This document discusses the role of linguistics in statutory interpretation. It begins by defining language and linguistics, noting that linguistics can help identify how a term may be commonly understood or ambiguous. It then discusses the difference between interpreting conventional language versus legislative language in statutes. A key difference is that statutes derive authority from being passed by a competent legislative body. The document explores debates around whether interpretation is solely the court's prerogative or if linguistics can inform interpretation. It acknowledges judges have flexibility in tools used but are not limited to arguments of parties in determining the correct interpretation.
Original Description:
This paper is an endeavour to introduce to the reader, the role of linguistics in statutory interpretation. As an essential precursor to an appreciation of the same, the paper shall initially meander through the fundamental understanding of language and interpretation. Furthermore, the paper shall explore as to what exactly transforms ‘conventional language’ into ‘legislative language’ namely, statutes. Consequently, the modification in the interpretation of statutes from interpretation of ‘conventional language’ if any, shall be discussed.
This discernment shall be the narthex to the essence of the paper, which is the impact and role of the philosophy of language in interpretation of statutes.
This document discusses the role of linguistics in statutory interpretation. It begins by defining language and linguistics, noting that linguistics can help identify how a term may be commo…