Admin Set 2 (Fulltxt)

PEOPLE V MACEREN
This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh
w ater fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries
Commission.
On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino
and Carlito del Rosario w ere charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court
of Sta. Cruz, Laguna w ith having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.
It w as alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted
to electro fishing in the w aters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz by "using their ow n motor
banca, equipped w ith motor; w ith a generator colored green with attached dynamo colored
gray or somew hat w hite; and electrocuting device locally know n as sensored w ith a
somew hat webbed copper wire on the tip or other end of a bamboo pole w ith electric wire
attachment w hich was attached to the dynamo direct and w ith the use of these devices or
equipments catches fish thru electric current, which destroy any aquatic animals w ithin its
cuffed reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace" (Criminal Case No. 5429).
Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The prosecution
appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the order of dismissal (Civil Case
No. SC-36). The case is now before this Court on appeal by the prosecution under Republic
Act No. 5440.
The low er court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not
an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in section I I of the Fisheries Law and
that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances.
The low er court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the
executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlaw ful.
(a)
Philippine w aters or territorial waters of the Philippines' includes all w aters of the
Philippine Archipelago, as defined in the t betw een the United States and Spain, dated
respectively the tenth of December, eighteen hundred ninety eight and the seventh of
November, nineteen hundred. For the purpose of this order, rivers, lakes and other bodies of
fresh waters are included.
(b)
Electro Fishing. Electro fishing is the catching of fish w ith the use of electric
current. The equipment used are of many electrical devices w hich may be battery or
generator-operated and from and available source of electric current.
(c)
'Persons' includes firm, corporation, association, agent or employee.
(d)
'Fish' includes other aquatic products.
SEC. 2. Prohibition. It shall be unlaw ful for any person to engage in electro fishing or
to catch fish by the use of electric current in any portion of the Philippine w aters except for
research, educational and scientific purposes which must be covered by a permit issued by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources w hich shall be carried at all times.
SEC. 3. Penalty. Any violation of the provisions of this Administrative Order shall subject
the offender to a fine of not exceeding five hundred pesos (P500.00) or imprisonment of not
extending six (6) months or both at the discretion of the Court.
SEC. 4. Repealing Provisions. All administrative orders or parts thereof inconsistent
w ith the provisions of this Administrative Order are hereby revoked.
SEC. 5. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect six (60) days after its
publication in the Office Gazette.
As legal background, it should be stated that section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the
use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance" in fishing.
On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the
recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 841, amending section 2 of Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting the ban against electro
fishing to fresh water fisheries (63 O.G. 9963).
Section 76 of the same law punishes any person w ho uses an obnoxious or poisonous
substance in fishing w ith a fine of not more than five hundred pesos nor more than five
thousand, and by imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than five years.
Thus, the phrase "in any portion of the Philippine w aters" found in section 2, was changed
by the amendatory order to read as follow s: "in fresh water fisheries in the Philippines, such
as rivers, lakes, sw amps, dams, irrigation canals and other bodies of fresh w ater."
It is notew orthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish .electro fishing."
Notw ithstanding the silence of the law , the Secretary of A griculture and Natural Resources,
upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224), prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine w aters.
The order is quoted below : +.wph!1
The Court of First Instance and the prosecution (p. 11 of brief) assumed that electro fishing
is punishable under section 83 of the Fisheries Law (not under section 76 thereof), which
provides that any other violation of that law "or of any rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder shall subject the offender to a fine of not more than tw o hundred pesos (P200),
or in t for not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court."
SUBJECT: PROHIBITING ELECTRO FISHING IN ALL WATERS +.w ph!1
That assumption is incorrect because 3 of the aforequoted Administrative Order No. 84

imposes a fm of not exceeding P500 on a person engaged in electro fishing, w hich amount
the 83. It seems that the Department of Fisheries prescribed their own penalty for swift fishing
w hich penalty is less than the severe penalty imposed in section 76 and which is not Identified
to the at penalty imposed in section 83.
OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Pursuant to Section 4 of Act No. 4003, as amended, and Section 4 of R.A. No. 3512, the
follow ing rules and regulations regarding the prohibition of electro fishing in all w aters of the
Philippines are promulgated for the information and guidance of all concerned.+.wph!1
SECTION 1. Definition. Words and terms used in this Order 11 construed as follow s:
Had Administrative Order No. 84 adopted the fighter penalty prescribed in on 83, then the
crime of electro fishing w ould be w ithin the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior court
(Sec. 44 [f], Judiciary Law ; People vs. Ragasi, L-28663, September 22,
We have discussed this pre point, not raised in the briefs, because it is obvious that the crime
of electro fishing w hich is punishable w ith a sum up to P500, falls w ithin the concurrent
original jurisdiction of the inferior courts and the Court of First instance (People vs. Nazareno,
L-40037, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 531 and the cases cited therein).
And since the instant case w as filed in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, a provincial
capital, the order of d rendered by that municipal court w as directly appealable to the Court,
not to the Court of First Instance of Laguna (Sec. 45 and last par. of section 87 of the Judiciary
Law ; Esperat vs. Avila, L-25992, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 596).
It results that the Court of First Instance of Laguna had no appellate jurisdiction over the
case. Its order affirming the municipal court's order of dismissal is void for lack of motion.
This appeal shall be treated as a direct appeal from the municipal court to this Court. (See
People vs. Del Rosario, 97 Phil. 67).
In this appeal, the prosecution argues that Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 w ere not
issued under section 11 of the Fisheries Law w hich, as indicated above, punishes fishing by
means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance. This contention is not w ell-taken because,
as already stated, the Penal provision of Administrative Order No. 84 implies that electro
fishing is penalized as a form of fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance
under section 11.
The prosecution cites as the legal sanctions for the prohibition against electro fishing in fresh
w ater fisheries (1) the rule-making pow er of the Department Secretary under section 4 of the
Fisheries Law ; (2) the function of the Commissioner of Fisheries to enforce the provisions of
the Fisheries Law and the regulations Promulgated thereunder and to execute the rules and
regulations consistent w ith the purpose for the creation of the Fisheries Commission and for
the development of fisheries (Sec. 4[c] and [h] Republic Act No. 3512; (3) the declared
national policy to encourage, Promote and conserve our fishing resources (Sec. 1, Republic
Act No. 3512), and (4) section 83 of the Fisheries Law which provides that "any other violation
of" the Fisheries Law or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder "shall subject
the offender to a fine of not more than tw o hundred pesos, or imprisonment for not more than
six months, or both, in the discretion of the court."
caught, and (6) other violations.

Now here in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in
punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense fails within the category
of "other violations" because, as already show n, the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty
next low er to the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed
in section 76, and is not the same as the penalty for "other violations" of the law and
regulations fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries Law .
The law making body cannot delegate to an executive official the pow er to declare what acts
should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition
of the penalty provided for in the law itself. (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 11 25, citing 11
Am. Jur. 965 on p. 11 32).
Originally, Administrative Order No. 84 punished electro fishing in all w aters. Later, the ban
against electro fishing w as confined to fresh water fisheries. The amendment created the
impression that electro fishing is not condemnable per se. It could be tolerated in marine
w aters. That circumstances strengthens the view that the old law does not eschew all forms
of electro fishing.
How ever, at present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable under the
Fisheries Law and that it cannot be penalized merely by executive revolution because
Presidential Decree No. 704, w hich is a revision and consolidation of all law s and decrees
affecting fishing and fisheries and which was promulgated on May 16, 1975 (71 O.G. 4269),
expressly punishes electro fishing in fresh water and salt w ater areas.
That decree provides: +.w ph!1
SEC. 33. Illegal fishing, dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. It
shall he unlaw ful for any person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken or
gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine w aters with the use of explosives,
obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (1),
(m) and (d), respectively, of Section 3 hereof: ...
As already pointed out above, the prosecution's reference to section 83 is out of place
because the penalty for electro fishing under Administrative order No. 84 is not the same as
the penalty fixed in section 83.
The decree Act No. 4003, as amended, Republic Acts Nos. 428, 3048, 3512 and 3586,
Presidential Decrees Nos. 43, 534 and 553, and all , Acts, Executive Orders, rules and
regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with it (Sec. 49, P. D. No. 704).
We are of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative
Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not w arranted under the Fisheries
Commission, Republic Act No. 3512.
The inclusion in that decree of provisions defining and penalizing electro fishing is a clear
recognition of the deficiency or silence on that point of the old Fisheries Law . It is an
admission that a mere executive regulation is not legally adequate to penalize electro fishing.
The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro
fishing is not banned under that law , the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
the Commissioner of Fisheries are pow erless to penalize it. In other w ords, Administrative
Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
Had the law making body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect
could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law .
That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing;
(2) unlaw ful fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal
taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish
Note that the definition of electro fishing, w hich is found in section 1 (c) of Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84 and w hich is not provided for the old Fisheries Law, is now found
in section 3(d) of the decree. Note further that the decree penalty electro fishing by
"imprisonment from tw o (2) to four (4) years", a punishment which is more severe than the
penalty of a time of not excluding P500 or imprisonment of not more than six months or both
fixed in section 3 of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84.
An examination of the rule-making pow er of executive officials and administrative agencies
and, in particular, of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Secretary of
Natural Resources) under the Fisheries Law sustains the view that he ex his authority in
penalizing electro fishing by means of an administrative order.
Administrative agent are clothed w ith rule-making pow ers because the lawmaking body finds
it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex
situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law . All that is required is that the
regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should
conform to the standards that the law prescribes (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125;
Director of Forestry vs. Mu;oz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183, 1198; Geukeko vs.
Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712).
The law making body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement of a
particular statute (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 125, citing U.S. vs. Grimaud 220 U.S.
506; Interprovincial Autobus Co., Inc. vs. Coll. of Internal Revenue, 98 Phil. 290, 295-6).
The grant of the rule-making pow er to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle
of separation of pow ers and is an exception to the nondeleption of legislative, powers.
Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation calculated to promote the public interest
are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modem life, the multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law"
Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726; People vs. Rosenthal and Osme;a, 68 Phil. 328).
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department
must be in harmony w ith the provisions of the law , and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot
be extended. (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an
act of Congress (Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the d of
Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General Auditing Office,
L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao vs. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969,
29 SCRA 350).
The rule-making pow er must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to
carry into effect the law as it his been enacted. The pow er cannot be extended to amending
or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (University of Santo Tomas vs. Board
of Tax A 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see of Internal
Revenue vs. Villaflor 69 Phil. 319, Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del March vs. Phil.
Veterans Administrative, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).
There is no question that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has rule-making
pow ers. Section 4 of the Fisheries law provides that the Secretary "shall from time to time
issue instructions, orders, and regulations consistent" w ith that law , "as may be and proper
to carry into effect the provisions thereof." That pow er is now vested in the Secretary of
Natural Resources by on 7 of the Revised Fisheries law , Presidential December No. 704.
Section 4(h) of Republic Act No. 3512 empow er the Co of Fisheries "to prepare and execute
upon the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, forms instructions,
rules and regulations consistent w ith the purpose" of that enactment "and for the
development of fisheries."
Section 79(B) of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "the Department Head shall
have the pow er to promulgate, w henever he may see fit do so, all rules, regulates, orders,
memorandums, and other instructions, not contrary to law , to regulate the proper w orking
and harmonious and efficient administration of each and all of the offices and dependencies
of his Department, and for the strict enforcement and proper execution of the laws relative to
matters under the jurisdiction of said Department; but none of said rules or orders shall
prescribe penalties for the violation thereof, except as expressly authorized by law."
Administrative regulations issued by a Department Head in conformity with law have the force
of law (Valerie vs. Secretary of culture and Natural Resources, 117 Phil. 729, 733; Antique
Saw mills, Inc. vs. Zayco, L- 20051, May 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 316). As he exercises the rulemaking pow er by delegation of the law making body, it is a requisite that he should not
transcend the bound demarcated by the statute for the exercise of that pow er; otherwise, he
w ould be improperly exercising legislative power in his own right and not as a surrogate of
the law making body.
Article 7 of the Civil Code embodies the basic principle that administrative or executive acts,
orders and regulations shall be valid only w hen they are not contrary to the law s or the
Constitution."
As noted by Justice Fernando, "except for constitutional officials w ho can trace their
competence to act to the fundamental law itself, a public office must be in the statute relied
upon a grant of pow er before he can exercise it." "department zeal may not be permitted to
outrun the authority conferred by statute." (Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs.
Santiago, L-29236, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 493, 496-8).
"Rules and regulations w hen promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority
conferred upon the administrative agency by law , partake of the nature of a statute, and
compliance therew ith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law . This is so
because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes,
objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner
of carrying out the law are oftentimes left to the administrative agency entrusted w ith its
enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a
delegated pow er to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law." The
rule or regulation should be w ithin the scope of the statutory authority granted by the
legislature to the administrative agency. (Davis, Administrative Law , p. 194, 197, cited in
Victories Milling Co., Inc. vs. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558).
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement
said law , the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms
and provisions of the basic law (People vs. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091).
This Court in its decision in the Lim case, supra, promulgated on July 26, 1960, called the
attention of technical men in the executive departments, w ho draft rules and regulations, to
the importance and necessity of closely following the legal provisions w hich they intend to
implement so as to avoid any possible misunderstanding or confusion.
The rule is that the violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive officer of the
government in conformity w ith and based upon a statute authorizing such regulation
constitutes an offense and renders the offender liable to punishment in accordance with the
provisions of the law (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 124).
In other w ords, a violation or infringement of a rule or regulation validly issued can constitute
a crime punishable as provided in the authorizing statute and by virtue of the latter (People
vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125, 1132).
It has been held that "to declare w hat shall constitute a crime and how it shall be punished is
a pow er vested exclusively in the legislature, and it may not be delegated to any other body
or agency" (1 Am. Jur. 2nd, sec. 127, p. 938; Texas Co. vs. Montgomery, 73 F. Supp. 527).
In the instant case the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with
the Fisheries Law , under which the regulation w as issued, because the law itself does not
expressly punish electro fishing.
The instant case is similar to People vs. Santos, 63 Phil. 300. The Santos case involves
section 28 of Fish and Game Administrative Order No. 2 issued by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to the aforementioned section 4 of the Fisheries
Law .
Section 28 contains the proviso that a fishing boat not licensed under the Fisheries Law and
under the said administrative order may fish w ithin three kilometers of the shoreline of islands
and reservations over w hich jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military reservations
authorities of the United States only upon receiving w ritten permission therefor, which
permission may be granted by the Secretary upon recommendation of the military or naval
authorities concerned. A violation of the proviso may be proceeded against under section 45
of the Federal Penal Code.
Under that statute, the Game Commission promulgated a rule that "it shall be unlaw ful to
offer, pay or receive any rew ard, prize or compensation for the hunting, pursuing, taking,
killing or displaying of any game animal, game bird or game fish or any part thereof."
Beryl S. Miles, the ow ner of a sporting goods store, regularly offered a ten-dow n cash prize
to the person displaying the largest deer in his store during the open for hunting such game
animals. For that act, he w as charged with a violation of the rule Promulgated by the State
Game Commission.
It w as held that there w as no statute penalizing the display of game. What the statute
penalized w as the taking of game. If the law making body desired to prohibit the display of
game, it could have readily said so. It w as not law ful for the administrative board to extend
or modify the statute. Hence, the indictment against Miles w as quashed. The Miles case is
similar to this case.
Augusto A. Santos w as prosecuted under that provision in the Court of First Instance of
Cavite for having caused his two fishing boats to fish, loiter and anchor without permission
from the Secretary within three kilometers from the shoreline of Corrigidor Island.
WHEREFORE, the low er court's decision of June 9, 1970 is set aside for lack of appellate
jurisdiction and the order of dismissal rendered by the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna
in Criminal Case No. 5429 is affirmed. Costs de oficio.
This Court held that the Fisheries Law does not prohibit boats not subject to license from
fishing w ithin three kilometers of the shoreline of islands and reservations over which
jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States, w ithout
permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources upon recommendation
of the military and naval authorities concerned.
US V PANLILIO
As the said law does not penalize the act mentioned in section 28 of the administrative order,
the promulgation of that provision by the Secretary "is equivalent to legislating on the matter,
a pow er which has not been and cannot be delegated to him, it being expressly reserved" to
the law making body. "Such an act constitutes not only an excess of the regulatory power
conferred upon the Secretary but also an exercise of a legislative pow er which he does not
have, and therefore" the said provision "is null and void and without effect". Hence, the charge
against Santos w as dismiss.
A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the right to make
ranks and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, that power should not be
confused with the power to enact a criminal statute. An administrative agency can have only
the administrative or policing pow ers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon
it. (Glustrom vs. State, 206 Ga. 734, 58 Second 2d 534; See 2 Am. Jr. 2nd 129-130).
Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards
authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of
administrative officers and boards, w hich have the effect of extending, or w hich conflict with
the authority granting statute, do not represent a valid precise of the rule-making pow er but
constitute an attempt by an administrative body to legislate (State vs. Miles, Wash. 2nd 322,
105 Pac. 2nd 51).
In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order, it must clearly appear that the order
is one w hich falls within the scope of the authority conferred upon the administrative body,
and the order w ill be scrutinized w ith special care. (State vs. Miles supra).
The Miles case involved a statute w hich authorized the State Game Commission "to adopt,
promulgate, amend and/or repeal, and enforce reasonable rules and regulations governing
and/or prohibiting the taking of the various classes of game.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pampanga
convicting the accused of a violation of the law relating to the quarantining of animals
suffering from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and sentencing him to pay
a fine of P40, w ith subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the
trial.
The information charges: "That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1913, all of the
carabaos belonging to the above-named accused having been exposed to the dangerous
and contagious disease know n as rinderpest, w ere, in accordance with an order of duly authorized agent of the Director of Agriculture, duly quarantined in a corral in the barrio of
Masamat, municipality of Mexico, Province of Pampanga, P. I.; that, on said place, the said
accused, Adriano Panlilio, illegally and voluntarily and w ithout being authorized so to do, and
w hile the quarantine against said carabaos w as still in force, permitted and ordered said
carabaos to be taken from the corral in w hich they were then quarantined and conducted
from one place to another; that by virtue of said orders of the accused, his servants and
agents took the said carabaos from the said corral and drove them from one place to another
for the purpose of w orking them."
The defendant demurred to this information on the ground that the acts complained of did
not constitute a crime. The demurrer w as overruled and the defendant duly excepted and
pleaded not guilty.
From the evidence introduced by the prosecution on the trial of the cause it appears that the
defendant w as notified in w riting on February 22, 1913, by a duly authorized agent of the
Director of agriculture, that all of his carabaos in the barrio of Masamat, municipality of
Mexico, Pampanga Province, had been exposed to the disease commonly know n as
rinderpest, and that said carabaos w ere accordingly declared under quarantine, and were
ordered kept in a corral designated by an agent of the Bureau of Agriculture and w ere to
remain there until released by further order of the Director of Agriculture.
It further appears from the testimony of the w itnesses for the prosecution that the defendant
fully understood that, according to the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, he w as not to
remove the animals, or to permit anyone else to remove them, from the quarantine in w hich
they had been placed. In spite, how ever, of all this, the carabaos w ere taken from the corral
by the commands of the accused and driven from place to place on his hacienda, and were
used as w ork animals thereon in the same manner as if they had not been quarantined.
The contention of the accused is that the facts alleged in the information and proved on the
trial do not constitute a violation of Act No. 1760 or any portion thereof.
We are forced to agree w ith this contention.
The original information against the accused charged a violation of section 6 of Act No. 1760
committed by the accused in that he ordered and permitted his carabaos, w hich, at the time,
w ere in quarantine, to be taken from quarantine and moved from one place to another on his
hacienda. An amended information w as filed. It failed, how ever, to specify that section of Act
No. 1760 alleged to have been violated, evidently leaving that to be ascertained by the court
on the trial.
The only sections of Act No. 1760, w hich prohibit acts and pronounce them unlaw ful are 3, 4
and 5. This case does not fall w ithin any of them. Section 3 provides, in effect, that it shall be
unlaw ful for any person, firm, or corporation know ingly to ship or otherw ise bring into the
Philippine Islands any animal suffering from, infected w ith, or dead of any dangerous
communicable disease, or any of the effects pertaining to such animal w hich are liable to
introduce such disease into the Philippine Islands. Section 4 declares, substantially, that it
shall be unlaw ful for any reason, firm, or corporation know ingly to ship, drive or otherwise
take or transport from one island, province, municipality, tow nship, or settlement to another
any domestic animal suffering from any dangerous communicable diseased or to expose
such animal either alive or dead on any public road or highw ay where it may come in contact
w ith other domestic animals. Section 5 provides that w henever the Secretary of the Interior
shall declare that a dangerous communicable animal disease prevails in any island, province,
municipality, tow nship, or settlement and that there is danger of spreading such disease by
shipping, driving or otherw ise transporting or taking out of such island, province, municipality,
tow nship, or settlement any class of domestic animal, it shall be unlaw ful for any person, firm
or corporation to ship, drive or otherw ise remove the kind of animals so specified from such
locality except w hen accompanied by a certificate issued by authority of the Director of
Agriculture stating the number and the kind of animals to be shipped, driven, taken or
transported, their destination, manner in w hich they are authorized to be shipped, driven,
taken, or transported, and their brands and distinguishing marks.
A simple reading of these sections demonstrates clearly that the case at bar does not fall
w ithin any of them. There is no question here of importation and there is no charge or proof
that the animals in question w ere suffering from a dangerous communicable disease or that
the Secretary of the Interior had made the declaration provided for in section 5 or that the
accused had driven or taken said animals from one island, province, municipality, tow nship
or settlement to another. It w as alleged had been exposed to a dangerous communicable
disease and that they had been placed in a corral in quarantine on the premises of the
accused and that he, in violation of the quarantine, had taken them from the corral and
w orked them upon the lands adjoining. They had not been in highw ay nor moved from one
municipality or settlement to another. They w ere left upon defendant's hacienda, where they
w ere quarantined, and there w orked by the servants of the accused.
The Solicitor-General in his brief in this court admits that the sections referred to are not
applicable to the case at bar and also admits that section 7 of said Act is not applicable. This
section provides: "Whenever the Director of Agriculture shall order any animal placed in
quarantine in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the owner of such animal, or his
agent, shall deliver it at the place designated for the quarantine and shall provide it with
proper food, w ater, and attendance. Should the ow ner or his agent fail to comply w ith this
requirement the Director of Agriculture may furnish supplies and attendance needed, and the
reasonable cost of such supplies and attendance shall be collectible from the ow ner or his
agent."
We are in accord w ith the opinion expressed by the Solicitor-General w ith respect to this
section, as w e are with his opinion as to sections 3, 4, and 5. the law nowhere makes it a
penal offense to refuse to comply w ith the provisions of section 7, nor is the section itself so
phrased as to w arrant the conclusion that it w as intended to be a penal section. The section
provides the means by w hich the refusal of the owner to comply therewith shall be overcome
and the punishment, if w e may call it punishment, w hich he shall receive by reason of that
refusal. It has none of the aspects of a penal provision or the form or substance of such
provision. It does not prohibit any act. It does not compel an act nor does it really punish or
impose a criminal penalty. The other sections of the law under which punishments may be
inflicted are so phrased as to make the prohibited act unlaw ful, and section 8 provides the
punishment for any act declared unlaw ful by the law .
The Solicitor-General suggests, but does not argue, that section 6 is applicable to the case
at bar. Section 6 simply authorizes the Director of Agriculture to do certain things, among
them, paragraph (c) "to require that animals w hich are suffering from dangerous
communicable diseases or have been exposed thereto be placed in quarantine at such place
and for such time as may be deemed by him necessary to prevent the spread of the disease."
Now here in the law , how ever, is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture
prohibited or made unlaw ful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such
orders. Section 8 provides that "any person violating any of the provisions of this Act shall,
upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand pesos, or by
imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the
discretion of the court, f or each offense." A violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture,
as authorized by paragraph (c), is not a violation of the provision of the Act. The orders of the
Bureau of Agriculture, w hile they may possibly be said to have the force of law , are statutes
and particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless
the statute itself somew here makes a violation thereof unlaw ful and penalizes it. Now here in
Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense,
nor is such violation punished in any w ay therein.
Finally, it is contended by the Government that if the offense stated in the information and
proved upon the trial does not constitute a violation of any of the provisions of Act No. 1760,
it does constitute a violation of article 581, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code. It provides:
A fine of not less than fifteen and not more than seventy pesetas and censure shall be
imposed upon: . . .
2. Any person w ho shall violate the regulations, ordinances, or proclamations issued with
reference to any epidemic disease among animals, the extermination of locusts, or any other
similar plague.
It alleged in the information and w as proved on the trial that the Bureau of agriculture had
ordered a quarantine of the carabaos at the time and place mentioned; that the quarantine
had been executed and completed and the animals actually segregated and confined; that
the accused, in violation of such quarantine and of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture,
duly promulgated, broke the quarantine, removed the animals and used them in the ordinary
w ork of his plantation. We consider these acts a plain violation of the article of the Penal
Code as above quoted. The fact that the information in its preamble charged a violation of
Act No. 1760 does not prevent us from finding the accused guilty of a violation of an article
of the Penal Code. The complaint opens as follow s: "The undersigned accuses Adriano
Panlilio of a violation of Act No. 1760, committed as follow s:" Then follows the body of the
information already quoted in this opinion. We w ould not permit an accused to be convicted
under one Act when he is charged with the violation of another, if the change from one statute
to another involved a change of the theory of the trial or required of the defendant a different
defense or surprised him in any other w ay. The allegations required under Act No. 1760
include those required under article 581. The accused could have defended himself in no
different manner if he had been expressly charged with a violation of article 581.
In the case of United States vs. Paua (6 Phil. Rep., 740), the information stating the facts
upon w hich the charge w as founded terminated w ith his expression: "In violation of section
315 of Act No. 355 of the Philippine Commission, in effect on the 6th of February, 1902."
In the resolution of this case the Supreme Court found that the facts set forth in the
information and proved on the trial did not constitute a violation of section 315 of Act No. 355
as alleged in the information, but did constitute a violation of article 387 in connection with
article 383 of the Penal Code, and accordingly convicted the accused under those articles
and sentenced him to the corresponding penalty.
In that case the court said: "The foregoing facts, duly established as they w ere by the
testimony of credible w itnesses who heard and saw everything that occurred, show beyond
peradventure of doubt that the crime of attempted bribery, as defined in article 387, in
connection w ith article 383 of the Penal Code, has been committed, it being immaterial
w hether it is alleged in the complaint that section 315 of Act No. 355 of the Philippine
Commission w as violated by the defendant, as the same recites facts and circumstances
sufficient to constitute the crime of bribery as defined and punished in the aforesaid articles
of the Penal Code." (U. S. vs. Lim San, 17 Phil. Rep., 273; U.S. vs. Jeffrey, 15 Phil. Rep.,
391; U. S. vs. Guzman, 25 Phil. Rep., 22.)
The accused is accordingly convicted of a violation of article 581, paragraph 2, of the Penal
Code, and is sentenced to pay a fine of seventy pesetas (P14) and censure, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs of this appeal. So ordered.
PEOPLE V SANTOS
When this case w as called for trial for the arraignment, counsel for the accused appeared
stating that in view of the ruling laid dow n by this court in criminal case No. 6785 of this court,
holding that the penalty applicable is under section 83 of Act No. 4003 w hich falls within the
original jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court he requests that the case be remanded
to the justice of the peace court of Cavite w hich conducted the preliminary investigation, so
that the latter may try it, being w ithin its original jurisdiction.
We agree that it falls w ithin the jurisdiction of the corresponding justice of the peace court,
but it being alleged in the information that the infraction w as committed w ithin the w aters of
the Island of Corregidor, the competent justice of the peace court is that of Corregidor, not
Cavite.
Wherefore, we decree the dismissal of this case, cancelling the bond filed by the accused,
w ith costs de oficio, w ithout prejudice to the filing by the prosecuting attorney of a new
information in the justice of the peace court of Corregidor, if he so deems convenient. It is so
ordered.
In support of his appeal the appellant assigns as the sole alleged error committed by the
court a quo its having dismissed the case on the ground that it does not fall w ithin its original
jurisdiction.
On June 18, 1930, the provincial fiscal of Cavite filed against the accused -appellee Augusta
A. Santos an information w hich reads as follows:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses Augusta A. Santos of violation of section 28 of

Fish and Game Administrative Order No. 2 and penalized by section 29 thereof committed
as follow s:
That on or about April 29, 1935, w ithin 1,500 yards north of Cavalry Point, Corregidor Island,
Province of Cavite, P.I., the said accused Augusta A. Santos, the registered owner of two
fishing motor boats Malabon II and Malabon III, did then and there w illfully, unlawfully and
criminally have his said boats, manned and operated by his fishermen, fish, loiter and anchor
w ithout permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce w ithin three (3)
kilometers from the shore line of the Island of Corregidor over which the naval and military
authorities of the United States exercise jurisdiction.
Contrary to law .
Cavite, Cavite, June 18, 1935.
Section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2 relative to fish and game, issued by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Commerce, provides as follow s:
28. Prohibited fishing areas. No boats licensed in accordance with the provisions of Act
No. 4003 and this order to catch, collect, gather, take, or remove fish and other sea products
from Philippine w aters shall be allow ed to fish, loiter, or anchor w ithin 3 kilometers of the
shore line of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval or military
authorities of the United States, particularly Corregidor, Pulo Caballo, La Monja, El Fraile,
and Carabao, and all other islands and detached rocks lying betw een Mariveles Reservation
on the north side of the entrance to Manila Bay and Calumpan Point Reservation on the south
side of said entrance: Provided, That boats not subject to license under Act No. 4003 and
this order may fish w ithin the areas mentioned above only upon receiving w ritten permission
therefor, which permission may be granted by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce
upon recommendation of the military or naval authorities concerned.
A violation of this paragraph may be proceeded against under section 45 of the Federal Penal
Code.
The above quoted provisions of Administrative, Order No. 2 w ere issued by the then
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, now Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, by virtue of the authority vested in him by section 4 of Act No. 4003 w hich reads
as follow s:
SEC. 4. Instructions, orders, rules and regulations. The Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources shall from time to time issue such instructions, orders, rules and
regulations consistent w ith this Act, as may be necessary and proper to carry into effect the
provisions thereof and for the conduct of proceedings arising under such provisions.
The herein accused and appellee Augusto A. Santos is charged w ith having ordered his
fishermen to manage and operate the motor launches Malabon II and Malabon Ill registered
in his name and to fish, loiter and anchor w ithin three kilometers of the shore line of the Island
of Corregidor over w hich jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the
United States, w ithout permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.
These acts constitute a violation of the conditional clause of section 28 above quoted, w hich
reads as follow s:
Provided, That boats not subject to license under Act No. 4003 and this order may fish w ithin
the areas mentioned above (w ithin 3 kilometers of the shore line of islands and reservations
over w hich jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States,
particularly Corregidor) only upon receiving w ritten permission therefor, w hich permission
may be granted by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce upon recommendation of the
military and naval authorities of concerned. (Emphasis supplied.)
Act No. 4003 contains no similar provision prohibiting boats not subject to license from fishing
w ithin three kilometers of the shore line of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is
exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States, w ithout permission from the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce upon recommendation of the military and naval
authorities concerned. Inasmuch as the only authority granted to the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce, by section 4 of Act No. 4003, is to issue from time to time such instructions,
orders, rules, and regulations consistent with said Act, as may be necessary and proper to
carry into effect the provisions thereof and for the conduct of proceedings arising under such
provisions; and inasmuch as said Act No. 4003, as stated, contains no provisions similar to
those contained in the above quoted conditional clause of section 28 of Administrative Order
No. 2, the conditional clause in question supplies a defect of the law , extending it. This is
equivalent to legislating on the matter, a pow er which has not been and cannot be delegated
to him, it being exclusively reserved to the then Philippine Legislature by the Jones Law, and
now to the National Assembly by the Constitution of the Philippines. Such act constitutes not
only an excess of the regulatory pow er conferred upon the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, but also an exercise of a legislative power which he does not have, and therefore
said conditional clause is null and void and w ithout effect (12 Corpus Juris, 845; Rubi vs.
Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660; U.S. vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil., 1; U.S. vs. Barrias,
11 Phil., 327).
For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold that the conditional clause
of section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2. issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, is null and void and w ithout effect, as constituting an excess of the regulatory
pow er conferred upon him by section 4 of Act No. 4003 and an exercise of a legislative power
w hich has not been and cannot be delegated to him.
Wherefore, inasmuch as the facts w ith the commission of w hich Augusto A. Santos is
charged do not constitute a crime or a violation of some criminal law within the jurisdiction of
the civil courts, the information filed against him is dismissed, w ith the costs de oficio. So
ordered.
3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
B. Dealer
1st Offense - Fine of P3,000
2nd Offense - Fine of P7,000
C. LPG Retail Outlet
1st Offense - Reprimand
2nd Offense - Fine of P500.00
3rd Offense - Fine of P1,000.00
SECTION 6. NO TARE WEIGHT OR INCORRECT TARE WEIGHT MARKINGS.
(REQUIREMENT ON ENGRAVED TARE WEIGHT SHALL TAKE EFFECT TWO (2) YEARS
AFTER EFFECTIVITY OF THIS CIRCULAR)
A. LPG Refiller/Marketer
SEC PEREZ V LPG

1st Offense - Fine of P3,000 for each cylinder
Batas Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended, penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing,
adulteration, underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products, as w ell as possession for
trade of adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)
cylinders.3 The said law sets the monetary penalty for violators to a minimum of P20,000 and
a maximum of P50,000.4
2nd Offense - Fine of P5,000 for each cylinder

B. Dealer
On June 9, 2000, Circular No. 2000-06-010 w as issued by the DOE to implement B.P. Blg.
33, thus:
SECTION 4. NO PRICE DISPLAY BOARD
LPG Marketer/LPG Dealer/LPG Retail Outlet
1st Offense - Reprimand/w arning letter
2nd Offense - Recommend suspension of business operation to the proper local government
unit

3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit and initiate
criminal proceedings
SECTION 5. NO WEIGHING SCALE
SECTION 7. NO APPROPRIATE OR AUTHORIZED LPG SEAL
2nd Offense - Fine of P10,000
B. Dealer
B. DEALER
C. LPG RETAIL OUTLET
SECTION 8. NO TRADE NAME, UNBRANDED LPG CYLINDERS, NO SERIAL NUMBER,

NO DISTINGUISHING COLOR, NO EMBOSSED IDENTIFYING MARKINGS ON
CYLINDER OR DISTINCTIVE COLLAR OR DESIGN (REQUIREMENT ON SERIAL
NUMBER AND DISTINCTIV E COLLAR OR DESIGN SHALL TAKE EFFECT TWO (2)
YEARS AFTER EFFECTIVITY OF THIS CIRCULAR)
SECTION 10. TAMPERING, ALTERING, OR MODIFYING OF LPG CYLINDER THRU ANY

MEANS SUCH AS BUT NOT LIMITED TO CHANGING THE VALVE, REPAINTING, AND
RELABELLING BY ANY PERSON OR ENTITY OTHER THAN THE LEGITIMATE AND
REGISTERED OWNER OF THE SAME. FOR THIS PURPOSE, LPG REFILLER,
MARKETER, DEALER, OR RETAIL OUTLET, AS THE CASE MAY BE, WHO HAS
POSSESSION OF SUCH ILLEGALLY TAMPERED, ALTERED, OR OTHERWIS E
MODIFIED LPG CYLINDER SHALL BE HELD LIABLE FOR THIS OFFENSE
B. Dealer
B. Dealer
SECTION 9. UNDERFILLED LPG CYLINDERS
A. LPG REFILLER/MARKETER
SECTION 11. UNAUTHORIZED DECANTING OR REFILLING OF LPG CYLINDERS
CIRCULAR ARE NOT PROVIDED FOR IN ANY OF THE THREE (3) LAWS".
II
SECTION 12. HOARDING
PETROLEUM GAS
OF PETROLEUM
PRODUCTS
INCLUDING
LIQUEFIED
1st Offense - Fine of P10,000 per cylinder
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "A
SCRUTINY OF THE NEW SET OF PENALTIES PROVIDED BY THE CIRCULAR SHOWS
THAT THE PENALTIES THIS TIME ARE BASED ON PER CYLINDER BASIS"; THAT
"BEING SUCH, NO CEILING WAS PROVIDED FOR AS TO THE ADMINISTRATIV E
FINES"; THAT "AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE PETITIONER, FOR JUST ONE LPG CYLINDER
FOUND VIOLATING AT LEAST SEC[TIONS] 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 AND 11 OF THE [CIRCULAR], A
FINE OF P24,000.00 IS IMPOSED;" AND THAT "THIS WILL CLEARLY BE BEYOND THE
P10,000.00 PROVIDED BY THE LAWS."
2nd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit plus the
filing of appropriate criminal action
III
SECTION 13. REFUSAL TO ALLOW OR COOPERATE WITH DULY AUTHORIZ ED

INSPECTORS OF THE ENERGY INDUSTRY ADMINISTRATION BUREAU (EIAB) OF THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
ENERGY
IN
THE
CONDUCT
OF
THEIR
INSPECTION/INVESTIGATION,
WHETHER
REGULAR AND ROUTINARY
OR
COMPLAINT-INITIATED
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SECTION
16 OF PETITIONERS CIRCULAR WHICH AUTHORIZES THE IMPOSITION OF
PECUNIARY PENALTIES WITH THE TOTAL FINE NOT EXCEEDING P20,000.00 FOR
RETAIL OUTLETS VIOLATES THE PENALTY CEILING OF P10,000.00 SET UNDER BP
BLG. 33, AS AMENDED.
IV
2nd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SINCE
SECTION 5(g) OF R.A. 7638 FINDS NO REFERENCE IN DOE CIRCULAR NO. 2000-06010, THE SAME SHOULD BE DISREGARDED.
SECTION 14. REFUSAL OR FAILURE TO PAY FINE The Department of Energy shall
recommend to the proper local government unit the closure of business of a respondent who
refuses or fails to pay any administrative fine w ithout prejudice to the filing of an appropriate
criminal action if w arranted.5
Respondent LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc. asked the DOE to set aside
the Circular for being contrary to law. The DOE, how ever, denied the request for lack of merit.
Respondent then filed a petition for prohibition and annulment w ith prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or w rit of preliminary injunction before the trial court.
After trial on the merits, the trial court nullified the Circular on the ground that it introduced
new offenses not included in the law .6 The court intimated that the Circular, in providing
penalties on a per cylinder basis for each violation, might exceed the maximum penalty under
the law . The decretal part of its Decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court renders judgment declaring DOE Circular No.
2000-06-010 null and void and prohibits the respondent from implementing the same.
SO ORDERED.7
The trial court denied for lack of merit petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence this
petition, raising the follow ing issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "A
CLOSE SCRUTINY OF BP 33, PD 1865 AND R.A. NO. 8479 SHOWS THAT OFFENSES
LIKE NO PRICE DISPLAY [BOARD], NO WEIGHING SCALE, ETC. SET FORTH IN THE
V
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "ON THE
NEW OFFENSES INTRODUCED IN THE CIRCULAR SUCH AS SECTIONS 4, 5, 10, 13
AND 14 AND THE IMPOSITION OF THE GRADUATED PENALTIES ON A PER CYLINDER
BASIS, THIS COURT FINDS [NO] REASON TO DISTURB ITS FINDINGS THAT
RESPONDENT- MOVANT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY. X X X IT SHOULD BE
REMEMBERED THAT BP BLG. 33 AS AMENDED AND P.D. 1865 ARE CRIMINA L
STATUTES AND MUST BE CONSTRUED WITH SUCH STRICTNESS AS TO CAREFULLY
SAFEGUARD THE RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT."
VI
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "THE ASSAILED
CIRCULAR SETS NO MAXIMUM LIMIT AS TO THE FINE THAT MAY BE IMPOSED ON AN
ERRING PERSON OR ENTITY TO WHICH FACT MOVANT CONCEDES. FOR ONE (1)
CYLINDER ALONE, NOT ONLY DOES THE CIRCULAR MAKE THE FINE EXCESSIVE TO
THE EXTENT OF BEING CONFISCATORY, BUT IT EVEN IMPOSES A PENALTY WHICH
MAY EVEN GO BEYOND THAT MAXIMUM IMPOSABLE FINE OF P50,000.00 SET BY P.D.
1865 IN ITS SEC. 4 AFTER A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING."8
To our mind, the issue raised by petitioner may be reduced to the sole issue of w hether the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig erred in declaring the provisions of the Circular null and void,
and prohibiting the Circulars implementation.
Petitioner argues that the penalties for the acts and omissions enumerated in the Circular are
sanctioned by Sections 19 and 3-A10 of B.P. Blg. 33 and Section 2311 of Republic Act No.
8479.12 Petitioner adds that Sections 5(g)13 and 2114 of Republic Act No. 763815 also
authorize the DOE to impose the penalties provided in the Circular.
Respondent counters that the enabling law s, B.P. Blg. 33 and R.A. No. 8479, do not
expressly penalize the acts and omissions enumerated in the Circular. Neither is the Circular
supported by R.A. No. 7638, respondent claims, since the said law does not pertain to LPG
traders. Respondent maintains that the Circular is not in conformity w ith the law it seeks to
implement.
We resolve to grant the petition.
For an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to have the force of penal
law , (1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating
statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself.16
The Circular satisfies the first requirement. B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, criminalizes illegal
trading, adulteration, underfilling, hoarding, and overpricing of petroleum products. Under this
general description of w hat constitutes criminal acts involving petroleum products, the
Circular merely lists the various modes by w hich the said criminal acts may be perpetrated,
namely: no price display board, no w eighing scale, no tare w eight or incorrect tare weight
markings, no authorized LPG seal, no trade name, unbranded LPG cylinders, no serial
number, no distinguishing color, no embossed identifying markings on cylinder, underfilling
LPG cylinders, tampering LPG cylinders, and unauthorized decanting of LPG cylinders.
These specific acts and omissions are obviously w ithin the contemplation of the law , which
seeks to curb the pernicious practices of some petroleum merchants.
As for the second requirement, w e find that the Circular is in accord w ith the law . Under B.P.
Blg. 33, as amended, the monetary penalty for any person w ho commits any of the acts
aforestated is limited to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000. Under the
Circular, the maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is P20,000,17 an amount w ithin
the range allow ed by law . However, for the refillers, marketers, and dealers, the Circular is
silent as to any maximum monetary penalty. This mere silence, nonetheless, does not
amount to violation of the aforesaid statutory maximum limit. Further, the mere fact that the
Circular provides penalties on a per cylinder basis does not in itself run counter to the law
since all that B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes are the minimum and the maximum limits of penalties.
PEOPLE V QUE PO LAY

Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding
him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection w ith section 34 of Republic
Act No. 265, and sentencing him to suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000
w ith subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The charge w as that the appellant w ho was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of
U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the
same to the Central Bank through its agents w ithin one day follow ing the receipt of such
foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. the appeal is based on the claim that said
circular No. 20 w as not published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed
to the appellant, and that consequently, said circular had no force and effect. It is contended
that Commonw ealth Act. No., 638 and Act 2930 both require said circular to be published in
the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general applicability. The Solicitor General
answ ering this contention says that Commonw ealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require
the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law
in order to have force and effect.
We agree w ith the Solicitor General that the law s in question do not require the publication
of the circulars, regulations and notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and
effective. All that said two laws provide is that law s, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals, notices and documents required by law to be of no force and
effect. In other w ords, said two Acts merely enumerate and make a list of w hat should be
published in the Official Gazette, presumably, for the guidance of the different branches of
the Government issuing same, and of the Bureau of Printing.
Clearly, it is B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, w hich defines w hat constitute punishable acts
involving petroleum products and w hich set the minimum and maximum limits for the
corresponding penalties. The Circular merely implements the said law , albeit it is silent on
the maximum pecuniary penalty for refillers, marketers, and dealers. Nothing in the Circular
contravenes the law .
How ever, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by
Congress shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the
fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article
2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that law s shall take effect
after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it
is otherw ise provided. It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law
but being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force
and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. (See U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil.,
119 and authorities cited therein.) Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially
like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question w hich prescribes a penalty for its
violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and
theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law,
regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed
of said contents and its penalties.
Notew orthy, the enabling law s on which the Circular is based were specifically intended to
provide the DOE w ith increased administrative and penal measures w ith w hich to effectively
curtail rampant adulteration and shortselling, as w ell as other acts involving petroleum
products, w hich are inimical to public interest. To nullify the Circular in this case w ould be to
render inutile government efforts to protect the general consuming public against the
nefarious practices of some unscrupulous LPG traders.
Our Old Civil code, ( Spanish Civil Code of 1889) has a similar provision about the effectivity
of law s, (Article 1 thereof), namely, that law s shall be binding tw enty days after their
promulgation, and that their promulgation shall be understood as made on the day of the
termination of the publication of the law s in the Gazette. Manresa, commenting on this article
is of the opinion that the w ord "law s" include regulations and circulars issued in accordance
w ith the same. He says:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Circular No. 2000-06-010 of DOE is
declared valid. The Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 161,
in SCA Case No. 2318, nullifying said Circular and prohibiting its implementation are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
El Tribunal Supremo, ha interpretado el articulo 1. del codigo Civil en Sentencia de 22 de

Junio de 1910, en el sentido de que bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden
tambien los Reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordenes
dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. Tambien el
poder ejecutivo lo ha venido entendiendo asi, como lo prueba el hecho de que muchas de
sus disposiciones contienen la advertencia de que empiezan a regir el mismo dia de su

publicacion en la Gaceta, advertencia que seria perfectamente inutil si no fuera de aplicacion
al caso el articulo 1.o del Codigo Civil. (Manresa, Codigo Civil Espaol, Vol. I. p. 52).
c]
General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank w as issued in the year 1949,
it w as not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction
of its violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any
legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazzette or after November
1951. In other w ords, appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it w as not binding
at the time he w as found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession thereof.
But the Solicitor General also contends that this question of non-publication of the Circular is
being raised for the first time on appeal in this Court, w hich cannot be done by appellant.
Ordinarily, one may raise on appeal any question of law or fact that has been raised in the
court below and which is within the issues made by the parties in their pleadings. (Section
19, Rule 48 of the Rules of Court). But the question of non-publication is fundamental and
decisive. If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20 had not been published as required by law
before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there w as no such circular to be violated and
consequently appellant committed no violation of the circular or committed any offense, and
the trial court may be said to have had no jurisdiction. This question may be raised at any
stage of the proceeding w hether or not raised in the court below .
d]
Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532,
1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 16121628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 17461751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 18121814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847,
1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952,
1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e]
Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510,
522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593,
594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f]
In view of the foregoing, we reverse the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant,
w ith costs de oficio.
Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94,
95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
TANADA V TUVERA
g]
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in
Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as w ell as the principle that laws
to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherw ise effectively
promulgated, petitioners seek a w rit of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees,
letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the follow ing presidential issuances is sought:
a]
Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265,
286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427,
429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658,
661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061,
1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 18131817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b]
Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161,
173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239,
241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599,
600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881,
882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, w ould have this case dismissed outright on
the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition.
The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and
directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in
question 2 said petitioners are w ithout the requisite legal personality to institute this
mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" w ithin the meaning of Section
3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, w hich we quote:
SEC.
3.
Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station, or unlaw fully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office
to w hich such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court alleging the facts w ith certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act
required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained
by the petitioner by reason of the w rongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a
public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show
any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs.
Governor General, 3 this Court held that w hile the general rule is that "a w rit of mandamus
w ould be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or
particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of
that w hich he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to
apply for the w rit w hen public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e.,
469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus
is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in
interest and the relator at w hose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that
he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen
and as such interested in the execution of the law s [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd
ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as
a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call
a special election for the position of municipal president in the tow n of Silay, Negros
Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the w eight of authority supports the proposition that the
relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be
enforced. If the general rule in America w ere otherwise, w e think that it w ould not be
applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is alw ays dangerous to apply a general
rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the
particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable
and reliance upon the rule may w ell lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for
the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the
United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other
person could be, as w e have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government
to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the
aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be
enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental
law of the land. If petitioners w ere not allow ed to institute this proceeding, it w ould indeed be
difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor
General, the government officer generally empow ered to represent the people, has entered
his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of law s w here the law s themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain
special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is
not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil
Code:
Art.
2.
Law s shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherw ise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord w ith this Court's construction of said
article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette
is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity datefor then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the
fifteenth day following its publication-but not w hen the law itself provides for the date w hen it
goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, how ever, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity
of law s with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the
issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date
of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonw ealth Act 638 provides as follow s:
Section
1.
There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3]
decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may
be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or
classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law ; and [5] such documents
or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time
to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published.
...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice
of the various law s which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such
notice and publication, there w ould be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia
legis non excusat." It w ould be the height of injustice to punish or otherw ise burden a citizen
for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice w hatsoever, not even a constructive
one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of
law s taken so vital significance that at this time w hen the people have bestow ed upon the
President a pow er heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept
abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansaand
for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative recordsno such publicity accompanies
the law -making process of the President. Thus, w ithout publication, the people have no
means of know ing w hat presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a
definite w ay of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As
the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden
tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines
dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonw ealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published
in the Official Gazette ... ." The w ord "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials
an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself
makes a list of w hat should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind,
leaves respondents w ith no discretion w hatsoever as to w hat must be included or excluded
from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability"
is mandated by law . Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or
penalties for their violation or otherw ise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and
revenue measures, fall w ithin this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to
particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not
be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person
may be bound by law , he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As
Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the
law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official
Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such
decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official
and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, w hich have
not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite
apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in
reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the
pendency of this petition, have put the question as to w hether the Court's declaration of
invalidity apply to P.D.s w hich had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication.
The answ er is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the
pragmatic and realistic course set f orth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8
to w it:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found
to be unconstitutional, w as not a law ; that it w as inoperative, conferring no rights and
imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby
County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite
clear, how ever, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken w ith qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior
to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly
be ignored. The past cannot alw ays be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects -with respect
to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested,
of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of
public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application,
demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those w hich have
engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions
that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified.
Consistently w ith the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right
of a party under the Moratorium Law , albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said
law w as declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in
the Official Gazette is "an operative fact w hich may have consequences which cannot be
justly ignored. The past cannot alw ays be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an allinclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential
decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential
Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so
published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since
no copies thereof are available. But w hatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed
that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the
government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that
"publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make
the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is
apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment
that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal
law s until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other
publication, even though some criminal law s provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances w hich are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

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PEOPLE V MACEREN

'Persons' includes firm, corporation, association, agent or employee.

'Fish' includes other aquatic products.

SUBJECT: PROHIBITING ELECTRO FISHING IN ALL WATERS +.w ph!1

That assumption is incorrect because 3 of the aforequoted Administrative Order No. 84

caught, and (6) other violations.

The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses Augusta A. Santos of violation of section 28 of

SEC PEREZ V LPG

2nd Offense - Fine of P5,000 for each cylinder

1st Offense - Fine of P2,000 for each cylinder

SECTION 4. NO PRICE DISPLAY BOARD

2nd Offense - Fine of P4,000 for each cylinder

LPG Marketer/LPG Dealer/LPG Retail Outlet

1st Offense - Reprimand/w arning letter

C. LPG Retail Outlet

1st Offense - Fine of P1,000 for each cylinder

SECTION 5. NO WEIGHING SCALE

SECTION 7. NO APPROPRIATE OR AUTHORIZED LPG SEAL

1st Offense - Fine of P5,000

1st Offense - Fine of P3,000 for each cylinder

2nd Offense - Fine of P10,000

2nd Offense - Fine of P5,000 for each cylinder

2nd Offense - Fine of P6,000 for each cylinder

1st Offense - Fine of P2,000 for each cylinder

2nd Offense - Fine of P4,000 for each cylinder

1st Offense - Fine of P3,000 for each cylinder

2nd Offense - Fine of P4,000 for each cylinder

C. LPG Retail Outlet

1st Offense - Fine of P1,000 for each cylinder

C. LPG RETAIL OUTLET

2nd Offense - Fine of P2,000 for each cylinder

1st Offense - Fine of P1,000 for each cylinder

2nd Offense - Fine of P2,000 for each cylinder

SECTION 8. NO TRADE NAME, UNBRANDED LPG CYLINDERS, NO SERIAL NUMBER,

1st Offense - Fine of P4,000 for each cylinder

SECTION 10. TAMPERING, ALTERING, OR MODIFYING OF LPG CYLINDER THRU ANY

2nd Offense - Fine of P5,000 for each cylinder

1st Offense - Fine of P5,000 for each cylinder

2nd Offense - Fine of P10,000 for each cylinder

1st Offense - Fine of P3,000 for each cylinder

2nd Offense - Fine of P4,000 for each cylinder

1st Offense - Fine of P3,000 for each cylinder

C. LPG Retail Outlet

2nd Offense - Fine of P5,000 for each cylinder

1st Offense - Fine of P1,000 for each cylinder

2nd Offense - Fine of P2,000 for each cylinder

C. LPG Retail Outlet

1st Offense - Fine of P1,500 for each cylinder

SECTION 9. UNDERFILLED LPG CYLINDERS

2nd Offense - Fine of P3,000 for each cylinder

1st Offense - Fine of P4,000 for each cylinder

SECTION 11. UNAUTHORIZED DECANTING OR REFILLING OF LPG CYLINDERS

1st Offense - Fine of P10,000 per cylinder

SECTION 13. REFUSAL TO ALLOW OR COOPERATE WITH DULY AUTHORIZ ED

1st Offense - Fine of P10,000

PEOPLE V QUE PO LAY

El Tribunal Supremo, ha interpretado el articulo 1. del codigo Civil en Sentencia de 22 de

sus disposiciones contienen la advertencia de que empiezan a regir el mismo dia de su

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