Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute

THE RASA THEORY AND THE DARANAS

Author(s): K. S. Arjunwadkar
Source: Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Vol. 65, No. 1/4 (1984), pp. 81100
Published by: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute
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THE RASA THEORY AND THE DARANAS

BY
K. S. Arjunwadkar
The Rasa-straof Bharata1has served as a fountain-headof all later
discussionson rasa. Bharata treatsof the rasa complexas a resultantof its
correlativesconsistingof some mentaland some physicalphenomena. The
mentalphenomenaare bhvas dividedintopermanent( sthyins) and visiting
( samcrins);and the physical phenomenaare the hang-onsor the objectsof
the sthyins( lambana-vibhvas), the contributories
( uddipana-vibhvas
),
and the manifestations( anubhvas) with their collaborators classed as
sttvikabhvas. They are all comradesin a joint operationoriginatingfrom
the personhousingthesthyinand extendingto theperson/objectthe sthyin
hangs on, contributed
byconditionsfavourableto thishanging-on,producing
physical,visibleeffectson rhepersonhousingthesthyinwhichmanifestthe
invisiblesthyin. The sthyins
, the vyabhicrins
, thesttvikasand theanubhvas are housed in or emanate fromthe same person; and the two types
of vibhvas are exteriorto him. This operation presentedon the stage
in the form of a drama and watched by the spectators(the rasikas)9
resultsin an experience,therasa, whichtherasikasrelishand cherish.Bharata
comparesthisprocesswiththatof the preparationof food with ingredients
of different
tastes- rasas - relishedby theeater,2which,incidentally,
indicates
the source from which the term rasa is borrowed. While detailing this
apparatusof the rasa, Bharata enumerateseight( nine, as viewedby some )
to eight( or nine) sthyins
rasas corresponding
and
, thirty-three
vyabhicrins
He
:
the
sttvikas.
also
divides
as
rasas
into
two
four
causes
eight
groups
of the remainingfour. What Bharata expounded as relatingto drama is
extended to poetryand other arts. The rasa theory,therefore,formsthe
nucleusof the aestheticdeliberationsin Sanskritthroughcenturies.
From the outlineof Bharata's rasa theory,it is evidentthatit is original in most of the concepts,theirclassificationand the metalanguagehe uses
to expound it. No work in the Sanskritliterature,
or priorto
contemporary
the Ntyasstra of Bharata, attemptstreatment
of similartopicsin a way or
1
8 t SSRI: ' 3^1?- 3WI|

I Ntyasstra,VI, betweenverse31and 32.

loc.C(.

Il [ Annals BORI ]

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82

Annals BORI , LXV ( 1984 )

by a methodcomparableto thatof Bharata. The creditdoes not, of course,

go to Bharata alone but is sharedbyhimwithhis predecessorson the subject
whomhe has frequentlyquoted. As a probable source a referencemay be
made to workson Ayurvedawhich,while treatingof their materiamedica,
speak of the rasa, vrya, vipka and prabhva of thematerialdescribed.3
One would expect an analysis of the facultiesof mind in the Yoga System
which Bharata mighthave made use of ; but littleis foundin thatsystem
whichhas even a remoteresemblancewithwhatBharata has presented. The
Smkhyasystem,akin to the Yoga, says littledifferentfromits sister-system
on thiscount. Even Kmasutra, havingratias its special field,disappointed
me in myattemptsto finda likenessof Bharata's analysisof mentalfaculties.
Surprisingly
enough,- and it may be a pure coincidence,- thereis a striking
resemblancebetween Bharata's theory of rasa and Carvaka's theory of
caitanya- consciousness,a qualityof thebody not presentindividuallyin the
four elements- theearth, the water, the fireand the air that combine to
make thebody but evolvingfromcombinationthereof.4 The same may be
said of rasa and its correlatives.
detailedso faras its mechanismis concerned,
This theory,sufficiently
which
generationsof critics offeredto solve in theirown
presentedproblems
are
The
varied, inter-relatedand so perplexingthat, even
right.
problems
afterlong discussions,the only satisfactionone is likelyto deriveis thatfor
almost every question there is a counter-question. And above all, anjr
solution has to be reconciled with what Bharata mightor mightnot have
said hereor elsewhere. If thecriticsweregiventhe choice of pickingup the
bestradical of Bharataand keepingconsistentwithit withoutany responsi^
bilityof defendinghis stand elsewhere,one feels hopeful that something
discussionsof the
morecoherentwould have come out of the hair-splitting
commentators.
The problemsstart with the very fundamentalquestionas to where
does rasa abide - in the character,in the actor or in the spectator? Every
one of thesealternativeshas its own difficulties.This breeds the next question : What is the nature of the experiencethat is called the rasa ? Is it
inference
or'perceptionor somethingelse ? This questioninevitablyleads to
the determinationof the relationof the sthayin withthe rasa. Are they
? And how does Bharata forgetto make a referenceto
identicalor different
3 Astahga-hrdaya
Sutra.1. 14etc.
4 Cp. 3^ xRnfi;
I
^4: m
lcTWt

I
i Sarva-darsana-samgraha
, Crvka.

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RJUNWADKAR: The Rasa Theoryand theDaranas

83

thesthyyinin his famousrasa-stra? What relation does rasa have with

its correlatives? What is the outcomeof rasa experience: all pleasureand no
pain, or pleasure from some rasas and pain from others? If pain is the
outcome of some rasa, how is the connoisseur interestedin it? These are
the basic questionson which criticshave wrangled for centuries. Not all
criticshave attemptedall questions. They probably presumed,as was the
examinationsome years back, that they had
practicein a higher university
to attemptc not more thanthree/four questions' ! We have then no way
but to value theiranswers' collectively* as was also the practiceof the examinersthatwenthand in hand withthe not more than' allowance.
The earliestcandidate on record who appeared for this exam was
Lollata who preferedto seek aid from his common sense rather than from
any established dogma. For him, rasa, which is substantiallythe sthyin
createdby the vibhvas,revealedby anubhvasand nourishedby the vyabhicrinsyabided primarilyin the characterin the play like Rma, and secondarilyin the actor who enacted the character.5 His outlook will be clear
whenwe imaginea flowerwhicheventuallywithersaway givingrise to a tiny
fruitthatdevelopsand ripens underfavorable nutritiveand climatic conditions.
This explanation,simpleas it sounds, createsmoreproblems than it
solves. It is not a fact with all sthyyinsthat they are nourished as the
timeadvances. Sthyins like anger and surprisewane with the time. They
would never reach the stage of rasa if we accept Lollata's explanation.
Rama is not,then,to any reasonable degree,let alone theprimary,the receptacle of rasa. Nourishmentof a sthyinlike rati is possiblein the real Rama
at the sightof the real Sta, both of whom are no more at the time of the
stagingof a play. All talk of the production,revelationand nourishmentof
therasa as Lollata visualisesit is, like thatof the fruitof a treebeyondthe
reach of a consumer,puerile.
For ankukawho thusfindsfaultwithLollata's view,the actorhimself,
of the spectatorsand is not far removed from them
is
who contemporary
Rama
whomhe imitates,is the receptacleof rasa, which
as are characterslike
is an imitationof the sthyinin the real character like Rama. This
sthyinin the actoris a matterof inferencearrivedat from his acting. Both
the sthyinand its correlativesare thus unreal and hence are named by
8 ifa

w- 1
i
^Ner; i H
Abhinv
abfioration the Rasa-stra,Page 124 in Rasa referred
to as Kang,
bhvavicraby Prof.R. P. Kangle,Bombay,1973,hereafter
followed
bypagenumbers.

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Annals BORI , LXV ( 1984)

84

Bharata by artificialtermslike vibhva

.6 How can such an unreal apparatus
lead to a real enjoymentof a rasa ? - *As does the pictureof a horse lead to
thecognitionof a real horse,' ( citra~turaga-nyya
)7 says akuka; deems
' and
it ' samvadi-bhrama
quotes Dharmakirti,the Buddhistphilosopher,as a
support.Imaginea personwho sees raysof lightat a distance, thinksthatit
is a jewel, rushesto secureit, reachesthe spot and, to his disappointment,
finds a lamp there. Imagine also anotherpersonwho sees rays of a jewel
( and not thejewel ifself,it being too small and too farfromhim), thinks
that it is a jewel,similarlyreachesthe spot and findsa jewel. In fact, both
are mistakeninasmuchas theytake as a jewel somethingotherthan a jewel.
But thisfalseknowledge( bhrama) producesa real action in them,withthe
only differencethat one of the two is rewarded with what he sought
) whilethe otheris not ( visamvdi-bhrama
( samvadi-bhrama
).8
This is how akuka argues, conceding that the inferredsthyin in
the actor and its apparatusare unreal. Personallyhe thinksthatthe cognition of the sthyinin theactor defiesdefinition,cannot be includedin any of
the knownvarietiesof cognition,but, at the same time, cannot be denied as
it is a matterof first-hand
experienceforeveryrasi/ca.9
It is customaryto deem akuka a Naiyyika on the strengthof his
view that rasa, thatis the sthyinimitated,is inferred. I do not subscribe
to thisview; for Nyya is a systemwhich expounds in detail all the four
means of knowledge of which inferenceis one, and nothingtypicalof the
Nyya systemis involvedin this view. A farmerdoes not need to study
Nyya to inferthatit would rain beforelong when he sees heavyclouds in
is adequate to deemhima Naiyyika,
the sky.If akuka's theoryof inference
6 3C-IR...

srdtaftw:
p-rrt
xT
f:| Kaiig.129-30
7 Thisexpression,
intheAbhinavabhrati
buthinted
at bysomeotherwords
missing
of a horse) usedbyAbhinava
on( Kang.145), is first
further
found
( a cow,instead
in hisKvyapraksa( UllsaIV ), whilerepresenting
used by Mammata
SaskukaV
view. 0/>.cit.p. 134.
8
I
Pramana-varttika
, 2.57.
c
view by thewords
Thisis alludedto in Sankuka's
'
Kang.130.
9 srfnicr
H ft*
T
i

gFqi

Il Kang.130.

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: The Rasa Theoryand theDaranas

RJUNWADKAR

85

his referenceto Dharmakirtican be regardeda sufficient

groundto deemhim
a Buddhist! I wouldconsiderthesecondclaimas more plausible,as theverse
quoted fromDharmakirtiis closelyrelatedto thetheoryof knowledgeof the
Buddhistswho denythe existenceof theobjective world. This sortof n'ive
taggingon a flimsygroundwould be of littleconsequencein a seriousstudy.
akuka is attackedforholdingthisviewby both BhattaTauta and his
'
disciple, Abhinavagupta. You call rasa an imitation; okay. But from
whose pointof view ? From thatof the spectatoror of the actor? ' interro*
gates Tauta, and bringsout the fallacy in akuka's stand fromeach of
them. To know somethingas imitation,the audience must know the imitated. (Just as to appreciatea parody,you must know the original.) Bat
none has seen a characterlike the real Rma.10 Aid even if it were not a
characterlike Rma farremovedin time fromthe spectator,cognition of
imitationis possibleonlyof thingsperceptible,and not of a sthyinwhichis
beyondthe reach of sense-organsand is onlyinferred. And even as inferred,
thesthyinis cognized as a sthyinand not as an imitationof a sthyin.It is
ridiculousto believethatan imitationof the hetu( smoke-likemist) leads to
the inferenceof an imitationof thesdhya( fire-like
flowerJ.11The imitation
theorydoes not hold good even fromthe pointof view of the actor who has
not seen the real Rma; and a sthyinin anotherperson is as imperceptible
to theactor as to the spectator. How can and would an actor imitatethe
sorrowof Rma ? Rma was sorry; the actor is not. The actor can at his
best shed tearsas did Rma when he was sorry. But shedding tears is not
the same as beingsorry. And how can sheddingtears, whichis common to
all normalpeople includingtheactor when theyare sorry,be an imitationof
Rma alone ?12 Needless to say that akuka's analogy of the horse in a
pictureis beside the point, as both the imitationand the imitatedin this
case are perceptible. Moreover, a pictureis createdby means of colours;
a sthyin,which already exists, is only revealed,never created. While
akuka's theorythatthe cognitionof thesthyinin the actor
controverting
defies definition,Tauta introducesan importantidea that what we see as
Rma in a play is Rma the general,and not Rma the particular; and this
is corroboratedwhen an actor enacting Rma is substitutedby another
withoutany problemto the spectator.13
10
^ K<KIMld*rcr:
I 1 =3RPIlt
Il Kang.135.
"
137.
I Kang.
it inq
W igsiRftffel
12 ^
i
rarfq
' ... q q*
2
^iirfq u)
?fcr
dRd'T%ft.
i Rang.142.
18
^sqfirfct
I
I Kang.140.

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ArmaisBORI, LXV ( 984 )

86

Followingin the footstepsof his preceptor,Abhinavagupta picks up

more
holes in the theory offeredby Sakuka. Imitation by its very
spme
nature,arguesAbbinava, breedslaughter ( as, forinstance,does a parody)
among thethirdpartyspectators,and angeramong those thatare imitated.14
Drama can neverbe an imitation; forimitationis a relationthat can exist:
between two particularentities. When it is clear that the actor cannot
imitatethe real Rma, the only alternativeleftis thathe makesactions that
all normalpeople do under comparable conditions. If this is imitation,we
arriveat the funnyconclusionthatthe actor is imitatinghimself! In other
words,what is generalcannot be regarded as imitation.16What is drama,
that is a repeat experience,
then? It is a kind of anuvyavasya
; re-cognition
a typicalawarenessof a cognitionin whicha spectatorrevels.
akuka thusstandsdiscredited.The nextcriticis BhattaNyaka, the
authorof Hrdaya-darpana( now lost, and knownthroughquotations), which
attemptsto refute nandavardhana's theory of dhvani. Nyaka should,
chronologically,figureafter nandavardhana whose explanationof rasa is
upheld by Abhinava. But Nyaka is usheredin by Abbinava, forhis view
is finallyto be refutedby himand the view of nanda-Abhinavaschool to be
. Nyaka startswith the denial of rasa as an
introducedas the siddhnta
of
object cognition,productionor suggestion( as Ananda-Abhinava claim ).
Is it thespectatoror thecharacterlike Rma thatis the receptacleof rasa ?
Ia thefirstalternative,the spectatorwould have to be sorrywhenhe cognizes
pathos,and would not care to have the same experienceagain; forwho would
like to be sorryifone can help it? But he is not,forhe is in no way relatedto
Sita whoseseparation mightmake himsorry. He is likelyto be sorryif he
iffina similarcondition. But, what ifhe is not, and if he has his beloved by
his side while watchingthe play? He is likely tobe sorryifhe identifies
himselfwith
himselfwithRma. But how can an ordinarypersonidentify
such superhumanpersonalitiesas Rma? In the second alternative,thatis,
if'Rrnais the receptacleof rasa, is the spectator'scognitionof rasa of the
? All theseoptionswhich
natureof memory,verbal knowledgeor inference
implyany indirectcognitionof rasa militateagainstthe spectator'sexperience
that he is having a direct experienceof rasa. If a rasa like rngrais
cognized by the spectatoras based in other persons,would he not feel
14

sfsci

... PTCFlFlt
5
^rcyTfo(4
(GaekwarSeries1936)! 107.
^ ^
SWFWHfWI

afe

sfi;
Wlffl;;
A
bhinavabhrati
I
cmTHtyasstra

I toc, cit*

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Arjunwadkar

: The Rasa Theoryand theDaranas

embarrassedto watcha man and a woman in privacy, provided,of course,

he is a gentleman?16
Nyaka would, therefore,like to explain rata as a joint outcomeof
two operations- ' bhvakatva9 and ' bhojakatva' By thefirsthe means the
'
'
process of sdhrarilkarana or generalisation,i.e. shearingrasa and its
correlativesof theirparticularspace-time-person
context and making them
a ' commonwealth* - a stateproducedbyfourfoldactingin a play and gunlamkras in poetry. Thus generalisedrasa is relishedby the spectatorby
bhojakatva, a unique processof the minddistinctfromthe commonlyrecognised meansof cognitionsuch as perception,memoryand others. Though
made up of threeprimeval qualities, the Sattva, the Rajas and the Tamas,
it is dominatedby the Sattva, as a result of which this experiencerests in
the consciousness( caitanya) full of light and happiness, - muchthe same
way as in the realization of the Supreme Brahman( Para-Brahmsvda
savidha). Nyaka conceivesbhvakatvaand bhojakatvaas processes exclusively operating in the field of poetry( and drama) and distinctfromthe
abhidhprocesswhichis commonto poetryand otherliterature,17mandatory
( Veda etc.) and advisory ( Itihsa, Purna etc.).18 The chief purpose of
poetryis, therefore,
purejoy, and, onlysecondarily,didactic.
Even a hurriedsurveyof Nayaka's view would revealthatin formulating his theoryhe has drawn substantiallyon Mmms ( as Abhinava
understandshim), Smkhya and, most of all, Vednta, and exemplifies
whatan imaginative,discriminating
man of wide knowledgecan contribute
to the expositionof a theory. For his bhvakatvaconcept, he is indebtedto
Mimmsa ( as Abhinava understandshim); for the constitutionof the rasa
experience,to Samkhya{ also absorbed in Vednta); and fortheidea of overwhelming,total absorptionin the experience,to Vednta.Nyaka is the fist
18 # *
SRfact,

I
flfspq

^
f| Tif

f|
srfi
RSwaf wraj ... qw g srltr

Kang.147.
is 5i5^5in=ri?qqri^l
TR
^Tfff

WT. | ^ ^

i
^

Kang.147.

sqrqf^qp-TFi
II Hrdaya-darpana
, as quotedinDhyanyalok
fflocana, Kavyaml
p. 27.
edition,

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88

ArmaisBORI, LXV ( 1984 )

criticto comparepoetic experienceto thatof the BrahmanwhichtheIndian

traditionregardsas the highestgoal of life. All subsequentwriterson poetics
are indebtedto him forthis brilliantconception. Even Abhinava who has
rejectedhis contentionthat rasa is not a cognitionand that bhavakatvais a
specificprocessin poetic experience,18concedes his descriptionof the poetic
experienceas on a par withthespiritualexperience,and his bhojakatvaprocess
as identical with Ananda's vyarijan. As monistic Saivagama, of which
fromthe monistic
Abhinava is the chief exponent,is basicallynot different
Vednta, indebtednessof the rasa expositionto aivgama needs no special
reference.
whichAbhinavahas
The two salientpointsin Nayaka's interpretation
is
i
and
under
:
not
a
are
rasa
fire
( ii ) bhavakatvais a
)
cognition,
passed
(
. About the
which
sdhranlkararta
about
the
special poetic process
brings
to call rasa a bhogafirst,Abhinava remarksthat it is self-contradictory
pleasure,and at the same timeto denythat it is a pratiti - cognition. What
is pleasure if not a form of awareness or cognition? Abhinava has no
objectionto singleit out fromthecommon formsof cognitionor awareness;
but to call it no cognitionis equivalent to make it unfitforany definition,
- like a ghost!19 As forthe bhavakatva
, Abhinava takes it as anotherselffor
contradiction
has
committed; it militatesagainsthisviewthatrasa
Nyaka
is not produced. Bhavakatvais thesame as bhvan of the Mmmsakas; and
bhvanis conceived as a mental process of a person that causes a thingto
come intobeing. It operatesthroughtwo media: the word and the meaning;
:
and is accordinglynamed &abdi%and rthi, as illustratedby the statements
41 mustdo this.' Mmmsakas

this
ii
me
and
i
to
do
someone
desires
',
( )
( )
is inducedby the Veda
believethatit is throughthisprocessthata performer
to performa ritual,thena will is created in his mind to do it which,eventually,is translatedinto the actual performanceof the ritual. In matters
secular,it is some person in command who playsthe role of the Veda in the
citedexample.20

( Com.), Baaras( 1940), p. 187.

80
^
sfarvmti f

Locana on DhvanyalokawithBalapriya

I*?
, <1^1^WPEH,
188-89.
it
#.
pp.
i
op.
f^TRrra:
in the
conceiveof thebhavakatvaseparately
shouldbe notedthattheMmmsakas
of the bhvan
wordand the sense,whichfactis corroborated
bytheirdivision
intosabdtandrthi.. cf.Kvyapraksaeditedby Arjunwadk^r
aqd Mangrulkar
Poona( 1962), p,0150.
mm wwra:s^qfrm
RWflU^ ^

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Arjunwadkar

: The Rasa Theoryand theDaranas

89

With due respectto Abhinava, T beg to differfromhim in his interpretationof Nyaka on the point of bhvakatva. It is in the contextof
sdhrankarana that Nyaka ushersin thebhvakatva
, which,whenunderstood in the proper spirit,means eliminationof the elementof specificity
from the apparatus of rasa by the spectatoron the strengthof his willpower,- somethingon a par witha ' willingsuspensionof disbelief'. It is a
unique power of the human mind to infuse a lifeless matterwith life, to
associate a thing with or dissociate it fromsomething,to equate something
with agreeable or disagreeablecomplex of qualities. A lifeless pictureor
image, a book, a souvenir, a word, a flower,a smell, a colour, a piece of
furniture,an apparel, - in short, anything,howsoever insignificantfrom
pthers'pointof view,can mean a lot fora personwho infusesit withfeelings
by his will power. It is a symbol for him of somethingwhichexistsin the
worldof his mind. This power of symbolism,whichman discoveredfirstin
the formationof language and extended it subsequentlyto other countless
areas, is perhapsthe one phenomenonthat pervadesthe entire human life.
All arts,plays,games,entertainments,
religious,social or politicalconventions,
are nothingbut manifestations
and
in
notations
all
studies
of
metalanguage
the power of symbolismbacked by individualor social will power. Bereft
of thispower, man would be a poor creaturelike any other. This is man's
bhvan akti, whichI thinkNyaka implieswhenhe speaks of bhvakatva
.
Abhinava's criticismof him on thispointis, therefore,unfairor an outcome
of misunderstanding.Even if Abhinava is supposed to be rightin taking
bhvakatvaas equivalentto bhvan, it deservesto be notedthatwhatNyaka
relatesto it is not rasa but onlysdhrankarana,which,by commonconsent,
can be grantedas produced.
On a close examination of the rasa theoryas understoodby Nyaka
and by Abhinava, one cannot help feelingthatthe latteressentiallyimbibed
the former'sview and developed it to a formone can logicallyarriveat, except on thepoint of bhvakatvaon which Abhinava has misunderstood
from
him, and bhojakatvawhich,for Abhinava, is a cognitionnot different
in terminology.
vyanjan, - i.e. a matterof difference
As detailed by Abhinava, rasa is different
from sthyininasmuchas
the formercan abide onlytemporarily
and only in a connoisseur( sahrdaya),
whilethe latter exists dormantlyand permanentlyin everybeingfromthe
moment he is born. In other words, rasa exists only in drama ( or other
arts), sthyinsexistonlyin actual life. Rasa exists only as long as theact
of carvan- relishing- continues: and carvancontinuesonlyas long as the
rasa apparatus- vibhva etc. - is in view.21 That is the reason why the
21

^
flfr:

V&T 3
'2 [AnnalsBORI]

| Kang.154.
^1
I Kang.167.
TTf
snfsSTT
1 Kang.174.

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tTf
f|

90

Annals BORI , LXV ( 1984)

correlativesof rasa cannot be regardedas havinga causal relation withthe

latter; because an effectlike a pot exists independentlyof the potterwho
makesit, once it has come into being. This leads us to the inevitableconclusionthatthe experienceof rasa has no parallel in actual life and hence
must be regardedas alaukika, uncommon.22The relationbetweenrasa and
its correlativesis explainedon the analogyof the pot and the lamp, - ghata,23and is called vyanjan. The pot is revealed,not produced,
pradpa-nyya
the
by
nearby lamp only as long as the lamp emitslight. Rasa too, which
alreadyexists in the forma sthyinin the mind of the spectator,is likewise
revealedto himby its correlativeswhenit assumestheformof a rasa. Before
: shornof its
this stage is reached,the sthyinundergoes a metamorphosis
this
is
sdhrankarana
. As a
is
it
generalised,
space-time-personcontext,
as
nor
his opponent's,
result,it is experiencedby the spectatornot as his own,
nor of a third party person, leaving thus no scope for such relations as
This experiencedoes not partakeof
embarrassment,
angeror indifference.24
not
it
is
the characterof memory(for
producedthroughthemediumof sense
organs), or inference( forit is relished),25- though,of course, the faculty
of inferencein the spectatoras he utilizesit in worldlyaffairslays thefoundation for the experienceof rasa. Hence it is a unique, pure experience#
by any othercognitionand unpollutedby any worldly motive'
uninterruped
verymuch like the experienceof the supremeBrahmanand, likewise, constitutedof purehappiness. The mostlogical concluion of this view is that,
theoretically,rasa is only one ( Brahmsvdadoes not have varieties), a
thread,not taken noticeof by othersbut taken up lateron by Bhoja and
elaboratedto its fullestextent.
22 m ^
R

rgt^mirsfq

?
Teff:,
174.
Kang.
I
q^rrq
23 T|
^
tosrti; i
sGfcraft
Pfa
^
qpj*
srtasraRl
I m? ft
I Dhvanynloka
,
^35
TOWRRfr
1 ...
Trfc
pp.421,431.
proseunder3.33,Blapriyedition
'
24 ...
m9
smsit
<TT
qt
qsf

... f?.sjr<
^ i Kang-154.^n^i^ar . . .
MsrsrfrlctTif
11 ^
i 3T
i ^ wcfiif
^ ^ astrai
I ^
*
%
I =*faCTTO&FKRRT
H^-WTRf,
I Kang. 179.
SJfR:
^
TTWJf^T
25 ?i ^ rr
^
i ^
S7lHi-au'
,T
_
N
174
Kang.
^"TI
I
^
1%

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rJUNWADKAR: The Rasa Theoryand theDar anas

For theconceptof vyajana, also called dhvani, foundin an elaborate

formforthe firsttimein the workDhvanyloka
, nanda has acknowledged
his debt to grammarianswho firstenunciatedthis principlein the contextof
sphota, a typicalsemantic concept of thePninian school. For Pninians
the audible wordconsistingof sounds comingone afterthe other, the earlier
one disappearingbeforetheadventof the nextone, and, hence, incapableof
forminga unitedwhole,cannot conveythe meaning. They have surmounted
this difficulty
by conceiving an eternal form of the word, the sphota,
which being partless, encountersno problem in conveyingthe meaning
whichthe audible, perishableworddoes. But how come we get at theeternal
wordfromtheaudible,perishableone ? Througha processcalled vyajana'
say the grammarians. The transitorysounds leave their impressions
on the mindof the listenerbeforetheydisappear; and the last sound of the
word togetherwith the impressionsof the earlier ones reveals through
vyajanathe eternalword, sphota, whichin its turnconveysthe meaning.26
This processof vyajanaas conceivedby the grammarianshas not a very
role to play in the corpus of the formal grammar. Thanks to the
significant
acumen of nanda who realizedthatthis conceptcan contributesubstantially to the criticismof poetryand elaboratedit in a systematicmanner; and
it changedthe whole outlook of Sanskritcriticismin the yearsthatfollowed.
What Nyaka calls bhojakatva (only in the context of rasa) and
Ananda-Abhinava school vyajana( in a wider context even outside the
span of rasa ) is controverted
by JayantaBhatta summarily,and Mahima
Bhatta in detail, who have upheld the claim of inferenceas the rightful
operant in areas where vyajana is supposed to operate.27 Mahima has
done this more systematicallyand in sufficientdetails than Jayanta. For
them the apparatus of rasa ( vibhva etc. ) is as much a cognitivetool
(japaka-hetu) of the sthyinjrasaas is smoke, of fire. They see no reason
between the two and whythe former
why thereshould be a discrimination
26

^fir^Fq: 3^3^:
Pnini-darsana.

'

Sarva-darsana-saihgrahat

Vakyapadiya
, 1.85.
2T Cf. Vyakti-viveka
1909), 1.26,52, 53. Mahimacalls thisprocess
( Trivandrum
it fromthe non-poetic
( 1.25) to distinguish
Kvynumiti
inference.
For him,as
itis theinference
thatoperateseven in the area of the
expected,
maybe logically
See also ATyayci-munjcivi
sphota of the grammarians.
( KsishTSarskrta
Series,
1936), p. 45,whereJayanta
nandaas panditammanya
disparages
. Theviewthat
inferencecan dispensewithvyanjan existedeven at the time of nanda
and refuted
whohas presented
it in hisownway. See Dhvanylokaunder3. 33.

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Annals BORI , LJSTF( 1984 )

92

be givena VIP treatment.Of course,of thetwo criticsof vyajana, Jayanta

is candid enough to concede that, afterall is said and done, this is the field
of the criticsof poetryand too profoundforthe logiciansto pass a judgment
on.28 Mahima is not that liberal. He not only argues out the case of
inferenceagainst vyajana but also slashes Ananda forlack of carefulness
in the wording of his statements. In a small verse by nanda in the
earlypartof his workwhichdefinesdhavni,Mahima has picked up as many
as ten errorsand, in a sneering-cum-ridiculing
manner, presentedit in a
29
the
!
form
errors
by correcting
recomposed
Mammata, in his Kavyaprakaa,has squarelydealt withthearguments
of Mahima. Inferenceas a means of right knowledge has as its basis an
invariableconcomitance( vypti) of thehetuwiththesdhya. In theabsence
of such a vypti, any inferencedrawn is open to prove fallacious. No
such vyptican be established betweenthe vyajaka and the vyagya
; and
hencethe verbaloperation like vyajana is inevitable to account for the
poetic experience.30Mammata has also recordedviewsof otherrivalschools
opposingvyajana( suh as inclusionthereofin laksan, the drgha-abhidh
view etc.); but as the topic underdiscussionis primarilythe rasa theory in
its relationto thephilosophicalsystems,going into the detailsof Mammafa's
would be out of
argumentsin favourof vyajana,howsoeverinteresting,
place.
As statedearlier,thethreadin Abhinava's expositionof rasa thattheoreticallyit is one was latertaken up and elaborated by Bhoja. Bhoja does
not subscribeto the traditionalview that there are eightor nine rasas in
dramaor poetry. It is a myth,handed down fromgenerationto generation
and followedblindlylikea beliefthata certaintreeis inhabitedby a ghost!S1
Whatare popularlycalled rasas are no more than bhvas generatedfrom
therasa, and theyneed not be limited to the sacred number eight or nine;
! Whyshould onlya fewof thembe promoted
theyare as manyas fortynine
to the status of rasa ? We findone logical end in Rudrata's answerto this
82
question: thattherecan be as many rasas as there are bhvas,i. e. 49.
28
29
80
i
82

13: I loc. cit. This

f%
JTtgqi
of Jayanta
is generally
overlooked.
statement
1.23,25.
Vyakti-viveka,
Kavyaprakaa,Ullsa5.
itfO
i drhgara-praka,
^ mraf: rasi fsflsfq
4Bhjas rngaraPraksa' Bombay1940.
See Rghavan's
I
, 12.3,4.
Kavylankara

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ArJUNWADKAR: The asa Theoryand thearatias

$3

The otherend is foundin Bhoja's position that none of the 49 candidates,

who play alternatelythe principaland the subordinaterole*in relation to
one another,deservesto be electedas rasa, whichis above themall.33 Bhoja
names thisone rasa variouslyas abhimna, ahamkra and rgara ( which
mustnot be confusedwithits namesakein Bharata's exposition). Rasa is
what is relished,is the subject of svda. And what is it that we really
relish? Our own ego says he; and explainsit as self-love.34 Whateveris
liked, disliked, loved, hated, welcomed, avoided, is the subject of anger,
sorrowor surprise,- all thathas an invariable referenceto one's own self.
This principleof ego is so overwhelmingthatit can converteven pain into
pleasureand vice versa. A younggirlfeelspleasureat the scratchesmade by
her lover's nails on her bosom; why? Her ego is theanswer.35 It is plain
thateveryman is happyor sorryfortheprofithe makesor theloss he incurs.
Even whenhe is happyor sorryforanotherman's profitor loss, it is for himselfin an indirectway. That a man makes a sacrificeforanother is also for
himself- forthe satisfactionhe obtains therefrom.That he weepsfor anotheris also forhimself. It is the self-lovethat is the source of all a man
does or does not. Even Yajavalkya and Manu do not thinkotherwise;86
and, above all, no one can denyone's own experience.
This ego is a qualityof the soul; and, hence, whosoeverhas a soul has
also an ego. Its refinement
whichmakes the rasika is the achievementof its
cultivationduring a seriesof past lives.37 The ego, accordingto the Samkhya theory,is constitutedof sattva, rajas and tamas. It develops into
rasa whentheelementof sattva reigns. Bhoja conceivesit in three stages:
the first,pureego; the second, wherethe 49 bhvas get a scope to be enriched
33

3T?qcrq
qlfa q^qt
|
3 sqfRTfl
ifft
stsf artftsq^rf^T:,
^ qifp: | Bhoja's rhgra
Prakasa p. 517.
84 W 9
intro.
I Qrhgaraprakasa,
5.1
Sarasvati-kanthbharana
85
I
# frg spir^ ^
SFJIWT
II Bhoja'sr'ngaraPraksa p. 516;See also
527.
484,
465-66,
pp.
Brhadranyaka%

4.5.6.
Sfjfi
R3^ 3fl?R:

2. 4.
II Manusmrti,
I
^cRJcT

3fl*n
I ... iffld
ft

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94

Annals BORU LXV ( 1984 )

by their respectivevibhva etc. when they are called rasa in a secondary

sense; the third, the fullydeveloped stage where the bhvas enrichedin
the second stage merge into one single awareness- self-love. Bhoja has
openly acknowledgedhis debt to the Smkhya system.38 But there are in
his exposition of rasa as he understandsit conceptslike karman, vsan,
punarjanmawhich are commonlyshared by almost all Indian philosophical systemsand are drawnupon tacitlyor with acknowledgementas much
by Bhoja as by otherexpoundersof rasa like Abhinava.
Jagannthais the last doyenof theSanskrittraditionof criticism. He
has enlisted as many as eleven views on rasa includingthose discussed
by Abhinava. Only the firstfourof these views are givenby him in detail,
whilethe restare coveredin a fewlines,the last five receivinghardly a line
in Jagannatha'streatmentof rasa is that he
each.39 The obvious difference
a
in
material
his
stylecultivatedby the Navya Nyaya and
mostly
presents
adopted by the post-Gagea works on Vednta. Following the ancients,
he firstpronouncesthe character of rasa as the sthyinqualified by unthe statementby saying that 4in
coveredconsciousness; and later rectifies
.'40 The diffefact,rasa is uncoveredconsciousnessengulfedby the sthyin

rence between these statementsis like that between the coloured glass
illuminatedby thesunlight and * thesunlightfilteredthroughthe coloured
*
glass. As a truescientist,he makes it categoricallyclearthattheexperience
of rasa, engulfedby objects such as vibhva, is quite distinct from the
, he has traced
experienceof the Brahmanin meditation.41As a truevedntin
the
oldest
a
ruti
to
rasa
possibleauthorityrespectedby all devout
passage,
third
the
he has ascribed to 'moderns', he
In
traditionists.
interpretation
with
the
on
a
rasa
appearance of silver on a shell shining
par
presents
caused
both
in the Sun,
by imperfectionsin cognitive conditions, and
indeterminate.42
Otherswould like to call themboth
,
equally anirvacanya
ftW*
^cfI Bhoja s rhgaraPrakasa, pp. 464,465.
88 s
3
^ 5JK:Rf.
...
^ aflffof,
p. 465,491.Cp.

I Op. cit.

9.
Il Smkhyakrik
WMHH ^
89 Rasa-gahgdhara
54-74
B.
Athavale's
edition
in
R.
I, pages
( Poona 1953). Vol.I.
feraci
'
^ h:, l

41
42 qsqrcg ...

w i ...
...
Cit.
I op.
p. 55.
icfgf:
I loc.cit.
...
| Op.cit,pp.56-57.
SgKWWS&Fte...
'

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ArJUNWADKAR: The Rasa Theoryand theDarianas

95

illusions.43 These are practicallyextentionsto rasa of various khytisin

philosophicalsystemswhich attemptto explain what happens whenX is
cognizedas Y.
From the surveyof the views on the rasa theoryfromLollata to
Jagannthamade so far,it will be clear that, althoughit is marked by some
viewsthatmay be termedpoles apart and some as of no consequence, the
main stream of thought startingwith Bhatta Nyaka and ending with
Jagannthaflowsalong a locus representedby the thoughtcomplex of what
may be called the Smkhya-Vedntagrid, I am using the term 'grid*
because, excepton a veryfewbasic concepts,the two systemshave identical
viewson a numberof philosophicalpoints. The very idea thatrasa is not
, has a
producedbut alreadyexists,it is only revealed,is one withthe sthyin
close resemblancewith the doctrineof satkryavda
which
is
shared
,
by
both the systemsand whichcontendsthatthe effectis not produced out of
nothingbut existsin its materialcause even before its productionand is alwaysone withitand thatit is nothingbut the materialcause in a new form
brought about by the efficient
cause/s. The idea of sdharanikarana first
propoundedby Nyaka has its roots partlyin the Smkhyaconceptthatthe
purusa, reallynot rela'ed to thegunas whichcause bhoga, is subjectedto the
in error,with the prakrti
worldlyexperiencesbecause of his identification,
which is reallyconstitutedof thethreegunas; and partlyin the Vedntaidea
that all is Brahman. Yet another probable source for sdhrunkaranais
thesmnyaconceptof the Nyaya-Vaiesikasystems44whichis thecommon
heritageof most of the philosophicalsystems. It is particularly
in
significant
thiscontextthatthe Smkhyas are fondof comparing the role of theprakrti
withthatof an actress who presentsthe drama of pleasureand pain on the
stageof the world, that is, the samsra, in whichthepurusagetsinvolvedso
long as he does not realize that he is in no way a partof it. As soon as he
5 We have seen
realizes it, the drama ends forhimand he attainskaivalya.*

Op,cit.p. 73.
CP-^
fit

m
2. 2. 68
| Vtsyyana's
BhsyaontheNyya-dariana
45 ^
fNiftfirtm
I
CTfJH
Tff:Il
ita
I
TT^fflfrtq;
Samkhya-krika
59, 65. The pointtobe
notedhereis thatthespectator
is viewedhereas notinvolved
inthe dramagoingon
before
him,whilethetheoryof rassvda presumes
involvement
of the specta-<
torinthedramatoa certain
extent.

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96

Annals BORI , LXV (1984 )

how Bhatta Nyaka has contendedthat it is not possible foran ordinary

charactersas Rma,
spectatorto identifyhimselfwith such extraordinary
To this, Abhinava's reply is that this is not impossiblewhenwe consider
the wide rangeof highand low formsof lifethroughwhicha soul passes and
Carriesimpressionsthereofin the seriesof lives,markedby birthsand deaths,
to whichhe is subjected in this anadi samsara. Again, the idea of happiness as the outcomeof all rasas has its rootsin the Upanisadic conceptof the
Brahman as constitutedof sat, cit and nanda. The novel rasa theoryexpounded by Bhoja is unquestionablyfoundedon the Smkhya-Vedntagrid;
witha marked Smkhya bias, both in conceptionand terminology. It will
thusbe clear thatthe theoryof rasa as developed, apparentlyon the basis of
Bharata's Rasastra, mainlyby the Smkhya-Vedntagridwill be deprivedof
its characteristicfeaturesif shorn of its moorings in Indian philosophical
systems.
fromthe view of thetradiThis conclusion,however,is quite different
thereofare represenof the Rasa-stra that interpreters
tional commentators
tativesof various philosophicalsystems( as we have noted above in thecase
pf akuka etc. ). An attempthas recentlybeen made to revivethisview by
Dr. Sunil Subhedar of theNagpur Universitywho delivereda seriesof three
}ecturesin Bombay on the 17th-19thDecember, 1976, underthe auspices of
theMumbai Marathi Sahitya Sangh. These lectures werelatelypublished
(1981 ) under the title Njyadar&ana. Dr. Subhedarhas, in theselectures,
treatedof threeaspectsof Indian drama,viz. ( 1 ) The Indian Drama : Tradition and Philosophy; ( 2 ) The Rasa-stra ofBharata; and ( 3 ) Philosophy
$nd theWesternDrama. The scope of the present discussionis limitedto
the main argumentin the second lecture.
to defend traditionalwisdom, Dr. Sunil Subhedar
In a valiant effort
of theRasa-strais possiblebydiscardarguesthatno correctcomprehension
FollowingprimarilyJhalkikar,the learned
ing thetraditionalinterpretations.
Sanskritcommentatorof the KvyaprakSa> he introducesthe five interpretationsby Lollata, akuka, Bhatta Nyaka, Abhinava and Jaganntha
as representingthe views of Mmms, Nyya, Snkhya, Vykarana and
Vdnta on the Rasa-stras9and maintainsthat, fora properunderstanding
of theviews, a close knowledgeof the basic principlesof these systemsis
essential. He furthermaintainsthat, once this stand is taken, what is left
forus is to acquaint ourselveswiththe hypothesesof these systems,draw

PhWKiJ ...

' Locana on
Dhvanyloka2.4.

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ArJUNWADKAR: The Rasa Theoryand theDaranas

97

conclusionsa priorifromthem and not question them a posteriorion the

strengthof our personal experiencesin total ignornace of the scientific
method47
It is perfectly
legitimateto say thatone should make an earnesteffort
to understandthe view of an interpreter
and acquaintoneselfwiththesystem,
if necessary,from which he draws his material. But to denythe rightof
vis--visone's own experienceis not onlydoing
questioningthe interpretation
to
the
but
also to the spiritof the tradition. The surest
injustice
questioner
confirmation
of a hypothesisis considered to be the agreementof its results
withactual experience.eWhat AlmightyExperiencedictatesus, we will obey,*
proclaims JayantaBhatta,48the learnedauthorof the Nyya Manjar/, and
whatis it, ifnot experience,whichis held as the touchstoneby the traditional
critics of the interpretations
in refutingviews they do not subscribe to?
Could therebe a strongerdefenceof experiencethan that by amkarcrya,
the doyenof Indian philosophers,whenhe remarks: 4Even a hundred ruti
passages cannotbe accepted iftheytell us thatthe fireis cool and devoid of
light'?49 The most astoundingfactis thatthe Mmmsakas seek sanction
fortheirtenetsfromcommonworldlyexperience,50
and Subhedarshutsdoors
to the latterin favourof theformer! Subhedar's argumentsare based on the
thatthereis an uninterrupted,
uniformtraditionof the interpretapresumption
tionsof the Rasa-strareachingas faras Jhalkikar,i. e., almost to our own
times.Againstthisbackground,it is amusingto findSubhedarsurprisedat the
factthat, in a long periodof one and a half millenniasince Bharata, Jaganntha was thefirstto cite passage from the TaittiriyaUpanisadin support
of the so-calledVednticview of Rasa-stra.51 This is equivalentto saying
thattherewas no Vednta traditionas such of the interpretation
of the Rasa sutra, and thatit was Jagannthafirstto thinkof utilisingVednticconcepts
and terminologyfor the interpretation
of the stra. And what whenthere
the
two
in
tradition
itself
in
to one or the
are
opinions
relatingan interpreter
othersystem,52
or whenan interpreter
borrowsfrommorethanone systems?58
47 See Natya-darsana(Bombay1981), pp.36-54.See also Rasa-vicara ani Pracina
DarsanakrabyMM. YajesvaraSstrIKasture,
1957.
Hyderabad
4:8 p
: I Nyaya Manjar (Benares1936),
Pramna.
p. 285.
49 * |
18.66.
l Glt-bh.ya
Sprat
co Cf.Mmamsa-Nyaya-Prakasa
, Introduction
:
byMM. VasudevaShastriAbhyankar
p. 2i.
Natya-darsanap. 53.
52 BhattaNyakaregarded
as a Simkhyais blamedby Abhinavaforhavingfounded
histheory
ontheMlmmsconcept
ofbhvan. See Note20 above.
63 Bhatta Nyaka,again. Regardedas a Smkhya,
he was the firstto compare
rasasvdato Brahmasvda of theVedntins.Whatis hisidentity
? A Samkhya,
a Vedntinora Mimam
saka (cf.Note52) ?

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98

Annals BORI , LXV ( 1984 )

This bringsus to the nextimportantpoint. The so-called Mmarsaka

etc. viewsof the Rasa-straare no more thana utilizationof some Mmms
etc. principlesforan issue outside thejurisdictionof the systemconcernedif
of the issue. What
theyare thoughtto be conduciveto a betterunderstanding
a solution to a
interestis a philosophical systemlikelyto have in offering
in
unsurmountable
?
land
an
We
may
problemit does not considerits own
ifwe wereto thinkthata systemhas a viewabout everyingunderthe
difficulty
sun. If a Mmmsaka carrieshis own theorieswhenhe turnsto Rasa-stra,
whatwould he do when he turnsto Vedntaor Vaiesika? Could therebe
anythinglike a Mmmsaka view of the Vedntaor the Vaiesika? What we
actuallyfindis thatan author havingcommandover severalsystemsor disciplines( like Vcaspati Mira ) is a Smkhya whenhe expoundsSmkhya, a
Vedntin when he expounds Vednta and so on. If Smkhyatenetsfigure;
as a criticof the
in theinterpretation
of theRasa-stra, it meansthe interpreter
rasa theoryhas borrowedsome Smkhya tenetsforhis convenience. The
advantagehe derivesby doing so is thatit is the Smkhya, and not he, who
is answerableforthetenetsreliedupon.
More discrepanciesare disclosed when we go into the details of
Subhedar'stheory. Lollata is a Mmmsaka, he maintains. Why? Because
the role the actor plays in a drama is comparableto thatof the sacrificer
in the Vedic ritual,suggestsSubhedar. There is nothingin the interpretation
of Lollata to provethathe had this in his mind when he propoundedhis
theory. Even if we ignorethis, the basic question is how can comparison
fromthe Vedic ritualbe regardeda part of the Mmms system which is
essentiallythe scienceof interpretation.That this science expoundsits tenets
withthe Vedic ritual in view is no reason whythe two should be treatedas
one, and Lollata as a Mmmsaka. If Subhedar is supposed to bs rightin
readingthe mindof Lollata, Lollata can at thebest be regardedas a ritualist,
not a Mmmsaka.

'
Equally untenable is the view that akuka is a Naiyyika on the
groundthathe regardsrasa as inferable.Nyya is a systemthatexpoundsin
detail all the four means of knowledge of whichinferenceis one. When
akuka maintiainsthat rasa is inferred,what typicallyNyya idea is involved in it which makes him a Naiyyika? Do I need to be a Naiyyika
when I inferor say that my missingshoes kept outside the house have
been stolenby someonewhileI was engagedinside? If akuka's theoryof
inferenceis adequate to deem him a Naiyyika, his referenceto Dharmaklrti
can be regardeda sufficient
groundfordeeminghim a Buddhist! In support
of his contentionthat Bhatta Nyaka was a Srkhya, Subhedar quotes

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rjunwadkAR : he Rasa Theoryand theDaranas

99

the Smkhyaterminology
he employs,conveniently
ignoringthe comparison
of the rasa experiencehe makes with the experienceof the Brahman. I
do not know of a Smkhya systemwhich shares the Vedntic concept of
Brahman and its experience. If Bhatta Nyaka is a Smkhya because he
employssome Smkhyaconceptsin expoundingthe Rasa-siitra, whyis he not
a Vedntistbecause he employssome Vednticconcepts? And Mmamsaka,
too, because, as interpreted
by Abhinava, he impliesthe bhvanconcept
of the Mimmsakas whenhe talksof the bhvakatvaprocess?
Subhedar's stand becomes all the more unconvincingwhen he introducesalamkraview of the Rasa-sutraas the view of the grammarianson
the strengthof theclich thatpoeticsis the tail ' of thegrammar,'
' Puccham' here means, forhim, a
respectableor dignifiedsequel as
'
But unlike Marathi,
illustratedin the Vedic passage,
'
srffT
' in thissense. Pratisthin Sanskrit
Sanskrit does not use the word ' srfgT
means *position,support,basis Nowherein his exposition,Subhedarseems
to be aware of this. This is funbased on a confusion.
as one representing
Subhedarhas introducedAbhinava'sinterpretation
the view of the grammar- he means the Pninian school, and Jagannatha's
as one of the Vedntins. Elsewhere in his exposition of thistopic, he has
attemptedto show how the two schools are veryclose in theirview of the
creationof the world. What is Brahmanto the the Vedntins,the ultimate
cause and reality,is the abda-Brahmanto Grammarians,says he, and takes
the conceptas farback as Panini and Patajali. Now, thereis no evidenceto
provethatPaniniand Patajali had thisconceptin theirmind. The firstwork
that expounds this concept is the Vkyapadya of Bhartrhari( 6thc.A.D. );
and thereare reasonsto believethathe, too, meantit in a metaphorical,rather
thana metaphysical,sense. Ngoji Bhatta ( 18thcent. A.D. ), therenowned
exponentof the Pninian school, understandsthe abda-Brahmanas produc
'
ed, and hence the apara % and not the para ' Brahman.54 If, however,
Subhedar believes that the two systemsare almost identicalin theirmetaphysicalview,it is not easy to understandwhyhe treatsthemseparatelyin
theirviewsof the Rasa-stra, whichare weddedto theirmetaphysicalviews,
as Subhedarmaintains. Subhedar believes that it is the influenceof the
monisticidea of the Brahmanthat led Jagannthadefinepoetryas abda *
in preferenceto the conventional ' abdrthau' which involves dualism.
See Vaiyakarana-Siddhanta-Laghu-Manjusat
...
(Chowkharaba
edition,
p. 172)

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ioo

Annals BORI, LXV ( 19S4 )

Jagannthadoes not seemto be aware of this; forhe justifieshis definition

by
to such commomexpressionsas thepoetryis recitedaloud 'M
a reference
We have no means to guess what Subhedar thinksof Bhoja's interpretationof rasa. Is Bhoja a Smkhyaor a Vedntin? Tneitheralternative,
how is Subhedargoingto account formore thanone interpretations
fromthe
same school and reconcilethis situationwithhis beliefthatthe various interpretationsof therasa theoryhave come downto us througha uniform,unbroken tradition? We are, therefore,forcedto conclude thatthereis no such
of theRasa-sUtraby philosophicalsystemslike
thingas oficial interpretations
Mimms; thatall those who offeredto interpretthe Rasa-sra did so as
criticsof drama and/orpoery; thattheysought aid from the philosophical
systemsin varyingdegreesin the hope of solvingproblemsrelatedto the issue
at hand; and, last but not the least, theydid so with an eye on the actual
experienceof theconnoisseuras a touchstoneforthecorrectnessor otherwise
of thetheory. Abhinava has succeeded in drawingthe best fromhis predewhich is least susceptibleto inconsiscessorsto formulatean interpretation
own
limitations.
has
its
but
tency

i ' 3^5^:
ifRr+rrcft.
^(^JSR^^itRd:
Sjfl
jisqi ^ fTRT:,'
ofthekvya.
, definition
Rasa-gahgdhara

qatf,

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