G.R. No.

82789 November 21, 1991 NARCISO

KHO, petitioner, vs.
MANUEL CAMACHO, SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, and
HONORABLE OSCAR LEVISTE, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 97, respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:p The issue in this petition for certiorari is whether
respondent Judge Oscar L. Leviste of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 97, grossly abused his discretion when he
issued the questioned order of March 29, 1988 which cancelled
the previous order approving a notice of appeal.
The facts are as follows:In payment of attorney's fees resolved
against him, petitioner Narciso Kho, a businessman, issued in
favor of private respondent Atty. Manuel Camacho six (6)
postdated Manila Bank checks in the total sum of P57,349.00.
One of the checks, in the amount of P10,000.00, was lost by Atty.
Camacho who promptly notified petitioner. When the other five
(5) checks were negotiated by Camacho with the Philippine
Amanah Bank, the same were returned uncleared because Manila
Bank had been ordered closed by the Central Bank.
Because of petitioner's refusal to replace the Manila Bank checks
or pay his obligation, Camacho instituted an action for a sum of
money against petitioner before respondent trial court. 1 In his
answer, petitioner alleged that he was under no obligation to
replace the lost check for P10,000.00, arguing that Camacho
should have executed a sworn statement that he lost the check
issued to him and furnished both the drawer and the bank with
said statement so that the bank could place on the check "under
alarmed," instead of merely informing petitioner.
Petitioner also refused to issue new checks maintaining that the
closure of Manila Bank (in which he had an outstanding deposit of
P581,571.84 which was more than enough to cover the cost of
the five checks) was beyond his control and therefore he was
in no financial position to pay Camacho unless and until his
money in that beleaguered bank was released.
Contending that petitioner's answer failed to tender a genuine
issue, Camacho moved for a judgment on the pleadings
which respondent Judge Leviste granted in his order of February
12, 1988. In said order, respondent Judge directed petitioner
to pay Camacho P57,349.00 "minus the P10,000.00 pertaining
to the lost check, or a total of P47,349.00 with interest at the
legal rate of 6% from June 2, 1987, until fully paid, with costs or
attorney's fees." 2
On February 25, 1988, petitioner seasonably filed a notice of
appeal stating that he was appealing the February 12, 1988 order
to the Court of Appeals. Respondent Judge duly approved said
notice in his order of February 29, 1988. On the other hand,
despite the reduced money judgment, Camacho made no move
to contest the award. Instead, he filed a motion/manifestation
praying that petitioner's notice of appeal be stricken off the
record as a mere scrap of paper.
Acting on the aforesaid motion, respondent Judge issued the
assailed order of March 29, 1988 setting aside the previously
approved notice of appeal and adopting Camacho's view that the
proper remedy from a judgment on the pleadings was a
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Said order
reads: In view of the Motion/Manifestation dated March 1, 1988,
which this Court finds with merit, . . ., this Court believing that
only questions of law are involved, hence the proper remedy
should be a petition for certiorari, there being no question of fact
presented by the pleadings and the order in Summary
Judgment, the order of this Court approving the notice of appeal
is hereby cancelled and a new order is hereby made that said
notice of appeal is disapproved. 3
Hence this petition for certiorari. The Court has readily
observed two very glaring errors committed by respondent

Judge Leviste. First, he listened to Camacho who could not even

distinguish between a petition for certiorari and a petition for
review on certiorari. Secondly, he pre-empted a prerogative that
legally pertains to the Court of Appeals when he disapproved
petitioner's notice of appeal "believing that only questions of law
are involved."
In E Razon, Inc. vs. Judge Moya, No. L-31693, February 24, 1981,
103 SCRA 41, the Court, through Justice Melencio-Herrera, held:
Concededly, issues that involve pure questions of law are
within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court.
However, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court does not authorize the
Trial Court to disallow an appeal on the ground that there is no
question of fact, but only a question of law, involved. 4
The Court was no less explicit and emphatic when it declared in
the subsequent case of PNB vs. Romillo, Jr., that:
We hold the view that whether an appeal involves only
question of law or both questions of fact and law, this
question should be left for the determination of an appellate
court and not by the court which rendered the subject
decision appealed from. . . . Respondent Judge erred in
dismissing said appeal on his misconception that the same
involves only a question of law and based on this reasoning,
disallowed petitioner's appeal because it was not made to the
Supreme Court. . . .
By dismissing the appeal on the ground that it was
misdirected because the case was resolved by it on a pure
question of law, the trial court committed a grave error.
Respondent Judge should have allowed the
Intermediate Appellate Court to decide whether or not
the petitioner's appeal involves only a question of law
and not arrogate unto himself the determination of
this question. His error in dismissing petitioner bank's
appeal becomes even more obvious considering the
provisions of Section 3 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court,
wherein it is specifically provided that "where the appealed
case has been erroneously brought to the Court of Appeals, it
shall not dismiss the appeal but shall certify the case to the
proper court, with a specific and clear statement of the
grounds therefor."
Thus, following the above pronouncements, what respondent
Judge should have done under the circumstances was to sustain
his approval of the notice of appeal and leave it to the
Court of Appeals to certify the case to the proper tribunal
if warranted. Indeed, Judge Leviste had absolutely no authority to
disapprove the notice of appeal. Under the present rules, his role
is to approve or disapprove the record on appeal (when required)
and the appeal bond, but not a notice of appeal. A notice of
appeal does not require the approval of the trial court. 5
Nonetheless, although a procedural error was committed by
respondent Judge in disapproving petitioner's notice of appeal, to
require him to give due course to the appeal and then elevate the
records of Civil Case No. Q-52014 to the Appellate Court will
serve no useful purpose and will only delay the resolution of an
otherwise open-and-shut case. The records before us are
sufficient to enable us to rule on the propriety of the judgment on
the pleadings and to terminate this case once and for all.
The obligation to pay P57,349.00 in attorney's fees is admitted.
The appropriate checks in payment therefor have been issued.
However, one check was misplaced through the creditor's fault
while the other five were dishonored because the drawee bank
has ceased to operate.
A perusal of petitioner's answer convinces us that the judgment
on the pleadings was proper. In that pleading, petitioner
disavowed any obligation to replace the useless checks and
gratuitously advanced the reason that the bank where he had

deposited his lifetime savings had been closed through no fault of

his. In effect, what petitioner was saying was that Camacho
should wait until he (petitioner) was in a position to pay. This is
not a sufficient controversion of the material allegations in the
complaint.
Finding no reversible error in the judgment on the pleadings
rendered by respondent Judge Leviste, the Court considers the
same as the final adjudication on the respective rights of the
parties. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, certiorari is
hereby DENIED. No costs.

G.R. No. 93783 December 11, 1992 EVANGELINE C.

BUCAD, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ASILDA GUANZON, WILLIAM
GUANZON, and EMILIA GUANZON, respondents.
NOCON, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari by
Evangeline C. Bucad from the decision 1 dated April 24, 1990 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19321, affirming the
dismissal of petitioner's complaint against respondents Asilda
Guanzon, William Guanzon and Emilia Guanzon for annulment
of sale and cancellation of certificate of title by the RTC of
Cebu, Branch XXIII.
There is no dispute as to the findings of fact made by the Court of
Appeals, which We quote, as follows:
Plaintiff-appellant Evangeline C. Bucad is the granddaughter
of Conrado Bucad. On March 16, 1982, a residential land, with
an area of 409 square meters, in Fuente Osmea, Cebu was
sold to her by her grandfather. It appears that although the
land is covered by the Property Registration Decree (PD No.
1529), the sale was not registered because the owner's
duplicate copy was in possession of Felipe Valencia to
whom the land had earlier been mortgaged.
On December 22, 1982, Conrado Bucad again sold the land to
the defendant-appellees. Asilda Guanzon, married to William
Guanzon, and to Emilia Guanzon, who registered their sale
on January 4, 1983 after paying off the mortgage lien of Felipe
Valencia. Although plaintiff-appellant made an affidavit of
adverse claim, which was annotated on the certificate of
title of Conrado Bucad on December 27, 1982, this fact did
not prevent the defendant-appellees from registering
the sale in their favor and from securing a new title in
their names.
It appears that a subsequent suit brought by defendantappellees against plaintiff-appellant for ejectment was
dismissed on the ground that the defendant-appellees did
not have prior possession of the land. Although in its decision
the RTC stated that defendant-appellees could not claim
ownership of the land because at the time they registered
their sales they had notice of the adverse claim of the
plaintiff-appellant, the decision of this Court affirming the
lower court's judgement, was based solely on the
consideration that since defendant-appellees did not have
prior possesion of the land, an action for ejectment
was not the appropriate remedy.
On May 8, 1985 plaintiff-appellant brought this suit for
annulment of the sale to the defendant-appellees and for

the cancellation of their certificate of title. After the filing

of defendant-appellees' answer and trial, the lower court
rendered a decision, holding that the plaintiff-appellant did
not have a perfected sale because of plaintiff-appelant's
failure to pay Conrado Bucad's indebtedness to Felipe
Valencia. Consequently art. 1544 of the Civil Code which
provides that if the same thing is sold to different persons
ownership shall be transferred to the person who in good faith
is first in recording his sale, does not apply. The lower court
ordered: Wherefore, premises all considered, this Court
hereby orders the dismissal of the instant complaint, and for
plaintiff to pay defendants. 1. P5,000.00 as litigation
expenses. 2. P2,000.00 representing attorney's fees, plus
costs.
In dismissing the petitioner's appeal, the appellate court found
that the appeal did not comply with Section 16, Rule 46 of the
Rules of Court with regard to the contents of an appellant's
brief, particularly paragraphs (b) and (d) and thus dismissable
under Section 1 (g), Rule 50. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals
belied petitioner's contention that the affirmance of the decision
in the ejectment case clearly established that the first vendee
(petitioner) is the real owner of the lot in question, since the
appellate court had upheld the decision on another ground,
namely, that respondents did not have prior possession of the
land.
After her motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner
instituted the instant petition, arguing that the Court of Appeals
erred (1) in not appreciating that respondents are not registrants
in good faith within the contemplation of Article 1544 of the Civil
Code; (2) in ignoring the deed of absolute sale executed by
Conrado Bucad in her favor; and (3) in dismissing her appeal on a
procedural technicality. We find the petition unmeritorious.
I
First, on the matter of whether the Court of Appeals
was correct for dismissing petitioner's appeal for her
failure to include a statement of facts with page
references to the record and assignment of errors in her
appellant's brief.
Section 16, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court lists down the items
which should be included in the appellant's brief:
Sec. 16 Contents of appellant's brief The appellant's brief
shall contain in the order herein indicated the following.
(a) A subject index of the matter in the brief with a digest of
the argument and page references and a table of cases
alphabetically arranged, textbooks and statutes cited with
references to the pages were they are cited;
(b) An assignment of the errors intended to be urged. Such
errors shall be separately, distinctly and concisely stated
without repetition, and shall be numbered consecutively;
(c) Under the heading "Statement of the Case," a clear and
concise statement of the nature of the action, a summary of
the proceedings, the appealed rulings and orders of the court,
the nature of the judgement and any other matters necessary
to an understanding of the nature of the controversy, with
page references to the record;
(d) Under the heading "Statement of Facts," a clear and
concise statement in narrative form of the facts admitted by
both parties and of those in controversy, together with the
substance if the proof relating thereto in sufficient detail to
make it clearly intelligible, with page references to the record;
(e) A clear and concise statement of the issues of fact and law
to be submitted to the court for its judgment;

(f) Under the heading "Argument," the appellant's arguments

on each assignment of error with page references to the
record. The authorities relied upon shall be cited by the page
of the report at which the case begins and the page of the
report on which the citation is found.
(g) Under the heading "Relief," a specification of the order or
judgment which the appellant seeks.
(h) In cases not brought up by record on appeal, the
appellant's brief shall contain as an appendix, a copy
of the judgment or order appealed from.
Non-compliance with paragraphs (b) and (d) of the
aforementioned provision subjects the appeal to dismissal under
section 1 (g), Rule 50, which provides: Sec. 1. Grounds for
dismissal An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals
on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following
ground: (g) Want of specific assignment of errors in the
appellant's brief, or of page references to the record as
required in section 16 (d) of Rule 46,
An examination of the appellant's brief with the Court of Appeals
reveals that the same does not comply with paragraph (a), (b),
(c), (e), (f), (g) and (h) of Section 16, Rule 46. In fact, the pleading
only mentions at the end that the appeal is from the decision of
the trial court in an action for annulment of sale and cancellation
of the certificate of title filed by petitioner. Dismissal of the
appeal was therefore warranted. While admitting that she failed
to observed some of the requirements of the Rules of Court,
petitioner was that the Rules be liberally construed in her favor.
We are unmoved by petitioner's plea.
The purpose of an assignment of errors is to point out to
the appellate court the specific portion of the decision
appealed from which the appellant seeks to controvert. 3 This
requirement is deemed complied with where the assignment of
errors are embodied in the arguments, and the clear discussion of
the points in issue have accomplished the task of informing the
Court which part of the appealed decision is sought to be
reviewed. 4
Petitioner's brief in the Court of Appeals is severely
wanting on this matter. It does not appraise the appellate
court of the portions of the trial court's decision which
she contests, but rather, it quoted at length the decision of the
Regional Trial Court in the ejectment case. 5 Consequently, We
see no reason for a liberal interpretation of the Rules of Court in
petitioner's case.
II
Now to the heart of the petition. The case at bar is an
instance of double sale of real property, in which case, Article
1544 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 1544 . . . . Should it be
immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith recorded it in the Registry of
Property. Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall
pertain to the person who in good faith was first in possession,
and in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest
title, provided there is good faith.
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not
considering respondents as registrants in bad faith since at the
time they registered their deed of sale, petitioner had already
caused the annotation of an adverse claim on the title of the
vendee, Conrado Bucad.
We do not agree.
Well-settled is the rule that the registration of a deed of sale by
either the first of second buyer must be made in good faith. 6 We
see no objection in applying said rule to the annotation of an
adverse claim in double sales.

In the case at bar, the annotation of petitioner's adverse claim

was attended by bad faith since at that time it was made in
December 27, 1982, petitioner had known of the previous sale to
the respondents. This was established by the testimony of
Francisca Bucad, mother of petitioner, who stated that petitioner
had learned of the second sale on December 24,
1982. 7 (Francisca Bucad is petitioner's duly constituted attorneyin-fact inasmuch as the latter is residing in the United States.)
Consequently, the annotation is of no force and effect as against
respondents.
Moreover, petitioner's actual knowledge of the subsequent sale is
equivalent to registration of the sale. 8
Since petitioner failed to prove that respondents knew of the
prior sale of the property to her, respondents are considered to
have registered their deed in good faith and thus ownership of
the disputed property should belong to them.
Petitioner cannot rely on the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 09914 dated September 30, 1987 9 in support for
her position. In said case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal of the complaint for ejectment filed by respondents
against petitioner on the ground that the former did not have
prior possession of the subject property, and not on the basis of
Article 1544. 10 In fact, the appellate court stated:
The Court sees no further need to discuss the petitioner's
assignments of error. Their cause is not founded upon
deprivation of prior possession but one that involves mainly
the question of ownership, the parties appearing to be
vendees of the same property from the same vendor. Clearly,
it is a cause beyond the Metropolitan Trial Court's
competence. 11
Besides, the inferior court in the ejectment case erred in applying
Article 1544 and in declaring respondents as in bad faith since
petitioner's knowledge of the sale of the subject property to the
respondents had caused the automatic registration of the same
ahead of the annotation of petitioner's adverse claim, as earlier
discussed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is
hereby DISMISSED. The decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. 89132 February 26, 1990 LEONCIA, MANUEL,

DIOSDADA, ANTONIA, ISIDRO, GERONIMO, CRESENCIO,
ALEJANDRO, BONIFACIA, AURELIO, EPIFANIO, POLICARPO,
IRENEO, ALL SURNAMED BACLAYON; HRS. of AGRIPINA
BACLAYON, rep. by LUCIA BACLAYON; HRS. of MODESTA
BACLAYON, rep. by FILING BACLAYON; HRS. OF HIPOLITO
BACLAYON, rep. BY MARIO BACLAYON; HRS. OF TOMAS
BACLAYON, rep. by CRISTITO BACLAYON; SILVESTRE
ABANES; HRS. of LEONICA ABELLARE, rep. by FELIX
BACLAYON; CECILIA, HERMINIA, FELIX, CONCORDIA, all
surnamed DELA VICTORIA; and THE HON. JUDGE GERMAN
LEE, JR., Presiding Judge of Branch XV, RTC,
Cebu, petitioners,
vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF SPOUSES
MARCIANO BACALSO AND GREGORIA SABANDEJA, namely,
ARCADIA, FRANCISCA, JOSEFA, DIONESIA, VALENTINA,
ANGELA, VENANCIO, DOMINGA and FELIMON, all
surnamed BACALSO, respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 28, 1989 ordering the
trial court, in a hearing supplementary to execution, to receive

private respondents' evidence to prove that they are builders in

good faith of the improvements and the value of said
improvements, and its resolution dated June 20, 1989 denying
the motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows: On May 7, 1969,
petitioners Leoncia, Martin, Policarpio, Hilarion, Ireneo, Juliana
and Tomas, all surnamed Baclayon; Rosendo, Felicidad and
Silvestra, all surnamed Abanes; and Tomasa, Leoncia, Anacleto,
Monica, Guillerma and Gertrudes all surnamed Abellare filed
with the then CFI-Cebu Branch 2, in Civil Case No. R-11185, a
complaint for recovery of ownership and possession, and
damages, against spouses Marciano Bacalso and Gregoria
Sabandeja of Lot No. 5528 of the Cebu Cadastre. The latter filed
their answer thereto on July 15, 1969. On December 20, 1982,
the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the Bacalso
spouses, declaring them owners of the subject lot, which decision
was appealed by the petitioners to the respondent Court of
Appeals. The case was docketed as AC-G.R. CV No. 04948.
On July 29, 1986, the respondent court rendered a decision
reversing the trial court, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows: WHEREFORE, the decision a quo is hereby reversed
and set aside and another one is rendered declaring plaintiffsappellants as heirs of the late Matias Baclayon the owners of Lot
No. 5528 of the Cebu Cadastre covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 2726 (O-NA) of the Registry of Deeds of Cebu and
ordering defendants to vacate the lot and surrender the same to
plaintiffs. No costs.
The private respondents then elevated the case to this Court by
filing a petition for review which was, however, denied in the
Resolution dated May 27, 1987.
The decision in favor of the petitioners having become
final and executory, they filed a motion for execution of
judgment and possession which was opposed by the
private respondents. The opposition was based on the
pronouncement of the respondent court in its decision dated July
29, 1986, to wit: No fraud or bad faith could be imputed on the
part of the Bacalso spouses. They believed the lot they bought
from Segundo Baclayon was the land they occupied.
The private respondents argued that since they were found by
the respondent court as builders and/or planters in good faith and
Article 546 of the Civil Code ordains that the necessary and
useful expenses for the improvements must be paid to the
builders/planters in good faith with right of retention, a reception
of evidence to determine the correct value of the necessary and
useful improvements must be done first before ordering the
execution.
The RTC-Branch 15, Cebu City, presided by Judge German G. Lee,
Jr., in its order, dated March 8, 1988, granted the motion for
execution of judgment and possession, to wit :
O R D E R : This is finally, acting on the Motion for Execution of
Judgment and Possession filed by Atty. Garcillano in this case
and the rejoinder of Atty. Nacua and the plaintiffs' rejoinder
dated February 11 and the manifestation of Atty. Garcillano of
February 26, 1988.
It appearing that the dispositive portion of the decision of the
Court of Appeals which is now being enforced categorically
declares plaintiffs/appellants as heirs of the late Matias
Baclayon, the owner of Lot No. 5526 (sic) of the Cebu Cadastre,
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2728 (sic) (0-NA) of
the Registry of Deeds of Cebu (Exh. 1) and ordering the
defendants to vacate the lot and surrender the same to the
plaintiffs, this Court is not in a position to entertain any further
claims by any parties in connection with said case.

However, if the clients of Atty. Nacua believe that they can

prove their claims, then they should file a separate civil case
to recover the same as this Court cannot pass judgment anew
on certain claims that should have been interposed as counterclaims in this case.
Wherefore, the Opposition to the issuance of the Writ of
execution is hereby DENIED, as the Clerk of Court is hereby
ordered to issue a writ of Execution in this case. SO ORDERED.
The private respondents appealed the said order of March 8,
1988 by filing a notice of appeal dated March 30, 1988 which
appeal was, however, dismissed by Judge Lee in the order dated
April 15, 1988.
On April 29, 1988, the petitioners filed a motion for writ of
possession and demolition to which motion the private
respondents filed their opposition reiterating the ground in the
opposition to the motion for execution and possession.
Judge Lee, thereafter, issued the order dated August 19, 1988, to
wit:
O R D E R : An examination of the records of this case reveals
that until now, there is yet no action by the Court of Appeals on
the Clarificatory motion filed by the losing party.
The Court has allowed this excuse to defer its issuance of an
order of demolition after the prevailing party has prayed the
Court to issue one.
With the long passage of time, since the judgment in this case
has become final, this Court cannot allow any further delay in
the enforcement of its judgment.
WHEREFORE, it is finally ordered that the losing party in this
case be given fifteen (15) days from today within which to
effect a voluntary removal of any improvements that they
have introduced in the premises, considering that the prevailing
party refused to reimburse the losing party therefor, and if they
do not demolish it after the expiration of this 15 days, this Court
will be constrained to order its demolition as prayed for. IT IS SO
ORDERED.
On September 19, 1988, the private respondents filed a petition
for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with the
respondent court concerning the orders dated March 8, 1988 and
August 19, 1988.
On April 28, 1989, the respondent court granted the petition, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, the
orders of March 8,1988 and August 19, 1988 issued in Civil Case
No. R-11185 by the RTC-Cebu City, Branch 15, are hereby SET
ASIDE and ANNULLED. In a hearing supplementary to execution,
the said court is hereby ordered to receive petitioners' evidence
to prove that they are builders in good faith of the improvements
and the value of the said improvements introduced by them in
the subject Lot 5528. IT IS SO ORDERED.
The motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present
petition.
The only issue is whether or not the private respondents should
be allowed, in a hearing supplementary to execution, to present
evidence to prove that they are builders in good faith of the
improvements and the value of said improvements. Petitioners
allege that the orders dated March 8, 1988 and August 19, 1988
are legitimate having been issued by a judge presiding a court of
competent jurisdiction, pursuant to his duties which are
ministerial in nature, to enforce a decision which is already final
and executory.

In ordering the trial court to receive private respondent's

evidence to prove that they are builders in good faith of the
improvements and the value of said improvements, reliance was
placed by the respondent court in the cases of Naga
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al..
We shall narrate the facts in these two cases in a nutshell:
1) In the former case, Pacific Merchandising Corporation
(Pacific) filed a complaint against Naga Development
Corporation (Naga) for the balance of its indebtedness in the
amount of P143,282.76. For failure to file an answer within
the period, Naga was declared in default. In its affidavit of
merit attached to the motion to set aside the order of default,
Naga asserted that it had made certain payments to Pacific
which should be deducted from the amount of the claim. The
motion was denied. A judgment by default was rendered
ordering Naga to pay said balance of indebtedness. The
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and also by this
Court, with the qualification that Naga was allowed to prove,
during the process of execution of the judgment, whatever
payments it had made to Pacific, either before or after the
filing of the complaint, which constitute a proper deduction
from the principal sum ordered to be paid. Thus, We
rationalized:
Bearing in mind the nature of the instant suit and considering
that the Court of Appeals' concurrence in the trial court's
assessment of the amount of P143,282.76 is in the nature of a
factual finding, this Court cannot now pass upon its
correctness. The two courts below had before them the sales
agreement between the parties, and to what extent the
parties complied with their respective prestations thereunder
was purely a matter of evidence.
However, although we cannot pass upon the correctness of
the said assessment, it is quite obvious that in the execution
of its judgment as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the trial
court cannot compel the Naga to pay more than what it
actually owes the Pacific under the terms of their covenant.
Deeply imbedded in our legal system are the principles that
no man may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another, and that every person must, in the exercise of his
rights, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith. ... .
2) In the latter case, an action for recovery of damages as a
result of a vehicular accident was filed by Rosita Yap Vda. de
Chi against Alfonso Corominas, Jr., the owner of the bus, and
Simplicio Lawas, the driver. Since the vehicle was insured, a
third-party complaint was filed against the surety company.
The trial court rendered judgment against Corominas, Jr. and
Lawas by ordering them jointly and severally to pay
P40,302.31 to Vda. de Chi. In turn, the surety company was
ordered to indemnify Corominas, Jr. by the same amount. A
writ of execution was issued against the defendants and the
surety company. The decision was only partially satisfied
because P6,700.00 has remained unpaid. Later, upon motion
of the Southern Islands Hospital, the trial court ordered the
surety company to pay directly to the hospital the amount of
P686.35 out of the residue of the unpaid judgment; upon
motion of the Chong Hua Hospital, the trial court issued
another order requiring Corominas, Jr. and the surety
company to pay the hospital the amount of P4,238.56. These
two orders were questioned before this Court by Vda. de Chi.
We set aside said orders and ordered the trial court to
conduct a hearing, after proper notice to the parties, to
determine whether or not the hospital bills incurred by Vda.
de Chi have been paid, and thereafter, to render a decision
accordingly. Thus, We explained:
Technically it was error for the respondent Court to order the
defendants and the surety company to pay the respondents
Southern Islands Hospital and Chong Hua Hospital the

amounts of P686.35 and P4,238.56, respectively, from the

balance of the judgment yet to be paid to the herein
petitioner by the defendants and the surety company since
the said respondents are not parties in the case. The
judgment sought to be executed specifically ordered the
defendants Alfonso Corominas, Jr. and Simplicio Lawas to pay,
jointly and severally, the plaintiff Rosita Yap Vda. de Chi, the
amount of P40,302.31, plus costs; and for the surety company
to indemnify the defendant Alfonso Corominas, Jr. the amount
of P40,302.31, which the said defendant is ordered to pay the
plaintiff. Consequently, to order the payment of certain
portions thereof to the herein respondent hospitals, Southern
Islands Hospital and Chong Hua Hospital, would be to modify,
alter, or vary the terms of the judgment. While the said
respondents may have an interest over the said amounts
claimed by them, their remedy was not to file a mere ex-parte
motion before the court, but to file separate and independent
actions before courts of competent jurisdiction, since the
judgment rendered in the case had already become final and
almost executed and the law allows no intervention after the
trial has been terminated.
On the other hand, it cannot also be denied that the sums of
money in question have been awarded to the herein
petitioner as expenses for her hospitalization in the
respondent hospitals and are based upon petitioner's own
evidence. To order the filing of a separate and independent
action to recover a claim where the respondent hospitals
concerned will have to prove exactly a claim which had
already been tried, litigated and adjudged would unduly result
in multiplicity of suits. Considering that the herein
respondents claim that the herein petitioner has not yet paid
the amounts she incurred for hospitalization, the interests of
justice will be best served if a hearing be conducted to
determine whether or not the hospital bills have been paid,
instead of requiring the respondent hospitals to file separate
actions to recover their respective claims.
The aforementioned reliance on these two cases was misplaced.
The common denominator between these two cases is the
existence of a defense/claim which has been raised/tried
before the trial court. In the Naga case, the defense of
payments made to Pacific which are properly deductible from the
principal sum ordered to be paid by Naga to Pacific was part of
the issues which Naga was not allowed to prove, being already in
default. In the Vda. de Chi case, her claim of hospitalization
expenses incurred in the respondent hospital has been litigated
and adjudged. The respondent court failed to appreciate that this
shared denominator does not obtain in the present case. The
defense of builders in good faith of the improvements and
evidence of the value of said improvements were not raised/
presented before the trial court.
More importantly, in the recent case of First Integrated Bonding
and Insurance Co., Inc., et al. v. Isnani, which involved a similar
issue, We ruled: Significantly, the decision of September 30, 1971
in Naga Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, on which
total reliance has been placed by the petitioners, does not appear
to have been reaffirmed by this Court in subsequent cases. It is
Justice Antonio Barredo's dissent that appears to have been
firmed up in later decisions of this Court:
"... I believe that since Naga has been declared in default, and
no grave abuse of discretion having been found by the Court
in that respect, the judgment by default must stand and be
executed, as is. Whether or not Naga has partially paid was
part of the issue before the court before judgment was
rendered, Naga through its own fault was not allowed to
prove any such partial payment by the trial court; surely, that
issue cannot be reopened during the execution because that
would tend to vary the terms of the judgment. The matters of
equity which can be raised in an execution proceeding,
cannot to my mind, refer to those which the court could have
passed upon before judgment. Otherwise, there will be no end
to litigation, since conceivably the proof of partial payments

could be so seriously controversial as to need another full

blown trial, decision and appeal. It is my view that under the
circumstances, Naga can do no more than address itself to
the benignity or conscience of the private respondent."
The rule is well established that once a decision has become
final and executory the only jurisdiction left with the trial
court is to order its execution. To require now the trial court in
a hearing supplementary to execution, to receive private
respondents' evidence to prove that they are builders in good
faith of the improvements and the value of said Improvements, is
to disturb a final executory decision; which may even cause
its substantial amendment. It appears that the private
respondent's opposition to the motion for the execution of the
judgment, possession and demolition is their last straw to prevent
the satisfaction of the judgment. Sad to say, We have to cut this
straw.
We disagree with the respondent court that any counterclaim for
reimbursement of the value of the improvements thereon by
reason of private respondents' being builders in good faith, which
presupposes that they are not the owners of the land, would run
counter to the defense of ownership and therefore could not have
been set up before the trial court. It should be emphasized that
Rule 8, Section 2 of the Rules of Court allows a party to set forth
two or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or
hypothetically, either in one cause of action or defense or in
separate causes of action or defenses. This Court, in Castle Bros.,
Wolf and Sons v. Go-Juno, even held that inconsistent defenses
may be pleaded alternatively or hypothetically provided that
each defense is consistent with itself. Mention must also be
made of the case of Camara, et al. v. Aguilar, et al., where We
ruled:
The contention that a counterclaim for expenses incurred in
clearing and cultivating the parcel of land and planting
coconut and other fruit-bearing trees therein could not have
been set up in the former case because that would have been
inconsistent with or would have weakened the claim that they
were entitled to the parcel of land, is without merit, because
'A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or
defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in one cause of
action or defense or in separate causes of action or
defenses.' Hence, the plaintiffs herein and intervenors in the
former case could have set up the claim that they were
entitled to the parcel of land and alternatively that
assuming (hypothetically) that they were not entitled to the
parcel of land at least they were entitled as possessors in
good faith to the coconut and other fruit-bearing trees
planted by them in the parcel of land and their fruits or their
value.
A corollary question that We might as well resolve now (although
not raised as an issue in the present petition, but conformably
with Gayos, et al. v. Gayos, et al., that it is a cherished rule of
procedure that a court should always strive to settle the entire
controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to
bear the seeds of future litigation) is whether or not the private
respondents can still file a separate complaint against the
petitioners on the ground that they are builders in good faith and
consequently, recover the value of the imprvements introduced
by them on the subject lot. The case of Heirs of Laureano
Marquez v. Valencia, 99 Phil. 740, provides the answer:
If, aside from relying solely on the deed of sale with a right to
repurchase and failure on the part of the vendors to purchase
it within the period stipulated therein, the defendant had set
up an alternative though inconsistent defense that he
had inherited the parcel of land from his late maternal
grandfather and presented evidence in support of both
defenses, the overruling of the first would not bar the
determination by the court of the second. The defendant
having failed to set up such alternative defenses and
chosen or elected to rely on one only, the overruling

thereof was a complete determination of the

controversy between the parties which bars a subsequent
action based upon an unpleaded defense, or any other cause
of action, except that of failure of the complaint to state
a cause of action and of lack of jurisdiction of the Court.
The determination of the issue joined by the parties
constitutes res judicata.
Although the alternative defense of being builders in
good faith is only permissive, the counterclaim for
reimbursement of the value of the improvements is in the
nature of a compulsory counterclaim. Thus, the failure by
the private respondents to set it up bars their right to
raise it in a subsequent litigation (Rule 9, Section 4 of the
Rules of Court). We realize the plight of the private respondents,
the rule on comlpulsory counterclaim is designed to enable the
disposition of the whole controversy at one time and in one
action. The philosophy of the rule is to discourage multiplicity
of suits.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals dated April 28, 1989 and its resolution dated
June 20, 1989 are SET ASIDE and the orders dated March 8, 1988
and August 19, 1988 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 15 are REINSTATED.

G.R. No. 95918 March 5, 1993 LUCIO M.

CAYABA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS AND SPOUSES RODOLFO AND ROSARIO
RAPADAS, respondents.
NOCON, J.: Petitioner, about to be ejected from his property by
order of the trial court, 1 claims he cannot be so ejected. Although
he and the Rural Bank of Olongapo, Inc., which sold him the
property in dispute, lost in the trial court, with the latter declaring
the sale made by the bank in favor of petitioner as null and
void, 2 petitioner manifests that said bank has appealed the
decision. If the bank will win the appeal, his ownership of the
property will necessarily be upheld as he has derived title to this
property from the bank.
As found by the trial court, the bare facts of the case are, as
follows: [T]he plaintiffs (Rapadas, et al) executed a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage over their parcel of land located at Barrio
Barretto, Olongapo City together with the improvements thereon
to defendant Rural Bank in the amount of P15,000.00. The
property is not yet covered by any sales or free patent. The
defendant Rural Bank of Olongapo, Inc. extrajudicially
foreclosed the property and was issued a Certificate of Sale
being the highest bidder in the amount of P17,557.15. Defendant
Lucio Cayaba bought the property from defendant bank under
conditional sale on March 19, 1979. Before the expiration of the
redemption period of one year, plaintiffs tried to repurchase or
redeem the property from the defendant but the latter refused so
they filed a motion to consignate the amount in Court. 3
On June 15, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
private respondents, which states in its dispositive portion, as
follows: WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, the Real
Estate Mortgage executed on August 18, 1971 is hereby
declared null and void; declaring the sale made by the bank in
favor of Lucio Cayaba is also declared null and void; all other
documents relating to the sale of the property is declared no
force and effect; and that the plaintiffs are allowed to repurchase

the property from the defendants in the amount of P17,557.15

plus legal interest thereon. 4
From said decision, defendant Rural Bank of Olongapo seasonably
appealed to the Court of Appeals while the appeal of petitioner
Cayaba was dismissed for having been filed out of time
and so with his motion for reconsideration.
Thereafter, the trial court issued an order for the issuance of a
writ of execution. 5 Petitioner appealed said order by way
of certiorari to the Court of Appeals but said court
dismissed the petition.
Hence, this petition where petitioner raises the following issue:
WHEN THE CO-DEFENDANT RURAL BANK OF OLONGAPO TIMELY
APPEALED THE ADVERSE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT TO THE COURT OF APPEALS, DID SUCH APPEAL BENEFIT
PETITIONER? CONSEQUENTLY, COULD THE SAME DECISION BE
VALIDLY ENFORCED BY EXECUTION AGAINST PETITIONER WHO
DID NOT PERFECT AN APPEAL THEREFROM? 6
The issue raised by petitioner is not exactly novel. The rule
on this matter is that a reversal of a judgment on appeal is
binding on the parties to the suit but does not inure to the
benefit of parties who did not join in the appeal. The
recognized exception is when their rights and liabilities and those
of the parties appealing are so interwoven and dependent so
as to be inseparable, in which case a reversal as to one
operates as a reversal to all. 7
Petilla vs. Court of Appeals 8 was a case where precisely one of
the respondents, Maximiniana Marcella, derived her title from her
co-respondent, Evaristo Marcella. The petitioners therein claimed
that since Maximiniana did not appeal, she could not benefit from
Evaristo's appeal.
The Court found out that she did appeal; it further stated that:
Even assuming for the sake of argument that said respondent did
not appeal from the judgment of the lower court, this Court has
held that a defendant may nevertheless be benefited by the
judgment in favor of her
co-defendants who inteposed an appeal.
As we have already said, whether an appeal by one of several
judgment debtors will affect the liability of those who did not
appeal must depend upon the facts in each particular case. If
the judgment can only be sustained upon the liability of the
one who appeals and the liability of the other co-judgment
debtors depends solely upon the question whether or not the
appellant is liable, and the judgment is revoked as to that
appellant, then the result of his appeal will inure to the
benefit of all. 9
In the same vein, it is petitioner's position that if the Rural Bank
of Olongapo wins the appeal, the victory of the bank inures to
his benefit since he derives his title from said bank, thereby
upholding his ownership of the property in question. If the bank
loses the appeal, it may still elevate the matter to this Court
under Rule 45. And if it wins, petitioner is benefited.
Petitioner is correct. The Court of Appeals' judgment
which dismissed petitioner's petition questioning the writ
of execution issued by the trial court should be reversed
and set aside and the trial court restrained from enforcing the
writ of execution pending the outcome of Rural Bank of
Olongapo's appeal with the Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the questioned Court of Appeals' decision of
August 28, 1990 and its Resolution of October 19, 1990 affirming
the same are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional
Trial Court, Third Judicial Region Branch 72, seating at Olongapo
City, is hereby RESTRAINED from enforcing the Writ of Execution
issued by virtue of its Order dated February 27, 1990.

G.R. No. L-25393 October 30, 1980 FERNANDO GO, GO

NAM, PONCIANO CUI VILLAS, FRANCISCO COSUANGCO and
SOUTH
PACIFIC
HARDWARE
CO.,
(a
registered
partnership), Petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
SPECIAL FOURTH DIVISION, VISAYAN SURETY INSURANCE
CORPORATION AND WESTERN CONSTRUCTION CO.,
INC. Respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.: This petition seeks primarily to question the
jurisdiction of the respondent Court of Appeals to render a
decision in a case, appealed from the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo, where petitioners, who were third-party defendants, were
neither apellants nor appellees in the appeal, but nevertheless
held in said decision liable for sums of money to the appellee
which was held liable to the appellant, the dispositive portion of
the respondent court's decision reading as follows:
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing considerations, the judgment
appealed from is reversed and defendants Juanita Hubo and
Visayan Surety and Insurance Corporation are condemned, jointly
and severally, to pay to plaintiff Western Construction Company,
Inc. the sum of Two Thousand Six Hundred Seventy-Three Pesos
and Seven Centavos (P2,673.07) with 6% interest thereon per
annum from June 16, 1955 until full payment, plus the sum of
P1,000.00 as attorney's fees, and costs in both instances. The
indemnitors (1) Maximino Sorongon, (2) Fernando Go, (3) South
Pacific Hardware Company, (4) Go Nam, (5) Ponciano Cui Villas,
and (6) Francisco Cosuangco and (7) Juanito Hubo are hereby
adjudged, jointly and severally, to pay to Visayan Surety
and Insurance Corporation the full amount of whatever the
said Visayan Surety shall pay to the plaintiff under this judgment,
plus the stipulated 12% interest thereon per annum from date of
payment until full reimbursement. The cross-claim of the
indemnitors against Maximino Sorongon, their co-indemnitor is
hereby dismissed. Juanito Hubo, in turn, is sentenced to pay the
indemnitors whatever the latter (indemnitors) shall have paid to
the Visayan Surety and Insurance Corporation for and in the
account of this judgment with 6% interest thereon per annum. 1
The relevant facts, for the purpose of the instant petition, may
be briefly stated without setting forth in detail the facts
constituting the causes of action, first, in the original complaint
between the plaintiff, Western Construction Co., Inc., and
the defendants Juanito Hubo and the Visayan Surety &
Insurance Corp. (VISAYAN, for short); and second in the crossclaim and third-party complaint filed by VISAYAN against Juanito
Hubo and petitioners, respectively and the defenses put up by
the defendants in each case, the issue raised in the instant
petition being purely legal, on a matter of procedure.
WESTERN filed an action for collection of sum of money in
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against Juanito Hubo, and
his bond furnished by VISAYAN for the faithful performance of
its obligation to the latter. 2In its answer to the
complaint, 3VISAYAN filed a cross-claim against its co-defendant,
Juanito Hubo, and a third-party complaint against herein
petitioners on their counter-bond executed in favor of VISAYAN.
Petitioners filed their answer to the third-party complaint against
them, and after trial, the court dismissed the com- complaint of
WESTERN against VISAYAN and Juanito Hubo, as well as the thirdparty complaint of VISAYAN against petitioner herein. Only
WESTERN, the plaintiff, appealed to the Court of
Appeals, 4assigning the following errors:
I. The trial court erred in not holding defendant Visayan
Surety & Insurance Corporation jointly and severally with
defendant Juanita Hubo to pay plaintiff the amount of P2,678.07
in accordance with its surety bond (Exhibit B);
II. The trial court further erred in exempting the Visayan Surety &
Insurance Corporation from liability on its surety bond on the
alleged ground that plaintiff did not follow the Contract;

III. The trial court erred in absolving the defendant Visayan Surety
& Insurance Corporation from liability on the surety bond it had
issued in behalf of defendant Juanita Hubo in favor of plaintiff.
It appears that appellant WESTERN had furnished not only
counsel for VISAYAN, as the sole appellee in its appeal, of copies
of its Notice of Appeal and motions related to the perfection of
its appeal, the record on appeal, 5 and its appellant's brief, but
also petitioners' counsel who filed a brief on July 18, 1960, as
stated in the brief for respondent VISAYAN, which was filed on
August 18, 1960. On October 2, 1965, the Court of Appeals
rendered judgment 6the dispositive portion of which was
quoted at the threshold of this decision, which petitioners seek to
reverse or annul, in so far as it imposes liability on them despite
that they were never parties to the appeal of the decision of the
trial court to the Court of Appeals.
Aside from the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
to render the aforementioned decision against them, petitioners
also claim denial of due process insofar as the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance dismissing the
third-party Complaint against them, 7the third Party Plaintiff
(VISAYAN) never having appealed said decision of
dismissal nor had it served petitioners, as the third party
defendants, with a copy of its brief, which was exclusively in
answer to the brief of appellant (WESTERN).
The question raised is purely on a procedural matter. In
this jurisdiction, the rule is pretty well-settled that a party who
does not appeal from the decision may not obtain any
affirmative relief from the appellate court other than what
he has obtained from the lower court, if any, whose decision
is brought up on appeal. 8 The respondent VISAYAN has not
appealed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for
the simple reason that it dismissed the complaint against it.
When its third-party complaint against petitioners as third party
defendants was also dismissed, it nevertheless could have
appealed, if it wanted the appellate court to reverse the decision
dismissing its third-party complaint, in the event that, as was an
ever-present possibility, the decision of the appellate court would
be adverse to it, and favorable to appellant. This would be the
more prudent action to take. It would be motivated by the same
consideration of avoiding multiplicity of actions, as was what
prompted VISAYAN to file the third party complaint in the lower
court, as the Rules allow and encourage, if not require and
demand.
Verily, it is the appeal taken by one of the parties against the
other, that gives jurisdiction of the appellate court over said
parties. The appellate court cannot acquire jurisdiction over
persons who are neither appellants nor appellees. For the
respondent court, in the instant case, to have rendered a decision
against petitioners who were neither appellees nor appellant
in the appeal brought before said court, is to act entirely
without jurisdiction. As a corollary, petitioners would also be
denied due process, never having been put on notice that
they were involved in the appeal so that they would have
tried to prevent the appellate court from rendering an adverse
decision against them in the ordinary course of law.
True it is that petitioners filed a brief on July 18, 1960, apparently
under a mistaken belief that having been furnished a copy of
appellant WESTERN's brief which it was not its duty to do, they
also had to file their own. They certainly did not have to, because
appellant WESTERN did not appeal as it could not have done so,
from the decision of the trial court dismissing the third-party
complaint against them. If they have to file a brief, it would be
one in answer to that of appellee VISAYAN. But VISAYAN did not
finish petitioners with its brief, which was filed on August 18,
1960 later than the filing of petitioners' aforementioned brief on
July 28, 1960, which, therefore, was not in reply to VISAYAN's
brief.

We are not persuaded that the cases relied upon the respondent
court in rendering the questioned decision against petitioners
who were not parties to the appeal justify its action complained
of as lacking in authority or jurisdiction and denying petitioners
their right to due process. If judgment is rendered by the
appellate court without having given the appellee an opportunity
to be heard through its brief, the judgment is clearly vulnerable
on ground of denial of due process. With more reason would a
judgment be similarly assailable as against one who was not
even an appellee at all, as herein petitioners. The American
cases cited by the Court of Appeal 9speak of either "co-parties,"
some having appealed but others did not, or of "joint liability "
and "joint judgment," neither of which is extant in the present
case. Petitioners are not co-parties with VISAYAN. Neither is
their iability as alleged, a "joint" one with VISAYAN,
insofar as appellant WESTERN is concerned. The judgment
on the original complaint is likewise not a "joint
judgment" with that dismissing the third party complaint.
The Philippine case cited 10in the decision under review is clearly
inapplicable. It speaks of an appeal of one of several judgment
debtors, and whether it would affect the liability of those who did
not appeal. Petitioners were never judgment debtors because the
complaint against them seeking to impose liability on them was
dismissed by the trial court.
It is worth also noticing that the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment against petitioners because it sustained VISAYAN's
contention that although the appeal was interposed by WESTERN
alone, the whole case can be considered open again for
adjudication of all the questions involved therein which were
submitted to the lower court, including the dismissal of its crossclaim and third-party complaint against herein petitioners,
despite that no appeal was taken from the dismissal of both
cross-claim and third-party complaint. 11It is, likewise, to be
noticed that petitioners were never given an opportunity to
controvert the above contention of VISAYAN. The denial of
due process in this specific instance therefore, manifest
itself loud and clear. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from
hereby is reversed insofar as it holds the petitioners liable
as third-party defendants to the third-party plaintiff, the
herein respondent Visayan Surety & Insurance Corporation. No
costs.
G.R. No. 86237 December 17, 1991 JORGE NAVARRA and
CARMELITA BERNARDO NAVARRA and THE RRRC
DEVELOPMENT CORP., Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and PIANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK,Respondents.
CRUZ, J.: The respondent Court of Appeals 1 is faulted in this
petition for review for sustaining the orders of the trial court
dated Fe ruary 22, 1988, and May 20, 1988. The petitioners,
spouses Jorge Navarra and Carmelita Benardo, together with
Ruben Bernardo and Cresencia Villanueva and their family
corporation, the RRRC Development Corporation, executed a real
estate mortgage in favor of private respondent Planters
Development Bank over five parcels registered land to secure the
payment of a loan in the principal sum of P1,200,000.00.
When the petitioners failed to pay their obligation, Planters
caused the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage in
accordance with Act No. 3135 as amended. On May 15, 1984, a
public auction was held; the following day the sheriff issued a
certificate of sale in favor of Planters as the highest bidder. The
one-year period having expired without the petitioners
exercising their right of redemption, ownership of the five
parcels of land was transferred to the private respondent
Planters upon the issuance in its name of new TCT Nos. by the
Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila.
Thereafter, Planters sent a letter of demand to the
petitioners to vacate the premises, but the demand was
rejected. It then filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 3135 as amended

before the RTC-Makati, Branch 137. This was docketed as LRC

Case No. M-1201. When the petition wan set for hearing on
August 24, 1987, no oppositor appeared nor was a written
opposition filed. Upon motion, Planters was allowed to present
its evidence ex parte. On October 2, 1987, however, the spouses
Navarro and the RRRC Development Corporation filed their
written opposition, alleging inter alia that they were the plaintiff
in Civil Case No. 16917 pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 145; that they were the owners of the
properties subject thereof which they had acquired by virtue of
a contract of sale; and that herein private respondent had
already been declared in default in the said civil case.
They added that the petition for the issuance of the writ of
possession was a mere ruse of the private respondent.
Civil Case No. 16917 is a complaint for specific performance filed
by the petitioners on June 3, 1987, to compel the respondent
bank to execute in their favor a deed of sale covering the five lots
involved in LRC Case No. M-1201. Acting upon the written
opposition, the trial court set the hearing of the petition on
November 16, 1987, to enable the oppositors to present their
evidence. On December 8, 1987, Planters filed its
comment/rejoinder to the opposition, and on December 14, 1987,
the petitioners filed their sur-rejoinder.
The trial court reset the hearing of November 16, 1987, to
December 14, 1982, then to January 25, 1988, and finally to
February 16, 1988. The petitioners filed a written manifestation
stating that they were not presenting evidence and, citing the
case of Zaragoza vs. Diaz, 65 SCRA 315, argued-rather
implausibly-that the petition for a writ of possession should be
dismissed because it was filed after the one-year period of
redemption.
On February 22, 1988, the trial court issued the assailed order
disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted,
and let a writ possession issue, to be implemented by the
Sheriff of this Court, placing the possession of the five (5) parcels
of land, including improvements existing thereon, situated at
Barangay San Dionisio Paraaque, Metro-Manila in favor of
petitioner.
Their motion for reconsideration of the order having been denied
on May 20, 1988, the petitioners filed with the respond Court of
Appeals a special civil action for certiorari, allege that the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the orders of February 1988, and May 20,
1988.
The respondent court dismissed the petition on September 12,
1988, and denied the motion for reconsideration on December
22, 1988. The petitioner then came to this Court for rel under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petitioners agree that it is the
ministerial duty of court to issue a writ of possession in favor of
the highest bid at the public auction conducted in the extrajudicial foreclos of the mortgage. This is authorized by Act No.
3135 as amend They also concede that as a rule any question
regarding validity of the mortgage or of its foreclosure cannot be
a le ground for refusing the issuance of the writ of possession.
But while the petitioners are not questioning these rules they
submit that the writ of possession should not have be issued
because they are already the owners of the subject property by
virtue of the perfected and partially consummated contract of
sale they had entered into with Planters. To prove their claim,
they presented to the respondent court an exchange of
letters which the petitioners insist has established a
meeting of minds between them and Planters relative to
their repurchase of the subject properties.
The Court has examined these letters and finds that the alleged
repurchase involved only a house and lot and a restaurant
building and lot while the assailed writ of possession involved

five lots in all. Remarkably, the letters were never presented in

LRC Case No. M-1201, as may be inferred from the following
observation of the trial judge in the assailed basic order:
The main thrust in the opposition is the claim by the oppositors'
ownership over the properties subject matter of the petition. It is
their impression that a perfected sale was entered into between
them and the petitioner. This Court has given them the
opportunity to present evidence in support of their stand but
instead they opted not to present evidence, and limited
themselves to filing a written manifestation inviting attention to
the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Zaragoza vs. Diaz .
The petitioners also ask this Court to consider four letters
which they have attached to their petition, claiming these
to be newly-discovered evidence that would substantiate
their allegation that they made a down payment of P300,000 to
the private respondent for the repurchase of the subject
properties.
As defined, newly-discovered evidence is evidence which
could not have been discovered prior to the trial in the court
below by the exercise of due diligence and which is of such
character as would probably change the result. The decision of
the respondent Court of Appeals was promulgated on September
12, 1988. On the other hand, the letters are dated October 24,
1988, and November 12, 1988. As they were not existing at the
time the respondent court rendered its decision, and indeed prior
to the trial, they could not by any kind of diligence have been
discovered at all during that period. It is clear that they do not
qualify as newly-discovered evidence under the definition as
they came into existence only after the trial.
A no less important consideration is that the Rules of Court allow
only two occasions when a party may file a motion for new
trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence. That
motion may be filed only with the trial court under Rule 37 or
with Court of Appeals under Rule 53 but never with the Supreme
Court. 6 Time and again we have stressed that the Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts. It is not the function of this Court
to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence already
considered in proceedings below, its jurisdiction being limited to
reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by
the low courts. Such review does not extend to reversing the
factual findings of such courts save only in the exceptional
instances have laid down in a number of decisions.
The petitioners cite the cases of Cometa vs. IAC, 151 SC 563,
and Barican vs. IAC, where this Court ordered deferment of the
issuance of the writ of possession pending resolution of
the issue of ownership of the disputed properties.
It is true that we did hold as follows in the Cometa case: In the
case at bar, the validity of the levy and sale of the properties
is directly put in issue in another case by the petitioners, This
Court finds it an issue which requires pre-emptive resolution. For
the respondent acquired no interest in the property by virtue of
the levy and sale, then, he is not entitled to its possession.
However, there were peculiar circumstances in that c which are
not present in the case at bar. to wit: Moreover, equitable
considerations constrain us to reverse the decision of the
respondent court. The fact is undisputed that properties in
question were sold at an unusually lower price than their true
value. Properties worth at least P500,000.00 were sold for only
P57,396.85. We do not comment on the consequences of the
inadequacy because that is the very issue which confronts the
court below in the pending case. It appearing, however, that the
issuance of the writ of possession would and might work injustice
because the petitioner might not be entitled thereto, we rule that
it be withheld.
The facts in the Barican case are also different because- In the
instant case, the petition for the issuance of an alias writ of

possession was set for hearing. During the hearing, the lower
court discovered certain facts, among them: In Civil Case No. C11232, the petitioner-spouses claim ownership of the foreclosed
property against the respondent bank and Nicanor Reyes to
whom the former sold the property by negotiated sale; the
complaint alleged that the DBP knew the assumption of mortgage
between the mortgagors and the petitioner-spouses and the
latter have paid to the respondent bank certain amounts to
update the loan balances of the mortgagors and transfer and
restructuring fees which payments are duly receipted; the
petitioner-spouses were already in possession of the property
since September 28, 1979 and long before the respondent bank
sold the same property to respondent Nicanor Reyes on October
28,1984; and the respondent bank never took physical
possession of the property.
Under these circumstances, the obligation of a court to issue a
writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure of
mortgage case ceases to be ministerial. In the said case, this
Court took into account the circumstances that as early as 1979
the judgment debtor was no longer in possession of the disputed
property and that there was a pending civil case involving the
rights of third parties, namely, the petitioner-spouses. No such
third parties are involved in the case at bar, the controversy
being confined only to Planters, as mortgagee, and the
Navarra spouses, as mortgagors.
The purchaser at an extra-judicial foreclosure sale has a right to
the possession of the property even during the one-year period of
redemption provided he files an indemnity bond. After the
lapse of the said period with no redemption having been
made, that right becomes absolute and may be demanded
by the buyer even without the posting of a bond.
Possession may then be obtained under a writ which may be
applied for ex parte pursuant to Section 7, of Act 3135 as
amended by Act 4118 as follows:
Sec. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the
purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the province
place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give
him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing
bond an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period
of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown
that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without
complying with requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be
made under oath filed in form of an ex parte motion in the
registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered,
or in special proceedings the case of property registered under
the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four
of the Administrative Code or any other real property
encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any
register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each
case the clerk of the court shall, upon the filing such petition,
collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one
hundred and fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and nine
six, as amended by Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and six,
and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ
possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in
which property is situated, who shall execute said order
immediately.
Applying this provision, the respondent Court of Appeals correctly
observed: Let it be stressed that, while it is true that the claim of
ownership over the five (5) parcels of land is pending litigation in
Civil Case 16917, until and unless the lower court in said case has
finally adjudicated the ownership thereof to petitioners, private
respondent cannot be deprived of its right of possession over the
same since the right of private respondent springs from the
failure of petitioners redeem the foreclosed properties within the
one-year period granted by law and the consequent issuance of
new transfer certificates of title in its name. Consequently, the
claim of ownership, allegedly in view a perfected contract of sale,
is left to be determined in Civil Case 16917. The same cannot be
raised as a justification for opposing t issuance of a writ of

possession since, under Sec. 7 of Act No. 3135 amended, the

proceeding is ex parte.
There being no dispute that the lands were not redeemed within
one year from the registration of the extrajudicial for closure sale,
it should follow that the private respondent he acquired an
absolute right, as purchaser, to the writ of possession. The land
registration court has the ministerial duty to issue that writ upon
mere motion, conformably to the aforecited Section 7. The
question of the ownership of the land or the alleged perfected or
consummated sale can be threshed out in Civil Case No. 16917,
which is still pending. What we are holding here only is that
because that question could not be raised in the petition for the
issuance of the writ of possession in LRC Case No. M-1201, the
order of the trial judge granting the petition was conformable to
law. WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
G.R. No. L-34589 June 29, 1988 ENGINEERING
CONSTRUCTION INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL
POWER CORPORATION and COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents. G.R. No. L-34656 June 29, 1988 MANILA
ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondents.
FERNAN, J.: In these related petitions for review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, the Engineering Construction, Inc. [ECI] and
the Manila Electric Company [MERALCO] question the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 47528-R which set aside the
orders of the trial court directing execution pending appeal of
a judgment for P1,108,985.31 in damages in favor of ECI.
Petitioners also question the resolution of said court holding them
liable for restitution of the garnished funds to the National Power
Corporation [NPC].
On August 29, 1968, ECI filed a complaint for damages against
the NPC in the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch 15,
alleging that it suffered damages to its facilities and
equipment due to the inundation of its campsite in Ipo,
Norzagaray, Bulacan, as a direct result of the improper and
careless opening by NPC of the spillway gates of Angat
Dam at the height of typhoon "Welming" on November 4,1967. 1
On December 23, 1970, the trial court found NPC guilty of gross
negligence and rendered its judgment, thus: WHEREFORE,
judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant
as follows: 1. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff actual or
compensatory damages in the amount of P675,785.31; 2.
Ordering defendant to pay consequential damages in the amount
of P233,200.00; * 3. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the
amount of P50,000 as and by way of exemplary damages; and 4.
Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P50,000 as and
for attorney's fees ... 2
NPC filed a notice of appeal from that decision but before it
could perfect its appeal, ECI moved for and was granted
execution pending appeal upon posting a covering bond of
P200,000 which it later increased to P1,109,000 to fully answer
for whatever damages NPC might incur by reason of the
premature execution of the lower court's decision. 3
In granting said motion for the exceptional writ over the strong
opposition of the NPC, the trial court adopted the grounds
adduced by movant ECI.
2. That the substantial portion of the award of damages refers
to the actual or compensatory damages incurred by plaintiff,
which are supported by voluminous documentary evidence, the
genuineness and due execution of which were admitted and
further, no evidence whatever was presented to contest the
same;

3. That this case has been pending for years, as the plaintiff
and the Honorable Court were led to believe that the matter in
dispute would be settled amicably;
4. That an appeal by defendant would obviously be for
purposes of delay;
5. That on appeal, the case would certainly drag on for many
years, and in the meantime, the actual loss and damages
sustained by plaintiff, who because of such loss have become
heavily obligated and financially distressed, would remain
uncompensated and unsatisfied
6. That also, plaintiff is willing and able to file a bond to answer
for any damage which defendant may suffer as a result of an
execution pending appeal. 4
Subsequently, Deputy Sheriff Restituto R. Quemada who was
assigned to enforce the writ of execution, garnished in favor
of ECI all amounts due and payable to NPC which were then in
possession of MERALCO and sufficient to cover the judgment sum
of P1,108,985.31. 5
Attempts to lift the order of execution having proved
futile and the offer of a supersedeas bond having been
rejected by the lower court, NPC filed with the Appellate Court a
petition for certiorari. 6
In its challenged decision of October 20, 1971, the Court of
Appeals granted NPCs petition and nullified the execution
pending appeal of the judgment rendered by the trial court on
December 28, 1970, as well as all issued writs and processes in
connection with the execution. One justice dissented. 7 On
November 11, 1971, MERALCO sought from the Appellate Court a
clarification and reconsideration of the aforesaid decision on the
ground, among others, that the decision was being used
by NPC to compel MERALCO to return the amount of
P1,114,545.23 (inclusive of sheriff's fees) in two checks which it
had already entrusted to the deputy sheriff on February 23, 1971,
who then indorsed and delivered the same to ECI. Whereupon, in
its resolution of January 7, 1972, the Appellate Court held the
sheriff, MERALCO and EC liable to restore to NPC the amount due
to NPC which MERALCO had earlier turned over to the sheriff for
payment to ECI. 8
Their two motions for reconsideration having been denied, ECI
and MERALCO filed separate petitions for review before this
Court: Nos. L-34589 and 34656, the very petitions before us for
adjudication. In this connection, it must be made clear that we
are not concemed with the main appeal. For the present, we limit
our discussion to the correctness of the extraordinary writ of
execution pending appeal and the ordered restitution of the
garnished funds---two collateral matters which have greatly
exacerbated the existing dispute between the parties.
We shall deal first with the propriety of the execution
pending appeal. Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
provides: Execution pending appeal. On motion of the
prevailing party with notice to the adverse party the court may,
in its discretion, order execution to issue even before the
expiration of the time to appeal, upon good reasons to be
stated in a special order. If a record on appeal is filed thereafter,
the motion and the special order shall be included thereon.
While the rule gives the court the discretionary power to allow
immediate execution, the following requisites must be satisfied
for its valid exercise: (a) There must be a motion by the
prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (b) There
must be a good reasons for issuing the execution; and (c) The
good reasons must be stated in a special order.
In its assailed decision, the Appellate Court, trough Justice
Salvador V. Esguerra, observe that NPC, as defendant in the civil
case for damages, was being ordered to pay the amount of P
1,108,985.31 pending appeal when practically 40% thereof was
made up of awards of damages based on the court's sole and

untrammelled discretion. Such amount might greatly be reduced

by the superior court, especially the items for consequential and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees which by themselves
would amount to the "staggering" sum of P433,220.00
The Appellate Court noted the many instances when on review,
the amounts for attorney's fees and exemplary and moral
damages were drastically cut or eliminated altogether in the
absence of proof that the losing party acted with malice, evident
bad faith or in an oppressive manner. Inasmuch as the list
submitted by ECI of the estimated losses and damages to its
tunnel project caused by the instant flooding on November 4,
1967 was duly supported by vouchers presented in evidence, and
considering that NPC, for its part, failed to submit proofs to refute
or contradict such documentary evidence, we are constrained to
sustain the order of execution pending appeal by the trial court
but only as far as the award for actual or compensatory damages
is concemed. We are not prepared to disagree with the lower
court on this point since it was not sufficiently shown that it
abused or exceeded its authority.
With respect to the consequential and exemplary damages as
well as attorney's fees, however, we concur with the Appellate
Court in holding that the lower court had exceeded the limits of
its discretion. Execution should have been postponed until such
time as the merits of the case have been finally determined in
the regular appeal.
In the fairly recent case of RCPI, et al vs. Lantin , the Court said:
The execution of any award for moral and exemplary
damages is dependent on the outcome of the main case.
Unlike actual damages for which the petitioners may clearly
be held liable if they breach a specific contract and the
amounts of which are fixed and certain, liabilities with respect
to moral and exemplary damages as well as the exact
amounts remain uncertain and indefinite pending resolution by
the Intermediate Appellate Court and eventually the Supreme
Court. The existence of the factual bases of these types of
damages and their casual relation to petitioners' act will have
to be determined in the light of the assignments or errors on
appeal. It is possible that the petitioners, after all, while liable
for actual damages may not be liable for moral and exemplary
damages. Or as in some cases elevated to the Supreme Court,
the awards may be reduced.
Indeed, as later events would show, the Appellate Court was
proven right when it postulated that it is not beyond the realm
of probability that NPCs appeal from the lower court's judgment
could result in the substantial reduction of the consequential
damages and attorney's fees and the deletion of exemplary
damages.
We take judicial notice of the fact that on August 24, 1987, the
Court of Appeals rendered a decision on the main appeal. 9 It
affirmed the trial court's conclusion that NPC was guilty of
negligence but differred in the award of damages. While it
upheld the court a quo's award of P675,785.31 as actual
damages, it reduced the consequential damages from
P333,200.00 to P19,200.00 and the attorney's fees from
P50,000 to P30,000.00 The grant of P50,000 as exemplary
damages was eliminated. Altogether, the award of damages
was modified from P1,108,985.31 to P724,985.31. From that
decision, both the ECI and NPC filed their separate appeals to
this Court. 10 Finally, on May 16, 1988, the Court promulgated
its judgment affirming in all respects the Appellate Court's
decision in CA-G.R. No. 49955-R, thus putting to rest the
question of negligence and NPCs liability for damages.
The point that the Court wishes to emphasize is this: Courts look
with disfavor upon any attempt to execute a judgment which has
not acquired a final character. Section 2, Rule 39, authorizing the
premature execution of judgments, being an exception to the

general rule, must be restrictively construed. It would not be a

sound rule to allow indiscriminately the execution of a money
judgment, even if there is a sufficient bond. "The reasons
allowing execution must constitute superior circumstances
demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages
should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment."' 11
We come now to the second issue of whether petitioners,
including the sheriff, are bound to restore to NPC the judgment
amount which has been delivered to ECI in compliance with the
writ of garnishment. In line with our pronouncement that we are
sanctioning in this particular instance the execution pending
appeal of actual but not consequential and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees which must necessarily depend
on the final resolution of the main cases, i.e., Nos. L-47379 and
47481, the direct consequence would be to authorize NPC to
proceed against the covering bond filed by ECI but only to the
extent of the difference between the amount finally adjudicated
by this Court in the main cases [P724,985.31] and the amount
originally decreed by the trial court relating to the consequential
and exemplary damages and attorney's fees [P1,108.985.31]. In
other words, ECIs bond is held answerable to NPC for P384,000.
But while partial restitution is warranted in favor of NPC, we find
that the Appellate Court erred in not absolving MERALCO, the
garnishee, from its obligations to NPC with respect to the
payment to ECI of P1,114,543.23, thus in effect
subjecting MERALCO to double liability. MERALCO should not have
been faulted for its prompt obedience to a writ of garnishment.
Unless there are compelling reasons such as: a defect on the face
of the writ or actual knowledge on the part of the garnishee of
lack of entitlement on the part of the garnisher, it is not
incumbent upon the garnishee to inquire or to judge for itself
whether or not the order for the advance execution of a judgment
is valid.
Section 8, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court provides, Effect of
attachment of debts and credits.-All persons having in their
possession or under their control any credits or other similar
personal property belonging to the party against whom
attachment is issued, or owing any debts to the same, at the time
of service upon them of a copy of the order of attachment and
notice as provided in the last preceding section, shall be liable
to the applicant for the amount of such credits, debts or
other property, until the attachment be discharged, or any
judgment recovered by him be satisfied, unless such property be
delivered or transferred, or such debts be paid, to the clerk,
sheriff or other proper officer of the court issuing the attachment.
Garnishment is considered as a specie of attachment for reaching
credits belonging to the judgment debtor and owing to him from
a stranger to the litigation. Under the above-cited rule, the
garnishee [the third person] is obliged to deliver the credits, etc.
to the proper officer issuing the writ and "the law exempts from
liability the person having in his possession or under his control
any credits or other personal property be, longing to the
defendant, ..., if such property be delivered or transferred, ..., to
the clerk, sheriff, or other officer of the court in which the action
is pending." 12
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, MERALCO, as
garnishee, after having been judicially compelled to pay the
amount of the judgment represented by funds in its possession
belonging to the judgment debtor or NPC, should be released
from all responsibilities over such amount after delivery thereof
to the sheriff. The reason for the rule is self-evident. To expose
garnishees to risks for obeying court orders and processes would
only undermine the administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, the Court in disposing of the two side issues of
execution pending appeal and petitioners' liability for restitution,
hereby MODIFIES the Court of Appeals' decision and resolution
under review, and rules as follows: [a] NPC is authorized to
proceed against the P1,109,000 bond filed by ECI to the extent of

P384,000 which corresponds to the difference between the

awards for consequential and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees upheld by the Court in the main cases (Nos. L-47379 and
47481) and those decreed for the same items by the trial court;
[b] MERALCO is declared absolved from any and all
responsibilities in connection with the amount of P1,114,545.23
representing the NPC garnished funds and therefore relieved from
the burden of restoring the same to NPC.

G.R. No. 92241 October 17, 1991 LILIA T.

ONG, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and VIRGINIA
SARMIENTO, respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:p This petition seeks to review on certiorari, the
decision of the Court of Appeals, upholding the writ of execution
pending appeal issued by the trial judge.
The facts of the case are stated in the Court of Appeals decision.
Private respondent Virginia Sarmiento (Sarmiento) sued
Eligio Dee (Dee) for the collection of the amount of
P121,759.00, representing the value of construction
materials allegedly obtained by him, for attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation. Dee had earlier issued checks in the
total amount of P40,000.00, but these subsequently, bounced for
insufficiency of funds. Sarmiento also prayed for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment.
The complaint was subsequently amended to include petitioner
Lilia Ong (Ong) as party-defendant on the allegation that she
and Eligio Dee had issued the checks and that the
construction materials were delivered to the piggery farm
of Ong. A writ of attachment was issued by the trial judge and
served upon Ong, resulting in the levy of certain hogs valued
at P40,000.00. The court later issued a temporary restraining
Order (TRO) against further enforcement of the writ,
pending resolution of a motion to quash filed by Ong.
On November 4, 1988, the trial judge rendered a decision, which
was received by Ong on November 29, 1988 finding Dee and
Ong jointly and severally liable for the sum of P121,759.00.
Dee and Ong filed a notice of appeal on December 2, 1988.
On December 12, 1988, Sarmiento filed a "Motion for
Immediate Execution Pending Appeal," dated December 9,
1988, alleging that the appeal is dilatory and frivolous. Ong
opposed the motion claiming that the trial court no longer had
any jurisdiction to act on said motion since the appeal had clearly
been perfected, and besides, there was already a writ of
attachment to secure the court's judgment. On January 26, 1989,
the trial judge issued an order granting Sarmiento's motion
for execution pending appeal, conditioned upon a bond in the
amount of P121,759.00. On February 2, 1989, Ong filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with injunction with the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court dismissed it on October 18, 1989.
Hence this petition questioning the validity of the appellate
court's ruling upholding the writ of execution pending appeal.
In upholding the writ of execution pending appeal, the appellate
court observed that the trial judge had, prior to its issuance, duly
noted the presence of the circumstances laid down by Section 2,
Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, allowing execution as an
exception, or pending appeal, even before final judgment; viz:
a. . . . motion by the prevailing party with notice to the
adverse party;
b. . . . good reasons for issuing execution; and
c. . . . the good reasons be stated in a Special Order

Likewise, it accepted as "good reasons" Sarmiento's statements

in support of her motion, that "the appeal of said defendants is
clearly and obviously frivolous and dilatory in nature,
considering that they have not adduced substantial valid and
meritorious defenses against the plaintiffs. The appellate court
also ruled that "the filing of the bond required by the court
constitutes special ground authorizing the court to issue writ of
execution pending appeal:
. . . the determination of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the
special reasons rests upon the sound discretion of the court
issuing the writ of execution pending appeal. The appellate
court cannot interfere with the exercise of this discretion unless
it appears that there had been a grave abuse or excess of
authority in doing so or conditions have so far changed since
the order was issued as to require the intervention of the
appella(te) court. In the present case, this Court finds no abuse
of discretion nor a change of condition since the order was
issued as to require the intervention of this court
The appellate court also disagreed with Ong's claim that upon
filing of her notice of appeal, the trial court had lost
jurisdiction to act on Sarmiento's motion for execution
pending appeal, declaring that the mere filing of appellant's
notice of appeal does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction
over the case, since "an appeal is not perfected on the date the
notice of appeal was filed but on the expiration of the last
day to appeal," citing the cases.
Thus, the appellate court observed: . . . when petitioner received
a copy of the decision on November 29, 1988, an appeal thereof
was deemed perfected on December 14, 1988, the expiration of
the last day to appeal by any party. When the private
respondent filed her motion for execution pending appeal
on December 12, 1988, it is very clear that the appeal was
not yet perfected. Considering then that the motion was filed
well before the perfection of the petitioner's appeal, the
respondent Court has jurisdiction to act on the motion..
We agree with the Court of Appeals. Section 23 of the
Interim Rules promulgated on January 11, 1983, provides:
23. Perfection of Appeal. In cases where appeal is taken the
perfection of the appeal shall be upon the expiration of the
last day to appeal by any party.
The Interim Rules brought about a change in the procedure for
appeal by dispensing with the appeal bond, as well as the record
on appeal (except in cases of multiple appeals). As a result, what
determines perfection of the appeal is the expiration of
the reglementary period for appeal . The mere filing of
appellant's notice of appeal does not divest the trial court of its
jurisdiction over the case. The court may still take cognizance of
the other party's motion for new trial under Rule 37, if he should
opt to file one, or, as in the instant case, a motion for execution
pending appeal, provided of course, such motions are filed within
15 days from said party's notice of the decision. What is crucial to
determine is the timeliness of the filing of the motion for
execution pending appeal.
On the other hand, We do not agree that the writ of execution
pending appeal was premised on, or justified by good
reasons, i.e. a) that the appeal was frivolous and dilatory, and b)
sufficient bond required by the court had been posted.
In the case of Roxas v. Court of Appeals , We stated:
Execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule
39 is, of course, the exception. Normally, execution of a
judgment should not be had until and unless it has become final
and executory i.e., the right of appeal has been renounced or
waived, the period for appeal has lapsed without an appeal
having been taken, or appeal having been taken, the appeal
has been resolved and the records of the case have been

returned to the court of origin in which case, execution "shall

issue as a matter of right." (Sec. 1, Rule 39 in relation to Sec.
11, Rule 51)
On the other hand, when the period of appeal has not expired,
execution of the judgment should not be allowed, save only if
there be good reasons therefor, in the court's discretion. "As
provided in Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules, the existence of
good reasons is what confers discretionary power on a Court. to
issue a writ of execution pending appeal. The reasons allowing
execution must constitute superior circumstances demanding
urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages should be
losing party secure a reversal of the judgment."
It is not intended obviously that execution pending appeal shall
issue as a matter of course. "Good reasons, special, important,
pressing reasons must exist to justify it; otherwise, instead of
an instrument of solicitude and justice, it may well become a
tool of oppression and inequity."
Where the reason given is that an appeal is frivolous and
dilatory, execution pending appeal cannot be justified. It is
not proper for the trial court to find that an appeal is frivolous and
consequently to disapprove it since the disallowance of an
appeal by said court constitutes a deprivation of the right
to appeal. The authority to disapprove an appeal rightfully
pertains to the appellate court .
Having declared that the trial judge may not rightfully determine
that an appeal from its own decision is frivolous or dilatory, it is
clear that the writ of execution pending appeal would be
premised solely on the bond posted by Sarmiento. The next
question to be resolved then is whether or not the filing of a
bond, without anything more, can be considered a good
reason to justify immediate execution under Section 2 of
Rule 39.
In the case of Roxas v. Court of Appeals, supra. We had occasion
to address this issue directly. We clarified the doctrine as follows:
. . . to consider the mere posting of a bond a "good reason"
would precisely make immediate execution of a judgment
pending appeal routinary, the rule rather than the exception.
Judgments would be executed immediately, as a matter of
course, once rendered, if all that the prevailing party
needed to do was to post a bond to answer for damages
that might result therefrom. This is a situation, to repeat,
neither contemplated nor intended by law.
There are, to be sure, statements in some of this Court's
decisions which do generate the perception that 'the filing of
the bond by the successful party is a good reason for ordering
execution. Petitioner Roxas herself cites City of Manila v. C.A. to
support her postulation of this effect. From that case which
adverts to Hacienda Navarra, Inc. v. Labrador, et al.she
quotes the following: "From what has been said, it is thus clear
that the Court of Appeals erred in not considering the city's
posting to a bond as [heirs of the estate of a deceased person
under administra] good and special reason to justify execution
pending appeal."
But sight should not be lost of the factual context in which the
quoted statement was made. In that case, the City of Manila
had succeeded in obtaining judgment for the recovery of a
piece of land it had lent to the Metropolitan Theater, and
immediate execution became imperative because the theater
was insolvent and there was imminent danger of its creditor's
foreclosing a mortgage on the property. This combination of
circumstances was the dominant consideration which impelled
the grant of immediate execution, the requirement of a bond
having been imposed merely as an additional factor, no doubt
for the protection of the defendant's creditor. In Hacienda
Navarra, there was a special reason for immediate execution, in

addition to the posting of a bond. There, the Court said that

"Inasmuch as the purpose in depositing the money is to insure
its receipts by the party obtaining a favorable judgment in the
above cited civil case, the filing of a sufficient bond for the
delivery of said proceeds secures said receipt." And in People's
Bank, the order involved in the case decreed payment of
allowances for the support of one of the heirs of the estate of a
deceased person under administration, and the urgent need of
the party entitled thereto was the paramount consideration for
immediate execution, not the filing of a bond.
Based on the foregoing discussions, We have no alternative but
to strike down the writ of execution pending appeal for lack of
"good reasons" to justify its issuance. The other issues raised by
Ong on her alleged solidary liability are not proper for discussion
in this petition for certiorari, being errors of judgment by the trial
court, correctible by appeal and which has been already
undertaken by Ong. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The
Order dated January 26, 1989 granting the issuance of a writ of
execution pending appeal is hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED,
having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. Costs against
private respondent.
G.R. No. L-27594 November 28, 1975 THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, and the ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs.
HON. SALVADOR C. REYES, as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch III, PARAAQUE
INVESTMENT and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ROMAN
C. TAMAYO, THE COMMISIONER OF THE LAND
REGISTRATION COMMISSION and the REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF NUEVA ECIJA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-28144 November 28, 1975 ALIPIO
ALINSUNURIN, now substituted by PARAAQUE
INVESTMENT and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, applicantappellee, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, THE DIRECTOR OF
FORESTRY and the ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES,oppositors-appellants.
ANTONIO, J.: These cases are interrelated, and so are decided
jointly. In his application originally filed on February 24, 1964 with
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, the applicant Alipio
Alinsunurin, claiming ownership in fee simple by
inheritance from the late Maria Padilla, sought the
registration of title under Act 496, as amended, of a vast tract of
land, containing an area of 16,800 hectares, more or less,
situated at the municipality of Laur, province of Nueva Ecija,
admittedly inside the boundary of the military reservation of Fort
Magsaysay. 1
On May 5, 1966, the Director of Lands, Director of Forestry,
and the Armed Forces of the Philippines opposed the
application, claiming that the applicant was without sufficient
title and was not in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question for at least
thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the
application; that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land
consist of the military reservation of Fort Magsaysay established
under Proclamation No. 237, dated December 10, 1955 of the
President. 2 On May 10, 1966, the applicant Alipio Alinsunurin
filed a motion for substitution of parties, requesting that
the Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation
be considered as the applicant in his place, it having
acquired all his rights, interests, ownership and dominion over
the property subject matter of the application. 3The motion was
granted by the lower court in its order dated June 10, 1966. 4
It is beyond dispute that the land subject of the application is
included within the area reserved for military purposes under
Proclamation No. 237, dated December 19, 1955, of the
President. The land is largely uncultivated, mountainous and
thickly forested with a heavy growth of timber of commercial
quantities. 5 Except for a small area cultivated for vegetation by

homesteaders issued patents by the Director of Lands, there

were no occupants on the land. 6 It is claimed by the applicant
that Melecio Padilla acquired the land by virtue of a
possessory information title issued during the Spanish
regime on March 5, 1895, and upon his death in 1900, he
transmitted the ownership and possession thereof to his
daughter and sole heir, Maria Padilla. The latter in turn
continued to cultivate the land thru tenants and utilized portions
for pasture, until her death sometime in 1944.
On November 19, 1966, the lower court rendered decision
holding that the parcel of land applied for, described in the
technical description Plan II-6752, is adjudicated to and ordered
to be registered in favor of Paraaque Investment and
Development Corporation, a Philippine corporation wholly owned
by Filipino citizens, with address at Manila, Philippines, two-thirds
(2/3) portion, subject to the rights of Ariosto Santos per Joint
Manifestation of Alipio Alinsunurin and Encarnacion CaballeroAlinsunurin, Ariosto Santos and Paraaque Investment and
Development Corporation dated July 19, 1966 and marked as
Exhibit "AA-4 " 7 and (b) Roman C. Tamayo, Filipino citizen,
married, resident of Cullit, Lallo, Cagayan, one-third (1/3) portion
of the said property.
On December 12, 1966, the oppositors Director of Lands, Director
of Forestry and the Armed Forces of the Philippines filed a Notice
of Appeal from the said decision to the Supreme Court, 8 copy of
which notice was furnished counsel for the applicant Paraaque
Investment and Development Corporation; however, no copy
was furnished to counsel for Roman C. Tamayo, to whom
one-third (1/3) portion of the land was adjudicated. On January
18, 1967, within the extended period granted by the court, the
oppositors-appellants filed the corresponding Record on
Appeal, copy of which was duly served upon appellees
Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation and Roman
C. Tamayo. By an order dated March 8, 1967, the lower court
required the Provincial Fiscal to file an Amended Record on
Appeal, so as to include therein certain orders and pleadings,
within ten (10) days from receipt of the order. 9 On March 16,
1967, the Amended Record on Appeal was duly filed and copies
served upon the appellees.
Pending the approval of the Record on Appeal, the applicant
Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation filed a
motion for the issuance of a decree of registration
pending appeal. Likewise, Roman C. Tamayo, thru counsel, filed
a motion for the issuance of a decree of registration. Both
motions were opposed by the Government. On March 11, 1967,
the lower court, ruling that its decision of November 19, 1966 had
become final as to the share of Roman C. Tamayo, directed the
issuance of a decree of registration of the entire land, one-third
(1/3)pro-indiviso in favor of Roman C. Tamayo, and two-thirds
(2/3) pro indiviso in favor of Paraaque Investment and
Development Corporation, subject to the final outcome of the
appeal.
On March 14, 1967, the Commissioner of Land Registration
forthwith issued Decree No. 113485 pursuant to the said order,
and, on March 15, 1967, the Register of Deeds issued Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-3151 of the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Nueva Ecija. On April 12, 1967, the lower court
approved the Amended Record on Appeal which, together with
the evidence and transcripts, was forwarded to this Court in due
course of appeal.
As the lower court denied reconsideration of the order directing
the issuance of a decree of registration, on May 29, 1967, the
Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the Armed Forces of
the Philippines instituted before this Court a special civil action
for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction,
seeking to nullify the order dated March 11, 1967, the decree
of registration issued pursuant thereto and Original Certificate of
Title No. 0-3151 of the Register of Deeds for the province of
Nueva Ecija, and to command the respondent court to certify the

entire proceedings and to allow appeal to the Supreme Court

from its decision in toto in LRC Case

be carried over in all titles subsequently issued, which will yield

to the ultimate result of the appeal. 14

On June 5, 1967, We issued a writ of preliminary injunction as

follows: NOW, THEREFORE, until further orders from this Court,
You (respondent Judge) are hereby restrained from issuing a writ
of possession in Land Registration Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No.
25545 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, entitled
"Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation versus
Director of Lands, et al."; You (respondent Paraaque Investment
and Development Corporation and Roman C. Tamayo), your
agents or representatives are hereby restrained from taking
possession and/or excercising acts of ownership, occupancy or
possession over the property in question subject matter of Land
Registration Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. N-25545; and You
(respondent Register of Deeds) are hereby restrained from
accepting for registration documents referring to the subject land
until petitioners shall have filed a notice oflis pendens as to the
title certificates of Roman Tamayo and Paraaque Investment and
Development Corporation, under Sec. 24, Rule 14, Rules of Court,
subject of the above-mentioned Land Registration Case No. N675, LRC Rec. No. N-25545.

During the pendency of the appeal, it appears that Honofre A.

Andrada, et al., filed with the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija (Branch I, not the land registration court), a complaint
against the appellee Paraaque Investment and Development
Corporation, Rodolfo A. Cenidoza and Roman C. Tamayo, for
reconveyance of a portion of the land in question (Civil Case No.
4696). The trial court assumed jurisdiction over the case despite
the pendency of the appeal involving the same land, and decided
the case in favor of plaintiffs. In violation of Our injunction
adverted to above, Paraaque Investment and Development
Corporation executed a subdivision plan of the original single
parcel of land subject of the land registration proceedings
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151, and deeded
over six (6) lots of the subdivision plan to plaintiffs Honofre A.
Andrada and Nemesio P. Diaz. By an order dated September 23,
1968, entered in Civil Case No. 4696, the Register of Deeds of
Nueva Ecija was directed to cancel Original Certificate of title No.
0-3151 and to issue new titles to the above-named transferees
"free from all liens and encumbrances." Immediately, transfer
certificates of title were issued to them and other transferees in
which the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija did not carry over the
notice of lis pendens originally inscribed in Original Certificate of
Title No. 0-3151. Subsequently, other transactions were entered
into involving portions of the land reconveyed in Civil Case No.
4696, including a transfer of about 4,000 hectares to the Land
Bank of the Philippines in consideration of P8,940,000.00.

Accordingly, petitioners-appellants caused the entry of a

notice of lis pendens to be duly inscribed in the primary entry
book of the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija and annotated in the
memorandum of encumbrances in Original Certificate of Title No.
0-3151.
In due time, the respondents filed their answers to the petition
for certiorari. The parties having filed their respective
memoranda, the case is deemed submitted for decision. At the
outset, We shall resolve the petition for certiorari and mandamus.
I Under the circumstances of this case, the failure of the
appellants to serve a copy of their Notice of Appeal to the counsel
for adjudicatee Roman C. Tamayo is not fatal to the appeal
because, admittedly, he was served with a copy of the original,
as well as the Amended Record on Appeal in both of which the
Notice of Appeal is embodied. 10 Hence, such failure cannot
impair the right of appeal. 11 What is more, the appeal taken by
the Government was from the entire decision, which is
not severable. Thus, the appeal affects the whole decision. 12
In any event, We rule that execution pending appeal is not
applicable in a land registration proceeding. It is fraught
with dangerous consequences. Innocent purchasers may be
misled into purchasing real properties upon reliance on a
judgment which may be reversed on appeal.
A Torrens title issued on the basis of a judgment that is not
final is a nullity, as it is violative of the explicit provisions of the
Land Registration Act which requires that a decree shall be issued
only after the decision adjudicating the title becomes final and
executory, and it is on the basis of said decree that the Register
of Deeds concerned issues the corresponding certificate of title.
Consequently, the lower court acted without jurisdiction or
exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of a decree
of registration despite the appeal timely taken from the
entire decision a quo.
II
In the instant case, as a precaution, oppositorsappellants caused notice of lis pendens to be duly inscribed in
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151 of the Register of Deeds of
Nueva Ecija, thereby keeping the whole land subject matter of
the appeal within the power of the court until the litigation is
terminated. 13
Such entry of notice of lis pendens cannot be cancelled until the
final termination of the litigation. The notice of lis pendens must

We find the order to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 03151

and to issue subsequent titles free from all liens and
encumbrances to be void ab initio.
Civil Case No. 4696 is an action in personam to which the
appellants are not parties; its object was to decree reconveyance
to plaintiffs of a portion of the area adjudicated to the Paraaque
Investment and Development Corporation and Roman C. Tamayo
in Land Registration Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No. N-25545,
which is subject to the outcome of the appeal. Such action is
barred by the pendency of the appeal. In that case, the court is
without jurisdiction to order the Register of Deeds to cancel
Original Certificate of title No. 0-3151 and to issue titles to
transferees "free from all liens and encumbrances ." 15 Nor can
such order be construed to authorize the Register of Deeds to
cancel the notice of lis pendens, which was not entered by virtue
of the reconveyance case. Thus, the Register of Deeds was duty
bound to carry over the said notice of lis pendens on all titles
subsequently issued. But, in plain violation of lis pendens in said
titles; such act constitutes misfeasance in the performance of his
duties for which he may be held civilly and even criminally liable
for any prejudice caused to innocent third parties, but cannot
affect the petitioners-appellants who are protected by Our writ of
injunction and the notice of lis pendens inscribed in the original
title. It must be remembered that Our injunction restrained the
Register of Deeds "from accepting for registration documents
referring to the subject land until the petitioners shall have filed a
notice of lis pendens as to the title certificates of Roman C.
Tamayo and Paraaque Investment and Development Corporation
under section 24, Rule 14, Rules of Court, subject of the abovementioned Land Registration Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No.
25545." Its plain meaning is to enjoin registration of documents
and transactions unless the notice of lis pendens is annotated
and so subject the same to the outcome of the litigation. In such
case, subsequent transferees cannot be considered innocent
purchasers for value.
On the other hand, the lower court's order dated September 23,
1968, in Civil Case No. 4696, cannot overrule an injunction of this
Court (in L-27594). As a result, We consider the notice of lis
pendens entered in virtue of this litigation to remain in full force
and effect, and affects all subsequent transferees of the title of
the land subject of this appeal.

At any rate, it is well-settled that entry of the notice of lis

pendens in the day book (primary entry book) is sufficient to
constitute registration and such entry is notice to all persons of
such adverse claim. 16

saidinformacion posesoria was issued. One copy showed that the

said document was issued on March 5, 1895 while the other
indicated that it was issued twelve (12) years earlier, or on March
5, 1883.

III
We now consider the appeal on the merits. 1. To
begin with, the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for,
which must be approved by the Director of Lands, was not
submitted in evidence. The submission of such plan is a statutory
requirement of mandatory character. 17 Unless a plan and its
technical description are duly approved by the Director of Lands,
the same are not of much value. 18

Moreover, according to the official records of the Register of

Deeds of Nueva Ecija, on the basis of the "List of Possessory
Information Titles (Spanish Titles) of Nueva Ecija", the
corresponding supporting documents of which are kept in the
vault of said office, the name of Melecio Padilla does not appear
among those listed as holders of informacion posesoria titles as
of the year 1898 covering lands situated in Santor (now Laur)
Nueva Ecija. According to said document, the name Melecio
Padilla appears only in the list of holders of possessory
information titles over lands situated in Pearanda, Nueva Ecija,
but of a substantially smaller acreage. 19 Thus, the seven (7)
parcels recorded in the name of Melecio Padilla covered only a
total area of 49 hectares, 18 acres and 325 centares. 20 In
addition, the list of property owners in Santor (now Laur), Nueva
Ecija existing in the Division of Archives does not include the
name of Melecio Padilla. 21 It is true that an alleged copy of
aninformacion posesoria in the name of Melecio Padilla, was
recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds on November 10,
1942 by one Rodolfo Baltazar, Register of Deeds (Exhibit "H"), but
the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija could not certify to its
veracity, as the supposed document does not exist in their
records. 22 There is another factor which weighs heavily against
the claim of the applicant. The alleged informacion
posesoriacovers an area of "seis mil quiiones, poco mas e
menos" or an equivalent of 16,800 hectares. Under the Royal
Decrees in force at the time of the supposed acquisition, no one
could acquire public land in excess of 1,000 hectares. Thus, the
Royal Decrees of November 25, 1880 and October 26, 1881,
prohibited any grant of public land in excess of one thousand
(1,000) hectares. 23

It is true that blueprints of two survey plans were presented

before the trial court. The first blueprint copy of a plan of land as
surveyed for Maria Padilla, was not formally offered in evidence.
The second plan of the land, as surveyed for Paraaque
Investment and Development Corporation was submitted by the
said applicant, but it lacks the approval of the Director of Lands.
Of course, the applicant attempts to justify the non-submission of
the original tracing cloth plan by claiming that the same must be
with the Land Registration Commission which checked or verified
the survey plan and the technical descriptions thereof. It is not
the function of the LRC to check the original survey plan as it has
no authority to approve original survey plans. If, for any reason,
the original tracing cloth plan was forwarded there, the applicant
may easily retrieve the same therefrom and submit the same in
evidence. This was not done.
It is also asserted that a blue print copy of the plan was
superimposed in the military plan of the reservation under
Proclamation No. 237, which military plan was presented in
evidence by the oppositors-appellants, and it was agreed by the
parties that the plan, Exhibit "D", superimposed in the plan of the
area covered by the proclamation, is the plan of the land applied
for.
Obviously, the superimposition of the copy of the survey plan of
land as surveyed for applicant in the military map of the area
under Proclamation No. 237 was for the sole purpose of showing
that the land applied for is situated within the area covered by
the military reservation of Fort Magsaysay appropriately indicated
in the perimeter map of said reservation. But the applicant is not
relieved from the original tracing cloth plan approved by the
Director of Lands as required by law. One of the distinguishing
marks of the Torrens System is the absolute certainty of the
identity of a registered land. Consequently the primary purpose
of the aforesaid requirement is to fix the exact or definite identity
of the land as shown in the plan and technical descriptions.
Hence, the applicant is not relieved of his duty of submitting the
original tracing cloth of the survey plan of the land duly approved
by the Director of Lands.
It will be noticed that the plan does not bear the approval of any
officer authorized by law.
In similar manner, the surveyor's certificate, also required in
original land registration proceedings, was not offered in
evidence.
2. We next consider the question of whether the applicant has a
registerable title to the land applied for.
The applicant relies on a purported titulo de informacion
posesoria issued in the name of Melecio Padilla. However, neither
the original of the said titulo de informacion posesoria, nor a duly
authenticated copy thereof, was submitted in evidence, and there
are serious flaws on the faces of the alleged copies of the
document, as in the circumstances surrounding their execution.
Thus, the two (2) purported photostat copies of the
said informacion posesoria title materially differ on the date when

Besides, the document described in Exhibit "H" is not the titulo

de informacion posesoria, because it was merely a certification of
possession of Melecio Padilla over the property, and was issued
without prejudice to a third party or parties having a better
right. 24 Thus, it states: "En su virtud habiendo examinado el
Registro nuevamente formado por la perdida o destruccion del
mismo y no hallando en ningun asiento contrario a lo relacionado
reinscribe la posesion de la finca de este numero a favor de Don
Melecio Padilla sin perjuicio de tercero que puede tener mejor
derecho a la propiedad." Under Spanish law, in order that
an informacion posesoria may be considered as title of
ownership, it must be proven that the holder thereof has
complied with the provisions of Article 393 of the Spanish
Mortgage Law.
It cannot be claimed that the registration of possession has been
legally converted into a registration of ownership because
Melecio Padilla had not complied with the requirements of Article
393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law, to wit: "that the applicant has
been in open possession of the land; that an application to this
effect be filed after the expiration of 20 years from the date of
such registration; that such conversion be announced by means
of a proclamation in a proper official bulletin; that the Court order
the conversion of the registration of possession into a record of
ownership; and that the Registrar make the proper record thereof
in the Registry." 25 Evidently, Melecio Padilla, having died on
February 9, 1900, barely five (5) years after the inscription of the
informacion posesoria, could not have converted the same into a
record of ownership twenty (20) years after such inscription,
pursuant to Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law.
One year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or on April 17,
1895, the right to perfect possessory information title under the
law expired. After that date, full property right of the land
reverted to the government and the right of the cultivator and
possessor to obtain gratuitous title was extinguished. 26

Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is

inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that
the land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a
matter of fact, at the time of the hearing, it was conceded that
approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of public
forest. During the lifetime of Melecio Padilla, only a small portion
thereof was cleared and cultivated under the "kaingin" system,
while some portions were used as grazing land. After his death,
his daughter, Maria Padilla, caused the planting of vegetables and
had about forty (40) tenants for the purpose. 27 During the
Japanese occupation, Maria Padilla died. Alipio Alinsunurin and
Encarnacion Caballero took possession of the land approximately
in 1950, but they had to abandon the place due to the unsettled
peace and order conditions in the area. In 1955, entry by them
was prevented by the Army.
It seems obvious, on the basis of the facts in the record, that
neither applicant Paraaque Investment and Development
Corporation nor Alipio Alinsunurin nor the latter's predecessorsin-interest have been "in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation" of the property in question,
"under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least
thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title." 28
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant,
and the raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession
under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not
exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant
from the State. 29 While grazing livestock over land is of course to
be considered with other acts of dominion to show possession,
the mere occupancy of land by grazing livestock upon it, without
substantial inclosures or other permanent improvements, is not
sufficient to support a claim of title thru acquisitive
prescription. 30 The possession of public land, however long the
period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the
possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public
land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can
prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of
ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant
from the State. 31
Apart from the aforesaid inconclusive evidence of possession to
support the applicant's claim of title, it does not appear that the
said property has ever been declared for taxation purposes by
either applicant or applicant's predecessors-in-interest. Thus, the
only tax declarations submitted were those of Mamerto Garcia
and Honofre Andrada, et al. (Exhibit "G", Tax Declaration No.
5576, covering an area of 7,340 hectares) and Mamerto Garcia,
et al. (Exhibit "H-1", Tax Declaration No. 5577, over an area of
9,547 hectares) but both were filed only in 1958. The latter
declaration contains an annotation that the property described
therein is an unidentified property, as the declarant failed to
identify the same, and it "was only through his insistence" that it
was assessed. Neither applicant Paraaque Investment and
Development Corporation nor its predecessor, Alipio Alinsunurin
had submitted any tax declaration supporting its/his claim over
the property. It is true that tax receipts and declarations of
ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence
of ownership, but they constitute at least proof that the holder
had a claim of title over the property.
It is obvious that the applicant has failed to submit convincing
proof of actual, peaceful and adverse possession in the concept
of owner of the entire area in question during the period required
by law. This is especially true in view of the basic presumption
that lands of whatever classification belong to the State and
evidence of a land grant must be "well-nigh incontrovertible." 32
Even more important, Section 48[b] of CA No. 141, as amended,
applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or
areas covered with forest are excluded. 33 It is well-settled that
forest land is incapable of registration; and its inclusion in a title,
whether such title be one issued during the Spanish sovereignty

or under the present Torrens system of registration, nullifies the

title. 34
Finally, the applicant urges that Proclamation No. 237 recognizes
the existence of private property within the military reservation.
It is true that the proclamation states that the same is subject "to
private rights, if any there be", but applicant must prove its
private rights over the property, which said party failed to
do. 35 For it is well-settled that, unless the applicant has shown by
clear and convincing evidence that the property in question was
ever acquired by the applicant or his ancestors either by
composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory
information title, or any other means for the acquisition of public
lands, the property must be held to be part of the public
domain. 36
WHEREFORE, decision in the above case is hereby rendered:
(1) in G. R. No. L-27594, the petition for certiorari is granted; the
order dated March 11, 1967 in LRC Case No. N-675, LRC Rec. No.
N-25545, the decree of registration issued pursuant thereto, and
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151 of the Registry of Deeds of
Nueva Ecija are all declared void; the Registry of Deeds of Nueva
Ecija is ordered to recall and cancel all transfer certificates of
title, including owners' duplicates and mortgagees' copies, if any,
arising out of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151; the
preliminary injunction issued on June 5, 1967 and the temporary
restraining order issued on June 1, 1973 are made final and
permanent, with costs against respondents (except respondent
Judge); and
(2) in G. R. No. L-28144, the appealed decision is hereby reversed
and set aside, and judgment is rendered dismissing the
application for registration. Costs against appellee.
G.R. No. L-63188 June 13, 1990 FERNANDO, PELAGIO,
CARLOS, JULIA and JUANA, all surnamed
ARANDA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, MARCELO DE LARA, MARIA DE LARA, and
DOMINADOR, PEDRO, and LIBRADA, all surnamed
RAMOS, respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.: The instant petition has it roots in the decision
rendered on November 29, 1967 by Judge Emmanuel Muoz of
the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch I (Malolos)
ordering herein private respondents as well as Tomasa de Lara,
Felicisima Ramos and Hilario Ramos as defendants therein to
reconvey to herein petitioners, as well as Asuncion Reyes Vda. de
Aranda and Maria Aranda as therein plaintiffs several parcels of
land situated in Bigaa (now Pandi), Bulacan and covered by
sixteen (16) transfer certificates of title. Defendants were further
ordered to pay P10,00.00 as moral damages plus P10,000.00 as
attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. 1
Private respondents De Laras et al., appealed from that
decision. 2 However, the Arandas, as the prevailing parties,
moved for an execution pending appeal which the trial court
granted on March 15, 1968 upon the filing by the Arandas of a
bond worth P10,000. As a consequence of the execution
pending appeal, the various lots were transferred to
petitioners. In addition, a jeepney belonging to private
respondent Marcelo de Lara was sold at public auction and the
amount of P42,159.00 due from Tecson Chemical Corporation to
Marcelo de Lara was garnished and turned over to the Arandas.
During the pendency of the appeal 3 on February 25, 1969,
the Arandas mortgaged eight (8) of the ten (10)
reconveyed parcels of land to Alfredo Cruz to secure a loan
of P80,000.00. Similarly on April 17, 1969, the Arandas
mortgaged two more lots, covered by TCT Nos. 98057 and 98058,
to Aurelia Oxiles to secure another loan of P 40,000.00. Both
loans were payable within one (1) year from the date of the
mortgages and said encumbrances were registered on June 4,

1969. 4 The loans matured during the pendency of the appeal and
because of the failure of the Arandas to redeem the same,
the two mortgages were foreclosed and the encumbered
properties were sold at public auction to mortgagees Cruz and
Oxiles on February 23, 1978 and March 30, 1978 respectively.
Eventually, the mortgagees consolidated their ownership
and new transfer certificates of title were issued in their
names. Meanwhile, on June 11, 1970, while their appeal was still
pending before the Appellate Court 5 private respondents decided
to register with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan notices of lis
pendens on all transfer certificates of title covering the parcels of
land mortgaged to Alfredo Cruz and Aurelio Oxiles.
On March 17, 1977, the Appellate Court, through Justice
Guardson R. Lood, reversed the decision of the Bulacan trial court
and declared the De Laras et al. as the owners of the disputed
lots covered by sixteen transfer certificates of title. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE,
in view of all the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is
hereby reversed; consequently, dismissing this case against the
defendants-appellants and declaring them owners of the
properties in question with costs against the plaintiffs- appellees.
The counterclaim is denied for insufficiency of evidence. 6
This reversal was aimed by the Supreme Court in a minute
resolution dated August 1, 1977. 7
On February 6, 1978, the lower court, pursuant to the reversal by
the Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 42228-R issued an order which
required the Arandas (plaintiffs in execution) to re convey to
private respondents within five (5) days from notice the
properties transferred to them by virtue of the writ of execution
pending appeal, with the exception of the property covered by
TCT No. 98052, and authorized the clerk of court to execute the
proper documents of reconveyance should the Arandas fail to
comply. The order further required the petitioners to return to
private respondent Marcelo de Lara the jeepney which was levied
on execution or to turn over the proceeds of the sale thereof, and
to reimburse the latter in the sum of P 42,159.00 which had been
garnished from Tecson Chemical Corporation.
On June 26, 1978, the clerk of court executed the deed of
reconveyance in favor of private respondents (defendants) with
respect to the lots covered by TCT Nos. all of the Bulacan Registry
of Deeds. Thereafter, on September 25, 1978, the De Laras et al.
filed a motion to nullify the aforesaid sixteen (16) titles to the
disputed properties for failure and/or refusal of the Arandas to
surrender their owner's copy of the said titles to the Register of
Deeds in order that new ones could be issued in favor of private
respondents.
After hearing the arguments of both parties in said motion to
nullify the titles, the lower court, on March 15, 1979, issued an
order cancelling TCT Nos. 98050, 98062, 38605, 98059, 98061
and 42055 but denied the motion of private respondents to nullify
TCT Nos. issued in favor of Alfredo Cruz and Aurelia Oxiles
respectively, without prejudice to private respondents' filing a
separate action for their invalidation. 8
Having failed in their attempt to nullify the titles now in the
names of Cruz and Oxiles, private respondents filed on January
14, 1980 an amended motion for restitution with motion for
contempt, which motions were rejected by the trial court in its
order dated August 21, 1980. 9 The court opined that the
consolidated ownership of said realty in the names of mortgagees
Cruz and Oxiles could no longer be disturbed in said proceedings.
However, this would not bar the De Laras, et al. from going after
the Arandas in a separate direct action to seek redress for the
former's inability to recover the said properties now in the names
of Cruz and Oxiles. 10
On August 9, 1982, private respondents (De Laras et al.) filed a
special civil action for certiorari and mandamusbefore the Court

of Appeals to set aside the order of August 21, 1980. 11 On

November 19, 1982, the Appellate Court, through Justice Jose C.
Colayco, modified the questioned order and ruled in this wise:
1. The ... Asuncion Reyes Vda. de Aranda, and an the other(s) ...
surnamed Aranda must pay to ... Marcelo de Lara the proceeds
of the sale of the jeepney, as shown by the certificate of sale
issued by the sheriff, and return to him the amount of P
42,159.00; 2. ... Pelagia Fernando, Maria, and Julia, all
surnamed Aranda, must pay to all the (De Laras, et al.) the
proceeds of the auction sale of the mortgaged parcels of land to
Alfredo Cruz and Aurelia Oxiles, as shown by the certificates of
sale issued by the sheriff.
The liability of the (Arandas) under these headings can be
enforced by writ of execution.
The (De Laras, et al.) may of course enforce restitution against
Alfredo Cruz and Oxiles, instead of demanding their rights
under Sec. 5, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court; but this
must be done in a separate civil action, where they can demand
from the (De Laras, et al.) and Alfredo Cruz and Aurelia Oxiles
their share of the harvest from the time of the levy. This
alternative right is recognized in the case of Hilario vs. Hicks (cf.
pp. 586, et seq.). But they cannot demand the amounts realized
from the auction sale. 'The right to recover mesne profits is
evidently derived from the right to specific
restitution. ... 12
It must be home in mind in this connection that the proceedings
for the execution of the decision pending appeal are lawful and
that 'those who act under the profess are protected by the
law." 13 This is the generally recognized rule. After a reversal,
the plaintiff is bound to make restitution-that is, to return to the
defendant whatever he got by means of the judgment; but he
cannot be treated as a wrongdoer for causing execution to
issue, and the defendant's property to be levied on and sold. It
protects him while it remains in force. 14 The petition for the
reconsideration or review of the order denying or dismissing the
motion to find the (Arandas) in contempt of court is not
meritorous either. An appeal cannot be availed of in contempt
proceedings where the charge has been dismissed because
contempt proceedings are criminal in nature. 15 WHEREFORE,
the order of August 21, 1980 is AFFIRMED with the
modifications above indicated, and the case remanded. for
further proceedings until the proper relief are carried out. 16
Hence this recourse. The pivotal issues presented are: (1)
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to
the special civil action of certiorari in CA-G.R. No. 14821-SP
despite the lapsed remedy of ordinary appeal;
(2) Whether or not the Appellate Court erred in granting reliefs
to private respondents which are not mentioned in the
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals'' derision in CA-G.R.
No. 42228-R which reversed the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan in Civil Case No. 2366R.
Anent the first issue, the Appellate Court can legally entertain the
special civil action of certiorari in CA-G.R. No. 14821-SP
considering the broader and primordial interests of justice which
compel an occasional departure from the general rule that the
extraordinary writ of certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal,
the order of March 15, 1979 having become final upon the lapse
of the reglementary period of appeal. 17
While the lower court correctly denied the motion to nullify the
subject titles in the names of Cruz and Oxiles, it failed to provide
private respondents complete restitution as decreed in Section 5,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which states: Effect of reversal of
executed judgment.-Where the judgment executed is reversed
totally or partially on appeal, the trial court, on motion, after the

case is remanded to it, may issue such orders of restitution as

equity and justice may warrant tinder the circumstances.
When a judgment is executed pending appeal and subsequently
overturned in the appellate court, the party who moved for
immediate execution should, upon return of the case to the lower
court, be required to make specific restitution of such property of
the prevailing party as he or any person acting in his behalf may
have acquired at the execution sale. If specific restitution
becomes impracticable, the losing party in the execution
becomes liable for the full value of the property at the time of its
seizure, with interest. 18
While the trial court may have acted judiciously under the
premises, its action resulted in grave injustice to the private
respondents. It cannot be gainsaid that it is incumbent upon the
plaintiffs in execution (Arandas) to return whatever they got by
means of the judgment prior to its reversal. And if perchance
some of the properties might have passed on to innocent third
parties as happened in the case at bar, the Arandas are
dutybound nonetheless to return the corresponding value of said
properties as mandated by the Rules.
On the second issue, petitioners argue that the proceeds of the
jeepney as well as the sum of P42,159.00 garnished from Tecson
Chemical Corporation cannot be returned to the De Laras, et al
because such return is not expressly included in the dispositive
part of the Appellate Court's judgment in CA-G.R. No. 42228-R.
It will be recalled that the decision of the Bulacan trial
court, 19 aside from awarding the subject pieces of realty to the
Arandas, also ordered the De Laras, et al to pay 10,000.00 as
moral damages and another P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Consequently, to satisfy said judgment pending appeal, the
jeepney of Marcelo de Lara was sold in execution and the amount
of P42,159.00 due from the Tecson Chemical Corporation in favor
of Marcelo was garnished. The proceeds of the jeepney and the
garnished amount were later withdrawn by the Arandas. To deny
restitution of these items would be to close our eyes to the
unalterable fact that such items as acknowledged by both parties
were used specifically to complete and satisfy the judgment of
the lower court in favor of the Arandas, the plaintiffs in execution,
and from which they have derived benefits since 1968. 20
Indeed, the Court of appeals need not specify in the judgment of
reversal that there should be restitution of the properties, etc.
Such restoration is expressly provided for in Section 5, Rule 39 of
the Rules and should apply in the absence of any contrary
disposition in the final judgment of the appellate court.
In sum, what the trial court failed to effect, the Court of Appeals
sought to rectify in the decision under review. h laid down in
detail what the trial court should accomplish if only to give full
meaning to the earlier reversal by the appellate court in CA-G.R.
No. 42228-R and our affirmance thereof in G.R. No. L-46086 and
more importantly, to Section 5, Rule 39. For without that assailed
judgment, an intolerably incomplete and inequitous situation
would have remained uncorrected in direct violation of the rules
and the basic tenets of fair play. WHEREFORE, the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated November 19, 1982 is affirmed.
G.R. No. 72746 May 7, 1987 BERNARDA S.
CANONIZADO, petitioner, vs. HON. REGINA ORDOEZ
BENITEZ, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH XLVII, MANILA and ATTY . CESAR R. CANONIZADO,
respondents.
CRUZ, J.: Somewhere along the way in the marriage of the
private respondent and the petitioner, the sweetness soured. The
spouses separated, and soon enough they were involved in a
bitter wrangling that would reach the courts, including this one,
and fester for more than three and a half decades.

It all began in an action for support filed by the petitioner against

her estranged husband, the private respondent on March 13,
1956 in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila. The
trial court granted the claim for their minor child Christina in the
amount of P100.00 monthly but denied similar support for the
petitioner on the ground that she was gainfully employed. 1
The petitioner questioned this decision in a petition for certiorari
with this Court, which on September 30, 1960, considered the
appealed decision a mere order resolving the petitioner's motion
for alimony pendente lite and modified it by granting support
both for the minor child and the petitioner in the monthly amount
of P100.00 each.2 When the corresponding writ of execution was
issued, the respondent filed an action in the Court of First
Instance to restrain the sale by public auction of certain
properties over which he claimed to have lost ownership.
However, on February 23, 1963, the trial court declared the
supposed conveyance of such properties to be simulated and
ordered the sheriff to proceed with the auction sale. 3 The
decision became final when the appeal filed by the private
respondent was later withdrawn. 4
An alias writ of execution was issued on March 1, 1963, but was
not satisfied because of an order of the court dated May 20,
1963, which, while directing payment of support from January to
May 1963, exempted from levy the books and office equipment
used by the respondent in the practice of his law profession. 5 On
September 9, 1964, a decision on the merits was promulgated by
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court awarding arrearages in
support pendente lite to both the petitioner and her daughter
plus current monthly support for the latter at the rate of P150.00
beginning October 1964. 6 This decision was affirmed on appeal,
with the modification that a P100.00 monthly support was also to
be given to petitioner beginning October 1964.7 This became final
and executory on January 21, 1969. 8
A writ of execution was accordingly issued on July 22, 1976, for
the collection of the amounts of P16,150.00 and P17,200.00,
respectively, representing the private respondent's liabilities for
the support of daughter Christina up to the time she finished her
studies in April 1969 and the total arrearages in support due the
petitioner as of December 1972. 9
However, these amounts were not collected, and remain
unliquidated to date because of a series of compromise
agreements reached by the parties for deferment and
moratorium. 10 As the commitments provided in these
agreements were not fulfilled, the petitioner filed on April 4,
1977, a motion for an alias writ of execution based on the original
writ of July 22, 1976. The respondent judge, however, denied the
motion and the subsequent motion for reconsideration, holding
that the decision could no longer be enforced by mere motion in
view of the lapse of more than five years. 11 On November 21,
1978, the petitioner filed with this Court a petition for mandamus
with pre injunction, docketed as G.R. No. L-49315, for the
payment by the respondent of his support in arreas. 12 On July 5,
1982, another petition, docketed as G.R. No. 60966, asked that
the respondent judge be ordered to act on the petitioner's motion
for current support. 13
We discussed G.R. No. 60966 because of the respondent's motion
to terminate support which had not yet been resolved and
directed the respondent judge to receive evidence on this
matter. 14 But in G.R. No. L-49315, this Court granted the
petition and ordered the issuance of the alias writ of execution to
enforce collection of the support in arrears from 1956 to 1972. 15
The records show that our decision in the latter case has not
been enforced, possibly because of the fact that the motion to
terminate support filed by the private respondent has not yet
been resolved. 16

The writ of execution we have ordered is not affected by that

motion. The motion affects only support from 1973 and does not
at all involve the support adjudged against him before that date,
specifically, from 1956 to 1972. Such support has already
become due and has acquired the character of vested rights
accruing to the petitioner and the daughter Christina.
The other possible reason for the respondent judge's delay in
implementing the writ of execution is a second pending motion
this time to restrain levy on the ground that the properties sought
to be taken are the same properties declared exempt in the order
of May 20, 1963. 17 We note, though, that as worded the alias
writ of execution issued by the respondent judge
covers other properties of the private respondent that can answer
for the payment of the support in arrears.
While mandamus is not available to control discretion, it may
nevertheless issue to compel the performance of a ministerial
act, as in this case. 18 The writ of execution having been
authorized and directed by this Court, the only task of the
respondent judge is to issue and enforce it. As the properties
exempt from execution have already been determined, the
respondent judge should now order the enforcement of the writ
against the other properties of the private respondent not exempt
from execution. That is a ministerial act that can be, as it is
hereby, compelled.
Regarding the motion to declare the private respondent in
contempt, its resolution will depend on the evidence received by
the respondent judge. Such resolution can be made by her in the
exercise of her discretion, which, to repeat, we cannot dictate. We
can, however, order her to exercise that discretion whichever way
she sees fit, not to decide the way we order but simply to decide
according to her own lights. In other words, what we are directing
is general action only, not any specific action sustaining a
particular position. 19 Later, we may review such action if it is
challenged as a grave abuse of discretion, but that question is
not before us now.
With respect to the third prayer, i.e., for legal interest on the
amount due from 1956, the same cannot be granted. Suffice it to
say that such a claim is groundless since the decision and orders
sought to be enforced do not direct the payment of interest and
have long become final. The issue of interest was never raised
before and cannot now be raised here for the first time.
We note from the record that after the hearing of July 30, 1986,
the parties were required to submit simultaneous memoranda
within fifteen days. 20 The petitioner complied but not the private
respondent. The private respondent did so only after he was
asked to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt, and at that his explanation was perfunctory and
unsatisfactory, 21 on top of the fact that the memorandum was
eighty days late. 22 For such contumacy, the private respondent is
hereby penalized with a fine of P500.00, to be paid within ten
days from notice, or ten days in prison.
There has been too much temporizing in this case that should not
be permitted to continue even longer in defiance of the
constitutional mandate for speedy justice. The respondent judge
is directed to act with an possible dispatch on the pending
incidents and to finally decide this protracted controversy once
and for all.
WHEREFORE, the respondent judge is hereby directed to order
the immediate enforcement of the alias writ of execution of
August 14, 1984, and the collection from the private respondent
of arrearages in support due to the petitioner from March 1956 to
December 1972 in the sum of P17,200.00 and to the daughter
Christina from March 1956 to April 1969 in the sum of
P16,150.00. For contempt of this Court, the private respondent is
also punished as above indicated.

G.R. No. L-44169 December 3, 1985 ROSARIO A.

GAA, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
EUROPHIL INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, and CESAR R.
ROXAS, Deputy Sheriff of Manila, Respondents.
PATAJO, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on March 30, 1976,
affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila. It
appears that respondent Europhil Industries Corporation was
formerly one of the tenants in Trinity Building at T.M. Kalaw
Street, Manila, while petitioner Rosario A. Gaa was then the
building administrator. On December 12, 1973, Europhil
Industries commenced an action (Civil Case No. 92744) in the
Court of First Instance of Manila for damages against petitioner
"for having perpetrated certain acts that Europhil Industries
considered a trespass upon its rights, namely, cutting of its
electricity, and removing its name from the building directory and
gate passes of its officials and employees" (p. 87 Rollo). On June
28, 1974, said court rendered judgment in favor of respondent
Europhil Industries, ordering petitioner to pay the former the sum
of P10,000.00 as actual damages, P5,000.00 as moral damages,
P5,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
The said decision having become final and executory, a writ of
garnishment was issued pursuant to which Deputy Sheriff Cesar
A. Roxas on August 1, 1975 served a Notice of Garnishment upon
El Grande Hotel, where petitioner was then employed, garnishing
her "salary, commission and/or remuneration." Petitioner then
filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a motion to lift said
garnishment on the ground that her "salaries, commission and, or
remuneration are exempted from execution under Article 1708 of
the New Civil Code. Said motion was denied by the lower Court in
an order dated November 7, 1975. A motion for reconsideration
of said order was likewise denied, and on January 26, 1976
petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
against filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
against said order of November 7, 1975.
On March 30, 1976, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
for certiorari. In dismissing the petition, the Court of Appeals held
that petitioner is not a mere laborer as contemplated under
Article 1708 as the term laborer does not apply to one who holds
a managerial or supervisory position like that of petitioner, but
only to those "laborers occupying the lower strata." It also held
that the term "wages" means the pay given" as hire or reward to
artisans, mechanics, domestics or menial servants, and laborers
employed in manufactories, agriculture, mines, and other manual
occupation and usually employed to distinguish the sums paid to
persons hired to perform manual labor, skilled or unskilled, paid
at stated times, and measured by the day, week, month, or
season," citing 67 C.J. 285, which is the ordinary acceptation of
the said term, and that "wages" in Spanish is "jornal" and one
who receives a wage is a "jornalero.
In the present petition for review on certiorari of the aforesaid
decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner questions the
correctness of the interpretation of the then Court of Appeals of
Article 1708 of the New Civil Code which reads as follows: ART.
1708. The laborer's wage shall not be subject to execution or
attachment, except for debts incurred for food, shelter, clothing
and medical attendance.
It is beyond dispute that petitioner is not an ordinary or rank and
file laborer but "a responsibly place employee," of El Grande

Hotel, "responsible for planning, directing, controlling, and

coordinating the activities of all housekeeping personnel" (p. 95,
Rollo) so as to ensure the cleanliness, maintenance and
orderliness of all guest rooms, function rooms, public areas, and
the surroundings of the hotel. Considering the importance of
petitioner's function in El Grande Hotel, it is undeniable that
petitioner is occupying a position equivalent to that of a
managerial or supervisory position. In its broadest sense, the
word "laborer" includes everyone who performs any kind of
mental or physical labor, but as commonly and customarily used
and understood, it only applies to one engaged in some form of
manual or physical labor. That is the sense in which the courts
generally apply the term as applied in exemption acts, since
persons of that class usually look to the reward of a day's labor
for immediate or present support and so are more in need of the
exemption than are other.
In Oliver vs. Macon Hardware Co., 98 Ga 249 SE 403, it was held
that in determining whether a particular laborer or employee is
really a "laborer," the character of the word he does must be
taken into consideration. He must be classified not according to
the arbitrary designation given to his calling, but with reference
to the character of the service required of him by his employer.
In Wildner vs. Ferguson, 42 Minn 112, 43 NW 793, the Court also
held that all men who earn compensation by labor or work of any
kind, whether of the head or hands, including judges, laywers,
bankers, merchants, officers of corporations, and the like, are in
some sense "laboring men." But they are not "laboring men" in
the popular sense of the term, when used to refer to a must
presume, the legislature used the term. The Court further held in
said case:
There are many cases holding that contractors, consulting or
assistant engineers, agents, superintendents, secretaries of
corporations and livery stable keepers, do not come within the
meaning of the term. Thus, in Jones vs. Avery, 50 Mich, 326, 15
N.W. Rep. 494, it was held that a traveling salesman, selling by
sample, did not come within the meaning of a constitutional
provision making stockholders of a corporation liable for "labor
debts" of the corporation.
In Kline vs. Russell 113 Ga. 1085, 39 SE 477, citing Oliver vs.
Macon Hardware Co., supra, it was held that a laborer, within the
statute exempting from garnishment the wages of a "laborer," is
one whose work depends on mere physical power to perform
ordinary manual labor, and not one engaged in services
consisting mainly of work requiring mental skill or business
capacity, and involving the exercise of intellectual faculties.
So, also in Wakefield vs. Fargo, 90 N.Y. 213, the Court, in
construing an act making stockholders in a corporation liable for
debts due "laborers, servants and apprentices" for services
performed for the corporation, held that a "laborer" is one who
performs menial or manual services and usually looks to the
reward of a day's labor or services for immediate or present
support. And in Weymouth vs. Sanborn, 43 N.H. 173, 80 Am. Dec.
144, it was held that "laborer" is a term ordinarily employed to
denote one who subsists by physical toil in contradistinction to
those who subsists by professional skill. And in Consolidated Tank
Line Co. vs. Hunt, , it was stated that "laborers" are those persons
who earn a livelihood by their own manual labor.
Article 1708 used the word "wages" and not "salary" in relation to
"laborer" when it declared what are to be exempted from
attachment and execution. The term "wages" as distinguished
from "salary", applies to the compensation for manual labor,
skilled or unskilled, paid at stated times, and measured by the
day, week, month, or season, while "salary" denotes a higher
degree of employment, or a superior grade of services, and
implies a position of office: by contrast, the term wages "
indicates considerable pay for a lower and less responsible
character of employment, while "salary" is suggestive of a larger
and more important service .

The distinction between wages and salary was adverted to in Bell

vs. Indian Livestock Co. wherein it was said: "'Wages' are the
compensation given to a hired person for service, and the same
is true of 'salary'. The words seem to be synonymous, convertible
terms, though we believe that use and general acceptation have
given to the word 'salary' a significance somewhat different from
the word 'wages' in this: that the former is understood to relate to
position of office, to be the compensation given for official or
other service, as distinguished from 'wages', the compensation
for labor."
We do not think that the legislature intended the exemption in
Article 1708 of the New Civil Code to operate in favor of any but
those who are laboring men or women in the sense that their
work is manual. Persons belonging to this class usually look to
the reward of a day's labor for immediate or present support, and
such persons are more in need of the exemption than any others.
Petitioner Rosario A. Gaa is definitely not within that class.
We find, therefore, and so hold that the Trial Court did not err in
denying in its order of November 7, 1975 the motion of petitioner
to lift the notice of garnishment against her salaries, commission
and other remuneration from El Grande Hotel since said salaries,
Commission and other remuneration due her from the El Grande
Hotel do not constitute wages due a laborer which, under Article
1708 of the Civil Code, are not subject to execution or
attachment. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, We find the present
petition to be without merit and hereby AFFIRM the decision of
the Court of Appeals, with costs against petitioner.
[G.R. No. 88114 : December 20, 1990.] 192 SCRA 492
PENTAGON SECURITY and INVESTIGATION AGENCY,
Petitioner, vs. VICENTE T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., and NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, SECOND DIVISION,
Respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N PADILLA, J.: The issue raised by petitioner

is whether there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC in upholding the sheriff's issuance of Notice of Levy and
Sale on Execution against licensed firearms owned and used by
the petitioner, a security agency, in its operations.
Petitioner, a single proprietorship engaged in security services,
was ordered to pay the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETEEN PESOS AND FOUR
CENTAVOS (P157,119.04) representing wages and COLA
differentials due its employees, as computed in a Decision of the
NLRC dated 21 February 1986. On 22 June 1988, a notice of
garnishment was issued against petitioner, addressed to the PCSUSIA c/o Col. Norberto M. Lina, Camp Crame, EDSA, Q.C. On 5
June 1988, Deputy Sheriff Silvino B. Santos issued a Notice of
Levy and Sale on Execution of Personal Properties against herein
petitioner, which personal properties are the licensed firearms in
question.
Petitioner filed an urgent petition to quash Notice of Levy and
Sale on Execution, claiming exemption from execution under Sec.
12, par. (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Labor Arbiter Eduardo Magno denied the petition. The Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied. On 21 March 1989, the
NLRC issued its resolution which is the subject of this petition.:The NLRC held:
"Respondent is a security agency. It is admitted that the
licensed firearm is an important implement used in the
business but this licensed firearm is not the tools and
implements exempted from execution . crlaw . The question,
therefore is whether a person can run his trade or employment
without such licensed firearm. The answer is in the affirmative
since the person can still run the business or engage in his
trade even without such firearm because there are other
alternatives open to him.

"Besides, there is no showing that the levied firearms are the

only firearms that the respondent-appellant has in its
possession. We affirmatively believe therefore that there are
firearms still hidden in its armory sufficient enough to answer
the call of its security trade or business. In the remote
assumption that no firearms remains in respondent's custody,
as practically flowing from the view of Labor Arbiter Magno,
respondent can lease or buy from legitimate sources. There
(sic) are some of the alternatives which even common layman
can expediently comprehend."
The Solicitor General's as well as private respondent's comments
submit that firearms of a security agency are not exempt from
execution under Rule 39, Sec. 12, par. (b) of the Rules of Court
which provides:
"Sec. 12. Property exempt from execution. Except as otherwise
expressly provided by law, the following property, and no other,
shall be exempt from execution:
'(b) Tools and implements necessarily used by him in his trade or
employment;'"
Respondents contend that from the above provision, three (3)
things can be deduced, viz:
"(a) Except in paragraphs (j) and (m), Sec. 12, Rule 39, Rules of
Court, the exemptions are accorded to individual debtors.
(b) The exempt properties are used personally by the debtor or
his family, or as tools or implements of the debtor in his trade or
employment.
(c) The properties are necessary for the livelihood of the debtor
and his family."
The term "tools and implements" refers to instruments of
husbandry or manual labor needed by an artisan craftsman or
laborer to obtain his living. Here petitioner is a business
enterprise. It does not use the firearms personally, but they are
used by its employees. Not being a natural person, petitioner
cannot claim that the firearms are necessary for its livelihood.
Private respondent invites the Court to take judicial notice of the
fact that there are security guards rendering service without
firearms.
Petitioner without filing any reply moves for the
resolution of the petition. There is no question, in our mind,
that a security agency without firearms to equip its guards is
useless.: rd
However, it would appear that the exemption contemplated by
the provision involved is personal, available only to a natural
person, such as a dentist's dental chair and electric fan. As
pointed out by the Solicitor General, if properties used in
business are exempt from execution, there can hardly be an
instance when a judgment claim can be enforced against the
business entity. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED.
However, for security reasons, and to prevent the possibility that
the firearms to be sold at the execution sale may fall into the
hands of lawless and subversive elements, the sale at public
auction should be with the prior clearance and under supervision
of the PC-INP authorities.
G.R. No. L-44240 May 5, 1979 FREDESWINDA R.
CASANOVA, petitioner, vs.
THE HON. MARIANO A. LACSAMANA, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Pasay City Court, Branch II, THE
SPOUSES JOSE V. OCHOA and ELENA VERGEL, THE SHERIFF
OF PASAY CITY and THE ENGINEER OF PASAY
CITY, respondents.
ANTONIO, J.: Petition for certiorari and mandamus with
preliminary injunction wherein petitioner prays this Court: (1) to
enjoin respondent Judge from enforcing his order of demolition
dated July 8, 1976 and the respondent City Sheriff of Pasay City
from carrying out his notice of demolition; (2) to annul the said
order of demolition and the Sheriff's notice of demolition; and (3)
to issue a writ of mandamus commanding the respondent Judge

to accord due process of law under the Constitution to the

petitioner and formal hearing under Section 14, Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Sometime in 1974, private respondent Jose V. Ochoa instituted an
action for ejectment against petitioner in the City Court of Pasay
City, Branch II (Civil Case No. 10977). Petitioner alleged among
others, that he is the absolute owner of the lot having purchased
the same from the Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro and has been
in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years. In the said
case, the respondent Judge rendered judgment in favor of
respondent Ochoa on March 5, 1976, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment on the pleadings
is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Jose V. Ochoa and
against the defendant Fredeswinda R. Casanova ordering her to
vacate and surrender the possession of the premises to the
plaintiff or his duly authorized representative; to pay the accrued
back rentals for the premises in the total amount of P300.00; to
pay P60.00 per month as damages for the illegal detainer of the
property until such time as the defendant actually vacates the
premises; and to pay the sum equivalent to 25% of the amount
involved as attorney's fees. 1
On April 9, 1976, petitioner moved for reconsideration and
suspension of the order of execution dated April 5, 1976 and
prayed that the Sheriff of Pasay City be ordered to withdraw and
desist from enforcing his notice of collection and ejectment dated
April 13, 1976, citing as basis for said motion General Order No.
53, dated August 21, 1975 which provides, among others, that
"all orders for the ejectment of tenants or the demolition of their
homes are hereby suspended until further orders." Respondent
Ochoa opposed said motion on April 28, 1976, on the ground that
General Order No. 53 had no application in the case because it
was issued for the purpose of forestalling the indiscriminate
eviction of bona fide tenants from agricultural and/or residential
lands converted or proposed to be converted into subdivision or
commercial center and establishment. Further, respondent Ochoa
stated that the ejectment case was instituted due to the failure
and/or refusal of petitioner to comply with her obligation as
lessee.
On May 6, 1976, private respondent filed an Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for Issuance of Order of Demolition and an Urgent ExParte Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution and Order of
Demolition. On June 4, 1976, upon the manifestation of private
respondent that said motions were submitted for resolution
without further oral argument, the respondent Judge issued an
order which considered said motions as submitted for resolution
without further oral arguments. On June 14, 1976, petitioner filed
an urgent motion for postponement of the hearing scheduled on
June 17, 1976 at 9:00 a.m. Considering that it had already issued
on June 4, 1976 an order which considered the motions of private
respondent as submitted for resolution without further oral
arguments, respondent court issued an order dated June 16, 1976
reiterating its afore-mentioned order of June 4, 1976, thus for all
intents and purposes denying the motion for postponement.
On July 8, 1976, respondent Judge issued an order denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration and suspension of order of
execution. In the same order, the motions of private respondent
were granted and the Sheriff of Pasay City was ordered "to
demolish the house/structure of the defendant (petitioner)
erected on the plaintiff's property and to remove the same
therefrom." On July 26, 1976, the Deputy Sheriff of Pasay City, in
a letter of even date, notified the petitioner as follows: THAT AT
9:00 AM 30 JULY 1976, YOUR HOUSE WILL BE DEMOLISHED BY
THIS OFFICE. Please remove said house outside of the Plaintiff's
lot before the given period. 2
Petitioner in seeking to annul the order of respondent Judge
dated July 8, 1976 and to restrain the Sheriff of Pasay City from
demolishing her house cites as basis for her petition section 14,
Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides: SEC. 14.
Removal of improvements on property subject of execution.

 When the property subject of the execution contains

improvements constructed or planted by the judgment debtor or
his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said
improvements except upon special order of the court issued upon
petition of the judgment creditor after due hearing and after the
former hasfailed to remove the same within a reasonable time
fixed by the court.
It is petitioner's contention that the respondent Judge failed to
observe said provision in not setting for hearing private
respondent's motion for order of demolition and motion for
issuance of alias writ and order of demolition and in the
questioned order the court did not fix a definite reasonable period
within which her house should be removed, thus rendering the
order of the court granting said motions null and void. Upon the
other hand, private respondents argue that from the decision of
the lower court dated March 5, 1976, no appeal was taken and
the same has become final and executory. Further, according to
private respondents there was no denial of due process on the
part of the petitioner when the respondent Judge issued the
questioned order because the petitioner was given ample time by
both respondent Judge and the Deputy Sheriff of Pasay City
within which to remove the construction she erected on private
respondent's premises.
We find petitioner's contention meritorious. We agree with private
respondents that the decision in the ejectment case has already
become final and executory, but what is being questioned in the
present petition is the order of the court ordering the Sheriff of
Pasay City or his deputies and the City Engineer's Office of Pasay
City or his duly authorized representative to demolish the
house/structure of the petitioner erected on the respondents'
property and to remove the same therefrom. The questioned
order was issued without due hearing of the motions of private
respondent and without granting petitioner a reasonable time
within which to remove her house from the premises.
In Folloso v. Director of Lands, 3 this Court said: Under Section 13
(now 14). Rule 39, the officer called upon to enforce a final
judgment involving delivery or restitution of property may do so
by placing the plaintiff in possession of such property, but 'the
officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove the improvements
made by the defendant or his agent on the property, except by
special order of the court, which order may only issue upon
petition of the plaintiff after due hearing and upon the
defendant's failure to remove the improvements within a
reasonable time to be fixed by the court.' The safeguard accorded
to the defendant by the above provision has not been followed.
While the motion of the appellee for the removal of the houses
was set for hearing after due notice given to the appellants, the
court ordered the sheriff to remove said houses within a period of
30 days but without giving them a reasonable time within which
to do so as required by said section 13 (now 14). This
requirement is not an empty gesture. This safeguard is necessary
to give the defendant an opportunity to protect his interest. The
lower court erred in issuing the order of demolition without giving
a reasonable time to the appellants.
The same ruling was reiterated in Rom v. Cobadora, 4 where this
Court held: ... Under Rule 39, section 14, the appellant's house
could not be removed pending appellee's recourse to the Court
for a special order for the demolition and removal of such
improvements constructed by the appellant, which order is to be
issued 'upon petition of the judgment creditorafter due
hearing and after the former has failed to remove the
same within a reasonable timefixed by the Court
WHEREFORE, the order of demolition dated July 8,1976, issued
by respondent Judge, and the Sheriff's Notice of Demolition, are
hereby set aside, and respondent Judge ordered to accord
petitioner a reasonable time to remove her house from the
premises after a formal hearing, in accordance with section 14,
Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.

G.R. No. L-31077 March 17, 1978 ARABAY,

INC., petitioner, vs. Hon. SERAFIN SALVADOR, Presiding
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City
Branch, and BENJAMIN M. PASCUAL, respondents.
AQUINO, J.: Ventilated in this case is the ever-recurring question
as to the jurisdiction of a Court of first Instance to issue, at the
instance of a third-party claimant, an injunction restraining the
execution sale of properties which were levied upon by a
judgment creditor in a case decided by another Court of First
Instance.
In a decision dated October 7, 1968 in Civil Case No. 71710 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, "Arabay, Inc. vs. Florencio A.
Soyangco", Judge Manuel P. Barcelona ordered Soyangco to pay
the plaintiff the sum of P36,874.49 plus six percent interest from
January 10, 1967 and P2,000 as attorney's fees. Soyangco did not
appeal. Pursuant to the writ of execution issued in that case, a
deputy sheriff of Rizal levied upon forty pieces of personal
property found in Soyangco's residence at Navotas, Rizal and
served notice that the same would be auctioned off to the
highest bidder on March 8, 1969.
On March 6, 1969 Benjamin M. Pascual filed a third-party claim
with the sheriff. He alleged that he owned the said pieces of
personal property because they were sold to him by the deputy
sheriff of Caloocan City for P8,106.16 to satisfy a judgment
against Soyangco in Civil Case No. 61193, "Esteban F. Ferrer vs.
Florencio Soyangco" of the Court of First Instance of Manila, as
shown in the certificate of sale dated June 30, 1967. On March
13, 1969 Arabay, Inc. posted an indemnity bond for P8,106.16 in
favor of the sheriff. The auction sale was rescheduled on March
28, 1969 but the sale did not take place because Pascual sued
the sheriff and Arabay, Inc. in Civil Case No. C-1545 of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City Branch XIV. Pascual
prayed in that case that the auction sale be enjoined, that the
levy be declared void and that the defendants be ordered to pay
moral damages and attorney's fees. The Caloocan court in an ex
parte order dated March 26, 1969 enjoined the sheriff from
proceeding with the auction sale.
Arabay, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss the injunction suit. It
invoked the rule that no court has the power to interfere by
injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent
or coordinate jurisdiction . Pascual opposed the motion to
dismiss. He cited the rule that a sheriff has no authority to attach
the property of a person other than the judgment debtor. The
Caloocan court in its order of may 19, 1969 denied the motion to
dismiss and reiterated its prior order that upon the filing or a
bond in the sum of P5,000 a writ of injunction should be issued to
enjoin the auction sale. The motion for the reconsideration of that
order was denied in the court's order of July 11, 1969.
On October 13, 1969 Arabay, Inc. filed in this court the instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition wherein it assailed the
injunction order. The issue is whether at the instance of a thirdparty claimant the Caloocan court can enjoin the sheriff from
selling the properties which he has levied upon to satisfy the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. We hold that
the Caloocan court can stop the execution of the Manila court's
judgment against properties not belonging to the judgment
debtor. The injunction in that case would not constitute an
interference with the process of a court of coordinate and coequal jurisdiction.
as a third-party claimant, Pascual has the right to vindicate his
claim to the properties levied upon by means of a proper action.
That right is recognized in Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
SEC. 17. Proceedings where property claimed by third person.
If property levied on be claimed by any other person than the
judgment debtor or his agent, and such person make an

affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof,

stating the grounds of such right or title, and serve the same
upon the officer making the levy, and a copy thereof upon the
judgment creditor, the officer shall not be bound to keep the
property, unless such judgment creditor or his agent, on
demand of the officer, indemnify the officer against such claim
by a bond in a sum not greater such than the value of the
property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value,
the same shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of
execution.
The officer is not liable for damages, for the taking or keeping
of the property, to any third-party claimant unless a claim is
made by the latter and unless an action for damages is brought
by him against the officer within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the date of the filing of the bond. But nothing herein
contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from
vindicating his claim to the property by any proper action.
The third-party claimant is to obligated to file an action for
damages against the sheriff in case an indemnity bond was filed
by the judgment creditor. The third-party claimant may file a
separate and independent action to establish ownership to the
property levied upon by the sheriff. In that action, he may secure
an injunction to restrain the sale of the attached property.
When the sheriff, acting beyond the bound of his authority, seizes
a stranger's property, the writ of injunction, which is issued to
stop the auction sale of that property, is not an interference with
the writ of execution issued by another court because the writ of
execution issued by another court because the writ of execution
was improperly implemented by the sheriff. Under that writ, he
could attach the property of the judgment debtor. He is not
authorized to levy upon the property of the third-party claimant.
In the instant case, respondent Judge acted within his jurisdiction
and did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in enjoining the
auction sale because, as already stated, "a sheriff has no
authority to attach the property of any person under an execution
except that of the judgment debtor. If he does so, the writ of
execution affords him no justification for the action is not in
obedience to the mandate of the writ. So long as the officer
confines his acts which are not justified by the writ are without
authority of law. An injunction is a proper remedy to prevent a
sheriff from selling the property of one person for the purpose of
paying the debts of another.".
In the Abiera case, supra, Angelina Puentevella secured a
judgment against Raul Javellana for a sum of money from Branch
II of the court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. To satisfy
that judgment the sheriff levied upon certain properties claimed
by Jovita de la Cruz. She and her husband filed an action
in Branch VI of the same court wherein they alleged that they
were the owners of the said properties. They secured an
injunction from Branch VI to restrain the sheriff from taking
possession of the properties and from proceeding with the
auction sale thereof. It was held that the injunction was not and
interference with the writ of execution issued by Branch II since
the said properties could not be levied upon by the sheriff.
It is noteworthy that, generally, the rule, that no court has
authority to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees
of a concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to
grant the injunctive relief, is applied in cases, where no thirdparty claimant is involved, in order to prevent one court from
nullifying the judgment or process of another court of the same
rank or category, a power which devolves upon the proper
appellate court.
The raison d'etre for that rule is that an effective ordering of legal
relationships in civil society is possible only when each court is
granted exclusive jurisdiction over the property brought to it. To
allow coordinate courts to interfere with each other's judgments

or decrees by injunctions would obviously lead to confusion and

might seriously hinder the proper administration of justice,
especially if they are branches of the same court.
That rule is not violated when the judge of another branch, who
annuls or modifies the order issued by another judge, acts in the
same case and belongs to the same court. But the rule is
infringed when the judge of a branch of the curt issues a writ of
preliminary injunction in a case to enjoin the sheriff from carrying
out an order of execution issued in another case by the judge of
another branch of the same court. An amended writ of possession
issued to the mortgagee in a case of judicial foreclosure, which
was filed in the court of First Instance of Manila, cannot be
enjoined in a subsequent case file in the same court by the
mortgagor.
In another case, it was held that the writ of garnishment which
was issued by the Court of first Instance of Manila to enforce a
judgment for P240,000 against the City of Baguio and which
enforced by attaching its deposits in the Philippine National Bank,
could not be enjoined by the Court of First Instance of Baguio on
the theory that the funds garnished are exempt from execution.
Relief against the writ of garnishment should be sought in the
court which issued the writ and which has the power to grant the
injunctive remedy. "Thereby, conflict of power is avoided between
different courts of coordinate jurisdiction.".
The execution of a final judgment rendered by one branch of the
Court of First Instance of Manila cannot be enjoined by another
branch at the instance of the judgment debtor. Similarly, Branch
14 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal has no jurisdiction to
annul an execution sale, which was held pursuant to a writ of
execution issued by Branch 12 of the same court. Branch
14 cannot interfere by injunction with the execution proceedings
with were held to satisfy the judgment rendered by Branch
12. Relief from the sale should be secured from Branch 12..
On the other hand, it should be noted that a Court of First
Instance or a branch thereof has the authority and jurisdiction to
take cognizance of, and to act in, a suit to annul a final and
executory judgment or order rendered by another Court of First
Instance or by another branch of the same court. In such a case,
there is no interference by one branch of the court with the
judgment of another branch of the same court because after a
case had been finally terminated in one branch and an action to
annul the judgment is filed in another branch, the cause of action
in the second case would be different from that in the first case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. Costs against the
petitioner.
G.R. No. L-49188 January 30, 1990 PHILIPPINE AIRLINES,
INC., petitioner, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE RICARDO D.
GALANO, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII,
JAIME K. DEL ROSARIO, Deputy Sheriff, Court of First
Instance, Manila, and AMELIA TAN,respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: Behind the simple issue of validity of an
alias writ of execution in this case is a more fundamental
question. Should the Court allow a too literal interpretation of the
Rules with an open invitation to knavery to prevail over a more
discerning and just approach? Should we not apply the ancient
rule of statutory construction that laws are to be interpreted by
the spirit which vivifies and not by the letter which killeth?
This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 07695 entitled "Philippine Airlines, Inc.
v. Hon. Judge Ricardo D. Galano, et al.", dismissing the petition
for certiorari against the order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila which issued an alias writ of execution against the
petitioner. The petition involving the alias writ of execution had
its beginnings on November 8, 1967, when respondent Amelia
Tan, under the name and style of Able Printing Press commenced

a complaint for damages before the Court of First Instance of

Manila. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 71307,
entitled Amelia Tan, et al. v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch 13, then
presided over by the late Judge Jesus P. Morfe rendered judgment
on June 29, 1972, in favor of private respondent Amelia Tan and
against petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the
defendant Philippine Air Lines: 1. On the first cause of action, to
pay to the plaintiff the amount of P75,000.00 as actual damages,
with legal interest thereon from plaintiffs extra-judicial demand
made by the letter of July 20, 1967; 2. On the third cause of
action, to pay to the plaintiff the amount of P18,200.00,
representing the unrealized profit of 10% included in the contract
price of P200,000.00 plus legal interest thereon from July
20,1967; 3. On the fourth cause of action, to pay to the plaintiff
the amount of P20,000.00 as and for moral damages, with legal
interest thereon from July 20, 1 967; 4. On the sixth cause of
action, to pay to the plaintiff the amount of P5,000.00 damages
as and for attorney's fee. Plaintiffs second and fifth causes of
action, and defendant's counterclaim, are dismissed. With costs
against the defendant.
On July 28, 1972, the petitioner filed its appeal with the Court of
Appeals. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 51079-R. On
February 3, 1977, the appellate court rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads: IN VIEW WHEREOF, with the
modification that PAL is condemned to pay plaintiff the sum of
P25,000.00 as damages and P5,000.00 as attorney's fee,
judgment is affirmed, with costs.
Notice of judgment was sent by the Court of Appeals to the trial
court and on dates subsequent thereto, a motion for
reconsideration was filed by respondent Amelia Tan, duly
opposed by petitioner PAL.
On May 23,1977, the Court of Appeals rendered its resolution
denying the respondent's motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit. No further appeal having been taken by the parties, the
judgment became final and executory and on May 31, 1977,
judgment was correspondingly entered in the case.
The case was remanded to the trial court for execution and on
September 2,1977, respondent Amelia Tan filed a motion praying
for the issuance of a writ of execution of the judgment rendered
by the Court of Appeals. On October 11, 1977, the trial court,
presided over by Judge Galano, issued its order of execution with
the corresponding writ in favor of the respondent. The writ was
duly referred to Deputy Sheriff Emilio Z. Reyes of Branch 13 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila for enforcement.
Four months later, on February 11, 1978, respondent Amelia Tan
moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution stating that
the judgment rendered by the lower court, and affirmed with
modification by the Court of Appeals, remained unsatisfied. On
March 1, 1978, the petitioner filed an opposition to the motion for
the issuance of an alias writ of execution stating that it had
already fully paid its obligation to plaintiff through the deputy
sheriff of the respondent court, Emilio Z. Reyes, as evidenced by
cash vouchers properly signed and receipted by said Emilio Z.
Reyes.
On March 3,1978, the Court of Appeals denied the issuance of the
alias writ for being premature, ordering the executing sheriff
Emilio Z. Reyes to appear with his return and explain the reason
for his failure to surrender the amounts paid to him by petitioner
PAL. However, the order could not be served upon Deputy Sheriff
Reyes who had absconded or disappeared. On March 28, 1978,
motion for the issuance of a partial alias writ of execution was
filed by respondent Amelia Tan.

On April 19, 1978, respondent Amelia Tan filed a motion to

withdraw "Motion for Partial Alias Writ of Execution" with
Substitute Motion for Alias Writ of Execution. On May 1, 1978, the
respondent Judge issued an order which reads:
As prayed for by counsel for the plaintiff, the Motion to
Withdraw 'Motion for Partial Alias Writ of Execution with
Substitute Motion for Alias Writ of Execution is hereby granted,
and the motion for partial alias writ of execution is considered
withdrawn.
Let an Alias Writ of Execution issue against the defendant for
the fall satisfaction of the judgment rendered. Deputy Sheriff
Jaime K. del Rosario is hereby appointed Special Sheriff for the
enforcement thereof.
On May 18, 1978, the petitioner received a copy of the first alias
writ of execution issued on the same day directing Special Sheriff
Jaime K. del Rosario to levy on execution in the sum of
P25,000.00 with legal interest thereon from July 20,1967 when
respondent Amelia Tan made an extra-judicial demand through a
letter. Levy was also ordered for the further sum of P5,000.00
awarded as attorney's fees. On May 23, 1978, the petitioner filed
an urgent motion to quash the alias writ of execution stating that
no return of the writ had as yet been made by Deputy Sheriff
Emilio Z. Reyes and that the judgment debt had already been
fully satisfied by the petitioner as evidenced by the cash
vouchers signed and receipted by the server of the writ of
execution, Deputy Sheriff Emilio Z. Reyes.
On May 26,1978, the respondent Jaime K. del Rosario served a
notice of garnishment on the depository bank of petitioner, Far
East Bank and Trust Company, Rosario Branch, Binondo, Manila,
through its manager and garnished the petitioner's deposit in the
said bank in the total amount of P64,408.00 as of May 16, 1978.
Hence, this petition for certiorari filed by the Philippine Airlines,
Inc., on the grounds that:
I
AN ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION CANNOT BE ISSUED
WITHOUT PRIOR RETURN OF THE ORIGINAL WRIT BY THE
IMPLEMENTING OFFICER.
II
PAYMENT OF JUDGMENT TO THE IMPLEMENTING OFFICER
AS DIRECTED IN THE WRIT OF EXECUTION CONSTITUTES
SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT.
III
INTEREST IS NOT PAYABLE WHEN THE DECISION IS
SILENT AS TO THE PAYMENT THEREOF.
IV
SECTION 5, RULE 39, PARTICULARLY REFERS TO LEVY OF
PROPERTY OF JUDGMENT DEBTOR AND DISPOSAL OR SALE
THEREOF TO SATISFY JUDGMENT.
Can an alias writ of execution be issued without a prior return of
the original writ by the implementing officer? We rule in the
affirmative and we quote the respondent court's decision with
approval:
The issuance of the questioned alias writ of execution under the
circumstances here obtaining is justified because even with the
absence of a Sheriffs return on the original writ, the unalterable
fact remains that such a return is incapable of being obtained
because the officer who is to make the said return has
absconded and cannot be brought to the Court despite the
earlier order of the court for him to appear for this purpose. .
Obviously, taking cognizance of this circumstance, the order of
May 11, 1978 directing the issuance of an alias writ was
therefore issued.. The need for such a return as a condition
precedent for the issuance of an alias writ was justifiably
dispensed with by the court below and its action in this regard
meets with our concurrence. A contrary view will produce an
abhorent situation whereby the mischief of an erring officer of

the court could be utilized to impede indefinitely the undisputed

and awarded rights which a prevailing party rightfully deserves
to obtain and with dispatch. The final judgment in this case
should not indeed be permitted to become illusory or incapable
of execution for an indefinite and over extended period, as had
already transpired.
Judicium non debet esse illusorium; suum effectum habere
debet (A judgment ought not to be illusory it ought to have its
proper effect).
Indeed, technicality cannot be countenanced to defeat the
execution of a judgment for execution is the fruit and end of the
suit and is very aptly called the life of the law. A judgment cannot
be rendered nugatory by the unreasonable application of a strict
rule of procedure. Vested rights were never intended to rest on
the requirement of a return, the office of which is merely to
inform the court and the parties, of any and all actions taken
under the writ of execution. Where such information can be
established in some other manner, the absence of an executing
officer's return will not preclude a judgment from being treated as
discharged or being executed through an alias writ of execution
as the case may be. More so, as in the case at bar. Where the
return cannot be expected to be forthcoming, to require the same
would be to compel the enforcement of rights under a judgment
to rest on an impossibility, thereby allowing the total avoidance
of judgment debts. So long as a judgment is not satisfied, a
plaintiff is entitled to other writs of execution. It is a well known
legal maxim that he who cannot prosecute his judgment with
effect, sues his case vainly.
More important in the determination of the propriety of the trial
court's issuance of an alias writ of execution is the issue of
satisfaction of judgment.
Under the peculiar circumstances surrounding this case, did the
payment made to the absconding sheriff by check in his name
operate to satisfy the judgment debt? The Court rules that the
plaintiff who has won her case should not be adjudged as having
sued in vain. To decide otherwise would not only give her an
empty but a pyrrhic victory.
It should be emphasized that under the initial judgment, Amelia
Tan was found to have been wronged by PAL.. She filed her
complaint in 1967.
After ten (10) years of protracted litigation in the Court of First
Instance and the Court of Appeals, Ms. Tan won her case. It is
now 1990.
Almost twenty-two (22) years later, Ms. Tan has not seen a
centavo of what the courts have solemnly declared as rightfully
hers. Through absolutely no fault of her own, Ms. Tan has been
deprived of what, technically, she should have been paid from
the start, before 1967, without need of her going to court to
enforce her rights. And all because PAL did not issue the checks
intended for her, in her name.
Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the payment to
the absconding sheriff by check in his name did not operate as a
satisfaction of the judgment debt.
In general, a payment, in order to be effective to discharge an
obligation, must be made to the proper person. Article 1240 of
the Civil Code provides: Payment shall be made to the person in
whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his successor
in interest, or any person authorized to receive it.
Thus, payment must be made to the obligee himself or to an
agent having authority, express or implied, to receive the
particular payment. Payment made to one having apparent
authority to receive the money will, as a rule, be treated as

though actual authority had been given for its receipt. Likewise, if
payment is made to one who by law is authorized to act for the
creditor, it will work a discharge. The receipt of money due on
ajudgment by an officer authorized by law to accept it will,
therefore, satisfy the debt.
The theory is where payment is made to a person authorized and
recognized by the creditor, the payment to such a person so
authorized is deemed payment to the creditor. Under ordinary
circumstances, payment by the judgment debtor in the case at
bar, to the sheriff should be valid payment to extinguish the
judgment debt.
There are circumstances in this case, however, which compel a
different conclusion. The payment made by the petitioner to the
absconding sheriff was not in cash or legal tender but in checks.
The checks were not payable to Amelia Tan or Able Printing Press
but to the absconding sheriff. Did such payments extinguish
the judgment debt?
Article 1249 of the Civil Code provides: The payment of debts in
money shall be made in the currency stipulated, and if it is not
possible to deliver such currency, then in the currency which is
legal tender in the Philippines. The delivery of promissory notes
payable to order, or bills of exchange or other mercantile
documents shall produce the effect of payment only when they
have been cashed, or when through the fault of the creditor they
have been impaired. In the meantime, the action derived from
the original obligation shall be held in abeyance.
In the absence of an agreement, either express or implied,
payment means the discharge of a debt or obligation in money
and unless the parties so agree, a debtor has no rights, except at
his own peril, to substitute something in lieu of cash as medium
of payment of his debt . Consequently, unless authorized to do so
by law or by consent of the obligee a public officer has no
authority to accept anything other than money in payment of an
obligation under a judgment being executed. Strictly speaking,
the acceptance by the sheriff of the petitioner's checks, in the
case at bar, does not, per se, operate as a discharge of the
judgment debt.
Since a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and
not money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself,
operate as payment . A check, whether a manager's check or
ordinary cheek, is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in
payment of a debt is not a valid tender of payment and may be
refused receipt by the obligee or creditor. Mere delivery of checks
does not discharge the obligation under a judgment. The
obligation is not extinguished and remains suspended until the
payment by commercial document is actually realized.
If bouncing checks had been issued in the name of Amelia Tan
and not the Sheriff's, there would have been no payment. After
dishonor of the checks, Ms. Tan could have run after other
properties of PAL. The theory is that she has received no value for
what had been awarded her. Because the checks were drawn in
the name of Emilio Z. Reyes, neither has she received anything.
The same rule should apply.
It is argued that if PAL had paid in cash to Sheriff Reyes, there
would have been payment in full legal contemplation. The
reasoning is logical but is it valid and proper? Logic has its limits
in decision making. We should not follow rulings to their logical
extremes if in doing so we arrive at unjust or absurd results.
In the first place, PAL did not pay in cash. It paid in cheeks.
And second, payment in cash always carries with it certain
cautions. Nobody hands over big amounts of cash in a careless
and inane manner. Mature thought is given to the possibility of
the cash being lost, of the bearer being waylaid or running off

with what he is carrying for another. Payment in checks is

precisely intended to avoid the possibility of the money going to
the wrong party. The situation is entirely different where a Sheriff
seizes a car, a tractor, or a piece of land. Logic often has to give
way to experience and to reality. Having paid with checks, PAL
should have done so properly.
Payment in money or cash to the implementing officer may be
deemed absolute payment of the judgment debt but the Court
has never, in the least bit, suggested that judgment debtors
should settle their obligations by turning over huge amounts of
cash or legal tender to sheriffs and other executing officers.
Payment in cash would result in damage or interminable
litigations each time a sheriff with huge amounts of cash in his
hands decides to abscond.
As a protective measure, therefore, the courts encourage the
practice of payments by cheek provided adequate controls are
instituted to prevent wrongful payment and illegal withdrawal or
disbursement of funds. If particularly big amounts are involved,
escrow arrangements with a bank and carefully supervised by the
court would be the safer procedure. Actual transfer of funds takes
place within the safety of bank premises. These practices are
perfectly legal. The object is always the safe and incorrupt
execution of the judgment.
It is, indeed, out of the ordinary that checks intended for a
particular payee are made out in the name of another. Making
the checks payable to the judgment creditor would have
prevented the encashment or the taking of undue advantage by
the sheriff, or any person into whose hands the checks may have
fallen, whether wrongfully or in behalf of the creditor. The
issuance of the checks in the name of the sheriff clearly made
possible the misappropriation of the funds that were withdrawn.
As explained and held by the respondent court:
... [K]nowing as it does that the intended payment was for the
private party respondent Amelia Tan, the petitioner
corporation, utilizing the services of its personnel who are or
should be knowledgeable about the accepted procedures and
resulting consequences of the checks drawn, nevertheless, in
this instance, without prudence, departed from what is
generally observed and done, and placed as payee in the
checks the name of the errant Sheriff and not the name of the
rightful payee. Petitioner thereby created a situation which
permitted the said Sheriff to personally encash said checks
and misappropriate the proceeds thereof to his exclusive
personal benefit. For the prejudice that resulted, the
petitioner himself must bear the fault. The judicial guideline
which we take note of states as follows:
As between two innocent persons, one of whom must suffer
the consequence of a breach of trust, the one who made it
possible by his act of confidence must bear the loss.
Having failed to employ the proper safeguards to protect itself,
the judgment debtor whose act made possible the loss had but
itself to blame.
The attention of this Court has been called to the bad practice of
a number of executing officers, of requiring checks in satisfaction
of judgment debts to be made out in their own names. If a sheriff
directs a judgment debtor to issue the checks in the sheriff's
name, claiming he must get his commission or fees, the debtor
must report the sheriff immediately to the court which ordered
the execution or to the Supreme Court for appropriate disciplinary
action. Fees, commissions, and salaries are paid through regular
channels. This improper procedure also allows such officers, who
have sixty (60) days within which to make a return, to treat the
moneys as their personal finds and to deposit the same in their
private accounts to earn sixty (60) days interest, before said finds
are turned over to the court or judgment creditor (See Balgos v.

Velasco, 108 SCRA 525 [1981]). Quite as easily, such officers

could put up the defense that said checks had been issued to
them in their private or personal capacity. Without a receipt
evidencing payment of the judgment debt, the misappropriation
of finds by such officers becomes clean and complete. The
practice is ingenious but evil as it unjustly enriches court
personnel at the expense of litigants and the proper
administration of justice. The temptation could be far greater, as
proved to be in this case of the absconding sheriff. The correct
and prudent thing for the petitioner was to have issued the
checks in the intended payee's name.
The pernicious effects of issuing checks in the name of a person
other than the intended payee, without the latter's agreement or
consent, are as many as the ways that an artful mind could
concoct to get around the safeguards provided by the law on
negotiable instruments. An angry litigant who loses a case, as a
rule, would not want the winning party to get what he won in the
judgment. He would think of ways to delay the winning party's
getting what has been adjudged in his favor. We cannot condone
that practice especially in cases where the courts and their
officers are involved. We rule against the petitioner.
Anent the applicability of Section 15, Rule 39, as follows: Section
15. Execution of money judgments. The officer must enforce
an execution of a money judgment by levying on all the property,
real and personal of every name and nature whatsoever, and
which may be disposed of for value, of the judgment debtor not
exempt from execution, or on a sufficient amount of such
property, if they be sufficient, and selling the same, and paying
to the judgment creditor, or his attorney, so much of the
proceeds as will satisfy the judgment. ...
the respondent court held: We are obliged to rule that the
judgment debt cannot be considered satisfied and therefore the
orders of the respondent judge granting the alias writ of
execution may not be pronounced as a nullity.
It is clear and manifest that after levy or garnishment, for a
judgment to be executed there is the requisite of payment by the
officer to the judgment creditor, or his attorney, so much of the
proceeds as will satisfy the judgment and none such payment
had been concededly made yet by the absconding Sheriff to the
private respondent Amelia Tan. The ultimate and essential step to
complete the execution of the judgment not having been
performed by the City Sheriff, the judgment debt legally and
factually remains unsatisfied.
Strictly speaking execution cannot be equated with satisfaction of
a judgment. Under unusual circumstances as those obtaining in
this petition, the distinction comes out clearly.
Execution is the process which carries into effect a decree or
judgment, whereas the satisfaction of a judgment is the payment
of the amount of the writ, or a lawful tender thereof, or the
conversion by sale of the debtor's property into an amount equal
to that due, and, it may be done otherwise than upon an
execution (Section 47, Rule 39). Levy and delivery by an
execution officer are not prerequisites to the satisfaction of a
judgment when the same has already been realized in fact
(Section 47, Rule 39). Execution is for the sheriff to accomplish
while satisfaction of the judgment is for the creditor to achieve.
Section 15, Rule 39 merely provides the sheriff with his duties as
executing officer including delivery of the proceeds of his levy on
the debtor's property to satisfy the judgment debt. It is but to
stress that the implementing officer's duty should not stop at his
receipt of payments but must continue until payment is delivered
to the obligor or creditor.
Finally, we find no error in the respondent court's pronouncement
on the inclusion of interests to be recovered under the alias writ
of execution. This logically follows from our ruling that PAL is
liable for both the lost checks and interest. The respondent

court's decision in CA-G.R. No. 51079-R does not totally

supersede the trial court's judgment in Civil Case No. 71307. It
merely modified the same as to the principal amount awarded as
actual damages.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED. The judgment of the respondent Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED and the trial court's issuance of the alias writ of
execution against the petitioner is upheld without prejudice to
any action it should take against the errant sheriff Emilio Z.
Reyes. The Court Administrator is ordered to follow up the actions
taken against Emilio Z. Reyes.
Separate Opinions NARVASA, J., dissenting: The execution of
final judgments and orders is a function of the sheriff, an officer
of the court whose authority is by and large statutorily
determined to meet the particular exigencies arising from or
connected with the performance of the multifarious duties of the
office. It is the acknowledgment of the many dimensions of this
authority, defined by statute and chiselled by practice, which
compels me to disagree with the decision reached by the
majority.
A consideration of the wide latitude of discretion allowed the
sheriff as the officer of the court most directly involved with the
implementation and execution of final judgments and orders
persuades me that PAL's payment to the sheriff of its judgment
debt to Amelia Tan, though made by check issued in said officer's
name, lawfully satisfied said obligation and foreclosed further
recourse therefor against PAL, notwithstanding the sheriffs failure
to deliver to Tan the proceeds of the check.
It is a matter of history that the judiciary .. is an inherit or of the
Anglo-American tradition. While the common law as such .. "is
not in force" in this jurisdiction, "to breathe the breath of life into
many of the institutions, introduced [here] under American
sovereignty, recourse must be had to the rules, principles and
doctrines of the common law under whose protecting aegis the
prototypes of these institutions had their birth" A sheriff is "an
officer of great antiquity," and was also called the shire reeve. A
shire in English law is a Saxon word signifying a division later
called a county. A reeve is an ancient English officer of justice
inferior in rank to an alderman .. appointed to process, keep the
King's peace, and put the laws in execution. From a very remote
period in English constitutional history .. the shire had another
officer, namely the shire reeve or as we say, the sheriff. .. The
Sheriff was the special representative of the legal or central
authority, and as such usually nominated by the King. .. Since the
earliest times, both in England and the United States, a sheriff
has continued his status as an adjunct of the court .. . As it was
there, so it has been in the Philippines from the time of the
organization of the judiciary ..
One of a sheriff s principal functions is to execute final judgments
and orders. The Rules of Court require the writs of execution to
issue to him, directing him to enforce such judgments and orders
in the manner therein provided (Rule 39). The mode of
enforcement varies according to the nature of the judgment to be
carried out: whether it be against property of the judgment
debtor in his hands or in the hands of a third person i e. money
judgment), or for the sale of property, real or personal (i.e.
foreclosure of mortgage) or the delivery thereof, etc. (sec. 8, Rule
39).
Under sec. 15 of the same Rule, the sheriff is empowered to levy
on so much of the judgment debtor's property as may be
sufficient to enforce the money judgment and sell these
properties at public auction after due notice to satisfy the
adjudged amount. It is the sheriff who, after the auction sale,
conveys to the purchaser the property thus sold (secs. 25, 26, 27,
Rule 39), and pays the judgment creditor so much of the
proceeds as will satisfy the judgment. When the property sold by
him on execution is an immovable which consequently gives rise
to a light of redemption on the part of the judgment debtor and

others (secs. 29, 30, Rule 39), it is to him (or to the purchaser or
redemptioner that the payments may be made by those declared
by law as entitled to redeem (sec. 31, Rule 39); and in this
situation, it becomes his duty to accept payment and execute the
certificate of redemption. It is also to the sheriff that "written
notice of any redemption must be given and a duplicate filed with
the registrar of deeds of the province, and if any assessments or
taxes are paid by the redemptioner or if he has or acquires any
lien other than that upon which the redemption was made, notice
thereof must in like manner be given to the officer and filed with
the registrar of deeds," the effect of failure to file such notice
being that redemption may be made without paying such
assessments, taxes, or liens.
The sheriff may likewise be appointed a receiver of the property
of the judgment debtor where the appointment of the receiver is
deemed necessary for the execution of the judgment (sec. 32,
Rule 39). At any time before the sale of property on execution,
the judgment debtor may prevent the sale by paying the sheriff
the amount required by the execution and the costs that have
been incurred therein (sec. 20, Rule 39).
The sheriff is also authorized to receive payments on account of
the judgment debt tendered by "a person indebted to the
judgment debtor," and his "receipt shall be a sufficient discharge
for the amount so paid or directed to be credited by the judgment
creditor on the execution" (sec. 41, Rule 39).
Now, obviously, the sheriff s sale extinguishes the liability of the
judgment debtor either in fun, if the price paid by the highest
bidder is equal to, or more than the amount of the judgment
or pro tanto if the price fetched at the sale be less. Such
extinction is not in any way dependent upon the judgment
creditor's receiving the amount realized, so that the conversion or
embezzlement of the proceeds of the sale by the sheriff does not
revive the judgment debt or render the judgment creditor liable
anew therefor.
So, also, the taking by the sheriff of, say, personal property from
the judgment debtor for delivery to the judgment creditor, in
fulfillment of the verdict against him, extinguishes the debtor's
liability; and the conversion of said property by the sheriff, does
not make said debtor responsible for replacing the property or
paying the value thereof.
In the instances where the Rules allow or direct payments to be
made to the sheriff, the payments may be made by check, but it
goes without saying that if the sheriff so desires, he may require
payment to be made in lawful money. If he accepts the check, he
places himself in a position where he would be liable to the
judgment creditor if any damages are suffered by the latter as a
result of the medium in which payment was made (Javellana v.
Mirasol, et al., 40 Phil. 761). The validity of the payment made by
the judgment debtor, however, is in no wise affected and the
latter is discharged from his obligation to the judgment creditor
as of the moment the check issued to the sheriff is encashed and
the proceeds are received by Id. office. The issuance of the check
to a person authorized to receive it (Art. 1240, Civil Code; See. 46
of the Code of Civil Procedure; Enage v. Vda y Hijos de Escano, 38
Phil. 657, cited in Javellana v. Mirasol, 40 Phil. 761) operates to
release the judgment debtor from any further obligations on the
judgment.
The sheriff is an adjunct of the court; a court functionary whose
competence involves both discretion and personal liability
(concurring opinion of J. Fernando, citing Uy Piaoco v. Osmena, 9
Phil. 299, in Bagatsing v. Herrera, 65 SCRA 434). Being an officer
of the court and acting within the scope of his authorized
functions, the sheriff s receipt of the checks in payment of the
judgment execution, may be deemed, in legal contemplation, as
received by the court itself (Lara v. Bayona, 10 May 1955, No. L10919).

That the sheriff functions as a conduit of the court is further

underscored by the fact that one of the requisites for
appointment to the office is the execution of a bond, "conditioned
(upon) the faithful performance of his (the appointee's) duties ..
for the delivery or payment to Government, or the person entitled
thereto, of all properties or sums of money that shall officially
come into his hands" (sec. 330, Revised Administrative Code).
There is no question that the checks came into the sheriffs
possession in his official capacity. The court may require of the
judgment debtor, in complying with the judgment, no further
burden than his vigilance in ensuring that the person he is paying
money or delivering property to is a person authorized by the
court to receive it. Beyond this, further expectations become
unreasonable. To my mind, a proposal that would make the
judgment debtor unqualifiedly the insurer of the judgment
creditor's entitlement to the judgment amount which is really
what this case is all about begs the question.
That the checks were made out in the sheriffs name (a practice,
by the way, of long and common acceptance) is of little
consequence if juxtaposed with the extent of the authority
explicitly granted him by law as the officer entrusted with the
power to execute and implement court judgments. The sheriffs
requirement that the checks in payment of the judgment debt be
issued in his name was simply an assertion of that authority; and
PAL's compliance cannot in the premises be faulted merely
because of the sheriffs subsequent malfeasance in absconding
with the payment instead of turning it over to the judgment
creditor.
If payment had been in cash, no question about its validity or of
the authority and duty of the sheriff to accept it in settlement of
PAL's judgment obligation would even have arisen. Simply
because it was made by checks issued in the sheriff s name does
not warrant reaching any different conclusion.
As payment to the court discharges the judgment debtor from his
responsibility on the judgment, so too must payment to the
person designated by such court and authorized to act in its
behalf, operate to produce the same effect.
It is unfortunate and deserving of commiseration that Amelia Tan
was deprived of what was adjudged to her when the sheriff
misappropriated the payment made to him by PAL in dereliction
of his sworn duties. But I submit that her remedy lies, not here
and in reviving liability under a judgment already lawfully
satisfied, but elsewhere.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to grant the petition.