LEDESMA VS.

CLIMACO
G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974
FACTS:
The petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election Registrar for
the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there,
he commenced to discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one
of the accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a
motion to withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such
motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants.
Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be
allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the
Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the
volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from
handling adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged
order of November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A motion for
reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding
ISSUE/S:
WON the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in
denying the motion?
HELD:
NO. Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to
the duty rqeuired of the legal profession. He ought to have known that
membership in the bar is burdened with conditions. The legal profession is
dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer may be
required to act as counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the
administration of justice. The fact that such services are rendered without
pay should not diminish the lawyer's zeal.
RATIO:
What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly
mindful of his obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that
membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It could be
that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the profession, being

appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For those holding such

belief, it may come as a surprise that counsel of repute and of eminence
welcome such an opportunity. It makes even more manifest that law is
indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade.
The denial by respondent Judge of such a plea, notwithstanding the
conformity of the defendants, was due "its principal effect [being] to delay
this case." 2 It was likewise noted that the prosecution had already rested
and that petitioner was previously counsel de parte, his designation in the
former category being precisely to protect him in his new position without
prejudicing the accused. It cannot be plausibly asserted that such failure to
allow withdrawal of de oficio counsel could ordinarily be characterized as a
grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. There is, however, the
overriding concern for the right to counsel of the accused that must be
taken seriously into consideration. In appropriate cases, it should tilt the
balance. This is not one of them. What is easily discernible was the obvious
reluctance of petitioner to comply with the responsibilities incumbent on the
counsel de oficio. Then, too, even on the assumption that he continues in
his position, his volume of work is likely to be very much less at present.
There is not now the slightest pretext for him to shirk an obligation a
member of the bar, who expects to remain in good standing, should fulfill.
The petition is clearly without merit.
IN RE ALMACEN
G.R.No. L-27654; February 18, 1970
FACTS:
1.) Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender
Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in protest
against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his
client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a
tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who
ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity.
2.) Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case.
They lost in said civil case but Almacen filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
His motion was denied. He then appealed but the Court of Appeals denied

his appeal as it agreed with the trial court with regard to the motion for
reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari before the
Supreme Court which outrightly denied his appeal in a minute resolution.
Atty. Almacen called such minute resolution as unconstitutional.
3.) He argues that due to the minute resolution, his client was made to pay
P120,000.00 without knowing the reasons why and that his client became
one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy. that his client
became one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.
4.) Because of his frustration, he filed before the court a petition to
surrender his lawyers certificate and renounce his title as to the practice of
such profession. The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Atty.
Almacens petition as the Court wanted to wait for him to actually surrender
his certificate. However, he did not do so.
ISSUE/S:
-W/N Almacens verbal allegations to the Court warrants disciplinary
sanctions -W/N the SC can make minute resolutions
HELD:
YES, YES.
RATIO:
-The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed
because the Supreme Court cannot accept every case or write full opinion
for every petition they reject otherwise the High Court would be unable to
effectively carry out its constitutional duties. The proper role of the Supreme
Court is to decide only those cases which present questions whose
resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and
parties involved. It should be remembered that a petition to review the
decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound
judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the courts denial.
For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of
Appeals opinion.
-On Almacens attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded
said criticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent, contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross

violation of the duty of respect to courts.-In the case at bar, Almacens

criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he should have known that a
motion for reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing party of the
time and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper and will not be entertained
by the court. He has only himself to blame and he is the reason why his
client lost. Almacen was suspended indefinitely.
MONTECILLO VS. GICA
G.R. No. L-36800; October 21, 1974
FACTS:
Jorge Montecillo was accused by Francisco Gica of slander (Montecillo
allegedly called Gica stupid and a fool). Atty. Quirico del Mar
represented Montecillo and he successfully defended Montecillo in the
lower court. Del Mar was even able to win their counterclaim thus the lower
court ordered Gica to pay Montecillo the adjudged moral damages. Gica
appealed the award of damages to the Court of Appeals where it reversed
the decision of the lower court. Atty. del Mar then filed a motion for
reconsideration where he made a veiled threat against the Court of
Appeals judges intimating that he thinks the CA justices knowingly
rendered an unjust decision and judgment has been rendered through
negligence and that the CA allowed itself to be deceived. The CA denied
the MFR and it admonished Atty. del Mar from using such tone with the
court. Del Mar then filed a second MFR where he again made threats. The
CA then ordered del Mar to show cause as to why he should not be
punished for contempt.
Thereafter, del Mar sent the three CA justices a copy of a letter, which he
sent to the President of the Philippines asking the said justices to consider
the CA judgment. But the CA did not reverse its judgment. Del Mar then
filed a civil case against the justices of the CA before a Cebu lower court
but the civil case was eventually dismissed by reason of a compromise
agreement where del Mar agreed to pay damages to the justices.
Eventually, the CA suspended Atty. del Mar from the practice of law. The
issue reached the Supreme Court. Del Mar asked the SC to reverse his
suspension as well as the CA decision as to the Montecillo case. The SC
denied both and this earned the ire of del Mar as he demanded from the

Clerk of the Supreme Court as to who were the judges who voted against
him. The Supreme Court then directed del Mar to submit an explanation as
to why he should not be disciplined. In his explanation, del Mar also
intimated that even the Supreme Court is part among the corrupt, the
grafters and those allegedly committing injustice. Del Mar even filed a civil
case against some Supreme Court justices but the judge who handled the
case dismissed the same.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Atty. del Mar should be suspended for disrespecting the
Court.
HELD:
Yes, Atty. del Mar should be suspended for uttering disrespectful language
against the justices of the Court of Appeals and issuing veiled threats
against them and even threatening to go to the President of the Philippines
for redress.
RATIO:
Atty. del Mar, by his contemptuous acts, is in violation of his duties to the
courts. The Court said that for a lawyer in the twilight of his life, with
supposed physical and mental ailments at that, who dares to challenge the
integrity and honor of both the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, we
have nothing but commiseration and sympathy for his choosing to close the
book of his long years of law practice not by voluntary retirement with honor
but in disciplinary action with ignominy and dishonor. As an officer of the
court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the court so
essential to the proper administration of justice. It is manifest that del Mar
has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy
ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the
integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust
judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if
not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.
Del Mar assumes that his personal knowledge of the law and his concept of
justice are superior to that of both the Supreme Court and the Court of

Appeals. Del Mar was then suspended from the practice of law indefinitely.
CASTANEDA VS. AGO
G.R. No. L-28546; July 30, 1975
FACTS:
In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson filed a
replevin suit against Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to
recover certain machineries and in 1957, judgment was rendered in favor of
them, ordering Ago to return the machineries or pay definite sums of
money. Ago appealed on this Court, but it affirmed the judgment. After
remand, the trial court issued on August 25, 1961 a writ of execution but
Ago moved for a stay of execution but his motion was denied, and levy was
made on Agos house and lots located in Quezon City. The sheriff then
advertised them for auction sale on October 25, 1961. Ago moved to stop
the auction sale, failing in which he filed a petition for certiorari with the CA,
but it dismissed the petition. Ago thrice attempted to obtain a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of
execution "to save his family house and lot;" his motions were denied, and
the sheriff sold the house and lots on March 9, 1963 to the highest bidders,
the petitioners Castaeda and Henson. Ago failed to redeem and the sheriff
executed the final deed of sale in favor of the vendees Castaeda and
Henson. Upon their petition, the CFI of Manila issued a writ of possession
to the properties.However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his
wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his co- plaintiff, filed a complaint in the CFI of
Quezon City to annul the sheriffs sale on the ground that the obligation of
Pastor Ago upon which judgment was rendered against him in the replevin
suit was his personal obligation, and that Lourdes Yu Agos one-half share
in their conjugal residential house and lots which were levied upon and sold
by the sheriff could not legally be reached for the satisfaction of the
judgment. The CFI of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of preliminary
injunction restraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds and the sheriff
of Quezon City, from registering the latters final deed of sale, from
cancelling the respondents certificates of title and issuing new ones to the
petitioners are from carrying out any writ of possession. A situation thus
arose where what the Manila court had ordered to be done, the Quezon

City court countermanded. While the battle on the matter of the lifting and
restoring of the restraining order was being fought in the Quezon City court,
the Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with this Court but was
dismissed as well as its MR. The respondents then filed a similar petition
for certiorari and prohibition with the CA, but also dismissed it. The Ago
spouses repaired once more to the CA, which denied it, thus they filed a
petition for review in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S:
WON the counsel of the respondents, Atty. Jose M. Luison, have misused
legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction
of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners?
HELD:
Yes. The respondents, with the assistance of their counsel, maneuvered for
14 years to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics
in and from one court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court).
RATIO:
We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who,"far

from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to
use them to subvert the very ends of justice."Forgetting his sacred mission
as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court,
Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and
a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for
compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of
a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice."A counsels
assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his clients cause
must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot
countenance is a lawyers insistence despite the patent futility of his clients
position, as in the case at bar. "It is the duty of a counsel to advise his
client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the
merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his clients cause is
defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce
and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist
the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to
litigate. A lawyers oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty
to his client; its primacy is indisputable."