Professional Documents
Culture Documents
133739
"GUNSHOT WOUND"
as a consequence of which said Edilberto Banate died
after four (4) months.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Ramil Coca affirmed the version of Ricardo and Tomas and added
that on the night of March 20, 1996, he was eating supper with
his family when they heard three successive gunshots. When he
and his mother went out to check what happened, they saw Roel
Soquib and Melino Leyson carrying the body of Edilberto Banate.
Then, at the instruction of his mother, he proceeded to the house
of Mario Rebales to inform his father of the shooting incident.
Thereafter, his father, Ricardo and Pedro Soquib followed by
Tomas, proceeded to the scene of the crime; while he went
home.13
The version of the defense was further corroborated by the
testimonies of defense witnesses Pedro Soquib and Mario
Rebales.14 Defense witnesses Sergio Borres and Roel Soquib, who
helped bring the victim to the hospital, further narrated that
Merolina Banate told them that she was not able to recognize the
culprit because it was dark.15
On July 30, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed judgment
of conviction. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing facts and
circumstances, accused Tomas Coca, Jr., Ricardo Coca
and Ramil Coca are hereby imposed each the penalty
of RECLUSON PERPETUA with the accessory penalties
of the law; to jointly indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Edilberto Banate in the sum of P50,000.00
and to pay the costs. The accused, however, are
credited in full during the whole period of their
detention provided that they will signify in writing that
they will abide by all the rules and regulations of the
penitentiary.
SO ORDERED.16
In their appeal, accused-appellants contend that the prosecution
failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the
perpetrators. They claimed that at 7:00 in the evening, it was
impossible for Merolina Banate to recognize the culprits through
a inch gap on the bamboo flooring, considering that the area
underneath the house where the gunfire allegedly came from
was dark. In the same vein, accused-appellants assert that the
testimony of Alexander Singson is fabricated. According to them,
it is unbelievable that Singson had committed to memory the
appearance of the assailants not only because it was dark, but
also because Singson himself admitted that he saw the
assailants only for the first time during the incident. They further
argued that if Merolina indeed recognized the perpetrators, she
would have immediately revealed their names to those who
responded and to the members of the media who interviewed
her. Accused-appellants likewise alleged that Merolina's reaction
immediately after the gun bursts was contrary to human
experience. The natural reaction would have been to seek cover,
turn off the light, shout for help, or cuddle the injured, and not to
peep through the floor where the shots came from. Finally,
accused-appellants Ricardo and Ramil Coca contend that even
assuming that the version of the prosecution were true, they
should have been acquitted considering that there was no
evidence to show that they connived with accused-appellant
Tomas Coca, Jr.
ATTY. VAILOCES:
xxx
Q.
You will admit that you did not see the person or
persons in the act of shooting your husband?
A.
xxx
A.
I do not admit because I actually saw the
persons who actually shot my husband.
xxx
xxx
x x x20
ATTY. VAILOCES:
Q.
A.
x x x19
Q.
You said that you saw Tomas Coca in the act of
shooting although that is not stated in your affidavit.
My question now is: how were you able to see when it
was nighttime?
A.
I intently peep through the floor and because it
was well-lighted by the fluorescent lamp I vividly saw
them underneath the house. I know them because
they are my close relatives.
A.
The three of them. It was Jr. Coca who held the
firearm.
xxx
xxx
xxx
ATTY. VAILOCES:
Q.
Now, what were the other two doing at the time
you saw them?
A.
FISCAL GALANIDA:
COURT:
There was a portion not translated:
Q.
A.
WITNESS:
A.
And even the adjacent area it was also well
lighted. Moreover, they are my close relatives even by
their smell I could sense they were (sic).
xxx
xxx
Q.
When you said you saw Tomas Coca underneath
your house and then left your house of course he was
the only one you saw and no other persons?
xxx
xxx
Q.
What light illumines (sic) from (sic) the outside
portion of the house?
xxx
xxx
xxx
WITNESS:
A.
It was a 100 watt bulb near our house. It gave
bright light from the outside.
Q.
How far is that bulb outside to the place where
you allegedly saw Tomas Coca?
was hit when she instinctively looked through the gaps in the
bamboo floor. Hence, her instinct could not have told her at that
time to cuddle her husband. At any rate, it is a settled
jurisprudence that different people react differently to a given
situation and there is no standard form of behavioral response
when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful
experience. One person's spontaneous response may be
aggression while another person's reaction may be cold
indifference.23
While it is true that accused-appellants Ricardo and Ramil Coca
did not actually shoot the victim, their conspiratorial acts and
omissions would likewise make them liable for his death. Ricardo
and Ramil purposely accompanied Tomas underneath the house
of the victim, such that they could not be considered innocent
spectators. They simultaneously left the scene of the crime
together with Tomas and did nothing to stop or prevent the latter
from shooting the victim. Finally, they had the motive to kill the
victim as they in fact previously mauled him after a
misunderstanding.
So also, the defenses of denial and alibi raised by accusedappellants must fail. Not only are said defenses inherently weak,
they cannot likewise prevail over their positive identification24 by
prosecution witness Merolina Banate, who was not shown to
have been impelled by any ill-motive to falsely impute the
commission of the crime against them, her very own relatives.
Furthermore, the locus criminis is only 300 meters25 and 40
meters26 away, respectively, from the place where accusedappellants Ricardo and Tomas, as well as Ramil, were allegedly at
when the crime occurred. This negates the physical impossibility
of their presence at the scene of the crime at the time the felony
was committed.27
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend to directly and specially insure the
execution of the crime, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. The essence of
treachery is the sudden, unexpected, and unforeseen attack on
the person of the victim, without the slightest provocation on the
part of the latter.28 Judging from the circumstances which
attended the shooting of the deceased, treachery undoubtedly
qualified the present case to murder. This is so because accusedappellants obviously devised a way, that is, by shooting the
victim from underneath the house, to effectively execute the
crime without risk to themselves arising from the defense which
the unsuspecting victim might put up.1wphi1.nt
In sum, the Court finds that the trial court did not err in
upholding the version of the prosecution and disregarding the
defenses put up by accused-appellants. Though Merolina did not
see the actual shooting of her husband, the circumstantial
evidences presented by the prosecution are sufficient to sustain
a conviction. Under the Rules of Court, conviction based on
Upon Jacinto's death in the later part of 1989, his surviving wife,
petitioner Cecilia and particularly his daughter, petitioner
Lilibeth, took over the operations, control, custody, disposition
and management of Shellite without respondent's consent.
Despite respondent's repeated demands upon petitioners for
accounting, inventory, appraisal, winding up and restitution of
his net shares in the partnership, petitioners failed to comply.
Petitioner Lilibeth allegedly continued the operations of Shellite,
converting to her own use and advantage its properties.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals,
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and
papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the
latter's knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent
Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic
of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her
mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly
opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took
157 documents consisting of private correspondence between
Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled
checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case
for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of
medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the
documents and papers and for damages against petitioner. The
case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X,
which, after trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr.
Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner of the
properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or
those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress"
and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf
to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay
him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral
damages and attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of the suit.
The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final
and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and
representatives were enjoined from "using or
submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in
question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in question
belong to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they
were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his
knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court declared
the documents and papers to be properties of private
respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private
respondent and enjoined her from using them in evidence. In
appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
trial court's decision, petitioner's only ground is that in Alfredo
Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled that the documents
and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondent's
comment in that case) were admissible in evidence and,
therefore, their use by petitioner's attorney, Alfonso Felix did not
constitute malpractice or gross misconduct, For this reason it is
contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private
respondent's complaint.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix,
Jr. was for disbarment. Among other things, private respondent,
REGALADO, J.:
Through the special civil action for certiorari at bar, petitioner
seeks the annulment of the resolution of respondent
Sandiganbayan, promulgated on December 22, 1993, which
denied petitioner's motion for the discharge of respondent
Generoso S. Sansaet to be utilized as a state witness, and its
resolution of March 7, 1994 denying the motion for
reconsideration of its preceding disposition. 1
The records show that during the dates material to this case,
respondent Honrada was the Clerk of Court and Acting
Stenographer of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San
Francisco-Bunawan-Rosario in Agusan del Sur. Respondent
Paredes was successively the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del
Sur, then Governor of the same province, and is at present a
Congressman. Respondent Sansaet was a practicing attorney
who served as counsel for Paredes in several instances pertinent
to the criminal charges involved in the present recourse.
The same records also represent that sometime in 1976,
respondent Paredes applied for a free patent over Lot No. 3097A, Pls-67 of the Rosario Public Land Subdivision Survey. His
application was approved and, pursuant to a free patent granted
to him, an original certificate of title was issued in his favor for
that lot which is situated in thepoblacion of San Francisco,
Agusan del Sur.
However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an action for the
cancellation of respondent Paredes' patent and certificate of title
since the land had been designated and reserved as a school site
in the aforementioned subdivision survey. The trial court
rendered judgment 3 nullifying said patent and title after finding
that respondent Paredes had obtained the same through
fraudulent misrepresentations in his application. Pertinently,
respondent Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes in that civil
case. 4
2
33
KAPUNAN, J.:
These case touch the very cornerstone of every State's judicial
system, upon which the workings of the contentious and
adversarial system in the Philippine legal process are based
the sanctity of fiduciary duty in the client-lawyer relationship.
The fiduciary duty of a counsel and advocate is also what makes
the law profession a unique position of trust and confidence,
which distinguishes it from any other calling. In this instance, we
have no recourse but to uphold and strengthen the mantle of
protection accorded to the confidentiality that proceeds from the
performance of the lawyer's duty to his client.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the
Complaint on July 31, 1987 before the Sandiganbayan by the
Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission
on Good Government against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one
of the principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten
wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named
corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled
"Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al." 1
Among the dependants named in the case are herein petitioners
Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C.
Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U.
Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private respondent
Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm Angara,
Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter
referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA Law Firm performed
legal services for its clients, which included, among others, the
organization and acquisition of business associations and/or
organizations, with the correlative and incidental services where
its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders.
More specifically, in the performance of these services, the
members of the law firm delivered to its client documents which
substantiate the client's equity holdings, i.e., stock certificates
endorsed in blank representing the shares registered in the
client's name, and a blank deed of trust or assignment covering
said shares. In the course of their dealings with their clients, the
members of the law firm acquire information relative to the
assets of clients as well as their personal and business
circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners
and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the
organization and acquisition of the companies included in Civil
Case No. 0033, and in keeping with the office practice, ACCRA
lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations
involved in sequestration proceedings. 2
On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential Commission on
Good Government (hereinafter referred to as respondent PCGG)
filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third
Amended Complaint" which excluded private respondent Raul S.
Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as partydefendant. 3Respondent PCGG based its exclusion of private
respondent Roco as party-defendant on his undertaking that he
will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as
nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case
No. 33. 4
Petitioners were included in the Third Amended Complaint on the
strength of the following allegations:
14. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr.,
Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C. Concepcion,
Teodoro Regala, Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A.
Vinluan, Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja G.
Hayudini and Raul Roco of the Angara
Concepcion Cruz Regala and Abello law
offices (ACCRA) plotted, devised, schemed
conspired and confederated with each other
in setting up, through the use of the coconut
levy funds, the financial and corporate
framework and structures that led to the
establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE,
COCOMARK, CIC, and more than twenty
other coconut levy funded corporations,
including the acquisition of San Miguel
Corporation shares and its
institutionalization through presidential
directives of the coconut monopoly. Through
insidious means and machinations, ACCRA,
being the wholly-owned investment arm,
ACCRA Investments Corporation, became
I
The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion in subjecting
petitioners ACCRA lawyers who undisputably
acted as lawyers in serving as nomineestockholders, to the strict application of the
law of agency.
II
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion in not considering
petitioners ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as
similarly situated and, therefore, deserving
of equal treatment.
1. There is absolutely no
evidence that Mr. Roco
had revealed, or had
undertaken to reveal,
the identities of the
client(s) for whom he
acted as nomineestockholder.
2. Even assuming that
Mr. Roco had revealed,
or had undertaken to
reveal, the identities of
the client(s), the
disclosure does not
constitute a substantial
distinction as would
make the classification
reasonable under the
equal protection clause.
3. Respondent
Sandiganbayan
sanctioned favoritism
and undue preference in
favor of Mr. Roco in
violation of the equal
protection clause.
III
IV
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion in not requiring
that the dropping of party-defendants by the
PCGG must be based on reasonable and just
grounds and with due consideration to the
constitutional right of petitioners ACCRA
lawyers to the equal protection of the law.
Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his own motion for
reconsideration of the March 18, 1991 resolution which was
denied by respondent Sandiganbayan. Thus, he filed a separate
petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 108113, assailing
respondent Sandiganbayan's resolution on essentially the same
grounds averred by petitioners in G.R. No. 105938.
Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent Roco as
party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33 grants him a favorable
treatment, on the pretext of his alleged undertaking to divulge
the identity of his client, giving him an advantage over them who
are in the same footing as partners in the ACCRA law firm.
Petitioners further argue that even granting that such an
undertaking has been assumed by private respondent Roco, they
are prohibited from revealing the identity of their principal under
their sworn mandate and fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at
all times the confidentiality of information obtained during such
lawyer-client relationship.
Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners'
contention, alleging that the revelation of the identity of the
client is not within the ambit of the lawyer-client confidentiality
privilege, nor are the documents it required (deeds of
assignment) protected, because they are evidence of nominee
status. 13
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
With the permission of this Hon. Court. I
propose to establish through these ACCRA
lawyers that, one, their so-called client is Mr.
Eduardo Cojuangco. Second, it was Mr.
Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the
monies to these subscription payments of
these corporations who are now the
petitioners in this case. Third, that these
lawyers executed deeds of trust, some in the
name of a particular person, some in blank.
Now, these blank deeds are important to our
claim that some of the shares are actually
being held by the nominees for the late
President Marcos. Fourth, they also executed
deeds of assignment and some of these
assignments have also blank assignees.
Again, this is important to our claim that
some of the shares are for Mr. Conjuangco
and some are for Mr. Marcos. Fifth, that most
of thes e corporations are really just paper
corporations. Why do we say that? One:
There are no really fixed sets of officers, no
fixed sets of directors at the time of
incorporation and even up to 1986, which is
the crucial year. And not only that, they
have no permits from the municipal
authorities in Makati. Next, actually all their
addresses now are care of Villareal Law
Office. They really have no address on
records. These are some of the principal
things that we would ask of these nominees
stockholders, as they called themselves. 16
It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their
clients as defendants in the complaint. Petitioners are being
prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services
performed in the course of their duties as lawyers. Quite
obviously, petitioners' inclusion as co-defendants in the
complaint is merely being used as leverage to compel them to
name their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to nail
these clients. Such being the case, respondent PCGG has no
valid cause of action as against petitioners and should exclude
them from the Third Amended Complaint.
II
The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the
Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio operarum(contract of
lease of services) where one person lets his services and another
hires them without reference to the object of which the services
are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services may be
compensated by honorariumor for hire, 17 and mandato (contract
of agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could be placed
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorneyclient relationship has been established. The attorney-client
privilege does not attach until there is a client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of
the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing
party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. "A party
suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is." 32 He
cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown
forces. 33
Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is
however qualified by some important exceptions.
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists
that revealing the client's name would implicate that client in the
very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.
In Ex-Parte Enzor, 34 a state supreme court reversed a lower
court order requiring a lawyer to divulge the name of her client
on the ground that the subject matter of the relationship was so
closely related to the issue of the client's identity that the
privilege actually attached to both. In Enzor, the unidentified
client, an election official, informed his attorney in confidence
that he had been offered a bribe to violate election laws or that
he had accepted a bribe to that end. In her testimony, the
attorney revealed that she had advised her client to count the
votes correctly, but averred that she could not remember
whether her client had been, in fact, bribed. The lawyer was
cited for contempt for her refusal to reveal his client's identity
before a grand jury. Reversing the lower court's contempt orders,
the state supreme court held that under the circumstances of the
case, and under the exceptions described above, even the name
of the client was privileged.
U .S. v. Hodge and Zweig, 35 involved the same exception, i.e.
that client identity is privileged in those instances where a strong
probability exists that the disclosure of the client's identity would
implicate the client in the very criminal activity for which the
lawyer's legal advice was obtained.
The Hodge case involved federal grand jury proceedings
inquiring into the activities of the "Sandino Gang," a gang
involved in the illegal importation of drugs in the United States.
The respondents, law partners, represented key witnesses and
suspects including the leader of the gang, Joe Sandino.
In connection with a tax investigation in November of 1973, the
IRS issued summons to Hodge and Zweig, requiring them to
produce documents and information regarding payment received
by Sandino on behalf of any other person, and vice versa. The
reason for the first rule is that it is not within the professional
character of a lawyer to give advice on the commission of a
crime.48 The reason for the second has been stated in the cases
above discussed and are founded on the same policy grounds for
which the attorney-client privilege, in general, exists.
In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the appellate court
therein stated that "under such conditions no case has ever yet
gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a
hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of
the transactions to which it related, when such information could
be made the basis of a suit against his
client." 49 "Communications made to an attorney in the course of
any personal employment, relating to the subject thereof, and
which may be supposed to be drawn out in consequence of the
relation in which the parties stand to each other, are under the
seal of confidence and entitled to protection as privileged
communications." 50 Where the communicated information,
which clearly falls within the privilege, would suggest possible
criminal activity but there would be not much in the information
known to the prosecution which would sustain a charge except
that revealing the name of the client would open up other
privileged information which would substantiate the
prosecution's suspicions, then the client's identity is so
inextricably linked to the subject matter itself that it falls within
the protection. The Baird exception, applicable to the instant
case, is consonant with the principal policy behind the
privilege, i.e., that for the purpose of promoting freedom of
consultation of legal advisors by clients, apprehension of
compelled disclosure from attorneys must be eliminated. This
exception has likewise been sustained in In re Grand Jury
Proceedings 51 and Tillotson v. Boughner. 52 What these cases
unanimously seek to avoid is the exploitation of the general rule
in what may amount to a fishing expedition by the prosecution.
There are, after all, alternative source of information available to
the prosecutor which do not depend on utilizing a defendant's
counsel as a convenient and readily available source of
information in the building of a case against the latter.
Compelling disclosure of the client's name in circumstances such
as the one which exists in the case at bench amounts to
sanctioning fishing expeditions by lazy prosecutors and litigants
which we cannot and will not countenance. When the nature of
the transaction would be revealed by disclosure of an attorney's
retainer, such retainer is obviously protected by the
privilege. 53 It follows that petitioner attorneys in the instant case
owe their client(s) a duty and an obligation not to disclose the
latter's identity which in turn requires them to invoke the
privilege.
In fine, the crux of petitioners' objections ultimately hinges on
their expectation that if the prosecution has a case against their
clients, the latter's case should be built upon evidence
painstakingly gathered by them from their own sources and not
from compelled testimony requiring them to reveal the name of
their clients, information which unavoidably reveals much about
ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari to annul the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated October 19, 1994, finding private
respondents as the heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad as well as
annulling petitioners' extra-judicial partition of the decedent's
estate.
The facts are as follows:
On April 18, 1972, petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores
de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco sought the settlement
of the intestate estate of their brother, Ricardo de Mesa Abad,
before the then Court of First Instance of Manila. In their petition,
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 86792, petitioners claimed
that they were the only heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad, as the
latter allegedly died a bachelor, leaving no descendants or
ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. On May 9, 1972,
petitioners amended their petition by alleging that the real
properties covered by TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021, listed
therein as belonging to the decedent, were actually only
administered by the latter, the true owner being their late
mother, Lucila de Mesa. On June 16, 1972, the trial court
appointed Cesar de Mesa Tioseco as administrator of the
intestate estate of Ricardo de Mesa Abad.
Meanwhile, on May 2, 1972, petitioners executed an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of their late mother Lucila de Mesa,
copying therein the technical descriptions of the lots covered by
TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021. By virtue thereof, the
Register of Deeds cancelled the above-mentioned TCTs in the
name of Ricardo Abad and issued, in lieu thereof, TCT No.
108482 in the name of Dolores de Mesa Abad, TCT No. 108483 in
the name of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco and TCT No. 108484 in the
name of Carolina Abad Gonzales. The three promptly executed
real estate mortgages over the real properties in favor of Mrs.
Josefina Viola, the wife of their counsel, Escolastico Viola.
On July 7, 1972, private respondents Honoria Empaynado, Cecilia
Abad Empaynado, and Marian Abad Empaynado filed a motion to
set aside proceedings and for leave to file opposition in Special
Proceedings No. 86792. In their motion, they alleged that
entitled to succeed to
the entire estate of said
deceased, subject to the
rights of Honoria
Empaynado, if any, as
co-owner of any of the
property of said estate
that may have been
acquired thru her joint
efforts with the
deceased during the
period they lived
together as husband
and wife;
(3) Denying the petition
of decedent's collateral
relatives, namely:
Dolores M. Abad, Cesar
M. Tioseco and Carolina
M. Abad to be declared
as heirs and excluding
them from participating
in the administration
and settlement of the
estate of Ricardo Abad;
(4) Appointing Honoria
Empaynado as the
administratrix in this
intestacy with a bond of
THIRTY THOUSAND
(P30,000.00) PESOS;
and
(5) Ordering Cesar
Tioseco to surrender to
the new administratrix
all property or
properties, monies and
such papers that came
into his possession by
virtue of his
appointment as
administrator, which
appointment is hereby
revoked. 1
The trial court, likewise, found in favor of private respondents
with respect to the latter's motion for annulment of certain
documents. On November 19, 1974, it rendered the following
judgment:
5. Declares as inexistent
and void from the
beginning the three (3)
real estate mortgages
executed on July 7,
1972 executed by (a)
petitioner Dolores de
Mesa Abad, identified as
Doc. No. 145, Page No.
30, Book No. XX, Series
of 1972, (b) petitioner
Cesar de Mesa Tioseco,
identified as Doc. No.
146, Page 31, Book No.
XX, Series of 1972; and
(c) Carolina de Mesa
Abad-Gonzales,
identified as Doe. No.
144, Page No. 30, Book
No. XX, Series of 1972,
all of the notarial book
of Ricardo P. Yap of
Manila, in favor of Mrs.
Josefina C. Viola, and
orders the Register of
Deeds of Manila to
cancel the registration
or annotation thereof
from the back of the
torrens title of Ricardo
Abad; and
6. Orders Atty.
Escolastico R. Viola and
his law associate and
wife, Josefina C. Viola,
to surrender to the new
administratrix, Honoria
Empaynado, TCT Nos.
108482, 108483, and
108484 within five (5)
days from receipt
hereof.
SO ORDERED.
OWNED BY THE
DECEASED RICARDO DE
MESA ABAD OR BY
LUCILA DE MESA, THE
MOTHER OF
PETITIONERS AND
RICARDO DE MESA
ABAD.
We are not persuaded.
Petitioners, in contesting Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie Abad's
filiation, submit the startling theory that the husband of Honoria
Empaynado, Jose Libunao, was still alive when Cecilia and Marian
Abad were born in 1948 and 1954, respectively.
It is undisputed that prior to her relationship with Ricardo Abad,
Honoria Empaynado was married to Jose Libunao, their union
having produced three children, Angelita, Cesar, and Maria Nina,
prior to the birth of Cecilia and Marian. But while private
respondents claim that Jose Libunao died in 1943, petitioners
claim that the latter died sometime in 1971.
The date of Jose Libunao's death is important, for if he was still
alive in 1971, and given that he was legally married to Honoria
Empaynado, the presumption would be that Cecilia and Marian
are not Ricardo Abad's children with the latter, but of Jose
Libunao and Honoria Empaynado. Article 256, the applicable
provision of the Civil Code, provides:
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed
legitimate, although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress. 4
To bolster their theory, petitioners presented in evidence the
application for enrolment at Mapua Institute of Technology of
Angelita Libunao, accomplished in 1956, which states:
Father's Name: Jose
Libunao
Occupation: engineer
(mining)
Mother's Name: Honoria
Empaynado 5
as well as Cesar Libunao's 1958 application for
enrolment at the Mapua Institute of Technology, which
states:
SYLLABUS
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS; PHYSICIANPATIENT PRIVILEGE; INFORMATION GATHERED IN PRESENCE OF
THIRD PARTIES, NOT PRIVILEGED. There is authority to the
effect that information elicited during consultation with a
physician in the presence of third parties removes such
information from the mantle of the privilege: "Some courts have
held that the casual presence of a third person destroys the
confidential nature of the communication between doctor and
patient and thus destroys the privilege, and that under such
circumstances the doctor may testify. Other courts have reached
a contrary result."cralaw virtua1aw library
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIVILEGED, WAIVED IN CASE AT BAR.
while it may be true that counsel for the petitioner opposed the
oral request for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to
Dr. Acampado and filed a formal motion for the quashal of the
said subpoena a day before the witness was to testify, the
petitioner makes no claim in any of her pleadings that her
counsel had objected to any question asked of the witness on the
ground that it elicited an answer that would violate the privilege,
despite the trial courts advise that said counsel may interpose
his objection to the testimony "once it becomes apparent that
the testimony, sought to be elicited is covered by the privileged
communication rule." The particular portions of the stenographic
notes of the testimony of Dr. Acampado quoted in the
petitioners Petition and Memorandum, and in the private
respondents Memorandum, do not at all show that any
objections were interposed. Even granting ex gratia that the
testimony of Dr. Acampado could be covered by the privilege,
the failure to seasonably object thereto amounted to a waiver
thereof.
DECISION
One who claims this privilege must prove the presence of these
aforementioned requisites. 18
Q Now, when Dr. Lim and his daughter went to your clinic, was
there any doctor who was also present during that interview?
A No, sir, I dont remember any." 20
There is authority to the effect that information elicited during
consultation with a physician in the presence of third parties
removes such information from the mantle of the
privilege:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Some courts have held that the casual presence of a third
BELLOSILLO, J.:
A confidential psychiatric evaluation report is being presented in
evidence before the trial court in a petition for annulment of
marriage grounded on psychological incapacity. The witness
testifying on the report is the husband who initiated the
annulment proceedings, not the physician who prepared the
report.
The subject of the evaluation report, Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn,
invoking the rule on privileged communication between
physician and patient, seeks to enjoin her husband from
disclosing the contents of the report. After failing to convince the
trial court and the appellate court, she is now before us on a
petition for review on certiorari.
On 14 June 1964, Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were
married at the Saint Vincent de Paul Church in San Marcelino,
Manila. The union produced three children, Edgar Johannes, Karl
Wilhelm and Alexandra. Their blessings notwithstanding, the
relationship between the couple developed into a stormy one. In
1971, Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing purportedly in an
effort to ease the marital strain. The effort however proved futile.
In 1973, they finally separated in fact.
In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential
psychiatric report on Ma. Paz prepared and signed by Drs.
Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes. On 2 November 1978,
presenting the report among others, he obtained a decree
("Conclusion") from the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in
Manila nullifying his church marriage with Ma. Paz on the ground
of "incapacitas assumendi onera conjugalia due to lack of due
discretion existent at the time of the wedding and
thereafter." 1 On 10 July 1979, the decree was confirmed and
pronounced "Final and Definite." 2
Meanwhile, on 30 July 1982, the then Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Pasig, Br. II, issued an order granting the
voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership.
March 5, 2003
Eddie observed them for about fifteen seconds, and then he left
and proceeded to the field to catch fish.5 He reported what he
had witnessed to Artemios stepfather, Celestino, later that
morning.6
Gloria Pagala, the mother of Cynthia and former common-law
wife of Artemio, testified that she and Artemio started living
together in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, in February 1969. Out of their
common-law relationship, they had six children, one of whom
was Cynthia. In March 1982, she and Artemio parted ways
permanently. Later, Gloria and her children lived in Pura, Tarlac.
When Artemios mother died sometime in 1996, Cynthia lived
with Artemio in a small one-room dwelling owned by Celestino
and located in Barangay Sapang Tagalog, Tarlac, Tarlac.7 On 30
August 1996, her son Novelito told her that Cynthia was
pregnant. Gloria then went to the house of Artemio and asked
Cynthia about her condition. The latter confessed that she had
been sexually abused by her father. Gloria then went to the
office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Tarlac and
reported what Artemio had done to their daughter Cynthia.8
Dr. Rosario Fider of Tarlac Provincial Hospital testified that she
examined Cynthia on 16 September 1996. She found Cynthia to
be five to six months pregnant and to have incomplete, healed
hymenal lacerations at 3, 5, 8 oclock positions, which could
have been caused by sexual intercourse or any foreign body
inserted in her private part.9
Atty. Florencio Canlas, an NBI agent, testified that on 18
September 1996, Cynthia, accompanied by her mother,
complained before him and NBI Supervising Agent Rolando
Vergara that she was raped by her father Artemio. She then
executed a written statement,10 which she subscribed and sworn
to before Atty. Canlas.11
The defense did not present Artemio as a witness. Instead, his
counsel de parte, Atty. Isabelo Salamida, took the witness stand
and testified for the defense. He declared that on 24 June 1997
(the same day when he testified before the court), between
10:45 and 11:00 a.m., he and his secretary went to the house of
Artemio in Barangay Sapang Tagalog. The hut was made of
sawali. Its door was padlocked, and its windows were shut. When
he went around the house and tried to peep through the old
sawali walls on the front and left and right sides of the hut, he
could not see anything inside the room where Artemio and his
children used to sleep. Although it was then about noontime, it
was dark inside.12 Atty. Salamida then concluded that prosecution
witness Eddie Sicat was not telling the truth when he declared
having seen what Artemio did to Cynthia when he peeped
through a small opening in the sawali wall of the house in the
early morning sometime on the second week of March 1996.
SO ORDERED.
June 8, 2006
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set
aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
45400 dated 24 August 1998 which upheld the Orders of Branch
77 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Civil Case
No. Q-95-25803 dated 22 July 19972 and 27 August
1997,3 allowing the taking of deposition upon oral examination of
petitioners Oscar P. Mapalo and Chito P. Rosete, and its
Resolution4 dated 19 October 1998 denying petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration.
Relevant to the petition are the following antecedents:
On 5 December 1995, respondents Juliano Lim and Lilia Lim filed
before Branch 77 of the RTC of Quezon City a Complaint for
Annulment, Specific Performance with Damages against AFP
Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS), Espreme
Realty and Development Corporation (Espreme Realty), Alfredo P.
Rosete, Maj. Oscar Mapalo, Chito P. Rosete, Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI), and Register of Deeds of the Province of Mindoro
Occidental, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-25803.5 It asked,
among other things, that the Deed of Sale executed by AFP-RSBS
covering certain parcels of lands in favor of Espreme Realty and
the titles thereof under the name of the latter be annulled; and
that the AFP-RSBS and Espreme Realty be ordered to execute the
necessary documents to restore ownership and title of said lands
to respondents, and that the Register of Deeds be ordered to
cancel the titles of said land under the name of Espreme Realty
and to transfer the same in the names of respondents.
On 18 January 1996, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
grounds that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action or suit and that venue has been improperly laid.6 A
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss was filed by petitioner Alfredo P.
Rosete on 23 January 1996.7 Respondents opposed the Motion to
Dismiss filed by petitioners8 to which petitioners filed their
Reply.9 Respondents filed a Comment on the Reply.10AFPRSBS,11 Espreme Realty,12 and, BPI13 filed their respective
Motions to Dismiss which respondents opposed.
In an Order dated 12 March 1996, the Motions to Dismiss filed by
all the defendants were denied.14 The Motions for
(Printed)
At the
F. close
Ramos
of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a
written offer of evidence dated June 21, 1988, 6which included
"the (above mentioned) statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
At the investigation of February 9, 1986, conducted by the PAL
taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office,"
vs.
Branch Manager in Baguio City, Edgardo R. Cruz, in the presence
which had been marked as Exhibit A, as well as his "handwritten
HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON, Presiding over Branch 6,
of Station Agent Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo
admission x x given on February 8, 1986," also above referred to,
Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Baguio City,
Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward Cristeta Domingo, Felipe
which had been marked as Exhibit K.
and FELIPE RAMOS, respondents.
Ramos was informed "of the finding of the Audit Team."
Thereafter, his answers in response to questions by Cruz, were
taken down in writing. Ramos' answers were to the effect inter
The defendant's attorneys filed "Objections/Comments to Plaintiff
Nelson Lidua for private respondent.
alia that he had not indeed made disclosure of the tickets
s Evidence." 7 Particularly as regards the peoples' Exhibit A, the
mentioned in the Audit Team's findings, that the proceeds had
objection was that "said document, which appears to be a
been "misused" by him, that although he had planned on paying
confession, was taken without the accused being represented by
back the money, he had been prevented from doing so, "perhaps
a lawyer." Exhibit K was objected to "for the same reasons
(by) shame," that he was still willing to settle his obligation, and
interposed under Exhibits 'A' and 'J.'
NARVASA, J.:
proferred a "compromise x x to pay on staggered basis, (and) the
amount would be known in the next investigation;" that he
By Order dated August 9, 1988, 8 the respondent judge admitted
What has given rise to the controversy at bar is the equation by
desired the next investigation to be at the same place, "Baguio
all the exhibits "as part of the testimony of the witnesses who
the respondent Judge of the right of an individual not to "be
CTO," and that he should be represented therein by "Shop
testified in connection therewith and for whatever they are
compelled to be a witness against himself" accorded by Section
stewardees ITR Nieves Blanco;" and that he was willing to sign
worth," except Exhibits A and K, which it rejected. His Honor
20, Article III of the Constitution, with the right of any
his statement (as he in fact afterwards did). 4 How the
declared Exhibit A "inadmissible in evidence, it appearing that it
person "under investigation for the commission of an offense . . .
investigation turned out is not dealt with the parties at all; but it
is the statement of accused Felipe Ramos taken on February 9,
to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such
would seem that no compromise agreement was reached much
1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office, in an investigation
right," granted by the same provision. The relevant facts are not
less consummated.
conducted by the Branch Manager x x since it does not appear
disputed.
that the accused was reminded of this constitutional rights to
About two (2) months later, an information was filed against
remain silent and to have counsel, and that when he waived the
Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the
Felipe Ramos charging him with the crime of estafa allegedly
same and gave his statement, it was with the assistance actually
Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station. It
committed in Baguio City during the period from March 12, 1986
of a counsel." He also declared inadmissible "Exhibit K, the
having allegedly come to light that he was involved in
to January 29, 1987. In that place and during that time,
handwritten admission made by accused Felipe J. Ramos, given
irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, 1 the PAL management
according to the indictment, 5 he (Ramos)
on February 8, 1986 x x for the same reason stated in the
notified him of an investigation to be conducted into the matter
exclusion of Exhibit 'A' since it does not appear that the accused
of February 9, 1986. That investigation was scheduled in
was assisted by counsel when he made said admission."
.. with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of
accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the
confidence, did then and there willfully ...
Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine
defraud the Philippine Airlines, Inc., Baguio
The private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration. 9 It
Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos
Branch,
...
in
the
following
manner,
to
wit:
was denied, by Order dated September 14, 1988. 10 In
pertained. 2
said accused ... having been entrusted with
justification of said Order, respondent Judge invoked this Court's
and received in trust fare tickets of
rulings in Morales, Jr. v. Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., 121 SCRA
On the day before the investigation, February 8,1986, Ramos
passengers for one-way trip and round-trip
538, People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 467, People. v. Sison, 142 SCRA
gave to his superiors a handwritten notes 3 reading as follows:
in the total amount of P76,700.65, with the
219, and People v. Decierdo, 149 SCRA 496, among others, to
express obligation to remit all the proceeds
the effect that "in custodial investigations the right to counsel
of the sale, account for it and/or to return
may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made
2-8-86
those unsold, ... once in possession thereof
with the assistance of counsel," and the explicit precept in the
and instead of complying with his obligation,
present Constitution that the rights in custodial investigation
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
with intent to defraud, did then and there ...
"cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
misappropriate, misapply and convert the
counsel." He pointed out that the investigation of Felipe Ramos
value of the tickets in the sum of P76,700.65
at the PAL Baguio Station was one "for the offense of allegedly
THE UNDERSIGNED WOULD LIKE TO STATE
and in spite of repeated demands, ... failed
misappropriating the proceeds of the tickets issued to him' and
THAT HE IS WILLING TO SETTLE
and refused to make good his obligation, to
therefore clearly fell "within the coverage of the constitutional
IRREGULARITIES ALLEGEDLY CHARGED VS.
the damage and prejudice of the offended
provisions;" and the fact that Ramos was not detained at the
HIM IN THE AMT. OF P 76,000 (APPROX.)
party .. .
time, or the investigation was administrative in character could
SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AS MAY BE
not operate to except the case "from the ambit of the
IMPOSED BY PAL ON OR BEFORE 1700/9 FEB
constitutional provision cited."
86.
On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a plea of
"Not Guilty," and trial thereafter ensued. The prosecution of the
case was undertaken by lawyers of PAL under the direction and
These Orders, of August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988 are
(s) Felipe Ramos
supervision of the Fiscal.
now assailed in the petition for certiorari and prohibition at bar,
37
a) to refuse to be a
witness;
b) not to have any
prejudice whatsoever
result to him by such
refusal;
c) to testify in his own
behalf, subject to cross-
examination by the
prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to
refuse to answer a
specific question which
tends to incriminate him
for some crime other
than that for which he is
then prosecuted.
It should by now be abundantly apparent that respondent Judge
has misapprehended the nature and import of the disparate
rights set forth in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.
He has taken them as applying to the same juridical situation,
equating one with the other. In so doing, he has grossly erred. To
be sure, His Honor sought to substantiate his thesis by
arguments he took to be cogent and logical. The thesis was
however so far divorced from the actual and correct state of the
constitutional and legal principles involved as to make
application of said thesis to the case before him tantamount to
totally unfounded, whimsical or capricious exercise of power. His
Orders were thus rendered with grave abuse of discretion. They
should be as they are hereby, annulled and set aside.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe
Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation, as the
term should be properly understood, prior to and during the
administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket
sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The
constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation
under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not
therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is
also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions
posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation,
February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be
recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during the
trial of the criminal action subsequently filed against him as
Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as
Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the
day before the investigation, offering to compromise his liability
in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act
on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the socalled "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.
His Honor adverts to what he perceives to be the "greater
danger x x (of) the violation of the right of any person against
self-incrimination when the investigation is conducted by the
complaining parties, complaining companies, or complaining
employers because being interested parties, unlike the police
agencies who have no propriety or pecuniary interest to protect,
they may in their over-eagerness or zealousness bear heavily on
their hapless suspects, whether employees or not, to give
statements under an atmosphere of moral coercion, undue
ascendancy and undue influence." It suffices to draw attention to
ROMERO, J.:
A man's signature, even if merely a flourish or even if
indecipherable, may signify authority, agreement,
acknowledgment and ownership. As indelible as his fingerprints,
dental records or DNA genetic map, it denotes trust and honor.
But the same trust and honor may be tainted by polluted
intentions, as when signing is done in bad faith, or to perpetrate
a fraud, to deceive others, or to commit a crime. The petitions at
bar will illustrate how one's John Hancock can bring a man, or a
woman for that matter, to ruin.
Sometime in 1984, then Minister of Human Settlements Imelda
R. Marcos and then Transportation and Communications Minister
Jose P. Dans, Jr., petitioners herein, entered into several contracts
involving the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and the Philippine
General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI). Concurrently and
respectively, Marcos and Dans served as ex-oficio Chairman
and ex-oficio Vice-Chairman of the LRTA, and as Chairman and
Director of the Board of Trustees of the PGHFI. By virtue of these
agreements, which were authorized and in fact ratified by the
LRTA Board of Directors, two vacant LRTA lots consisting of a
7,340-square meter parcel of land located in Pasay City (the
Pasay lot), and a 1,141.20-square meter lot in Carriedo, Sta.
Cruz, Manila (the Sta. Cruz lot), were leased out to the PGHFI.
Specifically, the LRTA and the PGHFI, represented by Dans and
Marcos, respectively, approved three deeds, namely, an
"Agreement for the Development of the Areas Adjacent to the
Light Rail Transit System Stations and the Management and
Operation of the Concession Areas Therein," 1 and two lease
agreements 2 dated June 8 and June 18, 1984, covering the Pasay
and the Sta. Cruz lots. The terms of the lease agreements were
identical except as to the price: the lease would be good for 25
years subject to an annual escalation of 7.5%; PGHFI had the
right to sublease the lots; and the monthly lease was
P102,760.00 for the Pasay lot and P92,437.20 for the Sta. Cruz
lot. Within the same month, the Pasay lot was subleased by
PGHFI, through Marcos to Transnational Construction Corporation
(TNCC) 3 for P734,000.00 a month, while the Sta. Cruz lot was
allegedly 4 subleased to Joy Mart Consolidated Corporation (Joy
Mart) 5 for P199,710.00 per month.
Because of these deeds, petitioners were charged on January 14,
1992, with a violation of Republic Act No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act), to wit:
Criminal Case No. 17449
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer
I, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby
accuses IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P.
DANS, JR. of Violation of Section 3(g) of RA
3019, as amended, committed as follows:
CONTRARY TO LAW.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
2. Under the
circumstances of record,
the absence of counsel
resulting from
imposition of
suspension from the
practice of law upon her
retained counsel,
constituted deprivation
of or denial of the Right
to Counsel.
3. Facts of record
showing legal
representation of
Petitioner Imelda
Marcos was not
adequate.
G. The questioned Decision is premature and
had disregarded the constitutional right of
the Petitioner to present evidence in her
behalf. Her right to testify in her own behalf
is a guaranteed right, the exercise of which
is her personal choice alone, and which
counsel had no authority to waive in her
behalf. Besides, counsel being suspended,
he could not have made a waiver. This
constitutional right "to be heard by himself
and counsel" she is invoking now, as part of
her right to due process (Sec. 14 (1) and (2),
Bill of Rights).
H. The questioned Decision is a nullity for it
was rendered in derogation of Petitioner's
subsisting right to be heard and to submit
evidence in her defense. The finding of
waiver is a prejudicial error. The evidence
thereof on the record is tenuous. A waiver by
an accused person of the right to be heard
in her defense, including her right to testify
in her own behalf must be indubitable, and
is valid only if personally exercised through
her own manifestation in open court.
I. The questioned Decision is a nullity
because the crime charged was not proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
presumption of innocence was not
overcome, which is required by Due Process.
1. There was no disadvantage to the
Government.
i. PGH Foundation is
part of the
"Government".
ii. There was no
disadvantage to the
"Government" because
the PGH, which is part
of the Government
benefitted.
iii. Facts of record,
especially the
On February 10, 1993, the court a quo denied the said motion in
this wise:
Since per testimony of witness Ramon
Cuervo, Jr. (tsn, pp. 20 to 26, August 13,
1992) that considering the nature of the
terminal at the Sta. Cruz Station, which
would be (the) subject of the lease contract
between the Light Rail Transit Authority and
the PGH Foundation, Inc. (Exhibit "C"), the
rental of the premises in question could go
up to P400,000.00 per month if the LRTA
would put up the building as against the
stipulated rental of P92,437.00 actually
entered into between the parties, there
would appear cause to believe that the lease
contract in question was grossly
disadvantageous for (sic) the government.
For this reason, the Demurrer to Evidence of
accused Jose P. Dans, Jr. dated December 7,
1992, is DENIED for lack of merit.
Dans questioned the denial on the ground that the demurrer
should have been resolved solely on the basis of the
prosecution's evidence and even assuming that it could be
resolved using the evidence for the defense, the latter must
have been previously formally offered. 13
These arguments are specious and must, therefore, be rejected.
Although a demurrer to evidence must be resolved based on the
evidence of the prosecution, there is nothing in the rules which
would bar the court from taking cognizance of any matter taken
up during the trial or which has become part of the records of the
case, especially in this instance where the disputed evidence
was taken in advance at the request of the defendant himself .
Additionally it is erroneous to suppose that Cuervo's testimony
was not formally offered at the time because "(t)estimonial
evidence is formally offered by the calling of the witness to the
stand." 14 Thus, we find merit in the manner by which the trial
court justified the denial of Dans' demurrer to evidence,15 viz.:
First, the advance testimony of Mr. Cuervo
taken at the instance of Engr. Dans on
August 12 and 13, 1992, was already part of
the record(s) in these cases when the
Demurrer to Evidence was filed by Engr.
Dans on December 7, 1992. The testimony
was introduced into the record in exactly the
same manner as any other testimony would
be presented in evidence during trial. . . . .
Being already part of the record in these
cases, the advance testimony of Mr. Cuervo
could be taken judicial notice of.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . (J)udicial notice takes the place of proof
and is of equal force. As a means of
establishing facts it is therefore superior to
evidence. In its appropriate field it displaces
evidence since, as it stands for proof, it
fulfills the objects which the evidence is
designed to fulfill and makes evidence
unnecessary.16 Consequently, "the party
desiring to establish a fact is relieved, when
ignore, for no market force could possibly have raised the rental
cost in the same site by that margin in just over a week. Even by
conservative estimates, the properties could have originally been
leased out for at least P500,000.00 27 more. The Government
was thereby deprived of at least an additional half a million
pesos per month.
Indubitably, there was some kind of conflict of interest in the
premises. Marcos and Dans, who were then Cabinet members,
occupied the highest positions in the Boards of the LRTA and the
PGHFI in a concurrent capacity at the time the questioned deals
were made. They were, as it were, playing both ends; but on
paper, one was acting for the lessor and the other for the lessee.
The fact that petitioners were cleared of the charge that they
acted improperly in accepting seats in the PGHFI Board of
Trustees at the time when it had pending business transactions
with the LRTA, of which they were also officers is of no moment.
First, their acquittal in Criminal Case No. 17451 and No. 17452
was simply due to the insufficiency of informations. Second, the
accusation in said informations have no bearing whatsoever on
the subject matter of the other cases filed against them as
signatories to the assailed lease agreements. Even Justice
Garchitorena had occasion to advert to this conflict of interest in
his resolution of November 13, 1996. 28
The focus now shifts to the testimony of defense witness Ramon
Cuervo. An examination of the pleadings filed in these petitions,
including all their attachments, would demonstrate the confusion
sown by Cuervo's expert opinion. Petitioners insist that Cuervo
confirmed their allegation that the lease price stated in the
questioned agreements was a fair valuation based on the
comparative rental costs in the immediate vicinity of the subject
properties. This inference was drawn from Cuervo's calculation of
the fair monthly rental value of the Pasay lot at P73,400.00 29and
the Sta. Cruz lot at P80,825.64, 30 using standard appraisal
techniques in the industry.
The court, on the other hand, interpreted his testimony
differently and arrived at a much higher valuation, that is,
P210,000.00 a month for the Pasay lot and P400,000.00 monthly
for the Sta. Cruz lot.
In view of this conflict in opinion, with petitioners and respondent
court holding steadfast to their respective interpretations of
Cuervo's testimony, this Court has no alternative but to fall back
on the documentary evidence.
Dans, in his motion to dismiss dated December 7, 1992, actually
made an implied recognition that the prosecution was able to
establish the manifest and gross disadvantage to the
government brought about by the lease agreement over the
Pasay lot (Exhibit "B"), when he raised no objection to the
presentation by the prosecution of the sublease agreement
between the PGHFI and TNCC over the same property (Exhibit
"D"). Just as he read the lease and sublease agreements over the
Sta. Cruz lot (Exhibits "C" and "E") together in order to
demonstrate to the court that the prosecution's evidence in
Criminal Case No. 17453 was weak, Exhibit "B" must also be
appreciated in connection with Exhibit "D" so that the "gross and
manifest" disadvantage to the government in Criminal Case No.
17450 can be established.
It must be noted that Dans objected vigorously to Exhibit "E" on
the ground that it was a mere photocopy of the original. Despite
diligent efforts to locate an original duplicate or an authentic
copy, the prosecution could not produce one, so that as to Dans,
said exhibit was not admitted. The same cannot be said of
any case, the fact that Justice Atienza signed his concurrence
cured the defect, if any, in the questioned judgment; again, an
illustration of the "curative" effect of one's signature. Petitioners
are of the impression that this chain of events was meant to
'railroad' their conviction, thus making the magistrates
concerned vulnerable to criticism. While the Court is averse to
encouraging this kind of behavior in judges, it is of the view,
however, that the assailed decision is in harmony with the basic
right of an accused to a speedy disposition of his case. This, to
our mind, is more important than any consideration of technical
impropriety in resolving a case.
Summing up, was the guilt of petitioners proved beyond a
reasonable doubt by the prosecution?
We distinguish.
In Criminal Case No. 17453, we do not concur with the
conclusions reached by the court a quo. The culpability of
petitioners in this case stems from their entering into the lease
agreement (Exhibit "C") over the Sta. Cruz lot under terms and
conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government, which, in this instance, is the LRTA. To prove this
assertion, the prosecution presented in evidence the sublease
agreement (Exhibit "E") over the same property showing the
disparity in the rental price. While the authenticity of Exhibit "D,"
which was used to prove the manifest and gross disadvantage to
the government occasioned by Exhibit "B," was admitted by the
court and by the parties themselves, the validity of Exhibit "E"
cannot, even up to this point, be determined with certainty
because it is a mere uncertified photocopy of the original. Thus,
the "gross and manifest" disadvantage to the government, which
Exhibit "E" was supposed to engender, remains an allegation
which cannot be proved by other direct evidence. The fact that
only Dans objected to its admissibility does not mean that it is
valid as to Marcos. As a result, both petitioners should be, as
they are hereby, acquitted in Criminal Case No. 17453 on ground
of reasonable doubt.
In Criminal Case No. 17450, we must further qualify our
judgment.
As regards petitioner Dans, the Court is of the opinion that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt in committing the offenses
charged beyond a reasonable doubt. We believe that his liability,
if any, could only stem from a knowledge of the terms of the
sublease agreements, Exhibits "D" and "E," which formed the
core of the Court's appraisal of the manifest and gross
disadvantage to the government. Exhibit "E," as already
discussed, was correctly disregarded by the court a quo for being
unauthenticated. Even though he was a Board Director of the
PGHFI, Dans denied any knowledge of the execution of Exhibits
"D" and "E," and his denial was never disproved by the
prosecution. In fact, his signature does not appear in either
sublease agreements. Neither was the alleged conspiracy
between him and Marcos established by the prosecution.
It is this Court's opinion, however, that the guilt of petitioner
Marcos was proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt. She
was charged with violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, for executing a lease agreement (Exhibit "B") in behalf
of the PGHFI, a private enterprise of which she was the
Chairman, over a lot located in Pasay City owned by the LRTA, a
government corporation of which she was undeniably also the
Chairman. The consideration therefor was shown to be unfair and
unreasonable upon comparison with the rental price stipulated in
the sublease agreement (Exhibit "D") which she subsequently
signed for the PGHFI in favor of TNCC. That she should be held
responsible is shown by the presence of her signature in Exhibits
"A" to "E," where she acts in different capacities. She cannot,
under these circumstances, claim ignorance of the great
disparity between the rental price stipulated in the lease and the
sublease agreements. Consequently, in Criminal Case No. 17450,
the conviction of petitioner Marcos should be, as it is hereby,
upheld.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. and Panganiban, J., concur.
1. Re: Demurrer
The Sandiganbayan Resolution dated February 10, 1993 denying
petitioner Dans' demurrer to evidence, reads.
Since per testimony of witness Ramon
Cuervo, Jr. (tsn., pp. 20 to 26, August 13,
1992) that considering the nature of the
terminal at the Sta. Cruz Station, which
would be subject of the lease contract
between the Light Rail Transit Authority and
the PGH Foundation Inc. (Exhibit C), the
rental of the premises in question could go
up to P400,000.00 per month if the LRTA
would put up the building as against the
stipulated rental of P92,437.00 actually
entered into between the parties, there
would appear cause to believe that the lease
contract in question was grossly
disadvantageous for the government.
For this reason, the Demurrer to Evidence of
accused Jose P. Dans, Jr., dated December 7,
1992 is DENIED for lack of merit.
It was highly improper for the Sandiganbayan to have
ruled on the demurrer on the basis of the advanced
testimony of defense witness Cuervo. A demurrer tests
the sufficiency or insufficiency solely of the
prosecution evidence and the trial court's resolution in
connection therewith should be strictly limited to that.
This is unmistakably deducible from Section 15, Rule
119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
states that a demurrer is filed and resolved when it is
only the prosecution that has rested its case. Thus:
Sec. 15. Demurrer to evidence. After the
prosecution has rested its case, the court
may dismiss the case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence; (1) on its own
initiative after giving the prosecution an
opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of
the accused filed with prior leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal,
the accused may adduce evidence in his
defense. When the accused files such
motion to dismiss without express leave of
court, he waives the right to present
evidence and submits the case for judgment
on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution.
That witness Cuervo's testimony was taken in advance which the
Sandiganbayan took judicial notice of, is no justification at all for
the premature consideration of said defense evidence. For
otherwise, it is tantamount to an adjudication on the merits even
before the defense takes its turn to present all evidence it deems
necessary to its cause.
RG
V
Rea
lty
offe
red
for
sale
1,0
00
sq.
m.
wit
h
imp
rov
em
ent
ther
eon
alo
ng
Taft
Ave
nue
,
Pas
ay
City
, at
P1.
7
mill
ion
or
an
ave
rag
e
per
squ
are
met
er
of
P1,
688
.
lot
loca
ted
on
F.B.
Har
riso
n
nea
r
Lib
erta
d
St.,
Pas
ay
City
, for
P1,
500
per
squ
are
met
er.
The firm of the witness itself had also made
the following appraisal jobs:
On June 7, 1984
Pro
pert
y
alo
ng
EDS
A
and
Vizc
arra
St.
clos
e to
Taft
Ave
nue
wit
h
an
are
a of
823
sq.
m.
at
P2,
500
per
squ
are
met
er.
On September 4, 1984
R.F.
Pul
a,
ano
ther
bro
ker,
offe
red
for
sale
300
sq.
m.
of
On June 6, 1984
25
con
tigu
ous
lots
alo
ng
Taft
Ave
nue
,
Mar
ia
Lim
and
Don
ada
Stre
ets
nea
r
De
la
Sall
e
Coll
ege
wit
ha
tota
l
are
a of
12,
000
sq.
m.
at
P1,
129
per
squ
are
met
er,
wit
h
the
are
a
alo
ng
Taft
Ave
nue
corr
esp
ond
ing
to
2,1
56
squ
are
met
ers
at
P1,
700
per
squ
are
met
er.
On June 1, 1984
6
con
tigu
ous
lots
alo
ng
Taft
Ave
nue
,
Bue
ndi
a
and
Don
ada
Sts.
wit
h
an
are
a of
3,7
72
sq.
m.
at a
tota
l
val
ue
of
P7,
964
,90
0 or
an
ave
rag
e of
P2,
111
.58
per
squ
are
met
er. 1
7
Pul
a at
P18
,57
5.0
0
per
squ
are
met
er;
On April 5, 1982
439
sq.
m.
lot
alo
ng
Ech
agu
e
St.
in
Qui
apo
offe
red
for
sale
by
Hon
oria
Dev
elo
pm
ent
at
P12
,00
0
per
squ
are
met
er.
Riz
al
Ave
nue
cor.
Rec
to
Ave
nue
wit
h
an
are
a of
1,5
80
sq.
m.
app
rais
ed
at
P14
,50
0
per
squ
are
met
er
(ex
clu
din
g
the
mo
vie
hou
se);
and
On March 19, 1984
The
Phil
ippi
ne
Co
mm
erci
al
Inte
rnat
ion
al
(sic
)
Ban
k's
site
at
Plaz
a
Sta.
Cru
z,
mor
e or
less
dia
gon
ally
acr
oss
Das
mar
ias
,
wit
h
an
are
a of
679
sq.
m.
was
app
rais
ed
at
P8,
500
per
squ
are
met
er. 1
9
Q So the rental
stipulated in the
contract exceeds what
you call fair rental for
this property?
So we summarize.
Considering the real estate values given by
appraiser Cuervo,
A Yes, sir.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Q That is on the
presumption that there
are no buildings on the
land you are renting?
WITNESS
acquisition, . . . . . what
would be the value
which would give you a
fair rental?
A If that land would fair
now?
Q Considering what it is
being used for.
A The only thing that
could be of value is the
potential of what rental
it could get by retailing
but not as station.
Q So, as a retail outlet,
or whatever, supposing
you are going to lease it
so that you could turn
around and use it for
advertising space, use it
for particular stalls,
stores, may be jeepney
or tricycle terminal or
whatever because it is
an exchange, would you
be in a position to do
appraisals for rental
value?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q Supposing the LRT at
that time had engaged
you and say, "Mr.
Cuervo, we want to
make money
additionally out of this
area, can you consult
with us"?
A We would go on
hypothetical. If there
were no stores there at
this point and time,
then we will consider
the rental rates of
commercial properties
of the immediate area,
and with the market
there we will also go to
hypothetical approach
to this area. Considering
that it is a catchment
area where thousands
of people would be
passing by in front
of . . . . .
PJ GARCHITORENA
Q Have you thought of
what values you would
put there?
A I would go to the
prevailing rental rates of
CANTIMAR (sic) and all
the other stores, and
the Baclaran activity,
and then . . . .
A Definitely more
comparing it to
Cantimar (sic) and the
Baclaran area would
probably be 2 to 3 times
more.
Q Alright, let's take it at
3. So, your testimony
yesterday was what? Do
you recall? Your
estimate yesterday
without inputing the
LRT, was what again?
A P63,039.00
PJ GARCHITORENA
Q That was your
assumed fair market
value for what period?
A Then we have
P425,885.
Q Would be for what
period, monthly period?
A That is the valuation.
Q Rental?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. BELO
PJ GARCHITORENA
It does not matter. See,
if the LRT put up the
building it will ask for a
fair return of the
property. Whoever put
up the building will
charge for the rent.
WITNESS
A If the tenant will put
up the building his
capital outlay on his
own will be beside the
rent. While if the LRT
will put up the building,
then the rent. . . . . . . .
PJ GARCHITORENA
That is correct, we are
talking here about cost
of money. There is a
beautiful phrase for that
in finance, how you
project the value of the
money-etc.
So, these are our figures
now, P400,000 more or
less is a good asking
price or fair rental price
insofar as the LRT
authority were
concerned.
Nonetheless, we are
told that the monthly
Q We are talking of
Pasay.
WITNESS
WITNESS
Q Yes.
A In this particular
property, the one in Sta.
Cruz, the building was
demolished.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Q So that while, as a
general statement, you
would say for ordinary
realtor in the Pasay
area, your listing on
Exhibit 4 would be
valid. In fact, everybody
in this courtroom knows
that the property we
are discussing here was
not an ordinary piece of
land?
A Was never an ordinary
piece of property before
it was built . . . . . .
Q Insofar as the subject
matter now is
concerned which is an
LRT terminal?
A Yes, sir.
ours)
48
(Emphasis
A I would go to the
prevailing rental rates of
CANTIMAR (sic) and all
the other stores, and
the Baclaran activity,
and then . . . .
A Definitely more
comparing it to
Cantinmar (sic) and the
Baclaran area would
probably be 2 to 3 times
more.
Q Alright, let's take it at
3. So, your testimony
yesterday was
what? Do You
recall? Your estimate
yesterday without
imputing the LRT, was
what again?
A P63,039.00.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Q That was your
assumed fair market
value for what period?
A Then we have
P425,885.
Q Would be for what
period, monthly period?
A That is the valuation.
Q No, Mr. Cuervo, we
are taking this out in
testimony and we want
to be able to read
well. What was your
estimates for the fair
rental value per square
meter of Pasay, the one
that you gave us
yesterday.
You gave us a figure
yesterday. You were
telling us that your land
value is ranged from
P1,000 to P1,500 in that
area. Under this
circumstances, what
would be your fair
rental at that time?
Q Rental?
49