Professional Documents
Culture Documents
I. INTRODUCTION
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recognition as criteria of social justice, Honneth pins down the task of social
justice to how social institutions establish and maintain the social preconditions that enable individuals to attain autonomy and hence self-realization.
Our contribution will attempt to accomplish two things: (i) an internal
reconstruction of Honneths recognition-theoretical conception of justice;
and (ii) an external reconstruction of Nancy Frasers critique of psychologization in Honneth. Essentially, the paper makes three claims. First, Honneths recognitive justice modelled on the formation of intact personal identity
and self-realization is founded on very specific moral-psychological assumptions. This is demonstrated in his concern for practical self-relations such as
self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem that are necessary conditions for
self-realization. Second, although this notion of justice is potentially susceptible to the charge of psychologization as Fraser alleges, it is not incorrect to
derive political conclusions about justice from moral-psychological premises.
Since social criticism has to rely on empirical studies in order to be grounded
in reality, psychological evidence should not be denied a critical role in a
theory of justice. And third, recognitive justice anchored in moral subjectivity
is not bereft of the resources that will enable it to pass the objectivity and
publicity criterion of justice. What needs to be done is to design a fairer and
more inclusive political communication not merely reducible to an exercise
of argumentation. The paper proceeds in six parts. Parts II and III critically
reconstruct Honneths notion of recognition-theoretical conception of justice.
Part IV briefly exposes Frasers critique of psychologization. Part V re-asserts
the importance of moral subjectivity in a theory of justice. Part VI attempts
to re-define the publicity criterion of justice in relation to Honneths recognitive justice. The last part (VII) presents a short conclusion.
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of which is immediately evident in its methodology. The definition of justice is not derived from a reconstruction of the intuitive notions of justice
that we would develop under the veil of ignorance as in Rawls. Nor is it
taken from a clarification of the norms of justification as in Habermas.
Drawing upon Hegel, Honneth links his theory of justice with Zeitdiagnose
(time diagnoses) more particularly with a diagnosis of social pathologies
(2010, 25-47; 2000). The latter refers to how persons are prevented from
enjoying their autonomy in the experience of injustice or moral suffering
which is an inescapable feature of our world. That is to say, a world which
is a paradise here and now, but which can become hell itself tomorrow
(Bernstein 2005, 303).
The reason why Honneth takes the negative path as his point of departure for a theory of justice is not so much for epistemological reasons as
it is for critical considerations (Deranty and Renault 2007, 93-94; Deranty
2004, 302-5). To undertake an effective critique of society, one must start
by taking into account instances of injustice or violations of standards of
justice. In contrast to its positive counterpart, the experience of injustice
possesses greater normative bite. As such, for Honneth, no experience of
injustice must be ignored even if its public expression is fraught with danger and difficulty. This approach to social justice and normativity is typical
of the Frankfurt School, which grounds the motivation for social resistance
and liberation movements not on grand theories of intellectuals but on
peoples everyday experience.
The experience of injustice that Honneth particularly refers to is the
moral experience of disrespect or misrecognition. Drawing upon his tripartite scheme of recognition, he identifies three forms of disrespect: physical
abuse, denial of equal rights, and denigration of individual and cultural
practices. These acts inflict wounds upon the self and cause humiliation
the feeling of being unwanted or unworthy in society, as if ones life
possesses no significance or integrity of its own (1995a, 247-60; 1995b,
160-70; Beitz 2001, 104). Physical maltreatment prevents people by force
from taking control of their body, bringing forth not only physical pain
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but also a loss of reality (1995b, 132). Losing basic self-confidence the
ability to express oneself publicly without fear of rejection persons will
lose trust in the world and will consequently suffer psychological death.
Meanwhile, excluding persons from the enjoyment of equal rights tramples upon their moral autonomy and reduces them to second-class citizens (1995b, 133). This leads to a loss of self-respect, or social death,
in the sense that persons will no longer be able to see themselves as
responsible agents capable of making moral judgments. Finally, denigration of individual and cultural practices denies individuals and groups the
social value they deserve (1995b, 134). As a result, they will lose selfesteem and will be unable to relate positively to their ways of life, producing moral scars and injuries. Without self-confidence, self-respect, and
self-esteem, the chance of persons fully functioning as autonomous subjects and attaining self-realization is completely lost. The question Who
am I? will never be answered.
How does the experience of personal disrespect generate feelings of
social injustice? Honneth goes back to his social theory in this regard. In
a given society, he claims, social order requires the existence of institutional rules and public practices that individual members understand to
be justified. These rules and practices are considered legitimate when
they pass generally accepted reasons, meaning, they must reflect the
moral expectations and claims of individuals upon the social order. The
social recognition of their personal integrity holds a central position here
(2003, 133). These expectations, Honneth writes, are internally linked
to conditions for the formation of personal identity because they indicate
the social patterns of recognition that allow subjects to know themselves
to be both autonomous and individuated beings within their socio-cultural environment (2003, 163). If institutional rules do not reflect the
normative expectations of individuals, that is, they deny and violate their
claims to respect, or fair treatment of their distinct ways of life and
achievement, then feelings of social injustice can arise (2003, 133; 2007,
134).
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and (iii) esteem, which means having a high regard for oneself in comparison to others, and is based on the persons particular and unique features. On the basis of these three principles of recognition, which impact
the formation of intact personal identity, Honneth extracts what he calls
three equal-ranking principles of social justice namely love, equality, and
merit (2003, 143; 2004, 358). In terms of intimate relationships, what is
required is the principle of love; in legal relationships the principle of equality; and in cooperative relationships the principle of merit. Since each particular sphere of social interaction is governed by a principle of justice,
Honneth calls his recognitive justice a plural theory of justice. However,
because the principles refer to distinct moral perspectives that generate
different obligations, inevitably the relationship between them is gripped
by a constant tension. Unfortunately, Honneth offers no formula as to how
to negotiate this tension, except for his reminder that the resolution lies
within individual responsibility (2007, 141).
The goal of social justice, he argues, is the creation of social relations in which subjects are included as full members of the society in the
sense that they can publicly uphold and practice their lifestyle without
shame or humiliation (2003, 259). What comprises a good and just society is its ability to guarantee the social conditions through which autonomous individuals are given the chance to realize their personality. Justice
requires establishing and maintaining enabling social conditions for the
formation of intact personal identity for all members of society. In this
sense, social equality is tied to being given an equal chance for an adequate self-realization. To work for justice involves eliminating the obstacles in attaining what Honneth calls practical self-relations such as selfconfidence, self-respect, and self-esteem.
Being institutionalized within the society, the principles of justice,
namely love, equality, and merit, constitute the normative perspectives
through which individuals can judge the adequacy of existing forms of
social recognition. Following Rawlss institutional approach to justice,
Honneth is convinced that the principles of recognitive justice apply to
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how social institutions secure the social conditions for mutual recognition. Let me briefly discuss the institutional application of these principles. I will give special attention to the institutions of the family and the
organization of labour.
According to Honneth, other than the formal marking off of childhood, the institution of marriage and the family marks the attitude of love
and care as a separate sphere of recognition. Taking his cue from Kant
and Hegel, he states that marriage is not simply a social contract between
two consenting and equal legal subjects, but also a union between two
persons who are mutually in love and in need of each other (2003, 139;
2007, 151-52). The family relationship between husband and wife, or
between children and parents, is nurtured by the principle of love and
care, which represents the core of the relationship. The lack of love and
care in the family can lead to its disintegration, which will create a serious
ethical-psychological impact on its members. Such is what happens in
rape, maltreatment of children, and other instances of domestic violence.
I think this point is crucial because it highlights the fact that the issue
of domestic violence or of unfair division of household labour cannot be
simply understood in terms of (legal) equality. In order to gain insight
into these phenomena, it is necessary to look more closely into the normative structure of the family, grounded in the principle of love. Justice
embedded in family relationships is not simply about the duty of members to respect each other as equal legal subjects but also the need of each
member to be loved and cared for.
Meanwhile, Honneth refers to the organization of labour as the institutionalization of the recognition principle of achievement, on which basis
we attain social esteem as productive citizens (2003, 141). He points to
the double-edged source of legitimacy of the principle of achievement.
On the one hand, the principle of achievement represents a biased evaluation of achievement. Its normative reference point for judging productive
or valuable work is mainly the economic activity of the independent,
middle-class, male bourgeois (2003, 141). In other words, the value of
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the obliteration of the moral basis of self-realization. To talk of distributing basic rights and liberties does not make sense unless the subjective
identities of individuals threatened by the social structure are taken into
account. The question of justice is not about the resources individuals
should possess in view of their rational life plans or what they can do
with such resources in terms of their functionings and basic freedoms
(Sen 2009; Nussbaum 2008). For Honneth, the main task of justice is to
look at the moral injury or harm to the individual (or impaired subjectivity, as Fraser puts it) caused by the unequal distribution of resources. In
other words, the point of injustice is not quantity but quality (Deranty
2009, 403). This significantly transforms the idea of injustice from a
strictly political issue into an ethical issue.
Based on the above discussion, the features of Honneths recognition-theoretical concept of justice can now be summarized. First, it is
rooted in a philosophical anthropology, particularly the intersubjective
character of human persons. It repudiates the liberal atomistic reading of
the nature of persons by conceiving them as dependent on the recognition of others. Second, faithful to the strategy of the Frankfurt School, it
takes as a point of departure the experience of injustice and moral suffering of individuals brought about by misrecognition. And third, it is
intimately intertwined with a concept of the good life as the ideal of selfrealization, the necessary conditions of which include the practical selfrelations of self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem.
It is conceivable that these features demonstrate one thing: Honneths idea of recognitive justice is founded on very specific moral-psychological assumptions. Psychological prerequisites, i.e. the experience of
moral subjectivity itself, are conferred paramount importance. His theory
of justice aims to protect subjective identities from the threats of the
social structure in order to attain and maintain intact personal identity. As
pointed out, Honneth thinks it would be misleading to talk of granting
equal rights to individuals if in the first place they do not have healthy
or stable self-relations that would enable them to act responsibly and
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both a process of individualization in which individuals are given the opportunities to legitimately articulate parts of their personality, and a process of
social integration in which individuals are given the chance to be included as
full members of society. In contrast to Honneths defense, what I want to
do instead is twofold: (i) to re-assert the crucial role of moral subjectivity
or moral suffering in the theory of justice; and (ii) to recover the potential
of such an approach of justice for passing the publicity criterion.
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violated, then one can say that there is nothing wrong with their situation.
Although it is possible that for some people the experience of being
excluded or subordinated may not be particularly threatening or humiliating, it does not mean that an outsider, much less a social critic, will only
tolerate what is happening. The point, rather, is that we have to be able
to answer the question: What exactly is unjust about subordination, marginalization, and exclusion? I believe that a sufficient answer can be found
by looking at the debilitating effects they cause upon the individual. Issues
of subordination and exclusion count as normatively meaningful in the
context of justice only when they do not appear external to the individuals experience. In other words, only when the notion of equal social
status for equal participation is interpreted as a potential source of moral
harm or injury that it can have normative bite. As J.M. Bernstein lucidly
frames the issue: Unless the violation of a norm is simultaneously and
thereby a violation of me, a way of actually harming me, it is not a moral
norm (2005, 311). There is no sense of talking about rights and liberties
if the existing condition of subjective identities is unjustifiably ignored.
Hence, Frasers dismissal of a suffering subject can potentially make
her account of misrecognition and injustice nothing but a theoretical culde-sac.
My sense is that Fraser tends to limit the issue of recognitive justice
to a matter of legal-political status of individuals and groups. She confines
it within the issue of what full-fledged citizenship means, and so she readily assigns recognitive justice with the singular task of guaranteeing equal
democratic participation. However, to limit justice solely to the status of
being legal subjects is rather short-sighted. The issue of justice (and hence
recognitive justice) does not only possess a legal alimension, it also has a
moral dimension.
Rainer Forst clearly states that there is a necessary distinction
between the legal status and the moral status of persons that both command respect. The former is based on law and actionable rights, while
the latter is based on the status of personhood (Forst 2002, 280). What
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is at stake in recognitive justice is not merely the agents status as citizens but more importantly their moral status as persons. This is where
Honneths notion of moral grammar of recognition becomes highly
relevant. By virtue of persons moral autonomy and inviolable dignity,
they deserve due recognition for what or who they are, and whose
violation, as in the experience of humiliation, shame or other moral
injuries, can ignite struggles for recognition. The black political movements are an example of this. That blacks were reduced to second-class
citizens is not the primary reason that motivated them to engage in
social resistance and fight for justice; rather it was because they were
treated like sub-humans or nonhumans by the society in which they
were living.
Honneth may have used a psychological strategy for his theory of
recognitive justice, but such a strategy is not necessarily flawed. It is only
by taking social and moral psychology as the normative basis for a theory
of social justice and social criticism that an adequate criticism of contemporary injustice is possible. Normative theories cannot avoid a certain
degree of dependence on empirical psychologies if they are to be regarded
as valid. Indeed, it is true that subjective experience maybe an unreliable
source of justification, but it cannot be denied that it plays a crucial role
in better situating what justice is all about and why it is being fought.
Subjective experience of the misrecognized can serve as a corrective
against subjectless discourses of justice by insuring that the content of
such discourses does not become empty. Such discourses of justice ensure
that they do not constitute another source of alienation for the individual
(Kompridis 2007, 280-81). It is the individual him or herself who is the
end of all talk and walk of justice. However, this does not mean rejecting
subjectless discourses in favour of an exclusively subjective experiencebased account of justice. The former can also act as a corrective against
the latter in the sense that it helps the misrecognized make sense of their
suffering by referring to normative principles as status and parity of participation. This leads me to my next point.
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inclusive, so that the voiceless and the powerless are empowered to have
a voice. Applied to the issue of recognitive justice, this suggests that there
is a need to find a way through which the victims of injustice, those who
suffer from the debilitating impact of misrecognition, can confidently
articulate their suffering and concerns publicly. How?
One possibility may be to fashion a democratic or political communication that is not simply reducible to an exercise of argumentation. In
this instance, I want to introduce Iris Marion Youngs notion of the narrative or storytelling (2000, 70-77; 1996, 130-25). Young notes how in
contemporary times legal theorists and resistance movements have
increasingly used narrative as a means to achieve particular objectives
political or otherwise. For example, legal theorists have realized that narrative can be used to dispute the impartiality of the law (universality) and
to rehabilitate the significance of the particularity of experience (context)
to which the law should respond but often does not (Young 2000, 71).
Similarly, revolutionary leaders in South America have used their life stories to expose to the outside world the oppression of their own people
and the repression that they went through under their governments. In
Youngs view, implicit in these instances is the fact that political narrative,
not narrative for entertainment purposes, can actually serve as a means
to give voice to the voiceless, to publicly articulate their suffering. That
is to say, it can function as a bridge between the condition of being in
total silence with respect to their suffering and its public expression.
What is interesting to note here is that the meaning of narrative has
been recast as a source of truth claims. Contrary to the view aligned with
the rational-critical discourse camp, narrative or storytelling is not simply
made up of incoherent emotional outbursts that contain no relevance to
democratic communication. Rather, it serves as an important vehicle to
make a particular point, to convey a political message to the public. This
is particularly important to those who have been victims of injustice, as in
the case of the disrespected and humiliated, who might have no other way
of expressing their claims. There might be no available terms in normative
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discourse that can precisely capture their harrowing experience. Nevertheless, the question is: How far is the narrative sufficient to let others or the
public understand the predicament and claim of the narrator?
Young argues that the downside of the language of narrative is that,
by itself, it is insufficient to make the claims of individuals legitimate.
Claims expressed through narrative are not automatically legitimate just
because they have a narrative form. Narrativity by itself does not solve
the problem of adjudicating legitimate and illegitimate claims. Since it
continues to be particularistic, it still requires to be universalized so to
speak. It has to be transformed into something that others are able to
accept (Gutmann and Thompson 1997, 137). How can claims expressed
through narrative become political arguments about justice? How do we
move from narrativity to normativity?
There are two ways of going about this problem the easier and the
harder route respectively. Determining the legitimacy of claims made
through narrative may not be particularly complicated when there are
already established normative principles that guide moral judgment. All
that needs to be done is to identify which normative principle is supported
or violated by the claim in question. The difficulty arises when narrative
exposes a new situation, a new claim to which existing rules do not apply,
or which challenges the rules themselves. A case in point is how in the
1970s, at the least in the United States, sexual harassment of women did
not have a public and normative face, even when women constantly suffered in silence in their workplaces. The situation calls for the creation of
a different normative language. How can this be possibly achieved?
Contrary to the exercise of argumentation, the power of narrative
does not lie in reason and analysis, but in its ability to elicit sympathy and
compassion by appealing to peoples moral intuitions and imagination
(Smith 1998, 373-74). By doing so, narrative hopes to set into motion
personal moral reformation accomplished through a hermeneutic process.
The audience are moved to compare their own situation with that of the
narrators and eventually identify with the latters moral sentiments. In
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this case, the legitimacy of the claim somehow depends on how far it
evokes the moral instincts of the audience. Narrative influences moral
reasoning through an appeal to the emotive, non-cognitive bases of moral
judgment. Despite the attractiveness of this idea, this is not the path I am
inclined to take. One of its problems is that adjudication of the legitimacy
of claims has been reduced to a strictly personal matter, thereby completely displacing the central role of public verification in the democratic
process. Fortunately, Young provides an alternative way.
She admits the fact that those who have been wronged may not possess
the necessary language to express their suffering as injustice. Contrary to
the exercise of rational argumentation, those who suffer tell stories in narrative about their sense of being wronged. However, Young hopes that as
these stories are told by people publicly and repeatedly within groups and
between groups, the process of discursive reflection upon them can pave
the way for the development of normative language. This becomes the basis
for victims to name their injustice and to discover why they constitute an
injustice (Young 2000, 72-73). It is through dialogical deliberation on the
stories of suffering that normative language is developed. Hence, adjudicating whether stories of suffering constitute an injustice still lies in the domain
of deliberative democracy. The legitimacy of claims expressed through narrative is still determined through the process of public deliberation.
However, unlike the strictly rational interpretation of democratic
communication, whose major concern is to find the unforced force of
the better argument, discursive reflection informed by narrative is aimed
at bringing into the open different perspectives and to discover a way not
to shut them off just because they are different and irrational. As Lynn
Sanders puts it, narrative encourages the democratic consideration of the
worthiness of perspectives [which] may not be rooted in common ground
and not necessarily voiced in a calmly rational way (1997, 372). The goal
then of such public discussion is to make sure that those who are often
excluded are enabled to speak and those who mostly dominate learn to
hear others perspectives.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Honneths recognition-theoretical conception of justice states that social
justice is concerned with how social institutions establish and maintain the
social preconditions for the formation of intact personal identity. The aim
of a theory of justice is to enable individuals to attain self-realization without necessarily specifying what the content is of such an ideal; hence, the
phrase formal conception of ethical life. Calling his account a plural
theory, he proposes three principles of justice, namely love, equality, and
merit on the basis of the three forms of inter-subjective recognition. The
attempt to ground justice in the experience of impaired subjectivity (or
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