Rosner and Low - Efficacy of Olympic Bans and Boycotts On Effectuating International Political and Economic Change

The Efficacy of Olympic Bans and Boycotts on
Effectuating International Political and
Economic Change
SCOTT ROSNER*
& DEBORAH Low**
ABSTRACT
The Olympics have been linked to politics since their revival in 1896. There are many ways
that the Olympic Games can and have been used as a venue for political action. Two
primary ways are through boycotts and bans. This articleprovides detailedanalyses of the
boycotts that occurred in 1976, 1980 and 1984, and the InternationalOlympic Committee's
(IOC) bans of South Africa, Iraq and Afghanistan. This analysis shows that, unless a nation
has violated the Olympic Charter,pressuringthe IOC to ban it is futile. Thus, international
disputes that do not involve sports are rarely injected with success into the politics of the
Olympic Games. In addition, while a nation can successfully carry out an ideological
protest by boycotting the Games, the accomplishment of any more substantivegoal is far
more difficult to achieve. Thus, the act of boycotting the Olympics or pressuringthe IOC to
ban anothernation has limited benefits compared to the costs associatedwith doing so.
SUMMARY
I. INTRO DUCTION ............................................................................................................
28
II.
BRIEF HISTORY OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES .......................................................................
30
A . The Ancient Games .........................................................................................

B. The Revival of the Olympic Games ................................................................
C. The InternationalOlympic Committee ...........................................................
30
31
34
1II . BOYCOTT S .....................................................................................................................

A. The 1976 African Nations Boycott ................................................................
B. The Olympics and the Cold War .....................................................................
C. The 1980 Boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games .......................................
D. The 1984 Boycott of the Los Angeles Games.................................................
E. Conclusions on Boycotts ................................................................................
37
39
45
46
53
58
Lecturer, Legal Studies and Business Ethics Department, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
Professor Rosner is also the Associate Director of the Wharton Sports Business Initiative. The author thanks
Jeremy Fink, Matt Obemauer and Johnathan Peterson for their invaluable research assistance and editorial support.
.. Associate, KL Gates, New York, New York. J.D. 2009 Georgetown Law School; B.A. in Political
Science,
University of Pennsylvania. A substantial portion of Ms. Low's thesis at the University of Pennsylvania was used
to produce this article. Ms. Low would like to thank Dr. Rogers Smith for his assistance in preparing the article.
TEXAS REVIEW OF ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS LAW
VOL. 11:1I
IV . B A N S .............................................................................................................................
A. The InternationalOlympic Committee's Ban on South Africa ......................

B. The InternationalOlympic Committee 's Ban on Afghanistan .......................
C. The InternationalOlympic Committee's Ban on Iraq ...................................
D . Conclusions on Bans ......................................................................................
58
59
68
72
73
V . C ONCLU SION ................................................................................................................ 74
Appendix A: Complete List of Olympic Boycotts .........................................................
76
Appendix B: Select Rules from the Olympic Charter .....................................................
78
I. INTRODUCTION
The Olympic Games are singular. As the largest regularly held gathering of citizens
from different parts of the world, the Olympics are an attractive target for political
expression and activity. There are many ways in which the Olympic Games can and have
been used as a venue for political action. The host city's nation is always particularly
vulnerable to political attacks as was the case in 1908 when the United States delegation
failed to tip the American flag to King George VI of the United Kingdom in protest of
British rule and mistreatment of Ireland and its citizens. 1 Another such example occurred in
1924 when the Italians, angry due to a controversial French victory over an Italian fencer,
marched out of the Closing Ceremonies in the Olympic Stadium in Paris singing the Fascist
anthem.2 Individual athletes have engineered protests, such as American medalists Tommie
Smith and John Carlos, who raised a black-gloved fist during the national anthem to protest
racial segregation in the United States.3 The games were boycotted in 1956, 1976, 1980,
1984 and 1988, and there have been numerous other threats of boycott. Political issues have
called into question the fairness of competition, as judging scandals have led nations to
blame unfavorable results on international conspiracies to favor more powerful nations. 4
Terrorist attacks resulted in fatalities at the 1972 Munich Games 5 and 1996 Atlanta Games. 6
There have been issues regarding the selection of the host city and the manner in which the
host city uses the Olympic Games to showcase an unpopular regime or culture. 7 Protests of
1See Bill Mallon & Ian Buchanan, To No Earthly King, 7 J. OLYMPIC HIST., Sept. 1999 21, 22, available at
http://www.la84foundation.org/SportsLibrary/JOH/JOHv7n3/JOHv7n3i.pdf.
2 ALLEN GUTTMANN, THE GAMES MUST GO ON: AVERY BRUNDAGE AND THE OLYMPIC MOVEMENT
54
(1984).
3 Richard Lewis, Caught in Time: Black Power Salute, Mexico, 1968, TIMES (London), Oct. 8, 2006, at Sport
29.
4 See, e.g., Posting of Philip Hersh to Olympics Blog, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/olympics-blog/figureskating-judging/ (Apr. 22, 2009, 13:50 PDT).
5 Tony Karon, Revisiting the Olympics' Darkest Day, TIME.COM, Sept. 12, 2000,
http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,54669,00.html.
6 Mike Lopresti, A Decade Later, Atlanta Olympic Bombing Overshadowed, USATODAY.COM, July 23, 2006,
www.usatoday.com/sports/columnist/lopresti/2006-07-23-lopresti-atl- I0-years x.htm.
7 See Kyle Smith, The Real History of the Olympic Games, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2006 at WI 1 ( "The 1936
Berlin Games were--and the 2008 Beijing games will be--propaganda coups for evil regimes seeking to put on
smiley faces for the Katie Couries of the world journalism corps.").
2009
THE EFFICACY OF OLYMPIC BANS AND BOYCOTTS
the pre-Olympic torch relay and Opening Ceremonies have occurred.8 Numerous nations
have taken issue with the International Olympic Committee over participation requirements,
and nations have sought to have their enemies banned from the Games. 9 On a few
occasions, when violations of the Olympic Charter have occurred, the International
Olympic Committee has bowed to pressure and banned nations.' 0
The preceeding discussion of political activity demonstrates two things. First, political
activity at the Olympic Games is not insignificant and should not be ignored. In the wake of
constant political interference, the Games have become tainted in the eyes of many, who
view the Olympics as nothing more than the continued political battles of powerful nations.
However, more often than not, the issues raised by the Olympic Games are not petty. Over
the course of its history, apartheid, racism, World Wars, invasions, colonialism, and
numerous other political and social issues have swirled around the games. It is apparent that
nations and athletes view the Olympic Games as an effective venue for political activity.
These observations lead to the question of why the Olympic Games is viewed as an
effective venue for political and social activity.
The Olympic Games are seen as an attractive venue for two reasons. First, it is the
largest regularly held gathering of the world's citizens, and no event has the ability to
capture the attention of as large an audience as the Olympic Games. During the 2008
Beijing Summer Olympic Games, over 11,000 athletes competed," and a record 4.7 billion
people watched at least part of the Games on television.12 If a nation, group, or individual
wanted to make a statement about international politics, then the Olympic Games is where
they will find the largest possible television audience. This makes the Games an enticing
venue for those seeking the attention of the world.
The second reason why the Olympic Games are an attractive venue is the tremendous
impact the Games have on the citizens of the world. The Games and the triumphs of the
athletes from a given nation are both inspirational and meaningful to the citizens of that
nation. This has been demonstrated repeatedly, from the joyous celebrations by the Greeks
following the victory of a Greek shepherd in the inaugural Olympic marathon in the 1896
Athens Games, 13 to the days of celebrating that Americans did following the hockey team's
"Miracle On Ice" victory in the 1980 Lake Placid Games. 14 More recently, the triumph of
Jamaican Usain Bolt in the 100 and 200 meter sprints in Beijing in 200815 and the Iraqi
men's soccer team reaching the semifinals in the 2004 Athens Olympics led to mass
celebrations in each country. 16
8 See CNN.com, Torch Relay in San FranciscoDraws Massive Protest,Apr. 8, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008US/04/08/us.olympic.torch/index.html.
'See infra pp. 39-40.
I See infra Part IV.
" The Official Website of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games,
http://en.beijing2008.cn/news/official/preparation/n214496035.shtml (last visited Oct. 9, 2009).
12Multi Channel News Staff, Beijing Olympics Sets Gold Standard: 4.7 Billion Global Viewers, MULTI
CHANNEL NEWS, Sept. 7, 2008, http://www.multichannel.com/article/l34614BeijingOlympicsSetsGoldStandard 4 7 BillionGlobalViewers.php.
13 See CHARLIE LOVET, OLYMPIC MARATHON: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE GAMES' MOST STORIED
RACE 5-7 (1997).

4 See Dave Kindred, Born to Be Players, Born to the Moment;
In the Locker Room, They Sangfor America, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 1980, at A 1.
15Paul A. Reid, Wild Celebration in Usain Bolt's Hometown, JAM. OBSERVER, Aug. 17, 2008,
http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20080816T2300000500 139154_OBSWILDCELEBRATIONINUSAINBOLTSHOMETOWN_.asp.
16Associated Press, IraqiSoccer Team Wins Again, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 16, 2004, at D9.
VOL. 11: 1
Thus, it is easy to see why the Olympic Games have been a forum for political activity
since their inception, but it is less clear whether or not the Games are actually an effective
venue for such activity. This article will look at two major Olympic political activities:
boycotting and the act of attempting to pressure the IOC to ban other nations. This article
will not comment on the political significance of issues raised of the Olympic Games;
rather, it will simply attempt to assess what the political objectives of the nations were and
analyze whether or not these objectives were met. To keep the issues manageable, this
article will only discuss the actions of governments or National Olympic Committees, and
will not include analysis of any political action by an individual or a group.
Specifically, the article will provide detailed analyses of the Olympic boycotts of
1976, 1980, and 1984, and the IOC's bans of South Africa, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The
analysis that follows will show that unless a nation has violated the Olympic Charter,
pressuring the IOC to ban it is futile. Thus, international disputes that do not involve sports
are rarely injected with success into the politics of the Olympic Games. Furthermore, this
paper will show that a nation can successfully carry out an ideological political protest, but
that any more substantive goal is difficult to achieve. The article will also briefly discuss the
cost-benefit analysis of participating versus not participating in the Games, and will
conclude that it is virtually always better for a nation to participate. Beyond ideological
motives, it is very difficult to accomplish any substantive goal by way of boycotting the
Olympics or pressuring the IOC to ban another nation. Thus the benefits of these actions are
limited when compared with the costs.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES

A. The Ancient Games
The origins of the ancient Greek Olympic Games are not known for certain. It is
thought that they evolved out of Funeral Games, an ancient Greek tradition whereby
sporting competitions were held following a funeral to honor the deceased's memory. The
best approximation anyone can give as to the date of origin of Funeral Games is 1250
B.C.
17
The first recorded list of Olympic victors is dated 776 B.C., and is commonly used as
the date marking the first Olympic Games.18 However, it is almost certain that athletic
activity of some sort took place in Greece prior to 776 B.C., particularly as the Olympic
Truce dates back to 884 B.C. 19
From 776 B.C. to 393 A.D., a quadrennial religious celebration and athletic festival
occurred in Greece at Olympia.2 0 The Olympic program included running, wrestling,
boxing, pankration (a sport that fused wrestling and boxing and was probably similar to
17 Robert K. Barney, Prologue: The Ancient Games, in HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE MODERN OLYMPIC
MOVEMENT xxi, xxii (John E. Findling & Kimberly D. Pelle eds., 1996).
"8Id. at xxvi.
19DAVID MILLER, ATHENS TO ATHENS: THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES AND THE IOC, 1896-
2004 23 (2003). According to Greek mythology, the site was selected when Zeus decreed that athletic competition
must be a part of any religious celebration. Given the religious importance of the site, Olympic scholars use the
selection of the Olympia as further evidence that the Olympic Games evolved from religious occasions such as
funerals. Id.
20 Olympic.org, Ancient Olympic Games: History, http://www.olympic.org/contentlOlympic-Games/AncientOlympic-Games/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
2009
modem martial arts), a spentathlon, and chariot racing. 21 The Olympic Games evolved into
one of the most beloved spectacles in Ancient Greece, attended by athletes and spectators
from the Greek world. Though the Olympic Games were meant to stress the
accomplishment of the individual, the Games also inspired fierce patriotism in the various
city-states and regions.22
The most distinctive aspect of the ancient Olympic Games was the Olympic Truce.
Installed in 884 B.C. by Greek rulers, the Truce called for the cessation of wars for a period
before, during and after athletic festivals.23 During the period of the Truce, any athlete,
artist, or spectator traveling to the site of the competition was not allowed to be harmed.24
This was a remarkable concept given the Ancient Greek states' almost constant state of
warfare. Consequently, the Games marked rare periods of peace and tranquility in Greece.
The Truce stood as a testament of the harmony and goodwill that the Games symbolized,
and was the impetus for the model of the modem Games as a means of improving
international friendship and foreign relations.25
Even in Ancient times the Games were tainted by politics. In 4 th century B.C., King
Phillip II of Macedon was received poorly by a crowd of spectators who believed that he
was preparing to lead Macedon in an attempt to seize control of Greece. 26 In 324 B.C.,
Alexander the Great confirmed that the fears about his father Phillip II were well founded,
as he announced to the crowd at Olympia that he would unite Greece with him as the
leader.27
As Ancient Greece went into decline, so did the Olympic Games. Traditional Greek
sports and religion, the foundation of the Olympic Games, were phased out of the games as
the Romans and later Christianity moved across Greece.28 Christian Emperor Theodosius I
ultimately outlawed the Olympic Games in 393 A.D., after branding them a celebration of
paganism. 29 With that decree, the Olympic Games would disappear until a young
Frenchmen, Baron Pierre de Coubertin, worked towards their eventual revival in 1896.
B. The Revival of the Olympic Games
The revival of the Olympic Games is credited to the work of the Frenchman Baron
Pierre de Coubertin. De Coubertin was interested in the potential use of sport to revive the
spirit of the French people, who were suffering from a lack of confidence and a deflated
sense of nationalism that had set in after the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. 30 De
21MILLER, supra note 19.
22Olympic.org, Ancient Olympic Games: The Athlete, http://www.olympic.org/content/OlympicGames/Ancient-Olympic-Games/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2009). This is demonstrated in the story of Astylos of
Croton, a runner who competed first for Croton, but then for Syracuse following his move to the latter city. The
citizens of Croton responded to his perceived disloyalty by crushing a statue that had been erected of Astylos and
converting his house to a prison. [d.
23
INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, FACTSHEET: OLYMPIC TRUCE 1 (2008), available at
http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en-report-839.pdf.
24 id.
25See Id. at 2-3.

26 MILLER, supra note 19, at 23.
27 id.
28See Olympic.org, ANCIENT OLYMPIC GAMES: History (2009) http://www.olympic.org/content/OlympicGames/Ancient-Olympic-Games/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
29See id.
30
See ALLEN GUrMANN, THE OLYMPICS: A HISTORY OF THE MODERN GAMES 7-9 (University of Illinois
Press 1992).
VOL. 11: 1
Coubertin believed that sport was a potential means of uniting French citizens of all classes
and restoring harmony among the French people. 31 These beliefs would later be
incorporated into de Coubertin's philosophy of Olympism, the overarching ideology that
governs the Olympic Games. Finally, de Coubertin realized that in order to truly
reinvigorate the French people and cultivate French nationalism, the resurgence of sport
would have to be on an international scale.32 With this realization, de Coubertin began work
towards the revival of the modem Olympic Games. Moving beyond his original jingoistic
intentions, de Coubertin envisioned the Olympics as a mechanism for creating a more
peaceful world, incorporating into the Games his vision of using sports as a means for
improving international harmony, developing national pride, and the replacement of
military warfare with athletic competition.33
Eventually de Coubertin solicited delegates from 12 nations to attend a sporting
conference at the Sorbonne in Paris in 1893. 34 The delegates were seduced by de
Coubertin's demonstration and voted unanimously to revive the Olympic Games. The
delegates also empowered de Coubertin to establish a committee whose purpose would be
the organization and administration of the Games.35 Thus, on June 23, 1894, de Coubertin
founded the International Olympic Committee. 36 The original formation of the IOC, its
purpose, responsibilities, and its evolution throughout the years, will be discussed in greater
detail later in this article.
Following the conference in Paris, preparations began for the first modem Olympic
Games in Athens. 37 From the beginning, the modem Olympic Movement has been affected
by political and economic concerns, as was the situation faced by the Athens 1896 Olympic
Organizing Committee. 38 Initially, Greece was not enthusiastic about hosting the Games
and feared being unable to provide the financial investment needed to stage the Games in
Athens. 39
The Olympic revival faced difficulties from the international community as well.
There were no set rules and regulations for most sports, and ad hoc councils had to be set up
to determine a set of rules for Olympic sports.4 Moreover, the world was paying very little
attention to the Olympic revival. The Russian press hardly reported on the event, the British
press branded it as an "athletic whim," the Germans dismissed it as "French shenanigans,"
3"See id.
32 See id. at 8.
33 MILLER, supra note 19, at 23. De Coubertin was not the first person to attempt to revive the Olympic
Games. Sporting festivals that were similar in spirit to the Olympic Games were held in England, Sweden and
Greece throughout the 19 th century. These festivals were all held on a national scale, and were only marginally
successful. The Greek festival, which seemed the most promising, was discontinued in 1889, after having been
held a mere 4 times. Realizing that the failure of those festivals had been that they were not international, de
Coubertin worked tirelessly to garner international support and competitors for his Games, a move that would
inevitably force the world to pay attention to the revival. Id.
34Alan Tomlinson, De Coubertin and the Modern Olympics, in FIVE RING CIRCUS: MONEY, POWER AND
POLITICS AT THE OLYMPIC GAMES 84, 91 (Alan Tomlinson & Garry Whannel eds., Pluto Press 1984).
35 GUTTMANN, supra note 30 at 14.
36
1d. at 14.
37 Pierre de Coubertin, The Olympic Games: Athens 1896, in OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE GAMES OF THE FIRST
OLYMPIAD (Apr. 1896), availableat http://www.pe04.com/olympic/athens I896/coubertin_96.php.
38See Timoleon J. Philemon, PreparatoryOrganizationfor the Games, August 1896, in THE OLYMPIC GAMES:
SECOND PART - THE OLYMPIC GAMES IN 1896 10 (N. G. Polites and Charalambos Anninos eds., 1897) available
at http://www.aafla.org/6oic/OfficialReports/1 896/1896.pdf.
'9 Id. at 10.
4o GUTTMANN, supranote 30, at 16.
2009
and even within de Coubertin's homeland of France, the Olympic revival was met with little
enthusiasm.4 1
Despite these problems, as the Games approached, they were embraced by Greece as a
mechanism of displaying a sacred part of their heritage. The Games opened on April 6,
1896, and were attended by 241 athletes from 14 different nations. 42 Women were not
permitted to compete at the 1896 Games.43 Greeks also made up the majority of the
approximately 40,000 spectators. The Games were not of a high athletic quality. Most
winning times did not even approach world records." Nonetheless, de Coubertin remained
optimistic about the future of the Games. Immediately following the Athens Games he
assumed the position of President of the International Olympic Committee which decided,
based on his recommendation, to hold the 1900 Games in Paris. 45 In a November 1896
essay published in Century Magazine, de Coubertin praised the potential of the Olympic
Games to contribute to "harmony and goodwill" and "universal peace. 46
Despite de Coubertin's optimism and the steady growth of the Olympic Games over
the course of the next few decades, the Games nonetheless had their fair share of problems.
The 1900 Paris Games saw the number of competing National Olympic Committees
(NOCs) increase from 14 to 24, and the number of athletes jump to 997, including 22
women. 47 However, the Paris organizers made the mistake of incorporating the Games into
the 1900 Paris World's Fair. 48 As a result, the Games of the Second Olympiad in Paris were
four months long. 49 The 1904 St. Louis Games were the same length, 50 and thereafter the
organizers learned that it was impossible for the Olympic Games to capture the world's
attention for four straight months. Ultimately in 1932, the Games were changed to sixteen
days. The Games have been a much more manageable and successful affair ever since.
There were also problems developing the Olympic program and determining which sports
were suitable for Olympic competition. Due to the uncertainty associated with merging
several sporting cultures, events such as single shot deer hunting and tug-of-war had brief
and unsuccessful stints as Olympic sports. As the Olympic movement grew, the Games
evolved into a successful format and expanded to include winter sports. The first Winter
Olympic Games were held in 1924."'
"'
Id. at 16-17.
42 INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, FACTSHEET: THE SUMMER OLYMPIC GAMES 1 (2008), available at
http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Reports/EN/en-report-I 138.pdf.
43The Australian Sports Commission, Women in the Olympics, (2000),
http://fulltext.ausport.gov.au/fulltext/2001 /ascpub/womenolymhist.asp.
44GUTTMANN, supra note 30, at 18.
45Olympic-Legacy.com, The Olympic Movement (2003),
http://www.pe04.com/olympic/athens l896/index.php.
46 GUTTMANN, supra note 30, at 20.
41INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, FACTSHEET: THE SUMMER OLYMPIC GAMES 1 (2008), available at
http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Reports/EN/en-report-l 138.pdf.
48Pierre de Coubertin, Olympic Memoirs, 109-110, OLYMPIC REv., 630, 636 (1976), availableat
htp://www.la84foundation.org/OlympiclnformationCenter/OlympicReview/1976/ore 109/oreI 09r.pdf.
9 INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, supra note 47.
50
id.
5'See Olympic.org, Chamonix 1924 (2009), http://www.olympic.org/en/content/Olympic-Games/All-PastOlympic-Games/Winter/Chamonix- 1924/.
VOL. 11: 1
C. The InternationalOlympic Committee

When the International Olympic Committee (IOC) was founded, it was composed of
fifteen men whom de Coubertin had personally recruited for the committee.52 In order to
prevent the politics of the member nations from controlling the IOC, de Coubertin set up the
IOC so that members were IOC delegates to their respective home nations and not the other
way around. 53 The IOC was meant to be akin to an exclusive club. Despite the changes to
the Olympics that have occurred since its reemergence, the IOC remains similar to an
exclusive club with membership available by invitation only. 54
In addition to the IOC members, administration of the Olympic Games is also
dependent on the IOC's umbrella organizations, the National Olympic Committees (NOCs)
of the member states, the organizing committees of the Olympic Games, and the
International Federations (IFs) of various sports.5 5 The NOCs are responsible for
maintaining sport in accordance with the Olympic Charter in their nations. IFs determine
the rules and regulations by which their sports are governed. Overseeing these organizations
comprises a large portion of the IOC's administrative duties. 56 The business of the
Olympics is a combination of organizations referred to in the industry by their
abbreviations. Each wields a certain degree of power and all must work together to stage the
Olympics in both their winter and summer forms. The rights to the Olympic Games and all
of the intellectual property associated with them-including the five rings, their colors, the
flag, and the words Olympics, Olympiad, and Olympic Games-are held by the
International Olympic Committee (IOC) based in Lausanne, Switzerland. The primary
sources of revenue for the IOC are broadcast rights, sponsorships, ticket sales, and licensing
related revenues. The financial driver for the Olympics, just as it is in professional sports, is
television. The sale of worldwide broadcast rights provided the IOC with $2.568 billionover half of its total revenues-from 2005 to 2008." 7 The IOC relies heavily on the United
States broadcast networks, with nearly 60% of these revenues coming from NBC, 23% from
Europe, and the remainder from the rest of the world. 8 This situation is unlikely to change
in the near future, with NBC paying around $2 billion for the right to broadcast (the
Olympic Games of 2010 in Vancouver and 2012 in London) in the United States.5 9 The
IOC distributes approximately "half of the broadcast rights fees of each Olympics to the
OCOG responsible
for the respective Olympic Games, and half to the Olympic
60
Movement."
Sponsorships established by the IOC sponsorship program, formally called The
Olympic Program (TOP), are a vital source of revenue for the IOC. Comprised of 9 global
companies that received broad category exclusivity, the TOP program generated $866
million during this past quadrennial from 2005 to 2008.61 Although less so than in the past,
the IOC is dependent on the United States for its sponsorships, with four of the nine 200952
LORD KILLANIN, MY OLYMPIC YEARS 13 (William Morrow & Co., Inc. 1983).
53id.
54
id.
55 Id. at 15; SCOTT R. ROSNER & KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE, THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS 395, 397-98 (Jacqueline
Ann Mark & Julie Champagne Bolduc, eds. Jones & Bartlett Pub. 2004).
56KILLANIN, supranote 52, at 15.
57Tripp Mickle, IOC Shifts from Dependence on U.S. Revenue, SPORTSBUSINESS JOURNAL, Oct. 12 2009, at 1.
58 id.
59 ROSNER & SHROPSHIRE, supra note 55, at 409.

60Id. at 395.
61 Tripp Mickle, IOC Shifts from Dependence on U.S. Revenue, SPORTSBUSINESS JOURNAL, Oct. 12, 2009, at
2009
2012 TOP sponsors based in this country. 62 Ticket sales to Olympic opening and closing
ceremonies and events generated $411 million for the IOC from 2001-2004.63 The sale of
Olympic related licensed products, coins, and stamps complete the IOC financial picture,
generating $86.5 million of the organization's revenues from 2001-2004.64
The IOC distributes over 90% of its revenues to OCOGs, NOCs and IFs.65 For
example, the Turin Organizing Committee (TOROC) received $406 million in broadcast
rights and $139 million from the TOP program.66 The IOC provided the Athens Organizing
Committee (ATHOC) with $960 million, or 60% of its operating budget, for the 2004
Games.67 In addition, the IOC distributed in excess of $4 billion to the Turin Organizing
Committee, the Beijing Organizing Committee, the NOCs that sent teams to the 2006 and
2008 Olympic Games, the twenty-eight summer sport IFs for the 2008 Olympics, and the
seven winter sports IFs for the 2006 Olympic Games.68 The IOC retains 8% of its revenues
to pay its administrative and operating expenses. 69
Each of the 205 countries that are a part of the Olympic family has its own national
Olympic committee.70 NOCs are the prime organizations that run the business of fielding
Olympic teams. 71 The United States Olympic Committee (USOC) shoulders this
responsibility in the United States. Empowered by the Amateur Sports Act, the USOC
derives much of its revenue from the IOC.The USOC receives royalty payments from the
IOC and broadcast networks for the U.S. Olympic broadcast rights. 12.75% of the IOC's
American broadcast revenues ultimately are delivered to the USOC as part of a twenty-one
year old deal, with NBC providing the USOC with $673 million for the Olympic Games
from 2000 to 2012.72 This bounty is not limited to television. The USOC also receives 20%
of the IOC's global marketing revenues- more than all of the other 205 NOCs combined.
The USOC also generates significant revenue, from its own domestic sponsorships, joint
ventures, fundraising and licensing efforts and earns annual revenues of over $200
million. In 2008, the USOC generated $280.6 million in total revenue.75
Despite its not-for-profit status, the USOC has struggled to avoid red ink in recent
years. The USOC has a staggering amount of overhead expenses and also provides
American athletes and various national governing bodies (NGBs) with over $70 million of
62id.
63 Karolos
Grohmann, Factbox: Key Facts on Olympic revenues for IOC, REUTERS, May 8, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/sportsNews/idUSL0864358320080509.
64
65
id.
ROSNER & SHROPSHIRE, supra note 55, at 397.
66 INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, OLYMPIC MARKETING FACT FILE 12, 13, 28 (2008), availableat
http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Reports/EN/en-report-344.pdf.
67ROSNER & SHROPSHIRE, supra note 55, at 397.
68Grohmann, supranote 63.
69 International Olympic Committee, Olympic Marketing FactFile (2008), availableat
http://www.olympic.orglDocuments/Reports/EN/en-report-344.pdf at 5.
7
oROSNER & SHROPSHIRE, supranote 55, at 397.
71 Id.
72Tripp Mickle, IOC, USOC Break Revenue-sharing Stalemate, SPORTsBUSINESS J., Mar. 30, 2009, at 6,
available at https://www.sportsbusinessjounal.com/article/62128.
73id.
75Tripp Mickle, Beijing Olympics a FinancialBoon for USOC, SPORTSBUSINESS J., June 1, 2009, at 4,
available at https://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/62665.
VOL. 11: 1
financial support each year. 76 However, it should be noted that, unlike almost every other
country's NOC, the USOC does not receive any direct government support.77 The fact that
the IOC and USOC are so interdependent is thought to have generated significant
resentment of the United States in the European-controlled IOC.
The next layer of governance is among the individual sports. Each sport is governed at
its highest level by an international sports federation. There are currently twenty-six IFs
involved in the Summer Olympics and seven in the Winter Olympics. 78 For example, the
International Amateur Athletics Federation governs "athletics," popularly referred to as
track and field. This organization sets the rules and holds the rights to various
championships and other competitions around the globe. Each country that has athletes
involved in that sport at the international level has a national governing body. In the United
States, the NGB for athletics is USA Track & Field (USATF), formerly The Athletics
79
Congress (TAC). Overall, there are 44 recognized Olympic NGBs in the United States.
All of these various enterprises are permanent and often extremely political. The perks
for leadership within these organizations include global travel, gifts, and important political
and business relationships.
The most unique of the Olympic related organizations are the organizing committees.
In the United States the OCOGs that people are most familiar with are the Los Angeles
Olympic Organizing Committee (LAOOC), which planned and operated the 1984
Olympics, and the more recent U.S. committees at Atlanta in 1996 (ACOG) and Salt Lake
City in 2002 (SLOC). The uniqueness comes primarily from the fact that once the Games
are complete, the OCOGs disband. The OCOGs are also heavily dependent on the IOC,
80
which provides the OCOG with revenue from its broadcasting and sponsorship rights. An
OCOG generates its own revenue through the sale of local sponsorships, tickets, and
licensed products. For example, SLOC earned $575 million in sponsorship revenues, $180
million in ticket sales, and an additional $25 million in sales of licensed products. 81 The
95% of its local sponsorship, ticketing, and licensing revenue, and gives
OCOG also retains
82
5% to the IOC.
The primary purpose of the IOC is to ensure the continued spread of the Olympic
ideals of peace and harmony through sport. This purpose is accomplished by way of holding
the Summer Olympic Games every four years. 83 The most famous administrative duty of
the IOC is the selection of host cities for the Olympic Games, which has become a largely
political process. According to the Olympic Charter, potential host cities are required to
submit a bid to be reviewed by the IOC. The host city for each Olympic Games is selected
76 The amount totaled $71.4 million on athletes and national governing bodies of Olympic sports in 2008. See
Brian Gomez, USOC's Assets Increase by $47 Million, THE GAZETTE (Colorado Springs), May 22, 2006, available
at http://www.gazette.com/sports/million-54677-revenue-usoc.html.
78id.
79Tripp Mickle & John Ourand, NGBs Skeptical About USOC's Plans, SPORTsBUSINESS J., Aug. 3, 2009, at 1,
available at http://www.sportsbusinessjoumal.com/article/63161.
81id.
82 id.
83The official name of an edition of the Summer Games reflects the Olympiad in which it is held. For
example, the 1896 Athens Games are officially termed "The 1896 Athens Games of the I Olympiad." The Winter
Olympics, which were originally held in the same year as the Summer Games, were moved to the third year of the
Olympiad in 1994. The Winter Olympics are not designated by Olympiad, but rather by the number of Winter
Olympic Games that have preceded them. As the most recent Winter Olympic Games were the twentieth to have
been held since the inception of the Winter Games in 1924, they were termed "The XX Winter Olympic Games in
Torino." Olympic.org, Turin 2006 (2009), http://www.olympic.org/en/contentOlympic-Games/All-Past-OlympicGames/Winter/Turin-2006/ (click on "all facts" tab and scroll down to bottom).
2009
between six and seven years prior to the Games so as to allow the host city adequate time to
prepare. 84 During this process, the IOC selects a host city, not a host nation. This distinction
is important to the IOC because, according to the Olympic Charter, during the course of the
Games the sites of the Olympic events are considered Olympic territory, and not territory of
the host nation.
In recent years the IOC has attempted to branch out and extend its influence over other
aspects of the Olympic Games through the formation of commissions that deal with various
aspects of Olympic administration. There are currently 22 IOC Commissions, including
Finance, Marketing, Medical, Judicial, International Relations, and Women in Sport. 85 As
previously mentioned, the IOC now receives monetary compensation from the sale of
Olympic television rights. Consequently, since the 1970s, the IOC has been well
endowed. 86
While originally the IOC allowed athletes to compete independent of their respective
NOCs, in 1920 the rules were changed so that only NOC could enroll athletes.87 The
exception to this rule is the Independent Olympic Athlete (IOA). If an athlete's nation has a
recognized National Olympic Committee, then that athlete must compete under that NOC.
However, if the athlete does not have an NOC, or if its NOC has been suspended, then the
athlete can appeal to the IOC to compete as an IOA.8 8 This rule allowed four athletes from
East Timor to participate in the 2000 Olympics as IOAs. 89 Following the mass boycotts in
1976, 1980, and 1984, many athletes appealed to the IOC and asked them to allow them to
compete as IOA but were denied due to the presence of a recognized Olympic committee
that had formally withdrawn its athletes. 90
III. BOYCOTTS
The period from 1972-1984 was perhaps the most troubling the Olympic movement
had ever faced. Following the terrorist attacks at the 1972 Munich Games, increased
security threats contributed to the rising costs of the Games, dissuading many cities from
submitting bids to host the Games. The lack of enthusiasm over hosting the Games led to
controversial decisions to award the 1980 Summer Games to Moscow over Los Angeles
and the 1984 Summer Games to Los Angeles. This came during the height of the Cold War.
The Cold War was only one of the three major international political issues that were
became entwined with the Olympic Games. The second issue revolved around the
continued debate over Olympic recognition or non-recognition of Taiwan, and the third
political issue surrounded the relationship between the IOC, South Africa, and nations that
had sporting ties to the apartheid regime. These three issues would lead to the era of the
boycott, in which boycotts plagued the Olympics for 12 years, the first of which was the
84 INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, OLYMPIC CHARTER, Rule 34(2) (2007), availableat
http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/enreport_ 122.pdf.
85 Olympic.org, THE ORGANIZATION: COMMISSIONS (2009), http://www.olympic.org/en/content/The-IOC/The-
IOC-Institution I/(click on "Commissions" tab).

86 KILLANIN, supra note 52, at 22.
87OLYMPIC CHARTER, supranote 84, at 28(7).
88 Jere See Jere Longman, East Timor Athletes Enjoy Independence, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2000 at D2,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000 09/09/sports/olympics-east-timor-athletes-enjoy-independence.htm.
89 Sports Reference LLC., Countries and Nationalities at the Olympics, http://www.sports-
reference.com/olympics/about/nationalities.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2009).

90See Olympic.org, NATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEES: MISSION (2009),
http://www.olympic.org/en/content/The-IOC/Govemance/National-Olympic-Committees/.
VOL. 11: 1
boycott of the 1976 Summer Games by 22 African nations over the nature of sport in
apartheid South Africa.
The most important boycotts were the three major boycotts of 1976, 1980 and 1984.
For that reason, only these three boycotts will be discussed in detail. A careful analysis of
these boycotts will show the limits of what a country can hope to accomplish via boycott.
Unfortunately, there is little deterrent to stop a country from boycotting. The IOC is a weak
organization. Its primary method of punishment is exclusion from the Olympic Games, and
the IOC is hesitant to take actions that will harm athletes. In response to these boycotts, the
IOC has never done anything more than censure a boycotting nation, which fails to deter
nations who are considering boycotting. With no deterrent, countries often do not see the
potential problems they could face as the result of a boycott.
In addition to being the largest boycotts in Olympic history, these three boycotts
demonstrate the different goals that nations can hope to accomplish by way of the boycott.
The experiences of the African nations in the years leading up to the 1976 boycott
demonstrate the limited power of the IOC. As shown in its 1964 and 1968 dealings with
South Africa, the IOC can be persuaded to act against a National Olympic Committee, if
that NOC is in violation of the Olympic Charter. However, as was demonstrated in 1976
and 1980 in its interactions with New Zealand and the Soviet Union respectively, the IOC is
unwilling to take action against a nation that is not in direct violation of the Olympic
Charter. The Olympic Charter is concerned solely with the administration of fair and free
sport in member states and not with any other actions of the member nation's government.
Thus, New Zealand in 1976 and the Soviet Union in 1980 could not be punished because
their transgressions did not constitute an Olympic violation.
The analysis of the 1980 and 1984 boycotts also demonstrates that governments and
NOCs cannot use an Olympic boycott to harm the host city's nation or cause a significant
disruption to the administration of the Games. The United States commonly sends the
largest Olympic delegation of any member nation and in 1980 it organized the largest
boycott in Olympic history. However, analysis will show that the Moscow Games suffered
minimal political and economic fallout as a result of this boycott. Similarly, in 1984, the
Soviet boycott of the Los Angeles Games had almost no economic or political effect on
what would become the most profitable Games of all time. Analysis will also show that it is
difficult to affect the domestic and international politics and policies of the host nation by
way of a boycott. The Games are marked by displays of nationalism, and thus, for the host
nation the allure of showcasing their culture to the world outweighs any potential
embarrassment of a boycott.
The analysis will also show that in many cases a boycott can actually hurt the
boycotting nation, or the people who made the decision to boycott. The African nations
arguably would have benefited more from competing in the 1976 Games than from
boycotting. This conclusion is based on the assumption that in 1976 the African National
Olympic Committees were still developing and had yet to establish themselves as a major
force in the Olympic movement. Rather than competing and showing themselves as
emerging sporting powers, the African nations were unable to gain any influence within the
IOC. Similarly, as American support for the 1980 boycott began to dwindle, so did the
polling numbers for President Jimmy Carter, who would lose his re-election bid later that
year.
The conclusion to be drawn from the following sections on the 1976, 1980, and 1984
boycotts are that boycotts have accomplished only the limited goals of making a fleeting
2009
political or ideological statement. However, they have not accomplished the desired
substantive goals of the boycotting nations to change politics and policies.
The analysis of the three major boycotts shows how difficult it is to accomplish
substantive goals by way of a boycott. Given that the most influential Olympic member
state and sixty-four of its allies were unable to influence the perceptions of the USSR or
affect a political or economic change in the Soviet Union, it can be concluded that it is quite
difficult for a boycott to have its desired effect. 9'
The boycotts also show that it is nearly impossible to influence the IOC into action if
the nation in question has not committed a violation of the Olympic charter. The philosophy
of Olympism states that sport should be free of politics. As a result the IOC is not interested
in passing judgment on a government's political actions.
In conclusion, the following analyses of the 1976, 1980, and 1984 boycotts will
endeavor to provide a solid argument against boycotting, and for participating in the Games.
A. The 1976 African Nations Boycott
The issue of South Africa plagued the Olympic movement for decades. Though
apartheid had been active policy in South Africa since 1948, the IOC only took notice of the
situation when it was pointed out that the entire 1960 South African Olympic team was
white. 92 In 1963 the IOC made a formal request to the South African NOC to publicly
denounce segregation in sport.93 When the South African NOC failed to comply, its
invitation to the 1964 Tokyo Summer Games was revoked. 94 Similarly, South Africa's
invitation to compete at the 1968 Mexico City Games was revoked amid fears that the
South African team's presence would lead to protests and violence. 95 In 1970 amid
increased international pressure and with the South African NOC continuing to exclude
non-white athletes, the IOC determined South Africa was in violation of the Olympic
Charter and expelled South Africa from the Olympic Movement. 96 The process by which
South Africa was expelled, as well as the ramifications of the IOC decision, will be
discussed in further detail in a later section.
Despite South Africa's expulsion from the Olympics, it still maintained sporting ties
with several nations including Rhodesia. 97 These ties proved problematic for the IOC, as the
Soviet Union, its allies in Eastern Europe, and the other African nations pressed for a
complete global severance of sporting ties with South Africa along with nations that
maintained sporting ties with the apartheid regime. 98 Rhodesia had a similar policy of racial
discrimination and was heavily reliant on economic and political support from South Africa.
99
Therefore, Rhodesia was unable and unwilling to sever sporting ties with its ally.
Consequently, several African nations threatened to boycott the 1972 Games if Rhodesia
" As an aside, the outcome of the Moscow boycott also demonstrates that it is difficult to change international
perspectives on a nation. It is difficult to say exactly how international perceptions of the Soviet Union changed
following the boycott, but it is a fair guess to estimate that they were probably fairly similar to international
perceptions of the Soviet Union before the boycott.
92 See KILLANIN, supra note 52, at 32.
93 id.
94
1d.
" Id. at 43.
96 Id.
97 RicHARD Espy, THE POLITICS OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES 156
98Id.
99
Id.
(U. Cal. Press, 1979).
VOL. 11: 1
was not banned from competing. 100 In light of this threat, the IOC withdrew Rhodesia's
invitation to compete in the 1972 Olympic Games, and it expelled Rhodesia from the
Olympic Movement in 1973.101 Following Rhodesia's expulsion, IOC officials were
hopeful that the South African issue was resolved. 102
The hopes of the IOC were dashed in May of 1976 when New Zealand's rugby team
agreed to tour South Africa. 10 3 This tour was seen by many African nations as veiled
support for apartheid. 10 4 Immediately following the announcement of the tour, several
African, Caribbean, and Eastern European nations considered boycotting the Games, or10at5
least the events in which New Zealand participated, unless New Zealand was banned.
The threat of a boycott was led by Tanzania, who officially warned the IOC on July 9, 1976
06
that, if New Zealand were allowed to participate, it would withdraw from the Games.1
Nigeria and the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa (SCSA) joined Tanzania's organizing
efforts. 0 7 The primary purpose of the SCSA, which will be discussed in greater detail in a
later section, was the downfall of apartheid. Initially, many African and Caribbean nations
echoed the threat. Forty-eight hours before the start of the Games, fifteen African Nations
sent the IOC an ultimatum: ban New Zealand from participating in the 1976 Games or face
an African boycott. 108
Facing the first mass boycott in Olympic history, the IOC had limited options. The
IOC appealed to the New Zealand NOC for assistance in condemning the tour, but rugby
was not an Olympic sport, and neither the IOC nor the New Zealand NOC had any control
over the New Zealand Rugby Federation. In addition to its inability to regulate the issue of
the rugby tour, the IOC has always maintained a policy of not instituting political decisions
that would harm athletes. Thus, the IOC decided not to ban New Zealand on the premise
that New Zealand's athletes would become the innocent victims of an African show of
defiance. 10 9 Moreover, as twenty-six other nations continued to have sporting ties with
South Africa, punishing New Zealand would be arbitrary. The IOC rejected the ultimatum,
and African NOCs began the process of gradual withdrawal from the Games. 110
Ultimately, 22 nations"'. representing 441 athletes declined to participate in the 1976
Montreal Olympics. Many of the athletes were uncertain as to the reason for the boycott.
Some appealed to the IOC to allow them to stay, but in accordance with IOC policy, only
athletes from participating NOCs were eligible to compete. Therefore, the athletes had no
remedy against the boycott." 2
There has been some question as to whether the African nations truly wanted to punish
New Zealand or instead were merely sacrificing New Zealand in their effort to call attention
100Id.
Id.
102ESPY, supra note 97, at 157 (citing the N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1973).
103 id.
101
04id.
105id.
106 id.
"' See KILLANIN, supra note 52, at 32.

108 ESPY, supra note 97, at 157.
9
Id. at 158.
110Id.
' While 22 nations are officially listed as boycotting nations, an additional four also withdrew from the
Games but are listed as competing nations because athletes from these countries actually participated in
competition before their NOC withdrew from the Games. Though sources differ on the number of nations that
boycotted each Games, for the purposes of this article, numbers attained from IOC records will be used.
112ALFRED E. SENN, POWER POLITICS AND THE OLYMPIC GAMES: A HISTORY OF THE POWER BROKERS,
EVENTS AND CONTROVERSIES THAT SHAPED THE GAMES 167 (Human Kinetics, 1999).
2009
to the atrocity of apartheid and discourage other nations from having further contact with
South Africa. Nigeria, the first nation to pull out of the Games, had a plane waiting to
transport its athletes home well before talks between the African NOCs and the IOC
concluded." 3 If Nigeria did not believe New Zealand would be banned and therefore, had
no investment in the ongoing talks that, then this indicates that Nigeria used its purported
boycott over New Zealand as an excuse to showcase an issue, rather than demonstrating an
actual grievance with New Zealand. 114 In contrast to Nigeria's early departure, the
withdrawal of teams occurred only gradually over the course of the first week of the Games,
as hope for a compromise between the African NOCs and the IOC waned.
There are many possible motives for the African nations' boycott, all of which will be
discussed in detail, along with an analysis as to whether each respective goal was met.
First, the ideological philosophy behind the boycott must be considered. If South Africa was
allowed to maintain normal contacts with the international community, including sporting
ties, then there would be less impetus for South Africa to end apartheid. Any continuance of
apartheid and perceived condoning of the regime posed a serious threat to other African
nations that, like South Africa, were overwhelmingly non-white in racial composition. It
was in the interest of these nations to rally as much support for the anti-apartheid movement
as possible. Thus, it is easy to see why there was an ideological opposition to competing
with New Zealand. This sentiment is clearly reflected in the statement of Isaac Lugonzo,
then-chairman of Kenya's National Sports Council, that "we cannot sacrifice principle for
the sake of getting gold ....We will not align ourselves with a country that has sports ties
with South Africa." 115 However, questions remain whether this ideological statement was
the primary purpose of the African nations, and how strong this statement was.
The actions of the African nations before the 1976 Games indicate that it is likely that
they had little intention of boycotting, until they were forced either to boycott or to admit
that they had been bluffing in their threats to the IOC. The timing of the boycott threats of
the African nations was different than the boycotts of the 1956, 1980 and 1984 Games. In
1956, rather than waiting to see if the IOC would bargain, the boycotting nations announced
they were boycotting in protest of Soviet and British actions. 116 In 1980, The United States
7
The
announced its intention to boycott well in advance of the Moscow Games."
Americans claimed that if the requests that they were making were granted, then they would
compete." 8 This was merely an attempt to demonstrate the unwillingness of all parties to
agree to acceptable conditions, and thereby allowed the United States to justify the boycott.
Likewise, though the Soviets made requests in 1984, they too knew or assumed that these
requests would not be met."1 9 The rationale of the Moscow and Los Angeles boycotts will
be discussed in full detail in later sections. Their relevance here is only to demonstrate that
the other major boycotts in Olympic history did not start with the expectation that demands
would be met. The difference between those boycotts and the 1976 boycott is that most
African nations did not think that they were going to boycott. They wanted New Zealand to
be suspended from the Games. Since the IOC had ceded to their requests in 1964, 1968 and
1972, it is reasonable to assume that they thought that they could get New Zealand excluded
113
KILLANIN, supra note 52, at 138.
14Id. at 138-40.
"s Steve Cady, 22 African Nations Boycott Opening Ceremonies of Olympic Games, N. Y. TIMES, July 18,
1976, at Sports 130.
116
SENN, supra note 112, at 107.
117KILLANIN, supra note 52, at 191. See also SENN, supra note 112, at 180-81.
11 SENN, supranote 112, at 167-68.

9Id. at 196-98.
VOL. 11: 1
from the Games, and that the exclusion of New Zealand would be a powerful statement
against apartheid in sport. The African nations who participated in the boycott continued to
discuss the situation with the IOC right up until the Opening Ceremonies, and continued to
work towards a compromise after the Games had started. 120 They even went so far as to
send athletes to Montreal. 12 1 It is apparent that even if Nigeria and Tanzania, the nations
that organized the boycott, were never willing to participate in the Games, many other
nations had every intention of competing if the continued talks were successful.
In light of the seeming determination of African nations to continue talks in order to
reach a solution, evidenced in statements made by African officials that suggested they were
willing to compromise, the reasons why an agreement was not reached must be considered.
On July 21, as talks continued, Denis Brutus, a South African expatriate who had been
instrumental in organizing the boycott, stated publicly that the African nations were
currently seeking a formal statement by the IOC and the New Zealand NOC condemning
the sporting ties between New Zealand and South Africa. 122 This request was significantly
less demanding then the earlier request that New Zealand be removed from the Games, yet
it failed to lead to an agreement. It appears that the African representatives were given
limited access to top IOC officials, and some representatives have subsequently stated that
the boycott could have been prevented if top Olympic officials had given it more attention
prior to and during the Games. 123 If, as evidence strongly corroborates, the IOC contributed
to the failure of talks between the parties by not giving the African crisis its full attention,
then it must be assumed that the African nations were not resigned to boycotting prior to the
completion of the unsuccessful talks. Ultimately, the primary goal of most of the African
nations that participated in the boycott-to have New Zealand removed from the Games-was
not successful. 124
The boycott received some international support, an important component in the
struggle that many nations took in the attempt to force the downfall of apartheid, such as
from the head of the United Nations Committee Against Apartheid, who called the boycott
a "noble act" that hopefully would "help persuade governments and sports bodies in New
Zealand, as well as other countries concerned, that verbal condemnation of apartheid is
meaningless so long as there is collusion and fraternization with the practitioners of that
crime."' 125 Many of the resolutions passed by the United Nations on apartheid included
appeals to the world sporting organizations and governments to sever all sporting ties with
South Africa. 26 New Zealand, France, Canada, the United States, Australia and many other
nations had apparently maintained sporting relations with South Africa following the
boycott. It is fair to conclude that the boycott was ineffective in convincing these nations to
sever sporting ties with South Africa.
The boycott was notable not only for who supported it but also for those who either
did not join the effort or openly support the African nations. The Soviet Union and its
Eastern European allies, which had allied with the African nations in 1964, 1968, and 1972
over the exclusion of South Africa and Rhodesia, were noticeably absent from the boycott
effort, despite initial promises to join the boycott. 127 The Soviet Union was understandably
120Cady, supra note 115, at 130.
121See id.
Trumbull, Africa Sportsmen Seeking a Compromise on Boycott, N. Y. TIMES, July 22, 1976, at 43.
123See e.g., MILLER, supra note 19, at 202.
124See BBC on this Day, 1976: African Countries Boycott Olympics, BBC NEWS, available at
122Robert
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/1 7/newsid-3555000/3555450.stm (last visited Nov. 9, 2009).

125Associated Press, U.N. Official Calls Boycott "Noble Act, "N. Y. TIMES, July 27, 1976, at 24.
126ESPY, supra note 97, at 156.
27
1 Id. at 157.
2009
concerned over what effect a boycott would have on the upcoming 1980 Moscow Summer
Olympics, and it actually cautioned the African nations not to boycott.128 Several Caribbean
nations that had initially shown support for the African nations heeded the Soviet warning,
and the only non-African nations to refuse participation were Guyana and Iraq.12 9 Most
damaging to the African nations' show of unity against apartheid was that not all African
nations withdrew their teams from Montreal. Several nations, including Senegal and the
Ivory Coast, permitted their athletes to remain in Montreal and compete. 130 In a final
crushing blow to the African boycott, it was 1publicly
announced that the African members
31
of the IOC unanimously opposed the boycott.
Additionally, the boycott failed to give the African nations the type of leverage with
the IOC that they had hoped it would accomplish. African representatives reported that top
IOC officials were reluctant to meet with them to prevent a boycott, a trend that continued
following the Olympic Games. Moreover, the Supreme Council of Sport of Africa, which
had been instrumental in organizing the boycott, was refused the recognition it sought from
the IOC. 132 It would be
21 years before the first official meeting between the leaders of the
133
SCSA and the IOC.
Another factor to be considered is the effect that the boycott had on the athletes and
the citizens of the boycotting nations. Sport undeniably has the ability to inspire nationalism
and pride in its citizens, and as these African nations went through the process of nationbuilding and attempting to find a national identity, athletic heroes played a large role.
Successful African Olympians returned home to heaps of praise, ceremonies, publicity and
fame. Images of African Olympians wearing the colors of their new nations were used by
their governments as powerful nationalistic propaganda. 134 Moreover, the athletes also
served as ambassadors from Africa to the world. At a time when many citizens of the world
knew little about the emerging African states, the African Olympians played a significant
role in calling attention to the continent. 135 The potential benefits of participating in the
1976 Games were lost by the boycotting nations, as reflected by Kenyan sprinter Mike Boit,
who lamented that he had been sent to Montreal by the people of Kenya
and that the
1 36
decision to withdraw was illogical, hurtful, and damaging to the athletes.'
The Montreal Olympic Games was not heavily affected by the boycott. Despite
lingering problems, Montreal was able to put forth a festive ambience that belied the
financial and political problems associated with the Games. Though African teams had
performed very well in Munich four years earlier, the quality of the athletic competition
remained high. Interestingly, athletes from nations that had supported the exclusion of New
Zealand from the Games but ultimately had been unwilling to boycott were among the most
noteworthy competitors. 137 Perhaps the most devastating blow to the Montreal Games came
at 167.
id.
130See BBC, supra note 124.
131ESPY, supra note 97, at 157.
132MILLER, supra note 19, at 206.
133
id.
134William J. Baker, PoliticalGames: The Meaning of InternationalSportfor IndependentAfrica, in SPORT IN
128SENN, supra note 112,
129
AFRICA: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL HISTORY 272, 273 (William J. Baker & James A. Mangan, eds. Africana Publ'g Co.,
1987).
135
Id.
136Neil Amdur, Athletes of ProtestingNations Disappointed,N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1976 at 130.
137In the track and field competitions, the sprint distances of 100, 200, 400, and 800 meters were swept by
runners from the Caribbean region. The gymnastics competition showcased a number of exciting and close events,
but it was best remembered by the exceptional display from young Soviet gymnast Nadia Comaneci. World
VOL. 11: 1
in the 1,500 meters, where track and field fans were denied a heavily anticipated showdown
between Filbert Bayi of Tanzania and John Walker138of New Zealand, two runners who had
both recently broken world records in the distance.
The Montreal Games were operationally successful, generating total revenues of $430
million against operating costs of $207 million, putting the profit of the Games at $223
million. 139 Thus, the boycott had a negligible economic impact on the Games.
Following the Games, the IOC did not give the African nations the recognition it had
sought, but in a display of the IOC's weakness, it also did not punish the African NOCs.
On July 19, 1976, the IOC passed a resolution that permitted the IOC to expel any nation
that violated IOC rules by withdrawing from the Games for political reasons. 140 Following
the Olympic Games, this rule was strengthened to allow for the expulsion of NOCs who
withdrew athletes for any reason that was not health related."41 In the year following the
Montreal Games, the IOC, under heavy pressure from the international community to
sanction the boycotting nations, requested that every nation who had declined participation
explain their reasons for doing so. However, Lord Killanin, in his memoirs, admits that he
and the other IOC executive board members were hesitant to impose any sanctions that
would harm the athletes. 142 The IOC accepted all of the excuses given by boycotting nations
as legitimate and the investigation was dismissed.
In conclusion, the African nations failed in their primary purpose to have New
Zealand excluded from the 1976 Games. New Zealand was not in violation of the Olympic
charter, and thus the IOC had no basis in excluding the country despite the pressure it felt
from the African nations. New Zealand
not only competed but won four medals, one more
43
than its athletes won in Munich. 1
In contrast to their unsuccessful attempt at having New Zealand excluded from the
Games, the African nations were successful in sticking to the principle that they could not
enter into any event with nations that supported sporting ties with South Africa. This was an
important statement; the African nations garnered a significant amount of attention to their
cause of condemning sporting ties with South Africa. Still they failed to gain the outright
support of their biggest allies, and they failed to terminate all global sporting ties with South
Africa. Additionally, the African nations lost the opportunity to reap any potential benefits
that Olympic participation may have had on domestic politics. Finally, though there was a
small disruption to the Olympic program, the disruption was not large enough to force the
IOC to recognize the legitimacy and power of the African NOCs. Thus, the boycott can at
best be called a triumph of principles but a failure to achieve any more tangible goal that the
African nations sought to achieve.
records were set in all but three of the swimming events. See Bruce Kidd, Montreal 1976, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE MODERN OLYMPIC MOVEMENT 191,194 (John E. Findling & Kimberly D. Pelle eds., 2004).
138MILLER,
supra note 19, at 206-07.
139Kidd, supra note 137, at 196. The Montreal Games are known for the $1.2 billion debt accrued during the
Games as a result of Montreal's lack of control over the budget for the construction of the Olympic venues. Due to
the unstructured nature of the Montreal Olympic Organizing Committee's budget, construction costs had
skyrocketed. The capital costs were never expected to be covered by revenue from the Games. The event had
never raised anywhere near that amount of money previously. Id.
140United Press International, New Rule By 1OC Has "Teeth, "N. Y. TIMES, July 20, 1976 at 24.
141KILLANIN, supra note 52, at 140.
142 id.
143Olympic.org, New Zealand (2009), http://www.olympic.org/en/content/National-OlympicCommittees/New-Zealand/ (click on the "Olympic Summer Games" tab and scroll down to "Montreal 1976").
2009
B. The Olympics and the Cold War

The 1976 boycott was followed by two larger and more substantive boycotts in 1980
and 1984. In understanding the nature of these boycotts, it is necessary to briefly examine
the political climate that led the two rival nations of the United States and the Soviet Union
to engineer boycotts against their rivals.
Following Vladimir Lenin's rise to power in the 1917 Russian Revolution and
Russia's ensuing civil war, the United States and the Soviet Union found themselves on
divergent ideological paths. The Soviet Union became a Communist state, and its citizens
were deprived of basic civil rights and liberties. This sharply contrasted with the United
States, which was a comparatively free and democratic society. Relations between the two
nations deteriorated following the Allied Forces' victory in World War II as the Soviet
Union seized control of much of Eastern Europe, installing communist governments in
countries under its sphere of influence. The USSR's plans, as well as the perceived intent, to
spread communism put the two nations at odds and made the United States incredibly
nervous. A nuclear arms race coupled with the creation of NATO to offset the Soviet's
Eastern bloc, led to a global battle for power and influence.
Cold War politics were soon interfering in the Olympic Games. The Soviet NOC was
formally recognized by the IOC in 1951, and the Soviet Union made its Olympic debut at
the 1952 Helsinki Summer Games.144 As the 1970s began, both the United States and the
Soviet Union looked to increase their prestige within the Olympic movement, and
consequently, both Los Angeles and Moscow submitted bids to host the 1976 Summer
Olympic Games. 145 In an effort to avoid confrontation between the two superpowers, the
Games were awarded to Montreal. 146 However, in 1973, Los Angeles and Moscow were the
only cities to submit bids for the 1980 Games.' 47 The 1980 Summer Games were awarded
to Moscow, with the IOC hopeful that the international climate would remain stable in the
six years preceding the Games. 148The Olympic movement grew steadily in the early 1970s,
and due to rising security and organizing costs (which will be discussed in more detail
later), Los Angeles was the only city to submit a bid for the 1984 Games. 149 The IOC was
forced to award the Games to Los Angeles as a result. This placed the 1980 and 1984
Summer Games in Moscow and Los Angeles, with both the Soviet Union and the United
States eager to demonstrate their ability to stage the greatest Games in Olympic history.
The United States and Moscow retained sporting contacts with each other, and there
were numerous American-Soviet athletic competitions in the years between 1977 and
1984.'" Thus, the boycotts did not have the ideological basis of an unwillingness to
fraternize with the enemy. There was clearly a more substantive agenda in mind. The
following sections will analyze what the objectives of the two nations may have been and
evaluate the effectiveness of the boycotts in achieving them.
144
GUTTMANN, supra note 2, at 138-39; INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, supra note 42, at 3.
145
INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, supra note 42, at 4.
146William
Oscar Johnson, Found: A Place in the Sun, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 7, 1977, available at
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG 1093008/index.htm.
147CNBC, 40 Years of Summer Olympic Cities, Oct. 2, 2009, http://www.enbc.com/id/33138974?slide=3.
148See KILLANIN, supra note 52, at 173. (stating "[n]o doubt people thought in casting their
vote for Moscow
they were supporting the mood of dtente.").
141CNBC, supra note 147.
150Hy Wallach, An Assault on Olympic Ideals, NEW WORLD REV.52.4, July-Aug. 1984, at 20.
VOL. 11: 1
C. The 1980 Boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, President Jimmy
Carter and his allies explored a number of retaliatory options against this act of Soviet
aggression. 1 Carter was determined to exact punitive measures on the Soviet Union for the
invasion but he was faced with few viable political alternatives.1 52 His administration
considered various military actions, economic sanctions, indirect military assistance to the
Afghan resistance movement, and general "worldwide condemnation [and] continuing
publicity about the Soviet crime."1 53 As the Soviet Union's presence on the United Nations
Security Council made any action by that body subject to veto, and following Carter's
decision that "direct military action was not advisable," the administration began to focus
on the latter option: that of engaging the world in a widespread campaign to eviscerate the
Soviet Union's actions, and thereby destroy any effort on the part of the Soviet Union to
54
gain respect or legitimacy among the U.S. allies and non-aligned Third World countries. 1
As such, the Moscow Olympic Games, the tool by which the Soviet Union was counting on
to gain prestige and market Soviet glory, was an attractive target.
As Jimmy Carter and the rest of the world were aware, the Soviet Union was heavily
invested in the Olympic Games. The importance of the Games to Moscow is shown by an
excerpt from the 1980 edition of the Book of the Party Activist, a Soviet governmentsponsored Communist propaganda book. It states, "The acute ideological struggle between
[East and West] directly affects the choice of cities for the Olympic Games, the program of
the competitions, the reporting of the preparations and the conduct of the Games."1 55 Soviet
officials believed that bringing the Games to Moscow would allow them to take a step
towards Olympic parity with the United States, which had hosted the Games five times.
This parity would then aid the Soviet Union in gaining legitimacy with a host of other
nations who doubted their actions and political structure. As such, the Soviet Union
launched an aggressive and expensive campaign to win the 1980 Games, fiercely believing
that not only would hosting the Games give them the opportunity to instill nationalism in its
citizens, but that they would also shock and astonish the world by impressively hosting the
world's largest sporting event, and the greatest Olympic Games in history.' 56 The symbolic
meaning that the Soviets saw in hosting the Games was not lost on the Carter
administration, as Lloyd Cutler, counsel to Jimmy Carter, famously stated the
administration's belief that the Games
"may be the most important single event in the
1
Soviet Union since World War 11 .,, 57
When the Soviet Union was eventually selected in 1974 to host the 1980 Games, it set
its propaganda wheels in motion. The Soviet press was soon reporting that the selection of
Moscow was due to the IOC's recognition of the Soviet Union's peaceful foreign policy and
stable domestic environment. 158 It was proclaimed to be a turning point in the Olympic
151The idea of a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games was first suggested by Dr. Rolf Pauls of West
Germany during an emergency session of NATO. Implementing a boycott for retaliatory purposes had never been
done before, and though many nations saw its appeal, it was noted by most merely as a passing idea rather than a
sound policy. Jimmy Carter, however, was intrigued. DERICK L. HULME, JR., THE POLITICAL OLYMPICS:
Moscow, AFGHANISTAN, AND THE 1980 U.S. BOYCOTT ix (Praeger 1990).
152 Id. at ix-x.
Ild. at x.
4 Id. at ix.
"' Id. at 76.
156
id.
supra note 151, at 81.

is reflected in the BOOK OF THE PARTY ACTIVIST, which noted that the selection of Moscow as the host
city, "testifies to the general recognition of the historical importance and correctness of the foreign political course
157HULME,
158This
2009
Movement, and Moscow was determined that now that the IOC had come to see the virtues
of Soviet society, the rest of the world could be easily swayed as well.' 59
The Soviet Union has never allowed public access to the financial reports of the
Moscow Games, and thus the expenditures and profits are not known for certain. However,
0
it is known that the bulk of financing for the Games was from the Soviet government.16
Though the Soviet Union claims to have spent around $1.304 billion (861.9 million rubles)
on preparation for the Games, including construction of and renovation to facilities, some
Western estimates put that figure as high as $3 billion - $9 billion.161 The Soviets hoped to
regain some of their investment through the 300,000 Western tourists that they expected to
travel to Moscow for the Games, and estimated that revenue from tourism would reach
62
$150 million.'
Though President Carter was never pleased with the selection of Moscow as hosts of
the 1980 Games, the U.S. never suggested a boycott prior to the Afghan invasion. 163 The
decision to boycott was directly related to the Soviet actions in Afghanistan. It is apparent
from Carter's statements that the boycott was meant to be punitive, and not a tool to coerce
the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. The Carter administration at no
point expected that the Soviets would withdraw from Afghanistan. '64 Although the Carter
administration set a mid-February 1980 deadline for the complete withdrawal of Soviet
troops from Afghanistan, it was apparent that the administration never expected the Soviets
to comply. This was made clear in a statement in January by Secretary of State Cyrus
Vance, who expressed
his belief that the Soviet Union would not pull out of Afghanistan "in
65
the near future."'
Since the aforementioned deadline was publicly announced on January 15, 1980, it
would have been virtually impossible for the Soviet Union to withdraw 85,000-100,000
troops from Afghanistan in approximately one month. Moreover, had the Soviet Union
obeyed the U.S. directive, then the Soviet Union would have been humiliated and its global
power strongly diminished. Additionally, prior to the February 20 deadline, Carter himself
told the United States Olympic Committee "not to be misled about our chances of
competing in the Olympics this year."' 166 Though the deadline was publicly announced for
the purposes of demonstrating the United States' will to give the Soviet Union a fair chance
of our country, the vast contribution of the Soviet Union to the struggle for peace." Author Unknown The Olympics
2: To Go or Not to Go?, THE SOVIET ANALYST 9.13, June 25, 1980 at 4.
59
' BARUCH HAZAN, OLYMPIC SPORTS AND PROPAGANDA Games 85 (1982).
160 HOLGER PREUSS, THE ECONOMICS OF STAGING THE OLYMPICS 15 (Edward Elgar Publ'g Ltd, 2004).
16'
ROBERT K. BARNEY, STEPHEN R. WENN, & Scorr G. MARTYN, SELLING THE FIVE RINGS: THE
INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE AND THE RISE OF OLYMPIC COMMERCIALISM 148 (The U. of Utah Press,
2002).
162HULME,

163Accusations arose that Carter had considered similar actions during the 1978 Soviet trial and subsequent
incarceration of noted anticommunist, human rights activist, and suspected U.S. spy, Anatoly Scharansky, and the
outrage stirred by the publicity associated with the increased presence of Soviet troops in Cuba in 1979. However,
Carter never publicly advocated a boycott prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Id. at ix.
'64 In a January 20, 1980 letter to Robert Kane, the United States Olympic Association president, Carter stated,
"[w]e must make clear to the Soviet Union that it cannot trample upon an independent nation and at the same time
do business with the rest of the world. We must make clear that it will pay a heavy economic and political cost for
such aggressions." Carter further stated that, "[w]e have no desire to use the Olympics to punish, except the
Soviets attach a major degree of importance to the holding of the Olympics in the Soviet Union." Id. at 18.
165
Bernard Gwertzman, Vance Sets Deadline on Olympic Boycott, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1980 at A 1.
166HULME, supra note 151, at 18.
VOL. 11: 1
to rectify its actions, it was not directly conveyed to the Soviet Union. 16 A boycott was, as
Carter stated, intended for punitive purposes.
Carter and his advisors thought that a large enough boycott would not only call
attention to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, forcing both foreigners and Soviet citizens
to condemn the Soviet action, but also destroy the ambitions that the Soviet Union had for
the Games. Carter felt that if the world could be convinced that the Games in Moscow were
mere exhibitions of the Communist states and not genuine competitive displays of
worldwide athleticism and diplomacy, then the Soviet Union would be faulted for
politicizing the Olympics. Moreover, if the world could be convinced not to pay attention to
the Games, then, as Cutler stated, the subsequent disruption of the Games would "deny [the
Soviets] what was going to be an enormous propaganda victory." 168 Furthermore, if enough
athletically strong countries boycotted the Games, then the level of competition could be
diminished to the point that the Moscow Games would be the weakest Games in history.
Finally, if enough nations and tourists could be convinced to not go to the Games, then the
Soviet Union might suffer tremendous economic damages. All of the above were
motivating factors in Carter's decision to boycott.
The final motivating factor behind the boycott was that Carter wished to demonstrate
the resiliency of American power and resolve in a time filled with doubts about the Carter
administration's capacity to stand up to Soviet aggression. Regarding the mixed signals as
to Carter's position on the atrocity of the Soviet invasion, deputy Secretary of State Warren
Christopher stated, "If we permit sports to go forward as usual after we have stated that
there will be no business as usual, we will be sending out a contradictory signal, and one
which could call into question the firmness of our resolve." 169 This statement demonstrates
the need for the boycott to support initial statements on the part of the administration
regarding the Soviet invasion.
Additionally, Americans were losing faith in their government, and the strength of the
American resolve. The invasion of Afghanistan supported the notion that the Soviet Union
was gaining power and the Iranian hostage crisis was well underway. This show of
weakness and resulting loss of confidence in the President demanded that Carter do
something in response to the Afghan invasion. A 1980 boycott would not only demonstrate
the United States' resolve to stand up to the Kremlin following a major military initiative on
the part of the Soviet Union, it would also show the world that the United States was not
afraid of taking a moral stand-particularly one that involved the gross moral indecency
shown by the Soviet Union. Vice-President Walter Mondale supported the boycott with his
declaration that the boycott would be "an unambiguous statement of our national
resolve."17 0 At the time, political analysts suspected Carter of using the Olympic boycott as
a display of strength in an election year. This opinion was held by many, including Lord
Killanin, president of the Intemational Olympic Committee, who stated that Carter was
"scrambling for his political life.'' 17 1
The United States' intent to punish the Soviet Union and demonstrate its own strength
is reflected in the lengths that President Carter went to garner international support and cooperation for a boycott. Unilateral action by the United States would have been precarious.
If the United States had been unable to find support amongst its allies and the international
community, it would have been a poor showing of strength and subject of humiliation for
167See
Gwertzman, supra note 165.
168HULME, supra note 15 1, at 18.

69
1 Id. at 19.
"' CHRISTOPHER R. HILL, OLYMPIC POLITICS 125 (Manchester U. Press, 1992).
2009
the United States. Moreover, had the United States been the only nation to boycott, the
172
Soviet Union could have very easily accused the United States of politicizing the Games.
Only a large-scale boycott would significantly reduce the quality of sport at the Games, as
demonstrated by the United States' desire to appeal to athletically strong nations such as
Kenya, which was not traditionally a U.S. ally. 173 It was imperative for the United States to
gather as much support as possible. The U.S. sent special delegations to seek out support
amongst its allies and the non-aligned Third World, most notably sending global icon and
1960 Olympic boxing gold medalist Muhammad Ali to persuade the African nations to join
the effort.
The potential of the boycott to destroy the Games was evidenced by the Soviet
Union's response to fears of a boycott. Following statements by the United States that it
would seek to lead the nations of the world in a boycott, the Soviets launched a massive
propaganda campaign to discredit the United States as a moral leader, and sought to gain
attendance at the Games from as many nations as possible. 174 In doing so, the Soviet Union
offered numerous incentives to nations that promised to compete. Latin American and
African nations were promised free room, board and travel to Moscow. 1 7 5 In the end, the
Soviet Union pledged to pay 100% of the travel costs of 40 of the 86 nations that competed
in Moscow, and these participation incentives contributed to the Soviet financial losses due
to the boycott.176 The large number of NOCs that received financial assistance caused one
IOC Executive Board member to comment that it was as though Moscow was paying these
nations to come. 177
On the balance, the boycott had mixed success. Though it did cause significant trouble
for the Soviet Union, it did not have the debilitating effect that the United States hoped for.
This was due to several factors, including the resolve of the IOC to avoid a large scale
boycott, the resiliency of the Soviet government, and the inability of the U.S. to persuade all
of its allies to join its efforts. Moreover, as numerous foreign officials noted, one of the
largest factors in the boycott's limited success was the Carter administration's failure to
understand the complexity of the Olympic movement. '78 To many of these officials, a more
thorough understanding of the process could have made Carter realize that many of his
initial goals for the boycott were impossible. 179 This was evident even in the U.S. Olympic
Committee's hesitance to agree to the boycott, as it realized the futility of Carter's actions:
Ultimately, the USOC was forced to succumb to the government's recommendation of a
boycott. 180
Despite President Carter's efforts to gather a large coalition of nations for the boycott,
80 nations and 5,179 athletes competed at the Games, including U.S. allies Great Britain
and France.' 8' The participation of France and Great Britain was a huge blow to the U.S.led boycott effort, demonstrating Carter's and the United States' inability to mobilize a
unified Western front. However, Carter's efforts were not entirely unsuccessful; sixty-five
172 HULME,
Id. at 46.
I7
Id. at 75. This strategy had limited success. Following the promise of free room, board and travel, Costa
Rica reversed its decision to boycott, while Jordan was persuaded to attend after the Soviets promised that the
Bolshoi ballet would visit Jordan on a special tour. Id. at 77.
171
Id. at 77.
176 USSR Foots Bilifor Half CountriesAttending the Games, UNITED DAILY MAIL, June 10, 1980 at 54.
177Id.
78
1 HILL, supranote 171, at 125.
79
Id.
ISOSee
'81
id. at 128-129.
INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC
COMMITTEE,
VOL. H:lI
nations boycotted, including Canada, Japan, West Germany and Communist China. 82 As
the nations were never required to submit a formal reason for their withdrawal from the
Games, the reason for their withdrawal was unclear. Moreover, the number of nations that
boycotted the Games was significantly lower than the 104 nations that had condemned the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
and called for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops at
183
the United Nations.
Carter's inability to garner backing from all of the United States' allies was also a
result of the counter-campaign launched by the IOC to mitigate the effects of the boycott.
IOC president Lord Killanin met with NOCs and government officials in all regions of the
world, determined to convince them to support the spirit and future of the Olympic
movement, rather than Carter's propaganda war. Killanin's campaign paid off, as evidenced
by the participation of Great Britain and France, among others. 184
The effect of the boycott on the athletic quality of the Games varied by event. Ten of
the sixty-five boycotting nations had won medals in the 1976 Montreal Games, though they
had accounted for 30% of the total medals won in 1976.185 Only those events in which the
boycotting nations had strong competitors were affected. The glamour events of track and
field, swimming, boxing and gymnastics suffered severely. 186 The absence of the boycotting
nations was also felt in field hockey, soccer, water polo, and basketball. 187 The remaining
events had historically been dominated by the Soviet Union and members of the Soviet
bloc, and thus the boycott had negligible effects in these events. Studies indicate that the
boycott caused a shift of approximately 140 medals, or 20% of the total medals awarded at
the Games, to be awarded to the Soviet bloc that would have otherwise gone to boycotting
nations. 188 On the whole, the Moscow Olympics were highly competitive. Despite the
boycott, thirty-six world records and thirty-nine Olympic records were broken. 189 The
United States contended that medals awarded at the Moscow Games would be tarnished due
to its absence. The Soviet Union asserted that the U.S. had long since forfeited its title as the
world leader in sports and thus, their absence could not diminish the accomplishments of
the athletes that did attend. Neither argument proved to be true according to Dr. Derick
90
Hulme, a professor of Political Science. 1
Domestically, the boycott had little effect on Soviet citizens. Soviet officials were
confident that the spike in nationalism as a result of the Games would increase Communist
party cohesion and the loyalty of the people to the government. Consequently, Carter was
confident that boycotting would tarnish the Soviet citizens' opinion of the government,
create fractures in the Soviet system, and he stated, ". . . this powerful signal of world
outrage cannot be hidden from the Soviet people, and will reverberate around the globe...
I know that it will be a very difficult problem for the Soviet Union to explain to the rest of
the world and to its own citizens why. . . maybe 70 other nations refuse to participate."' 191
182Olympic.org, Moskow 1980 (2009) http://www.olympic.org/en/content/Olympic-Games/All-Past-Olympic-
Games/Summer/Moscow- 1980/ (click on "All Facts" tab).

183Interview by Bill Monroe, Carl Rowan, David Broder, & Judy Woodruff with President Carter on Meet the
Press, in CONVERSATIONS WITH CARTER 182 (Don Richardson ed., Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998).
"8 MILLER, supra note 19, at 221.
185See HULME, supra note 15 1, at 84.
187
18s id.
Id.
189See id.; Olympic.org, Moscow 1980 (2009) http://www.olympic.org/en/content/Olympic-Games/AII-PastOlympic-Games/Summer/Moscow- 1980/.

190HULME, supranote 151, at 84.
m Id. at 78.
2009
However, Carter underestimated the Kremlin's skill at propaganda and ability to

control the Soviet media. Once a boycott became likely, the Kremlin successfully spun it as
a boycott motivated by the United States' opposition to the ideals of brotherhood and
humanitarianism embodied in the Games, and as an attempt by Carter to regain his
popularity in an election year. Soviet coverage of the Games conveniently excluded any
political statements, including the sixteen nations that made reference to the boycott in their
march during the Opening Ceremonies. 192 Despite some disappointment on the part of the
Soviet people over the boycott, most ordinary citizens did not connect the boycott to events
in Afghanistan, and the boycott did not preclude them from feeling a sense of pride in their
93
nation over the success of the Games. 1
The effects that the boycott had on the Soviet hopes of penetrating a world market
were substantial. The boycott caused a drastic reduction in television coverage of the Games
in Western nations. 194 In covering the Games, the Soviet and British press battled over the
strongest message of the Games. The Soviet press depicted the Games as unaffected by the
boycott. 195 However, the British press seemed to go out of their way to depict the Games as
inherently abnormal. 196 As a result, Moscow did not get the media attention and
international exposure that it had hoped for.
The economic effects of the boycott on the Games were substantial. As Moscow has
never allowed full disclosure on its expenditures for the Games, it is unclear how much of
the expenditures were covered by profits. However, Moscow's final financial report to the
IOC indicated that total revenues from the Games were $1.127 billion (744.9 million
rubles). 197 This number puts the deficit of the Games at over $150 million (100 million
rubles), though some analysts believe that the deficit was significantly higher, and was in
part caused by a decline in expected revenue from Western tourists and investment from
Western companies.
The Soviet Union had been hoping to reap revenues of up to $150 million from
tourists, which would be used to finance the importation of technology for the Games.
Skepticism over the Games led the number of tourists who were planning to travel to
Moscow to decrease from 300,000 to approximately 70,000. In light of the decrease in
tourists, the organizers were left with a surplus of tickets, many of which were sold at
discounts up to 70%. 98 This was distressing to the Soviet Union, which had spent $500
million in hard currency on the Games, and the decrease in tourists could not offset the
original losses. '9 Additionally, Moscow had been hoping to receive large financial rewards
for the rights to broadcast the Games from American television networks. After a bidding
war between the American broadcast networks, the broadcasting rights to the Games were
awarded to NBC for $82 million in 1977.200 However, the U.S. Department of Commerce
embargoed NBC's payments to Moscow in March of 1980. At that point only $10.66
192Id. at
77.
193HULME, supra note 151, at 78-79.

"A
Great Britain's two networks covering the Games declined to show over 130 hours of coverage that it had
originally scheduled. Japan cut 80% of the broadcast time it had originally allotted, while American and West
German coverage was relegated to brief highlights. Id. at 76.

195Gary Whannel, The Television Spectacular,in FIVE RING CIRCUS: MONEY, POWER AND POLITICS AT THE
OLYMPIC GAMES 36 (Alan Tomlinson & Garry Whatnnel eds., Pluto Press 1984).
196Id.
197BARNEY, supra note 161, at 148.

98 Olympics Games Boycotts Leaves a Surplus of Tickets, REUTERS, July 26, 1980 at S4.
20 BARNEY, supra note 161, at 144.
VOL. 11: 1
million had been paid to the Soviets, and the remaining $71.33 million was never paid.2 1
This loss of revenue constituted a substantial financial setback for the Soviet Union.
The boycott also resulted in economic setbacks for American companies and
organizations. Companies such as Coca-Cola and Nike that hoped to penetrate the Soviet
market were denied large money-making opportunities. More notably, the United States
Olympic Committee reported that the boycott resulted in a debt of $11 million, due to a
sharp decline in contributions.20 2
Domestic support of the boycott in the U.S. was initially positive. Americans fully
supported Carter's decision to take punitive action against the Soviet Union without the loss
of American lives. The boycott resolution passed 386-12 in the House of Representatives
and 88-4 in the Senate in January, 203 when 61% of Americans favored the boycott in June
1980.204 There are, however, indications that popular opinion shifted, particularly when it
appeared that the Olympic Games would go on and be successful. Carter's approval rating
began to decline in April of 1980, but it is unclear how much of a role the Olympic boycott
played in this decline. However, The Gallup poll reports that the lowest approval rating of
Carter's presidency, 21%, was measured during the period of July 14-25, 1980, which
coincided with the Olympic Games. A look at Carter's approval ratings 20 5 shows that his
dip in popularity only lasted the length of the Olympic Games, strongly suggesting the dip
was due to public displeasure at the boycott. 20 6 Despite his hopes that the public would
from
blame the Soviet Union for the tarnished dreams of America's athletes, Carter suffered
20 7
negative publicity. The plan backfired, and the blame was placed squarely on Carter.
Aside from economic losses, it is difficult to quantify the other effects of the boycott.
On balance, the boycott can at best be seen as only a partial success. Carter demonstrated
his resolve in America's continuing determination to take a proactive leadership role in the
Cold War struggle. However, in doing so, startling fractures in the Western alliance system
were revealed. The boycott prevented the large scale global media propaganda campaign
that the Soviets were planning to wage, and as a result the Soviets did not achieve the
degree of international legitimacy and acceptance that they had hoped to attain. Yet, while
sixty-five nations boycotted, they did not prevent the Games from being high quality, and
the boycott did not relegate the Games to the status of mere Communist Games. Aside from
the boycott's contribution to the significant financial losses felt by the Soviet Union, it did
not have substantial domestic or international effects on the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union
managed to control the perception of its citizens to the point that a boycott had little effect
on its citizenry.
Lord Killanin, President of the IOC during the Moscow Games, had perhaps the most
objective view of anyone as to the effects of the boycott. Following the Games he stated
201Id. at 146
Olympic Debt is $11 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1980, at 6.

204The Gallup Organization, Do you Think the U.S. Should or Should not Participatein the Olympic Games in
202U.S.
203MILLER,
Moscow this Summer? GALLUP OPINION INDEX: POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC TRENDS, Report No. 178
(June 1980).
205The Gallup Organization, President Carter'sApproval Ratings Trend, GALLUP OPINION INDEX: POLITICAL
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC TRENDS, Report No. 182, (Oct.-Nov. 1980).
206The Gallup Organization, President Carter'sApproval Ratings Trend, GALLUP OPINION INDEX: POLITICAL
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC TRENDS, Report No. 198, (Aug. 1980).
207Telephone Interview with Anita DeFrantz, Chairwoman of the IOC Commission on Women in Sport (Mar.
22, 2006).
2009
that despite the pretense of success at the Games, they were "joyless.
wrote:
20 8
In his memoirs he
The boycott, had it succeeded, would have broken the Olympic Movement for
good. It did not succeed, but at the same time, nobody won and the politicians
lost face . .
. The Games themselves, though brilliantly organized, were
fundamentally sad. There were too many absent faces, too many doubts and
scruples on the part of those who were there. Certainly I found that Jimmy
Carter and his aides were singularly ill-informed on how the Olympic Movement
works. 209
Thus, though the Games suffered some losses and Carter demonstrated his resolve as a
leader, the boycott far from had the devastating effects that Carter had hoped for.
D. The 1984 Boycott of the Los Angeles Games
Following the 1972 and 1976 Games, the task of hosting the Summer Olympic Games
seemed much less appealing. The Games grew significantly in the 1960s and early 1970s,
resulting in a large increase in participating NOC, athletes and sports. As a result of this
growth, the costs associated with hosting the Games and ensuring that transportation,
housing and athletic facilities were adequate rose drastically. 210 Moreover, the terrorist
attacks at Munich had resulted in the need for the host city to dramatically increase its
security budget, further contributing to the rising price tag of hosting the Games.211 With
Montreal reeling from an approximately $1 billion dollar debt from the 1976 Games, the
rising costs of putting on the Olympics loomed over the heads of potential hosts.
Consequently, Los Angeles was the only city to submit a bid for the 1984 Summer
Olympics.
2 12
The Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee was so confident that it
would be awarded the Games that it proposed 21an

entirely new financing plan that scoffed at
3
many IOC regulations and infuriated the IOC.
The premise behind the Los Angeles Games' revolutionary financing plan was twofold: first, to limit the opulence of the Games rather than outdo the lavishness of the
previous Olympic Games and second, the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee was
going to be run as a private company. 21 4 The private corporation of the Los Angeles
208GUTTMANN,
209MILLER,
210 KENNETH
REICH, OLYMPIC HISTORY, IN THE LOS ANGELES TIMES BOOK OF THE 1984 OLYMPIC GAMES 19
(Harry N. Abrams, Inc. 1984) (citing the estimated $600M price tag for the Games despite Los Angeles'
"economical" approach, and "massive injection of government funds for construction of new athletic facilities" for
the 1988 Seoul Games).
2 The two games following Munich posted security expenditures of over $100 million. KENNETH REICH, THE
L.A. TIMES BOOK OF THE 1984 OLYMPIC GAMES 19 (Harry N. Abrams, Inc. 1984). The security costs skyrocketed
after the terrorist attacks of September I1,2001. Security expenditures for the 2010 Vancouver Games are
projected to be over $900 million and over $1 billion for the 2012 London Games. See Matthew Brown, London
Update - London 2012 OrganizersDefend HistoricPark Venue, Higher Security Costs, AROUND THE RINGS, Dec.
5, 2008, http://www.aroundtherings.com/articles/view.aspx?id=31073; see also Brian Hutchinson, Vancouver's
Olympic FinancesMelt Down, NAT'L POST, July 17, 2009, availableat
http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id= 1802520.
22 BILL SHAIKIN, SPORT AND POLITICS: THE OLYMPICS AND THE Los ANGELES GAMES 38 (Praeger 1988).
213KILLANIN, supra note
214Previous
52, at 97.
Olympic Games had been run as municipal undertakings; funds for the Games came directly from
local and national governments. The citizens of Los Angeles, however, refused to volunteer their city for such a
VOL. 11: 1
Olympic Organizing Committee would finance the Games by way of corporate

sponsorships, broadcasting rights, and ticket sales, and would offset construction costs by
using many existing facilities. This made it possible for the Los Angeles Games to have a
lower starting budget.215 With a lower expected cost, and a new financial plan, organizers of
the Games were so confident that they expressed their belief that the Los Angeles Games
would be the first Games ever to be run at a net profit. Of course, if that did not turn out to
then the LAOOC, and not the city of Los Angeles, would be responsible for the
be the21case,
6
debt.
The IOC was adamantly opposed to the Los Angeles plan. The IOC has traditionally
backed plans to enlarge the Olympic Games and supported prior hosts' lavish efforts that
brought prestige to the event. As the IOC did not pay for the Olympic Games, it was able to
maintain its policy of continuing to enlarge the Olympic program. However, Los Angeles'
bid stood in stark contrast to the IOC's vision of a continually enlarged and more opulent
Games. Moreover, the Olympic Charter in effect during the time of the Los Angeles bid
stated clearly that the host city was required to be financially liable for the Games,2" 7 and
thus the Los Angeles bid that passed liability onto the privately run LAOOC was in
violation of that regulation. 218 The audacity of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing
Committee's financing plan and refusal to adapt its bid to meet IOC regulations put the IOC
in the embarrassing situation of having to petition other cities to submit bids. Though
originally certain that the bids would come, the IOC eventually admitted defeat; after
months of contract negotiations, the 1984 Olympic Games were awarded to Los Angeles in
March of 1979.219
The victory of the LAOOC over the IOC's attempts to revamp their financing plan had
two important implications. First, it demonstrated that the IOC's power is only as strong as
the strength of the Olympic movement. When the Olympic movement is strong and nations
are vying for the chance to host the Games, then the IOC is able to force cities to formulate
their bids to fit IOC parameters. When, as was the case in 1977, the movement is suffering
from increased security threats, political interference, and spiraling costs, then the IOC must
make do with whatever options they have available to continue the movement. The
weakness of the movement and the IOC during this time may help explain the IOC's
reluctance to punish the boycotting African nations in 1976, the United States and its allies
in 1980, and the Soviet Union and its allies in 1984. It would have been tremendously
damaging to the Olympic movement to punish the two world superpowers, which were
among the only nations in the world to have the inclination and resources to continue to
support the growth of the Olympic movement actively.
The second implication of the LAOOC's financing plan for the Games was that it
made the city of Los Angeles, and in turn the USOC and the U.S., far less vulnerable to the
negative effects that a boycott might have. With the Moscow boycott, one goal of the U.S.
costly and risky undertaking. They passed a municipal charter amendment in late 1978 that prohibited the city from
contributing non-reimbursable funds to the Olympic movement. SHAIKIN, supra note 212, at 39-41.
215 KILLANIN, supra note 52, at 98.
216SHAIKIN, supra note 212, at 43.
217The most recently adopted Olympic Charter, which was passed in 2004, states only that the host city must
guarantee full funding from municipal, local, regional, or national public authorities, or willing third parties. Rule
34, bylaw 2.4 reads: "Each candidate city shall provide financial guarantees as required by the IOC Executive
Board, which will determine whether such guarantees shall be issued by the city itself, or by any other competent
local, regional or national public authorities, or by any third parties." INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, THE
OLYMPIC CHARTER 74 (International Olympic Committee 2007), available at
http://multimedia.olympic.orgpdf/en-report- 22.pdf.
218 SHAIKIN, supra note 212, at 39.
2009
THE EFFICACY OF OLYMPIC BANS AND BoYcoTrs
appeared to be imposing economic damages on the Soviet regime by depriving it of its

expected revenue from the influx of athletes and tourists into the country. Proportionally,
U.S. tourists in Moscow had been expected to make up a larger percentage of Moscow's
total tourists than Soviet tourists in Los Angeles. Not only was Los Angeles not in danger of
losing as much tourism revenue as Moscow had been, but any deficit accrued in Los
Angeles would have been the responsibility of the LAOOC and would not have damaged
the finances of the city or the nation in any way.
As the Games approached, on May 8, 1984, the Olympic torch reached the U.S. and
began its cross-country journey from New York to Los Angeles. The Soviet Union began its
campaign to tarnish the American Games by announcing its decision to boycott the Los
Angeles Games only two hours later. 22 0 The statement alleged that "from the very first days
of preparations for the present Olympic Games, the American administration has sought to
set course at using the Games for its political aims .... Chauvinistic sentiments and an antiSoviet hysteria are being whipped up in the country." 221 The statement concluding by
stating, "To act differently would be tantamount to approving of the anti-Olympic actions of
the United States officials and organizers of the Games. 222
The Soviet concerns over security and anti-Soviet protests in Los Angeles were not
unwarranted. Though Los Angeles would prohibit protesters from entering the Olympic
Village, it had no stated intention of suppressing protests that took place in other areas of
Los Angeles. Soviet officials were allegedly concerned over the safety of their athletes in
what seemed like a hostile city, and they were highly critical of the LAOOC's security
preparations and the United States refusal to allow a known K.G.B. spy to accompany the
Soviet team and have unlimited access within Olympic sites. 223 Although the Soviets
claimed that security was a big issue, according to Anita DeFrantz, Vice President of the
LAOOC, everything possible was done to guarantee the security of the Soviet delegation.
DeFrantz stated that though protests were possible, "they wouldn't have had access to the
Soviet team. The Soviets would have been safe, and they knew that." 224 DeFrantz's
allegation that the Soviets were not truly concerned over their security at the Games is
corroborated by the Soviets' refusal to accept the LAOOC's invitation to inspect the
security measures that would be in place.225 Therefore, the boycott must have been
motivated by something more than Soviet fears over security issues.
The Soviet Union preferred a Democratic victory in the United States' 1984
Presidential election, leading analysts to suggest that the boycott was possibly aimed at
damaging the re-election campaign of President Ronald Reagan.226 This is verified by Marat
Gramov, Soviet NOC Chairman, who stated "the primary reason for all the complications
has been the marked intensification of anti-Sovietism in the policy of the U.S.
Administration, which resolved to exploit the Olympic movement and the Olympic ideals
for purposes of gain in its election campaign. 227 Other analysts suggested that the Soviet
Union feared that it would fall behind the United States in the medal count, and that its
220
SHAIKIN,
221John F. Bums, Moscow Will Keep its Team from Los Angeles Olympics; Tass Cites Peril, U.S. Denies it;
Protestsare Issue, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1984, at Al.

222 id.
223ld.
224Anita DeFrantz Interview, supra note 207.

225Marat Vladimirovich Gramov, Chairman of the USSR Sports and Nat'l Olympic Comm., USSR Nat'l
Olympic Comm. Press Conference (May 15, 1984).
226id.
227
Id.
VOL. 11: 1
Olympic program would be embarrassed as a result. Most analysts agreed, however, that the
largest factor in the decision to boycott was likely the 1980 U.S.-led boycott of the Soviet
Games, a move that unquestionably tarnished the Soviets' attempt to project its glory on a
global stage.228
It is difficult to know the exact reasoning behind the Soviet Union's decision to
boycott the Games. However, by analyzing its consequences, it is apparent that regardless
of the actual reason, the boycott had little effect on the quality and economics of the Games.
First, the Soviets' attempt to garner widespread international support was a failure.
The Soviet Union sought to include much of Europe, Africa and Asia in its boycott. In the
end, only fourteen nations stayed away while, despite the boycott, a record 140 nations
competed. 229 At the behest of the LAOOC, many nations sent larger delegations then had
originally been planned in 23order
to compensate for the loss of the athletes from the countries
0
that chose not to compete.
Second, the LAOOC's administration of the Games received positive reviews. 23' The
facilities were adequate, the transportation systems functioned well, and the Security Plan
was executed perfectly. 232 In fact, much of the surplus from the Games resulted from the
contingency funds put in place in case of a security crisis not being used.233
Third, the most prevalent effect of the Soviet-led boycott was that it diminished the
competitive quality of some sports. Though only fourteen nations boycotted, they accounted
for 58% of the gold medals at the 1976 Games.234 However, despite the absence of the
Soviets and its allies, three world records and more than 80 Olympic records were tied or
broken.235 Moreover, the debasement of competition was offset by the Americans, who
were overjoyed at the influx of medals won by American athletes, and smaller nations that
were delighted at the prestige that they gained by sending larger, more competitive teams to
the Games. Moreover, the introduction of the women's marathon and cycling events
changed the focus of the Games from the athletes who 2were
not there to the advances that
36
the Games made in the participation of women in sports.
Fourth, if in fact the Soviets had sought to use the boycott as a mechanism to disrupt
Ronald Reagan's re-election campaign, then this goal was certainly not accomplished as
Reagan easily won re-election in November of that year, with the success of the Olympic
Games as an important aspect of his re-election campaign. Throughout the final months of
the campaign, sports imagery pervaded Reagan's campaign speeches, integrating the
success of America's Olympians into his message of the success of America under his
leadership. By publicly imploring America's athletes to "win one for the Gipper," Reagan
228
Though the Soviet Union did not specifically address the 1980 boycott in its statement, U.S. analysts and
even the IOC have termed the 1984 boycott to be retaliation for the events of 1980 and an attempt to punish the
U.S. for 1980. Serge Schmemann, Behind the Decision, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1984 at A 16.
229The Olympic.org, Los Angeles 1984 (2009), http://www.olympic.org/en/content/Olympic-Games/AII-PastOlympic-Games/Summer/Los-Angeles- 1984/.
230 SHAIKIN, supra note 212, at 67.
231 Id. at 37.
232id.
233
Id. at 66.
Olympic.org, Los Angeles 1984 (2009), http://www.olympic.org/en/content/Olympic-Games/AII-Past-
234The
Olympic-Games/Summer/Los-Angeles- 1984/.
235 BARNEY, supra note 17, at xxiii.
236 See Marlene Cimons, THE L.A. TIMES BOOK OF THE 1984 OLYMPIC GAMES 19 (Harry N. Abrams, Inc.
1984).
2009
was able to emblematically receive credit for the success of the Olympians. 237 Throughout
the summer and into the fall, sports imagery pervaded Reagan's campaign speeches. "We
were never meant to be a second best nation," Reagan declared at numerous campaign
events, continuing with, "and so like our Olympic athletes, we're going to go for the
gold., 238 Reagan took every opportunity to remind Americans that they were, "a nation of
champions," and in turn Americans began to greet Regan with the "U-S-A! U-S-A!" chant,
a cheer typically reserved for United States sports teams. 239 Thus, despite Soviet efforts to
sway the election to Walter Mondale, the Olympic Games were an important component in
the success of Reagan's re-election bid.
Finally, the boycott did little to diminish the profits of the Games, as the 1984
Olympics generated $718 million in revenue and yielded a profit of $222 million. 240 Any
hopes that the Soviet Union might have had that its boycott would cause economic damages
to the United States were not accomplished, and the Los Angeles financing plan was hailed
as a success. 24 1 Since 1984, virtually every host city has tried to emulate the LAOOC's
business model, which is now endorsed under the current Olympic Charter. 242 More
importantly, the success of the Los Angeles Games reinvigorated world interest in hosting
the Games.2 43 Following the Los Angeles Games, six cities submitted bids to host the 1992
Summer Games. 244 According to DeFrantz, the organizers of the Los Angeles Games
concluded that the boycott had zero impact on the success of the Games.245
The IOC's struggle to find an appropriate mechanism to punish boycotting nations
continued in the wake of the Los Angeles Games. Prior to the Games, IOC president Juan
Antonio Samaranch put forth a motion to suspend all boycotting nations from participation
in the Olympic movement. Following the Games, in an effort to prevent a fourth
consecutive boycott at the 1988 Games, an Extraordinary Session of the IOC was convened
in December 1984.246 The explicit purpose of the session was to explore possible
regulations and punitive measures that were available to be enacted on boycotting
nations. 247 The session saw a renewal of Samaranch's pre-Games punishment models, as
well as similar motions, including one to revoke recognition of boycotting nations for two
subsequent Olympic Games. However, these motions met resistance. As with other
boycotts, IOC officials found themselves unable to condone sanctions that would harm the
athletes, and in turn, the Olympic movement. Ultimately, the IOC's official response to the
1984 boycott was to alter the means by which National Olympic Committees were invited
to participate in the Games. Henceforth, invitations were to be sent by the IOC, and not the
hosting committee, in an effort to prevent boycotts motivated by an opposition to the nation
of the host city. The added stipulation regarding NOC invitations to compete was viewed by
about Seoul,"
many as insignificant, including Samaranch, who left the session "terrified
248
Games.
1988
the
to
opposition
Korean
North
strong
of
and the threat
237 PAUL D. ERICKSON, REAGAN SPEAKS: THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN MYTH 106
1985).
23
239
id. at108.
Id. at 107.
240 40
Years of Summer Olympic Cities, http://www.cnbc.com/id/33138974?slide=4 (last visited Oct. 2, 2009).

supra note 17, at lxxi.
14 BARNEY,
242 id.
243Id.
244id.
245 Anita DeFrantz Interview,
246MILLER, supra note 19, at
247
id.
(New York Univ. Press
248 Id. at
250.
supra note 207.

249.
VOL. 11: 1
E. Conclusionson Boycotts
The political objectives sought by nations were not attained with complete
satisfaction. In 1976, the boycott failed in its intentions to have New Zealand suspended
from the Olympic Games, and to force nations to re-examine and ultimately end their
sporting contacts with South Africa. New Zealand and many other nations retained sporting
ties with South Africa despite the boycott.
The 1980 US-led boycott of the Moscow Games had similarly disappointing results.
Though the Soviet Union suffered financial and publicity setbacks, the limited success of
these two goals came at a very high price for U.S. President Jimmy Carter. The
overwhelming result of the boycott was insubstantial. The Games went on, and they were
not tarnished for the athletes that competed, only for the athletes that were forced to
boycott. Additionally, numerous American companies and organizations suffered
significant financial losses in sponsorship revenues and contributions.
The Soviet-led boycott of the 1984 Games saw equally limited success. The
overwhelming sentiment was that Americans disliked the Soviets, so the nation was hardly
dismayed that the Soviets were not in attendance. The private financing of the Los Angeles
Games made the United States government and the city of Los Angeles impervious to
financial losses, and the Games posted an unprecedented profit. The Soviets also wanted to
use the boycott to influence the presidential election and oust Ronald Reagan from power.
This had the opposite effect; the success of the Olympics was incorporated into Reagan's
successful re-election bid.
The second conclusion that can be gleaned from the cases of these three boycotts is
that the athletes who were forced to withdraw became the unwilling victims of politics. The
fate of the athletes is truly lamentable in all three instances. These athletes trained hard for
years only to have their dreams of Olympic participation denied by politicians seeking to
use the Games for political benefit. The fate of the athletes created negative publicity for the
politicians who advocated the boycotts, further impairing the effectiveness of the boycotts.
Additionally, as demonstrated by the 1976 boycott and experienced by anyone who has ever
watched the Olympic Games, the power of seeing an athlete compete has an enormous and
positive impact on the citizens of the athlete's home country. Athletic heroes are inspiring;
they promote patriotism and goodwill. Nations that boycott the Olympic Games do not get
to reap the positive benefits that participation in the Games can yield. For these reasons, it is
apparent that boycotting the Games had limited political success, especially when compared
to the potentially positive political outcome that could result from participating.
IV. BANS
In addition to boycotts, another major form of political activity implemented via the
Olympics is the act of pressuring the IOC to ban a nation. In theory the IOC members are
supposed to be unaffected by the international relations of their respective nations. Baron
Pierre de Coubertin attempted to ensure that this was the case by making IOC members
delegates from the IOC to their nations, as opposed to the other way around. Unfortunately,
members are often unable to ignore the political situation at home and their own political
leanings. As will be shown in the following sections, the process by which an IOC member
calls for the banning of a member nation is often linked to the political climate of the
member's home country. This process was briefly mentioned in the discussion of how
South Africa and Rhodesia came to be banned from the Olympic movement, and it will be
discussed in more detail in the following section.
2009
Specifically, the next two sections will examine the instances of South Africa and
Afghanistan, where an IOC member successfully called attention to a violation of the
Olympic Charter, resulting in the expulsion of the offending nation from the Olympic
movement. These cases will demonstrate the extent to which the actions of the IOC are
determined by the actions of IOC members who seek to sway the organization to take action
that would be favorable to politics in their home country.
After exposing the weakness of the IOC-that its actions are shaped by the political
agendas of its member states-the sections below will discuss the ramifications of these bans
both on the ousted nation and in the greater scope of international relations. This analysis
will show that though Olympic bans may have been a component in a larger scheme against
the banned nation, the Olympic bans did little to effect change in the offending nations.
Governments may believe that banning a nation from the Olympics will play a role in
bringing down an enemy regime, but officially, according to the IOC, the purpose of the
49
Olympic ban is merely to entice the banned nation to amend its sports practices.2 This
analysis will show that in both cases, though the regimes desired reinstatement to the
Olympic movement, they did not amend their offensive athletic practices. Thus, the bans
were ineffective. The sections will also discuss the other goals that IOC member states may
have hoped to accomplish by way of influencing the IOC to ban member nations, and the
conclusions that will be drawn will indicate that these goals were met with limited success.
A. The InternationalOlympic Committee's Ban on South Africa
Throughout the second half of the 2 0 th century, South Africa was plagued by
apartheid, a form of racial discrimination against an ethnic majority. Racial discrimination
existed in South Africa from the moment that the Dutch set foot on Cape Hope in 1652, and
it was reinforced during British colonial rule, which began in 1806.250 The ideology of
racial inequality and discrimination policy became so powerfully embedded in South
African culture that when South Africa became independent in the early 1900s, the ruling
2 5
party felt the need to strengthen the racial laws to reinforce white dominance. 1 This
became particularly important in the 1930s and 1940s, when the minority white South
252
African population began to sense its control over the non-white populations slipping.
Thus, in 1948, the South African government began establishing the active and stated policy
of apartheid. 253
254
"apartness.
Apartheid, an Afrikaans word, literally means "separate-ness," or
Following its implementation as active national policy in 1948, existing laws prohibiting the
mix of races were strengthened and extended to include a ban on interracial marriage and
the forcible removal of non-white South Africans to separate townships, thereby further
255
The legal system enacted by apartheid
enforcing the geographic segregation of the races.
essentially legalized continued economic, social, and political discrimination against
249Anita
250
DeFrantz Interview, supra note 207.
Marc Keech, "One Nation, One Soul, One Dream, One Goal? " Sport and National Identity in South Africa,
in SPORT AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE POST-WAR WORLD 109 (Adrian Smith & Dilwyn Porter eds.,
Routledge 2004).
251Id. at 109-10.
252 See id. at 110.
253Id.
254Apartheid, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary 2009, http://www.meriam-
webster.com/dictionary/Apartheid (last visited Oct. 9, 2009).

255KEECH, supra note 250, at 109.
VOL. 11: 1
nonwhite South Africans and a severe segregation system that was used to ensure the
durability of racial discrimination in South Africa.25 6
The ironclad apartheid laws that were created in 1948 included the segregation of
sport practices.
257
The policy against mixed sport extended to visiting foreign teams as well.
When the New Zealand rugby team visited South Africa in 1966,
their visit was contingent
2 58
on the team coming to South Africa without their Maori players.
The issue of South Africa and apartheid came to the attention of the International
Olympic Committee in 1959. IOC member Aleksei Romanov of the Soviet Union accused
the South African NOC of "never having done anything to prevent apartheid," which
constituted a violation of the provision of the Olympic Charter stating that an NOC must
maintain free and fair sport for all and cannot be influenced by government politics.
259
The
IOC finally took notice of the issue in 1960, when South Africa's entire Summer Olympic
Team was white. 260 Following the tightening of South Africa's racial laws the following
year, Romanov led a growing number of IOC officials in showing concern over the
increasing racial boundaries in South African sport. 6
The IOC, hopeful that the situation could be mediated, requested in 1963 that the
South African National Olympic Committee publicly denounce racial discrimination in
sport both in theory and practice. 262 When thr
the request had not been acted upon the
following year, the IOC withdrew South Africa's invitation to compete at the 1964 Tokyo
Summer Olympics. This action proved to be insufficient, and led representatives of 32
African nations to create the Supreme Council of Sport in Africa in 1966.263 With the
support of several Eastern European countries, including the Soviet Union, the SCSA
declared its purpose:
It is the firm decision of the Supreme Council to use every means to obtain the
expulsion of the South African Sports Organizations from the Olympic
Movement . . . should South Africa fail to comply fully with the IOC rules.
Finally, the Supreme Council invites all its members to subject their decision to
participate in the 1968 Olympics26Games
to the reservation that no racialist team
4
from South Africa takes part ....
Additionally, South African expatriates formed the South African Non-Racial Open
Committee (SANROC), an organization that appealed to the IOC to be recognized as the
sole Olympic Committee of South Africa on the grounds that the current South African
NOC practiced racial discrimination in violation of the Olympic Charter. 265 Though its
petition was rejected, SANROC would continue to pressure the IOC about apartheid in the
decades to come. 266
2 56
id.
257Id. at
110.
supranote 2, at 232.
Keech, The Ties Thai Bind: South Africa and Sports Diplomacy 1958-1963, in THE SPORTS
258GUTTMANN,
259Marc
HISTORIAN Vol. 21 No. I at 74 (May 2001).

260 KILLANIN, supranote 52, at 34.
261
id.
262RICHARD E. LAPCHICK, THE POLITICS OF RACE AND INTERNATIONAL SPORT: THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA
52 (Greenwood Press 1975).

263 id.

232-233.
266 Id. at 233.
264GUITTMANN,
265 Id. at
2009
Eventually, the pressure from the international community caused the IOC to send a
fact-finding mission to South Africa in 1967. Future IOC President Lord Killanin was
chosen to head the mission. Avery Brundage, IOC president at the time, made it clear that
the issue at hand was whether or not the South African NOC was in compliance with the
Olympic Charter, and not whether or not the IOC approved of apartheid.267
Upon arrival in South Africa, the three-man commission met several challenges: an
attempt by the chairman of the South African NOC to have all commission meetings
supervised by one of its representatives, undoubtedly to prevent some from speaking
candidly about the true nature of sport in South Africa; South Africans attempted to speak
to the commission without the South African NOC's knowledge; the South African NOC
endeavored to bribe numerous non-whites into not speaking to the commission by offering
them improved facilities; finally, the one black member of the three-man commission was
subjected to repeated racial discrimination, much to the indignation of the other two
members of the commission.268
The findings from interviews and meetings were bleak. Non-white sports officials
detailed the disparity between whites and non-whites in facilities and opportunities for
international competition, leading to unequal development. Furthermore, since non-whites
who requested better facilities were labeled as "agitators," they had no remedy by which to
improve non-white sport in South Africa.269 Meetings with the South African government
resulted in equally depressing findings. While the Minister of Sport publicly issued thinly
veiled threats aimed at the commission, the Prime Minister, B. J. Vorster, reinforced South
Africa's stated unwillingness to have mixed Olympic trials. 270 He further launched into271a
full defense of segregation, insisting that the price of mixed sport would be too high.
Furthermore, he falsely stated that though the facilities were separate, they were not
unequal.272 Vorster further explained that he was not opposed to allowing non-whites to
compete on the South African Olympic team, but that it was impossible to allow whites and
non-whites to compete against each other in South Africa.273 Thus, Olympic Team selection
would have to be done statistically. He further stated that South Africa would be unable to
274
The meeting concluded
send mixed teams to the Olympics to compete in team sports.
with Vorster defiantly stating that though South Africa was committed to Olympic
participation, it would not allow integrated sport, and would accordingly pay the price for
having segregation.275
In his memoirs, Killanin stated that the fact finding mission verified his "worst fears
about apartheid., 276 It demonstrated the lengths that South Africa was willing to go to in
order to maintain apartheid in the face of international criticism and possible ostracism.
The ultimate conclusion of the report was that the government of South Africa was
determined to preserve apartheid, and the policy of separate development in sport was
note 262, at 97.

267 LAPCHICK, supra

268KILLANIN,
269
Id. at 38.

id.
272See KILLANN, supra note 52, at 39 ("He said.. that it would be impossible to find better sporting facilities
270LAPCHICK,
271
for nonwhites anywhere in the world, which did make me wonder ifhe had travelled far.").
273id.
274 Id.
at 40
275LAPCHICK,
276KILLANIN,
VOL. 11: 1
enforced by law when necessary.277 Though the commission concluded that the South
African NOC had attempted to revise governmental policy on sport, its attempts had been
fruitless and it was unable to disobey the regulations in place by the South African
Government. 278 The findings of the Commission were reviewed by the IOC in 1968.279
The IOC decided in 1968 that it was clear that South Africa was not upholding the
Olympic Charter and its subsequent rules and regulations. 280 The IOC vote was,
nonetheless, to allow them to participate in the 1968 Mexico City Summer Olympic Games,
if their team was multi-racial. 2 8' This compromise led to outrage among the international
community, and the SCSA led forty nations in a threat to boycott the 1968 Mexico City
Games if South Africa took part.282 This threat was particularly vexing to Avery Brundage,
who feared that the boycotting nations of Africa would join the newly formed Games of the
New Emerging Forces (GANEFO), an alternative competition organized by Indonesia in
1964 to unite the Third World against imperialistic forces.283 GANEFO deviated from the
Olympic ideal by placing the fusion of sports and politics in the forefront of its charter with
the stated intention that through sport, the Third World could gain power and prestige on the
global stage.284 Had GANEFO been successful, as could have been the case if the African
nations and Soviet bloc chose to participate in GANEFO and not the Olympic Games, then
the Olympic movement could have been severely crippled.285
Brundage's concerns over the potential of South African inclusion to severely damage
the Olympic movement led him to quickly call the IOC to a meeting where a decision was
made to withdraw South Africa's invitation to the Games on the basis that the safety of the
South African team could not be guaranteed in light of the growing threat of political
286
protest against apartheid. The decision was supported by IOC members by a 3:1 margin.
Continued calls for the permanent expulsion of South Africa led to a definitive
decision on the subject during the Amsterdam session of 1970. The extent to which the IOC
was influenced by member states and international pressure is demonstrated by the
proceedings of the 1970 session, which show that the issue of South Africa was instigated
28 7
by the other African NOCs presenting a list of charges against the South African NOC.
288
The charges were as follows:
South Africa's NOC allowed its policy to be influenced by the South African
government in violation of then- rule 25 (28.5-28.6).289
South Africa's NOC did not abide by then-rule 24 (28.2) that would require it to
extend membership in its National Sports Federations to all citizens.290
27
Id. at 41.
278id.
279 Id.
280Id. at 42.
281 id.

id.
284 Id. at 228.
285See id. at 232.
287LAPCHICK, supra note 262, at 191.
288
See infra Appendix B.
282GUTrMANN,
283
289id.
29
0 Id.
2009
South Africa did not provide equal opportunity for non-white athletes to compete on
Olympic teams, or be employed by the South African NOC's administrative staff, thereby
violating then-rule 1. (28.2). 9
South Africa's NOC abided by the South African government's policy of not allowing
multi-racial athletic competition and providing separate and unequal athletic facilities for
different races, also in violation of then-rule 1. (28.2).292
South Africa was not in compliance with the IOC's resolution at the 1963 BadenBaden session, which stated that the South African NOC must make a public declaration
condemning racism in sport and receive from the South African government a pledge to
reverse its position on discrimination in sport.
An all-white regional competition held in South Africa in 1969 violated the
Fundamental Olympic Principle #5 of the Olympic Charter, which states that discrimination
against athletes who wish to participate in Olympic competition is non-compliant with the
Olympic Spirit.
The 1969 all-white South Africa Games had disobeyed orders that the Olympic
symbols were not to be used at the event (7).
South Africa's National Sports Federations had thus far been suspended from nine
International Federations.
The African NOCs concluded their presentation by recommending that the South
African NOC be permanently expelled from the Olympic movement, and emphasizing their
intention to boycott any sporting event that showcased athletes whose nations maintained
sporting ties with South Africa.
Following the presentation by the African NOCs, the South African NOC was given
the opportunity to defend its actions. Agitated at having been scrutinized by the IOC for
three years, the South African NOC chair did not prepare a statement to demonstrate its
commitment to the Olympic movement, and harshly advised the IOC not to interfere in the
internal affairs of South Africa.293 This display proved definitively that South Africa valued
the preservation of apartheid over the ideals embodied in the Olympic Charter. The
sentiment of the IOC leading up to the meeting had indicated that South Africa would be
suspended for the 1972 Games, but not expelled. The SANOC head further condemned the
actions of the IOC in 1968, and charged IOC discrimination against South Africans by not
allowing the country to compete in the 1968 Mexico Games. The motion to expel South
Africa permanently from the Olympics was passed by a narrow margin. 294 Press accounts of
the Amsterdam session cite the remarks made by the SANOC head as being the catalyst in
the increase of support for expulsion.295
Following the fall of apartheid, South Africa was readmitted to the Olympic
movement for the 1992 Barcelona Summer Olympics Games, ending a 32 year absence
from the Games. In the wake of the termination of the Olympic ban, important questions
about South Africa and the Olympic Games remain. How much did international pressure
influence the IOC? Why did other nations want South Africa to be banned? What effect did
the ban have on South Africa, and did it in any way contribute to the downfall of apartheid?
291
Id.
292
id.
293KILLANIN, supranote 52, at 43.

294LAPCHICK, supra note 262, at 194.
295Id.
VOL. 11: 1
The timeline by which the IOC eventually examined South Africa's sport policies and
first suspended, then permanently expelled the nation, is notable only for the perceived
slowness of their response. Avery Brundage was aware that South Africa would require
IOC attention long before he let the matter enter the IOC agenda. The slow timeline by
which the IOC took action along with their inaction at key events and hesitance to bow to
international pressure, combined to form a three-part demonstration of how the IOC was
swayed not through their own conviction, but by international pressure to take action
against South Africa.
First, as early as 1958, Brundage expressed a belief that the South Africa issue would
inevitably be on the IOC agenda at some point and that, "there can be only one answer,
unless changes are made. 296 In 1959, only weeks before the Soviets first launched their
complaint against South Africa, Brundage remarked to IOC Chancellor Otto Mayer that
South Africa "is another situation that we cannot evade much longer., 297 These statements
clearly demonstrate that though Brundage was familiar with the situation in South Africa,
and had probably realized that the Committee might someday be forced to expel the
country, he kept the issue off of the IOC agenda for as long as possible. Interestingly, its
emergence onto the IOC agenda corresponds with the rise of African influence within the
IOC. In 1959, the IOC had two African members, one from Egypt and one from South
Africa. Beginning in 1960 with the election of Reginald Alexander of Kenya to the IOC,
over the next ten years the IOC was to gain members from Morocco, Nigeria, Sudan,
Tunisia, Senegal, Madagascar, the Ivory Coast, and an additional member from Egypt,
bringing the total number of African IOC members to ten. 298 In addition, in 1959, there
were ten recognized African NOCs; by 1970 that number had jumped to thirty.299 With the
increased presence of African nations in the IOC, the issue of South Africa was forced to
the forefront of the IOC agenda. Thus, in light of Brundage's comments and the IOC's
eventual action, it must be concluded that had the IOC been motivated by commitment to its
own principles, it would have taken definitive action on South Africa much earlier.
Second, the IOC was neither the first nor the last international sports federation to take
action against South Africa. In 1959, a Brazilian official objected during an IOC meeting
that his country's national soccer team had been barred from playing a match against South
Africa because of Brazil's black players. 30 0 The cancellation was a direct result of South
Africa's apartheid policies, 30 1 but the IOC did not probe the reason for the cancellation, and
no action was taken against South Africa.30 2 In contrast, FIFA voted by a 5:1 ratio to
suspend the Football Association of South Africa (FASA) within one year if racial
discrimination did not end. When no action was taken by FASA, it was suspended in
1961.33 The IOC should have taken action; a blatant violation of IOC regulations had been
committed and followed up by a complaint from an IOC member. The IOC's inaction at
major infringements of the Olympic Charter show that its eventual action was more a
product of international pressure and the threat to the continuing existence of the Games
than its own desire to preserve the Olympic ideal from those who threatened it.
296GUITMANN, supra note 2, at 233.
Id.
297
298 See
generally Member Countries of the
visited
29 November 4, 2009).
9 d.
300GUTrMANN, supra note 2, at 233.

301 Id.
302 id.
303 ld.
IOC, http://users.skynet.be/hermandw/olymp/lOCcntrs.html
(last
2009
Third, following assurances that South Africa would attempt to field a multi-racial
team at the 1968 Olympic Games, the IOC initially voted to allow South Africa to compete
in Mexico City. 3 4 Though the decision was met with heavy international criticism,
Brundage was defiant in his assertion that South Africa would attend the Mexico City
Games. At the resulting IOC meeting in Lausanne, Brundage argued that political
discrimination occurred in many nations, and since it was outside of the realm of sport in
South Africa, it would not be sufficient grounds for a nation's expulsion from the Games.
Brundage's eventual defeat marks the beginning of the use of the boycott threat in Olympic
politics, and the realization that political powers do have sway in the Olympics. Brundage
had attempted to please the international community for ten years, but was finally forced to
act in a manner with which he was not pleased.30 5 The IOC's hand would further be forced
with the ban on Rhodesia. This demonstrates the extent to which the IOC can be swayed by
its member nations; the next step must be to consider what these states hoped to accomplish
with the expulsion of South Africa.
The motivations and objectives of the nations that opposed South Africa's inclusion in
international sport were numerous. They ranged from an ideological and moral opposition
to apartheid to the use of the anti-apartheid stance to gain power and prestige among the
IOC and the international community. First and foremost, it is apparent that there were
those who did believe that excluding South Africa from international sport was an important
step in eradicating apartheid. This opinion is mirrored in the actions of the United Nations,
which included provisions on the need to ban apartheid in sport in many of its anti-apartheid
proceedings and resulting resolutions. In the years between 1971 and 1980, the United
Nations General Assembly issued fifteen resolutions relating to South Africa, each
condemning the continuance of political, social and economic ties to South Africa and
calling for increased pressure to be placed on South Africa to end apartheid. Seven of these
resolutions included calls for the need to sever sporting ties with South Africa, including the
Declaration Condemning Apartheid in Sports in 1977.306 Additionally, in an address to the
UN General Assembly, E.B. Maycock, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Drafting of an International Convention Against Apartheid in Sports, called for stronger
resolutions condemning apartheid in sports and punitive mechanisms for nations that
continued sporting ties with South Africa.30 7 Maycock stated that, "It is particularly
timely.. .that we have been able to reach agreement on the draft convention
at this stage
308
when the evil system of apartheid is under such diverse pressure.... "
The quest to end global discriminatory practices was led by the Third World, much of
which was striving to overcome colonial legacies during the 1960s and 1970s. 30 9 The Third
World sought to gain global power and prestige in several ways, including the sporting
arena. With successful colonial African participation in the Olympic Games since the
beginning of the 2 0 th century, the African nations felt that sport was an ideal way to gain
international attention. 3 10 The cause of the African nations was strengthened in 1963 with
3o4Id. at237.
305Id. at
239.
306
Int'l Convention Against Apartheid in Sports, Gen. Assem. Res. 40/64, (Dec. 10, 1985),
http://www.anc.org.za/un/unsports.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2009).
307Int'l Convention Against Apartheid in Sports, Gen Assem. Res. 40/64, (Dec. 10, 1985), available at
http://www.anc.org.za/un/unsports.htm.
308
The 1985 Assembly: A Message ofSolidarity and Hope, UN Chronicle, Feb. 1986, availableat
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m 1309/is v23/ai_4118327/pg_2/.
309DOUGLAS BOOTH, THE RACE GAME: SPORT AND POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA 96 (Frank Cass ed., 1998).
310
BAKER, supra note 134, at 273-77.
VOL. 11: 1
the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), whose charter stated, "freedom,
equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate
aspirations of the African peoples.", 311 Apartheid, which was based on the idea of racial
inequality, was a major barrier to the goal of the OAU.3 12 The presence of the OAU led to
immediate success when
in 1963, the first black African was invited by the IOC Executive
3 13
Board to join the IOC.
Furthermore, the cause of Third World empowerment through sports has been
embraced in the international community by the creation of the General Assembly of
International Federations and the Permanent General Assembly of National Olympic
Committees. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, an influx of Third World representatives
had gained entry into the international sporting federations including the IOC, weakening
the traditional stronghold that Europe and the United States had over the Olympic Games.
Apartheid was the perfect platform to make their presence and importance to the growth of
international sport known; it stood in the way of the personal ambitions of the African
states, and anti-apartheid sentiment in the global community was strong enough to ensure
adequate support in their actions.314
The Soviet Union and Communist Bloc's role in the anti-apartheid sport dispute is
interesting in that its inconsistencies provide insight into the Soviet rationale for supporting
the African nations. It is undoubtedly true that the Soviet Union had moral objections to
apartheid; representatives from the Soviet Union were the first to attempt to call the
attention of the IOC to the situation in Africa. However, once the IOC delved into the issue
further, the Soviet Union's role was substantially minimized. The Soviet Union joined the
African nations in threatening to boycott the 1968 Olympic Games; 31 5 yet in 1976 when
most of the African nations actually withdrew from the Games, not only did the Soviet
Union participate, it also encouraged the African nations to do so as well. 3 16 Its failure to
withdraw is not surprising; Moscow had already been awarded the 1980 Summer Olympics
and suggested that successful athletic performances could be more effective in combating
racism than boycotts.317 Notwithstanding its refusal to participate in the boycott, the Soviet
Union had supported the African nations in other ways; it provided African nations with
funds for the development of their Olympic programs, sent athletic equipment and trainers
to African nations, and hosted African sports officials and trainers on visits to the Soviet
Union. 8 However, considering the amount of financial support the Soviet Union had given
the African nations, the lack of support the Soviets showed at this crucial moment was
crushing to the African boycott. Though the Soviet Union was unwilling to compromise its
Olympic legacy, it was willing to pay to get Africa more influence in international sport
with the hope that the Africans would use their increased influence to support the Soviet
Union. 31 9 Thus, it is apparent that the Soviet Union's funds for African sport were at least in
part intended to win the African nations over to the Communist side in the Cold War. If the
31 Charterof the Organizationof African Unity, Sept. 13, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 39, availableat
http://wwwI.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/OAUCharter
312BOOTH, supra note 309, at 96.
313MILLER, supra note 19, at 161.
314BOOTH, supra note 309, at 98.
315
ESPY, supra note 97, at 102.
316 SENN, supra note 112, at 167.
317id.
3'8
HAZAN, supranote 159, at 60-62.
319id.
1993.html.
2009
Soviet Union had not had this strategy in mind, then it would not have
been hesitant to
320
finance and attach its name to organizations such as SANROC publicly.
The international pressure that was placed on the IOC and other International Sporting
Federations was successful. By the end of May, 1970, South Africa had been suspended or
expelled from not only the Olympic movement, but also international federations for table
tennis, soccer, basketball, fencing, judo, volleyball, boxing, weightlifting, Davis Cup tennis,
gymnastics, and cycling. Track and field and wrestling would soon follow. In the decade to
follow, the effect that sporting isolation had on South Africa were visible, and the other
motives that nations may have had in the expulsion of South Africa were realized.
During the 1967 IOC commission to South Africa, it had been discovered that the
majority of South African athletes of the younger generation were not opposed to mixed
sport, yet these athletes did not often speak out against apartheid. The isolation provided the
impetus for several athletes and media outlets to speak out and change their views. On May
23, 1970, The Rand Daily Mail of Johannesburg called for a national sports conference to
examine the merit of multi-racial sport.321 Cricketer Dennis Gamsey stated publicly that
there was "no question" of the need to integrate sports or face the consequences of a
significant worsening of South Africa's position in the global sporting world.322 Peter
Pollock, another cricketer who had condemned protests against apartheid only weeks before
the IOC expulsion, quickly reversed his position to urge athletes to speak out against
apartheid and stated his new
belief that, "the government owes something to people who
323
play sport in this country.,
Following the expulsion of South Africa from the Olympic movement and other
organizations, South Africa was unable to hide its status as an international pariah from a
population that was wildly enthusiastic about sports and the Olympic Games.324 Though the
impact that this knowledge had on the citizens and government officials of South Africa
cannot be quantified, it is believed to have at least slightly lessened the resolve of the
citizens to support apartheid. The disappointment in the athletic isolation of South Africa
was reflected in South Africa's continued efforts to be reinstated in international sports
federations.325
In September of 1976, the month following the 1976 Olympics, South Africa amended
its sport policy to allow white club teams to play non-white club teams under special
circumstances, but it did not allow for integrated sport or equal opportunities for all races to
be selected for elite teams.326 As this move failed to gamer the positive response from the
international community that South Africa had hoped, the policy was clarified a year and a
half later to indicate that integrated sport was not illegal in South Africa. 27 However,
despite this sentiment from the South African government, it stood in contrast to laws that
had been put in place in the early 1950s that were intended to have a prohibitory effect, as
from South Africa pertaining to the arrests of citizens
well as continued news reports 328
engaging in racially mixed sports.
320MILLER, supra note
19, at 161.
321
LAPCHICK, supra note 262, at 197.
322id.
323Id. at
197-98.
324RICHARD W. POUND, INSIDE THE OLYMPICS 118 (Wiley Ltd. 2004).

325Id.
32 6
O1ZDEMIR A. OZGR, APARTHEID: THE UNITED NATIONS & PEACEFUL CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA 139
(Transnational Publishers, Inc. 1982).

327id.
328 id.
VOL. 11: 1
In February of 1978, as South Africa was facing expulsion from the International
Tennis Federation, a non-white tennis player was named to the South African Davis Cup
team and he competed in the 1978 Davis Cup finals in the United States. 32 9 However, these
changes proved to be insufficient to the international sporting world. In 1979, the South
African press reported that countries that had thus far chosen to maintain sporting contacts
with South Africa were coming under increased pressure to sever ties, particularly given
South Africa's continued reluctance to fulfill its earlier promises to ban segregation in
sport. 330 These changes in South African sport policy were perhaps best summarized in a
letter from the Acting Chairman of the Special Committee Against Apartheid to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, which stated that, "Special efforts are being made
by representatives of the apartheid regime to convince the world's sporting community that
apartheid is being removed from sport in South Africa in an attempt to justify South
Africa's re-integration with international sport. This faqade of change.. .is in fact a direct
result of the international campaign... and it would be a negation of past sacrifices to relax
the campaign at a point when success is within reach and efforts should be redoubled." 331
South Africa's policy changes reflected the country's interest in maintaining its
position in the global sporting world. However, the changes failed to meet the demands of
the international community, and they were labeled a "faqade" by the United Nations'
Intemational Conference on Sanctions Against Apartheid in Sports.
332
Though severing
sporting ties clearly did affect a country that has a strong sports tradition, the changes
reflected South Africa's desire to be allowed to partake in global sports without altering
their policy on apartheid.
Other goals that nations had hoped to accomplish by pressuring the IOC to expel
South Africa were met with limited success. African nations did gain some influence and
prestige on the heels of the apartheid issue, but their inability to pressure the IOC to ban
New Zealand from the 1976 Games demonstrates the limits on their influence. The Soviet
Union did not win its battle to win the hearts and minds of the African people. Not only did
their refusal to join the 1976 Montreal boycott hurt their cause, but 21 African nations
joined the United States in their boycott of the 1980 Games.
The nations that were waging an ideological battle against apartheid by refusing to
enter into sports competitions with South Africa accomplished their mission. However,
although the ban did have a noticeable and adverse effect on South African civil society, it
did not compel South Africa to alter its sports policies, and it was not a primary factor in the
eventual downfall of apartheid.
B. The InternationalOlympic Committee's Ban on Afghanistan
Afghanistan's National Olympic Committee was first created in 1935 and recognized
by the IOC the following year. 333 Although an Afghan athlete did not win a medal until the
Beijing Games in 2008, Afghanistan had sent a team to almost every Summer Games since
329
id.
330 Id.
at 140.
331United Nations, The United Nations Official Document Online Database,2004,
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N83/191/21/PDF/N8319121
.pdfPOpenElement.
3 32
id.
333The National Olympic Committees, Afghanistan, http://www.olympic.org/en/content/National-OlympicCommittees/afghanistan/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2009).
2009
1936. 3 34 This sporting tradition flourished under the rule of Afghan president Mohammed
Daud during the 1970s.335 With the rise of the Taliban, sports in Afghanistan took a
downturn, as strict regulations on sport were enforced.336
When the Taliban rose to power in 1996, the regime quickly seized control of the
National Olympic Committee and appointed senior Taliban official, Abdul Shukur
Motmayn, as the NOC chair.337 This move, as well as other statements made by the Taliban
regarding how sport violated the Islamic code of Shariah, caused speculation among the
international community that the Taliban would ban sports altogether. 338 The Taliban
strongly denied this, and in late 1996, showcased a sports parade in Kabul both to celebrate
the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan's capital and to demonstrate that the regime would
not ban sports. 339 At the parade, Motmayn stated that sports would continue, though athletes
would be required to conform to the Shariah.34 Motmayn further explained that this
regulation would primarily affect the athletes' attire. They would be unable to compete
wearing short sleeved shirts or short pants. 34' Motmayn also made it a point to emphasize
that once the nation was stable, women would be allowed to compete in sports. 342
The Taliban continued to show its commitment to sport in early 1997 by allowing the
Afghan National Olympic Committee to stage a three mile cycling competition through the
streets of Kabul.343 The race was followed by a martial arts demonstration, where a senior
Taliban official declared, "We are not against sports. Our athletes should serve the nation
and win honor for the country." 344 The positive sports sentiment even led the winner of the
cycling race to express his hope of someday representing Afghanistan in the Olympic
Games. 345 Later that year, the Afghanistan National Olympic Committee appealed to the
international community for assistance in securing finances for their athletes to travel
abroad for competitions.346
Following the Taliban's seemingly friendly approach to sports, the national stadium in
Kabul hosted martial arts fights and soccer and volleyball matches. 347 However, to increase
the presence of Islam in sports and ensure complete adherence to the Shariah, in the spring
of 1997 the Taliban began imposing harsher restrictions on athletics.348 Spectators were no
longer allowed to clap or cheer at sporting events, but rather were asked to yell, "Allah-oAkbar," an Islamic chant that translates to "God is great., 3 49 Additionally, the Taliban
334Afghanistan at the Olympics, http://www.gz20I0.cn/09/0524/17/5A3KBL2E00780143.htmI (last visited

Nov. 8, 2009).
335Mohammed Bashir, No Word of the World Cup in Kabul and Pyongyang, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 12.
336id.
337Reuters, Sports Aren't Outlawed, Say Kabul's Taliban, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 25, 1996 at
38
3 Id.
33 9
A 18.
id.
340id.
341Id.
342
id.
343Kabul Stages FirstSports Event Since Taliban Takeover, AGENCE-FRANCE- PRESSE, Jan. 7, 1997.
34
4 Id.
345
id.
346Embattled Afghan Sportsmen Request Return to InternationalStage, AGENCE FRANCE- PRESSE, Apr. 13,
1997.
347 Stefan Smith, Swimming, Women and Clapping outfor Afghan Athletes, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Aug. 16,
1997.
348 Afghanistan's Islamic Rulers Apply the Screws on Sports, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Jun. 22, 1997.
349id.
VOL. 11:1
decreed that sports must be interrupted during prayer time so that all competitors and
spectators abide by the Shariah and enter into prayer.35
Taliban restrictions on sport only became stricter in the summer of 1997 when
Montmayn declared the goal of the Taliban and Afghanistan NOC to "make the lives of
sportsmen a Muslim one.",35' The Afghanistan National Olympic Committee now required
that male athletes be unshaven, as required by the Shariah, despite being both an
impediment to the athletes in many ways, and a violation of several international sporting
federation codes that require facial hair not exceed a certain length.352 Montmayn also
declared that swimming was to be outlawed in Afghanistan due to the inability of swimmers
to dress in conformity with the Shariah, and that female sporting activity was not a priority,
reiterating that women
would only be allowed to participate in sports once the country was
353
stable and secure.
By 1998, athletics in Afghanistan had quickly worsened. The 25,000 seat Olympic
stadium in Kabul had deteriorated during Afghanistan's war-torn years and was being used
not for soccer matches, but as a venue for the Taliban to publicly execute and torture
citizens that had failed to act in accordance with Islamic law.354 As per the Shariah, all
3 55
Afghan men were forbidden from trimming their beard shorter than the length of one fist.
Thus, the pride of Afghan athletics, its boxers, had been prevented from competing in
international competition due to the International Amateur Boxing Association's
requirement that boxers be clean-shaven. 356 As the end of 1998 approached, Afghanistan
submitted numerous protests to organizers of both the Olympic Games and the upcoming
Asian Games requesting that the rules be amended to allow Afghan boxers to compete. 357
Following the rejection of Afghanistan's appeals to amend boxing laws, Afghanistan
pulled out of the 1998 Asian Games, citing its financial inability to send a delegation. 35 8
The ongoing controversy surrounding the bearded Afghan boxers, as well as the status of
the nation as one in ongoing civil war, cast a doubt over the long-term sporting prospects
for the nation, a situation exacerbated by the Asian Games debacle. The situation was
further called into question as the Afghanistan NOC declared their intention to field a team
in the Sydney Olympics, despite the lack of an invitation from the IOC. 3 59 According to the
Olympic charter, in order to send a team to the Olympics, the nation must be recognized by
the international community. 360 The Taliban only controlled at most 90% of Afghanistan
and had failed to gain legitimacy and recognition in the eyes of the international community
and the United Nations, calling
into question whether or not Afghanistan should be invited
3 61
to the 2000 Sydney Games.
350Id.
note 347.
Id.
353Id.
354Jason Burke, FridayAfternoon in August in Kabul, THE OBSERVER, Feb. 13, 2000, at 35.
355Beards and the Sporting Life, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 31, 1998, at 44.
351SMITH, supra
352
356
Id.
337
Luke Hunt, Afghanistan Seeks Olympic Rule Change on Boxer's Beards, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Oct. 26,
1998.
358Afghanistan to PresentNew Image in Asian Games, PAK TRIBUNE, Nov. 28, 2006, availableat
http://www.wtf.org/bbs/bbs.phpbbs-no=354&bbs-code= 10002&bbscate=&bbs.num = I18&page-8&search=&k
eyword=&symode=view&PHPSESSID=29cbf8f377c59d5fbbbbO17e99d0bc23 (last visited Nov. 8, 2009).
359Luke Hunt, Afghanistan Still Waitingfor Invitation to Sydney Olympics, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Apr. 5,
1999.
" OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 84 at 45.1-45.3.
361 HUNT, supra note 357.
2009
Following the Afghan committee's continued reluctance to abide by international

sporting regulations, as well as other violations of the Olympic Charter, the IOC approved
its first punitive action against the Afghan NOC at its October 1999 session in Athens,
Greece. There the IOC voted to suspend the Afghanistan NOC on the ground that the
Taliban had disbanded the recognized NOC in favor of one controlled by the Taliban
regime. 362 The IOC cited the forced exile of the president of the old NOC following the rise
of the Taliban as evidence. 363 According to Francois Carrard, director-general of the IOC,
the old NOC did "not control the sport anymore," stating that it was impossible to grant
recognition to the Taliban run NOC, which among other things, prohibited women to
compete in sports, a violation of the Olympic Charter for discrimination in sport. 364 At that
point, the IOC was still hopeful that Afghan athletes would compete in the 2000 Sydney
Olympics as Individual Olympic Athletes.365
The decision to suspend the Afghanistan NOC was met with outrage by Taliban
officials, who submitted an appeal in an attempt to allow their athletes to compete under the
Afghanistan flag in Sydney.366 In a statement made by the Afghan Sports Minister, the IOC
decision was attributed to "pressure from enemy countries who don't want to see peace and
security in Afghanistan," specifically accusing the United States of pressuring the IOC as an
ongoing means of forcing the regime to turn over Osama bin Laden. Earlier in the year the
U.S. had imposed trade sanctions on the Taliban and frozen overseas financial assets
following the fall 1998 bombings of U.S. Embassies in Africa, actions attributed to bin
Laden's Al Qaeda terrorist network. The statement further accused the IOC of "usurping"
the right of the Afghan athletes to take part in the Olympic Games. 367
The quest by the Afghan officials to be invited to the Olympics continued right up
until weeks before the opening ceremonies of the Sydney Games. The IOC was unmoved,
and it failed to reinstate Afghanistan, making it the only nation with a National Olympic
Committee to be barred from entering the Games.368 As was the case with South Africa, the
IOC was forced to punish a NOC that was in violation of the Olympic Charter. However, in
the continued interest of not harming the athletes, the IOC invited Afghan athletes to
compete in Sydney as Independent Olympic Athletes.
Unfortunately, the Taliban prohibited
369
Afghanistan's athletes from accepting this offer.
Afghanistan's efforts to be reinstated in the Olympic movement demonstrated its
desire to take part in the Games and not face the ignominy of being the only NOC to be
sanctioned by the IOC. Additionally, statements made by Afghanistan NOC officials
reflected the recognition that having Afghan athletes compete at the Games would bring
pride and prestige to the nation. 37 0 However, despite this, the Taliban continued its reign of
terror over sport in Afghanistan. Only a month before the Sydney Games opened, the
362IOC Bars Afghan Athletes from Olympics, ABC NEWS, Oct. 2, 1999,
http://abcnews.go.com/Sports/story?id= 100745&page= I&page=l.

363 Id.
364See OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 84, at 28.2.5, (stating: "The NOCs' role is... to take action against any
form of discrimination and violence in sport.").
363IOC Bars Afghan Athletes from Olympics, supra note 362.
366Afghanistan News Center, Taliban Demand Right to Compete at Sydney Olympics, Oct. 5, 1999,
http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/i999/october/oct5d
1999.htm.
367Id.
368Vicky Michaelis, Afghanistan Seeks to Have Ban Lifted; Only Country underIOC Suspension, USA
TODAY, Dec. 13, 2001, at 7C.
369Afghanistan News Center, supra note 366.
370Afghan Athletes Desperateto Compete in Sydney, AGENCE FRANCE- PRESSE, Aug. 10, 2000.
VOL. 11: 1
Afghanistan religious police sparked international controversy when they arrested, shaved
the heads of, and deported a visiting Pakistani soccer team who were wearing short pants. 371
Further, only days after the IOC's suspension of the Afghanistan NOC was upheld, a riot
broke out during a soccer match in Kabul as Afghan religious police interrupted the game
and swept through the stands, beating those who were not praying. 372 Finally, the
Afghanistan NOC refused to change its stance on women in sport saying that the IOC
should allow individual NOCs to have their own rules and that the IOC should just "never
invite us, nor do we want them to invite us, when there are women's competitions," as
3 73
allowing women to engage in sport would be the equivalent of betraying Islam.
The continued actions by the Afghanistan NOC in both refusing to adapt its Olympic
program to meet IOC standards and continuing to impose restrictions on sport in
Afghanistan reflected their unwillingness to change their sporting regulations. They
remained committed to a sports ideology that promoted discrimination in sport. Although
they wanted to take part in the Olympic Games, the Olympic ban had little to no effect on
either sporting regulations in Afghanistan or Taliban relations with the international
community and the terrorists that were based within its borders.
If the United States had been using the Olympic ban as a mechanism to try and force
Afghanistan to stop harboring Osama bin Laden and encouraging terrorist activity, then this
plan failed. Not only did Afghanistan fail to turn over bin Laden, but he remained active and
executed his deadliest attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, a year after the
Olympic ban was exacted.
Following the downfall of the Taliban, an Olympic delegation was sent to Afghanistan
to assist in the establishment of the National Olympic Committee and rebuild the sporting
infrastructure and the IOC reinstated the Afghanistan National Olympic Committee in July,
2003. Five Afghan athletes, including two women, competed for Afghanistan in the 2004
Olympic Games in Athens. 37 4 The country was represented by four athletes at the 2008
Beijing Olympics-three men and one woman.375 Though a small delegation, it returned
home triumphant when taekwondo athlete Rohullah Nikpai won Afghanistan's first medala bronze in the men's 58 kg competition.376
C. The InternationalOlympic Committee's Ban on Iraq
Afghanistan is not the only war-tom nation to face a ban in recent years.377 Iraq was
both banned from and subsequently reinstated to the Beijing Olympics in 2008. Like many
other aspects of life in Iraq, the country's Olympic movement has been in disarray since the
early 2000s; the IOC has twice banned Iraq during this time. The first suspension occurred
shortly after the ouster of Saddam Hussein's regime by U.S.-led forces, when the IOC
311 Stephen Coates, Olympic Ban Fails to Tame Taliban Hostility to Sport, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 6,
2000.
372 id.
373Afghanistan News Center, Afghanistan's Taliban Regime Mulls Ban on Boxing, Oct. 22, 1988,
http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2000/october/oct22b2000.htm.
374Afghanistan at the Olympics, http://www.gz2010.cn/09/0524/17/5A3KBL2E00780143.htm (last visited
Nov.3 7 9, 2009).
5 Id.
id.
377In addition to the recent bans and subsequent reinstatements of Afghanistan and Iraq, the IOC banned
Brunei from the 2008 Beijing Games on a technical matter after its National Olympic Committee failed to register
either of its two athletes with the IOC by the required deadline. BBC, Brunei Excluded from 2008 Games, Aug. 8,
2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/olympics/7549559.stm.
376
2009
became aware of the abuse and torture of Iraqi athletes by Uday Hussein, the former head of
the Iraqi NOC and Saddam's son. 378 The IOC removed the ban the next year when a new
Iraq NOC was elected in 2004 in accordance with IOC regulations, and Iraq was allowed to
compete in the 2004 Athens Olympics. 379 However, the saga did not end there. Four
members of the Iraqi Olympic Committee were kidnapped from a meeting in 2006 and are
presumed dead. 380 The IOC again banned Iraq prior to the 2008 Beijing Olympics after the
Iraqi government disbanded the elected NOC and replaced it with a new entity comprised of
its own appointees and led by a government official, claiming that the elected NOC was
corrupt, illegal and dysfunctional. 381 Despite these claims, many observers saw the removal
as another chapter in an ongoing fight for control of Iraq between the country's Shias and
Sunnis.382 Either way, the move ran contrary to the IOC Charter's Article 28, which
requires NOCs to be independent bodies free from political interference. 383 Five days after
the IOC announced the ban on July 24, subsequent negotiations between the IOC and the
Iraqi government led to an agreement days prior to the opening ceremonies for the country
to re-establish an independent Iraqi NOC through an open and fair election. 384 The ban was
lifted, and though several Iraqi athletes were prevented from competing in Beijing because
the ban led the Iraqi NOC to miss the registration deadline for the Games, four Iraqi athletes
competed in the Olympic Games. 385 The elections occurred on April 4, 2009 and an
independent Iraqi Olympic Committee was re-established.386
D. Conclusions on Bans
According to Anita DeFrantz, who served as an IOC Executive Vice-President when
Afghanistan was banned from the Olympic movement, the Afghanistan ban and any other
ban that the IOC imposes is meant to impel the banned nation to amend its sport practices
so that they are in accordance with the Olympic Charter. 387 That is all that the IOC believes
can be accomplished.388
However, in the cases of both South Africa and Afghanistan, it is clear that the
Olympic ban did not prove to be the catalyst in the change of sporting policies. In both these
instances, the change in sporting policies came only with the downfall of the two regimes,
events that occurred due to heavy resistance movements, and in the case of Afghanistan, a
U.S.-led invasion. Thus, it is fair to conclude that an Olympic ban is an ineffective tool to
378Associated Press, Olympic Panel Ends Ban, Says Iraq Can Go to Games, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 29, 2008,
available at http://vww.nydailynews.comlsports/more-sports/2008/07/29/2008-0729olympic-panel-endsban-saysiraq-can-go.html.
37
9
Id.
380 David
Sands, Iraq Barred From Games; Panel Cites Interference, WASH. TIMES, Jul. 25, 2008 at A2 1.
381BBC, Iraq Banned from Beijing Olympics, July 24, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/olympics/7523708.stm.
2
38 Id.
383See Amit R. Paley, 2 Iraqi Athletes Set for Beijing After IOC Lifts Ban, THE WASH. POST, July 30, 2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/07/29/AR2008072901848.html?hpid=moreheadlines.
384Id.
185See China View, Iraqi Athletes Competing at Olympics Doubles to Four,

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-08/01/content_8890480.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2009).
386Chinese Olympic Committee, Iraq Elects New National Olympic Committee, Apr. 4, 2009,
http://en.olympic.cn/news/olympic-news/2009-04-04/1770444.html.
38'Anita DeFrantz Interview, supra note 207.
388Id.
VOL. 11: 1
use on countries whose discriminatory sporting practices are strongly embedded in the
ideology of a powerful regime.
Moreover, IOC member nations attempt to pressure the IOC to ban nations with the
hope that these bans will achieve further political ends. But in the cases explored in this
article, it seems that though an Olympic ban is unfavorable, it is in no way crippling to a
regime; it cannot be considered a powerful weapon in the fight against an unpopular regime
or in the quest to accomplish any other substantive goal.
For the above reasons, the IOC does not favor Olympic bans. In the absence of
significant international pressure to ban a nation, the IOC now prefers to work with NOCs
on amending perceived violations of the Olympic Charter. This is evident in the cases of
other Arab nations. Like Afghanistan, many of these nations used Islam as an excuse for the
exclusion of women from Olympic sport. The IOC has successfully worked with many of
these nations on reforming their policies. Iran allowed women to compete for the first time
at the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games, and Kuwait followed at the 2004 Athens Games. Since
2004, Qatar has agreed to allow women to compete at the Games.38 9 Of the nine NOCs that
did not enter women into the 2004 Games, five did not enter women due to sports policy
that precluded female participation. 390 Eight countries 39'-including the Muslim nations of
Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia-did not enter women into the 2008 Games, with only Saudi
Arabia not doing so for gender-based reasons.392 The success of the Commission on
Women in Sport demonstrates the ineffectiveness of merely banning a nation and hoping
that the action alone will compel it to change its sport policies.
V. CONCLUSION
The Olympic Games are for humanity. They are meant to espouse the fundamental
principles in the Olympic Charter which speak to the glory of humankind and the
phenomenal feats that humans can accomplish. Though the Charter also expresses the hope
of Baron Pierre de Coubertin that the Olympic Games can be used to promote international
harmony and goodwill, the spread of these ideals is meant to be accomplished through the
Games. Thus, the focal point of Olympism is the athletic competition and the benefits that
can result from this competition. The Olympic Games has some protection from political
interference for this reason.
The Olympic Games, which is the mechanism by which the IOC spreads Olympism,
has persisted despite the numerous political issues that have threatened it. The Games will
endure for as long as there are nations who wish to compete in the Olympics. Even as
nations have boycotted the Games and influenced the IOC to ban other nations, the Games
have still seen a sufficient number of competitors to ensure their continued success. The
ability of the Games to continue despite repeated attempts to disrupt them via boycotts and
bans speaks to the resiliency of the Games, and the ineffectiveness of attempting to draw
attention away from the competition for political purposes.
389IOC
Commission on Women in Sport,
REPORT ON WOMEN PARTICIPATION AT THE GAMES OF THE XXVIII
OLYMPIAD: ATHENS 2004 (The Department of International Cooperation and Development, IOC February 2005).
390Ms. DeFrantz, who is currently the Chairwoman of the IOC Commission on Women in Sport, expressed the
hope that at the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, at most three delegations will not allow women to compete.
Anita DeFrantz Interview, supra note 207.
391IOC, FACTSHEET-
WOMEN IN THE OLYMPIC MOVEMENT - KEY FIGURES,
http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en-report-1402.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2009).

392Aline Bannayan, Muslim Sportswomen Gain Standing in Beijing, WOMEN'S ENEWS, Aug. 7, 2008,
http://www.womensenews.org/story/athleticssports/080807/muslim-sportswomen-gain-standing-beijing.
2009
The boycotts that have occurred throughout Olympic history demonstrate this
perfectly. In 1976, 1980, and 1984, one of the primary focuses of the boycotts was the lost
dreams of the athletes who were kept away from competition, in contrast to the joy and
success that were perceived on the part of the athletes that were there. The three boycotts
discussed in this article demonstrate that the effect on the athletes is generally the most
significant impact that a boycott will have. Any more substantive political objective is very
difficult to accomplish.
In 1976, the boycott by a number of African nations did little to stop other countries
from continuing to maintain sporting ties with South Africa. Ironically, this boycott
achieved almost the reverse effect: rather than preventing the South African athletes from
entering into international sporting events, the athletes from the boycotting nations were
prevented from entering into the greatest international sporting event of all. In 1980, the
United States sought to undermine Soviet power and completely disrupt the Games. Like
the African nations boycott, President Carter's plan had almost the reverse effect. Rather
than undermining Soviet power and disrupting the Games, America's power and alliance
system were revealed to be heavily fractured. Carter had hoped to have the negative effects
of the boycott blamed on the Soviet ideology that precluded American participation.
However, as Americans and the world witnessed the Games go on with the participation of
thousands of athletes, it became apparent that the American boycott was ineffective. In
light of that realization, Carter was blamed for the negative effects of the boycott, a move
that proved politically costly.
In 1984, the Soviet Union similarly tried to disrupt the Los Angeles Games and the
1984 U.S. Presidential election. The Los Angeles Games were a huge success both
symbolically and financially, and the success of the Olympic Games played a role in the
landslide victory of Ronald Reagan in the November 1984 election. The attitudes of the
Americans during the Los Angeles Games must be seen as reflective of the ineffectiveness
of the boycott.
The Olympic Games are marked by the joyous celebration of the athletic
accomplishments of humankind. Once the Games start, the focus is on the athletes that
come and demonstrate their physical abilities. The politics that keep athletes away are far
less important than the spirit and accomplishments that are embodied by those that come.
The focus of the Games on sport contributes to the inability of nations to utilize the Games
for political purposes. In every boycott discussed in this article, it is demonstrated that
depriving the athletes from participating is a significant price to pay for the limited political
accomplishments that can be attained by using the Games to advance a political agenda.
Similarly, although bans are an ideological triumph over nations that seek to
undermine the Olympic spirit, nations that seek to exact the ban can gain very little from the
banning of another nation. In both cases discussed in this paper, the bans were completely
ineffective. The bans did not compel the nations to change their sporting practices, much
less their system of government. Furthermore, the bans did little to allow nations to gain
more power either within the Olympic movement or the broader scope of international
relations. As shown by the experience of the IOC Commission on Women in Sport,
allowing a nation to participate in the Olympic Games can do more to demonstrate to a
nation that their sporting practices are inappropriate than banning them. Additionally, if a
nation stays in the Olympic movement, then the IOC has a greater degree of influence over
it and more opportunity to work with the nation on its sporting practices.
VOL. 11: 1
The political actions discussed in this article make a strong argument that participation
in the Olympic Games will enable a nation to see more positive results than what can flow
from nonparticipation, or the preclusion of another nation from participation. This is
demonstrated not only by the positive effects that participation can have, but also the
negative effects and limited success that can result from using the Olympic Games to make
a political statement.
The ideals encompassed in the Olympic movement remain vibrant today. Pierre de
Coubertin's observations on the ability of sport and athletic heroes to positively affect a
nation were prophetic. There are certain political expressions that will never be gone from
the Olympics, such as the tensions that arise when athletes from rival nations face off in
Olympic competition and the playing of national anthems during medal ceremonies. But
boycotts and bans have limited effectiveness, and thus only serve to taint the Olympic
Games. In that regard, it can be concluded that these political statements should not be
executed on the Olympic stage due to their ineffectiveness and the interest of preserving the
Olympic ideal.
APPENDIX A: COMPLETE LIST OF OLYMPIC BOYCOTTS
THE 1956 MELBOURNE
Egypt
3 93
Iraq
Lebanon
Holland
THE
GAMES OF THE XVI OLYMPIAD
1976
MONTREAL GAMES OF THE
Spain
Switzerland 394
XXI OLYMPIAD
3 95
Algeria
Guyana
Sudan
Cameroon*
Iraq
Swaziland
Central African Republic
Kenya
Taiwan
Chad
Libya
Tanzania
Congo
Malawi
Togo
Egypt*
Mali
Tunisia*
Ethiopia
Morocco*
Uganda
313Olympic.org, Melbourne/Stockholm 1956 Summer Olympic Games,

http://www.olympic.org/en/content/Olympic-Games/All-Past-Olympic-Games/Summer/Melboume--Stockholm1956/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2009).
394Due to a strict horse quarantine law in place in Australia, the equestrian events of the 1956 games were held
in June in Stockholm, Sweden. The events that resulted in the 1956 boycotts occurred between June and
November, which was when the game opened in Melbourne. Thus, although Switzerland withdrew its team from
Melbourne, it is given credit for having participated in the 1956 Games due to Swiss athletes competing in
Stockholm. The Official Report of the Organizing Committee for the Equestrian Games of the XVIth Olympiad,
http://www.aafla.org/6oic/OfficialReports/l956/orl 956eq.pdf.
395Africa and the XXI Olympiad,
http://www.la84foundation.org/OlympiclnformationCenter/OlympicReview/1976/ore I09/oreI 09h.pdf (last visited
Nov. 9, 2009). The (*)'s denote nations that are classified as competing nations because their athletes competed
prior to the delegations being withdrawn mid-way through the first week of the games.
2009
The Gambia
Niger
Upper Volta (Burkina Faso)
Ghana
Nigeria
Zambia
Sri Lanka
THE
1980 MosCow
GAMES OF THE
XXII OLYMPIAD 396
Albania
Haiti
Papua-New Guinea
Antigua
Honduras
Paraguay
Argentina
Hong Kong
Philippines
Bahamas
Indonesia
Saudi Arabia
Bahrain
Iran
Singapore
Bangladesh
Israel
Somalia
Barbados
Ivory Coast
South Korea
Belize
Japan
Sudan
Bermuda
Kenya
Suriname
Bolivia
Liberia
Swaziland
Canada
Liechtenstein
Taiwan
Cayman islands
Malawi
Thailand
Central African Republic
Malaysia
Togo
Chad
Mauritania
Tunisia
Chile
Mauritius
Turkey
China
Monaco
United States
Egypt
Morocco
U.S. Virgin Islands
El Salvador
Netherland Antilles
Upper Volta (Burkina Faso)
Fiji
Niger
Uruguay
Gabon
Norway
West Germany
The Gambia
Pakistan
Zaire (DRC)
Ghana
Panama
THE
396
1984
LOS ANGELES GAMES OF THE
XXIII
39 7
OLYMPIAD
See American-led Boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics,
http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/American-led&boycott-of the 1980_SummerOlympics#encyclopedia

(last visited Nov. 9, 2009); See also The Olympic Boycott, 1980,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/qfp/104481.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2009).
397See 1984 Summer Olympics, http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/1984_SummerOlympics (last
visited Nov. 9, 2009).
Afghanistan
Ethiopia
Poland
Bulgaria
Hungary
Soviet Union
Cuba
Laos
Vietnam
Czechoslovakia
Mongolia
Yemen
East Germany
North Korea
THE
1988
SEOUL GAMES OF THE XXIV OLYMPIAD
39 8
Albania*
Ethiopia
North Korea
Cuba
Nicaragua*
Seychelles*
APPENDiX
VOL. 11: 1
B: SELECT RULES FROM THE OLYMPIC CHARTER
The Olympic Charter has been amended several times, and as such, many of the
African NOC's complaints cited rules that have since been reformatted. The full text of the
relevant rules as they appear in the current Olympic Charter is as follows:
Rule 5: Any form of discrimination with regard to a country or a person
on grounds of race, religion, politics, gender or otherwise
incompatible with belonging to the Olympic Movement.
Rule 7: Rights over the Olympic Games and Olympic properties
7.1: The Olympic Games are the exclusive property of the IOC which
owns all rights and data relating thereto, in particular, and without
limitation, all rights relating to their organisation, exploitation,
broadcasting, recording, representation, reproduction, access and
dissemination in any form and by any means or mechanism
whatsoever, whether now existing or developed in the future. The
IOC shall determine the conditions of access to and the conditions
of any use of data relating to the Olympic Games and to the
competitions and sports performances of the Olympic Games.
7.2: The Olympic symbol, flag, motto, anthem, identifications
(including but not limited to "Olympic Games" and "Games of the
Olympiad"), designations, emblems, flame and torches, as defined
in Rules 8-14 below, shall be collectively or individually referred to
as "Olympic properties". All rights to any and all Olympic
properties, as well as all rights to the use thereof, belong
exclusively to the IOC, including but not limited to the use for any
profit-making, commercial or advertising purposes. The IOC may
license all or part of its rights on terms and conditions set forth by
the IOC Executive Board.
Rule 28.2: The NOCs' role is:
2.1: to promote the fundamental principles and values of
318CBC Sports, Past Olympic Boycotts, http://www.cbc.ca/sports/indepthlfeature-boycotts-countries.html (last
visited Nov. 9, 2009). The (*)'s denote that the reason for these respective boycotts are unknown.
2009
Olympism in their countries, in particular, in the fields of

sport and education, by promoting Olympic educational
programmes in all levels of schools, sports and physical
education institutions and universities, as well as by
encouraging the creation of institutions dedicated to
Olympic education, such as National Olympic Academies,
Olympic Museums and other programmes, including
cultural, related to the Olympic Movement;
2.2: to ensure the observance of the Olympic Charter in their
countries;
2.3: to encourage the development of high performance sport
as well as sport for all;
2.4: to help in the training of sports administrators by
organising courses and ensure that such courses
contribute to the propagation of the fundamental
principles of Olympism;
2.5: to take action against any form of discrimination and
violence in sport;
2.6: to adopt and implement the World Anti-Doping Code.
Rule 28.5:
5: In order to fulfill their mission, the NOCs may cooperate with
governmental bodies, with which they shall achieve harmonious
relations. However, they shall not associate themselves with any
activity which would be in contradiction with the Olympic
Charter. The NOCs may also cooperate with non-governmental
bodies.
Rule 28.6:
6: The NOCs must preserve their autonomy and resist all pressures
of any kind, including but not limited to political, legal, religious
or economic pressures which
may prevent them from complying
399
with the Olympic Charter.
'99 OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 84.

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The Efficacy of Olympic Bans and Boycotts on

Effectuating International Political and

& DEBORAH Low**

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES .......................................................................

A . The Ancient Games .........................................................................................

1II . BOYCOTT S .....................................................................................................................

TEXAS REVIEW OF ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS LAW

A. The InternationalOlympic Committee's Ban on South Africa ......................

V . C ONCLU SION ................................................................................................................ 74

Appendix A: Complete List of Olympic Boycotts .........................................................

Appendix B: Select Rules from the Olympic Charter .....................................................

THE EFFICACY OF OLYMPIC BANS AND BOYCOTTS

RACE 5-7 (1997).

TEXAS REVIEW OF ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS LAW

II. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES

THE EFFICACY OF OLYMPIC BANS AND BOYCOTTS

INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, FACTSHEET: OLYMPIC TRUCE 1 (2008), available at

25See Id. at 2-3.

TEXAS REVIEW OF ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS LAW

THE EFFICACY OF OLYMPIC BANS AND BOYCOTTS

5'See Olympic.org, Chamonix 1924 (2009), http://www.olympic.org/en/content/Olympic-Games/All-PastOlympic-Games/Winter/Chamonix- 1924/.

TEXAS REVIEW OF ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS LAW

C. The InternationalOlympic Committee

59 ROSNER & SHROPSHIRE, supra note 55, at 409.

THE EFFICACY OF OLYMPIC BANS AND BOYCOTTS

TEXAS REVIEW OF ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS LAW

THE EFFICACY OF OLYMPIC BANS AND BOYCOTTS

IOC-Institution I/(click on "Commissions" tab).

reference.com/olympics/about/nationalities.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2009).

TEXAS REVIEW OF ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS LAW

THE EFFICACY OF OLYMPIC BANS AND BOYCOTTS

(U. Cal. Press, 1979).

TEXAS REVIEW OF ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS LAW

"' See KILLANIN, supra note 52, at 32.

THE EFFICACY OF OLYMPIC BANS AND BOYCOTTS

11 SENN, supranote 112, at 167-68.

TEXAS REVIEW OF ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS LAW

http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/1 7/newsid-3555000/3555450.stm (last visited Nov. 9, 2009).

THE EFFICACY OF OLYMPIC BANS AND BOYCOTTS

TEXAS REVIEW OF ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS LAW

supra note 19, at 206-07.

THE EFFICACY OF OLYMPIC BANS AND BOYCOTTS

B. The Olympics and the Cold War

TEXAS REVIEW OF ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS LAW

C. The 1980 Boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games

supra note 151, at 81.

THE EFFICACY OF OLYMPIC BANS AND BOYCOTTS

supra note 151, at 81.

TEXAS REVIEW OF ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS LAW

Gwertzman, supra note 165.

168HULME, supra note 15 1, at 18.

THE EFFICACY OF OLYMPIC BANS AND BOYCOTTS

supra note 151, at 43.

supra note 42, at 4.

TEXAS REVIEW OF ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS LAW

182Olympic.org, Moskow 1980 (2009) http://www.olympic.org/en/content/Olympic-Games/All-Past-Olympic-

Games/Summer/Moscow- 1980/ (click on "All Facts" tab).

189See id.; Olympic.org, Moscow 1980 (2009) http://www.olympic.org/en/content/Olympic-Games/AII-PastOlympic-Games/Summer/Moscow- 1980/.

THE EFFICACY OF OLYMPIC BANS AND BOYCOTTS

However, Carter underestimated the Kremlin's skill at propaganda and ability to

193HULME, supra note 151, at 78-79.

German coverage was relegated to brief highlights. Id. at 76.

197BARNEY, supra note 161, at 148.