Citizenk

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K of citizenship Page 1 of 28
SHELL.............................................................................................................................................................2
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SHELL.............................................................................................................................................................7
LINK: CITIZENSHIP....................................................................................................................................8
LINK: CITIZENSHIP....................................................................................................................................9
LINK: INSTITUTIONS...............................................................................................................................10
CITIZENSHIP » CAP..................................................................................................................................11
AT: “WE CHANGE CITIZENSHIP”.........................................................................................................12
AT: PERM.....................................................................................................................................................13
AT: FLOATING PICS..................................................................................................................................14
ALT SOLVENCY/EXTENSIONS...............................................................................................................15
AFF SOLVENCY TAKE OUTS..................................................................................................................24
I'm dealing with this the same way I dealt with my own alcoholism and drug addiction... with lies and delusion.
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SHELL
A. The 1AC holds up United States citizenship as the ideal which should
frame our responsibility to the other, however this model is
problematic as citizenship is a flawed concept—one whose sole
purpose is of creating distinction and determining who is worthy
Michaelson and Shershow 2005, Scott and Scott Cutler, Why work
on rights? Citizenship, welfare and property in empire and beyond,
theory & event, volume 8, issue 4, 2005
It is no accident that citizenship, here in Balibar, and literally

everywhere else in the theoretical literature, is explicitly understood as
a certain kind of labor, education, and moral elevation: in short, as a
work.2 Citizenship always takes the form of a work, and is exclusive on
the basis of work. As Giorgio Agamben puts it, following Aristotle, citizenship is an "additional capacity" of the singular being that must be
actualized (Agamben 7). Modern citizenship is therefore the product of what Charles
W. Mills calls the "moral contract," a contract originally supplemental to

the presumably foundational "political contract" but which has become
primary following the acknowledgement that the political contract is
merely an inaugurating fiction (Mills 10 ff.).
Plato, perhaps, is first to demonstrate the way in which a universal

potential for citizenship is necessarily combined with a judgment of
capability:
Zeus, therefore, fearing the total destruction of our race, sent Hermes to impart to men the qualities of respect for others and a sense of justice, so as to bring order into
our cities and create a bond of friendship and union.Hermes asked Zeus in what manner he was to bestow these gifts on men. "Shall I distribute them as the arts were
distributed -- that is, on the principle that one trained doctor suffices for many laymen, and so with the other experts? Shall I distribute justice and respect for their fellows
in this way, or to all alike?""To all," said Zeus. "Let all have their share. There could never be cities if only a few shared in these virtues, as in the arts. Moreover, you must
lay it down as my law that if anyone is incapable of acquiring his share of these two virtues he shall be put to death as a plague to the city." (Protagoras 320)
Here, even though "all" should "have their share" of citizenship virtues
(including "a respect for others" and "a sense of justice"), it is

presumed that at least some will be found "incapable" of achieving
these lofty aims, and these shall be "put to death" (a particularly extreme form of second class citizenship).
In more modern formulations of citizenship, the same question of

fitness and the same structure of exclusion is always at the forefront.
Hobbes, for example, in De Cive (The Citizen) (1651), makes clear that
the educational elevation necessary for citizenship must be subject to
a determination of "fitness":
all men, because they are born in infancy, are born unapt for society. Many also, perhaps most men, either through defect of mind or
want of education, remain unfit during the whole course of their lives; yet have they, infants as well as those of riper years, a human
nature. Wherefore man is made fit for society not by nature, but by education. Further, although man were born in such a condition as
to desire it, it follows not, that he therefore were born fit to enter into it. For it is one thing to desire, another to be in capacity fit for
what we desire. (Hobbes 110)
And while other social contractarians phrase the question of the education and labor of
the citizen in more inviting terms -- for example, Rousseau, in The Social Contract
(1762) -- the structural limit to inclusion remains: his [the citizen's] faculties are exercised and developed, his ideas
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enlarged, his sentiments ennobled, his entire soul elevated to such an extent, that if the abuses of this new condition did not often degrade him to beneath the condition he has left,
he should ceaselessly bless the happy moment which wrested him from it forever, and out of a stupid and bounded animal made an intelligent being and a man. (Rousseau 53)
citizenship remains a category

Rousseau's formulation is fundamentally the same as the Hobbesian one to the extent that
of distinction, here in relation to a "stupid and bounded animal." In either case, the citizen
necessarily is a labor which elevates one above the level of the beast,
thereby establishing the (non)domain of the beast (or what Agamben
will call "bare life") in relation to it. Thus traditional models of citizenship cannot
and do not evade the determination of what one recent commentator
calls "strangers" -- figures who do not need to be treated as "human
being[s]" (Oldfield 81). Indeed, much later in the text, Rousseau produces a passage resonant with Plato's Protagoras, arguing that the social contract
depends upon a "purely civil profession of faith," or "sentiments of sociability," such that:
Without being able to oblige anyone to believe them, the Sovereign may banish from the State anyone who does not believe them; it may banish them, not as impious but
as unsociable, as incapable of sincerely loving the laws, justice, and, if need be of sacrificing his life to his duty. If anyone, after having publicly acknowledged these same
dogmas, behaves as if he did not believe them, let him be punished with death. (Rousseau 150)
SHELL
B. The Aff makes a fatal flaw in linking rights to the notions of
citizenship... this is a violent act which leads to diminished rights for
others
Kerber 2005, Linda K, Professor, University of Iowa, Toward a History of Statelessness in
America, American Quarterly 57.3 (2005) 727-749
The work of Hannah Arendt is a crucial starting point for any examination of statelessness. She
calls our attention to ironies of the era of the democratic revolutions of the eighteenth century
when civil and human rights were reconceptualized. Americans speak of inalienable rights, the
French of the "rights of man"—abstractions that gain power from not being rooted in time or
place. Yet both democratic revolutions, Arendt points out, situated the practice of those rights in
the context of the new national sovereignty. Revolutionaries [End Page 731] were convinced that
true freedom and true popular sovereignty could be attained only with full national emancipation,
that is, within a nation. Inadvertently, as Arendt saw it, they left in limbo people who lacked their
own national government. Thus one of our major inheritances from the era of democratic
revolutions, an era that generally we honor for its expansive vision, is a narrow understanding of
individual human rights. Arendt finds herself thinking Burke was right:
The Rights of Man, after all, had been defined as "inalienable" because they were supposed to be
independent of all governments; but it turned out that the moment human beings lacked their own
government and had to fall back on their minimum rights, no authority was left to protect them
and no institution was willing to guarantee them. . . . [Instead,] civil rights—that is the varying
rights of citizens in different countries—were supposed to embody and spell out in the form of
tangible laws the eternal Rights of Man, which by themselves were supposed to be independent
of citizenship and nationality. All human beings were citizens of some kind of political community;
if the laws of their country did not live up to the demands of the Rights of Man, they were
expected to change them, by legislation in democratic countries or through revolutionary action in
despotisms.15
What was "supposedly inalienable, proved to be unenforceable," Arendt observed. It is a sad

irony.
The transformations that we call the era of the democratic revolution—asserting as they did an
increase of freedom and civil liberties—simultaneously drew new boundaries and thickened
already existing ones until nations constructed themselves out of provinces, principalities,
Army 2006 KR and SW
counties, and townships. As Robert Wiebe brilliantly discerned, the democratic transformations of
the late eighteenth century paradoxically gathered an increasingly mobile population, one no
longer tied to the soil, into populations fictively tied to a nation. Systematized citizenship had its
advantages for the state; it simplified taxation, it provided an identifiable pool of male citizens
vulnerable to military conscription. And in these redefinitions, it might be added, the space
between those who belonged to a state and those who lacked one expanded.16
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SHELL
C. By bestowing citizenship, or the rights of citizenship, upon certain
people the Aff causes some people to be invested with inherent value,
but this valuation of life inevitably reduces the value of many lives to
the zero point of holocaust
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SHELL
D. In order to solve for the harms perpetrated upon those held in Gitmo
we cannot merely hold out the trappings of citizenship as a distant
hope on the horizon but rather be ever mindful of our duty to the
Other... as such in order to solve for the harms of the 1AC we must
identify with and open ourselves to the arrival of the refugee.
Continued.....
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SHELL
[2/2]
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Link: citizenship
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Link: Citizenship
Conceptualizations of what citizenship is constructs an ‘other’ in its lack… such habits exemplify
American exceptionalism
Statelessness is a subject that most historians of the United States have treated as though it
belongs to others—Jews, Gypsies, Palestinians. That U.S. history is taken to be innocent of
engagement with the subject is yet another example of the habits of American exceptionalism.
Since the meanings of statelessness have changed over time, the subject is one that should command the attention of historians as well as humanitarians. In
recent years, when some boundaries between states have become more plastic, "statelessness" has been given a positive valence in the form of
cosmopolitanism, flexible citizenships, multiple citizenships; statelessness can be made to sustain a dream of unboundedness.13 The dreamers include many
citizens of the member states of the European Union, whose passports carry them over the borders of twenty-five countries, and hundreds of thousands of people
who hold more than one passport, often wealthy people with property on two continents. For these people, a destabilized citizenship is an enriched citizenship, and
ties to a particular state seem less important than they once were. Such people speak cheerfully of multiplied citizenships, a comfortable cosmopolitanism, being a
citizen of the world—an empowered status, an enlargement of the traditional relationship of subject to king, citizen to nation. If citizenship is about what might be
called statefullness, then some people are rich in it.
When we speak informally of citizenship, the "other" is often constructed as the citizen of another
state—the citizen of Mexico, of Japan, rather than of the United States—and is directed to a
different line in customs. Or the "other" [End Page 730] might be someone with doubled
citizenship and dual passports, the enriched citizenship of the multiply stated. But even the
enriched state is defined by borders; inside those borders are citizens and subjects, their identity
secured by passports. In fact, the ultimate "other" to citizenship lies in its absence, in lack, in
statelessness. It is possible that the state needs its negation in order to know itself. "The
boundaries of a state's identity are secured by the representation of [what counts as] danger,"
David Campbell has observed; a full decade before 9/11 Campbell sensed "a general disquiet
about the pervasive nature of ambiguity and uncertainty." Our post-9/11 moment intensifies
Campbell's challenge to historians: "What functions have difference, danger, and otherness
played in constituting the identity of the United States?"14 To historicize statelessness is to write a
history of the practices of race, gender, labor, and ideology, a history of extreme otherness and
extreme danger.
The nightmare of statelessness—of the man or woman without a country—exists everywhere in our own time. But the contours of statelessness are now
Statelessness is in part the description of a status,
somewhat different from those Hannah Arendt limned a half century ago.
fixed in its contemporary moment. But statelessness is also a condition that changes over time,
dynamically created and re-created by sovereignties in their own interests, defining the vulnerable
in ways that affirm the invulnerable, and in the process revealing changing domestic values and
changing power relations across international boundaries. As the meanings of work, racial
identity, and gender identity have shifted over time under the stress of war, political struggles,
global economic relations, and developing ideologies, vulnerability to statelessness has been
reconfigured. To examine the phenomenon as it now presents itself—in the context of new turn-
of-the-century wars, in the context of American fears of terrorism, and when, as likely as not, it's
the woman who lacks the country—and to attempt to place the matter in the long course of U.S.
history, is a long overdue exercise.
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Link: Institutions
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Citizenship » Cap
Cap link—citizenship is linked to the concept of work and who has
rights to said work—thereby creating and perpetuating a system of
exclusion
Michaelson and Shershow 2005, Scott and Scott Cutler, Why work on rights?
Citizenship, welfare and property in empire and beyond, theory & event, volume 8, issue
4, 2005
There are, perhaps, at least three distinct ways of thinking the general problem of work in
relation to citizenship. First are the traditional sorts of "political obligations," such as
military service, loyalty, voting, and the like. In a great many cases, schedules of rights have such matters built right into them. A very clear and
4
straightforward example, the "American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man" (1948), argues in its "Preamble":
The fulfillment of duty by each individual is a prerequisite to the rights of all. Rights and duties are interrelated in every social and political activity of man. While rights exalt individual
liberties, duties express the dignity of that liberty. (Brownlie 489)
The first draft of the United Nations' "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," drafted by socialist John Humphrey, similarly declared in its "Preamble": "That man does not have rights only; he owes duties to
the society of which he forms part" (Glendon 271). It is thus no accident that formulations of rights always entail some norm and form of reciprocity, some particular-to-open-ended idea of duty or obligation which
operates as the hinge for citizenship's exclusivity.
Second is the relationship between citizenship and the traditional domain of labor.
Here, as Judith N. Shklar has noted with reference to the United States, "We are citizens
only if we earn" (67). Shklar's formulation, much like Nikolas Rose's in Governing the Soul (1991), focuses specifically on how
the work-ethic proper serves as a crucial criterion for judging individual citizens. U.S. immigration
law allows us to nuance this problem yet further, and explore the fundamental bourgeois tilt to the system. For instance, the Immigration Act of 1990 heavily restricts occupational visas for "unskilled workers"
relative to those with college degrees, advanced degrees, or "extraordinary ability" in arts, science, education, business, and athletics, in a ratio of 1-12 (10,000 versus 120,000 visas per year) (Hing 108).5 And the
increasing politicization and militarization of the U.S.-Mexican border is, of course, directly related to such law, producing, in the borderlands, a permanent race-camp of diminished or second-class citizenship
among those perceived as relatively valueless and highly fungible in terms of the production of capital.6
The third and most general way of connecting citizenship and labor is, however, what interests us most here:
that the very form of citizenship is itself commonly understood as a Work. The bare
minimum of the moral contract is the labor that is the citizen, and this labor takes the
form of a certain moral elevation, education, or self-working which makes one qualified
or fit for any sort of citizenship -- and which therefore makes possible every other kind
of social exclusion. Both Mills and Carole Pateman, in, respectively, The Racial Contract and The Sexual Contract, have identified the clear and total pattern of social contract exclusion
along lines of gender and race. We are suggesting here something even more fundamental with regard to what a being of animality or particularity must accomplish in terms of a labor of self-fashioning in order to be
a citizen and enter into the general democratic will. The racial and sexual exclusions of the social contract are, from this perspective, subsets of a more general problem.
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AT: “we change citizenship”

Even the most benign and universalizing attempts at utilizing the
conception of citizenship are violent exclusive acts
Michaelson and Shershow 2005, Scott and Scott Cutler, Why work on rights?
Citizenship, welfare and property in empire and beyond, theory & event, volume 8, issue
4, 2005
In other words, citizenship -- even an allegedly global or universal citizenship -- will

always be an exclusive formulation, open to judgment and determination of who is in and
who is out. And Hardt and Negri transparently reveal the hinge for such exclusion, given their dual thresholds of productive achievement -- one keyed to productive
labor, and the other to affective community. As Schuck and Smith note, Locke, Rousseau, Hobbes, and the like are all aligned in producing a notion of
citizenship which has the "potential for discriminatory exclusion" (Schuck and Smith 11; see also 27), and Hardt and
Negri merely recapitulate and intensify this form, "squaring" it.
Hardt and Negri, of course, have not set out to do this; indeed, Negri explicitly claims that they have, by contrast, superseded the whole of modern political philosophy: "The
theory that goes from Marsilio to Hobbes and from Althusius to Schmitt is finished. Empire marks a new theoretical threshold" (Negri and Zolo 23-24). Hardt and Negri thus
it is far from clear that

seem to think that a certain limit internationalism need not worry about the theory and history of the citizen and the State. But
global citizenship can ever overcome the Schmittian logic of the political. As Carl
Schmitt argues, "A world state which embraces the entire globe and all of humanity
cannot exist;" and "whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat" by pretending that global
polities might no longer require "enemies," and no longer exclude (Schmitt 53, 54). In
particular, a global concept of citizenship tethered to productive labor must always in
principle work against those figures of bare life who appear to be in "lazy" opposition to
such citizenship; a dominating power dynamic inheres between the one world and all
those who are not "one" with it. Even if nationality is no longer pitted against nationality,
such a world will remain in perpetual conflict with its anarchically-conceived others
whom it constantly is "prepar[ing] to discipline" (Ashley 267). As Hegel argues, the
point or moment at which the state "is most supremely its own" is doubly conditioned by
war against other states, and by actions against "barbarians . . . who lag behind them in
institutions which are the essential moments of the state" (Hegel para. 323, 351). With
regard to such non-stated or de-stated peoples, the state "treats their autonomy as only a
formality" (Hegel para. 351). This is the inevitable shape of the universalized globe, so
long as one maintains the bond between work and citizenship. And while it must be noted that Hardt and Negri
mark their prescriptions as tentative, and as merely first steps, the inquiry we make here concerns whether their work on citizenship should be judged as a step at all, in any
direction (Hardt and Negri 400).
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AT: Perm
1. Perm masks the harms of the plan— the plan text means that the tools of empire are
still used to measure rights. Extend the _________________ evidence which
demonstrate the flawed framework of the 1AC
2. No textual basis—it is impossible to perm when what the perm incorporates of the K is
indeterminate and the alternatives are fundamentally mutually exclusive
3. Incorporation is a replan- by allowing the Aff to reformulate the assumptions of their

policy when we kritik those flaws crushes our ground in the same way as if they had
replanned after we ran a disad. This is a voting issue for fairness and ground.
4. Perm is illegitimate- the aff is responsible for the totality of the claims, advances and
underlying assumptions of the 1AC. Severing to perm fails to escape the Aff’s
endorsement of empire
5. The perm seeks to combine a productive political framework with an unproductive

one, the existence of the links functionally link-turns their position
6. Perm is like driving up to a stop light and trying to turn left and right at the same
time.... means the perm is even less productive then the K or case alone
7. Links function as reasons to reject the permutation unless the sever part of the 1AC.
A. Severance is a moving target
B. Argumentatively irresponsible
C. Decreases education is they can’t decide what their case even is
D. This is a voting issue for fairness and ground
8. This creates disingenuous advocacy – if the aff could just take our args as suggestions
for minor repairs then they would never have to defend their position of the 1AC which
undermines argumentative responsibility and education
9. Perm conditionalizes the 1AC. It is an admission of guilt and a concession that the 1ac
is not good enough on its own, so you should vote neg
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AT: floating PICs

1. We’re not a floating anything... we have a text and stick with it—the text is the tag and
the alternative card
2. Don’t punish us because we solve for the harms of case... its the same thing as a good
c/p debate and increase education on the depth of issues in the 1AC
3. Plan texts are inherently vague and can always be redefined and reinterpreted—
vagueness is a feature of language
4. Provides for the best ed because we analyze deep portions of the debate, talk about the
specifics of the evidence and make better impact analysis
5. The mutual exclusivity of the Plan and alternative checks any abuse the aff might
dream up
6. There is no abuse in round and no reason to vote against us on this argument
7. Parametrics checks, this is the best division of ground—the aff has an infinite amount
of prep time to choose their ground from all of the possible topical iterations therefore
any part of the 1AC we choose to kritik is fair game
8. Increases argumentative responsibility – forces the aff to defend what they have done
in the 1ac
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Alt Solvency/Extensions
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Continued...
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[2/2]
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Continued...
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[2/2]
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AFF Solvency Take Outs

Their solvency mechanism fails: even US citizens have had their rights
takes away
Imprisonment heightens vulnerability. Citizenship in one country has long been a fragile claim to
protection for those in the prisons of another country, but that fragility has been heightened in
American military prisons of the post–cold war era, which Amnesty International has recently
decried as twenty-first century "gulags" in which even U.S. citizenship has not assured prisoners
of the civil rights of citizens, such as the right to counsel. U.S. citizens captured in post-9/11
conflicts have been declared to be "enemy combatants" and denied, for varying periods of time,
the right to consult their own lawyers. The United States held Yaser Esam Hamdi incommunicado
for three years, "without any semblance of normal legal process or rights despite his citizenship."
After the U.S. Supreme Court intervened, Hamdi, who was born in Baton Rouge, was finally
allowed to leave the country, but only at the price of relinquishing his citizenship.10
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US CITIZENS CAN BE DENIED THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. THE
CASE OF HAMDI, A US CITIZEN DETAINED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE, PROVES.
Stumpf 2004 (Juliet. “Citizens of an Enemy Land: Enemy Combatants, Aliens, and the
Constitutional Rights of the Pseudo-Citizen” 38 UC Davis Law Review 79. November,
2004.)
In the fall of 2001, the Northern Alliance n21 captured Yaser Esam Hamdi in
Afghanistan. They then turned him over to the U.S. military along with other prisoners.
n22 When the U.S. military discovered that Hamdi was a U.S. citizen, they transferred
him from a detention camp in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to the Norfolk Naval Station Brig
in Virginia. n23
Unlike Padilla, Hamdi did not grow up in the United States. He was born in Baton
Rouge, Louisiana, but his family moved to Saudi Arabia when he was a young child. n24
In contrast to the searching media inquiry [*83] into Padilla's U.S. childhood, n25
neither the media nor the courts have shed much light on Hamdi's background. According
to the petition his father filed on his behalf, Hamdi resided in Afghanistan when Northern
Alliance forces detained him. n26 The Department of Defense alleges that he served with
the Taliban and was captured with an assault rifle. n27 Like Padilla, President Bush has
labeled Hamdi an "enemy combatant." n28 And, like Padilla, the Department of Defense
has detained Hamdi in a military brig incommunicado and, until recently, without access
to legal counsel. n29 The United States has brought no charges against either detainee.
n30
On January 8, 2003, the Fourth Circuit upheld the military's detention of Hamdi, n31
ruling that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not require the government to
provide him with a criminal trial. n32 Portraying Hamdi as a foreigner who "may not
have renounced his American citizenship," n33 the opinion described his U.S. citizenship
as accidentally obtained and characterized his connection with the U.S. community as
minimal at best. n34 Consistent with that portrayal, the opinion relied upon rules that
govern the scope of constitutional protections for non-citizens. n35 It applied the plenary
power doctrine, which calls for extraordinary judicial deference to the executive and
legislative branches and diminished constitutional protections when those branches act
within the spheres of immigration, national security, or foreign policy. n36 The plenary
power doctrine was created in part to [*84] govern individuals deemed outside the
social contract embodied in the Constitution, such as non-citizens. n37 This was the first
time that a court had applied the plenary power doctrine to a U.S. citizen in the United
States alleged to be an unlawful combatant.
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US COURTS CAN AND ROUTINELY USE PLENARY POWERS TO STRIP
EVEN US CITIZENS OF THEIR RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS.
2004.)
This is, I believe, the only way in which all those subject to U.S. jurisdiction can be
assured of both liberty and security. To accept the government's assertion that "we" will
be safer by sacrificing some of our liberties is to become complicit in a process which
systematically sacrifices the protections of those deemed Other for the benefit of a
narrowly defined and privileged class within the citizenry. To attempt to address this
disparity by insisting that noncitizens be extended the same rights as citizens disregards
the reality that large sectors of those formally deemed citizens are routinely denied the
protections of the Constitution and international law. Ignoring this reality will not make it
disappear; if we are to change it, we must directly confront the longstanding and ongoing
United States' policy of exercising plenary power over peoples under its jurisdiction,
unconstrained by the rule of law.
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THE SUPREME COURT ALREADY COLLAPSED THE BOUNDARIES
BETWEEN CITIZEN AND DETAINEE, STRIPPING BOTH OF ANY RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS, AND PROVIDING EVEN LESS CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTIONS.
2004.)
The Supreme Court failed to resolve the puzzle posed by these two cases. It disposed
of Padilla on procedural grounds without reaching the merits of Padilla's habeas claims.
In Hamdi, four opinions without a clear majority splintered around the significance of
citizenship to the constitutional reach of federal power over detained individuals. A
plurality determined that any individual, whether citizen or alien, who the government
detains as an enemy combatant is entitled to a "meaningful opportunity" to challenge that
designation. n42 That opportunity, however, may be satisfied by a military trial and by a
process that grants significant presumptions and procedural advantages to the
government. n43
Like the Fourth Circuit, the plurality collapsed the categories of citizen and alien, and
drew from authority governing aliens. n44 In effect, it permitted the legislative and
executive branches to exert plenary power over the detained citizen. As a result, Hamdi
solidified the creation of a new category of pseudo-citizens with lesser constitutional
protection against government action. In dissent, Scalia and Stevens chastised the
plurality for failing to distinguish between citizens and aliens. n45 They argued that
citizenship invokes the constitutional protections of a criminal trial and the jurisdiction of
a federal court. n46
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Turn: the Plan leads to Plenary Power being used to justify trampling
over the rights of citizens and pseudo-citizens alike—the overreach of
Federal power has historically lead to great injustices particularly over
Native American peoples
2004.)
The roots of the plenary power doctrine emerged through judicial decisions about non-
citizens that reflected an expanded legislative and executive branch power over groups
considered outside of the social contract. In the early 1800s, prior to Milligan, both
Native Americans and Chinese immigrants were considered citizens of foreign states, and
Congress barred them from naturalizing as U.S. citizens. n128 The Supreme Court used
the enumerated powers doctrine to limit the federal government's power over Native
Americans to the constitutional provisions that expressly addressed them. n129
Beginning two decades after Milligan, the Court reversed its reliance on the
enumerated powers doctrine and invoked membership principles to justify expanding
federal power over both Native Americans and immigrants. In separate decisions, the
Court described both communities as aberrant states, existing within but apart from the
nation. In United States v. Kagama, the Court held that Congress had authority to
legislate a criminal code specifically for Native Americans. n130 The Court based its
decision in part on a view of Native Americans that excluded them as a community from
equal membership in the polity. As dependents of the federal government, the tribes were
fully within the "exclusive sovereignty" of the government: "The power of the General
Government over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in
numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom
they dwell." n131 Later, the Court would describe the Native Americans as "wards of the
nation," "in a state of [*100] pupilage," and as such subject to federal plenary authority.
n132
This child-like relationship with the federal government left no room for conceiving
of the tribes as equal parties to the constitutional contract. Greater federal power over
these groups followed naturally from their status as wards and pupils in need of
protection and tutelage. They were incapable of equal membership with those "among
whom they dwelt." Greater federal power and the lack of equal membership went hand-
in-hand with lesser constitutional protections for the tribes. n133

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Army 2006 KR and SW

It is no accident that citizenship, here in Balibar, and literally

W. Mills calls the "moral contract," a contract originally supplemental to

Plato, perhaps, is first to demonstrate the way in which a universal

(including "a respect for others" and "a sense of justice"), it is

In more modern formulations of citizenship, the same question of

citizenship remains a category

What was "supposedly inalienable, proved to be unenforceable," Arendt observed. It is a sad

AT: “we change citizenship”

In other words, citizenship -- even an allegedly global or universal citizenship -- will

it is far from clear that

3. Incorporation is a replan- by allowing the Aff to reformulate the assumptions of their

5. The perm seeks to combine a productive political framework with an unproductive

AT: floating PICs

6. There is no abuse in round and no reason to vote against us on this argument

AFF Solvency Take Outs

AFF Solvency Take Outs

AFF Solvency Take Outs

AFF Solvency Take Outs

AFF Solvency Take Outs

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