Analysis

February 13, 2015

Summary: This piece examines

the negative consequences
of Turkeys present relations
with Egypt and offers potential
policy options that could be
employed to repair the dire
state of relations, which would
be exceedingly difficult, if not
impossible under the current
circumstances. It stresses that
the current political tension
places substantial obstacles in
the way of societal interaction,
and underlines that the political
leadership of the two countries,
who currently ascribe to
dramatically disparate ideas
and approaches, should at least
tone down their rhetoric and
step aside to allow for societal
interaction.

It is Time for Turkey to Fix

its Relations with Egypt
by Osman Bahadr Diner and Mehmet Yegin
Introduction
Egypt and Turkey are major players
in both the Mediterranean Basin and
the Middle East region. As crucial
regional actors, their cooperation has
the potential to facilitate stability and
security in their shared geography.
Nonetheless, the current state of
Turkish-Egyptian relations is being
held hostage by perceptions that the
relationship is based on ideology and
emotion rather than a sense of rationality that is rooted in strong strategic
mutual interests. Bilateral relations are
in a state of crisis.
The gains and losses of the current
situation have to be revisited and positions should be reviewed accordingly.
This piece will examine the negative
consequences of Turkeys present relations with Egypt and present potential
policy options that could be employed
to repair the dire state of relations,
which would be exceedingly difficult,
if not impossible under the current
circumstances.
Not Competing, but
Complementary Countries

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Turkey and Egypt are generally

portrayed as rivals. It is more useful
to consider these two countries as

complementary to one another rather

than competitive. As mid-sized
regional powers, the two countries
need each other; in the end, neither
one is actually in a position to dominate the other. Their cooperation will
be to their mutual benefit at both the
regional and global level.
Some may rightly argue that the
Egyptian and the Turkish leadership,
who currently ascribe to dramatically
disparate ideas and approaches to the
local, regional, and global issues, might
not be eager to initiate a new page in
bilateral relations on their own. Yet,
the important point here is that it is
not required for the political leaders
of the respective countries to take
part in concrete efforts. If the leadership could take the necessary strategic
and tactical initiative of toning down
their rhetoric and stepping aside to
placate the tensions between their two
proud states, their societies would
easily find ways to initiate and enhance
cooperation. The unnecessary tension
has actually led to the emergence of
insurmountable barriers and hesitations. If a first step were to be taken
by the leaders of these societies, then
state institutions would follow suit
and feel more comfortable in pursuing
cooperative action with their respec-

Analysis
tive counterparts. Intellectuals in Egypt remain reluctant
to engage or even be affiliated with Turkey as a result of the
current atmosphere created by the national leaders and the
media.
Negative Perceptions of Turkey
There are important reasons behind the current deadlock
in Turkish-Egyptian relations. First, the ruling party in
Turkey drew too many parallels between itself and the
Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) in Egypt. In this regard, the
perception held by the ruling government in Turkey that
the Gezi movements in its own country were similar to the
protests held against then-President Mohamed Morsi in
Egypt caused Turkey to shift from a realist approach to one
rooted in emotion. This new strategy based on emotional
response was supplemented by the rise of protests in Turkey
expressing solidarity with Egypts Ikhwan, therefore making
the issue a domestic matter for Ankara. In the end, the
way the events unfolded made it all but impossible for the
Turkish government to retract its earlier approach, thus
constraining it to a path to greater deterioration in bilateral relations. Furthermore, this emotional approach was
regarded in Egypt as employing Ikhwan rhetoric, and
Egyptians increasingly came to criticize Turkey for taking a
reductionist approach to their country by focusing solely on
Ikhwan.
Alternately, as a foreign country, Turkeys vocal criticism
of Egypts domestic institutions elicited a strong reaction not only from the political elite but also from the
Egyptian public at large. Specifically, Turkeys aggressive

The way the events unfolded made

it all but impossible for the Turkish
government to retract its earlier
approach, thus constraining it to
a path to greater deterioration in
bilateral relations.
2

stance toward the Egyptian military, thought of at home

as the nations symbol of honor, was not well received by
many Egyptians. Furthermore, Turkeys denouncement of
Egypts prominent al-Azhar University was met with outcry.
Overall, such sharp criticism triggered a wave of nationalistic backlash directed at Turkey, culminating in the administration of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi labeling Turkeys actions
as equal to meddling in Egypts internal affairs. The more
Turkey reacted, the more the Egyptian rhetoric increased.
As a result, Turkeys image in Egypt has been severely
damaged and the two countries societies have become
increasingly estranged. The secular and liberal sections of
Egyptian society have especially come to have doubts about
Turkey.
In Sisis Egypt, Turkey is now perceived of as an Ikhwan
supporter and meddlesome country. These perceptions
are deeply problematic, regardless of whether they are based
in truth or symptomatic of a simple misunderstanding.
On one hand, if these perceptions are based in truth, this
goes against Turkeys long-term foreign policy stance that
it should remain equidistant from all parties in a given
country. On the other hand, if these perceptions represent
a misunderstanding, this means that Turkey is not able to
manage its image in Egypt, an issue that requires its own set
of solutions.
Lost Chances and Seizing the Future
Turkeys strong reactions to developments in Egyptian
politics were not only harmful to Turkey itself, they also
did not help the Egyptians. Turkey lost the chance to play
a constructive role in the country after July 2013. This is
especially pertinent when considering that some Ikhwan
members have said Turkey had the potential to help find a
middle ground between the conflicting parties during and
after the Rabia Square events in Egypt. They claim a more
cautious Turkish approach could have prevented the bloodshed and imprisonments. Turkey should adopt a different
approach in the upcoming period. Turkish engagement,
albeit with a different approach, would be more productive
than outright disengagement. From now on, Turkey should
be in solidarity with Egypt while it is getting through one of
its hardest times in history.

Analysis
What Can Turkey Do?
The Egyptian elites perception of Turkey as one-sided
dramatically increased after Sisi came to power. Since there
is such a high degree of misunderstanding between the
parties, Turkey needs alternative channels that allow it to
better express itself to its Egyptian counterparts in social,
political, and economic communities.
Economic cooperation could be especially effective in
creating interdependence among the involved parties, not
only facilitating the establishment of short-term solutions
but also helping to raze the long-term bulwarks that stand
in the way of amiable relations. Such an approach may
begin with the arrangement of meetings between Turkish
and Egyptian businesses. In this way, the government could
look into initiating these first steps by facilitating meetings
between the two countries prominent companies in the
economic, tourism, and industrial sectors. Furthermore,
there are still agreements between the two countries that
have yet to be ratified. If Turkey were to take the initiative
to visibly approve these agreements, Egypt may regard the
action as a sign of Turkeys good will.
In addition to businesses, civil society actors could also play
a decisive role in rapprochement between Egypt and Turkey.
Civil society actors could get in touch with their Turkish
or Egyptian counterparts, and possibly expand their target
audiences to include the larger publics of the countries.
They could explore areas of cooperation such as joint
cultural activities or scientific and scholarly collaboration.
It could be useful if influential intellectuals and journalists
from Egypt traveled to Turkey. Providing the opportunity
for such influential Egyptian voices to learn more about the
country may open channels for Turkey to reach out to the
larger Egyptian community.
When it comes to the Turkish administration, its primary
position should be one of tactical silence, strategic
dialogue, referring to the avoidance of inflammatory
speech and comments on matters where the official stances
of the Turkish and Egyptian governments may diverge. It
would also be felicitous for the two governments to avoid
speaking to one another through the media. Direct contact
would work to prevent both misunderstandings and exaggerated statements. The media in general has the tendency
to focus on the negative while often employing an implicit

Economic cooperation could be

especially effective in creating
interdependence among the
involved parties, not only
facilitating the establishment
of short-term solutions but also
helping to raze the long-term
bulwarks that stand in the way of
amiable relations.
ideological perspective, and its hyperbolic misrepresentations often make the jobs of the bureaucracy and other
political actors that much harder.
Aside from cooperation in the economic and civil societal spheres, other areas could also serve the interests of
both sides. We may expect more high politics initiatives
embraced by the two states, including mutual efforts to
combat the Islamic State group, Islamophobia, and the
East-West tension. The cooperation of the two parties with
regard to the demarcation of the Eastern Mediterranean
into Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) may also provide an
upper hand for both countries.
Conclusion
Turkeys constructive approach during and after the Egyptian Revolution was seen in a positive light by all parties.
Yet during and after Morsis rule, this approach took a turn
for the worse. Turkey not only lost the chance to cooperate
with Egypt in the face of rising challenges in the region,
it also lost the chance to act in solidarity with Egypt as a
whole during the recent turbulence. In order to contribute
to stability and societal peace in the region, which includes
Egypt, Turkey should adopt a cautious approach that

Analysis
engages all parties equitably. In order to avoid further
aggravation of the two countries already dubious relations,
steps need to be taken as soon as possible.
Today, one of the major problems in the region is violent
extremism reinforced by strong attempts to instrumentalize the religion of Islam as a source of legitimacy.
Indeed, it can be argued that there is a civil war within
Islam. Various terrorist organizations, and the so-called
Islamic State in particular, are using the terms of Islamic
State and Khalifa in order to recruit militants. Egypt and
Turkey, as two reasonable countries with overwhelmingly
Sunni majorities, could work together to provide a strong
alternative model to those posed by militant organizations
sweeping the region. An alliance between the two countries, which could only ultimately be achieved after the
societies grow closer, may offer a strong voice as to the true
representation of Islam, thus introducing a robust counter
narrative that acts against the mindset that gave rise to and
continues to sustain organizations such as ISIS.

The views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the

views of the author alone.

About the Authors

Osman Bahadr Diner and Mehmet Yegin are researchers at an
Ankara-based think tank, International Strategic Research Organization (USAK). Diners areas of interest are Middle East politics,
Turkish-Arab relations, and foreign policy. Yegins areas of interest are
Turkish politics, Turkey-U.S. relations, and security.

About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens
transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges
and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF contributes
research and analysis and convenes leaders on transatlantic issues
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About the On Turkey Series

GMFs On Turkey is an ongoing series of analysis briefs about Turkeys
current political situation and its future. GMF provides regular
analysis briefs by leading Turkish, European, and U.S. writers and
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observers. To access the latest briefs, please visit our web site at www.
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