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Z. Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 (RA No.

7877)
153.
Aquino vs. Acosta, A.M. CTA-01-1, 02 April 2002 (casual buss
on the cheek, not SH)
Facts: Atty. Susan Aquino, Chief of the Legal and Technical Staff of the Court of
Tax Appeals filed an affidavit-complaint alleged six instances when Judge Acosta,
Presiding Judge of the same court, sexually harassed her. These incidents were
casual buss on the cheek of the complainant. During the last incident,
respondent asked complainant to see him in his office to discuss the Senate bill
on the CTA. Thereupon, he tried to grab her and complainant instinctively raised
her hands to protect herself but respondent held her arms tightly, pulled her
towards him and kissed her. She pushed him away, then slumped on a chair
trembling. Complainant left crying and locked herself inside a comfort
room. After that incident, respondent went to her office and tossed a
note stating, sorry, it wont happen again.
In his comment, respondent judge denied complainants allegation that he
sexually harassed her six times. He claimed that he has always treated her with
respect, being the head of the CTA Legal Staff. In fact, there is no strain in their
professional relationship. Regarding the last incident, he approached
complainant to give her a casual buss on the cheek. But she suddenly stood and
raised her arms to cover her face, causing her to lose her balance. So he held
her arms to prevent her from falling. Her rejection came as a surprise to him and
made him feel quite embarrassed. Shortly, complainant excused herself and left
the room. Stunned at the thought that she might misinterpret his gesture, he
sent her a short note of apology. Respondent further explained that the structure
of his office, being seen through a transparent glass divider, makes it impossible
for anyone to commit any improper conduct inside.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime of sexual harassment as
defined and punished under R.A. 7877?
Ruling:
No. The elements of sexual harassment are as follows: (1) The
employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher,
instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person has authority, influence
or moral ascendancy over another; (2) The authority, influence or moral
ascendancy exists in a working environment; (3) The employer, employee,
manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor,
coach, or any other person having authority, influence or moral ascendancy
makes a demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor.
What we perceive to have been committed by respondent judge are
casual gestures of friendship and camaraderie, nothing more, nothing
less. In kissing complainant, we find no indication that respondent was
motivated by malice or lewd design. Evidently, she misunderstood his
actuations and construed them as work-related sexual harassment under R.A.
7877
Indeed, from the records on hand, there is no showing that respondent judge
demanded, requested or required any sexual favor from complainant in
exchange for favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotion or

privileges specified under Section 3 of R.A. 7877. Nor did he, by his actuations,
violate the Canons of Judicial Ethics or the Code of Professional Responsibility.

While we exonerate respondent from the charges herein, however, he is


admonished not to commit similar acts against complainant or other
female employees of the Court of Tax Appeals, otherwise, his conduct
may be construed as tainted with impropriety.

154.
Digitel Telecom Phils vs. Mariquit Soriano, GR 166039, 26
June 2006 (Proper conduct of victim)
FACTS: Mariquit Soriano (Soriano) was hired as Director of Marketing by Digitel
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (Digitel). Soriano worked under Vice
President for Business Division Eric J. Severino (Severino) and Senior Executive
Vice President Johnson Robert L. Go (Go). Following a professional dispute
against Severino and Go, Soriano filed a resignation letter which was accepted
by her superiors.
After her resignation, Soriano filed a suit for illegal termination alleging that she
was forced to resign due to professional and sexual harassment. Mariquit alleged
that Go crept his hand under a throw pillow and poked her vagina several
times. . She justified her failure to flee by claiming that she was hemmed in by
the arm of the sofa. ; that Mariquit danced on the same occasion with Go, albeit
allegedly thru force, during which he pressed her close to him and moved his
hand across her back to feel her body; that while dancing, in order to free herself
from Gos hold, she maneuvered to turn to the beat of the music. It was at this
time, according to her, that Go reached out his hand and groped [her] breast,
caressed [her] back and reached inside [her] blouse to rub [her] from up [her]
brassieres down to [her] buttocks.; and as to severino, she often caught him
looking at her legs up to the back of her thighs on several occasions.
She alleged that her superiors are preventing her former colleagues in testifying
to the sexual harassment. She produced an affidavit by one of the persons
involved with Digitel stating that the employees of the company were being
forced not to testify against Go and Severino. In defense, Go and Severino
provided witnesses that testified that the acts alleged by Soriano din not happen.
The Labor Arbiter held that Mariquit voluntarily resigned, thus dismissing the
complaint. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter. The
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of NLRC. Hence,this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the alleged sexual harassment are true and Mariquits conduct
was proper.
RULING: NO. While, as this Court stated in Philippine Aelous, there is, strictly
speaking, no fixed period within which an alleged victim of sexual harassment
may file a complaint, it does not mean that she or he is at liberty to file one

anytime she or he wants to. Surely, any delay in filing a complaint must be
justifiable or reasonable as not to cast doubt on its merits.
At all events, it is settled that the only test of whether an alleged fact or
circumstance is worthy of credence is the common experience, knowledge and
observation of ordinary men.
As New Jersey Vice Chancellor Van Fleet stated in the often-cited case
of Daggers v. Van Dyck:[67] Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from
the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the
common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under
the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its
conformity to our knowledge, observation, and experience. Whatever is
repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside of judicial
cognizance.[68]
From the earlier-quoted narration of alleged facts by Mariquit, this Court
finds that it does not pass the test of credibility.
Mariquit claimed that as regards petitioner Severino, she often caught him
looking at her legs up to the back of her thighs on several occasions. If to her
the acts amounted to sexual harassment, why did she not bring the matter to
the attention of any company official to make sure that they wont happen again
and she be spared of any disgrace or vexation?
Following Mariquits narration, it would appear that the earliest
harassment committed by Severino took place in January 1999 when he
intentionally pointed to [her] legs to a fellow company officer who also looked at
them, while the earliest committed by Go occurred in May 1999 during a
cocktail party at the Manila Galleria Suites. Yet, she claimed to have reported
and expressed to, oddly enough, Severino, who was the first to allegedly harass
her, her disgrace and outrage over the sexual advances made by Go, and only
during the party of Pau on November 19, 1999, a claim denied by Severino.
As regards the five incidents of sexual harassment attributed to Go, a
discussion of even only one of them betrays its non-conformity to human
experience.
In paragraphs 12 to 15 of her April 25, 2002 Affidavit which were quoted
earlier, Mariquit, narrating the November 19, 1999 incident which allegedly took
place at the residence of Pau, claimed that she was cornered by Go on a sofa in
such a way that she was virtually pinned against its side, making it impossible
for her to elude his advances. It is not disputed that it was raining at the time
and that the about 60 guests had no choice but to stay in the living room and
covered lanai of Paus residence. Could not have at least one noticed the
incident? She presented no one, however. On the other hand, Pau belied her
claim.
Mariquit went on to claim that Go crept his hand under a throw pillow and
poked her vagina several times. She justified her failure to flee by claiming

that she was hemmed in by the arm of the sofa. But if indeed Go did such
condemnable act, could she not have slapped him or stood up and/or left?
Yet still, by her claim, Mariquit danced on the same occasion with Go,
albeit allegedly thru force, during which he pressed her close to him and moved
his hand across her back to feel her body. Any woman in her right mind, whose
vagina had earlier been poked several times without her consent and against
her will, would, after liberating herself from the clutches of the person who
offended her, raise hell. But Mariquit did not.
Mariquit claimed that while dancing, in order to free herself from Gos
hold, she maneuvered to turn to the beat of the music. It was at this time,
according to her, that Go reached out his hand and groped [her] breast,
caressed [her] back and reached inside [her] blouse to rub [her] from up [her]
brassieres down to [her] buttocks.
Since this alleged incident occurred while
Mariquit and Go were dancing, and surely there were a lot of people around in
the well lighted small area as stated by house owner Pau, would Go be that
maniacal to forego the respect accorded to him by virtue of his high position? To
be sure, a person who holds a very exalted position would normally behave at
social gatherings, unless he is a proven maniac, to deserve that respect.
Petitioners Go and Severino, on the other hand, presented affidavits of
persons who were present during the time when alleged incidents took place and
who declared in effect that no such incidents did take place and could have taken
place. The appellate court dismissed the claim of these affiants, however, as
obviously biased in favor of [petitioners], their superior and employer. [69]
155.
Domingo vs. Rayala, GR No. 155831, 18 February 2008
(employment related sexual harassment)
Facts:
The case at bar is a complaint filed by Domingo against respondent
Rayala, who was then NLRC chief, for sexual harassment on the basis of
administrative order no. 250, the rules and regulations implementing RA 7877 in
the Department of Labor and Employment which was then referred to the Office
of the president.
The office of the president through then secretary Laguesma found
respondent guilty of sexual harassment as provided in RA 7877 and
recommended for suspension of 6 months and 1 day. However, through
Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora expressed that a public servant must
exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity, and "utmost
devotion and dedication to duty" (Sec. 4 (g), RA 6713), respect the rights of
others and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, and good morals (Sec.
4(c)). No less than the Constitution sanctifies the principle that a public office is a
public trust, and enjoins all public officers and employees to serve with the
highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency (Section 1,
Article XI, 1987 Constitution). Hence, stricter standards must apply being the
highest official [of] the NLRC - had shown an attitude, a frame of mind, a
disgraceful conduct, which renders him unfit to remain in the service. Therefore,
respondent Rogelio I. Rayala, Chairman, National Labor Relations Commission, is
found guilty of the grave offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct and is
hereby dismissed from the service effective upon receipt of this Order.

On a motion for reconsideration, the petition was referred to the Court of


Appeals for appropriate action. The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of guilt
of respondent Rayala but modified the penalty to a maximum period of 1 year
was imposed. A motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied.
Both parties filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court. Invoking
Aquino v. Acosta, Rayala argues that the case is the definitive ruling on what
constitutes sexual harassment. Thus, he posits that for sexual harassment to
exist under RA 7877, there must be: (a) demand, request, or requirement of a
sexual favor; (b) the same is made a pre-condition to hiring, re-employment, or
continued employment; or (c) the denial thereof results in discrimination against
the employee. Petitioner failed to prove as such. That the Office of the President
erroneously relied on Administrative Order 250 expanding the scope of RA 7877.
The law did not delegate to the employer the power to promulgate rules which
would provide other or additional forms of sexual harassment, or to come up with
its own definition of sexual harassment.
Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of sexual harassment on the basis of
administrative order no. 250, the rules and regulations implementing RA 7877
and the penalty to provide thereof.
Ruling:
Yes. Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule,
which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise
to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can proceed
independently of the others. This rule applies with full force to sexual
harassment. The CA, thus, correctly ruled that Rayala's culpability is not to be
determined solely on the basis of Section 3, RA 7877, because he is charged with
the administrative offense, not the criminal infraction, of sexual harassment. It
should be enough that the CA, along with the Investigating Committee and the
Office of the President, found substantial evidence to support the administrative
charge.
The events of this case shows that the administrative charges against
Rayala were for violation of RA 7877; that the Office of the President assumed
jurisdiction over administrative cases; that the participation of the DOLE, through
the Committee created by the Secretary, was limited to initiating the
investigation process, reception of evidence of the parties, preparation of the
investigation report, and recommending the appropriate action to be taken by
the Office of the President. Hence, being the said case at hand to be
administrative, mala in se or mala prohibitum is immaterial. The administrative
case was not based on AO 250.
Lastly, there was no violation of his right to due process. He accuses the
Committee on Decorum of railroading his trial for violation of RA 7877. He also
scored the OP's decision finding him guilty of "disgraceful and immoral conduct"
under the Revised Administrative Code and not for violation of RA 7877.
Considering that he was not tried for "disgraceful and immoral conduct," he
argues that the verdict is a "sham and total nullity."
We hold that Rayala was properly accorded due process. In previous cases, this
Court held that:
[i]n administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the
following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of
proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity
to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses

and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with
competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and
(4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence
submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or
made known to the parties affected.
The records of the case indicate that Rayala was afforded all these procedural
due process safeguards. Although in the beginning he questioned the authority
of the Committee to try him, he appeared, personally and with counsel, and
participated in the proceedings.
156.
Jacutin vs. People, GR No. 140604, 6 March 2002 (sexual
harassment)
FACTS:
Juliet Q. Yee, then a 22-year old fresh graduate of nursing, averred
that on 28 November 1995 her father accompanied her to the office of petitioner
at the City Health Office to seek employment. Jacutin informed her that there
was a vacancy in a family planning project for the city and that, if she were
interested, he could interview her for the job. Petitioner then started putting up
to her a number of questions. When asked at one point whether or not she
already had a boyfriend, she said no. Petitioner then invited her to go
bowling. Petitioner told her to meet him at Borja Street so that people would not
see them on board the same car together. While driving, petitioner casually
asked her if she already took her bath, and she said she was so in a hurry that
she did not find time for it. Petitioner then inquired whether she had varicose
veins, and she said no. Petitioner told her to raise her foot and lower her pants
so that he might confirm it. She felt assured that it was all part of the
research. Petitioner still pushed her pants down to her knees and held her
thigh. He put his hands inside her panty until he reached her pubic
hair. Surprised, she exclaimed hala ka! and instinctively pulled her pants
up. Petitioner then touched her abdomen with his right hand saying words of
endearment and letting the back of his palm touch her forehead. He told her to
raise her shirt to check whether she had nodes or lumps. She hesitated for a
while but, eventually, raised it up to her navel. Petitioner then fondled her
breast. Shocked at what petitioner did, she lowered her shirt and embraced her
bag to cover herself, telling him angrily that she was through with the
research. He begged her not to tell anybody about what had just
happened. Before she alighted from the car, petitioner urged her to reconsider
her decision to quit. He then handed over to her P300.00 for her expenses.
The Sandiganbayan, through its Fourth Division, rendered its decision, finding
the accused, Dr. Rico Jacutin, guilty of the crime of Sexual Harassment under
Republic Act No. 7877.
ISSUE:
WON Petitioner can be convicted of the crime of sexual harassment
under Republic Act No. 7877 in the case at bar?
RULING: Yes. Section 3 of Republic Act 7877 provides:
SEC. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined.
Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an
employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher,
instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority,
influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education
environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the

other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission


is accepted by the object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is
committed when:
(1)
The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the
employment, re-employment or continued employment of said individual, or in
granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions,
or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting,
segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate,
deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said
employee.
While the City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in appointing city
personnel, it should stand to reason, nevertheless, that a recommendation from
petitioner in the appointment of personnel in the municipal health office could
carry good weight. Indeed, petitioner would not have been able to take undue
liberalities on the person of Juliet had it not been for his high position in the City
Health Office of Cagayan de Oro City.
AA. Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (RA No. 9208)
157.
People vs. HadjaLalli, GR 195419, 12 October
(recruitment and trafficking-prostitute; no double jeopardy)

2011

FACTS:
This is a consolidated criminal case filed against the accused-appellants for the
crimes of Illegal Recruitment and Trafficking in Persons. The facts revealed that
Ronnie Aringoy asked Lolita Plando if she wants to work as restaurant entertainer
in Malaysia. Since Lolita is interested, she inquired how she could apply. Ronnie
brought Lolita to Nestor Relampagos and Hadja Lalli. The latter accompanied
Lolita and other women in Malaysia by boat from Zamboanga to Sandakan,
Malaysia and then boarded a van going to Kota Kinabalu. They were forced to
work as prostitutes in Pipen Club in Labuan, Malaysia. Lolita worked as a
prostitute from June 14 to July 8, 2005. Every night, a customer used her. She
had at least one customer or more a night, and at most, she had around five
customers a night. They all had sexual intercourse with her. Lolita was saved by
her brother-in-law who acted as a customer. Lolita was advised to file a complaint
with the police regarding her ordeal in Malaysia.
The RTC found the accused guilty of Illegal Recruitment and Trafficking in
Persons, which the CA affirmed. Aringoy claims that he cannot be convicted of
the crime of Trafficking in Persons because he was not part of the group that
transported Lolita from the Philippines to Malaysia on board the ship M/V Mary
Joy. In addition, he presented his niece, Rachel, as witness to testify that Lolita
had been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars. On the other hand, Lalli denies
any involvement in the recruitment and trafficking of Lolita, claiming she only
met Lolita for the first time on board M/V Mary Joy going to Malaysia.
ISSUE:
Whether Lalli, Relampagos and Aringoy are guilty of syndicated illegal
recruitment and trafficking in persons.
HELD:
YES. It is clear that a person or entity engaged in recruitment and placement
activities without the requisite authority from the DOLE, whether for profit or not,

is engaged in illegal recruitment. The POEA issues the authority to recruit under
the Labor Code. The commission of illegal recruitment by three or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one another is deemed committed by a
syndicate and constitutes economic sabotage. In this case, the trial court, as
affirmed by the appellate court, found Lalli, Aringoy and Relampagos to have
conspired and confederated with one another to recruit and place Lolita for work
in Malaysia, without a POEA license. The three elements of syndicated illegal
recruitment are present in this case, in particular: (1) the accused have no valid
license or authority required by law to enable them to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers; (2) the accused engaged in this activity
of recruitment and placement by actually recruiting, deploying and transporting
Lolita to Malaysia; and (3) illegal recruitment was committed by three persons,
conspiring and confederating with one another.
Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208 (RA 9208), otherwise known as the AntiTrafficking in Persons Act of 2003, defines Trafficking in Persons, as follows:
Trafficking in Persons refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or
harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victims consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force,
or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a
minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of
organs.
The testimony of Aringoys niece, Rachel, that Lolita had been travelling to
Malaysia to work in bars cannot be given credence. Lolita did not even have a
passport to go to Malaysia and had to use her sisters passport when Aringoy,
Lalli and Relampagos first recruited her. It is questionable how she could have
been travelling to Malaysia previously without a passport, as Rachel claims.
Moreover, even if it is true that Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to work in
bars, the crime of Trafficking in Persons can exist even with the victims consent
or knowledge under Section 3(a) of RA 9208.
Trafficking in Persons under Sections 3(a) and 4 of RA 9208 is not only limited to
transportation of victims, but also includes the act of recruitment of victims for
trafficking. In this case, since it has been sufficiently proven beyond reasonable
doubt, as discussed in Criminal Case No. 21930, that all the three accused
(Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos) conspired and confederated with one another to
illegally recruit Lolita to become a prostitute in Malaysia, it follows that they are
also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in
Persons committed by a syndicate under RA 9208 because the crime of
recruitment for prostitution also constitutes trafficking.
When an act or acts violate two or more different laws and constitute two
different offenses, a prosecution under one will not bar a prosecution under the
other. The constitutional right against double jeopardy only applies to risk of
punishment twice for the same offense, or for an act punished by a law and an
ordinance. The prohibition on double jeopardy does not apply to an act or series
of acts constituting different offenses.
BB. Anti-Violence against Women and their Children Act (RA No. 9262)

158.
People vs. MarivicGenosa, GR 135981, 29 September 2000 &
GR 135982, 15 Jan 2004 (Battered woman syndrome; exculpating
circumstance)
Facts: The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed
toward his family, particularly to his wife. The Report continued: "At first, it was
verbal and emotional abuses but as time passed, he became physically abusive.
Marivic claimed that the viciousness of her husband was progressive every time
he got drunk. It was a painful ordeal Marivic had to anticipate whenever she
suspected that her husband went for a drinking [spree]. They had been married
for twelve years[;] and practically more than eight years, she was battered and
maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly by her husband whenever he was drunk.
One night while Ben was sleeping, Marivic took a steel pipe and hit Ben in the
head, which caused his death. Marivic was charged and found guilty of parricide.
Marivic used the defense of Buttered Womans Syndrome.
Issue: WON Marivic may be excusable
Held: A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is repeatedly
subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to
coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights.
Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship
with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple
must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself
in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she
remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.
the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called "cycle of
violence,"27 which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute
battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the "cycle of violence"
supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt
there were acute battering incidents. In relating to the court a quo how the fatal
incident that led to the death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the
tension-building phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail
the typical characteristics of this stage. However, that single incident does not
prove the existence of the syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove that in
at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar
pattern.
159.
Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan vs. Sps. Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L.
Tan, GR 168852, 30 September 2008 (Offender in VAWC;
application of conspiracy under RPC)
FACTS:
Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan and Steven L. Tan were married. They have two daughters,
Kyra Danielle and Kristen Denise. Barely six years into the marriage, petitioner
filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order
against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan
(respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with
respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her
in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004."

Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the
provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the
suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the
provision on "conspiracy" under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorily applied
to R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had community of design and
purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing
and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly
abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically; that respondents
should be included as indispensable or necessary parties for complete resolution
of the case.
On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No.
9262 since Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be
related to the victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual
relationship; that allegations on the conspiracy of respondents require a factual
determination which cannot be done by this Court in a petition for review; that
respondents cannot be characterized as indispensable or necessary parties,
since their presence in the case is not only unnecessary but altogether illegal,
considering the non-inclusion of in-laws as offenders under Section 3 of R.A. No.
9262.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-INLAW OF SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A
PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262.
HELD:
YES. Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''violence against women and their
children'' as "any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a
woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person
has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child,
or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the
family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such
acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty."
While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to
the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it
does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory
application of the RPC.
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a
supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No.
9262, in which the special law is silent on a particular matter.
It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law and that this intent must
be effectuated by the courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A.
No. 9262 reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best
ensure the attainment of the object of the law according to its true intent,
meaning and spirit - the protection and safety of victims of violence against
women and children.

10

160.
Rustan P. Ang v. CA and Irish Sagud, No. GR 182835, 20 April
2010 (RA 9262- single harassment by naked picture sent through
phone)
FACTS:
This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against
women when a former boyfriend sent to the girl the picture of a naked woman,
not her, but with her face on it. After she got the obscene picture, Irish
(petitioner) got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be
easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to
spread the picture he sent through the internet.
Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should not be
considered a form of harassment. He claims that such would unduly ruin him
personally and set a very dangerous precedent. Rustan alleges that todays
women, like Irish, are so used to obscene communications that her getting one
could not possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial
emotional or psychological distress. He claims having previously exchanged
obscene pictures with Irish such that she was already desensitized by them.
After trial, the RTC found Irishs testimony completely credible, given in an
honest and spontaneous manner, and found Rustan guilty of the violation of
Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the picture with
her face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological
distress, and humiliation on her in violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
HELD:
YES. The elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment
are:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the
offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of
acts of harassment against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to her.
Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that constitutes
violence against women. This means that a single act of harassment, which
translates into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect
women and children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would
license isolated ones. The Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish
experienced based on Rustans low regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of
todays youth. What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of
course only be determined based on the circumstances of each case. Here, the
naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irishs head and
face, was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one.
Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be
scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a picture. What makes it
further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to
post it in the internet for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare.

11

161.
Karlo Angelo Dabalos y San Diego vs. Regional Trial Court,
Branch 59, Angeles City, et al, G.R. No. 193960, 7 January 2013
(RA 9262, elements of VAWC through harassment)
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262. After examining
the supporting evidence, the RTC found probable cause and consequently, issued
a warrant of arrest against petitioner. The latter posted a cash bond for his
provisional liberty and filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause
with Motion to Quash the Information. Petitioner averred that at the time of the
alleged incident he was no longer in a dating relationship with private
respondent; hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable. Private respondent admitted that
her relationship with petitioner had ended prior to the subject incident. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59 denied petitioners Motion
for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the
Information.
Petitioner insists that the act which resulted in physical injuries to private
respondent is not covered by RA 9262 because its proximate cause was not their
dating relationship. Instead, he claims that the offense committed was only slight
physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code which falls under the jurisdiction
of the Municipal Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in denial petitioners motion.
HELD:
NO. Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and
their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person
against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a
common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such
acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x x
x.
The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or
series of acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women through
physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her child and the
woman is the offenders wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or
dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is
likely to result in physical harm or suffering.
The elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment, to
wit:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the
offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of
acts of harassment against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to her.

12

Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship with the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not
indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of such relationship.
Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the rule on
statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the
courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against
women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship. As
correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased
for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence
of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm
was committed.
While the degree of physical harm under RA 9262 and Article 266 of the Revised
Penal Code are the same, there is sufficient justification for prescribing a higher
penalty for the former. Clearly, the legislative intent is to purposely impose a
more severe sanction on the offenders whose violent act/s physically harm
women with whom they have or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their
children with the end in view of promoting the protection of women and children.
Accordingly, the Information having sufficiently alleged the necessary elements
of the crime, such as: a dating relationship between the petitioner and the
private respondent; the act of violence committed by the petitioner; and the
resulting physical harm to private respondent, the offense is covered by RA 9262
which falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC in accordance with Sec. 7 of the said
law.
CC. Anti-Child Abuse Law (RA No. 7610, as amended)
162.
People vs. Patricio Rayon, Sr. GR 194236, 30 January 2013
(RA 7610-other sexual abuse)
Facts: XYZ and appellant begot 5 children. XYZ sees appellant embracing AAA
and spreading his legs, this put his hands on AAAs breast, inserted his other
hand inside her underwear and touched her vagina. BBB revealed to XYZ that
the appellant had raped her. The petitioner was charged with violation of Section
10(a) Article v1 of RA no. 7610.
Issue: WON Section 10 (a) article v1 of RA no. 7610 is the proper charge
Held: This provision punishes not only those enumerated under Article 59 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b)
child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions
prejudicial to the child's development.24 We stress that Section 10 refers to
acts of child abuse other than child prostitution and other sexual abuse under
Section 5, attempt to commit child prostitution under Section 6, child trafficking
under Section 7, attempt to commit child
trafficking under Section 8, and obscene publications and indecent shows under
Section 9.
Sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 has three elements:
(1) the accused commits an act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse; and
(3) the child is below 18 years old.
In the present case, all the elements of violation of section 5(a)

13

163.
People vs. Jover Matias, GR 186469, 13 June 2012 (RA 7610sexual abuse v. statutory rape)
Facts: Jover Matias was charged of raping a minor, it was alleged that AAA
(victim) was was on her way to the vegetable stall (gulayan) of a certain
Manuela to buy something when, all of a sudden, appellant pulled her towards
a house that was under construction. There, he forced her to lie on a bamboo
bed (papag), removed her shorts and underwear, and inserted first, his finger,
and then his penis into her vagina. Appellant threatened to kill her if she should
report the incident to anyone. Upon reporting the incident to the police he was
arrested. In his defense, he claimed in the evening of the incident, he and his
uncle, Romeo Matias, were doing construction work at the house of his aunt, also
located at Sto. Nino St., Barangay San Antonio, Quezon City.
Issue: Whether the accused should be convicted of rape under RA 7610?
Ruling: Yes, Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 provides:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion
or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed upon the following:
(a) x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a
child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; xxx
In the case of People v. Pangilinan,8 which affirmed the doctrines enunciated in
the cases of People v. Dahilig9 and People v. Abay,10 the Court explained:
Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of
sexual abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for
sexual abuse but for statutory rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised
Penal Code and penalized with reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, if the
victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual
abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except
paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be
accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against double
jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal
liability for a single criminal act. Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with a
violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code
(on complex crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape)
cannot be complexed with an offense penalized by a special law.
In this case, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, convicted appellant for "rape" under
Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, upon a

14

finding that AAA was a minor below 12 years old at the time of the commission
of the offense on June 6, 2004. However, a punctilious scrutiny of the records
shows that AAA was born on April 23, 1991, which would make her 13 years old
at the time of the commission of the offense on June 6, 2004. Thus, appellant can
be prosecuted and convicted either under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 for
sexual abuse, or under Article 266-A of the RPC, except for rape under paragraph
1(d).11 It bears pointing out that the penalties under these two laws differ: the
penalty for sexual abuse under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 is reclusion
temporal medium to reclusion perpetua, while rape under Article 266-A of the
RPC is penalized with reclusion perpetua
164.
People vs. HeracleoAbello, GR 151952, 25 March 2009 (RA
7610-child defined)
Facts: The accused was charged of raping his stepdaughter a 21 year old, AAA
(Victim) was sleeping in their house in Kalyeng Impiyerno, Navotas, Metro Manila
along with her sister-in-law and nephew. She was suddenly awakened when
Abello mashed her breast. Come July 2, 1999 at around 3:00 a.m. Abello again
mashed the breast of AAA practically under the same previous situation while
the latter was sleeping. In these two occasions AAA was able to recognize Abello
because of the light coming from outside which illuminated the house. Then on
July 8, 1998, at around 2:00 a.m., Abello this time placed his soft penis inside the
mouth of AAA. The latter got awaken when Abello accidentally kneeled on her
right hand. AAA exclaimed "Aray" forcing the accused to hurriedly enter his
room. AAA nevertheless saw him. The victim on the same date reported the
incident to her sister-in-law and mother. Amidst the accusation of raping and
twice sexually abusing AAA, Abello interposed the defense of denial. In all of the
instances, Abello claimed that he merely stepped on the victim at the sala on his
way to his room after retiring home. The RTC and CA found him guilty of the
charged.
Issue: Whether the victim is considered child under RA 7610?
Ruling: No, AAA cannot be considered a child under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7610
which reads:
(a) "Children" refers to person below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but
are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental
disability or condition; [Emphasis supplied]
The implementing rules elaborated on this definition when it defined a "child" as
one who is below 18 years of age or over said age who, upon evaluation of a
qualified physician, psychologist or psychiatrist, is found to be incapable of
taking care of herself fully because of a physical or mental disability or condition
or of protecting herself from abuse.
While the records show that the RTC, the CA and the investigating prosecutor
who filed the corresponding Informations, considered AAAs polio as a physical
disability that rendered her incapable of normal function, no evidence was in fact
presented showing the prosecutions compliance with the implementing rules.
Specifically, the prosecution did not present any evidence, testimonial or
documentary, of any medical evaluation or medical finding from a qualified
physician, psychologist or psychiatrist attesting that AAAs physical condition

15

rendered her incapable of fully taking care of herself or of protecting herself


against sexual abuse. Under the circumstances, we cannot consider AAA a child
under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7610.
In arriving at this conclusion, we consider that since R.A. No. 7610 is a special
law referring to a particular class in society, the prosecution must show that the
victim truly belongs to this particular class to warrant the application of the
statutes provisions. Any doubt in this regard we must resolve in favor of the
accused.
165.
People vs. Dina Dulay, GR 193854, 24 September 2012 (child
prostitution for profit; Section 5a; elements)
Facts: AAA was 12 years old when the whole incident happened. AAA's sister
introduced the appellant to AAA as someone who is nice. Thereafter, appellant
convinced AAA to accompany her at a wake at GI San Dionisio, Paraaque City.
Before going to the said wake, they went to a casino to look for appellant's
boyfriend, but since he was not there, they went to Sto. Nio at Don Galo.
However, appellant's boyfriend was also not there. When they went to Bulungan
Fish Port along the coastal road to ask for some fish, they saw appellant's
boyfriend. Afterwards, AAA, appellant and the latter's boyfriend proceeded to the
Kubuhan located at the back of the Bulungan Fish Port. When they reached the
Kubuhan, appellant suddenly pulled AAA inside a room where a man known by
the name "Speed" was waiting. AAA saw "Speed" give money to appellant and
heard "Speed" tell appellant to look for a younger girl. Thereafter, "Speed"
wielded a knife and tied AAA's hands to the papag and raped her. AAA asked for
appellant's help when she saw the latter peeping into the room while she was
being raped, but appellant did not do so. After the rape, "Speed" and appellant
told AAA not to tell anyone what had happened or else they would get back at
her. AAA went to San Pedro, Laguna after the incident and told it to his family
and latter on filed a complaint to authorities.
Issue: whether the accused is guilty of violating sec. 5 of RA 7610?
Ruling: Yes, In this light, while this Court does not find appellant to have
committed the crime of rape as a principal by indispensable cooperation, she is
still guilty of violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610, or the Special Protection of
Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, which states that:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion
or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed upon the following:
(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which
include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
(2) Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or
oral advertisements or other similar means;

16

(3) Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a


prostitute;
(4) Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute;
or
(5) Giving monetary consideration goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child
with intent to engage such child in prostitution.21
The elements of paragraph (a) are:
1. the accused engages in, promotes, facilitates or induces child prostitution;
2. the act is done through, but not limited to, the following means:
a. acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
b. inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or
oral advertisements or other similar means;
c. taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;
d. threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or
e. giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child
with intent to engage such child in prostitution;
3. the child is exploited or intended to be exploited in prostitution and
4. the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
166.
People vs. IreneoBonaagua, GR 188897, 6 June 2011 (Acts of
lasciviousness, Sec. 5b RA 7610)
Facts: Ireno was charged by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City
with four (4) counts of Rape under Paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, as
amended, in relation to R.A. No. 7610, for inserting his tongue and his finger into
the genital of his minor daughter, AAA.
The RTC convicted hi, of the crime charged. The Ca rendered a decision affirming
the decision of the RTC and finding Ireno guilty of acts of lasciviousness under
Section 5(b) of RA 7610 instead of rape, since the prosecution failed to establish
the act of insertion of finger in to the vagina of AAA.
Issue: WON the decision of the CA is correct
Held: Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, defines
penalizes acts of lasciviousness committed against a child as follows:

and

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. -Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any
other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse.

17

xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject
to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victims is under
twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under
Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815,
as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct,
as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious
conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall
be reclusion temporal in its medium period.[38]
Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only
with a child exploited in prostitution, but also with a child subjected to other
sexual abuses. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit,
but also where one through coercion, intimidation or influence engages in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child. [39]
However, pursuant to the foregoing provision, before an accused can be
convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct committed against a minor
below 12 years of age, the requisites for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336
of the RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610.[40]
Acts of Lasciviousness, as defined in Article 336 of the RPC, has the
following elements:
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise
unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex. [41]
In addition, the following elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of
R.A. No. 7610 must be established:
1.

The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious


conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution
or subjected to other sexual abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
167.
People vs. Ernesto A. Fragante, G.R. No. 182521, 9 February
2011( sexual abuse/acts of lasciviousness)
Facts: Fragante was charged with 9 counts of acts of lasciviousness and 1 count
of rape all committed against his own minor daughter. It was find out that that
the accused on many occasion molest her daughter and after the last incident
together with his mother they proceed to NBI and report the incidents. Later on
his arraignment the accused entered separate pleas of Not Guilty to all the
crimes charged. The accused was later on found guilty of beyond reasonable
doubts.

18

Issue: whether the accused was guilty of violating Sec. 5 of RA 7610?


Ruling: Yes, Appellant was charged with violation of Article 336 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No.
7610. These provisions state:
Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. Any person who shall commit any act of
lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances
mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional.
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion
or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse of lascivious conduct with a
child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That
when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No.
3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the
case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period;
xxx
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 7610
are as follows:
1.

The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.

2.
The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected
to sexual abuse.
3.

The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.31

As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, all the elements of sexual abuse
under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 are present here.
168.
Salvador Flordeliz v. People, GR 186441, 3 March 2010 (Sec
5b RA 7610-elements)
Facts:
The case at bar is on the conviction of the accused for 9 counts of
rape and 1 count of acts of lasciviousness.
In April 1995, while the petitioners children, AAA and BBB, were sleeping,
petitioner woke up AAA, then 14 years old, touched her vagina and played with
it. Petitioner told AAA not to tell it to anyone otherwise she would be harmed.
Eventually, petitioner was convicted for homicide and imprisoned in
Muntinlupa City. Afterwards, he was released on parole and would be visited by

19

her children. After his release, he committed again the same acts on several
occasions from 2002 to 2003 to her then second child BBB, then was 11 years
old. She was also told not to tell it to anyone or else she would be harmed as well
but inserted his fingers inside BBBs vagina.
AAA and BBB had the chance to reveal their horrifying experiences when
their mother ABC arrived for a vacation. AAA immediately told ABC what
petitioner did to her. When confronted by ABC, BBB likewise admitted the
repeated abuses committed by petitioner. ABC forthwith reported the incidents
to the National Bureau of Investigation.
Petitioners was found by the Regional Trial Court with lewd design and
deliberate intent to cause malice and satisfy his lascivious desire, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously touched and play the private part of
offended party AAA, a minor, against her will and consent. The petitioner was
convicted for Act of Lasciviousness.
On the other hand, petitioner by means of force and intimidation and
taking advantage of his moral ascendancy over the private offended party he
being the biological father of said offended party, did there and there remove the
pants and underwear of the offended party and thereupon fondled her private
part and forcibly inserted his finger into the vagina of the offended party BBB, a
minor, against her will and consent. The accused was convicted of 9 counts of
sexual assault with aggravating circumstance due to the relationship against the
accused.
The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court.
Issue: Whether or not that the Regional Trial Court conviction for the offenses of
Act of Lasciviousness and sexual assault are proper.
Ruling:
With regard to the sexual assault, the said conviction is proper.
However, on the judgment of Act of Lasciviousness, the case was modified for
violating R.A. No. 7610 or "The Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act" instead.
It defines sexual abuse of children and prescribes the penalty therefor in
its Article III, Section 5, to wit:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion
or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That
when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No.
3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the

20

case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period.
Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only
with a child exploited in prostitution, but also with a child subjected to other
sexual abuses. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit,
but also where one -- through coercion, intimidation or influence -- engages in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child.
However, pursuant to the foregoing provision, before an accused can be
convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct committed against a minor
below 12 years of age, the requisites for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336
of the RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610.
The crime of Acts of Lasciviousness, as defined in Article 336 of the RPC,
has the following elements:
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.[46]
In addition, the following elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of
R.A. No. 7610 must be proven:
(1) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(2) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse; and
(3) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
Based on the foregoing definition, petitioner's act of touching AAA's vagina
and playing with it obviously amounted to lascivious conduct. Considering that
the act was committed on a child less than twelve years old and through
intimidation, it is beyond cavil that petitioner is guilty under the aforesaid laws.
Furthermore, failure to designate the offense by statute or to mention the
specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of the law
violated, does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged therein clearly recite
the facts constituting the crime charged. The character of the crime is not
determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor by the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by the
recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information.
169.
Clement John Ferdinand M. Navarrete v. People, GR 147913,
31 January 2007 (Section 5b, RA 7610 in rel. Art. 336, RPC)

21

FACTS:
Clement John Ferdinand M. Navarrete was charged with the crime of statutory
rape of BBB. The RTC absolved petitioner of statutory rape as there was no clear
and positive proof of the entry of petitioners penis into the labia of the victims
vagina. However, it convicted petitioner for acts of lasciviousness under Article
336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA
7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act). On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Petitioner asserts that he cannot be convicted of acts of lasciviousness in relation
to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, a crime not specifically alleged in the
information which charged him with statutory rape. Otherwise, his constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him would
be violated. He likewise contends that his guilt for the said offense was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner insists that Section 5 (b) of RA 7610
refers only to those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in prostitution and argues that this does not apply
in this case since the victim is not a child exploited in prostitution.
ISSUE:
Whether the conviction of petitioner for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610
is proper.
HELD:
YES. The law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit but
also one in which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in any
lascivious conduct. The very title of Section 5, Article III (Child Prostitution and
Other Sexual Abuse) of RA 7610 shows that it applies not only to a child
subjected to prostitution but also to a child subjected to other sexual abuse. A
child is deemed subjected to "other sexual abuse" when he or she indulges in
lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. Here, BBB was
sexually abused because she was coerced or intimidated by petitioner (who
poked her neck with a knife) to indulge in lascivious conduct.
Petitioner was found guilty of violating Article 336 of the RPC in relation to
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610:
Sec. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion
or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse.
Just like in the case of People v. Bon, the accused was charged with the rape of a
six-year old girl. The Court ruled that rape was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt. However, it was held that the accused was "liable for the crime of acts of
lasciviousness, as defined and penalized under Article 336 of the RPC in relation
to RA 7610" since all the elements of this offense were established. Petitioner
cannot therefore successfully argue that his constitutionally protected right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated
when he was found guilty under Section 5 of RA 7610.
Both lower courts also found that petitioner poked victims vagina with a stick
with cotton and watched a pornographic movie with her. These acts are
undoubtedly acts of lasciviousness or lewdness.

22

The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 that must be
proven in addition to the elements of acts of lasciviousness are as follows:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution
or subjected to other sexual abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
"Lascivious conduct" is defined under Section 2 (h) of the rules and regulations of
RA 7610 as:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia,
anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into
the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite
sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the
sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the
genitals or pubic area of a person.
The aforestated acts of petitioner undeniably amounted to lascivious conduct
under this law.
170.
People vs. DoneyGaduyon y Tapispisan, G.R. No. 181473, 11
November 2013 (Sexual abuse includes)
Facts: Appellant is married to the mother of "AAA" with whom he has three
daughters. Their eldest child is "AAA," who at the time material to this case was
only 12 years old.
On August 21, 2002, the mother and sisters of "AAA" attended the wake of her
auntie in Caloocan City. "AAA" and her father, the appellant, were thus the only
ones left in the family residence in San Mateo, Rizal. At around 9:00 p.m. of the
said date, "AAA" was lying in her bed in the family room located at the upper
portion of their house when appellant fondled her breasts and touched her
arms.10 Appellant threatened "AAA" not to tell her mother about the incident or
else something bad might happen to the latter. 11
At around 11:00 p.m. of the following day, August 22, 2002, and while her
mother and sisters were still in Caloocan City, "AAA" was awakened when
appellant lowered her shorts and panty. 12 Appellant spread her legs and inserted
his penis into her vagina. 13 "AAA" felt pain but could do nothing but
cry.14 Appellant pulled out his penis and inserted it again into "AAAs" vagina.
When he was done, appellant put her shorts and panty back on and again
threatened "AAA
Accused was charged with for secual abuse for touching AAAs breast and
Qualified Object Rape for inserting his finger into the genital orifices of AAA.
Issue: WON Gaduyon was held liable
Held: Appelaant is guilty of 2 kinds of rape under Art 2666 a of RPC and Sexual
abuse under RA 7610.

23

rape under paragraph 2 of the above-quoted article is commonly known as rape


by sexual assault. The perpetrator, under any of the attendant circumstances
mentioned in paragraph 1, commits this kind of rape by inserting his penis into
another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the
genital or anal orifice of another person. It is also called "instrument or object
rape", also "gender-free rape", or the narrower "homosexual rape.
On the other hand, RA 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act", defines and
penalizes child prostitution and other sexual abuse. "Sexual abuse includes the
employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to
engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children. Lascivious
conduct means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of
the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of
any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same
or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or
gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
171.
JojitGaringarao vs. People, G.R. No. 192760, 20 July 2011
(Sexual abuse)
FACTS:
AAA, 16 years of age, was admitted to the Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center due
to fever and abdominal pain. The next day, her parents left the said hospital to
process AAAs Medicare papers and to attend to their store respectively, leaving
her alone. When her father returned to the hospital, AAA told him that she
wanted to go home. The doctor allowed them due to AAAs insistence but
instructed that she should continue medications. At home, she then told her
parents that Jojit Garingarao, the nurse on duty that day, sexually abused her.
AAA testified during trial that, Garingarao, entered her room to check her
medications and if she was still experiencing pains. Garingarao lifted AAAs bra
and touched her left breast and insisted that he was only examining her.
Garingarao also slid his finger inside AAAs private part and only stopped when
he saw that AAA really had her monthly period.
Garingarao alleged that, assuming the charges were correct, there was only one
incident when he touched AAA and as such, he should have been convicted only
of Acts of Lasciviousness and not of Violation of R.A. 7610. The RTC of San Carlos
City, Pangasinan found Garingarao guilty as charged, which was affirmed by the
CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the single lascivious incident was enough to hold the accused
liable for Violation of R.A. 7610.
HELD:
Yes. The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 are the
following:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or

24

subjected to other sexual abuse; and


3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
Under Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA
7610, lascivious conduct is defined as follows:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia,
anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object
into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite
sex, with the intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the
sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the
genitals or pubic area of a person.
In this case, the prosecution established that Garingarao touched AAAs breasts
and inserted his finger into her private part for his sexual gratification.
Garingarao used his influence as a nurse by pretending that his actions were part
of the physical examination he was doing. Garingarao persisted on what he was
doing despite AAAs objections. AAA twice asked Garingarao what he was doing
and he answered that he was just examining her.
The Court has ruled that a child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse when
the child is the victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of
any adult. In lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult,
there must be some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which
subdues the free exercise of the offended partys free will. In this case,
Garingarao coerced AAA into submitting to his lascivious acts by pretending that
he was examining her.
It is inconsequential that sexual abuse under RA 7610 occurred only once.
Section 3(b) of RA 7610 provides that the abuse may be habitual or not. Hence,
the fact that the offense occurred only once is enough to hold Garingarao liable
for acts of lasciviousness under RA 7610.
172.
People vs. CA and Gaspar Olayon, GR 171863, 20 August
2008 (Child abuse-section 5 v. Section 10)
FACTS:
The then 22-year old Gaspar Olayon was charged with violation of Section
10(a)of Republic Act No. 7610 before the RTC, of which the then 14-year old AAA
was alleged to be the victim, whom it was alleged that he had sexual intercourse
with and commited lewd and lascivious acts. Respondent was also charged for
acts of lasciviousness for the same victim. Having found that AAA consented to
the sexual intercourse, after trial, he was acquitted of acts of lasciviousness but
convicted of violation of Section 10 (a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 for having
taken advantage of AAA's minority. The RTC said that even if they were with her
consent, consent is not an accepted defense in said special law.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, answering in the negative the issue of whether
consensual sexual intercourse with a minor is classified as child abuse under
Section 10 of RA No. 7610, reversed the trial courts decision and acquitted
respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in acquitting the respondent for violation of Sec. 10 of RA
7610.
HELD:

25

NO. In the case at bar, even if respondent were charged under Section 5(b),
instead of Section 10(a), respondent would just the same have been acquitted as
there was no allegation that an element of the offense coercion or influence or
intimidation attended its commission.
Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 under which respondent was charged in each of
the two cases provides:
SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and
Other ConditionsPrejudicial to the Child's Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's
development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree
No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
(Underscoring supplied),
Section 5(b), upon the other hand, provides:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether
male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due
to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse;
Provided, That when the victims is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape
and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for
rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty
for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age
shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; (Italics in the original,
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As Section 10 refers to acts of child abuse prejudicial to the childs development
other than child prostitution and other sexual abuse under Section 5, attempt to
commit child prostitution, child trafficking, attempt to commit child trafficking,
and obscene publications and indecent shows, the Court of Appeals did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that "x x x sexual abuse [as
defined under Section 5] x x x is a completely distinct and separate offense from
child abuse [as defined under Section 10]."
Consensual sexual intercourse or even acts of lasciviousness with a minor who is
12 years old or older could constitute a violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
For Section 5(b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a
child exploited in prostitution but also with a child subjected to other sexual
abuse.
For consensual sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a minor, who is not
exploited in prostitution, to thus fall within the purview of Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610, "persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion" of the child must be
present.
173.

People vs. Candaza, 524 Phil. 589 [2006] (Section 5b)

26

Facts: Alex Candaza was accused of raping his relative Kristine Dorado. That the
incident happen in their house located at Valenzuela City. It was alleged that the
victim was raped and molest not only once but several times by the accused.
Upon discovering of the incident by her father they later go to the police station
to report the incident and thereafter, they filed separate two information of rape
and acts of lasciviousness against the accused. The accused plead not guilty and
trial ensued. Subsequently, the accused herein was found by the court to be
guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of Sec 5(b) of RA 7610?
Ruling: Yes, prosecution proved that appellant committed acts of lasciviousness
upon the victim under Article III, Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Kristine, who was 13
years old when the criminal acts complained of occurred, was sexually abused by
appellant since she was coerced and intimidated by the latter to indulge in
lascivious conduct.[38]
As correctly found by the trial court, the penalty for simple rape through force
and intimidation is reclusion perpetua. Civil indemnity and moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.00 each are also awarded to victims of rape in accordance
with prevailing jurisprudence.
However, the penalty for acts of lasciviousness performed on a child under
Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610 is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed
on appellant should thus fall within the range of prision mayor medium to
reclusion temporal minimum, as minimum, to reclusion temporal maximum, as
maximum. Hence, appellant is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum
to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Consistent with previous rulings of the Court, appellant must also
indemnify the victim in the amount of P15,000.00 as moral damages and pay a
fine in the same amount.
174.

Amployo vs. People, 496 Phil. 747 [2005] (section 5b)

Facts: Kristine Joy Mosquera was eight years old on 27 June 1997 , [8] having
celebrated her eighth year the day before. A grade III student, she was walking
to school (which was just a short distance from her house) at around seven
oclock in the morning when she was met by petitioner who emerged from hiding
from a nearby store. Petitioner and Kristine Joy were neighbors. Petitioner
approached Kristine Joy, touched her head, placed his hand on her shoulder
where it then moved down to touch her breast several times. Petitioner
thereafter told Kristine Joy not to report to anybody what he did to her. Petitioner
was charged with violation of Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610.
Petitioner argues that lewd design cannot be inferred from his conduct firstly
because the alleged act occurred at around seven oclock in the morning, in a
street very near the school where people abound, thus, he could not have been
prompted by lewd design as his hand merely slipped and accidentally touched
Kristine Joy's breast. Furthermore, he could not have been motivated by lewd
design as the breast of an eight year old is still very much undeveloped, which
means to say there was nothing to entice him in the first place. Finally,
assuming that he indeed intentionally touch Kristine Joy's breast, it was merely

27

to satisfy a silly whim. Petitioner contends that even assuming that the acts
imputed to him amount to lascivious conduct, the resultant crime is only acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC and not child abuse under Section
5(b) of Rep. Act No. 7610 as the elements thereof have not been proved.
Issue: WON petitioner liable under RA 7610
Held: Terrifying an eight-year old school girl, taking advantage of her tender age
with his sheer size, invading her privacy and intimidating her into silence, in our
book, can never be in satisfaction of a mere silly whim.
The second element is likewise present. As we observed in People v. Larin,
Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being
abused for profit, but also one in which a child engages in any lascivious conduct
through coercion or intimidation. As case law has it, intimidation need not
necessarily be irresistible. It is sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to
intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended
party. This is especially true in the case of young, innocent and immature girls
who could not be expected to act with equanimity of disposition and with nerves
of steel. Young girls cannot be expected to act like adults under the same
circumstances or to have the courage and intelligence to disregard the threat.
As to the third element, there is no dispute that Kristine Joy is a minor, as she
was only eight years old at the time of the incident in question.
175.
People vs. Sumingwa, G.R. No. 183619, 13 October 2009
(section 5b)
Facts: Salvino Sumingwa was charged with two (2) counts of Acts of
Lasciviousness, four (4) counts of Rape, three (3) counts of Unjust Vexation, one
(1) count of Other Light Threats, one (1) count of Maltreatment, and one (1)
count of Attempted Rape for acts committed against his minor11 daughter AAA
from 1999-2001.
Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of violating Sec (5b) of RA 7610?
Ruling: Yes, Appellant is guilty of two (2) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness under
Section 5(b), Article III, R.A. 7610 committed against AAA on the second week of
August 1999 and on the first week of September 1999. AAA testified that in
August, appellant, with lewd design, inserted his hands inside her shirt then
fondled her breasts; and in September, he forced her to hold his penis until he
ejaculated.
The trial and the appellate courts were correct in giving credence to the victims
testimony, in dismissing appellants defense of denial and alibi, and in
disbelieving that AAA initiated the criminal cases only upon the prodding of the
latters grandmother. Settled jurisprudence tells us that the mere denial of ones
involvement in a crime cannot take precedence over the positive testimony of
the offended party.
We are not unmindful of the fact that appellant was specifically charged in an
Information for Acts of Lasciviousness defined and penalized by Article 336 of the
RPC. However, the failure to designate the offense by statute, or to mention the
specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of the law
violated, does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly recite the
facts constituting the crime charged.55 The character of the crime is not

28

determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor from the


specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by the
recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information.56
In the present case, the body of the information contains an averment of the acts
alleged to have been committed by appellant which unmistakably refers to acts
punishable under Section 5(b), Article III, R.A. 7610.
Appellant should, therefore, be meted the same penalties and be made to
answer for damages as in Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and 1654.
176.
Michael Padua vs. People,
(Suspension of sentence of minor)

GR

168546,

23

July

2008

Facts: Petitioner, who was then 17 years old, was involved in selling illegal drugs.
Initially in his arraignment he pleaded not guilty but re-entered his plea of guilty
to avail the benefits of first time offenders. Subsequently, he applied for
probation but was denied. In his petition for certiorari, the court said that
probation and suspension of sentence are different and provisions in PD 603 or
RA 9344 cannot be invoked to avail probation. It is specifically stated that in drug
trafficking, application for probation should be denied. As aside issue, the court
discussed the availment of suspension of sentence under RA 9344.
ISSUE: Whether suspension of sentence under RA9344 can still be invoked given
the fact that the accused is now 21 years old.
Ruling: No. The suspension of sentence under Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344
could no longer be retroactively applied for petitioners benefit. Section 38 of
Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that once a child under 18 years of age is found
guilty of the offense charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction,
the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence.
Section 40 of Rep. Act No. 9344, however, provides that once the child reaches
18 years of age, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child, order
execution of sentence, or extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified
period or until the child reaches the maximum age of 21 years. Petitioner has
already reached 21years of age or over and thus, could no longer be considered
a child for purposes of applying RA 9344. Thus, the application of sec. 38 and 40
appears moot and academic as far as his case concerned.
177.
People vs. MelchorCabalquinto, GR 167693, 19 September
2006 (Confidentiality of records-RA 7610 and RA 9262)
Facts: ABC, the common-law wife of Cabalquinto, was on her way home. As she
was approaching the house, she noticed that the door was closed although the
lights were on. Since there is a half-inch gap between the door and the wall, she
peeped through the gap and saw Cabalquinto lying face down making pumping
motions on their daughter, AAA, who was lying underneath him with her panties
pulled down. When she heard Cabalquinto tell AAA to open her legs
(ibuka mo), she kicked and pounded the door. Cabalquinto immediately lay
down. AAA then stood up and opened the door. ABC entered the room and
confronted Cabalquinto who only denied her accusation. She then asked AAA
what her father did to her. AAA did not say anything but looked pale. ABC, as
advised by her sister and the barangay officials, filed a complaint. AAA was 8

29

years old then. AAA testified that she was raped several times when her mother
was abroad. Accused claimed that ABCs frequent spats with his brother
motivated her to file the rape cases against him and there were inconsistencies
with regard to the testimonies of ABC and AAA. Accused was found guilty of rape.
ABC wrote a letter to the Chief Justice expressing anxiety over the posting of full
text decisions of the Supreme Court on its Internet Web Page.

Issue: Whether the Court should refrain from posting in its Internet Web Page
the full text of decisions in cases involving child sexual abuse?

Ruling: Yes. Sec. 29 of RA 7610 provides:

Sec. 29. Confidentiality.at the instance of the offended


party, his name may be withheld from the public until the court
acquires jurisdiction over the case.
It shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher, and reporter or
columnist in case of printed materials, announcer or producer in the
case of television and radio broadcasting, producer and director in
the case of the movie industry, to cause undue and sensationalized
publicity of any case of a violation of this Act which results in the
moral degradation and suffering of the offended party.

Sec. 44 and Sec. 40 of RA 9262 similarly provides:


Sec. 44. Confidentiality.All records pertaining to cases of
violence against women and their children including those in the
barangay shall be confidential and all public officers and employees
and public or private clinics or hospitals shall respect the right to
privacy of the victim. Whoever publishes or causes to be published,
in any format, the name, address, telephone number, school,
business address, employer, or other identifying information of a
victim or an immediate family member, without the latters consent,
shall be liable to the contempt power of the court.
Any person who violates this provision shall suffer the penalty
of one (1) year imprisonment and a fine of not more than Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).

Sec. 40. Privacy and confidentiality of proceedings.All


hearings of cases of violence against women and their children shall
be conducted in a manner consistent with the dignity of women and
their children and respect for their privacy.

30

Records of the cases shall be treated with utmost


confidentiality. Whoever publishes or causes to be published, in any
format, the name, address, telephone number, school, business
address, employer or other identifying information of the parties or
an immediate family or household member, without their consent or
without authority of the court, shall be liable for contempt of court
and shall suffer the penalty of one year imprisonment and a fine of
not more than Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos.

Taking all these opinions into account and in view of recent enactments
which unequivocally
express
the
intention to maintain the
confidentiality of information in cases involving violence against women
and their children, in this case and henceforth, the Court shall withhold
the real name of the victim-survivor and shall use fictitious initials
instead to represent her. Likewise, the personal circumstances of the victimssurvivors or any other information tending to establish or compromise their
identities, as well those of their immediate family or household members, shall
not be disclosed.

DD. Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (RA No. 9344)
Exemption from criminal liability; exemption to the exemption
Diversion and intervention programs
Treatment of child in conflict with the law
EE. Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 (RA No. 9775)
178.
Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr.et.al. v. Secretary of DOJ, GR 203335,
et.al, 18 February 2014 (Anti-child porn-online; no double
jeopardy)
Facts: Petitioner sought to declare several provisions of RA 10175, the
Cybercrime Prevention act of 2012, unconstitutional and void. Petitioner
contended that it intrudes in to the area of protected speech and expressions,
creating a chilling effect and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.that
it transgress the freedom of the press, that the grant to law enforecement
agencies of the power to collect or record data in real time as tendin to curtail
civil liberties or provide opportunities for official abuse.
Issue: WON RA 10175 is unconstitutional
Held: the Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of
the strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is
involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act accessing the
computer system of another without right. It is a universally condemned conduct.
It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism, 8 the act of willfully
destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their
computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has
no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other
peoples computer systems and private documents.

31

Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an
obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is
actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal
code, already punishes it.
The State has a compelling interest in enacting the cybercrime law for there is a
need to put order to the tremendous activities in cyberspace for public good. 82 To
do this, it is within the realm of reason that the government should be able to
monitor traffic data to enhance its ability to combat all sorts of cybercrimes.
Formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy of the law to
"prevent and combat such [cyber] offenses by facilitating their detection,
investigation, and prosecution at both the domestic and international levels, and
by providing arrangements for fast and reliable international cooperation." 105 This
policy is clearly adopted in the interest of law and order, which has been
considered as sufficient standard. 106 Hence, Sections 24 and 26(a) are likewise
valid.
FF. Anti-Photo and Video Voyeurism Act of 2009 (RA No. 9995)
Elements of violation (taking photo and video)
GG. Prescriptive period of SPL
PRESCRIPTION OF CRIMES UNDER ACT 3326 (Special laws) 1
2 MONTHS if the crime is violation of Municipal ordinance;
1 YEAR with penalty of Fine or imprisonment of 1-30 days;
4 YEARS imprisonment of 1 month to two (2) years;
8 YEARS imprisonment of two (2) years to six (6) years;
12 YEARS imprisonment of six (6) years or more
20 YEARS if the crime committed is treason.
179.
Republic vs. Eduardo Cojuangco, et.al. GR 139930, 26 June
2012 (Prescription)
FACTS: Teodoro D. Regala, Victor P. Lazatin, Eleazar B. Reyes, Eduardo U.
Escueta and Leo J. Palma incorporated the United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. (UNICOM
)[1] with an authorized capital stock of P100 million divided into one million shares
with a par value of P100 per share. UNICOM had several amendments in its
capitalization.
The Board of Directors of the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB)
composed of respondents Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, Maria
Clara L. Lobregat, Jose R. Eleazar, Jr., Jose C. Concepcion, Rolando P. Dela Cuesta,
Emmanuel M. Almeda, Hermenegildo C. Zayco, Narciso M. Pineda, Iaki R.
Mendezona, and Danilo S. Ursua approved Resolution 247-79 authorizing UCPB,
the Administrator of the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CII Fund), to invest
not more than P500 million from the fund in the equity of UNICOM for the benefit
of the coconut farmers. Thereafter several amendments which increases the
capital stock without par value until on September 18, 1979 a new set of
UNICOM directors, composed of respondents Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Juan
Ponce Enrile, Maria Clara L. Lobregat, Jose R. Eleazar, Jr., Jose Concepcion,

1 If the law does not provide for prescriptive period.

32

Emmanuel M. Almeda, Iaki R. Mendezona, Teodoro D. Regala, Douglas Lu Ym,


Sigfredo Veloso, and Jaime Gandiaga, approved another amendment to
UNICOMs capitalization.
About 10 years later or on March 1, 1990 the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed a complaint for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.)
3019[6] against respondents, the 1979 members of the UCPB board of directors,
before the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The OSG
alleged that UCPBs investment in UNICOM was manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government since UNICOM had a capitalization of only P5
million and it had no track record of operation. In the process of conversion to
voting common shares, the governments P495 million investment was reduced
by P95 million which was credited to UNICOMs incorporators. The PCGG
subsequently referred the complaint to the Office of the Ombudsman which
disqualified the PCGG from conducting the preliminary investigation in the case.
About nine years later or on March 15, 1999 the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP) issued a Memorandum, [8] stating that although it found
sufficient basis to indict respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019,
the action has already prescribed. Respondents amended UNICOMs
capitalization a third time on September 18, 1979, giving the incorporators
unwarranted benefits by increasing their 1 million shares to 100 million shares
without cost to them. But, since UNICOM filed its Certificate of Filing of Amended
Articles of Incorporation with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on
February 8, 1980, making public respondents acts as board of directors, the
period of prescription began to run at that time and ended on February 8,
1990. Thus, the crime already prescribed when the OSG filed the complaint with
the PCGG for preliminary investigation on March 1, 1990.
In
a
Memorandum[9] dated May
14,
1999, the Office of the
Ombudsman approved the OSPs recommendation for dismissal of the
complaint. It additionally ruled that UCPBs subscription to the shares of stock of
UNICOM on September 18, 1979 was the proper point at which the prescription
of the action began to run since respondents act of investing into UNICOM was
consummated on that date. It could not be said that the investment was a
continuing act. The giving of undue benefit to the incorporators prescribed 10
years later on September 18, 1989. Notably, when the crime was committed in
1979 the prescriptive period for it had not yet been amended. The original
provision of Section 11 of R.A. 3019 provided for prescription of 10 years. Thus,
the OSG filed its complaint out of time. The OSG filed a motion for
reconsideration on the Office of the Ombudsmans action but the latter denied
the same;[10] hence, this petition,
ISSUE: Whether the action already prescribed as such respondents are
not guilty of the charge,
RULING: YES. Notably, Section 11 of R.A. 3019 now provides that the offenses
committed under that law prescribes in 15 years. Prior to its amendment by
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 195 on March 16, 1982, however, the prescriptive
period for offenses punishable under R.A. 3019 was only 10 years. [16] Since the

33

acts complained of were committed before the enactment of B.P. 195, the
prescriptive period for such acts is 10 years as provided in Section 11 of R.A.
3019, as originally enacted.[17]
Now R.A. 3019 being a special law, the 10-year prescriptive period should be
computed in accordance with Section 2 of Act 3326, [18] which provides:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at
the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The above-mentioned section provides two rules for determining when
the prescriptive period shall begin to run: first, from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, if such commission is known;
and second, from its discovery, if not then known, and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.[19]
Petitioner points out that, assuming the offense charged is subject to
prescription, the same began to run only from the date it was discovered,
namely, after the 1986 EDSA Revolution. Thus, the charge could be filed as late
as 1996.
In the prosecution of cases of behest loans, the Court reckoned the prescriptive
period from the discovery of such loans. The reason for this is that the
government, as aggrieved party, could not have known that those loans existed
when they were made. Both parties to such loans supposedly conspired to
perpetrate fraud against the government. They could only have been discovered
after the 1986 EDSA Revolution when the people ousted President Marcos from
office. And, prior to that date, no person would have dared question the legality
or propriety of the loans.[20]
Those circumstances do not obtain in this case. For one thing, what is
questioned here is not the grant of behest loans that, by their nature, could be
concealed from the public eye by the simple expedient of suppressing their
documentations. What is rather involved here is UCPBs investment in UNICOM,
which corporation is allegedly owned by respondent Cojuangco, supposedly a
Marcos crony. That investment does not, however, appear to have been withheld
from the curious or from those who were minded to know like banks or
competing businesses. Indeed, the OSG made no allegation that respondent
members of the board of directors of UCPB connived with UNICOM to suppress
public knowledge of the investment.
Prescription of actions is a valued rule in all civilized states from the beginning of
organized society. It is a rule of fairness since, without it, the plaintiff can
postpone the filing of his action to the point of depriving the defendant, through
the passage of time, of access to defense witnesses who would have died or left
to live elsewhere, or to documents that would have been discarded or could no
longer be located. Moreover, the memories of witnesses are eroded by
time. There is an absolute need in the interest of fairness to bar actions that
have taken the plaintiffs too long to file in court.

34

Respondents claim that, in any event, the complaint against them failed to show
probable cause. They point out that, prior to the third amendment of UNICOMs
capitalization, the stated value of the one million shares without par value, which
belonged to its incorporators, was P5 million. When these shares were converted
to 5 million shares with par value, the total par value of such shares remained
at P5 million. But, the action having prescribed, there is no point in discussing
the existence of probable cause against the respondents for violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. 3019.
180.
Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on
Desierto, GR 135715 (prescription, counting)

Behest

Loans

vs.

Facts:Mindanao Coconut Oil Mills (MINCOCO) applied for a Guarantee Loan


Accommodation with the National Investment and Development Corporation
(NIDC) for the amount of approximately P30.4 Million which the NIDC's Board of
Directors
approved
on
June
23,
1976.
The guarantee loan was both undercapitalized and under-collateralized
because MINCOCO's paid up capital then was only P7 million and its assets worth
is P7 Million. This notwithstanding, MINCOCO further obtained additional
Guarantee Loan Accommodations from NIDC worth over P20 million.
When MINCOCO defaulted, Eduardo Cojuangco issued a memorandum
dated July 18, 1983, bearing the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos' marginal
note, disallowing the foreclosure of MINCOCO's properties. The government
banks were not able to recover any amount from MINCOCO and President
Marcos' marginal note was construed by the NIDC to have effectively released
MINCOCO, including its owners, from all of its financial liabilities.
These transactions were, however, discovered only in 1992 after then
President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 136 creating the Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans.
The Committee found that MINCOCO, together with 20 other corporations,
obtained behest loans. The Committee filed with the Ombudsman a sworn
complaint against MINCOCO's Officers and NIDC's Board of Directors for violation
of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019,9 as amended.
The Ombudsman, by Resolution, motu prorio dismissed the complaint on
the following grounds: (1) insufficiency of evidence, and (2) prescription of the
offenses. The Ombudsman held that the acts should be governed by the law in
force at the time of their commission, which is the old R.A. No. 3019 before its
amendment by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 in March 1982. The old law provided a
10 year prescriptive period. Prescription commenced to run in 1976 when the
assailed transaction happened, hence, when the case was filed in
September 1997, the offenses have long prescribed.
On the other hand, the Committee argues that the right of the State to
recover behest loans as ill-gotten wealth is imprescriptible under Section 15,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, assuming that prescription applies,
the period should be counted from the time of discovery of behest loans or
sometime in 1992 when the Committee was constituted.

35

Issues: Whether or not State can still recover behest loans for being
imprescriptible as provided in the Constitution that claims for ill-gotten wealth
are imprescriptible.
Ruling:
The State can still recover behest loan although they only found the
said transaction in 1992.
The provision found in Section 15, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution that "the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully
acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or
transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppels,"
applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to
criminal cases.
Section 1126 of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 195, provides that the offenses committed under Republic Act
No. 3019 shall prescribe in fifteen (15) years; However, for crimes
committed PRIOR to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which was
approved on March 16, 1982, (or under the old Republic Act No. 3019), the
prescriptive period was only ten (10) years. The period of prescription for the
subject crime committed in 1976 and prior to the amendment of Republic Act No.
3019, is ten (10) years.
The time as to when the prescriptive period starts to run for crimes
committed under Republic Act No. 3019, a special law, is covered by Act No.
3326, Section 2 of which provides that:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at
the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy.
Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the
crime is committed. That an aggrieved person "entitled to an action has no
knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises," does
not prevent the running of the prescriptive period.
An exception to this rule is the "blameless ignorance" doctrine,
incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326. Under this doctrine, "the statute of
limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which
will support a cause of action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply
the statute of limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable
means of knowing the existence of a cause of action." xxx Thus, we held in a
catena of cases, that if the violation of the special law was not known at
the time of its commission, the prescription begins to run only from the
discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act
or acts.
Hence, the prescriptive period for the subject crimes commenced from
the date of its discovery in 1992 after the Committee made an exhaustive
investigation. When the complaint was filed in 1997, only five years have

36

elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not yet set in. The rationale for this is that
"it was well-high impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known
these crimes committed prior to the 1986 EDSA Revolution, because of the
alleged connivance and conspiracy among involved public officials and the
beneficiaries of the loans."
181.
People vs. Arturo Pacificador, GR 139405, 13 March 2001
(applying prescriptive period)
FACTS:
Arturo and co-accused, Jose T. Marcelo, were charged before the
Sandiganbayan with the crime of violation of Republic Act No. 3019. The
information in this case, dated October 19, 1988, was filed with the
Sandiganbayan on October 27, 1988 on which date the existing jurisprudence on
matters of prescription of the offense was the ruling enunciated in Francisco v.
Court of Appeals (May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 538) to the effect that the filing of the
complaint with the fiscals office also interrupts the period of prescription of the
offense.
The offense charged was allegedly committed from December 16, 1975 to
January 6, 1976. The running of the period of prescription of the offense may
have started on January 6, 1976 but was interrupted by the filing of the
complaint with the appropriate investigating body. Sandiganbayan reconsidered
its Resolution of November 10, 1998 and dismissed the Information in Criminal
Case No. 139405 against the respondent on the ground of prescription. For
Instead of applying Act No. 3326, as amended, xxx, SB utilized Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code. In this case, as the offense involved is the violation of R.A.
3019, a special law, it follows that in computing the prescriptive period of the
offense, it is not the provision contained in the Revised Penal Code that should
govern but that of Act No. 3326.
Petitioner argues on prescription of offenses punishable under special laws
is not applicable to the instant criminal case for the reason that Republic Act No.
3019 provides for its own prescriptive period. Section 11 thereof provides that
offenses committed and punishable under the said law shall prescribe in fifteen
(15) years. However, inasmuch as Republic Act No. 3019 does not state exactly
when the fifteen-year prescriptive period begins to run, Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code should be applied suppletorilyArticle 91 of the Revised Penal Code,
which adopts the discovery rule for the prescription of offenses
ISSUE:
WON the prosecution of the crime charged is time-barred by
prescription as shown by facts and circumstances on record and of judicial
notice?
RULING: Yes. It has been settled that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 governs the
computation of prescription of offenses defined and penalized by special laws. In
the case of People v. Sandiganbayan, this Court ruled that Section 2 of Act No.
3326 was correctly applied by the anti-graft court in determining the reckoning
period for prescription in a case involving the crime of violation of Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended.
Sec. 2. Prescription should begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the

37

discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known, the
prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day it was committed. The
petitioner denies having any knowledge of the crime at the time it was allegedly
committed by the respondent. This Court takes notice of the fact that the
subject Deed of Sale dated December 29, 1975 relative to the sale of the parcels
of land by the National Steel Corporation to the Philippine Smelters Corporation,
was registered shortly thereafter in the Registry of Deeds of the Province of
Camarines Norte. While petitioner may not have knowledge of the alleged crime
at the time of its commission, the registration of the subject Deed of Sale with
the Registry of Deeds constitutes constructive notice thereof to the whole world
inlcuding the petitioner.

38