ANTICHRESIS

Article 2132. By the contract of antichresis the creditor acquires the right to receive the fruits of
an immovable of his debtor, with the obligation to apply them to the payment of the interest, if
owing, and thereafter to the principal of his credit. (1881)
Article 2133. The actual market value of the fruits at the time of the application thereof to the
interest and principal shall be the measure of such application. (n)
Article 2134. The amount of the principal and of the interest shall be specified in writing;
otherwise, the contract of antichresis shall be void. (n)
Article 2135. The creditor, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary, is obliged to pay the
taxes and charges upon the estate.
He is also bound to bear the expenses necessary for its preservation and repair.
The sums spent for the purposes stated in this article shall be deducted from the fruits. (1882)
Article 2136. The debtor cannot reacquire the enjoyment of the immovable without first having
totally paid what he owes the creditor.
But the latter, in order to exempt himself from the obligations imposed upon him by the
preceding article, may always compel the debtor to enter again upon the enjoyment of the
property, except when there is a stipulation to the contrary. (1883)
Article 2137. The creditor does not acquire the ownership of the real estate for non-payment of
the debt within the period agreed upon.
Every stipulation to the contrary shall be void. But the creditor may petition the court for the
payment of the debt or the sale of the real property. In this case, the Rules of Court on the
foreclosure of mortgages shall apply. (1884a)
Article 2138. The contracting parties may stipulate that the interest upon the debt be
compensated with the fruits of the property which is the object of the antichresis, provided that if
the value of the fruits should exceed the amount of interest allowed by the laws against usury,
the excess shall be applied to the principal. (1885a)
Article 2139. The last paragraph of article 2085, and articles 2089 to 2091 are applicable to this
contract. (1886a)

Antichresis, concept
A contract whereby the creditor acquires the right to receive the fruits of an immovable of
his debtor, with the obligation to apply them to the payment of the interest, and thereafter to the
principal of his credit. (Art. 2132)

Characteristics of antichresis
1.
Accessory - it is a contract that is dependent upon another for its existence.
2.
Formal it must be in writing; the amount of the principal and of the interest shall be in
writing, otherwise the contract of antichresis is void. (Art. 2134)
3.
Nominate it has a special name under the law.
4.
Real right it creates a lien on immovable property.
5.
Real property it is a real property by itself.
6.
Indivisible it subsists as long as the principal obligation remains unpaid. (Art. 2089,
2139)
Requisites of antichresis
1.
That it be constituted to secure the fulfilment of a principal obligation. (Art. 2085, 2139)
A contract of antichresis may secure all kinds of obligations, be they pure or subject to a
resolutory or suspensive condition. (Art. 2091, 2139)
2.
That the debtor be the absolute owner of the immovable property.
Nonetheless, a third person, not a party to the principal obligation, may be the owner of
the immovable given as security. (Art. 2085, 2139)
3.
That the debtor must have the free disposal of such immovable property, and in the
absence thereof, that he be duly authorized for the purpose.
4.
That the amount of the principal and the interest must be in writing; otherwise, the
antichresis is void. (Art. 2134)
Measure of application of fruits
The actual market value of the fruits at the time of application thereof to the interest and
principal shall be the measure of such application. (Art. 2133)
Obligations of the creditor
1.
To pay the taxes and charges upon the immovable, unless there is a stipulation to the
contrary.
2.
To bear the expenses necessary for its preservation and repair.
Application of the fruits of the immovable (Art. 2135, 2138)
1.
The taxes and charges upon the immovable.
2.
The expenses for the preservation and repair.
3.
Interest on the principal obligation.
4.
Principal obligation.
When debtor can reacquire enjoyment of the property. (Art. 2136)
1.
Upon full payment of his obligation to the creditor.
2.
When he is compelled by the creditor to enter into the enjoyment of the property, unless
there is stipulation to the contrary.
This right is available to the creditor if he desires to exempt himself form the obligation to
pay the taxes and charges upon the property and the expenses for its preservation and repair.

Effect of non-payment of the debt within the period agreed upon. (Art. 2137)
The creditor does not acquire ownership of the immovable for non-payment of the debt
within the period agreed upon. Any stipulation to the contrary is void.
In case of non-payment, the creditor shall have the following remedies:
1.
To petition the court for the payment of the debt.
2.
To sell the immovable.
The provisions of the Rules of Court on foreclosures of mortgages shall apply. In case of
any deficiency in the foreclosure sale, the creditor can recover the deficiency.

1.

Barreto vs Barreto

2.

Adrid vs Morga

3.

Rosales vs Tansenco

4.

Legaspi vs Celestial

5.

Pando vs Giminez

6.

Ramirez & Bonifacio vs. CA & Medina

7.
8.
9.
10.

Diego vs. Francisco

Kasilag vs. Rodriguez
Acme Shoe, Rubber and Plastic Corporation v. CA
Escay vs. Court of Appeals

11.

Adriano Mendoza vs. Francisca De Guia

12.

MATEO DISTOR vs. GREGORIO DORADO and ROSALIA ARROYO

13.

FELIXBERTO MEDEL and PRISCO JOJUYCO vs. HON. BERNABE DE AQUINO

14.

AGUSTIN ALDEA vs. INOCENTES FUENTES

15.

AUGUSTO COSIO and BEATRIZ DE RAMA vs. CHERIE PALILEO

16.

HILARIO RAMIREZ and VALENTINA BONIFACIO

17.

RAYMUNDO TANSIOCO vs. FELICIANO RAMOSO

18.

MARCELO G. VAZQUEZ vs. AGATA TACSAGON VDA. DE ABKILAN.

19.

SALVACION A. CATANGCATANG vs. PAULINO LEGAYADA

20.

JUAN CRUZ, JR vs. CRISANTO DIAZ

21.

Alberto Barreto vs. Leonardo Barreto

FACTS:
After the death of Juan Antonio Barretto, Sr., his son Juan Antonio Barreto Jr., in his own behalf
and as the executor of his father, mortgaged, the cultivated half of said hacienda in favor of
Antonio Vicente Barretto as security for the amount of P11,000 which the latter loaned to him.
By verbal agreement, Antonio will collect his credit from the products of the property. His three
children and heirs Antonio Ma Barretto, Ricardo Esteban Barretto, and Guadalupe Barretto
came to succeed after the death of Antonio.
Guadalupe made a donation inter vivos in favor of the plaintiff Alberto Barretto of the undivided
one-third part of the hypothecary credit and of the rights belonging to her deceased father
Antonio Vicente Barretto, assigning to the donee all the rights and actions which she might have
in the foreclosure proceedings exhibited at the trial of the present action, on the condition that
as soon as the donee Alberto Barretto could collect the said one-third part of the credit or should
obtain the assignment of the property of the debtor, he would divide what was donated, into nine
equal parts among the donee himself and six living brothers and the heirs of their two brothers
now dead, each receiving one-ninth part.
Alberto Barretto, complying with the condition imposed in said document of the donation paid to
each of his brothers and nephews, and in exchange for the sums received as such price his codonees assigned and conveyed to him one-eight part of the third of the said hacienda and
whatever rights and interests the grantors might have by virtue of the said donation in favor of
the plaintiff Barretto.

It is to be noted that the plaintiff bought one-eight undivided part of the third of the whole
hacienda of Balintagac and paid to every claimant the price of the eight part sold to him. The
third part of the ownership of the hacienda was transferred to the plaintiff by the donor
Guadalupe Barretto.
Antonio and Ricardo, as grantors, sold and conveyed all their rights and actions included and
derived from the said hypothecary credit for the price of P14,000 which would be paid by the
grantee and vendee by instalments and in the manner prescribed in the said deed, assigning to
him, besides, all the rights which the said brothers had over the two-third parts of the said
hacienda.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a transfer of ownership to Alberto.
RULING:
No. the plaintiff did not obtain by assignment, sale, or transfer, as expressed in said deeds, the
ownership of the said hacienda of Balintagac, but only the hypothecary credit which the heirs of
the deceased creditor Antonio Vicente Barretto had inherited from the latter, after the plaintiff
had obtained from his other brothers the conveyance of their respective rights to the donation.
The rights acquired by the creditor were transmitted by hereditary title through operation of law
to the heirs of the same Antonio MA, Ricardo Esteban, and Guadalupe, Barretto y Rocha and
these in turn assigned, sold and transferred the credit with all their rights as hypothecary
creditors, as well as the right to the usufruct of all the hacienda of Balintagac to the plaintiff
Alberto Barretto.
When in the record of an action it is fully established that the parties indebted in a certain
amount, which is secured with a mortgage over of their hacienda, having delivered to the
creditor not only the mortgaged half but the whole hacienda, not in the nature of an assignment
of property in payment of a debt, still unpaid, but with the object that the creditor may collect by
means of usufruct his credit and the interest agreed upon, the verbal contract which is inferred
from such facts and presumed to have been entered into between the parties, although not set
in any document, deserves in law the name of antichresis as defined in Article 1881 of the Civil
Code.
By the antichresis a creditor acquires a right to receive the fruits of real property of his
debtor, with the obligation to apply them to the payment of the interest, if due, and
afterwards to the principal of his credit.

The creditor in antichresis cannot by mere possession of the real property which he received by
virtue of an antichresis acquire ownership over the same for failure of the debtor to pay the debt
within the stipulated time, any agreement to the contrary being void; and the debtor on his part
cannot recover the enjoyment and use of the real property given in antichresis to the creditor,
without having previously paid the latter all his debt and interests thereon, the creditor being
entitled to ask the courts that the said real property be sold to satisfy his credit.
With regard to prescription, the creditor in antichresis can never by prescription acquire the
ownership of the real property received in antichresis, as he entered into the possession of the
same not as an owner but as a creditor with right only to collect his credit from the fruits of said
real property.
The extinguishment of the right as creditor and the termination of his use and possession of the
real property given in antichresis depend upon the full payment of the debt and its interests,
after the liquidation of the amounts entered on the account of the debtors and received by the
creditor.
Adrid vs Morga
FACTS:
Sps Adrid executed a sale with a right to repurchase in favor of Morga over their lot. Sps Adrid
never repurchased the same. Later on they brought an action to recover the lot contending that
such agreement had been converted into one of antichresis considering that Morga took
possession of the same and benefited himself of the yearly harvest of palay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the agreement had been converted into an antichresis.
RULING:
No. There is nothing in the document or in the acts of the parties subsequent to its execution to
show that the parties had entered into a contract of antichresis. In the case of Alojado vs. Lim
Siongco, 51 Phil., 339 this Court said:
What characterizes a contract of antichresis is that the creditor acquires the right to receive the
fruits of the property of his debtor with the obligation to apply them to the payment of interest, if
any is due, and then to the principal of his credit, and when such a covenant is not made in the
contract which speaks unequivocally of a sale with right of repurchase, the contract is a sale
with the right to repurchase and not an antichresis.

The agreement was in fact an equitable mortgage. The lot was given as security for Sps. Adrids
loan. Adrid also paid for the real estate tax.
Rosales vs Tansenco
FACTS:
Congzon, thru fraud and without consideration, was made by Tansenco to execute a mortgage
in favor of Tan Sun on a piece of land owned by him (Congzon). Tan Sun then transferred all his
rights to Tan Tay Sun, who, in turn, assigned such to Tansenco. Congzon never enjoyed the
possession and fruits of the land. He also paid for the taxes, the amount of which is much more
than that of the credit of Tan Sun secured by the mortgage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was in fact a contract of antichresis.
RULING:
Yes. In a contract of antichresis the creditor is obliged to pay the taxes on the property, unless
the contract says otherwise (Art. 1882 Civil Code). The contract between Congzon and Tan Sun
said nothing about taxes. Hence it was the obligation of the creditor or creditors to pay the taxes
on the property at issue herein.
Bearing in mind that the credit was only P26,000 it is plain to see that Congzon et al affirmed in
effect that they had already discharged their debt (by advancing the taxes which the creditor
should have paid) and are entitled to the return of their property free from all encumbrance.
Legaspi vs Celestial
FACTS:
Legaspi et al brought an action against Celestial to pay a certain obligation plus the interests.
Celestial, contends, among others, that the contract entered into between them was an
antichresis, thus, Legaspi et al are bound to render an account of the products.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract was an antichresis.
RULING:
No. It was a mortgage. It appears therefore that the debtor, instead of paying a certain per cent
of the principal of the loan as compensation for the sacrifice made by the creditors in depriving
themselves of the use of their principal and the enjoyment of its fruits, so as to give them to the
debtor, has delivered to them the property constituted as a security for the payment of the loan,
so that they may administer and use it, enjoying its fruits, by way of compensation for their said
sacrifice in lending said debtor their money. Therefore, the contracts, which are the subject

matter of this action, have all the essential requsites of a mortgage, enumerated in article 1857
of the Civil Code and, consequently, are mortgage contracts.
When a contract of loan with security does not stipulate the payment of interest but provides for
the delivery to the creditor by the debtor of the real property constituted as security for the
payment thereof, in order that the creditor may administer the same and avail himself of its
fruits, without stating that said fruits are to be applied to the payment of interest, if any, and
afterwards to that of the principal of the credit, the contract shall be considered to be one of
mortgage and not of antichresis.

Pando vs Giminez
FACTS:
Gimenez was indebted to Pando. Such indebtedness was secured by a mortgage over his
house and the leasehold right on the lot on which the house was erected. Because Gimenez
was to leave Manila, he gave Pando the full control and possession of the property including the
payment of taxes and monthly rentals and the collection of the rents from the tenants, among
others. Pando failed to pay the taxes, as a result of which, such was sold at public auction.
Pando denies liability alleging that his responsibility was confined only in the collection of rents
and applying them to the payment of the interest of the mortgage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Pando was duty bound to pay for the taxes, among others.
RULING:
Yes. The administration of the property in question assumed by Pando is antichretic in
character, and therefore justice and equity demand that application be here made of the Civil
Code provisions touching the obligations of the antichretic creditor (Art. 1882, Civil Code.).
Failure to fulfill his obligation to pay the tax and the rent of the lot, the law requires him to pay for
indemnity of damages. (Art. 101, NCC).
(Art. 1882, Civil Code.)
The creditor is obliged to pay the taxes and charges which burden the estate, in the absence of
an agreement to the contrary.
He shall also be obliged to pay any expenses necessary for its preservation and repair.
Any sums he may expend for such purposes shall be chargeable against the fruits. (Art. 1882,
Civil Code.)

These obligations arise from the very nature of the covenant, and are correlated with the
plaintiffs acquired right to take charge of the property and collect the fruits for himself. Hence,
the illustrious Manresa, explains the basis of this article 1882 in the following terms:
The right which the creditor acquires by virtue of antichresis to enjoy the fruits of the property
delivered to him, carries two obligations which are a necessary consequence of the contract,
because they arise from its very nature.

Ramirez & Bonifacio vs. CA & Medina

FACTS:
A decree of registration over a lot was issued in favor of Ramirez & Bonifacio on the ground of
prescription. Medina et al, however, moved for the cancellation of such on the ground of fraud,
alleging that they are the real owners of the lot and that Ramirez & Bonifacio were mere
antichretic as a result of a loan contracted by them (Medina et al) secured by such lot.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ramirez & Bonifacio, the antichretic creditors, may acquire the lot in question
through prescription.
RULING:
No. The antichretic creditor cannot ordinarily acquire by prescription the land surrendered to him
by the debtor. The petitioners are not possessors in the concept of owner but mere holders
placed in possession of the land by its owners. Thus, their possession cannot serve as a title for
acquiring dominion (See Art. 540, Civil Code).
Diego vs. Francisco
FACTS:
The defendant executed a deed of mortgage in favor of the plaintiff over two parcels of land
registered in his name, to secure a loan THAT WAS TO HAVE NO INTEREST. After this,
possession was turned over to the mortgagee.- The debtor was unable to pay the loan, leading
plaintiff Diego to file an action for foreclosure of mortgage.- Defense: The true transaction was
that of antichresis; the plaintiff received120 cavans of palay as security, which at the rate of
P10/cavan would fulfill his obligation.- RTC: It was a mortgage. There was nothing that showed
otherwise in spite of the turn over provision and the possibility of intent that the mortgagee
would just collect the fruits.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract was an antichretic contract.

RULING:
No. It was a contract of mortgage.- Antichresis must be expressly stipulated. It must stipulate
that the creditor in possession of the properties given as security is to apply the fruits for
the payment of interest and later, credit. This is in spite of the 'no interest' or 'take possession'
stipulations.- However, this does not mean that the mortgagee can appropriate them for himself
without accounting for them to the appellant. This type of mortgage is imposed with one of the
obligations of the antichretic creditor, which is to account for the value of the fruits before final
rppropriation.
Kasilag vs. Rodriguez
FACTS:
This is an appeal taken by the defendant-petitioner (Kasilag) from the decision of the Court of
Appeals which modified that rendered by the court of First Instance of Bataan. The said court
held that the contract is entirely null and void and without effect; that the plaintiffs-respondents
(Rodriguez, et.al.), then appellants, are the owners of the disputed land, with its improvements,
in common ownership with their brother Gavino Rodriguez, hence, they are entitled to the
possession thereof; that the defendant-petitioner should yield possession of the land in their
favor, with all the improvements thereon and free from any lien.
The parties entered into a contract of loan to which has an accompanying accessory contract of
mortgage. The executed the accessory contract involved the improvements on a piece land, the
land having been acquired by means of homestead. Petitioner for his part accepted the contract
of mortgage. Believing that there are no violations to the prohibitions in the alienation of lands
Petitioner, acting in good faith took possession of the land. To wit, the Petitioner has no
knowledge that the enjoyment of the fruits of the land is an element of the credit transaction of
antichresis.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the principal contract entered into is null and void.
Whether or not the subsequent contract is null and void.
Whether or not the Kasilag is a possessor in good faith of the land.
RULING:
The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is to the effect that the intention of the
contracting parties should always prevail because their will has the force of law between them.
Article 1281 (now Art. 1370) of the Civil Code consecrates this rule and provides, that if the
terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties,
the literal sense of its stipulations shall be followed; and if the words appear to be contrary to the

evident intention of the contracting parties, the intention shall prevail. The contract should be
interpreted in accordance with these rules. As the terms thereof are clear and leave no room for
doubt, it should be interpreted according to the literal meaning of its clauses.
The words used by the contracting parties in the contract clearly show that they intended to
enter into the principal contract of loan in the amount of P1,000, with interest at 12 per cent per
annum, and into the accessory contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired
as homestead, the parties having moreover, agreed upon the pacts and conditions stated in the
deed. In other words, the parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on
the land acquired as homestead, to secure the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 and the
stipulated interest thereon.
Another fundamental rule in the interpretation of contracts, not less important than those
indicated, is to the effect that the terms, clauses and conditions contrary to law, morals and
public order should be separated from the valid and legal contract and when such separation
can be made because they are independent of the valid contract which expresses the will of the
contracting parties.
Principal contract is that of loan and the accessory that of mortgage of the improvements upon
the land acquired as a homestead. There is no question that the first of these contract is valid as
it is not against the law.
Parties entered into another verbal contract whereby the petitioner was authorized to take
possession of the land, to receive the fruits thereof and to introduce improvements thereon,
provided that he would renounce the payment of stipulated interest and he would assume
payment of the land tax. The possession by the petitioner and his receipt of the fruits of the
land, considered as integral elements of the contract of antichresis, are illegal and void
agreements because the contract of antichresis is a lien and such is expressly prohibited by
section 116 of Act No. 2874.
Despite the foregoing, SC found the defendant-petitioner Kasilag as a possessor of the land in
good faith. Sec 433 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides Every person who is unaware
of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated shall be
deemed a possessor of good faith. And in this case, the petitioner acted in good faith. Good
faith maybe a basis of excusable ignorance of the law, the petitioner acted in good faith in his
enjoyment of the fruits of the land to which was done through his apparent acquisition thereof.

Acme Shoe, Rubber and Plastic Corporation v. CA

G.R. No. 103576, Aug. 22, 1996
FACTS:
Chua Pac, president and general manager of Acme Shoe, Rubber and Plastic Corporation,
executed a chattel mortgage in favor of Producers Bank of the Philippines, as a security for
a corporate loan in the amount of P3M. The chattel mortgage contained a clause that provided
for the mortgage to stand as security for all other obligations contracted before, during and after
the constitution of the mortgage.
The P3M was paid. Subsequently, the corporation obtained additional
financial accommodations totalling P2.7M. This was also paid on the due date. Again, the bank
extended another loan to the corporation in the amount of P1M, covered by four promissory
notes. However, the corporation was unable to pay this at maturity. Thereupon, the bank applied
for an extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage.
For its part, the corporation filed an action for injunction with prayer for damages. The lower
court ultimately dismissed the case and ordered the extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage.
ISSUES:
Whether or not extra-judicial foreclosure of the chattel mortgage is proper.
If not proper, whether or not the corporation is entitled to damages as a result of the extrajudicial foreclosure.
RULING:
Contracts of security are either personal or real. In contracts of personal security, such as a
guaranty or surety ship, the faithful performance of the obligation by the principal debtor is
secured by the personal commitment of another (the guarantor or surety). In contracts of real
security, such as a pledge, a mortgage or an antichresis, that fulfillment is secured by an
encumbrance of property -- in pledge, the placing of movable property in the possession of the
creditor; in chattel mortgage by the execution of the corresponding and substantially in the form
prescribed by law; in real estate mortgage, by the execution of a public instrument encumbering
the real property covered thereby; and in antichresis, by a written instrument granting to the
creditor the right to receive the fruits of an immovable property with the obligation to apply such

fruits to the payment of interest, if owing, and thereafter to the principal of his credit -- upon the
essential condition that if the obligation becomes due and the debtor defaults, then the property
encumbered can be alienated for the payment of the obligation, but that should the obligation be
duly paid, then the contract is automatically extinguished proceeding from the accessory
character of the agreement. As the law so puts it, once the obligation is complied with, then the
contract of security becomes, ipso facto, null and void.
After-incurred Obligations
While a pledge, real estate mortgage, or antichresis may exceptionally secure afterincurred obligations so long as these future debts are accurately described, a chattel mortgage,
however, can only cover obligations existing at the time the mortgage is constituted. Although a
promise expressed in a chattel mortgage to include debts that are yet to be contracted can be a
binding commitment that can be compelled upon, the security itself, however, does not come
into existence or arise until after a chattel mortgage agreement covered the newly contracted
debt is executed either by concluding a fresh chattel mortgage or by amending the old contract
conformably with the Chattel Mortgage Law. Refusal on the part of borrower to execute the
agreement so as to cover the after-incurred obligation can constitute as an act of default on the
part of the borrower of the financing agreement wherein the promise is written, but, of course,
the remedy of foreclosure can only cover the debts extant at the time of constitution and during
the life of the chattel mortgage sought to be foreclosed.
In the case at bar, the chattel mortgage was terminated when payment for the P3M loan was
made so there was no chattel mortgage to even foreclose at the time the bank instituted the
extra-judicial foreclosure.
Damages
In its complaint, the corporation asked for moral damages sustained "as a result of the unlawful
action taken by the respondent bank against it." The court said -"Moral damages are granted in recompense for physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury. A corporation, being an artificial person and having existence only in legal

contemplation, has no feelings, no emotions, no senses; therefore it cannot experience physical

suffering and mental anguish. Mental suffering can be experienced only by one having a
nervous system and it flows from real ills and sorrows and griefs of life -- all of which cannot be
suffered by respondent bank as an artificial person.
"Although Chua Pac was included in the case, he was only so named as a party in
representation of the corporation."

Escay vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-37504
December 18, 1974
FACTS:
Emilio and Jose Escay (now deceased) were brothers. In his lifetime, Emilio mortgaged his
properties now in question to the Philippine National Bank. He died in 1924 before he could pay
his obligation with the bank which had mounted. The back then filed in 1930 a foreclosure suit
against the estate of Emilio represented by the administrator, Atty. Eduardo Arboleda. Pending
the suit, on April 28, 1933 a contract here after referred to as original contract was entered
among the Philippine National Bank, Jose Escay Sr. and the administrator, Atty. Arboleda under
which Jose assumed the mortgage indebtedness of his brother Emilio, in her own behalf and as
a guardian ad litem of their children. When it was discovered that the consideration of his
assumption of the mortgage indebtedness of Emilio (subject to the right of repurchase of the
heirs) within 5 years after the mortgage had been fully paid. A supplementary contract was
entered into among the PNB, the administrator, Atty. Arboleda and Escay, Sr. This was approved
by the probate court taking cognizance of the estate of the deceased Emilio Escay in its order of
February 24, 1934. In 1941, Magdalena Vda. de Escay, Roberto and the other children filed a
complaint against Jose Escay, Jr. and Atty. Arboleda for the recovery of the ownership and
possession of the properties in question.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Vda. de Escay entitled for the recovery of the ownership and possession of
properties in question?
RULING:

No. All the findings of fact by the Court of Appeals were supported by evidence and in any event
there was no grave abuse of discretion by the Court of Appeals in arriving at its findings. The
deed of conveyance and the supplementary contract are not antichretic contracts. It was a sale
and a transfer of property from the debtor to a buyer who in consideration thereof, assumed the
obligation of the debtor to the creditor. Jose Escay Sr. did not become the creditor of the estate.
He became the debtor of the PNB. Neither did he become a creditor of the estate of Emilio
Escay by virtue of supplementary contract. Jose Escay Sr. became the owner of the properties,
subject only to the right of estate or the heirs to repurchase the same within 5 years after Jose
Escay Sr have completely paid the debts to the Bank.

ADRIANO MENDOZA vs. FRANCISCA DE GUIA

G.R. No. L-1628
November 9, 1949
FACTS:
In the year 1920 appellant borrowed from appellee P1,200, with which he purchased a parcel of
land containing a fishpond, situated in the municipality of Noveleta, Cavite. To guarantee the
payment of the loan appellant mortgaged the said land to appellate. The land was gradually
improved and converted into a fishpond and salt beds. To defray the cost of the improvements
appellee advanced additional sums to appellant which, together with the original amount of
P1,200, reached the total of P6,646.52 by the middle of 1930.
On October 21, 1929, appellant executed a notarial document in favor of appellee whereby he
delivered to the latter the possession of the land in question with the stipulation that appellee
shall administer and exploit the fishpond and salt beds for a period of five years and deliver to
appellant one-third of the produce thereof. This document is known in the record as Exhibit H.
One June 11, 1930, another document, Exhibit A-1, was executed by appellant in favor of
appellee wherein he stated the following: That he is the owner of the land in question, described
in original certificates of title No. 1133 of the office of the register of deeds of Cavite; that on April
17, 1920, he executed a mortgage in favor of appellee to guarantee payment of an
indebtedness of P1,200 plus what he might spend for the improvements of said land; that up to
said date he not only had not paid any amount on account of said indebtedness but had
obtained from appellee various additional sums of money which, together with the origin
amount, aggregated P6,646.52, all of which had been invested in the improvement of said land;
that the original mortgage of April 17, 1920, had not been registered; and that to guarantee the

payment of said indebtedness of P6,646.52 within five years from June 11, 1930, he conveyed
by way of mortgage all his right, title, interest, and participation in and to the said parcel of land
in favor of appellee.
In the meantime the appellee continued in possession of the land in question under the contract
Exhibit H. Appellant was unable to pay the mortgage within the period therein stipulated. In
1936, when appellee demanded payment, appellant "confessed that he could not pay for lack of
funds and authorized plaintiff (appellee) to continue in possession of the property, pursuant to
Exhibit H, and to apply his share of one-third of the products on account of his debt." In 1939
appellant dispossessed appellee of the property, and the present action was then commenced
by appellee to foreclose the mortgage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, with the elimination of Exhibit H, Exhibit A-1 would in effect become a contract
of antichresis and all the harvests obtained by appellee from the land mortgaged should be
applied to the payment of appellant's indebtedness.
RULING:
No. Article 1204 of the Civil Code provides: "In order that an obligation may be extinguished by
another which substitutes it, it shall be necessary that it be so declared expressly, or that the old
and new obligations be incompatible in every respect." Thus an obligation may be extinguished
through novation either expressly or impliedly.
There is nothing in Exhibit A-1 which expressly revokes, or in any way refers to, Exhibit H.
Neither do we find an implied revocation of Exhibit H by Exhibit A-1. We agree with the Court of
Appeals that there is no incompatibility between these two documents. The fact that at the time
the mortgage Exhibit A-1 was executed in mortgagee was in possession of the mortgaged
property under the contract Exhibit H, whereby the creditor-mortgagee was to administer and
exploit said property and deliver one-third of the produce to the debtor-mortgagor, did not cancel
the previous contract Exhibit H and convert the contract of mortgage Exhibit A-1 into a contract
of antichresis. As a matter of fact, after the execution of Exhibit A-1 appellee continued to deliver
to appellant one-third of the produce of the land until the year 1936, when appellant, according
to the Court of Appeals, authorized appellee "to continue in possession of the property, pursuant
to Exhibit H, and apply his share of one-third of the products on account of his debt." It was only
then (1936), therefore, that the mortgage became in a way antichresis in the sense that the
debtor's one-third participation in the fruits of the property was to be applied to the payment of
the loan.
Appellant contends that since there was no express agreement as to interest appellee was not
entitled to it, and that therefore all the fruits of the land should be applied to the payment of the

principal. This contention is devoid of merit both in law and in equity. In granting to appellee twothirds of the produce of the land by means of Exhibit H, appellant must have taken into
consideration the fact that he was not paying any interest on the capital furnished by appellee
and invested in the purchase and improvement of said land.

MATEO DISTOR vs. GREGORIO DORADO and ROSALIA ARROYO

G.R. No. 21587
September 13, 1924
FACTS:
The plaintiff prays that he be declared owner of the four parcels of land described in his
complaint and that the defendants be sentenced to return them to the plaintiff, or to pay him the
sum of P31,800 as damages, plus P3,300 every year he fails to receive the product thereof, and
P7,950 as attorney's fee.
That on or about March 4, 1917, the plaintiff mortgaged said parcels of land to the deceased
Angel Distor for 638 cavans and 15 gantas of palay, it having been stipulated that he could
redeem them at any time from the aforesaid date, but must make the redemption within six
years from March 4, 1917, the date of the document, otherwise the plaintiff shall become bound
to pay double the amount for which the property was given as security, that is to say,
1,217 cavans and 5 gantas, one-half of this amount being interest for the six years within which
he failed to redeem. Another condition of said mortgage is that the plaintiff should remain in
order that he might pay the mortgage debt with their products; but the aforesaid Angel Distor,
taking advantage of plaintiff's ignorance of the Spanish language, drew or caused to be drawn a
deed or mortgage in Spanish, wherein he stated, or caused to be stated, that he should have
the usufruct of the aforesaid parcels of land for six years the plaintiff could not redeem them,
both of which conditions are contrary to the true agreement had between the parties the
plaintiff and the deceased.
That said deceased, Angel Distor, succeeded in causing the plaintiff to sign said document of
mortgage because he made the latter believe that he could redeem the four parcels of land at
any time and that said plaintiff would remain in the possession and enjoyment thereof in
accordance with what was really stipulated between them; for had he known at or prior to
signing said document that he could not redeem them within six years from the aforesaid date
and that the said deceased should have the usufruct thereof during the time they were not
redeemed, said plaintiff would not have affixed his signature to said document.
That said deed or mortgage is in the hands and possession of the defendant administrators and
is a part of the evidence of the plaintiff.

That the 630 cavans and 15 gantas of palay for which said four parcels of land were mortgaged
were and are the aggregate of the principal, which is one-half, and the interest, which is the
other half, of said quantity of palay.
That the aforesaid deceased, Angel Distor, by virtue of said deed of mortgage, unlawfully and
without justifiable motive, took possession of the aforesaid parcels of land in or about the middle
of March, 1917, and continued in the possession and enjoyment thereof until his death, having
disposed of and appropriated all their products during said period of time notwithstanding the
several demands made upon him by the plaintiff to let him redeem the aforesaid four parcels
and to return said products to him.
The trial court rendered judgment, absolving the defendants from the complaint with the costs
against the plaintiff on the ground that the latter had not established by a preponderance of
evidence the allegations contained in the complaint.
Now the appellant prays for a reversal of the judgment appealed from, assigning thirteen errors
in his typewritten brief.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract Exhibit A is a contract of antichresis.
RULING:
Yes. In view of the phraseology used in said exhibit, we are inclined to hold that said exhibit
expresses a contract of antichresis, as contended by the appellant, for the debtor delivered his
lands to the creditor in order that the latter might enjoy their fruits, without obligation on the part
of the former to pay interest upon his debt. But according to the exhibit itself, the debtor, that is
the plaintiff, cannot redeem the property given in antichresis until after six years from March 4,
1917.
There is no use entering upon a detailed discussion of the errors assigned by the appellant, for
the reason that, after examining the evidence introduced in this case, we have reached the
conclusion that the plaintiff has not successfully proven the allegations of the complaint as to the
machinations imputed to the creditor in the drawing of Exhibit A, nor as to the damages and
attorney's fee claimed by him.
The contract Exhibit A being valid, is binding between the contracting parties and their heirs.
The judgment appealed from is, therefore, affirmed with the costs against the appellant; it being
understood that to avoid unnecessary litigations, and it appearing from Exhibit A, that, upon the
date of the return of the record to the court of origin, the six years stipulated by the contracting
parties shall have elapsed, and in view of the statement contained in the last page of appellee's
brief that they have no objection to it, the appellant may recover from the defendants the lands
claimed by him upon delivering the 638 cavans and 15 gantas of palay or paying their value, as
determined by the court below, should the parties not come to an agreement.

FELIXBERTO MEDEL and PRISCO JOJUYCO vs. HON. BERNABE DE AQUINO

G.R. No. L-5587
April 17, 1953
FACTS:
On November 19, 1933 respondent Prisco Jojuyco, claiming to be the owner of lots 4354 and
4355 of the cadastral survey of Paniqui, Tarlac, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7025
executed an escritura de venta absoluta in favor of Jose Jojuyco and Maria Marquez purporting
to sell and convey to them the two lots in question in consideration of P700. The vendees took
possession and continued their cultivation through tenants from whom they received their share
in the yearly harvests.
On behalf of the petitioners it is claimed that the urgent petition for the appointment of a receiver
was not verified, and that furthermore, they were not notified of the hearing of said petition.
Respondent Jose Jojuyco equally claims, however, that his urgent petition for the appointment
of a receiver was duly verified as shown by a copy he has submitted, and that furthermore,
petitioner Medel was duly notified of the hearing of said motion. We consider this question not
very important. On the basis of cases decided by this Court, Moran in his Comments on the
Rules of court, Vol. II, 1952 edition, p. 84, says the following:
The application for a receiver should be made not by motion but by petition under oath and
supported by affidavits. The failure to follow such procedure constitutes a defect which may
justify a denial of the petition. But such defect does not affect the jurisdiction of the court and
cannot serve as a ground for certiorari, unless there has been a gross abuse of discretion that
amounts to substantial prejudice to the adverse party.
As to the supposed lack of notification of the hearing of the petition for the appointment of a
receiver, suffice it to say that the petition was ex-parte and section 3 of Rule 61 of the Rules of
Court contemplates the appointment of a receiver upon an ex-parte application, this, assuming
that herein petitioners were not really notified of the hearing although it is a fact that Medel must
have known of the petition because he filed his written opposition to it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction or gravely abused his
discretion in appointing a receiver.
RULING:
It is a well-settled rule that the granting of a petition for the appointment of a receiver is
discretionary with the court. Once the discretion of the trial court is exercised in the matter of

appointment of a receiver, the appellate court will not interfere with it except in a clear case of
abuse thereof or an extralimitation of jurisdiction. (Moran, op. cit., pp. 85-86). It will be
remembered that the complaint in civil case No. 7 was filed as early as June 19, 1945, and the
petition for the appointment of a receiver was filed only on November 7, 1951, and it is alleged
therein that since 1945 defendant Medel had been enjoying the products of the land to the
prejudice of plaintiff Jose Jojuyco; that he had not offered any security and assurance that he
would be able to reimburse the plaintiff the amount or value of the products corresponding to
him in case decision was rendered in his favor; and that a receiver should be appointed to
preserve the products of the land in question in such a way that the decision of the court may
not be rendered ineffectual because of inability of the losing party to make good the restoration
of the products of the land to the prevailing party. This lack of security mentioned in the petition
for the appointment of the receiver is confirmed by Medel himself who admits that he has no
other property except the parcels in question.
On the basis of the facts above-recited and considering the circumstances surrounding the
appointment of the receiver in civil case No. 7, we cannot say that the respondent Judge
abused his discretion in making the appointment. On the contrary, there is reason to believe that
said appointment was justified and warranted.

AGUSTIN ALDEA vs. INOCENTES FUENTES

G.R. No. L-5899
February 12, 1913
FACTS:
On July 21, 1908, counsel for Agustin Aldea filed a written complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Capiz against Inocentes Fuentes, setting forth that, by virtue of an instrument
executed in his favor by Juana de la Pea, on May 24, 1905, before the justice of the peace of
Mambusao, he was the owner of two parcels of irrigated land situated in the places known as Ilo
and Naboongan, Mambusao, of 4 hectares 27 ares and 86 centares, being bounded on the
north by the property of Maria Arluida, on the east by Calle San Jose, on the south by the
property of Diego Orleans, Ramon Veedor, and Juan Lopez; and on the west by the properties
of Juan Lopez and Sixto Lema; and the second parcel of 1 hectare 74 ares and 80 centares, on
the north by the property of Luciana Laguda; on the east by land belonging to Higina Villareal
and Santiago de la Cena; and on the south by that of Santiago de la Cena; and on the west by
the Dumalag Road

While Aldea was in the full enjoyment of possession and usufruct of the said lands, the
defendant, Fuentes, took possession of them, despoiling him of possession thereof, and by
intimidation obliged the latter's tenant, Vito Navarra, to cease to occupy and cultivate them.
Notwithstanding the allegations of Agustin Aldea in his complaint, it is not shown by the record
to have been duly proved that the plaintiff was in possession of at least the parcel of land of the
area of "2 cavanes and 10 gantas of seed rice," which the defendant, Inocentes Fuentes, now
holds and has held since 1901 when it was conveyed to him through a contract of antichresis
because its original owner, Juana de la Pea, had not paid him a sum which she had owed him
from July 23, 1900.
If the plaintiff Aldea has not succeeded in proving in this suit right of possession which he claims
to have in the land of lesser area now held by the defendant by virtue of a perfectly legal
contract executed between the latter and the previous owner of the land, in 1890, neither has he
proved the alleged despoliation or usurpation which the plaintiff charges the defendant with
having committed, through a violent act performed one day of the month of February, 1907, and
consequently there is no lawful reason for the success in law of the improper complaint whereby
this litigation was commenced.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Juana de la Pea cannot reacquire the enjoyment of the land that is the subject
of the antichresis, without previously paying in full what she owes to her creditor.
RULING:
Aside from this positive conclusion derived from the evidence, it was proved furthermore, that
the defendant, Fuentes, has been since 1902 paying the land tax on the said land of the area of
"2 cavanes and 10 gantas of seed rice," which had been levied against him from that year up to
date, a fact the plaintiff could not be establish.
Article 445 of the Civil Code prescribes: "Possession, as a fact, cannot be recognized in two
different personalities, except in cases where there is no division. Should a question arise as to
the fact of the possession, the actual possessor shall be preferred; when there are two, the
oldest shall be preferred; if the dates of the possession are the same, the one presenting a title;
and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in deposit or judicial keeping until
the possession or ownership thereof is decided in the proper manner."
Solely with reference to the possession of the land in litigation, it is unquestionable that the
defendant Fuentes, the present possessor of the property, has been in possession thereof
longer than the plaintiff, and, in the hypothesis that Juana de la Pea delivered the land to the
defendant, Inocentes Fuentes, under a lawful contract it is undeniable that the debtor, Pea,

cannot reacquire the enjoyment of the land that is the subject of the antichresis, without
previously paying in full what she owes to her creditor (art. 1883 of the Civil Code); and it cannot
be alleged that the plaintiff has a better right, since the contract contained in the instrument,
Exhibit 2, executed by Pea in the defendant's favor bears a date long prior to that of the
instrument presented by the plaintiff, Exhibit A, though this latter document was certified by the
justice of the peace of Mambusao, but is not, however, of a public character and the said justice
of the peace, when he certified it, did not hold the office of notary.

AUGUSTO COSIO and BEATRIZ DE RAMA vs. CHERIE PALILEO

G.R. No. L-18452
May 20, 1966
FACTS:
Petitioners have filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision in this case in so far as it
declares petitioner Cosio de Rama to be a possessor in bad faith of a house, with obligation to
pay rental for its use.
Petitioners contend, first of all, that Cosio de Rama could not have known that she was not
entitled to the possession of the house before the decision in Palileo v. Cosio, 97 Phil. 919
(1955), because even Palileo herself referred to Cosio de Rama as the owner of the house. For
instance, the following portion of a letter, written by Palileo to Sor Consuelo of the Hospicio de
San Jose, dated February 17, 1952, is cited.
I am in receipt of your letter today and wish to explain the situation about the lot and house.
x x x Everyone who sees my house falls in love with it and so instead of my offer to mortgage
the house, the other party wanted a conditional sale for one (1) year. This means that Miss
Cosio is the temporary owner of my house until December 31, 1952 or until I can pay her back
P12,000 before that date.
Another letter is cited in which the Hospicio de San Jose made the statement that Palileo had
"sold the house to Miss B. Cosio" and it is said that Palileo's failure to deny this statement was
in effect an admission of the truth of that statement. Finally, it is contended that when the house
was burning, respondent Palileo called Cosio de Rama and told her: "Betty, your house is
burning!" All this is shown to prove that before their transaction was declared to be an equitable
mortgage, Cosio de Rama had a right to the possession of the house.
Palileo may indeed have called the transaction a "sale" and referred to Cosio de Rama as
"owner" of the house, but that is no reason for inferring that the parties understood their contract
to be one of sale. For that matter, they entitled their contract "Conditional Sale of Residential
Building" and it was doubtless in the context of that contract that Palileo referred to Cosio de

Rama as the "temporary owner of my house until December 31, 1952 or until I can pay her back
P12,000 before that time." Because the parties referred to their contract as a "conditional sale,"
should we then have held that Cosio de Rama was the "temporary owner" with a right to the
possession of the house?
In a contract of mortgage, the mortgagor, as a general rule, retains the possession of the
property mortgaged as security for the payment of the sum borrowed from the mortgagee, and
pays the latter a certain per cent thereof as interest on his principal by way of compensation for
his sacrifice in depriving himself of the use of said money and the enjoyment of its fruits, in order
to give them to the mortgagor. Inasmuch as it is not an essential requisite of the contract of
mortgage that the property mortgaged remain in the possession of the mortgagor (Article 1857
of the Civil Code) the latter may deliver said property to the mortgagee, without thereby altering
the nature of the contract. It not being an essential requisite of said contract of mortgage that
the principal of the mortgage credit bear interest, or that the interest, as compensation for the
use of the principal and enjoyment of its fruits, be in the form of a certain per cent thereof, such
interest may be in the form of fruits of the mortgaged property, without the contract's losing
thereby its character of a mortgage contract. (At 377-378)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract was an antichresis or a mortgage.
RULING:
We may mention, at this point, that this ruling was made in answer to the contention of the
appellant in that case that the contract was an antichresis and not a mortgage. Of course in
other cases the rule has been laid down that where by agreement the mortgaged property is
delivered to the mortgagee, such mortgagee in possession is subject to the obligation of an
antichretic creditor to apply the fruits to the payment, first, of the interest and, later, of the
principal. (Diego vs. Fernando, G.R. No. L-15128, August 25, 1960; Macapinlac v. Gutierrez
antRepide, 43 Phil. 770 [1922].) Thus it was held in Macapinlac v. Gutierrez Repide, supra, at
786-87:
The respective rights and obligations of the parties to a contract of antichresis, under the Civil
Code, appear to be similar and in many respects identical with those recognized in the equity
jurisprudence of England and America as incident to the position of a mortgagee in possession
in reference to which the following propositions may be taken to be established, namely, that if
the mortgagee acquires possession in any lawful manner, he is entitled to retain such
possession until the indebtedness is satisfied and the property redeemed; that the nonpayment
of the debt within the term agreed does not vest the ownership of the property in the creditor;
that the general duty of the mortgagee in possession towards the premises is that of the

ordinary prudent owner; that the mortgagee must account for the rents and profits of the land, or
its value for purposes of use and occupation, any amount thus realized going towards the
discharge of the mortgage debt; that if the mortgagee remains in possession after the mortgage
debt has been satisfied, he becomes a trustee for the mortgagor as to the excess of the rents
and profits over such debt; and, lastly, that the mortgagor can only enforce his rights to the land
by an equitable action for an account and to redeem. (3 Pomeroy Equity Jurisprudence, secs.
1215-1218)

HILARIO RAMIREZ and VALENTINA BONIFACIO

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FRANCISCA MEDINA, MATILDE MARTIN, EMILIO MARTIN, DELFIN
GUINTO, TEOFILO GUINTO, PRUDENCIO GUINTO and MARGARITA GUINTO
G.R. No. L-38185 September 24, 1986
On September 15,1959, petitioners-spouses Hilario Ramirez and Valentina Bonifacio filed an
application for registration of a parcel of riceland in Pamplona, Las Pinas Rizal. Thereafter, the
petitioners presented parol evidence that they acquired the land in question by purchase from
Gregorio Pascual during the early part of the American regime but the corresponding contract of
sale was lost and no copy or record of the same was available.
On January 30, 1960, the court ordered the issuance of the decree of registration and
consequently: Original Certificate of Title No. 2273 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal was issued
in the petitioners names.
On March 30, 1960, the private respondents Francisca Medina, Basilio Martin, Matilde Martin,
Delfin Guinto, Teofilo Guinto, Prudencio Guinto and Margarita Guinto, petitioners' nephews and
nieces, filed a petition to review the decree of registration on the ground of fraud. The private
respondents based their claim to the land on the following allegations: that they are the legal
heirs of the deceased Agapita Bonifacio; that Agapita Bonifacio acquired the property in
question by purchase from Gregoria Pascual; that Gregoria Pascual during her lifetime, from
possessed the said property in the concept of owner, publicly and uninterruptedly, which
possession was continued by Agapita Bonifacio; that in 1938 respondents obtained a loan of
P400.00 from the petitioners which they secured with a mortgage on the land in question by way
of antichresis;; that when they learned of the issuance of the certificate of title to the land in the
petitioners' names, they also filed the instant petition for review. The previous complaint, Civil
Case No. 272-R, was subsequently dismissed on a joint petition filed by the parties after they

agreed to have the determination of the question of ownership resolved in the registration
proceedings.
In their answer, the spouses Ramirez denied the material allegations of the petition, they based
their claim to the land on two deeds of sale allegedly executed on April 15, 1937 and April 23,
1937 which they allegedly found accidentally in March 1960.
After trial, the court found that deeds of sale spurious. It further found that the respondents took
possession of the land as owners after the death of Agapita Bonifacio and in 1938, mortgaged it
to the spouses Ramirez to secure the payment of a loan in the amount of P400.00. It was
agreed that the respondents could not redeem the property within a period of five years and that
the petitioners would take possession of the land, enjoy its fruits, and pay the land taxes
thereon.
The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. On a motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioners, the same appellate court, but with a new member, promulgated a resolution setting
aside the original decision. On a motion for reconsideration filed by the private respondents, this
resolution was set aside and the original decision was reinstated.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance, acting as a land registration court, has the power and
authority to vest title on the land involved to herein private respondents and order even its
partition amongst them in the face of the admitted fact that the land is in actual possession of
petitioners while private respondents had not possessed the same at all?
RULING:
While there was an admission that the petitioners have been in actual possession of the
disputed land since 1938, it was made to show and prove the fact that the petitioners are only
antichretic creditors. The respondents never admitted that they have not possessed the land at
all. On the contrary, they alleged that they and their predecessors-in-interest namely Gregoria
Pascual and Agapita Bonifacio have been in possession of the land since time immemorial and
that the petitioners were placed in possession of the land pursuant to a contract of antichresis.
The court below found that the petitioners are merely antichretic creditors. This finding and its
factual bases were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. On the basis of the evidence supporting
this conclusion, this finding is binding on us as it is not our duty to weigh evidence on this point
all over again. This court has on several occasions held that the antichretic creditor cannot
ordinarily acquire by prescription the land surrendered to him by the debtor. The petitioners are
not possessors in the concept of owner but mere holders placed in possession of the land by its
owners. Thus, their possession cannot serve as a title for acquiring dominion.
The argument of laches is explained and countered by the close relationship of the parties and
the nature of a contract of antichresis. The private respondents are nephews and nieces, with

their spouses, of the petitioners. Moreover, there is evidence to show that long before the filing
of the cases, there had been attempts to recover the property.
In view of the foregoing, we are constrained to affirm the appellate court's decision. We note,
however, that in spite of the finding of an existing contract of antichresis between the parties, the
two courts below did not order the payment of the principal amount of mortgage. Under Article
2136 of the Civil Code, the debtor cannot reacquire the enjoyment of the immovable without first
having totally paid what he owes the creditor.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with a modification that the
respondents are ordered to pay the petitioners the amount of P 400.00 as principal for the
contract of antichresis, the fruits obtained from the possession of the land having been applied
to the interests on the loan.

RAYMUNDO TANSIOCO vs. FELICIANO RAMOSO

G.R. No. L-37671
March 15, 1934
FACTS:
The following stipulation of facts agreed upon by all the parties was filed November 25, 1931:
1. That all the plaintiffs are of legal age, and are the legitimate heirs of the deceased spouses,
Sebastian Tansioco
2. That Serapia Serrano died on December 4, 1913, and Sebastian Tansioco died on March 11,
1926.
3. That on March 30, 1916, Sebastian Tansioco legally married the defendant, Rafaela Tecson.
4. That Rafaela Tecson is the judicial administratrix of the properties left by the deceased
Sebastian Tansioco and Serapia Serrano.
5. That the defendants, Feliciano Ramoso and Lucia Y. Matias Viuda de Tinio, are the legal
administrators of the properties left by the deceased Casimiro Tinio,
6. That Sebastian Tansioco in his lifetime acquired all the properties
7. That parcels Nos. 1, 2, and a portion of parcel No. 3 as their conjugal property as evidenced
by original certificate of title No. 7377 issued in their names on April 13, 1927,
8. That the remaining portion of parcel No. 3 which lot has been registered also in the names of
the said spouses, Sebastian Tansioco and Rafaela Tecson
9. That parcel No. 4 which has been adjudicated and registered in the name of Sebastian
Tansioco, married to Rafaela Tecson, in accordance with the Land Registration Act as
evidenced by original certificate of title No. 5294 issued in his name on September 13, 1926, by
the register of deeds for the Province of Nueva Ecija.
10. That on September 5, 1922, Sebastian Tansioco and Rafaela Tecson sold the abovementioned properties, lots Nos. 2233-A and 2235, and also lots Nos. 1872 and 3622, and also
lot C of the subdivision plan, which lot C, is more particularly described in transfer certificate of

title No. 847, issued in the name of Sebastian Tansioco and Rafaela Tecson by the register of
deeds for the Province of Nueva Ecija, which contract of sale is hereby attached marked as
Exhibit 1-Ramoso, the genuineness of which is admitted by the parties although the said exhibit
is a mere copy of its original, in favor of Casimiro Tinio for the amount of P33,800, which are the
lands described in the cross-complaint of the defendants, Feliciano Ramoso and Lucia Y.
Matias, against the other defendant, Rafaela Tecson.
11. That this contract of sale, Exhibit 1-Ramoso, on July 12, 1923, during the cadastral
proceedings in San Jose, Nueva Ecija, was converted and changed to a mere mortgage with six
per cent (6%) interest per annum on the said amount of P33,800, from the first day of January,
1923, and payable on September 5, 1924, by agreement of the parties with the approval of the
court, in order that the said Sebastian Tansioco and Rafaela Tecson would not be dispossessed
of their whole properties described in the said contract of sale.
12. That neither the said amount of P33,800, nor its interest of six per cent (6%) per annum
from January 1, 1923, has been paid by the said Sebastian Tansioco and Rafaela Tecson until
the present time. This agreement of non-payment of the said amounts, shall not in anyway
affect the theory of the defendant, Rafaela Tecson, that the said contract of mortgage is one
of antichresis and that said sum of P33,800 together with interest thereon has already been paid
in full with the application of the products of said land, which theory is denied by the defendant,
Feliciano Ramoso and Lucia Y. Matias.
13. That lot No. 1872 of the cadastral survey of San Jose, described in original certificate of title
No. 5259, issued in the name of Sebastian Tansioco, by the register of deeds of Nueva Ecija,
was mortgaged to the deceased, Casimiro Tinio, on July 12, 1923, in the sum of two hundred
pesos (P200) with twelve percent (12%) interest per annum from July 12, 1923, payable on
March 30, 1926, and which mortgage is not included in the claim of the defendant Rafaela
Tecson, regarding antichresis. This amount of P200 together with the interest thereon from July
12, 1923, has not yet been paid by the said Sebastian Tansioco and Rafaela Tecson until the
present time.
14. That parcel No. 1 in paragraph 7 of the said second amended complaint is the same and
corresponds to parcel No. 7 of the land described in the contract of sale, Exhibit 1-Ramoso.
15. That parcel No. 2 of the said paragraph 7 of the second amended complaint is the same and
corresponds to parcel No. 9 of the land described in the contract of sale, Exhibit 1-Ramoso.
16. That parcel No. 3 of the said paragraph 7 of the second amended complaint is the same and
corresponds to parcel No. 6 of the land described in the said contract of sale, Exhibit 1-Ramoso.
17. That parcel No. 4 of the said paragraph 7 of the second amended complaint is the same and
corresponds to parcel No. 2 of the land described in the said contract of sale, Exhibit 1-Ramoso.
18. That the land east of parcel No. 7 of the contract of sale, Exhibit 1-Ramoso, was previous to
Sebastian Tansioco, the property of Juan Lozano, and the land west of the said parcel 7 was

bought by Mariano Francisco from Pedro Balangue. This parcel No. 7 is also bounded on the
west by the Panlasian Creek.
19. That neither Sebastian Tansioco and Rafaela Tecson nor the plaintiffs herein has paid the
irrigation charges and land taxes to the Government of the Philippine Islands from 1922 until the
present time for the said lots Nos. 2233-A, 2234, 2235, and lot C of the subdivision plan
described in title No. 847.
20. That the defendants, Feliciano Ramoso and Lucia Y. Matias, have paid the amount of
P1,218.31 for land taxes and the amount of P2,711.37 for irrigation charges to the Government
of the Philippine Islands from 1922 until the present date corresponding to lots Nos. 2233-A,
2234, 2235, and the said lot C.
21. That the defendants, Feliciano Ramoso and Lucia Y. Matias Viuda de Tinio are in
possession of lots Nos. 2233-A, 2234, 2235, and a lot C described in title No. 847, from April 18,
1923, up to the present date. This admission, however, shall not affect the defense, and is
subject to the claim, of said defendants, Feliciano Ramoso and Lucia Y. Matias, that the only
benefit which they derive from the said lands is the annual rental of 250 cavanes of palay for the
reason that those lands have been leased to other persons and that the said benefit derived
from the lands should be applied for the payment of the interests of the said mortgages.
22. That the average price of one cavan of palay from 1924 to April 1931, is P2.50.
23. That the area of lot No. 2233-A is 1 hectare, 18 ares and 28 centares (11,823 square
meters).
24. That the said mortgages of P33,800 and P200, respectively, in favor of Casimiro Tinio, which
are admitted in this stipulation of facts are registered and noted in the decisions and certificates
of title corresponding to lots Nos. 2233-A, 2233, 1872, 3622, and lot C of the subdivision plan
described in title No. 847. That said incumbrances to the said land are the only lien or
incumbrances noted and registered in the said decisions and titles, with the exception "of the
incumbrances mentioned in article 39 of said Law as may be subsisting, and to a first lien in
favor of the Insular Government to guarantee the payment of the special taxes assessed
pursuant to the provisions of section 18 of Act No. 2259, as amended by Act No. 3081."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said contract was not in reality a mortgage but rather a contract
of antichresis.
Whether or not all stipulation of facts agreed upon by all the parties are correct.
RULING:
Upon the cross-complaint of the administrators of the estate of Casimiro Tinio, it is clear that
they are entitled to recover against Rafaela Tecson, as administratrix of the estate of Sebastian
Tansioco and Rafaela Tecson, the said debt of P33,800 together with interest at 6 per cent per

annum from September 5, 1922, and the lien or incumbrance noted on the Torrens certificates
should be foreclosed. The appellants state in their brief (page 32) that it is immaterial to them
whether the said incumbrance be treated as a mortgage as they claim or as a contract
of antichresis as the lower court held. The appellee, Rafaela Tecson, insists upon the application
of article 1881 of the Civil Code and asks for affirmance of the judgment holding the contract to
be one of antichresisand that the account as stated by her and reproduced on pages 48 to 50 of
the Bill of Exceptions should be applied. The court below rejected this account and we see no
reason for reversing the court's decision in that respect.
The appellants Feliciano Ramoso and Lucia Matias Viuda de Tinio, the administrators of the
estate of Casimiro Tinio, assign fifteen errors of which we deem it necessary to comment on the
following only:
The lower court erred:
3. In declaring that the four parcels of land described in the complaint are the conjugal
properties of the deceased spouses, Sebastian Tansioco and Serapia Serrano.
5. In holding that sales and mortgages executed by a surviving husband affecting conjugal
properties are null and void.
6. In declaring that the plaintiffs are the absolute owners of one half undivided interest in the
four parcels of land described in the complaint.
7. In ordering the defendant, Rafaela Tecson, in her own name and in her capacity as the
administratix of the estate of the deceased, Sebastian Tansioco, to execute a contract of
transfer, which can be registered in the register of deeds of Nueva Ecija in favor of the plaintiffs,
of one half of the said four parcels of land, lots Nos. 2233-A, 2234, and 2235, free from any lien
or incumbrance.
8. In declaring null and void the mortgage noted in the titles of the said lands with regards to its
one-half undivided interest.
9. In ordering the defendants-appellants to pay to the plaintiffs the amount of P11,069.18. 10. In
absolving the plaintiffs from paying to the defendant-appellants the amount of P33,800 together
with its interests of 6 per cent per annum from January 1, 1923, until they are completely paid.
12. In not ordering the defendant, Rafaela Tecson, in her own representation and in her capacity
as administratix of the estate of the deceased, Sebastian Tansioco, to pay the said amount of
P33,800 together with its interests to the defendant-appellants, within the period of three months
from the date of the judgment.
13. In not ordering the sale of the said lands, lots Nos. 2233-A, 2234, 2235, 2622, and lot C of
the subdivision plan described in title No. 847, after the said period of three to satisfy the
judgment.
Upon the counter-demand of Feliciano Ramoso and Lucia Matias Viuda de Tinio, administrators
of the estate of Casimiro Tinio, the decision of the court below is modified in this respect: that
the said defendant Rafaela Tecson personally and as administratrix of the estate of Sebastian

Tansioco, is ordered and required to pay to the said administrators of the estate of Casimiro
Tinio the sum of P33,800 with interest at the rate of 6 per cent from September 5, 1922, until
paid, less the net gain which the said administrators have received from the lands here involved
to the date of trial, P2,955.88, and less such net sum as the said administrators may have
received from the lands covered by said incumbrance to the date of foreclosure as hereafter
provided.

MARCELO G. VAZQUEZ vs. AGATA TACSAGON VDA. DE ABKILAN.

G.R. No. L-48621
February 26, 1943
FACTS:
Atanasio Abkilan, who died during the pendency of this action, had been indebted to Marcelo G.
Vazquez and Andrea Olea for some years previous to April 26, 1926. That indebtedness, which
bore interest at the rate of 10% per annum and was secured by a mortgage on lots Nos. 711,
1515, and 1528 of the cadastral survey of Himamaylan, Occidental Negros, became due and
demandable on July 31, 1925; but as the debtor was unable to pay it, a new contract entitled
"Deed of Mortgage" was entered into by the parties on April 26, 1926, wherein Abkilan
acknowledged that the total amount owing from him to his said creditors was P34,812.46, which
he obligated himself to pay on or before July 31, 1935, without any interest up to the lastmentioned date but with interest thereafter, if unpaid, at the rate of 12% per annum, and as
security he conveyed to them by way of mortgage lots Nos. 711 and 1528 of the cadastral
survey of Himamaylan. It was further stipulated in said contract: (1) that the creditors shall have
the usufruct of a specified portion of lot No. 711, with an area of about seven hectares, during
four agricultural years from the date of the contract up to the end of the crop year 1930-1931,
without paying any rent; (2) that during the existence of the mortgage Abkilan was obligated to
raise sugar cane on the remaining part of said lot No. 711, which should be milled either in the
sugar mill of the Hacienda Dos Hermanos, belonging to Olea, or in the Binalbagan central,
should the parties deem it more advantageous to produce centrifugal instead of muscovado
sugar; if milled in the former, 50% of the sugar produced would belong to the creditors, who
would have to take charge and pay the expenses of cutting the sugar cane and conveying it to
the mill and of placing and packing the sugar in bayones, and if milled in the latter (Binalbagan
central) Abkilan had to pay to his creditors 15% of the centrifugal sugar produced during the
crop years 1927-1928 to 1930-1931 inclusive, and 17% thereafter, the expenses of cutting the

sugar cane and placing it on the railroad cars of the sugar central to be for the account of the
creditors; in either case Abkilan's net share in the sugar was to be sold by his creditors and
applied to the payment of his indebtedness; (3) that the creditors obligated themselves to
furnish the debtor a credit of P2,000 yearly without interest to defray his expenses in planting
sugar cane, but should the amount drawn by Abkilan for such expenses exceed P2,000 or P80
per hectare for new planting and P50 per hectare for rattans, the excess shall bear interest at
12% per annum; and (4) that in case of suit the debtor shall pay 10% of the total amount due on
the date of the rendition of the judgment by way of penalty to cover judicial expenses and
attorney's fees.
Subsequently Marcelo G. Vazquez acquired the interest of Andrea Olea in the mortgage.
This action was instituted to foreclose the mortgage, on which, as found by the trial court, there
was due the total sum of P29,913.08 less the sum of P561.39.
Insofar as this appeal is concerned, the judgment of the trial court requires the defendant
administratrix of Abkilan to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P29,351.69, with interest thereon at the
rate of 12% per annum from July 31, 1935, to the date of payment, plus 10% of the amount due
on the date of the rendition of the judgment by way of penalty, and the costs, with appropriate
directions for the sale of the mortgaged property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract is an antichresis and that contract is usurious.
RULING:
Nevertheless, there is no basis in the record for believing that the parties intended the contract
in question to be one of antichresis. Before the commencement of this action the plaintiff sent to
Abkilan several yearly statement of account, but Abkilan never demanded an accounting of the
proceeds from the usufruct and the sugar received by the plaintiff under said contract on the
theory that they should be applied to the payment of his indebtedness. Neither is there any
basis for the proposition that the stipulations in said contract regarding the usufruct on seven
hectares and the participation of the creditors in the sugar produced by the debtor were resorted
to and adopted as a mere cloak to hide a usurious operation. It must be borne in mind that the
creditors' participation in the debtor's sugar, altho forming part of the consideration for the loan,
cannot be imputed exclusively to the interest thereon because the creditors had to render
service and undergo expenses to earn such participation.
If it had been pleaded and proved that the annual rental value of the portion of seven hectares
of lot No. 711 ceded by Abkilan to the plaintiff in usufruct for four years, plus the net profit to be
realized by the plaintiff from his participation in the sugar produced from the rest of said lot, was
known by the parties to exceed the equivalent of 12% yearly interest on the loan and that the

mortgage contract in question was resorted to in order to circumvent the Anti-Usury Law, the
court might be justified in declaring said contract to be one of equitable antichresis, just as a
sale with pacto de retro has often been declared an equitable mortgage, upon the principle that
Equity looks thru the form in the substance. But such a situation does not obtain in the case
before us; there was neither allegation nor proof to that effect. On the other hand the trial court
believed that even if an accounting by appellee be ordered as pretended by appellant, the result
would not be favorable to the latter. As a matter of fact and as appears from the appealed
decision, the plaintiff, in a memorandum filed by his counsel in the court below, offered to render
an accounting counsel in the court below, offered to render an accounting of all the products
and benefits received by him under said contract provided that both parties should agree not to
appeal from the result thereof and provided further that the rate of interest to be charged should
be only 6% per annum up to July 31, 1935, and 12% per annum thereafter; but the defendant
ignored and impliedly rejected said offer.

SALVACION A. CATANGCATANG vs. PAULINO LEGAYADA

G.R. No. L-26295 July 14,1978
FACTS:
On May 19, 1952, respondent executed in favor of petitioner a deed of sale with pacto de retro, with
a five-year period of redemption, over a parcel of land situated at Lambunao, Iloilo, with a stated
area of 8.8272 hectares more or less, for a specified consideration of P1,400.00. Of the total
consideration, the amount of P1,200.00 was paid upon the execution of the deed and the balance of
P200.00, covered by a promissory note, was agreed to be payable at a later date.
Subsequently, petitioner found that the area of the land actually delivered to her was only 5.0779
hectares. Thus, on January 22, 1957, she instituted Civil Case No. 2635 against respondent,
seeking the recovery of the area allegedly withheld. In his answer to the complaint in said case,
respondent filed a counterclaim asking for rescission of the Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase
attached as Annex "A" to the complaint because of failure of plaintiff to pay the balance of P200.00
of the purchase price on the due date.
On May 10, 1957, during the pendency of the aforementioned case, respondent forcibly took back
the possession of the land from petitioner. On May 19, 1957, the period for the repurchase of the
land expired, allegedly without respondent having availed himself of his right to repurchase the
same.
On June 17, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo dismissed the complaint, having found that the
parcel of land subject matter of the deed of sale was described by metes and bounds, as shown by

Tax Declaration No. 4156, and has an actual area of 5.0779 hectares, notwithstanding that the
stated area in the Tax Declaration was 8.8272 hectares. In the same decision, the counterclaim of
Paulino Legayada was likewise dismissed. The decision of the Court of First Instance became final,
neither party having appealed therefrom.
On June 29, 1957, petitioner instituted the present petition for consolidation of title and restoration of
possession (Civil Case No. 4464). In his answer, Paulino Legayada admitted that on May 19, 1952,
he, as vendor, executed a Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase in favor of petitioner but denied
that he failed to repurchase the property on or before May 19, 1957 because on May 10, 1957 he
took possession of the property "because the redemption amount is already deposited in the hands
of undersigned counsel to be paid" to petitioner Salvacion Catangcatang.
The Court of First Instance of Iloilo, finding that respondent was not able to effect the repurchase
within the period stipulated, rendered judgment declaring title over the land consolidated in the name
of petitioner and ordering respondent to deliver the possession of the same to her, plus 100 cavanes
of palay or the value thereof, fixed at P10.00 per cavan, for every year from May 10, 1957, the date
of the dispossession, until actual delivery is effected, and costs.
Petitioner came to this Court, contending that the Court of Appeals erred: (a) in holding that the
failure to pay the remaining consideration of P200.00 suspended the running of the period for
redemption; (b) in not holding that said remaining consideration is now unenforceable by reason
of res judicata; (c) in not holding, accordingly, that in legal effect, the decision in Civil Case No. 2635
of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo operated to reform the sale in question so as to make its actual
consideration only P1,200.00 (which was fully paid on the date of the execution of the deed); (d) in
not holding that title to the land subject matter of the sale with pacto de retro is now consolidated, for
failure of the vendor to effect the repurchase thereof; and (e) in not affirming en toto the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.
The nature and character of the deed of May 19, 1952 as a Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase
appears definitely settled in the decision of the Court of First Instance in Civil Case No. 2653, which
had already become final. As a matter of fact, respondent, in the second case, Civil Case No. 4644,
admitted that it was a sale with right of repurchase. Likewise, in his defense, he attempted to
establish that he offered in due time to pay the repurchase price of the property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the non-payment of the P200.00 suspended the running of the period to repurchase.
RULING:
We are unable to find any support for the holding of the Appellate Court that the failure to pay the
balance of the purchase price embodied in the agreement in the amount of P200.00 resulted in the
suspension of the running of the period for redemption.
The sale was consummated upon the execution of the document and the delivery of the land subject
matter thereof to the vendee, petitioner herein. It was a perfectly valid agreement, and the non-

payment of the balance of the purchase price could not have the effect of suspending the efficacy of
the provisions thereof. Failure to pay part of the consideration of the contract. 1 The sale under
consideration was perfected from the moment Legayada consented to sell the land in question and
Catangcatang agreed to purchase it for the sum of P1,400.00 and the latter had partially complied with his
obligation by paying the sum of P1,200.00 and the former by delivering possession of the land to the
vendee. Moreover, there was nothing whatsoever in the deed of sale to indicate that the agreement of the
parties was to suspend the running of the period of redemption until full payment of the purchase price.
On the contrary, said period was agreed to be five (5) years from the date of the execution of the deed.

In addition, it appears from the records that the balance of the purchase price has been litigated in
Civil Case No. 2635, the same having been presented as a counterclaim by herein respondent.
When the complaint in said case was dismissed, the counterclaim was likewise dismissed. The
decision became final without either party having appealed therefrom; hence the principle of res
judicata applies to bar the reopening of this issue in the instant Proceedings.

G.R. No. L-15740

May 23, 1961
JUAN CRUZ, JR vs. CRISANTO DIAZ
FACTS:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Davao granting defendant's motion to
dismiss the complaint upon the ground that it fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause
of action and, accordingly, dismissing said complaint, with costs.
Plaintiff, Juan Cruz, Jr., alleges therein that, by virtue of a public instrument executed on
December 28, 1953, defendant Crisanto Diaz had transferred to him whatever rights and
interests he (Diaz) had over a parcel of land forming part of Lot 1080 of the Davao Cadastre No.
102, situated in the barrio of Panacan, Davao City, and covered by Homestead Application No.
165589, E-15448, for a consideration actually received by said defendant; that, thereafter,
plaintiff filed the corresponding homestead application with the office of the Bureau of Lands in
Davao, took possession of the aforesaid land and cultivated the same, as well as introduced
improvements thereon, at a cost of, at least, P10,000.00; that on April 3, 1954, defendant
caused to be issued, in his favor, Original Certificate of Title No. P-412, thru misrepresentation
or fraudulent representation made to the Register of Deeds, to the effect that he (Diaz) had not
made any transfer or transaction in connection with said land and was still its owner; that
plaintiff demanded from defendant the surrender of said Original Certificate of Title No. P-412,
but defendant refused to do so; that plaintiff asked the Director of Lands to revoke Homestead
Patent No. V-25943 issued to the defendant, but said officer had taken, as yet, no action
thereon; and that by reason of defendant's aforementioned acts, plaintiff had suffered damages

in the sum of P1,000, aside from attorney's fees amounting to P1,500, and the costs. Plaintiff
prayed, therefore, that judgment be rendered annulling or cancelling the aforementioned
homestead patent and original certificate of title and that defendant be sentenced to pay him
said sum of P1,000 as damages and P1,500 as attorney's fees, as well as for "such further and
equitable remedy as may be deemed proper in the premises."
ISSUES:
Whether or not the transfer of homestead rights invoked by a plaintiff is null and void, it being in
contravention of section 118 of the Public Land Act
Whether or not the true agreement between them was one of antichresis for the payment of a
loan made by plaintiff to the defendant in August 1953 amounting to P16,000.
RULING:
The lower court mounds thereof should be deemed held that the first two waived by the
defendant, under Rule 9, section 10, of the Rules of Court. It, however, granted the motion upon
the third ground: (a) because the effect of the relief sought by plaintiff would be a reversion of
the land in question to the public domain, which only the Bureau of Lands may seek; (b)
because the review of a Torrens title may be sought by the aggrieved party within one (1) year
from the issuance of the decree of registration, and, in the case of certificates of title issued
upon the authority of a homestead patent, from the issuance of said certificate of title, which, in
the case at bar, took place on March 8, 1954 whereas plaintiff's complaint herein was filed on
March 22, 1955, or more than a year later; and (c) because plaintiff claims to have derived his
rights and interest in and to said land from the defendant, so that if the rights and interest of the
latter were nullified, then the former would have no right or interest to invoke and protect in his
case.
It should be noted, however, that plaintiff's complaint contains two (2) causes of action: (a) the
first refers to the alleged transaction between the parties, the fraudulent means allegedly
resorted to by the defendant to secure a homestead patent and a certificate of title, and his
refusal to surrender the latter to the plaintiff, who, therefore, prays for the annulment or
cancellation of said patent and title; and (b) the second refers to the damages allegedly
sustained by plaintiff on account of defendant's acts, and for which plaintiff seeks a money
judgment against the defendant.
Even, however, with respect to the annulment or cancellation of defendant's homestead patent
and certificate of title, the order appealed from appears to be too technical under the
circumstances obtaining at the time of its issuance, and to serve no practical purpose. Indeed,
in view of the intervention of the Director of Lands, who prayed for said annulment and
cancellation, the question whether plaintiff was entitled thereto became academic, insofar as the
defendant is concerned, for, at any rate, the lower court would have to pass upon the merits of

said complaint in intervention and decide, after due hearing, whether said homestead patent
and certificate of title should be annulled and/or cancelled.