
mark the Turkish state has tested in Gezi
protests of June 2013 and in the Kurdish
street demonstrations of October 2014.
The path for social peace and democratization in Turkey is related to how the state
53
and governors perceive the people living in

the country and how this perception reflects
the individuals reality and his/her demands
from the state as a citizen. If the perceptions
can meet at a common ground reflecting the
reality and if the state as well as the people
abandon using the term traitor so easily,
political life might normalize. Besides, people require a need to trust the state and to
be confident that there is justice in the country. Because in a just environment, a state is
unlikely to classify its citizens according to
some criteria of palatability. If there ought
to be any criteria of palatability, then this
should take universal human rights criteria
as the basic common ground.
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58

Kemalism and Post-Kemalism. Turkish State in Search of Palatable Citizen Forever

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TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 5 No.

Kemalism and Post-Kemalism:

TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 5 No. 2 Winter 2014

The First Steps of A New Nation

TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 5 No. 2 Winter 2014

riod. The first interaction of the empire with

I.A. Turkish Nationalism before

1 The uprises began in Serbia in 1808. It was not

the Balkan War took place upon which the

TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 5 No. 2 Winter 2014

ly.3 The policies were only implemented in

I.B. Citizen Constructing

Coming to the point of citizen, learning

3 The territories of Turkey lost about 90 percent

TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 5 No. 2 Winter 2014

to the life of the state. Namely, they should

which started in the CUP period have been

In the late Ottoman period, there was an

A national enclosure defines also the

There were two important institutions

Mustafa Kemal and his comrades were

TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 5 No. 2 Winter 2014

II.A. Instruments of Kemalism

TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 5 No. 2 Winter 2014

II.B. Laicism (Secularism) and

TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 5 No. 2 Winter 2014

over and over to make people threatened of

II.C. Sunni Identity or the

an army officer. Many speculative scenarios have been

ter shaped by the Kemalist rhetoric(Ylmaz

TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 5 No. 2 Winter 2014

tended to be more oppressive, which was

So the citizens would call themselves Sunni

TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 5 No. 2 Winter 2014

ble through Turkification. In the Laussanne

There are threat perceptions based on

III. The Others of Turkey: The

commended us (Atam! Emanetin olan Cumhuriyetin sadk

TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 5 No. 2 Winter 2014

III.A. The non- Muslims

people in Istanbul and Izmir. If they could

TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 5 No. 2 Winter 2014

have also recognized the 1915 events as

III.A.2. The Greeks

Turkey was left with even a smaller Greek

22 See Taraf, September 2014. http://www.taraf.

mektedir/30841/ . Accessed November 3, 2014.

TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 5 No. 2 Winter 2014

ever, in time, Turkish public has developed

III.A.3. The Jews

cal violence between June 28 and July 4,

III.B. The Practising Muslims

TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 5 No. 2 Winter 2014

dering Turkeys path to modern civilization.

headscarf in Turkey. Now they have become

III.C. The Alevis

TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 5 No. 2 Winter 2014

perception, Zaza and Kurd Alevis were more

27 For detail see the documentary http://www.

government specifies a significant amount

III.D. The Kurds

TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 5 No. 2 Winter 2014

fort private education. Indeed, in 2014, a

IV. The Recurrence of History: