VALLES V.

COMELEC
G.R. No. 137000. August 9, 2000
CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and January 15,
1999, respectively, of the Commission on Elections in SPA
No. 98-336, dismissing the petition for disqualification filed
by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998
elections for governor of Davao Oriental.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier
Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses,
Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet,
Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In
1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to
settle in the Philippines.
On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a
Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila.
Since then, she has continuously participated in the
electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as
well.
She served as Provincial Board Member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she
ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her
election was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a
petition for quo warranto, docketed as EPC No. 92-54,
alleging as ground therefor her alleged Australian
citizenship.
However, finding no sufficient proof that
respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the
Commission on Elections en banc dismissed the petition,
ratiocinating thus:

A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the

impugned resolution shows that respondent was able to
produce documentary proofs of the Filipino citizenship of her
late father... and consequently, prove her own citizenship
and filiation by virtue of the Principle of Jus Sanguinis, the
perorations
of
the
petitioner
to
the
contrary
notwithstanding.
On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged
important documents . . . no other evidence substantial in
nature surfaced to confirm the allegations of petitioner that
respondent is an Australian citizen and not a Filipino.
Express renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing
citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63 is an equivocal
and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and
consequence. The evidence adduced by petitioner are
inadequate, nay meager, to prove that respondent
contemplated renunciation of her Filipino citizenship.[1]
In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental. Her
opponent,
Francisco
Rabat,
filed
a
petition
for
disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95-066 before the
COMELEC, First Division, contesting her Filipino citizenship
but the said petition was likewise dismissed by the
COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision in EPC 92-54.
The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised
as an issue when she ran for re-election as governor of
Davao Oriental
in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Her
candidacy was questioned by the herein petitioner, Cirilo
Valles, in SPA No. 98-336.
On July 17, 1998, the COMELECs First Division came out
with a Resolution dismissing the petition, and disposing as
follows:
Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply and
We are to dispose the instant case on the merits trying it de
novo, the above table definitely shows that petitioner herein

has presented no new evidence to disturb the Resolution of

this Commission in SPA No. 95-066. The present petition
merely restates the same matters and incidents already
passed upon by this Commission not just in 1995 Resolution
but likewise in the Resolution of EPC No. 92-54. Not having
put forth any new evidence and matter substantial in
nature, persuasive in character or sufficiently provocative to
compel reversal of such Resolutions, the dismissal of the
present petition follows as a matter of course.
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no new
matters and issues tendered, We find no convincing reason
or impressive explanation to disturb and reverse the
Resolutions promulgated by this Commission in EPC 92-54
and SPA. 95-066. This Commission RESOLVES as it hereby
RESOLVES to DISMISS the present petition.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid Resolution but to no avail. The same was denied
by the COMELEC in its en banc Resolution of January 15,
1999.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the
present petition; questioning the citizenship of private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.
The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore,
qualified to run for a public office because (1) her father,
Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the
principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the
1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a
Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure
under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she
renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992
before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of

Australia and her Australian passport was accordingly

cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in
Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC
Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066,
declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the
elective position of Davao Oriental governor.
Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private
respondent is an Australian citizen, placing reliance on the
admitted facts that:
a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the
Bureau of Immigration as an Australian national and was
issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated
September 19, 1988;
b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an
Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), and
c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on
March 3, 1988.
Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and
circumstances, the private respondent had renounced her
Filipino citizenship. He contends that in her application for
alien certificate of registration and immigrant certificate of
residence, private respondent expressly declared under oath
that she was a citizen or subject of Australia; and said
declaration forfeited her Philippine citizenship, and operated
to disqualify her to run for elective office.
As regards the COMELECs finding that private respondent
had renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15,
1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic
Affairs of Australia and had her Australian passport
cancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified to by the
Australian Embassy here in Manila, petitioner argues that
the said acts did not automatically restore the status of
private respondent as a Filipino citizen.
According to
petitioner, for the private respondent to reacquire Philippine

citizenship she must comply with the mandatory

requirements for repatriation under Republic Act 8171; and
the election of private respondent to public office did not
mean the restoration of her Filipino citizenship since the
private respondent was not legally repatriated. Coupled
with her alleged renunciation of Australian citizenship,
private respondent has effectively become a stateless
person and as such, is disqualified to run for a public office
in the Philippines; petitioner concluded.
Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections
erred in applying the principle of res judicata to the case
under consideration; citing the ruling in Moy Ya Lim Yao vs.
Commissioner of Immigration,[3] that:
xxx Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever
the corresponding court or administrative authority decides
therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as
res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and
again as the occasion may demand. xxx
The petition is unmeritorious.
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of
jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or
citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her
birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which
determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of
birth.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May
16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to
the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of
Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian.
Historically, this was a year before the 1935 Constitution
took into effect and at that time, what served as the
Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic
acts by which the United States governed the country.
These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the

Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as

the Jones Law.
Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be
citizens of the Philippine islands. The Philippine Bill of 1902
defined Philippine citizens as:
SEC. 4 xxx
all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on
the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine,
and then resided in the Philippine Islands, and their children
born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States, except such as shall have
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain signed at Paris
December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
(underscoring ours)
The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:
SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who
were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands,
and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such
as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the
Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the
treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed
at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninetyeight, and except such others as have since become citizens
of some other country:
Provided, That the Philippine
Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to
provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
those natives of the Philippine Islands who cannot come
within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular
possessions of the United States, and such other persons
residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the
United States, or who could become citizens of the United

States under the laws of the United States if residing

therein. (underscoring ours)
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines
who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided
therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine
citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was
born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact
duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the
Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a
Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were
the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforos
daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez,
is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has
established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to wit:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents
who, before the adoption of this Constitution had been
elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and,
upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers
citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently
retained under the 1973[4] and 1987[5] Constitutions.
Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez,
is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father.

The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to

her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the
principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can
also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession
of dual citizenship.
Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that
the private respondent is a Filipino citizen, she has
nonetheless renounced her Philippine citizenship.
To
buttress
this
contention,
petitioner
cited
private
respondents application for an Alien Certificate of
Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence
(ICR), on September 19, 1988, and the issuance to her of an
Australian passport on March 3, 1988.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose
his citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining
twenty-one years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air
service of a foreign country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a
deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war,
unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been
granted: and
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if,
by virtue of the laws in force in her husbands country, she
acquires his nationality.

In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such

renunciation must be express. Petitioners contention that
the application of private respondent for an alien certificate
of registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of
merit. This issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar vs.
COMELEC[6] and in the more recent case of Mercado vs.
Manzano and COMELEC.[7]
In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that
respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that
he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a
Filipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of
registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.

Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child

of Filipino parent/s was born in another country has not been
included as a ground for losing ones Philippine citizenship.
Since private respondent did not lose or renounce her
Philippine citizenship, petitioners claim that respondent
must go through the process of repatriation does not hold
water.
Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that
the private respondent had dual citizenship, still, she is
disqualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental; citing
Section 40 of Republic Act 7160 otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991, which states:

And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that

the fact that respondent Manzano was registered as an
American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation and was holding an American passport on April
22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of
candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just assertions of
his American nationality before the termination of his
American citizenship.

SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are

disqualified from running for any elective local position:

Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco

Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an
alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an
effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate
against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to
effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be
express.[8] As held by this court in the aforecited case of
Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration
does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation
of ones citizenship. The application of the herein private
respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her
holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado
vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian
citizenship before she effectively renounced the same.
Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.

In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court

clarified dual citizenship as used in the Local Government
Code and reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of
the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance.[9] Recognizing
situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without performing
any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the
conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of
another state, the Court explained that dual citizenship as a
disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance.
The Court succinctly pronounced:

xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
Again, petitioners contention is untenable.

xxx the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40

(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, xxx 20 must be understood as
referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with
mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.

Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual

citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from running
for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for
candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect
Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of
candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship.[10] The filing of a certificate of candidacy
sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification as a dual citizen.[11] This is so
because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that
he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and
defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain
true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is
under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign
citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private respondent
filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone
terminated her Australian citizenship.
Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992,
private respondent executed a Declaration of Renunciation
of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department
of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12,
1992. And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian
passport of private respondent was cancelled, as certified to
by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of
Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC,
the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the
alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her
renunciation was effective, petitioners claim that private
respondent must go through the whole process of
repatriation holds no water.
Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised
as an issue in judicial or administrative proceedings, the
resolution or decision thereon is generally not considered
res judicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging the
same; citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of
Immigration.[12] He insists that the same issue of
citizenship may be threshed out anew.

Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned,

i.e. the principle of res judicata generally does not apply in
cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. However, in the
case of Burca vs. Republic,[13] an exception to this general
rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in
order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in
cases of citizenship, the following must be present:
1) a persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in a
controversy where said person is a party;
2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took
active part in the resolution thereof, and
3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya
Lim Yao, the case did not foreclose the weight of prior
rulings on citizenship.
It elucidated that reliance may
somehow be placed on these antecedent official findings,
though not really binding, to make the effort easier or
simpler.[14] Indeed, there appears sufficient basis to rely on
the prior rulings of the Commission on Elections in SPA. No.
95-066 and EPC 92-54 which resolved the issue of
citizenship in favor of the herein private respondent. The
evidence adduced by petitioner is substantially the same
evidence presented in these two prior cases. Petitioner
failed to show any new evidence or supervening event to
warrant a reversal of such prior resolutions. However, the
procedural issue notwithstanding, considered on the merits,
the petition cannot prosper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the
COMELEC Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998 and January 15,
1999, respectively, in SPA No. 98-336 AFFIRMED.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby
adjudged qualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

DELA CRUZ V. CA
[G.R. No. 138489. November 29, 2001]
ELEANOR DELA CRUZ, FEDERICO LUCHICO, JR., SOLEDAD
EMILIA CRUZ, JOEL LUSTRIA, HENRY PAREL, HELENA
HABULAN, PORFIRIO VILLENA, JOSEPH FRANCIA, CARMELLA
TORRES, JOB DAVID, CESAR MEJIA, MA. LOURDES V. DEDAL,
ALICE TIONGSON, REYDELUZ CONFERIDO, PHILIPPE LIM,
NERISSA SANCHEZ, MARY LUZ ELAINE PURACAN, RODOLFO
QUIMBO, TITO GENILO and OSCAR ABUNDO, as members of
the Board of the National Housing Authority from the period
covering 1991-1996, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, represented by its Commissioners, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
This petition for certiorari[1] assails the Decision No. 98-381
dated September 22, 1998, rendered by the Commission on
Audit (COA), denying petitioners appeal from the Notice of
Disallowance No. 97-011-061 issued by the NHA Resident
Auditor on October 23, 1997.
Such Notice disallowed
payment to petitioners of their representation allowances
and per diems for the period from August 19, 1991 to
August 31, 1996 in the total amount of P276,600.00.
Petitioners, numbering 20, were members of the Board of
Directors of the National Housing Authority (NHA) from 1991
to 1996.
On September 19, 1997, the COA issued Memorandum No.
97-038[2] directing all unit heads/auditors/team leaders of
the national government agencies and government-owned
and controlled corporations which have effected payment of
any form of additional compensation or remuneration to

cabinet secretaries, their deputies and assistants, or their

representatives, in violation of the rule on multiple positions,
to (a) immediately cause the disallowance of such additional
compensation or remuneration given to and received by the
concerned officials, and (b) effect the refund of the same
from the time of the finality of the Supreme Court En Banc
Decision in the consolidated cases of Civil Liberties Union vs.
Exexcutive Secretary and Anti-Graft League of the
Philippines, Inc. et al. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, et
al., promulgated on February 22, 1991.[3] The COA
Memorandum further stated that the said Supreme Court
Decision, which became final and executory on August 19,
1991,[4] declared Executive Order No. 284 unconstitutional
insofar as it allows Cabinet members, their deputies and
assistants to hold other offices, in addition to their primary
offices, and to receive compensation therefor.
Accordingly, on October 23, 1997, NHA Resident Auditor
Salvador J. Vasquez issued Notice of Disallowance No. 97011-061[5] disallowing in audit the payment of
representation allowances and per diems of "Cabinet
members who were the ex- officio members of the NHA
Board of Directors and/or their respective alternates who
actually received the payments." The total disallowed
amount of P276,600 paid as representation allowances and
per diems to each of the petitioners named below, covering
the period from August 19, 1991 to August 31, 1996, is
broken down as follows: [6]
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
SCHEDULE OF PAID REPRESENTATION/PER DIEM OF THE
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
For the period August 19, 1991 to August 31, 1996
AGENCY
DISALLOWED
DOF
P25,200.00

MEMBERS OF BOARD OF

AMOUNT

DIRECTORS
Eleanor

dela

Cruz

(1991-1993)
DTI
36,450.00
DOF
57,300.00
DOLE
4,500.00
DOLE
2,250.00
DOF
4,050.00
DOF
6,750.00
DTI
73,500.00
DOLE
4,500.00
DPWH
6,750.00
DPWH
3,150.00

(1993)

Federico Luchico, Jr.

(1991-1992)
Soledad

Emilia

Cruz

(1992-1995)
Joel Lustria
(1992)
Henry Parel
(1992)
Helena

Habulan

(1993-1994)
Porfirio

Villena

(1993)
Joseph

Francia

(1993-1995)
Carmela Torres
(1993)
Job David
(1993-1994)
Cesar Mejia

DOF
2,250.00
DTI
900.00
DOLE
11,250.00
DOLE
4,500.00
DOF
2,700.00

Ma. Lourdes V. Dedal

(1993)
Alice

Tiongson

(1994)
Reynaluz Conferido
(1994-1995)
Philippe Lim
(1994-1995)
Nerissa

Sanchez

(1995)

DOF
1,800.00

Mary Luz Elaine Puracan

DOLE
7,200.00

Rodolfo Quimbo

DOLE
14,400.00
DPWH
7,200.00
_____________
P276,600.00

(1995)

(1995)
Tito Genilo
(1995)
Oscar Abundo
(1995-1996)

============
Petitioners, through then Chairman Dionisio C. Dela Serna of
the NHA Board of Directors, appealed from the Notice of
Disallowance to the Commission on Audit[7] based on the
following grounds:
1. The Decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Liberties
Union and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. was
clarified in the Resolution of the Court En Banc on August 1,
1991, in that the constitutional ban against dual or multiple
positions applies only to the members of the Cabinet, their
deputies or assistants. It does not cover other appointive
officials with equivalent rank or those lower than the
position of Assistant Secretary; and
2. The NHA Directors are not Secretaries, Undersecretaries
or Assistant Secretaries and that they occupy positions
lower than the position of Assistant Secretary.
On September 22, 1998, the COA issued Decision No. 98381[8] denying petitioners' appeal, thus:
After circumspect evaluation of the facts and issues raised
herein, this Commission finds the instant appeal devoid of
merit. It must be stressed at the outset that the Directors
concerned were not sitting in the NHA Board in their own
right but as representatives of cabinet members and who
are constitutionally prohibited from holding any other office
or employment and receive compensation therefor, during
their tenure (Section 13, Article VII, Constitution; Civil
Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317).
It may be conceded that the directors concerned occupy
positions lower than Assistant Secretary which may exempt
them from the prohibition (under) the doctrine enunciated in
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, supra.
However, their positions are merely derivative; they derive
their authority as agents of the authority they are

representing; their power and authority is sourced from the

power and authority of the cabinet members they are sitting
for.
Sans the cabinet members, they are non-entities,
without power and without personality to act in any manner
with respect to the official transactions of the NHA. The
agent or representative can only validly act and receive
benefits for such action if the principal authority he is
representing can legally do so for the agent can only do so
much as his principal can do. The agent can never be larger
than the principal. If the principal is absolutely barred from
holding any position in and absolutely prohibited from
receiving any remuneration from the NHA or any
government agency, for that matter, so must the agent be.
Indeed, the water cannot rise above its source.[9]
Hence, this petition.
Presidential Decree No. 757 is the law "Creating the National
Housing Authority and dissolving the existing housing
agencies, defining its powers and functions, providing funds
therefor, and for other purposes." Section 7 thereof
provides:
SEC. 7.
Board of Directors. - The Authority shall be
governed by a Board of Directors, hereinafter referred to as
the Board, which shall be composed of the Secretary of
Public Works, Transportation and Communication, the
Director-General of the National Economic and Development
Authority, the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Labor,
the Secretary of Industry, the Executive Secretary and the
General Manager of the Authority.
From among the
members, the President will appoint a chairman.
The
members of the Board may have their respective alternates
who shall be the officials next in rank to them and whose
acts shall be considered the acts of their principals with the
right to receive their benefit: Provided, that in the absence
of the Chairman, the Board shall elect a temporary presiding
officer. x x x (Emphasis ours)

It bears stressing that under the above provisions, the

persons mandated by law to sit as members of the NHA
Board are the following: (1) the Secretary of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications, (2) the DirectorGeneral of the National Economic and Development
Authority, (3) the Secretary of Finance, (4) the Secretary of
Labor, (5) the Secretary of Industry, (6) the Executive
Secretary, and (7) the General Manager of the NHA. While
petitioners are not among those officers, however, they are
alternates of the said officers, whose acts shall be
considered the acts of their principals.
On this point, Section 13, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution,
provides:
SEC. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office
or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during
their tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in
the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within
the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his
tenure be appointed as Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, or the Office of Ombudsman, or as
Secretaries, Undersecretaries, Chairmen, or heads of
bureaus of offices, including government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
Interpreting the foregoing Constitutional provisions, this
Court, in Civil Liberties Union and Anti-Graft League of the
Philippines, Inc.,[10] held:

The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or

employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution
must not, however, be construed as applying to posts
occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of
said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do not
comprise any other office within the contemplation of the
constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of
additional duties and functions on said officials. x x x
x x x
xxx

x x x

To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is

not to be interpreted as covering positions held without
additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided
by law and as required by the primary functions of the
concerned officials office. The term ex-officio means from
office; by virtue of office. It refers to an authority derived
from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon
the individual character, but rather annexed to the official
position. Ex-officio likewise denotes an act done in an
official character, or as a consequence of office, and without
any other appointment or authority than that conferred by
the office. An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a
member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without
further warrant or appointment. To illustrate, by express
provision of law, the Secretary of Transportation and
Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of the Board of
the Philippine Ports Authority, and the Light Rail Transit
Authority.
x x x
xxx

x x x

The ex-officio position being actually and in legal

contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the
official concerned has no right to receive additional
compensation for his services in the said position.
The

reason is that these services are already paid for and

covered by the compensation attached to his principal
office. It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of
Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as an exofficio member thereof, he is actually and in legal
contemplation performing the primary function of his
principal office in defining policy in monetary banking
matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his
department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not
entitled to collect any extra compensation, whether it be in
the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or
some other such euphemism. By whatever name it is
designated, such additional compensation is prohibited by
the Constitution.
x x x
xxx

Buena, J., on official leave.

ONG V. ALEGRE
FRANCIS G. ONG,
Petitioner,
Present:

G.R. No. 163295

PANGANIBAN, C.J.
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,

x x x

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
GARCIA, JJ.

- versus -

(Emphasis ours)
Since the Executive Department Secretaries, as ex-oficio
members of the NHA Board, are prohibited from receiving
extra (additional) compensation, whether it be in the form
of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some
other such euphemism," it follows that petitioners who sit as
their alternates cannot likewise be entitled to receive such
compensation.
A contrary rule would give petitioners a
better right than their principals.
We thus rule that in rendering its challenged Decision, the
COA did not gravely abuse its discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents.
x---------------------x

Promulgated:
January 23, 2006

ROMMEL G. ONG,
Petitioner,

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Pardo, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon , Jr.,
and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., no part. Former DOLE Secretary.

versus -

G.R. No. 163354

JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents.
GARCIA, J.:

Before the Court are these two separate petitions

under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside
certain issuances of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) en banc.
The first, docketed as G.R. No. 163295, is a petition for
certiorari with petitioner Francis G. Ong impugning the
COMELEC en banc resolution[1] dated May 7, 2004 in SPA
Case No. 04-048, granting private respondent Joseph
Stanley Alegre's motion for reconsideration of the resolution
dated March 31, 2004[2] of the COMELECs First Division.
The second, G.R. No. 163354, is for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, with application for injunctive
relief, filed by petitioner Rommel Ong, brother of Francis,
seeking, among other things, to stop the COMELEC from
enforcing and implementing its aforesaid May 7, 2004 en
banc resolution in SPA Case No. 04-048 pending the
outcome of the petition in G.R. No. 163295.
Per its en banc Resolution of June 1, 2004, the Court
ordered the consolidation of these petitions.
The recourse stemmed from the following essential and
undisputed factual backdrop:
Private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre (Alegre) and
petitioner Francis Ong (Francis) were candidates who filed
certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. Francis was
then the incumbent mayor.

On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed with the COMELEC

Provincial Office a Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due Course
and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy[3] of Francis. Docketed
as SPA Case No. 04-048, the petition to disqualify was
predicated on the three-consecutive term rule, Francis
having, according to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, May 1998,
and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed office
as mayor and discharged the duties thereof for three (3)
consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections.
To digress a bit, the May 1998 elections saw both Alegre and
Francis opposing each other for the office of mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte, with the latter being
subsequently proclaimed by COMELEC winner in that
contest.
Alegre subsequently filed an election protest,
docketed as Election Case No. 6850 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) at Daet, Camarines Norte.
In it, the RTC
declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in that 1998
mayoralty contest,[4] albeit the decision came out only on
July 4, 2001, when Francis had fully served the 1998-2001
mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to serve the
2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality of San
Vicente.
Acting on Alegres petition to disqualify and to cancel
Francis certificate of candidacy for the May 10, 2004
elections, the First Division of the COMELEC rendered on
March 31, 2004 a resolution[5] dismissing the said petition
of Alegre, rationalizing as follows:
We see the circumstances in the case now before us
analogous to those obtaining in the sample situations
addressed by the Highest Court in the Borja case. Herein,
one of the requisites for the application of the three term
rule is not present. Francis Ong might have indeed fully
served the mayoral terms of 1995 to 1998; 1998 to 2001
and 2001 to 2004. The mayoral term however, from 1998 to
2001 cannot be considered his because he was not duly

elected thereto.
The [RTC] of Daet, Camarines Norte,
Branch 41 has voided his election for the 1998 term when it
held, in its decision that Stanley Alegre was the legally
elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election in San
Vicente, Camarines Norte. This disposition had become
final after the [COMELEC] dismissed the appeal filed by Ong,
the case having become moot and academic.
xxx

xxx

xxx

On the basis of the words of the Highest Court

pronounced in the Lonzanida case and applicable in the
case at bench, Ong could not be considered as having
served as mayor from 1998 to 2001 because he was not
duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as a
presumptive winner; which presumption was later
overturned when [the RTC] decided with finality that [he]
lost in the May 1998 elections. (Words in bracket and
emphasis in the original).

Undaunted, Alegre filed a timely motion for

reconsideration, contending, in the main, that there was a
misapplication of the three-term rule, as applied in the cited
cases of Borja vs. Comelec and Lonzanida vs. Comelec,
infra.

On May 7, 2004, the COMELEC en banc issued, in SPA

No. 04-048, a resolution[6] reversing the March 31, 2004
resolution of the COMELECs First Division and thereby (a)
declaring Francis as disqualified to run for mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004; (b)
ordering the deletion of Francis name from the official list of
candidates; and (c) directing the concerned board of
election inspectors not to count the votes cast in his favor.

The following day, May 8, Francis received a fax machine

copy of the aforecited May 7, 2004 resolution, sending him
posthaste to seek the assistance of his political party, the
Nationalist Peoples Coalition, which immediately nominated
his older brother, Rommel Ong (Rommel), as substitute
candidate. At about 5:05 p.m. of the very same day - which
is past the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy,
Rommel filed his own certificate of candidacy for the
position of mayor, as substitute candidate for his brother
Francis.
The following undisputed events then transpired:
1. On May 9, 2004, or a day before the May 10 elections,
Alegre filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel
Certificate of Rommel Ong.
2. Atty. Evillo C. Pormento, counsel for the Ong brothers,
addressed a letter[7] to Provincial Election Supervisor (PES)
of Camarines Norte Liza Z. Cario and Acting Election Officer
Emily G. Basilonia in which he appealed that, owing to the
COMELECs inaction on Alegre's petition to cancel Rommels
certificate of candidacy, the name Rommel Ong be
included in the official certified list of candidates for mayor
of San Vicente, Camarines Norte. The desired listing was
granted by the PES Carino.
3. On May 10, 2004, Alegre wrote[8] to then COMELEC
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, Commissioner-in-Charge
for Regions IV and V, seeking clarification on the legality of
the action thus taken by the PES Cario. Responding,
Commissioner Garcillano issued a Memorandum under date
May 10, 2004[9] addressed to PES Liza D. Zabala-Cario,
ordering her to implement the resolution of the COMELEC en
banc in SPA No. 04-048 promulgated on May 7, 2004.[10]
Said Memorandum partly stated:
The undersigned ADOPTS the recommendation of Atty.
Alioden D. Dalaig [Director IV, Law Department], which he

quote your stand, "that substitution is not proper if the

certificate of the substituted candidacy is denied due
course. In the Resolution of the Commission En banc, the
Certificate of candidacy of Francis Ong was denied due
course," and elaborated further that:
"x x x there is an existing policy of the Commission not to
include the name of a substitute candidate in the certified
list of candidates unless the substitution is approved by the
Commission.
In view, thereof, it is recommended that 1) the substitute
certificate of candidacy of Rommel Ong Gan Ong, should
be denied due course; and 2) the election officer be
directed to delete his name from the list of candidates."
The above position of the Commission was in line with the
pronouncement of Supreme Court in Miranda vs. Abaya (311
SCRA 617) which states:
"There can no valid substitution where a candidate is
excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial and
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy."
In view thereof, you are hereby directed to faithfully
implement the said Resolution of the Commission En Banc in
SPA No. 04-048 promulgated on May 7, 2004. (Emphasis in
the original; words in bracket added].

4. Owing to the aforementioned Garcillano Memorandum, it

would seem that the Chairman of the Municipal Board of
Canvasser of San Vicente issued an order enjoining all
concerned not to canvass the votes cast for Rommel,
prompting the latter to file a protest with that Board.[11]
5. On May 11, 2004, the Municipal Board of Canvassers
proclaimed Alegre as the winning candidate for the
mayoralty post in San Vicente, Camarines Norte.[12]

On May 12, 2004, Francis filed before the Court a petition for
certiorari, presently docketed as G.R. No. 163295. His
brother Rommels petition in G.R. No. 163354 followed
barely a week after.
In our en banc resolution dated June 1, 2004, G.R. No.
163295 and G.R. No. 163354 were consolidated.[13]
Meanwhile, on June 4, 2004, the COMELEC issued an order
dismissing private respondent Alegres Petition to Deny Due
Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Rommel
Ong, for being moot and academic.[14]
The issues for resolution of the Court are:
In G.R. No. 163295, whether the COMELEC acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing its en banc resolution dated May 7,
2004 declaring petitioner Francis as disqualified to run for
Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004
elections and consequently ordering the deletion of his
name from the official list of candidates so that any vote
cast in his favor shall be considered stray.
In G.R. No. 163354, whether the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion when it denied due course to
Rommels certificate of candidacy in the same mayoralty
election as substitute for his brother Francis.
A resolution of the issues thus formulated hinges on
the question of whether or not petitioner Franciss
assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines
Norte for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should be
considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term
limit rule.

Respondent COMELEC resolved the question in the

affirmative. Petitioner Francis, on the other hand, disagrees.
He argues that, while he indeed assumed office and
discharged the duties as Mayor of San Vicente for three
consecutive terms, his proclamation as mayor-elect in the
May 1998 election was contested and eventually nullified
per the decision of the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte dated
July 4, 2001. Pressing the point, petitioner argues, citing
Lonzanida
vs.
Comelec[15],
that
a
proclamation
subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and one
assuming office on the strength of a protested proclamation
does so as a presumptive winner and subject to the final
outcome of the election protest.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is
found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.

Section 43 (b) of the Local Government Code restates

the same rule as follows:
Sec. 43. Term of Office.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than

three consecutive years in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered an interruption in the continuity of service for

the full term for which the elective official concerned was
elected.

For the three-term limit for elective local government

officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur,
to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for
three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government
post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive
terms.[16]
With the view we take of the case, the disqualifying
requisites are present herein, thus effectively barring
petitioner Francis from running for mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. There can
be no dispute about petitioner Francis Ong having been duly
elected mayor of that municipality in the May 1995 and
again in the May 2001 elections and serving the July 1,
1995- June 30, 1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004
terms in full. The herein controversy revolves around the
1998-2001 mayoral term, albeit there can also be no
quibbling that Francis ran for mayor of the same
municipality in the May 1998 elections and actually served
the 1998-2001 mayoral term by virtue of a proclamation
initially declaring him mayor-elect of the municipality of San
Vicente. The question that begs to be addressed, therefore,
is whether or not Franciss assumption of office as Mayor of
San Vicente, Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998 to June 30,
2001, may be considered as one full term service in the
context of the consecutive three-term limit rule.
We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for
Francis, service for the full term, and should be counted as
a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit
prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions,
supra, barring local elective officials from being elected and
serving for more than three consecutive term for the same
position.

It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in

Election Protest Case No. 6850,[17] that it was Francis
opponent (Alegre) who won in the 1998 mayoralty race
and, therefore, was the legally elected mayor of San
Vicente. However, that disposition, it must be stressed, was
without practical and legal use and value, having been
promulgated after the term of the contested office has
expired. Petitioner Francis contention that he was only a
presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his
proclamation was under protest did not make him less than
a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal
Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected
mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his
assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the
functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should
legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of
the three-term rule.
The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary
view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean
that Alegre would under the three-term rule - be
considered as having served a term by virtue of a veritably
meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually
served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due
course after an election.

Petitioner cites, but, to our mind, cannot seek refuge from

the Courts ruling in, Lonzanida vs. Comelec,[18] citing Borja
vs. Comelec[19]. In Lonzanida, petitioner Lonzanida was
elected and served for two consecutive terms as mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections.
He then ran again for the same position in the May 1995
elections, won and discharged his duties as Mayor.
However, his opponent contested his proclamation and filed
an election protest before the RTC of Zambales, which, in a
decision dated January 9, 1997, ruled that there was a
failure of elections and declared the position vacant. The
COMELEC affirmed this ruling and petitioner Lonzanida

acceded to the order to vacate the post.

Lonzanida
assumed the office and performed his duties up to March
1998 only. Now, during the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida
again ran for mayor of the same town. A petition to
disqualify, under the three-term rule, was filed and was
eventually granted. There, the Court held that Lonzanida
cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the
post in the May 1995 election, and that he did not fully
serve the 1995-1998 mayoralty term by reason of
involuntary relinquishment of office. As the Court pointedly
observed, Lonzanida cannot be deemed to have served the
May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate
[and in fact vacated] his post before the expiration of the
term.
The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is
at once apparent. For one, in Lonzanida, the result of the
mayoralty election was declared a nullity for the stated
reason of failure of election, and, as a consequence
thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was
nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the office of
mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not fully serve the 19951998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance
from office as a result of legal processes. In fine, there was
an effective interruption of the continuity of service.
On the other hand, the failure-of-election factor does not
obtain in the present case. But more importantly, here,
there was actually no interruption or break in the continuity
of Francis service respecting the 1998-2001 term. Unlike
Lonzanida, Francis was never unseated during the term in
question; he never ceased discharging his duties and
responsibilities as mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte
for the entire period covering the 1998-2001 term.
The ascription, therefore, of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the COMELEC en banc when it disqualified Francis
from running in the May 10, 2004 elections for the
mayoralty post of San Vicente and denying due course to his

certificate of candidacy by force of the constitutional and

statutory provisions regarding the three-term limit rule for
any local elective official cannot be sustained. What the
COMELEC en banc said in its May 7, 2004 assailed
Resolution commends itself for concurrence:
As correctly pointed out by Petitioner-Movant [Alegre]in
applying the ruling in the Borja and Lonzanida cases in the
instant petition will be erroneous because the factual milieu
in those cases is different from the one obtaining here.
Explicitly, the three-term limit was not made applicable in
the cases of Borja and Lonzanida because there was an
interruption in the continuity of service of the three
consecutive terms.
Here, Respondent Ong would have
served continuously for three consecutive terms, from 1995
to 2004. His full term from 1998 to 2001 could not be
simply discounted on the basis that he was not duly elected
thereto on account of void proclamation because it would
have iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and
inequality as it rewards a legally disqualified and repudiated
loser with a crown of victory. (Word in bracket added;
emphasis in the original)

Given the foregoing consideration, the question of

whether or not then Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano
overstepped his discretion when he issued the May 10, 2004
Memorandum, ordering the implementation of aforesaid
May 7, 2004 COMELEC en banc resolution even before its
finality[20] is now of little moment and need not detain us
any longer.
Just as unmeritorious as Francis petition in G.R. No.
163295 is Rommels petition in G.R. No. 163354 in which he
(Rommel) challenges the COMELEC's act of not including his
name as a substitute candidate in the official list of
candidates for the May 10, 2004 elections. As it were,
existing COMELEC policy[21] provides for the non-inclusion

of the name of substitute candidates in the certified list of

candidates pending approval of the substitution.
Not to be overlooked is the Courts holding in Miranda
vs. Abaya,[22]
that a candidate whose certificate of
candidacy has been cancelled or not given due course
cannot be substituted by another belonging to the same
political party as that of the former, thus:
While there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of
a registered or accredited political party may substitute for a
candidate of the same party who had been disqualified for
any cause, this does not include those cases where the
certificate of candidacy of the person to be substituted had
been denied due course and cancelled under Section 78 of
the Code.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
While the law
enumerated the occasions where a candidate may be validly
substituted, there is no mention of the case where a
candidate is excluded not only by disqualification but also
by denial and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy.
Under the foregoing rule, there can be no valid substitution
for the latter case, much in the same way that a nuisance
candidate whose certificate of candidacy is denied due
course and/or cancelled may not be substituted. If the
intent of the lawmakers were otherwise, they could have so
easily and conveniently included those persons whose
certificates of candidacy have been denied due course
and/or cancelled under the provisions of Section 78 of the
Code.
xxx

xxx

xxx

A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be

considered a candidate in much the same way as any
person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all
can not, by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at
all.

xxx

xxx

xxx

After having considered the importance of a certificate of

candidacy, it can be readily understood why in Bautista
[Bautista vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 133840, November 13,
1998] we ruled that a person with a cancelled certificate is
no candidate at all. Applying this principle to the case at
bar and considering that Section 77 of the Code is clear and
unequivocal that only an official candidate of a registered or
accredited party may be substituted, there demonstrably
cannot be any possible substitution of a person whose
certificate of candidacy has been cancelled and denied due
course.

In any event, with the hard reality that the May 10,
2004 elections were already pass, Rommel Ongs petition
in G.R. No. 163354 is already moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED and
the assailed en banc Resolution dated May 7, 2004 of the
COMELEC, in SPA No. 04-048 AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution,
and the Division Chairman's Attestation, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.