People vs.

Narvaez
121 SCRA 389 (1983)
FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by
treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968,
Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia duringthe time the two were constructing a
fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill.
The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and
found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop
destroying his house and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer
responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead." Defendant lost his
"equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was
running towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the
shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved
in a legal battle with the defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over
certain pieces of property. At the time of the shooting, the civil case was still
pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher and
Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his
property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to
avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant received letter terminating contract
because he allegedly didn't pay rent. He was given 6 months to remove his
house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter. Defendant
claims he killed in defense of his person and property. CFI ruled that Narvaez
was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for
moral damages.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the
fact that he acted in defense of his person.
No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the
house of the defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the part of the
victim. However, this
aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights
to property. On the first issue, the courts did not err. However, in
consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30
of the civil code recognizing the right of owners to close and fence their land.
Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to
the article because his ownership of the land being awarded by the
government was still pending, therefore putting ownership into question. It is
accepted that the victim was the original aggressor.
2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted

in defence of his rights.

Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is
applicable only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates
these requisites:
Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression
towards appellant's property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6
months and he should have left him in peace before time was up,
instead of chiseling Narvaez's house and putting up fence. Art. 536 of
the Civil Code also provides that possession may not be acquired
through force or intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that every
possessor has the right to be respected in his possession
Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In
the case, killing was disproportionate to the attack.
Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself.
Here, there was no provocation at all since he was asleep
Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the special
mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC.
These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender and passion and
obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not
murder because treachery is not applicable on account of provocation by the
deceased. Also, assault was not deliberately chosen with view to kill since
slayer acted instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of planning
or preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion
temporal. However, due to mitigating circumstances and incomplete
defense, it can be lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to arrestomayor.
3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable to
pay the civil indemnity due to the offended party.
No. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for nonpayment of civil
indemnity. RA 5465 made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only
and not to reparation of damage caused, indemnification of consequential
damages and costs of proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its
conviction, considering that RA 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a
habitual delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect pursuant to Art. 22 of
the RPC.
Judgment: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances and
extenuating circumstance of incomplete self defense. Penalty is 4 months
arresto mayor and to indemnify
each group of heirs 4,000 w/o subsidiary imprisonment and w/o award for
moral damages. Appellant has already been detained 14 years so his
immediate release is ordered.

Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of property can only be invoked when coupled

with form of attack on person defending property. In the case at bar, this was
not so. Appellant should then be sentenced to prision mayor. However, since
he has served more than that, he should be released.
People vs. Boholst-Caballero
[61 SCRA 180 (1974)]
Facts:
Cunigunda Boholst Caballero seeks reversal of the judgment of the CFI of
Ormoc City finding her guilty of parricideshe allegedly killed her husband,
Francisco Caballero, using a hunting knife. The couple was married in 1956
and had a daughter. They had frequent quarrels due to the husband's
gambling and drinking and there were times when he maltreated and abused
his wife. After more than a year, Francisco abandoned his family. In 1958,
Cunigunda went caroling with her friends and when she was on her way
home she met her husband who suddenly held her by the collar and accused
her of going out for prostitution. Then he said he would kill her, held her by
the hair, slapped her until her nose bled then pushed her towards the
ground. She fell to the ground, he knelt on her and proceeded to choke her.
Cunigunda, having earlier felt a knife tucked in Francisco's belt line while
holding unto his waist so she wouldn't fall to the ground, grabbed the
hunting knife and thrust it into her husband's left side, near the belt line just
above the thigh. He died 2 days after the incident due to the stab wound.
Then she ran home and threw the knife away. The next day, she surrendered
herself to the police along with the torn dress that she wore the night
before.
Issue: Whether or not Cunigunda, in stabbing her husband, acted in
legitimate self-defense
Held:
Yes, she did. Acquitted.
1. Burden if proof of self-defense rests on the accused. In this case, the
location and nature of the stab wound confirms that the said victim, the
husband, was the aggressor.
With her husband kneeling over her and choking her, accused had no other
choice but to pull the knife tucked in his belt line and thrust it into his side.
The fact that the blow landed in the vicinity where the knife was drawn from
is a strong indication of the truth of the testimony of the accused. Based on
the re-enactment of the incident, it was natural for her to use her right hand
to lunge the knife into husband's left side.

2. Three requisites of legitimate self-defense are present

Unlawful aggression. The husband resorting to pushing her to the ground
then choking her just because she was out caroling at night constitutes
unlawful aggression, There was imminent danger of injury.
Reasonable necessity of means employed. While being choked, Cunigunda
had no other recourse but to take hold of the knife and plunge it into
husband's side in order to protect herself. Reasonable necessity does not
depend upon the harm done but on the imminent danger of such injury.
Lack of sufficient provocation. provocation is sufficient when proportionate to
the aggression. In this case, there was no sufficient provocation on the part
of the accused (Cunigunda) to warrant the attack of her husband. All that she
did to provoke an imaginary commission of a wrong in the mind of her
husband was to be out caroling at night.

People vs. Alconga

Facts: On May 27, deceased Silverio Barion, the banker of the card game,
was playing black jack against Maria De Raposo. De Raposo and Alconga
were partners in the game, they had one money. Alconga was seated behind
Barion and he gave signs to De Raposo. Barion, who was suffering losses in
the game, found this out and he expressed his anger at Alconga. The two
almost fought outright this was stopped.
The two met again on May 29. when Alconga was doing his job as a home
guard. While the said accused was seated on a bench in the guardhouse,
Barion came along and said Coroy, this is your breakfast followed by a
swing of his pingahan, a bamboo stick. Alconga avoided the blow by falling
to the ground under the bench with the intention to crawl out of the
guardhouse. A second blow was given by Barion but failed to hit the accused,
hitting the bench instead. Alconga managed to go out of the guardhouse by
crawling on his abdomen. While Barion was about to deliver the 3rd blow,
Alconga fired at him with his revolver, causing him to stagger and hit the
ground. The deceased stood up, drew forth his dagger and directed a blow to
the accused who was able to parry the attack using his bolo. A hand to
handfight ensued. The deceased, looking already beaten and having
sustained several wounds ran away. He was followed by the accused and was
overtaken after 200 meters.
A second fight took place and the deceased received a mortal bolo blow, the
one which slasehde the cranium. The deceased fell face downward besides
many other blows delivered. Alconga surrendered.
Issue: Whether or not self-defense can be used as a defense by Alconga
Held: No. Self-defense cannot be sustained. Alconga guilty of Homicide
The deceased ran and fled w/o having to inflicted so much a scratch to
Alconga, but after, upon the other hand, having been wounded with one
revolver shot and several bolo slashes the right of Alconga to inflict injury
upon him has ceased absolutely/ Alconga had no right to pursue, no right to
kill or injure. He could have only attacked if there was reason to believe that
he is still not safe. In the case at bar, it is apparent that it is Alconga who is
the superior fighter and his safety was already secured after the first fight
ended. There was no more reason for him to further chase Barion. The
second fight will be treated differently and independently. Under the first
fight, self-defense would have been valid, but that is not the case in the

second fight. In the second fight, there was illegal aggression on the part of
Alconga and as a result, he is found guilty of Homicide with no mitigating
circumstance (MC) of Provocation
Note Provocation in order to be an MC must be sufficient and immediately
preceding the act. It should be proportionate to the act committed and
adequate to stir one to its commission
People vs. Luague
[C.A. No. 384, February 21, 1946]
Facts:
Inside the chapel of the 7th day Adventist Church, Amado Capina sat beside
the appellant and with the greatest of impudence, placed his hand on the
upper part of her right thigh. On observing this highly improper and offensive
conduct, Avelina Jaurigue, conscious of her personal dignity and honor,
pulled out a fan knife and stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of
the neck
Amado Capina died from the wound a few minutes later.
Appellant Avelina Jaurigue was subsequently tried and convicted of the crime
of Homicide.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant Jaurige acted in the legitimate defense of her honor
and that she should be completely absolved of all criminal responsibility
Held:
No. The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
The attempt to rape a woman constitutes an unlawful aggression sufficient to
put her in a state of legitimate defense inasmuch as a woman's honor cannot
but be esteemed as a right as precious, if not more than her very existence;
and it is evident that a woman who, thus imperiled, wounds, nay kills the
offender, should be afforded exemption from criminal liability, since such
killing cannot be considered a crime from the moment it became the only
means left for her to protect her honor from so great an outrage (1 Viada,
Codigo Penal, 5th ed., p. 301; People vs. Luague and Alcansare, 62 Phil.,
504). .
As long as there is actual danger of being raped, a woman is justified in
killing her aggressor in the defense of her honor.
When the deceased sat by the side of the appellant on the same bench, near
the door of the barrio chapel and placed his hand on the upper portion of her
right thigh without her consent, the said chapel was lighted with electric

lights, and there were already several people inside the chapel, including her
own father and the barrio lieutenant and other dignitaries of the
organization; and under the circumstances, there was and there could be no
possibility of her being raped. And when she gave Amado Capina a thrust at
his neck, inflicting upon him a mortal wound and causing his death a few
moments later, the means employed by her in the defense of her honor was
evidently excessive; and under the facts and circumstances of the case, she
cannot be legally declared completely exempt from criminal liability.
People of the Philippines vs Bienvenido de la Cruz
Criminal Law - Aggravating Circumstance Evident Premeditation
On December 25, 1996, Timgas joined a cockfight. He let his brother-in-law
de la Cruz install the gaff on his game cock. Unknown to Timgas, de la Cruz
betted against his cock. When Timgas cock won, he was advised to collect
the bet from his brother-in-law, feeling betrayed he challenged de la Cruz
into a fist fight. Cooler heads parted the two. Later de la Cruz returned with a
bolo and hacked to death Timgas.

ISSUE:
Whether or not evident premeditation is present thus making de la Cruz
guilty for murder.

HELD:
No. The following were not shown to concur on the part of de la Cruz:
a.)

Time when he decided to commit the crime,

b.) An overt act showing that de la Cruz clung to his determination to

commit the crime,
c.)
Lapse of a sufficient period of time as to that would allow de la Cruz to
reflect upon the consequences of his act.

In this case, de la Cruz killed Timgas no later than when the fistfight was
over. No sufficient time lapsed for him to plan the killing of Timgas.
Therefore, hes only guilty of homicide.

People vs. Jaurigue

Justifying circumstances are those wherein the acts of the actor are in
accordance with law and, hence, he incurs no criminal and civil liability. The
justifying circumstances by subject are as follows:
1) Self-defense
Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights. (Art. 11, Par. 1) The
scope included self-defense not only of life, but also of rights like those of
chastity, property and honor. It has also been applied to the crime of libel. Its
elements are: a) Unlawful aggression, b) Reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it, c) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part
of the person defending himself.
2) Defense of Relative 3) Defense of Stranger 4) State of Necessity 5)
Fulfillment of duty 6) Obedience to superior order

FACTS:
Avelina Jaurigue and Nicolas Jaurigue, her father, were prosecuted for the
crime of murder for which Nicolas was acquitted while Avelina was found
guilty of homicide. She appealed to the Court of Appeals for Southern Luzon
on June 10, 1944 to completely absolve her of all criminal responsibility for
having acted in defense of her honor, to find in her favour additional
mitigating circumstances and omit aggravating circumstance.
At about 8:00 PM of September 20, 1942, Amado Capina, deceased victim,
went to the chapel of Seventh Day Adventists to attend religious services
and sat at the front bench facing the altar. Avelina Jaurigue entered the
chapel shortly after the arrival of her father for the same purpose and sat on
the bench next to the last one nearest the door. Upon seeing Avelina, Amado
went and sat by Avelinas right side from his seat on the other side of the
chapel, and without saying a word, placed his hand on the upper part of her
right thigh.
Avelina Jaurigue, therafter, pulled out with her right hand the fan knife
which she had in a pocket of her dress with the intention of punishing
Amados offending hand. Amado seized her right hand but she quickly
grabbed the knife on her left hand and stabbed Amado once at the base of
the left side of the neck inflicting upon him a wound about 4 inches deep,

which is mortal.
Nicolas saw Capina bleeding and staggering towards the altar, and upon
seeing his daughter approached her and asked her the reason for her action
to which Avelina replied, Father, I could not endure anymore.
Amado Capina died a few minutes after. Barrio lieutenant, Casimiro Lozada
was there and Avelina surrendered herself. Lozada advised the Jaurigues to
go home immediately for fear of retaliation of Capinas relatives.
EVENTS PRIOR:
One month before that fatal night, Amado Capina snatched Avelinas
handkerchief bearing her nickname while it was washed by her cousin, Josefa
Tapay.
7 days prior to incident (September 13, 1942), Amado approached her and
professed his love for her which was refused, and thereupon suddenly
embraced and kissed her and touched her breasts. She then slapped him,
gave him fist blows and kicked him. She informed her matter about it and
since then, she armed herself with a long fan knife whenever she went out.
2 days after (September 15, 1942), Amado climbed up the house of Avelina
and entered the room where she was sleeping. She felt her forehead and she
immediately screamed for help which awakened her parents and brought
them to her side. Amado came out from where he had hidden and kissed the
hand of Avelinas father, Nicolas.
Avelina received information in the morning and again at 5:00 PM on the
day of the incident (September 20, 1942) that Amado had been falsely
boasting in the neighbourhood of having taken liberties with her person. In
the evening, Amado had been courting the latter in vain.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the defendant should be completely absolved of all criminal
responsibility because she is justified in having acted in the legitimate
defense of her honor.
Whether or not the Court should find the additional mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender, presence of provocation and absence
of intent in her favour
Whether or not committing said offense in a sacred place is an aggravating
circumstance in this case

HELD:
Conviction of defendant is sustained and cannot be declared completely
exempt from criminal liability. To be entitled to a complete self-defense of
chastity, there must be an attempt to rape. To provide for a justifying
circumstance of self-defense, there must be a) Unlawful aggression, b)
Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, c) Lack
of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Attempt
to rape is an unlawful aggression. However, under the circumstances of the
offense, there was no possibility of the defendant to be raped as they were
inside the chapel lighted with electric lights and contained several people.
Thrusting at the base of Capinos neck as her means to repel aggression is
not reasonable but is instead, excessive.
Mitigating circumstances are considered in her favour. Circumstances
include her voluntary and unconditional surrender to the barrio lieutenant,
provocation from the deceased which produced temporary loss of reason and
self-control of the defendant and lack of intent to kill the deceased evidenced
by infliction of only one single wound.
Aggravating circumstance of having committed offense in a sacred place is
not sustained as there is no evidence that the defendant had intended to
murder the deceased when she entered the chapel that night. She killed
under great provocation.
Penalty: For homicide, penalty is reclusion temporal. However, with 3
mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, it is reduced by
two degrees, in this case, prision correccional. Indeterminate Sentence Law
provides the penalty ranging from arresto mayor in its medium degree to
prision correccional in its medium degree.
Avelina is sentenced to 2mos and 1 day of arresto mayor as minimum to 2
years, 4 months, and 1 day of prision correccional as maximum; to indemnify
heirs of Capina in the sum of 2,000; with corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment not to exceed 1/3 of principal penalty and to pay costs. She is
given the benefit of of her preventive imprisonment
SEPARATE OPINION: Hilado questions the validity or nullity of judicial
proceedings in the Japanese-sponsored courts.

US VS Bumanglang
14 Phil 644
Facts:
Rafael Bumanglag, found missing from his granary, 4 baares and 40 manojos
of palay, and the inclosure within which the palay was situated torn down
and partly destroyed. The following morning he discovered a portion of the
missing palay in a field of sugar cane about 100 meters from the granary
from which it was taken. For the purpose of discovering who was the author
of the crime and of bringing him to justice, he secured the assistance of
Gregorio Bundoc, Antonio Ribao, and Saturnino Tumamao, the first being his
cousin and the others his neighbors and friends, to watch with him the
succeeding night in the vicinity of the palay, acting upon the expectation
that the robber would return to secure it. Sometime after dark of the night
succeeding to the robbery, Bumanglag, and the other persons mentioned,
gathered together in said field of sugar cane, near to the palay in question,

placing themselves so as to surround it in a measure, and awaited the

appearance of the malefactor. At about 10 oclock there came into the field
the deceased, Guillermo Ribis, who approached the palay, picked it up, and
started to carry it away. At this moment Bumanglag presented himself in
front of Ribis, stopping his further progress, whereupon Ribis attacked him
viciously with a bolo and they engaged in a hand-to-hand struggle.
Bumanglag, upon finding that he was likely to be killed by the robber
because of his great strength and the fact that he was armed with a bolo,
called for assistance, whereupon his three companions rushed forward and,
seeing the extremity in which Bumanglag was, joined in the struggle for the
purpose of his protection. Within a few minutes Ribis fell to the earth
mortally injured and soon expired.
The court below, however, refused to believe the story of defendants
because of certain alleged contradictory circumstances which appear in the
proofs. These circumstances, as presented by the court below and here
argued by the fiscal, are that (1) while the defendants claim in their
statements and testimony that the deceased attacked Bumanglag with his
bolo, nevertheless, when the body of the decedent was the next day taken
possession of by the justice of the peace, the bolo was still in its sheath; and
(2) that while the defendants stated and testified that they were not armed
with any kind of weapons except bamboo sticks or clubs, still the testimony
of Barba, the sanitary inspector of that district, shows that some of the
wounds upon the body of the deceased were made with sharp instruments.
Upon these two circumstances, impugning, as it is alleged they do, the
evidence of the defendants in their own behalf, the court below found the
defendants guilty of homicide.
Issue:
WON the accused are exempted from criminal responsibility of homicide.
Ruling:
It is therefore indisputable that, without any prior illegal aggression and the
other requisites which would fully or partially exempt the accused from
criminal responsibility, the appellant and his two companions assaulted
Guillermo Ribis with sticks and cutting and stabbing arms, inflicting upon him
serious and mortal wounds, and therefore, the said accused is guilty of the
crime of homicide as co-principal by direct participation, fully convicted,
together with his codefendants who are already serving their sentence.
In the commission of the crime we should take into account the mitigating
circumstance of the Penal Code, because the defendant acted with loss of
reason and self-control on seeing that Guillermo Ribis was taking material
possession of the palay seized and hidden by him on the previous night, thus
committing one of the numerous unlawful acts perpetrated at that place, to

the damage and prejudice of those who, by their labor endeavor to provide
themselves with the necessary elements for their subsistence and that of
their families. The special circumstance established by the same code should
be also considered in favor of the accused, in view of the erroneous and
quite general belief that it is legal to punish, even to excess the thief who, in
defiance of law and justice, while refusing to work, devotes himself to
depriving his neighbors of the fruits of their arduous labors; these two
circumstances are considered in the present case as especially admissible,
without any aggravating circumstance, and they determine, according to the
Penal Code, the imposition of the penalty immediately inferior to that
prescribed by the law, and in its minimum degree.

People vs Toledo
Facts:
This is a case of homicide against Toledo. Morales and Holgado agreed to a
bolo duel over a parcel of land.Toledo allegedly intervened in the duel that
dealt a mortal blow to Morales. Holgado executed a written testimony that
during the duel there is no one present but him and the victim.
Issue:
Whether or not the statement executed by Holgado (a statement of fact
against penal interest) be admitted as evidence.
Held:

Any man outside of a court and unhampered by the pressure of technical

procedure, unreasoned rules of evidence, and cumulative authority, would
say that if a man deliberately acknowledged himself to be the perpetrator of
a crime and exonerated the person charged with the crime, and there was
other evidence indicative of the truthfulness of the statement, the accused
man should not be permitted to go to prison or to the electric chair to
expiate a crime he never committed.
The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay
rule is that the extrajudicial and unsworn statement of another is not the
best method of serving this purpose. In other words, the great possibility of
the fabrication of falsehoods, and the inability to prove their untruth, requires
that the doors be closed to such evidence. So long therefore as a declarant is
available as a witness, his extrajudicial statement should not be heard.
Where, however, the declarant is dead or has disappeared, his previous
statements, out of court, if not inadmissible on other grounds, are the best
evidence. But they are not rendered inadmissible by the mere fact that the
declarant is unavailable, something else is necessary. One fact which will
satisfy this necessity is that the declaration is or was against the declarant's
interest, and this is because no sane person will be presumed to tell a
falsehood to his own detriment.