Professional Documents
Culture Documents
41
43
works projects. It was also during this period that the distant Western Hemisphere
began to feel Chinas new economic weight in the international system, following
almost 20 years of sustained PRC economic growth that had begun with Chinas
cautious opening to the world in 1978. In 1997, the Caribbean governments of
the Bahamas and Saint Lucia recognized the PRC (although Saint Lucia would
reverse this position in May 2007),10 followed by Dominica in March 2004 and
(for the second time) *renada in 2005.
This progression culminated in the change in diplomatic recognition by Costa Rica in June 2007, arguably a strategically signicant event. That nation was
the most economically developed state in Latin America, and its president at the
time, Dr. Oscar Arias, was the broker of the November 1987 Central American
peace accords and one of the most respected political leaders in the region.11 The
fall of Costa Rica was expected to lead to changes in diplomatic recognition by
a number of other Central American states. Indeed, during this period, leading gures in a number of the states continuing to recognize Taiwan, including Mauricio
Funes (while candidate for the presidency of El Salvador); Richard Martenelli in
Panama, Fernando Lugo in Paraguay, and later, Porrio Lobo in Honduras, signaled their interest in changing position.
The principal factor preventing the PRC from making further diplomatic advances in the region following the change by Costa Rica was arguably the election of a nationalist (KMT) government in Taiwan the following January and
an agreement between the new Taiwanese president Ma Jeng Jeou and his PRC
counterpart Hu Jintao to suspend the competition for diplomatic recognition while
the two Chinas sought to improve relations with each other.12
The freezing of the diplomatic status quo in 2008, however, did not block
the advance of commercial relations. By the end of the rst decade of the 21st
century, virtually every state in the region was conducting a full spectrum of economic interactions with the PRC. This included Honduras, which in 2011 signed
a contract with the mainland Chinese company Sinohydro for a major new hydroelectric plant,13 and Nicaragua, which contracted Chinese companies for the
launch of a new telecommunications satellite14 as well as the possible construction
of its own transcontinental canal.15
In January 2012, the reelection of the nationalist KMT government in Taiwan
enabled the continuation of the rapprochement underlining the freezing of the
diplomatic status quo in the Latin America, even though Central American and
Caribbean presidents such as Porrio Lobo of Honduras continued to express
interest in changing diplomatic recognition.16
Beyond questions of diplomatic recognition, the PRC has created a hierarchy of sorts for its relations with countries of the region. Five Latin American
nations have been designated by the PRC as strategic partners of the PRC:
Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, and Chile.17 The designation, however, is
only a recognition of the importance that both parties afford each other and not
an indication that the relationship is positive. Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, for
instance, each have signicant bilateral disputes with the PRC despite their designation as strategic partner.
44
Finally, Latin Americas foreign policy toward the PRC also has an important multilateral dimension. The Organization of American States has afforded the
PRC formal observer status, to include hosting a member of the Peoples Liberation Army at the Inter-American Defense College (IADC) in Washington, D.C.
Although the PRC is not an observer in UNASUR, the organization has sought
cooperation with the PRC for the nancing of regional development projects.18
Similarly, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean State (CELAC) has
conducted formal political interactions with the PRC, including a visit by the
CELAC leadership to the PRC in August 2012.19 On the economic front, both
the Inter-American Development Bank20 and the Caribbean Development Bank21
have made the PRC a member.
Relative Harmony on Political Issues versus Diversity on Economic Ones
Latin American countries that diplomatically recognize the PRC generally have
few strong conicts with it on political matters. Their economic orientations toward the PRC, however, run the gamut from harmonious to highly conicted,
depending on the sector and the domestic coalition affected.
On noneconomic issues, Latin American governments generally emphasize
areas of agreement with the PRC and play down points of contention. Such consensus is made easier because few countries in the region are actively pursuing
extraregional political agendas. Thus, issues such as PRC sovereignty over Tibetof great importance to the PRC but of little relevance to Latin American
statesis commonly conceded by Latin American regimes in bilateral communiqups following meetings with senior PRC ofcials. This harmonious orientation is
arguably reinforced by the PRCs promotion of nonintervention in internal affairs
of each partner by the other,22 effectively conning interactions to material issues
rather than political ones. Although expressions of concern over issues such as
censorship or alleged human rights violations appear in the public debate in Latin
America,23 Latin American governments have rarely pressed such issues in their
interactions with the PRC to the point of adversely affecting their trade with or
investment from the PRC.
To the extent that political differences with the PRC are expressed by Latin
American governments, it is more commonly done by the larger countries of the
region. Brazil, for example, has been frustrated by what it perceives as a lack of
support from the PRC for its bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, while Mexico has incurred the ire of the PRC leadership by meeting
with the Dalai Lama.24
In select instances, Latin American states have also sought the PRCs political support for their positions on specic international issues. The Argentine
government of Cristina Fernandez has actively sought Chinese backing in its dispute with *reat Britain over ownership of the FalklandsMalvinas islands.25
Colombia and Ecuador have solicited PRC support for their bids to join the AsiaPacic Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC).26 Former Venezuelan leader Hugo
Chvez repeatedly sought to associate the PRC with his crusade against global
forces of imperialism, although the Chinese have politely demurred.27
Volume 15 / 2014
45
47
sition to oppose entry of an unarmed medical ship to the region, or to refuse to take
advantage of the humanitarian services that it was offering to provide once there.
Multiple Cross-Cutting Cleavages in the Regions Orientation
toward the PRC
Differences in the policies and style of Latin American governments toward the
PRC on economic matters are far more apparent than in the political arena. Such
differences tend to manifest themselves in the approach toward trade with the
PRC, the style of soliciting and incorporating investment from China, and the way
that Chinese interest in public works projects is managed.
Latin Americas heterogeneous orientation toward China on economic issues
may be understood in terms of four crosscutting cleavages, which reect economic, political, and geographic divisions in the region more broadly: (1) north versus
south, (2) populist regimes versus market economies, (3) pure resource exporters
versus industrialized exporters versus nonexporting capital recipients versus pure
importers, and (4) Pacic versus Atlantic.
Such divisions generally do not reect a debate within the region about
whether to engage with Chinaviewed as almost inevitable given Chinas omnipresence in global commerce and nance. Rather, they map out differences
regarding how to engage with China, including the level of importance and condence to give to the PRC in those interactions.
North versus South. The relationship of Latin American states with the PRC
manifests a distinct north-south divide, with a border that can be drawn roughly
at Nicaragua. The distinction reects the persistent close integration of the economies of Mexico and Central America with those of the United States and Canada.
Such integration is reinforced by trade accords, including the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the case of Mexico and the Dominican
RepublicCentral America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) for the states of
Central America. These bonds are also reinforced by human ties, with many immigrants from Mexico, El Salvador, *uatemala, and Honduras living in the United
States sending remittances to family in their countries of origin.36 Costa Rica and
Panama are special cases in this division, linked through free trade agreements
and strong commercial relationships to the U.S., but with increasingly important
commercial interactions with the PRC.
There is also signicant variability in the pattern. Mexico has long had an
independent foreign policy and was one of the early countries in the region to
diplomatically recognize the PRC. However, such relations have been troubled
by persistent large trade decits with the PRC, as well as Mexicos hosting of the
Dalai Lama on various occasions. Mexico is also one of Latin Americas largest
and earliest investors in the PRC, and, reciprocally, has worked hard at federal,
state, and local levels to attract Chinese investors in sectors such as autos, computers, and telecommunications. Similarly, Honduras, which does not maintain
diplomatic relations with the PRC, has contracted with a Chinese company for a
major hydroelectric project, the Patuca III dam, and has been in talks with Chi48
49
Pure resource exporters are those whose economies are focused around
primary-product exports, while lacking a politically signicant manufacturing
sector. This category includes both market-oriented states such as Chile and Peru,
as well as populist states, such as Venezuela. In such countries, the orientation
toward commercial engagement with the PRC has been very positive because
the benets of such engagement are signicant, while the industries and others
harmed are either few or politically voiceless.43
Industrialized exporters encompasses states such as Brazil, Argentina, and
Colombia, with both signicant export-oriented primary product sectors selling
goods to the PRC, as well as politically important industries and labor unions that
are damaged by competition from Chinese products in their own country and third
markets. The results of such divided political imperatives have been particularly
evident in Argentina, which by 2012 was exporting almost 90 percent of its soy
production to the PRC, relying on it for over $10 billion in loans for infrastructure
projects and looking to China to be a key player in its petroleum sector following
the nationalization of Repsol YPF. At the same time, reecting concerns over domestic industries and workers, Argentina had imposed 38 protectionist measures
against the PRC, including restrictions on Chinese tires44 and toys,45 as well as
textiles and computer equipment.46
Similarly for Brazil, the PRC is the nations number one trading partner, principal purchaser of its soy and iron, and increasingly a key investor in the mining
and petroleum sectors. Yet, as with Argentina, the protection of domestic industries has led Brazil to impose an increasing array of protectionist measures on the
PRC, from tariffs on shoes and tires,47 to a 30-percentage point increase in the
industrial products tax announced in September 2011.48
The third category encompasses states that, while not exporting signicant
quantities of goods to the PRC, benet from major Chinese loans and investments.
These are generally states in Central America and the Caribbean that initially received sports stadiums, roads, and other benets for switching their diplomatic
recognition to the PRC, but now have transitioned into being recipients of major
loan-backed infrastructure projects. These include such projects as the Jamaica
Development Infrastructure Program (JDIP), commercial investments such as the
port of Freeport in the Bahamas and the North-South toll road in Jamaica, or resort projects such as Baha Mar and Blackwood Pointe in the Bahamas and Bacolet
Bay Resort in *renada.
Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama are special cases in this category. Costa Rica has received major Chinese investments such as a new stadium
and the expansion of its renery at Moin, yet is also tied to the PRC via the export of semiconductors to the PRC from the Intel plant near San Jos. In the case
of Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama, although none diplomatically recognize
the PRC, each has benetted from Chinese loans and investments, including the
Patucha III dam in Honduras, work on a major new canal49 and renery50 in Nicaragua, and the presence of Hutchison-Whampoa51 and various smaller Chinese
manufacturers in the Panama Canal zone.
The benets provided by the relationship with the PRC has arguably fostered
50
a strong pro-PRC sentiment in these countries, yet has also generated signicant
discussions within their societies, with opponents to China-funded public works
projects raising questions about the use of large numbers of Chinese workers to
build them, the associated expansion of Chinese communities, and the accumulation of debts to the PRC to pay for the infrastructure being built.
The nal category is Latin American states with neither substantial exports
to the PRC, nor signicant loans, investments, or gifts from it. This category includes *uatemala, El Salvador, Belize, and those Caribbean states that do not recognize the PRC, as well as Mexico, which does receive some Chinese investment
and exports to China, but for which such benets are eclipsed by imports from
China and other factors. In virtually all countries in this category, the orientation
of government toward the PRC has generally been less positive than is the case
with the other three, since the net ow of benets coming from expanded engagement with the PRC is relatively limited and the net harm from the entry of Chinese
products into local markets is ever greater.
Pacic versus Atlantic States. An important new division is emerging within
Latin America with regard to the PRC between a block of Pacic-facing states and
the rest of the region.52 Shared motivations, based on expanding commercial engagement with Asia, interpreted through similar ideologies, have driven Mexico,
Colombia, Peru, and Chile to form a new block, the Alliance of the Pacic, with
Panama and Costa Rica participating in the founding activities of the new group
as observers.
Regimes in each of these states coincide in seeking to position themselves
as hubs for the expanding commerce between Asia and other states in the Hemisphere and in following a relatively capitalistic, market-oriented approach to doing so. Each of these countries also takes pride in more-efcient-than-average
bureaucracies to support its postulated new role, as well as a sufciently sophisticated legal system, independent judiciary, and tradition of respect for contracts
and private property, so as to give condence to Chinese and other investors.
In the four summits leading to the formal launch of the organization at the
summit in Paranal, Chile, in June 2012, the founding members achieved remarkable progress in the initial steps toward a functional multilateral organization,
including agreements to coordinate trade promotion policies toward the PRC and,
in some cases, to share resources, such as the new Chilean-Colombian consulate
opened in Shanghai in 2012. They also made progress in standardizing investment
regulations, and even creating shared nancial markets that could support doing
business with the PRC.53 Some analysts have even suggested a logical complementarity between the Pacic Alliance and the emerging new Trans-Pacic Partnership (TPP) to bring together similarly like-minded nations from Asia and the
Pacic coast of Latin America in order to form a new trading community.
In contrast to the Alliance of the Pacic, the countries on the Atlantic side
of the continent are in disagreement on how to engage the PRC. As noted previously, both Brazil and Argentina have major primary product industries seeking to
export to China, yet both have adopted increasingly protectionist policies, pushed
by domestic manufacturing and labor constituencies that have undercut Chinese
Volume 15 / 2014
51
interest in investing there. In the north of the continent, as noted previously, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador have engaged the PRC principally through state-tostate mechanisms. In Central America, Nicaragua and the states of the Northern
Triangle are effectively part of the Atlantic camp, lacking the diplomatic relations or physical or intellectual infrastructure to engage the PRC effectively,
although each has a Pacic coastline.54
Latin Americas Business and Societal Response to China
Although studies of inter-state relations most commonly focus on governmentto-government interactions, an increasingly important component of Chinas relationship with Latin America is how nongovernmental elites and publics react
to both China as an actor and the activities of Chinese entities on the ground in
Latin America.
First, the rise of China globally has captured the attention of business, students, academics, journalists, and others across the region. Although motivations
and responses differ, the people of Latin America are captivated by the prospect
of the PRC as a market, a source of investment and loans, and an alternative
to a world dominated by the U.S. and Western institutions, while others fear the
impact that it could have on their businesses or the development of their country.
The attention that China has commanded affords it signicant soft power, in the
form of businesses committing resources in pursuit of China-related opportunities, Latin American academics and journalists dedicating countless pages and
gigabytes to writing about the PRC, and students dedicating years to the study of
China, the Mandarin language, and the Chinese character set.
LA-POP, the rst major social sciences survey in Latin America to include
questions about the PRC, reported that more than 20 percent of the region believed China to be the most inuential actor in their particular country, and 23
percent believed that China would soon be so. Moreover, although a much larger
portion saw the U.S. as continuing to be the most important actor in the region, a
signicant margin (68 to 62) saw Chinas role in the region as more positive
than that of the U.S.55
Although the impact of Latin American business on China and its companies is a story that involves thousands of people, it can be seen at the highest
level through the elites who helped to build their countries trade with the PRC
and investment deals with its companies. These included the late Ricardo Claro,
Alejandro Luksic, and Jean Ponce LeRou in Chile; the Brazilian billionaire Aike
Bautista; and Argentine businessmen Sergio Spadone, Franco Macri, Nuria Quintela, and Carlos Bulgheroni. Each spearheaded or helped set up major Chinese
investments in their respective countries or investments by private interests from
their companies in the PRC, as well as leveraging relationships in their own governments to facilitate such deals. Similarly, the story of Colombias opening to
China must similarly include the protagonism of gures such as *ustavo *aviria,
*uillermo Velez, and Martin Ibarra.
In addition to the actions of such elites, Latin Americas interactions toward
China at the popular level increasingly include responses to the presence of
52
53
Notes
The Mandarin word for China, Zhong Guo literally translates as middle kingdom. The
) focuses on the concept of China in the world.
associated pictogram for China (
2
*ilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spencer, In from the Cold: Latin Americas New Encounter
with the Cold War (Duke University Press, 2007). In addition, unique among Latin American governments, from 1950 to 1954 Colombia sent a battalion of soldiers to Korea as part
of the U.S.-led United Nations force ghting against the North Koreans and the Chinese.
3
See, for example, P.J. Mc*owan and H.B. Schapiro, The Comparative Study of Foreign
3olicy: A Survey of Scientic Findings (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publishers, 1973). See
also K. J. Holsti, International Politics (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1972). See
Also D.O. Wilkinson, Comparative Foreign Policy: Framework and Method (Belmont,
CA: Dickerson, 1969). See also Stephen J. Andriole, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and *erald W.
Hopple, A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy Behavior, International Studies Quarterly 19, no. 2 (June 1975): 160198.
4
Although Allende was ousted by a military coup in September 1973, the government of
*eneral Augusto Pinochet that replaced him chose to continue diplomatic relations with the
PRC, given that the regimes of both Mao and Pinochet needed other countries to recognize
them to increase their international legitimacy. See Cynthia A. Watson, U.S. Responses to
Chinas *rowing Interests in Latin America: Dawning Recognition of a Changing Hemisphere, in Enter the Dragon? Chinas Presence in Latin America, eds. Cynthia Arnson,
Mark Mohr, and Riordan Roett (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars, 2009): 6571.
5
To some degree, the timing of the change was a product of the consolidation of Sandinista
rule in that country.
6
Often such organizations had roots in the benecence societies, mutual aid organizations by which Chinese communities provided help to newly arriving members of the
community and those in need, as well as providing assistance to family and social causes
in China itself.
7
Others, such as the Asociacin Paraguaya de Amigos de la Republica Popular China
(APACHI), arguably continue to do so to this day.
8
The exemplar of the attitude that the West had triumphed in the battle of ideas against
communism was arguably Francis Fukuyamas essay, The End of History? The National
Interest, Summer 1989. For an extended version of Fukuyamas thesis, see also Francis
Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992, 2006).
9
See Johanna Mendelson Forman and Susana Moreira, Taiwan-China Balancing Act
in Latin America, in Chinese Soft Power and its Implications for the United States, ed.
Carola Mc*iffert (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March
2009): 97101. See also Daniel P. Erikson and Janice Chen, China, Taiwan and the Battle
for Latin America, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs (Summer 2007).
10
*uy Ellis, Tiny St. Lucia Earns a Big Enemy: China, The Seattle Times, May 2, 2007.
11
See Manuel Roig-Franzia, Oscar Arias Sanchez Reects on 25 Years since Central
American Peace Accords, Washington Post, August 22, 2012.
12
In January of 2008, a new nationalist (KMT) government was elected to power in Tai1
Volume 15 / 2014
55
wan. As part of the effort by Taiwans new president, Ma Jing-yeou, to reach out to improve relations with the PRC, both sides agreed to suspend checkbook diplomacy. See,
for example, Presidente electo de Taiwn rechaza diplomacia de la chequera, El Mercurio, Santiago, Chile, March 23, 2008.
13
Honduras rma convenio con China para hidroelctrica, La Tribuna, Tegucigalpa,
Honduras. April 17, 2011.
14
Danilo Valladares, China llega a Amrica Central con satlites y megaobras, Euro
Xpress, November 1, 2012.
15
Tim Rogers, Nicaragua Taps China for Canal Project, Nicaragua Dispatch, September
11, 2012.
16
In December 2012, Honduran President Lobo publicly declared his interest in establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC, while also maintaining relations with Taiwan.
See Joseph Yeh, Honduras Dual Taiwan, China Recognition Unacceptable: MOFA, The
China Post, December 26, 2012.
17
In general, this has involved the establishment of binational commissions with periodic
meetings to coordinate issues relevant to the relationship. These meetings are generally at
the ministerial level, but are supported by lower-level working groups.
18
UNASUR to Strengthen Ties with China, Xinhua, July 28, 2011.
19
The visit was led by the foreign ministers of each of the three states leading CELAC at
that time: Nicholas Maduro, representing Venezuela; Alfredo Moreno representing Chile;
and Rogelio Sierra, representing Cuba. See Maduro fue a China para fortalecer nexos de
la CELAC, El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, August 10, 2012.
20
China Joins IDB in Ceremony at Bank Headquarters, Inter-American Development
Bank Ofcial Website, http:www.iadb.org, January 12, 2009.
21
Chinese, Caribbean foreign ministers issue joint press communiqu, Xinhua, August
21, 2002.
22
See, for example, Chinas Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean (full text),
*overnment of the Peoples Republic of China, http:english.gov.cnofcial2008-1105
content_1140347.htm, November 2008.
23
See, for example, Humberto Salinas Castaeda, Los derechos humanos en China, El
Sol de Zacatecas, June 25, 2009.
24
El Dalai Lama estar en Monterrey en su tercera visita a Mxico, La Prensa, September 8, 2011.
25
China apoy el reclamo argentino por la soberana de las Islas Malvinas, La Nacin,
Buenos Aires, Argentina, December 25, 2011. See also *-20: Cristina y Hu Jintao, mutuo
apoyo por Malvinas y una China ~nica, Cronista, June 19, 2012.
26
See R. Evan Ellis, China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009).
27
Pekn se desmarca de vnculo ideolgicos con Venezuela a la llegada de Chvez,El
Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, September 23, 2008.
28
R. Evan Ellis, China-Latin America Military Engagement, Air and Space Power Journal (2012). See also *abriel Marcella, Chinas Military Activity in Latin America, Americas Quarterly (Winter 2012).
29
R. Evan Ellis, Actividades militares chinas en Amrica Latina: panda o dragn?
Perspectiva 28 (MarchJune 2012).
30
Pekn se desmarca de vnculo ideolgicos con Venezuela a la llegada de Chvez, September 23, 2008.
31
For details, see R. Evan Ellis, ChinaLatin America Military Engagement (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, August 2011).
56
Ellis, ChinaLatin America Military Engagement,Air and Space Power Journal (2012).
CDS OverviewHistorical Evolution, Center for Defense Studies, National Defense University, accessed January 10, 2013, http://www.cdsndu.org/en/survey/2history/history.htm.
34
Ellis, China-Latin America Military Engagement, Air and Space Power Journal (2012).
35
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2010-05/04/content_9809029.htm.
36
There are a relatively smaller number of immigrants from Costa Rica and Panama in the
United States, arguably because of the relatively greater prosperity of those countries and
the absence of a legacy of civil wars that created a ood of refugees from other Central
American states to the U.S. in the 1980s. According to Department of Homeland Security
statistics, Costa Rica and Panama were the two Central American countries with the lowest legal emigration to the United States, with 68,170 residency permits granted to Costa
Ricans since 1980 and 82,300 to Panamanians over the same period. See Persons Obtaining Legal Permanent Resident Status by Region and Selected Country of Last Residence:
Fiscal Years 1820 to 2011, Department of Homeland Security, accessed January 10, 2013,
http://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2011-1.
37
In January 2013, the Chinese company Beijing *ED Orient Tech Development and a
local Honduran partner, Junior Reyes, signed a Memorandum of Understanding for a biofuels production project involving 2.7 million hectares of forests in Olancho, Coln, Yoro,
Francisco Morazn, La Paz, Lempira, Copn, and Mosquita. The project contemplated the
eventual creation of up to 300,000 jobs and the generation of up to $2 billion annually in
tax revenue for the Honduran state.
38
Bolivian president Evo Morales, during his 2011 visit to the PRC, for example, proclaimed, China is a country so great that from here, I can imagine that within a short
time, the United States will be a colony of China. See Evo anuncia siete convenios con
China, Los Tiempos, Cochabamba, Bolivia, August 16, 2011. Similarly, Hugo Chvez,
during one of his own visits to the PRC, declared that the Latin American revolutionary
gure Simon Bolvar and the Chinese revolutionary leader Mao Zedong would have been
great friends. See Alberto Alemn Aguirre, Relaciones que saben a petrleo, El Nuevo
Diario, Managua, Nicaragua, August 15, 2012.
39
As with the North-South dichotomy, the populist-market economy dichotomy is imperfect. In the nations of the Caribbean, as in populist regimes, large loans from Chinese banks
are one tool by which Chinese construction companies circumvent traditional competitive
procurement processes to win work projects for the state.
40
Antonio Rossi, Intervienen la operadora del ferrocarril Belgrano Cargas, Clarin, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 26, 2012.
41
Zhou Siyu, Trade with Argentina Hit by Protectionism, China Daily, May 23, 2012.
42
Zhou Siyu, The Ups and Downs of Latin Adventure, China Daily, July 24, 2012.
43
The falloff in Chinese demand for primary products that has accompanied the slowing
of growth in the PRC has hurt the economies of these states, but to date the relationship
has continued to cause sufcient benets so as not to jeopardize the positive orientation of
these regimes toward the PRC.
44
Measure No. 2609. See Argentina: Denitive Antidumping Duties on Certain Rubber
Tires Originating in China, http://www.globaltradealert.org, July 26, 2011.
45
Argentina Slaps Tariffs on China-Made *oods, France24, http://www.france24.com/
en/20110310-argentina-slaps-tariffs-china-made-goods, March 10, 2011.
46
Anti-Dumping Investigations against China in Latin America, International Bar Association, 2011.
47
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CDw
QFjAB&url=http3A2F2Fwww.agrichina.org2Fadmin2Fkindeditor-4.1.22Fa
32
33
Volume 15 / 2014
57
ttached2Fle2F201208282F20120828104625_7950.pdf&ei=uOruUIzPNtCr0AH
EsIFg&usg=AFQjCNF1VNP-HW1jc1H2w2_*iecXChlKlQ&sig2=Ytg-On1gfR6z7bN1
2F9NjQ&bvm=bv.1357700187,d.dmQ&cad=rja.
48
Joe Leahy, Brazil Hits Imported Cars with Tax Increase, Financial Times, September
16, 2011.
49
The canal project in Nicaragua is estimated to cost $30 billion and will consist of a waterway for ships and a dry canal railroad for freight. The Chinese company in charge of
the project is the Hong Kong-based HK Nicaragua Canal Development Investment Co.
Ltd. See Tim Rogers, Nicaragua Taps China for Canal Project, Nicaragua Dispatch,
September 11, 2012.
50
The total cost of the project is reported to be $6 billion. In April 2012, two contracts were
signed between the Nicaraguan petroleum organization Petronic and the Chinese company
CAMCE for the initial phase of the project: one for $183 million to construct the renery
terminal, and a second for $50M to construct 3.8 kilometers of submarine piping required
for the facility. See Chinos construirn mega renera en Nicaragua, El Comercio, April
27, 2012.
51
Kimberley Dannels-Ruff and Michele A. Watts, Security of the Panama Canal One Decade after U.S. Departure, Air and Space Power Journal (2010): 1013.
52
The division was highlighted by Dr. Frank O. Mora, thenDeputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense, in remarks to a group of senior Latin American defense and security analysts on
the topic of emerging strategic issues in the region. Remarks to the seminar Colleagues
for the Americas Seminar, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Fort Lesley McNair,
Washington, D.C, January 17, 2013. Quoted with permission of Dr. Mora.
53
For a review of the early progress made by the Pacic Alliance, see Andres Oppenheimer,
El nuevo bloque latinoamericano, El Nuevo Herald, Miami, Florida, June 9, 2012.
54
This refers to the absence of a substantial body of businessmen with the knowledge or
connections required to do business in the PRC beyond small-scale imports of Chinese
merchandise.
55
China in Latin America: Public Impressions and Policy Implications, based on the
Latin America Public Opinion Surveys, http://www.lapopsurveys.org, presented March 28,
2013, Washington, DC.
56
Chinese Investor to Breathe New Life into Palm Oil Industry, DevSur, http://www.devsur.
com/chinese-investor-to-breathe-new-life-into-palm-oil-industry/2011/05/03/, May 3, 2011.
57
Dixie-Ann Dickson, At What Cost, Chinese labour? http://www.guardian.co.tt/business-guardian/2012-06-06/what-cost-chinese-labour, June 7, 2012.
58
China Harbour Is Deeply Disappointed, Cayman Net News, November 8, 2012.
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Maickol Tamayo, Proposed Chinese Dragon Mart Complex Raises Eyebrows in Cancun, Mexico, PVAngels, http://pvangels.com/news-mexico/5068/chinese-dragon-martcomplex-raises-eyebrows-in-cancun, January 10, 2013.
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Marcha avanz a Latacunga y est a 75 kilmetros de Quito, El Universo, *uayaquil,
Ecuador, March 20, 2012.
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See, for example, Acusan al alcalde de Sapalache de apoyar violencia contra Ro Blanco, El Comercio, Lima, Peru, November 23, 2011.
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Juan Bosco Zambrano, Constructora china dice que diseos de proyecto Chone se
ajustan al paso, El Universo. *uayaquil, Ecuador, August 1, 2012.
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Marisol Espinoza canalizar al Congreso pedidos de mineros de Shougang, Andina.
September 8, 2011.
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An Eye-Opener for the Chinese at the Sierra *rande Mine, No a la Mina, April 6, 2010.
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Mireya Tabuas and Maria Alesia Sosa, No es un cuento chino, El Nacional, Caracas,
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Volume 15 / 2014
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