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hears sarcastic remarks about his or her person) can cause extreme
anxiety and depression; insufficient control over one's own instinctive
reactions (the subject "cannot control himself", succumbs to his
impulses); inability to sublimate (which in fact is only another aspect of
the above); the subject is no stranger to "important" achievements,
which are merely a means to satisfy a "lower" aim (in high social
circles, the subject can boast merit and considerable knowledge
nevertheless, he gives the impression that his only motivation is social
success and that, in reality, he "does not care about it at all"). 2.
Regression to primary mental forms: the subject's mentality is
dominated by associations and superficial details which are beyond
"rational" thinking. But again, there is more to it. On the surface,
borderline subjects are completely capable of rational thinking;
nevertheless, their behaviour and emotions follow two completely
different sets of logic. For example, although he is completely aware
that a person close to him is not an enemy and holds nothing against
him, some "primitive" conclusion, which is, for example, based on a
paranoid interpretation of a casual smile or similarity to another
(hostile) individual, convinces the subject that this person is the worst
of his enemies (this regression is best carried out by means of
projective tests).
3."Regression" to primary defence mechanisms: the main defence
mechanism in a "normal", "mature" person is suppression (the fully-developed
Ego integrates and unifies one's mental life, and a message which is
unsuitable for this unified framework is suppressed or pushed from one's
awareness), while in a borderline subject, the Ego is not strong enough to
perform this integrational role and is replaced by primitive defence
mechanisms which destroy the integrity of the Ego: split, projection, denial of
reality. Here, special attention must be paid to how, by employing some kind
of paranoid construct, these "regressive" defence mechanisms prevent both
the unity of the Ego and psychological unity. When, for example, a borderline
subject considers somebody both "good" and "bad", he solves this dichotomy
with a simple time split: for a while, the object is "good", after which the
subject goes to the other extreme and the object becomes "bad", which does
not result in any sense of contradiction, because the subject's Ego is not
sufficiently integrated; he can carry several contradictory libidinal beliefs which
are expressed one after another. (The best known example of such a
tendency is the attitude of the "little man" towards politics, in terms of rapidly
changing contradictory libidinal opinions: at one point, "politics" is a "big
thing", awakening patriotic feelings; at another point, it is a "whore", a sphere
of corruption and intrigue. The "little man" does not attempt to integrate these
two beliefs.) A "normal" subject would suppress or eject one of the contrary
beliefs from his awareness: if according to my integrated normative system I
hate somebody, I must suppress the love I feel for this person, and vice versa.
4. The last feature, which is already contained in the previous one, is a
pathological relationship towards the object, which is in fact an inability to
integrate different beliefs (the "good" and the "bad") into a single image of the
object. In this respect, it is possible to describe the basic characteristic of the
borderline subject: he always gives the impression that he experiences the
other as a "puppet", that he is incapable of a proper inter-subjective
his narcissistic affirmation; (3) the rest, the "crowd", "puppets", suckers who
exist only to be used and abandoned. Even when PN develops an attachment
to the ideal other, the relationship is not particularly deep and can easily be
broken or demoted to the level of the "crowd" (if the ideal other experiences
failure) or the "enemy" (if the ideal other humiliates PN's narcissism or ignores
him). Relationships are easily broken and established anew; the ideal other
today is the "enemy" tomorrow because Narcissus cannot establish a
relationship with the other at the subjective level. Evidently, PN takes the
availability of other people for granted and finds it completely natural that
people should be treated ruthlessly and used for his own narcissistic pleasure.
For this reason, PN often gives the impression of profound indifference,
coldness and selfishness, hidden behind a mask of brilliance. Narcissus
attempts to charm and seduce us; he astonishes with eloquence, enthusiasm
and sexiness. Nevertheless, behind it all, a cruel and selfish mind can be
sensed. As long as he expects narcissistic gain from us, he is full of
enthusiasm, but once "we are no longer of any interest" to him, his incredible
charm immediately turns into complete indifference. It is evident from the
above that PN is incapable of forming a sincere attachment to another person,
and of depending on him or her in terms of commitment, obligation,
engagement, trust and dedication. PN is a slave to his "success" in the eyes
of other people. He depends on their recognition, but this kind of dependence
cannot be mistaken for trust in and dedication to the other. Narcissus wants to
take advantage of the other, gain as much narcissistic profit from him or her,
and even when he greatly admires the other, he does that exclusively for
narcissistic reasons. For this reason, he always preserves a fundamental
mistrust in people; he is pathologically afraid of being excessively dependent
on them, of opening up "too much" and becoming too attached to them.
Therefore, in sexuality, he prefers short-term "cold" relationships which do not
represent an excessive "emotional burden" and which "allow him to breathe".
Every Narcissus is intrinsically convinced that he is an exception, an
"outcast". Externally, he respects the "rules of the game", he is a conformist;
in reality, he "does not take the game seriously", he "plays it" only to escape
punishment and become successful in society. PN is even convinced that
everybody else does the same: life in society is a game, everybody wears a
mask, everybody is a criminal hiding behind a conformist appearance and
thinking only about how to exploit and trick other people. One must be smart;
one must know how to lie low and adjust. PN pathologically fears even the
smallest failure, such as loneliness, old age and illness. He takes care of his
body (jogging being narcissistic exercise par excellence!), tries to stay
"forever young" and remain the centre of attention. He is prepared to do
everything "not to get lost in the grey crowd of the average", because he
believes that there are only two kinds of people in the world: those who have
made it and the remaining "crowd". PN is incapable of true sadness. When
faced with the loss of a loved one, he breaks into a helpless rage. The loss is
simply unacceptable and unbearable to him; it is an assault on his narcissism.
He is incapable of "containing" this wild rage and turning it into quiet
mourning. Finally the last feature, which brings us back to the initial
paradox. PN simply cannot enjoy himself, because pleasure is completely
alien to him and exteriorised in the other. He finds pleasure when other people
acknowledge his pleasure (a typical example would be a "heart-breaker" who
boasts about his conquests, while in reality he does not care because the only
thing that matters to him is the recognition he gains from other people with his
exploits he enjoys himself as much as he thinks others enjoy themselves).
This subjective economy results in a curious "short circuit": the final aim of
being successful is not what can be gained by it but the success itself as
social fact. For this reason, PN is never "with himself" but is always
"exteriorised", which manifests itself, for example, as an "inner sense of
emptiness" and "loss of identity", which drives him into even more frenetic
activity. Before we begin with structural analysis, another observation derived
from the phenomenological description of PN must be mentioned. It is not
difficult to recognise in PN an "average American", with his paradoxical
"conformist individualism" (individualism as a social conformist perception")
and cult of social "success" at any cost, etc. Sometimes we even get the
impression that Kernberg is not describing a type generated by means of
generalised clinical experiences but a caricatured model found in films or
literature. This observation in no way diminishes the value of Kernberg's
analysis, however, because it is based on a nave distinction between "real
life" and ideological "clichs", presuming that in "real life" individuals do not
imitate models which are, in a pure and distilled form, offered by popular art.
Therefore, the ideological construct of the "big Ego" is in no way merely a
"reflection" of real processes but is actively formed and structured by the very
"real" subjective constitution of an individual. Consequently, structural analysis
shows that the pathological "big Ego", as the central integrational aspect of
PN, is a result of the fusion or merging of three elements: (1) the real Ego (the
subject recognising himself as a special, real being); (2) the ideal Ego (an
idealised self-image nourished by the subject); (3) the ideal object (the ideal
other, a dear person, experienced by PN as an extension or part of his own
"big Ego"). This merging diminishes the critical distance between the real Ego,
the ideal Ego and the object, which in a "normal" subject is a motivating force
for constant improvement and approximation to the ideal. Therefore, in PN,
the real Ego is directly blended with the ideal Ego, while the idealised Other
loses all negative characteristics and appears as an omnipotent "good other",
as the subject's secret guardian who takes care of his wellbeing and provides
narcissistic satisfaction. The critical component of PN takes a "degenerate"
form of the horrifying, blind, cruel, paranoid and threatening force of the
Superego, as an "evil fate" embodied in the "enemy" into whom the subject
projects his own aggression. With this we have touched upon the crucial
dimension concealed behind PN: in reality, "pathological Narcissus" is a
helpless, terrified subject, a victim of a cruel and uncontrollable Superego who
is completely lost and faced with impossible demands on the part of his
environment and his own aggression. This is, in fact, a pre-Oedipal situation,
dominated by an omnipotent, protective and caring mother in the form of the
"ideal object" on the one hand and the aggressive uncontrollable environment
on the other. The narcissistic "big Ego" is in fact a reactive formation a
reaction to an unresolved and unsymbolised conflict situation. The only way
for the subject to endure this situation is to build an "imaginary supplement",
the "big Ego", which is blended with the omnipotent, idealised, motherly
guardian. Now we can reply to a previous remark according to which the
borderline phenomenon proves the outdatedness of the Oedipus complex and
of classical psychoanalytical methods as such: " the problem of borderline
identity"; what he lacks are not images that would give him an imaginary
identity but a "bond" that would place him in the inter-subjective symbolic
network. In other words (if the "metaphorical " description is replaced with
more expert terminology): pathological Narcissus simply lacks the
performative dimension of speaking. This statement may at first seem
paradoxical, because PN strives for "effect" rather than for the "content" of
what is said, the whole point of his speaking being to assert his brilliance and
to enchant or seduce the person spoken to. In this respect, we must take
account of the key differences (interpreted completely wrongly by Marcuse in
his criticism of Austin's supposed "behaviourism") between the performative
(illocutive) and pragmatic (perlocutive) aspects of the speech act. The
performative aspect is not the same as the pragmatic "effect" of a statement.
Let us take an extremely basic example: if I say to somebody in trouble "I
promise I will help you", this is the performative aspect, or the very act of
promise, which I thereby perform. I gave my word to somebody; there is a
new symbolic relationship between us and I am obliged to help regardless of
whether I will indeed help him. The pragmatic aspect of this example would
encompass the "actual" effects of the promised act: the other will undoubtedly
behave differently if he believes my promise; he will feel gratitude and respect
towards me, and so on. And this is PN's problem: he is a master of the
pragmatic power of speech, he knows how to use speech as a tool for the
manipulation, seduction and enchantment of others; at the same time, he
does not keep his word and keeps his distance from it, as if it were the tool of
manipulation itself. What precisely do we mean when we say that PN is not
capable of establishing a relationship with the other (i.e. subject) as such
that he is not capable of real inter-subjectivity? This issue can be approached
by means of description theory or, to be more precise, by means of Kripke's
criticism of this theory and his rejection of the possibility of reducing a name to
a set of positive characteristics that an object must feature in order to be
denotative of the name in question in other words, his rejection of the
possibility of replacing a name with a description of a set of characteristics
(see Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 1979). PN could be described as a
subject behaving in accordance with the theory of description; he sees the
other reduced to a set of descriptive characteristics, particularly those which
meet his narcissistic needs. In other words, he sees the object in terms of the
gain he can receive from him or her: he loves a woman because (she has
beautiful hair and legs, she has a great sense of humour and is interested in
the same films as he is). PN is therefore the person who answers the
woman's eternally excruciating question: "Why do you love me?" with a
detailed description of reasons: because of your beautiful eyes, because of
your wit, etc. The other side of this reduction to a set of descriptive virtues is
that as soon as the subject loses one of these virtues, she also loses her
libidinal status and becomes dull. The logic of "pathological Narcissus" is
clearly reflected in the often-heard remark: "My fiance is never late for a
date, otherwise she would no longer be my fiance!" The fiance is reduced
to a set of positive features, which include the fact that "she is never late for a
date". The moment she loses this virtue, that is, the moment she is late, she
also loses her status and is no longer a fiance. It is not necessary to point
out how far this kind of attitude is from a real attitude towards the other as
such. It is immediately evident that an answer to the question "Why do you
love me?", which consists of a well-defined list, is a rude and scornful insult
and a direct negation of love. By it, the other is "objectivised" and denied
existence as a subject. The only true answer to the question would be: "I do
not know why, there is something in you, some x, something that gives a
miraculous lustre to all your virtues". Proper "love" entails a feeling that one
would still love a person if he or she lost all his or her positive features. In
other words, the beloved is "set in an abyss", all of his or her "positive"
characteristics are trans-substantiated, they glow in some impalpable void
and are in fact a "positivisation" of the void itself of that x ("object small a" in
Lacan's terminology). The same theory could be approached from the point of
Lacan's distinction between the logic of the sentences: "tu es celui qui me
suivra" and "tu es celui qui me suivras" (see Lacan, Le Sminaire III, Paris,
1981, p. XXII). The definition of the subordinate clause radically changes its
status depending on whether the verb in the subordinate sentence is in the
second or third person. If in the third person, the sentence is about a simple
statement, a description of (one's) characteristics. If the verb is in the second
person, however, the sentence is no longer merely about a description but a
performative "appointment of a mandate", a symbolic engagement, bond and
obligation you are the one who must follow me (even if in reality you do not).
In the first case ("tu es celui qui me suivra") one simply made a mistake one
associated the other with an erroneous characteristic and it turns out that the
other is not the one who will follow. In the other case ("tu es celui qui me
suivras"), you will remain that who will follow me, who should have followed
me, because the fact that "you will follow me" remains a symbolic bond, a
"mandate" defining your inter-subjective status. The fact that you did not
follow me does not change this status but means that you simply did not keep
your promise and commitment. Here we can return to the statement about the
fiance: the mandate and commitment of the "fiance" naturally implies a
whole set of positive characteristics, including the fact that the person who is
granted this mandate will not be late for a date (leaving aside to what extent
certain cultural environments regard being late for a date as proof of "female
charm" and part of the game), which represent a symbolic definition (Lacan's
S1 mathem) superseding and totalising a chain of positive virtues (S2). This
means that even if she is late, she will remain my fiance because we are
bonded with a symbolic pact that is beyond petty narcissistic disappointments.
With this, we have reached the realistically known possibilities for the
integration of "good" and "bad" characteristics into an integrated image of the
object; this is more probable if founded on a symbolic integrating
characteristic or a symbolic "beyond good and evil" definition in other words,
beyond the imaginary opposition of "good" and "bad" characteristics. The
united or integrated image of a "fiance" does not lie in the simple "picturing of
the same object with both good and bad characteristics". A unifying symbol is
called for, a symbolic definition which defines the person of the "fiance"
beyond her (imaginary) characteristics, which preserves its value even if she
disappointed us regarding the positive features implied by the mandate or
definition. The integration of the image of the object as a collection of his or
her "imaginary" characteristics implies some unimaginable aspect, a symbolic
designation of a performative nature which cannot be justified by means of the
object's positive characteristics. On this basis, PN's other characteristics can
be explained, such as his inability to mourn. Mourning is a symbolic act par
and success enjoyed with other people. For this reason, the fundamental
characteristic of Protestant ethics is the difference between legality and
morality: the former consists of social rules and external laws; the latter is
guided by an inner law, the "voice of conscience" or, in other words, the
internalised paternal ideal of the Ego. Naturally, this implies an ideology that
fits in with liberal capitalism, the society of the "struggle against everything"
this society is guided by the "invisible hand" of the market, everyone should
follow their own interests and thus contribute to the welfare of the whole of
society as much as possible. With the onset of bureaucratic corporate
capitalism, this individual autonomy was lost and the heteronomous principle
prevailed; the "non-conformity" of Protestant ethics has been replaced by an
individual striving to attain recognition from the social group to which he
belongs. The ideal of the ego radically changes its content and, in a way,
becomes "exteriorised", consisting of the expectations of one's group and
surroundings. The source of moral satisfaction is no longer a sense that,
despite pressures from the environment, one has remained faithful to oneself
and fulfilled one's duty. On the contrary, it is the sense that one has given
priority to being loyal to one's group. From the point of view of the ideal of the
Ego, the individual observes himself with the eyes of the people around him;
he sees himself the way he should be in order to be worthy of the group's
affection. In the conflict between the individual and the institution, the
individual must let go, renounce his worthless independence and find his
place in the social organism to which he belongs and which gives meaning to
his life the greatest value is the sense of belonging. The "invisible hand" of
the market has been replaced by the "invisible hand" of the institution. The
individual's resistance to the institution is a result of his narrow narcissistic
delusion rather than anything else. The institution does not want to harm him;
it is just that the deluded individual is not always aware of that. This does not
only change the "content" of the ideal but also its status: it is not that, in the
case of the heteronomous individual, individualism has been replaced by
conformity but that the ability to adjust to the demands of the environment and
respond quickly to the ever new and changing demands of the environment is
a value as such, or even a supreme value. In the 1940s and 50s,
"heteronomous ethics" was promoted by a series of Hollywood films. The
extreme example quoted by Whyte is The Caine Mutiny (based on H. Wouk's
novel of the same title). In brief, the story is about a warship called Caine,
which is in danger of sinking because its crazy paranoid captain is incapable
of issuing the right commands. He is replaced by a group of officers who take
over the command and save the ship. Later, on shore, the mutinous officers
must justify their actions in court and prove that the captain was indeed
insane and incompetent. They succeed in doing this with the help of their
lawyer, but at a reception where the mutinous crew members celebrate their
victory, the lawyer tells them that he defended them out of duty whereas, in
reality, he is ashamed of himself because they were in fact guilty. One of the
reasons why the captain became paranoid was that the subordinate officers
derided him instead of putting up with his whims and striving to help him as
considerately as possible. In short, the officers bear the blame for the entire
incident because they displayed cynical mistrust instead of dedication to the
common cause. (The gallant paradox of the lawyer character lies in the fact
that it is his duty to defend the officers, which corresponds to individualist
hobbies, in order to turn it into a sphere for the expression and affirmation of
one's "authentic" personality and for the development of one's creative
potentials. Lasch shows that this cult of "authenticity", this cult of the free
development of the "big Ego", free of "masks" and "repressive" rules, is
nothing less than a form of its own opposite, of pre-Oedipal dependence, and
that the only path leading to the mastering of this dependence is identification
with a certain decentralised, alien aspect of the symbolic law external to the
Ego. The late bourgeois individualism of the narcissistic "big Ego" merely
seems to be a return to the early bourgeois individualism of "Protestant
ethics" while, in reality, it implies a much greater dependence than that of
"organisation man". In addition to the inherent incompleteness of his analytical
conceptual apparatus, Lasch's weak point lies in the fact that he does not
supply a sufficient theoretical definition of that turning point in the socioeconomic reality of late capitalism which corresponds to the transition of
"organisation man" to "pathological Narcissus". At the level of discourse, this
turning point is not difficult to determine: it is the transformation of the
bureaucratic capitalist society of the 1940s and 50s into a society described
as "permissive". It entails a "post-industrial" process which, at this level, has
been described in terms of the "Third Wave" theory of writers such as Toffler.
Now we can finally return to the key issue of the relationship between
"pathological narcissism" and borderline disorders. Unlike American medical
practice, which sets borderline closer to psychosis than neurosis (which is due
to an obsession with the "strong Ego" as a sign of "normality", while the
absence of this Ego immediately points to psychosis), we must agree with J.
A. Miller, who says that borderline is literally a "contemporary form of
hysteria". If "pathological Narcissus" represents the prevalent libidinal
constitution of late bourgeois "permissive" society, borderline marks the point
of its hysterisation, the point at which the subject is faced with the alreadydescribed basic paradox or contradiction of his PN. Miller connects the
transformation of hysteria into borderline disorder with scientific changes in
contemporary ideological everyday life science in different forms, ranging
from experts whose advice and instructions guide our entire life, including its
most intimate aspects, to micro-electronic gadgets offered en masse by
industry, which is increasingly becoming an inherent constituent of the
everyday Lebenswelt. This blending of Lebenswelt with science radically
undermines the very notion of Lebenswelt as a field of everyday pre-scientific
self-understanding and pre-theoretical life practice, from which science
derives its meaning. An exemplary case would be Husserl's late attempt to
expose the rootedness of the scientific way of thinking in the pre-scientific
world of life practice exemplary because it is no longer possible today, since
Lebenswelt has "lost its innocence" and become inherently defined by
science. Reference to the pre-scientific Lebenswelt would today correspond
with reference to the pristine and unspoiled domestic environment of Blut and
Boden ideology. Husserl is entirely right when he claims that it is possible to
define science's signifying horizon in other words, a hermeneutic question to
which science replies with its activity only through references to the prescientific Lebenswelt. In other words, it is impossible to say that science
replaces the original ground of life practice with another (its own) signifying
horizon or a hermeneutic question. Science as such, in the strict hermeneutic
sense of the word, is unsignifying and as soon as it inherently begins to
encroach on the Lebenswelt, the whole loses its meaning and we find
ourselves in a void. In this sense, we must also understand Miller's claim that
there exist today numerous proofs of the presence of science in the everyday
Lebenswelt, which in its basic dimension appears to be an answer without a
question: "The history of our time adjusts to the predominant form of
knowledge: to science which is evident in the constant invasion of gadgets
that represent numerous answers without questions. Recently, a person from
Silicon Valley gave a befitting description of the turning point which in culture
is generally experienced as discomfort: 'Home computer is a solution without
a problem.' Based on this, a hysteric turns his essence into a question." (J.A.
Miller, "Liminaire". Ornicar?, 29, Paris, 1984, p. 4) Given the fact that an
"answer without a question" is actually the most condensed definition of the
real as the unsymbolised (the real as a condition that "does not answer any
question" and which lacks a signifying horizon), it becomes clear in what
sense science represents the basic reality of the contemporary world. This
aspect of the "question-less answer" can be clearly presented with three
partial characteristics of the contemporary age: the role of experts in everyday
life; micro-electronic gadgets; and advertising. The basic paradox of the
contemporary "cult of authenticity" is that its inner constitution and driving
force are a bunch of manuals which, by appearing scientifically legitimate,
give the subject prescriptions on how to attain his authenticity, how to liberate
the "creative potentials of his Ego", how to cast his mask and reveal his "real
Ego", and how to turn to intuitive spontaneity and genuineness. But here we
are interested in something other than the fact that even the most intimate
spheres of life are presented as attainable by means of (pseudo or real it
does not matter which) scientifically legitimate procedures. In connection with
these phenomena, we usually speak of a void, and of the loneliness,
alienation and artificiality of "contemporary man" in terms of a real need which
the scores of manuals attempt to satisfy in an individually psychological way
by means of a mystification of the actual social foundations. But we are
ignoring the opposite dimension, which is in fact even more important: the
primary effect of these manuals is not a prescription of how to satisfy these
needs but the creation of these "needs" and the provocation of the unbearable
sense of "void" in our everyday life, the insufficiency of our sexuality, the lack
of creativity of our work, the artificiality of our relations with other people and,
at the same time, a feeling of complete helplessness and an inability to find a
way out of this dead end or in the words of Molire, before these manuals
offer their poetry to us, they haughtily instruct us that, up to now, we have
been talking in prose. The difference between PN and borderline can be
defined in terms of this very dialectic of the question and answer:
"pathological" Narcissus plunges "without questions" into the current of evernew answers and for each answer, with an "ethical" obsession, he invents for
each object functions and needs to be met by it, in order to conceal the basic
paradox of the "answer without a question" as soon as possible. In contrast,
borderline defines a point where this current stops, where the subject is faced
with the lack of meaning of the answer as such and where he no longer
accepts ever-new "answers without questions" "without asking questions". He
asks a well-known hysterical question, a question to the Other, from whom he
expects a different answer, an answer to what these answers without
questions mean. From a traditional point of view, this answer would be quickly
rejected on the premise that it represents "fake needs" serving the interest of
capital accumulation. Nevertheless, this explanation is misleading, because it
presumes the existence of "real needs". Naturally, every individual has a few
"basic" needs which must be met in order to survive. But as soon as we enter
the sphere of the symbolic, the whole matter is reversed and the symbolic
articulation of a need changes it into a demand of the Other, while beyond this
demand there lurks the abyss of unarticulated and merely-evoked desire. That
need is subordinated to desire is made evident by the banal fact that for
desire (=law), the subject is prepared to sacrifice any "basic" need, such as
going on hunger strike or living in complete celibacy. The basic paradox or
fundamental fact of psychoanalysis is that no matter how integrated he is into
the network of speech, the subject in reality and irreducibly "does not know
what he wants", the object of his desire eludes him, and every articulation of
desire in the form of a symbolic demand is accompanied by a shift until the
ultimate point of the desire turns into the experience of "this is not it", which in
turn creates a possibility for a whole range of "not wanting anything" stands,
such as of wanting only "nothing" that missing part which fuels the desire.
Strictly speaking, the position of the hysteric is nothing other than the position
of a subject who "does not know what he wants", who does not know to what
extent he is caught up in the network of predominators. The "hysterical
question" is the question to the big Other, demanding to tell us what we want
and what our desire is. Here we must take into account the key fact that
desire is always inter-subjective the subject's desire is, in different forms,
always "mediated" by the desire of the Other. The desire, to desire what the
Other desires, to desire the Other himself, to desire to become the object of
the Other's desire Therefore, the problem of the "permissive" "consumer"
society does not lie in the fact that it forces us to adopt "fake needs" instead of
"real ones". On the contrary, the problem is that with the constant flood of new
consumer items and the provocation of demands, it narrows the space of
desire, masks the "empty place" from which desire emerges, and creates a
saturated field where the "impossible" desire can no longer be articulated. In
simple terms, "pathological Narcissus" is so saturated with "answers without
questions", and is shown in so many ways "what he really wants", that he
simply cannot experience the paradox of the desire, the cleft between desire
and wanting, which results in the fact that, despite the object of desire, "we do
not know what we want". Borderline marks the very point where this crazy
curve breaks and the subject becomes hysterical, convincing himself that,
despite all the answers, he in fact "does not know what he wants", finally
opening up to the desire. The paradox of the relationship between PN and
borderline is that the actual situation contradicts what is visible, according to
which borderline would be closer to the pathological disintegration of the
personality while PN would represent a step closer to normalisation, or to an
attempt at some kind of unification of the Ego which is supposed to synthesise
the disintegrated elements. An opposing view would be that if it is not a
psychosis, "pathological narcissism" is clinically a "pre-psychotic condition" at
least, characteristic of the "als-ob-personality" (as-if-personality) a condition
in which, on the surface, the subject is "fully functional", although he does not
inherently abide by social law. For this reason,"pathological Narcissus" gives
the unsettling impression that "there is nothing behind the mask", that we are
speaking to a puppet, that the mask really is just a mask, and that what is