MIAA v.

Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006
Facts:
The Manila International Airport Authority
(MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA) Complex in Paraaque City under Executive
Order No. 903 (MIAA Charter), as amended. As such
operator, it administers the land, improvements and
equipment within the NAIA Complex. In March 1997,
the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
(OGCC) issued Opinion No. 061 to the effect that the
Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) withdrew the
exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA under
Section 21 of its Charter.
Thus, MIAA paid some of the real estate tax
already due. In June 2001, it received Final Notices of
Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of
Paraaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. The
City Treasurer subsequently issued notices of levy
and warrants of levy on the airport lands and
buildings.
At the instance of MIAA, the OGCC issued
Opinion No. 147 clarifying Opinion No. 061, pointing
out that Sec. 206 of the LGC requires persons exempt
from real estate tax to show proof of exemption.
According to the OGCC, Sec. 21 of the MIAA Charter
is the proof that MIAA is exempt from real estate tax.
MIAA, thus, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals
seeking to restrain the City of Paraaque from
imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and
auctioning for public sale the airport lands and
buildings, but this was dismissed for having been filed
out of time.
Hence, MIAA filed this petition for review,
pointing out that it is exempt from real estate tax under
Sec. 21 of its charter and Sec. 234 of the LGC. It
invokes the principle that the government cannot tax
itself as a justification for exemption, since the airport
lands and buildings, being devoted to public use and
public service, are owned by the Republic of the
Philippines. On the other hand, the City of Paraaque
invokes Sec. 193 of the LGC, which expressly
withdrew the tax exemption privileges of governmentowned and controlled corporations (GOCC) upon the
effectivity of the LGC.
It asserts that an international airport is not
among the exceptions mentioned in the said law.
Meanwhile, the City of Paraaque posted and
published notices announcing the public auction sale
of the airport lands and buildings. In the afternoon
before the scheduled public auction, MIAA applied
with the Court for the issuance of a TRO to restrain
the auction sale. The Court issued a TRO on the day
of the auction sale, however, the same was received
only by the City of Paraaque three hours after the

sale.
Issue:
Whether or not MIAA is an instrumentality of the
government and not government-owned controlled
corporation (GOCC) and as such exempted from tax.
Held:
The Petition is GRANTED.
The airport lands and buildings of MIAA are
exempt from real estate tax imposed by local
governments. Sec. 243(a) of the LGC exempts from
real estate tax any real property owned by the
Republic of the Philippines. This exemption should be
read in relation with Sec. 133(o) of the LGC, which
provides that the exercise of the taxing powers of local
governments shall not extend to the levy of taxes, fees
or charges of any kind on the National Government,
its agencies and instrumentalities.
These provisions recognize the basic
principle that local governments cannot tax the
national government, which historically merely
delegated to local governments the power to tax.
The rule is that a tax is never presumed and
there must be clear language in the law imposing the
tax. This rule applies with greater force when local
governments seek to tax national government
instrumentalities. Moreover, a tax exemption is
construed liberally in favor of national government
instrumentalities.
MIAA is not a GOCC, but an instrumentality
of the government.
The Republic remains the beneficial owner
of the properties. MIAA itself is owned solely by the
Republic. At any time, the President can transfer back
to the Republic title to the airport lands and buildings
without the Republic paying MIAA any consideration.
As long as the airport lands and buildings are
reserved for public use, their ownership remains with
the State. Unless the President issues a proclamation
withdrawing these properties from public use, they
remain properties of public dominion. As such, they
are inalienable, hence, they are not subject to levy on
execution or foreclosure sale, and they are exempt
from real estate tax.
However, portions of the airport lands and buildings
that MIAA leases to private entities are not exempt
from real estate tax. In such a case, MIAA has granted
the beneficial use of such portions for a consideration
to a taxable person.

Santos vs Go
G.R. No. 156081, October 19, 2005
Petition for review on certiorari
Facts:
The petitioners are corporate directors and
officers of FilEstate Properties, Inc. (FEPI).
October 17, 1995, FEPI allegedly entered into a
Project Agreement with Manila Southcoast
Development Corporation (MSDC), whereby FEPI
undertook to develop several parcels of land in
Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly owned by MSDC. Under
the terms of the Agreement, FEPI was to convert an
approximate area of 1,269 hectares into a first-class
residential, commercial, resort, leisure, and
recreational complex. The said Project Agreement
clothed FEPI with authority to market and sell the
subdivision lots to the public.
Go offered to buy Lot 17, Block 38 from FEPI.
Lot 17 measured approximately 1,079 square meters
and the purchase price agreed upon was P4,304,000.
The Contract to Sell signed by the parties was the
standard, printed form prepared by FEPI. Under the
terms of said contract of adhesion, Go agreed to pay a
downpayment of P1,291,200 and a last installment of
P840,000 on the balance due on April 7, 1997. In turn,
FEPI would execute a final Deed of Sale in favor of
Go and deliver to Go the owners duplicate copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) upon complete
payment of the purchase price.
Go fully complied with the terms of the Contract.
FEPI, however, failed to develop the property. In
several letters to its clients, including respondent Go,
FEPI explained that the project was temporarily halted
due to some claimants who opposed FEPIs
application for exclusion of the subject properties from
the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL).
Go was neither satisfied nor assured by FEPIs
statements and he made several demands upon FEPI
to return his payment of the purchase price in full.
FEPI failed to heed his demands. Go then filed a
complaint before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB). He likewise filed a
separate Complaint-Affidavit for estafa under Articles
316 and 318 of the Revised Penal Code before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City against
petitioners as officers of FEPI.
Go alleged that the petitioners committed estafa.
Petitioners challenged the jurisdiction of the City
Prosecutor of Pasig City to conduct the preliminary
investigation on the ground that the complainant was
not from Pasig City, the contract was not executed nor
were the payments made in Pasig City. Besides,
countered petitioners, none of the elements of estafa
under Articles 316 and 318 were present. They

averred that FEPI was not the owner of the project but
the developer with authority to sell under a joint
venture with MSDC, who is the real owner.
After the preliminary investigation, the City
Prosecutor resolved to dismiss the complaint for
estafa. thus:
Go appealed the City Prosecutors Resolution to
the Department of Justice (DOJ), which, in turn
reversed the City Prosecutors findings.
The DOJ found that there was a prima facie
basis to hold petitioners liable for estafa under Article
316 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioners herein filed with the Court of Appeals.
On September 2, 2002, the appellate court disposed
the case. The appellate court opined that a petition for
review pursuant to Rule 43 cannot be availed of as a
mode of appeal from the ruling of the Secretary of
Justice because the Rule applies only to agencies or
officers exercising quasi-judicial functions. The
decision to file an information or not is an executive
and not a quasi-judicial function.
Petition for CERTIORARI.
Issue:
Whether or not the DOJ is a quasi-judicial
agency exercising a quasi-judicial function. OR
Whetehr or not the petition made by the petitioners for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is a proper
mode of appeal from a resolution of the Secretary of
Justice directing the prosecutors to file an information
in a criminal case.
Held:
No.
In the course of this determination, SC must also
consider whether the conduct of preliminary
investigation by the prosecutor is a quasijudicial
function.
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
clearly shows that it governs appeals to the Court of
Appeals from decisions and final orders or resolutions
of the Court of Tax Appeals or quasi-judicial agencies
in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions. The
Department of Justice is not among the agencies
enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 43. Inclusio unius est
exclusio alterius.
Among these agencies are: Civil Service
Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals,
Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the
President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security
Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer,
National Electrification Administration, Energy
Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications
Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under
Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service

Insurance System, Employees Compensation

Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance
Commission,
Philippine
Atomic
Energy
Commission
SC cannot agree with petitioners submission that
a preliminary investigation is a quasi-judicial
proceeding, and that the DOJ is a quasi-judicial
agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it
reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding
the presence of probable cause.
Since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it
is not one of those agencies whose decisions, orders
or resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals
under Rule 43, the resolution of the Secretary of
Justice finding probable cause to indict petitioners for
estafa is, therefore, not appealable to the Court of
Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
petitioners petition for review.
Petition DENIED.

Odchigue-Bondoc vs Tan Tiong Bio

GR 186652, October 6, 2010
Facts:
Respondent filed a complaint for estafa
against Fil-Estate officials including its Corporate
Secretary, herein respondent. Petitioner denies the
allegations.
The DOJ, by resolution signed by the Chief
State Prosecutor for the Secretary of Justice, motu
proprio dismissed the petition on finding that there
was no showing of any reversible error.
The CA set aside the DOJ Secretarys
resolution holding that it committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing its Resolution dismissing
respondents petition for review without therein
expressing clearly and distinctly the facts on which the
dismissal was based, in violation of Sec. 14, Art. VIII
of the Constitution (No decision shall be rendered by
any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based).
Petitioner asserts in this present petition for
review on certiorari that the requirement in Sec. 14,
Art. VIII of the Constitution applies only to decisions of
courts of justice, and it does not extend to decisions
or rulings of executive departments such as the DOJ.
Respondent counters that the constitutional
requirement is not limited to courts as it extends to
quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, as well as to
preliminary investigations conducted by these
tribunals.
Issue:
Whether or not a prosecutor exercises quasi-judicial
power.
Whether or not the DOJ Secretary exercises quasijudicial power.
Held:
No. A prosecutor does not exercise adjudication or
rule-making powers. A preliminary investigation is not
a quasi-judicial proceeding, but is merely inquisitorial
since the prosecutor does not determine the guilt of
innocence of the accused. While the prosecutor
makes the determination whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause, he
cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is
the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the
accused.
No. The Secretary of Justice in reviewing a
prosecutors order or resolution via appeal or petition
for review cannot be considered a quasi-judicial
proceeding since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body.
Sec 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution does not thus
extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary.