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POLICE POWER CASES

A COMPILATION OF
POLICE POWER
DIGEST CASES FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2

2014006964
Valeriano, Iris Y. Sanchez
09168649597

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POLICE POWER CASES

Table of Contents
Case Title

Page

BINAY V. DOMINGO, 201 SCRA 508

3
5
6
7
8
9
10
13
14
15
17

CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP V. DSWD GR166494

ORTIGAS AND CO. V. CA GR126102
MMDA V BEL AIR ASSOCIATION GR 135962
CITY OF MANILA V JUDGE LAGUIO GR 118127
ABECEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, INC V. CA 329,SCRA, 314
TAXI CAB OPERATORS OF METROMANILA V. BOT 119 SCRA 597
VELASCO V VILLEGAS 120SCRA568
MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE PROPERTIES 234SCRA255
TANO V. SOCRATES GR110249
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS v. CITY MAYOR 20SCRA849

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Binay v. Domingo
Facts: Resolution 60 confirming the ongoing burial assistance program initiated by the
mayors office. Under this program, bereaved families whose gross family income does not
exceed 2k/month will receive a 500php cash relief to be taken out of unappropriated
available funds existing in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved
Resolution 60. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000 for the
implementation of the Burial Assistance Program. R 60 was referred to the Commission on
Audit for its expected allowance in audit. Based on its preliminary findings, COA disapproved
R 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof. The
program was stayed by COA Decision No. 1159.
Issues:
WON R 60 is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.
Held:
YES.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal
corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by
the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation
of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the
creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may
exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are
reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring
powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things
essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people.
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: authority to
"enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and
discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and
proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and
order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality
and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein."
Sec 7 of BP 337: every LGU shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to
promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and
order in the LGU, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein."
Police power: power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential,
insistent, and illimitable of powers; greatest and most powerful attribute of the government;
elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions.
COA: there is no perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be
attained under R 60 and the alleged public safety, general welfare. etc. of the inhabitants of
Makati

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POLICE POWER CASES

Apparently, COA tries to re-define the scope of police power by circumscribing its exercise
to "public safety, general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati ."
Police power of a municipal corporation: broad, and has been said to be commensurate
with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health,
safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to
all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every
function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is
especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general
welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions
which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting
public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation
of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to
frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.
COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional
merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. OSG: "the drift is towards
social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services
(Section 9, Art. II, Constitution), the promotion of the general welfare (Section 5, Ibid) social
justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights. (Section 11,
Ibid."
The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has
long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.
There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of
legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying
treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the
welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the
disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban
poor, etc.
The resolution is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social
justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss
of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be
financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late
President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law."

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POLICE POWER CASES

Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. DSWD, 526 SCRA 130 (2007)

Facts: Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the
Philippines. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of RA 9257, otherwise known
as the Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003. Section 4(a) of RA 9257 grants twenty percent
(20%) discount as privileges for the Senior Citizens. Petitioner contends that said law is
unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private property.
Issue: Whether or not RA 9257 is unconstitutional
Held: Petition is dismissed. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to
the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object.
Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs. It is the power vested in the
legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to
the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth,
and of the subjects of the same.
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property
rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by
due process, must yield to general welfare.

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POLICE POWER CASES

Ortigas & Co. v. Court of Appeals & Dar v. Alonzo-Legasto

G.R. No. 126102, December 4, 2000 | 346 SCRA 748
RATIO DECIDENDI
A lessee or a possessor in the concept of holder of the thing may be the real party-ininterest if he/she stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment.
A party who impleads another cannot later question the standing of the latter.
FACTS
Ortigas & Co. (Ortigas) sold to Emilia Hermoso a parcel of land, with the condition that
only a single-family residential building shall be erected on the same.
A few years later, the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) issued a zoning
ordinance which effectively reclassified the land bought by Hermoso from residential to
commercial.
Hermoso leased the land to Ismael Mathay III (Mathay). Mathay constructed a singlestorey commercial building on the land.
Ortigas sued Hermoso for breach of contract and prayed for the demolition of the
building. Mathay was subsequently impleaded as a respondent.
The lower court ruled in favor of Ortigas. Mathay moved for reconsideration, but he was
rebuffed. He filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), ascribing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court judge. The CA ruled in his favor,
hence this review on certiorari filed by Ortigas.
ISSUES
W/N the zoning ordinance should be read into the contract between Ortigas and Hermoso;
W/N Mathay is a real party-in-interest considering that he is a mere lessee and there is
no privity of contract between him and Ortigas.
W/N Mathay is a real party-in-interest considering that he is a mere lessee and there is no
privity of contract between him and Ortigas
RESOLUTION
the first issue: Although, as a general rule, laws are to be applied prospectively, not
retroactively, there are exceptions to this, one of which is when the State exercises
police power for the common weal. The zoning ordinance issued by the MMDA is an
exercise of the States police power, and is therefore applicable retroactively. The CA
rightfully read the provisions of the ordinance into the contract between Ortigas and
Hermoso.)
YES, Mathay is a real party-in-interest.
First, Mathay is a possessor in the concept of a holder of the thing under Art. 525, CC;
therefore, he has an interest in the property.
Second, what Ortigas prayed for is the demolition of the building erected by Mathay on
the property. As the owner of the building, he has a material interest in it, and he obviously
stands either to be benefited or injured after the case is decided.
Lastly, Ortigas impleaded Mathay as a respondent; as such, it can no longer question his
standing by virtue of estoppel.

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POLICE POWER CASES

MMDA VS BEL AIR ASSOCIATION GR 135962

March 27, 2000
FACTS:
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting the former
to open its private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996.
On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter separating the subdivision
from Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the issuance of a
TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the
demolition of the perimeter wall.
ISSUE:
WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as an agent of the
state endowed with police power.
HELD:
A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law
and has substantial control of local affairs. It is a body politic and corporate one
endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a
corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory (LGC of 1991).
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC of 1991. It empowers
the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or
municipality] and its inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of
the [LGUs corporate powers] provided under the Code.
There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative
power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is no grant of authority in RA 7924 that
allows the MMDA to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is merely a development authority and not a
political unit of government since it is neither an LGU or a public corporation endowed with
legislative power. The MMDA Chairman is not an elective official, but is merely appointed by
the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member.
In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is
the LGUs, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power
and police power.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution
ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.

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CITY OF MANILA VS JUDGE LAGUIO

Facts : On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE
PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS
OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically
prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels and hotels from operating in
the Malate District which was notoriously viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers.
Malate Tourist Development Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid as it includes
hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering amusement or entertainment. MTDC
reiterates that they do not market such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment.
MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot prohibit their
operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power as
provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized that the purpose of the law is to
promote morality in the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the
constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be
reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance
was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to
general laws.

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ABECEDO OPTICAL COMPANY V, CA

Municipal Corporation Proprietary Functions Police Power
FACTS:Acebedo Optical applied for a business permit to operate in Iligan City. After hearing
the sides of local optometrists, Mayor Cabili of Iligan granted the permit but he attached
various special conditions which basically made Acebedos dependent upon prescriptions
to be issued by local optometrists. Acebedo is not allowed to practice optometry within the
city. Acebedo however acquiesced to the said conditions and operated under the permit.
Later, Acebedo was charged for violating the said conditions and was subsequently
suspended from operating within Iligan. Acebedo then assailed the validity of the attached
conditions. The local optometrists argued that Acebedo is estopped in assailing the said
conditions because it acquiesced to the same and that the imposition of the special
conditions is a valid exercise of police power; that such conditions were entered upon by the
city in its proprietary function hence the permit is actually a contract.
ISSUE: Whether or not the special conditions attached by the mayor is a valid exercise of
police power.
HELD: NO. Acebedo was applying for a business permit to operate its business and not to
practice optometry (the latter being within the jurisdiction PRC Board of Optometry). The
conditions attached by the mayor is ultra vires hence cannot be given any legal application
therefore estoppel does not apply. It is neither a valid exercise of police power. Though the
mayor can definitely impose conditions in the granting of permits, he must base such
conditions on law or ordinances otherwise the conditions are ultra vires. Lastly, the granting
of the license is not a contract, it is a special privilege estoppels does not apply.

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TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC vs. THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION (1982)

On October 10, 1977, BOT issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 that aimed to phase
out and replace old dilapidated taxis to insure only safe comfortable units are used by the
public, to respond to complaints by metro manila residents regarding the old dilapidated
taxis, to make the commuting public more comfortable, have more convenience and
safety. 6 years is enough for taxi operators to get back cost of unit plus profits. No car
beyond 6 years can still be operated as taxi.

Taxis model 1971 were considered withdrawn on Dec 31, 1977, applied it to succeeding
years just add one year to both dates. They had to surrender the expired taxis plates to the
BoT for turnover to Land Transpo Commission.

Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land
Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, instructing
the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the NCR, to
implement the phasing out of the taxis.

On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 807553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration
and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of
earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are
roadworthy and fit for operation.
The issues were in the form of questions that the petitioners presented to the SC through a
query.

A.

Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the
manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners'
constitutional right to procedural due process?

B.

Granting, arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements
imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of the
assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?

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HELD:
The court here did not answer the queries directly they just dealt with the ff issues
1.
2.

WON the procedural and substantive due process rights of the taxi operators were
violated NO.
WON their equal protection rights were violated NO.

On Procedural and Substantive Due Process:

Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power
4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements,
or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility
motor vehicles.
Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency to follow in the
exercise of its powers:
Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. In the exercise of the powers granted in the preceding section,
the Board shall proceed promptly along the method of legislative inquiry.
Apart from its own investigation and studies, the Board, in its discretion, may require the
cooperation and assistance of the Bureau of Transportation, the Philippine Constabulary,
particularly the Highway Patrol Group, the support agencies within the Department of Public
Works, Transportation and Communications, or any other government office or agency that
may be able to furnish useful information or data in the formulation of the Board of any
policy, plan or program in the implementation of this Decree.
The Board may also call conferences, require the submission of position papers or other
documents, information, or data by operators or other persons that may be affected by the
implementation of this Decree, or employ any other suitable means of inquiry.

PET claim that they were denied due process because they were not asked to submit
position papers or to attend conferences regarding the assailed circ.

SC held that the PD provides a wide leeway as to how the board will choose to gather data
in formulating its policy. NOT ALL OPTIONS ARE REQUIRED TO BE DONE FOR POLICY TO BE
VALID the board has the choice of which avenue to pursue in collecting data.

PET also claim that 6 year limit was arbitrarily set oppressive they want each taxi cab
to be inspected regarding their condition WON it was still safe and roadworthy despite age.

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Court held that their proposed standard is not practicable and can open the door to
multiple standards and corruption

Court furthers aid that 6 years is a reasonable time based on experience and based on cost
and fair returns on the units

Court held that a uniform standard is best and fair

On Equal Protection of the Law:

PET allege that the circular targets and singles out the taxi industry = violation of their equal
protection rights
Court said NO. Circs of the same kind are also being implemented in other cities like Cebu
and is also in the process of conducting the same studies and policy formulations in other
cities.
Manila was first because of the heavier traffic pressure and the more constant use of the taxis
in MM.
SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTION the traffic conditions in the various cities

CONCLUSIONS:
Manila has more traffic which means that taxis in Metro Manila are more heavily used and
more likely to deteriorate.
The public has a right to convenience, comfort and safety in their public commute.
The danger posed by the dilapidated and old taxis is a valid nuisance that the Board can
abate through the circular that it passed.
Absent a clear showing of any repugnancy of the circular it is deemed valid.
Petition DISMISSED

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Velasco v. Villegas [GR L-24153, 14 February 1983]

En Banc, Fernando (J): 10 concur, 1 reserving vote, 1 took no part
Facts: Ordinance 4964 was issued by the city of Manila prohibiting any operator of any
barbershop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any
adjacent room(s) of said barber shop, or in any room(s) within the same building where the
barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the rooms where
massaging is conducted is the same person. Tomas Velasco, Lourdes Ramirez, Sy Pin,
Edmundo Unson, Apolonia Ramirez, and Lourdes Lomibao, as component members of the
Sta. Cruz Barbershop Association, filed petition for declaratory relief with the lower court,
challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance as it allegedly amounts to a deprivation of
property of their means of livelihood without due process of law. The petition was denied by
the lower court as its availability being dependent on there being as yet no case involving
such issue having been filed. Hence, the appeal.
Issue: Whether Ordinance 4964 is a valid police power measure.
Held: The objectives behind its enactment are: "
(1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage
clinic under Ordinance 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure
than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and,
(2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of
separate rooms for massage of customers."
The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare
clause. It has made clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which delegates in
statutory form the police power to a municipality. The clause has been given wide
application by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of
the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such is the progressive view of Philippine
jurisprudence and it has continued to be.

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Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. [GR 111097, 20 July 1994]

En Banc, Cruz (J): 12 concur
Facts: The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a corporation
created directly by Presidential Decree 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of
chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines
(the constitutionality of the decree was sustained in Basco v. Philippine Amusements and
Gambling Corporation). Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is
empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code.
It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare
Clause embodied in Section 16. Its Sangguniang Panglungsod derives its powers, duties and
functions under Section 458 of said Code. In 1992, following its success in several cities,
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a
portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation Inc., renovated and
equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas
season.
The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile.
On 7 December 1992, it enacted Ordinance 3353 (An Ordinance Prohibiting the issuance of
business permit and canceling existing business permit to any establishment for the using and
allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of Casino). On 4 January
1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance 3375-93 (An Ordinance prohibiting the operation of
Casino and providing penalty for violation therefore). Pryce assailed
the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor
and supplemental petitioner. The Court found the ordinances invalid and issued the writ
prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. Reconsideration of the decision was denied on 13
July 1993. Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor filed a petition for review under Rules of Court
with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro can prohibit the
establishment of a casino, or gambling, operated by PAGCOR through an ordinance or
resolution.
Held: The morality of gambling is not justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is
generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the
Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even
mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of
its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without
limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it
may consider sufficient. Further, there are two kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal and those
authorized by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern concept; it is probably as old as
illegal gambling, if not indeed more so. The suggestion that the Local Government Code
(LGC) authorize Local Government Units (LGUs) to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase
the distinction between these two forms of gambling without a clear indication that this is the
will of legislature. Ordinances should not contravene a statute as municipal governments are
only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative
powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate
cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.

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Tano v. Socrates [GR 110249, 21 August 1997]

En Banc, Davide Jr. (J): 5 concur, 4 join ponencias of Davide & Mendoza, 1 on official leave.
Facts: On 15 December 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted
Ordinance 15-92 (taking effect on 1 January 1993; An ordinance banning the shipment of all
live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from 1 January 1993 to 1 January 1998, and
providing exemptions; penalties and for other purposes thereof).
To implement said ordinance, Acting Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office Order 23 (series
of 1993) dated 22 January 1993 authorizing the inspection of cargoes shipped out from the
Puerto Princesa Airport, Wharf, and any other port within the jurisdiction of the City. On 19
February 1993, the Sangguniang Lalawigan of Palawan enacted Resolution 33 [A resolution
prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of live marine
coral dwelling aquatic organisms, to wit: Family: Scaridae (Mameng), Epine Phelus Fasciatus
(Suno), Cromileptes Altivelis (Panther or Senorita), Lobster below 200 grams and spawning,
Tridacna Gigas (Takllobo), Pinctada Margaritefera (Mother pearl, Oysters, Giant clams, and
other species), Penaeus Monodon (Tiger Prawn, Breeder size or mother), Epinephelus
Suillus (Loba or Green grouper), and Family: Balistidae (Tropical Aquarium Fishes) for a period
of 5 years in and coming from Palawan waters].
Puerto Princesa City and the province of Palawan implemented said ordinances. Tano, et.
al., who were criminally charged with violating Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution 33
and Ordinance 2 of Palawan in Criminal Case 93-05-C of the 1st MCTC of Palawan; and
Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, who were charged with violating City Ordinance 15-92 of Puerto
Princesa City and Ordinance 2 of Palawan before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Puerto
Princesa, questioned the validity of the said ordinances before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the ordinances in question, which prohibit the fishing of certain marine
species in Palawan are constitutional and/or valid.
Held: Laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy the presumption
of constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In short,
the conflict with the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. Where doubt
exists, even if well-founded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to
sustain. In light of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the Local
Government Code (LGC) and the powers granted therein to local government units
under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447(a) (1) (vi),
458(a)(1)(vi) and 468(a)(1)(vi), which involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the
Ordinances cannot be doubted.
The ordinance also find full support under Republic Act 7611 (Strategic Environmental Plan
for Palawan Act), approved on 19 June 1992; which adopts a comprehensive framework for
the sustainable development of Palawan compatible with protecting and enhancing the
natural resources and endangered environment of the province, which serve to guide the
local government of Palawan and the government agencies concerned in the formulation
and implementation of plans, programs and projects affecting said province. The first
objective (to establish a "closed season" for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered
therein for a period of five years) is well within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws in

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municipal waters which allows the establishment of "closed seasons." The second objective
(to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of
Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities) falls within both the general
welfare clause of the LGC and the express mandate thereunder to cities and provinces
to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the
environment.

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POLICE POWER CASES

Ermita Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association v. City of Manila [GR L-24693, 31 July
1967]
En Banc, Fernando (J): 7 concur, 2 on leave
Facts: On 13 June 1963, Ordinance 4760 was issued by the municipal board of the City of
Manila and approved by Vice Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting Mayor
of the City of Manila.
The ordinance
(1) imposes a P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class
motels;
(2) requires the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel,
or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting
any room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form
in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given
name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the
nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the
name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence
certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person
signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and
records kept and bound together;
(3) provides that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would
be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly
authorized representatives.
The ordinance also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of
certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining
room or restaurant and laundry;
while second class motels are required to have a dining room.
It prohibited a person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels,
lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian
and made it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of
such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours. It
provided a penalty of automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party in case of
conviction. On 5 July 1963, the Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association
(EMHMOA), its member Hotel del Mar, and a certain Go Chiu filed a petition for prohibition
against the mayor of the City of Manila in his capacity as he is charged with the general
power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary
orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances. There was a plea for
the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the above
ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on 6 July 1963 issued a writ of
preliminary injunction ordering the Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance
4760 from and after 8 July 1963. After the submission of the memoranda, ruled that the City
of Manila lack authority to regulate motels and rendering Ordinance 4760 unconstitutional
and therefore null and void. It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued by the

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POLICE POWER CASES

Mayor and his agents to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance. The Mayor of Manila
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the regulations imposed on motels and hotels (increasing license fees,
partially restricting the freedom to contract, and restraining the liberty of individuals) is valid
and/or constitutional.
Held: Yes. The ordinance was enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals.
It was made as there is observed an alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery
and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which provide a
necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus become the ideal
haven for prostitutes and thrill seekers. The ordinance proposes to check the clandestine
harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and
guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view
at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter
the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests. The increase in the
license fees was intended to discourage establishments of the kind from operating for
purpose other than legal and to increase the income of the city government. Further, the
restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it
unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel,
motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion
thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be
charged, cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. It is
neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the
immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, are being devoted.
Furthermore, the right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by
general law for the common good. The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest
of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope
of the police power. State in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property
may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.