WikiLeaks logo

The Global Intelligence Files,

2763235
emails released so far
Search the GI Files
Community resources
Supporters Support Wikileaks Follow us on Twitter Twitter this Follow us on Face
book
courage is contagious
On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligenc
e Files, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intellig
ence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 201
1. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence pu
blisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations,
such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon a
nd government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US
Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web
of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological
methods.
Re: [MESA] [Analytical & Intelligence Comments] Impressions from Syria
Released on 2013-03-04 00:00 GMT
Email-ID
2983119
Date
2011-05-20 18:36:30
From
reva.bhalla@stratfor.com
To
ct@stratfor.com, mesa@stratfor.com
Will reply
Sent from my iPhone
On May 20, 2011, at 12:23 PM, Kamran Bokhari <bokhari@stratfor.com> wrote:
A decent source to develop
On 5/20/2011 11:43 AM, michael.niedermayr@metka.gr wrote:
michael.niedermayr@metka.gr sent a message using the contact form at
https://www.stratfor.com/contact.
Good day,
My name is Michael Niedermayr and as a former humanitarian security
professional (most recently with IFRC) I have been receiving your
reports for several years. Suffice it to say that I find them very
useful.
Last December I moved to Damascus, Syria, where I am now working for
an international construction company, albeit (primarily) not in a
security capacity.
I have therefore been following events on the ground closely, not
least because I have my family here with me, and have to admit that I
have been astonished by the biased and one-sided reporting on events
in the wider media. And while STRATFOR has consistently been providing
some of the best reporting and analysis, I nevertheless feel that
there are a number of points that I could and should add.

The below are simply the impressions I get from my surroundings here,
although obviously viewed through the prism of my past experience. Of
course you don't know me and thus can't really judge my
qualifications or experience, and I had therefore intended to also
attach my CV, just in case. Unfortunately your website does not allow
me to attach material, but in case it's of interest, you can find my
CV on LinkedIn.
And on that note, hope the below will be useful / of interest. Please
feel free to circulate this, if you believe that this could be of
interest to your wider audience (which I hope), and/or to use this or
parts thereof for your own analysis, as you see fit. In this context
please note that the below does not in any way reflect the views of my
employer, and that I of course would prefer to remain anonymous, just
in case you decide to circulate or use (some of) this.
Best regards and keep up the good work,
Michael Niedermayr
Administration Manager
METKA Damascus, Syria
mobile: +963-(0)993-107013
email: michael.niedermayr@metka.gr
skype: michael.niedermayr
--------------------------------While the overall picture remains somewhat murky, it would appear that
the unrest in Syria unfolded in a number of distinct stages, as
follows:
- Initial demonstrations in Deraa in mid-March, when a number of
families in the area demanded the release of a group of teenagers, who
had reportedly been detained by the local authorities for spraying
graffiti, presumably inspired by the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings.
- A rather heavy-handed crackdown by the local authorities, which
reportedly also led to a number of casualties. This was probably at
least partly due to the fact that the authorities were apparently
genuinely surprised by and thus not accustomed to this kind of public
dissent, something that was also alluded to in the president's two
speeches (and more so in the second one), following the uprising.
- Tough talk by the government, nevertheless followed by a partial
withdrawal of security forces from the areas immediately affected, and
hints at possible reforms.
- A series of Friday demonstrations (always following prayers - the
only time Syrians can congregate in larger numbers under the then
emergency regulations), spreading to neighboring villages, and at
times leading to further confrontations with the security forces,
followed by funeral processions and more demonstrations, interspersed
with reform promises from the government, more often than not
conveniently announced on a Thursday.
- Despite these promises, culminating in the abrogation of the
'emergency law' (a key demand of the initial protests), these
'concessions' were summarily dismissed by the 'opposition' as
merely symbolic, and by end of March the demonstrations (unrest?) had
spread further, first to the coastal areas and specifically Latakia
and Banyas, a number of Damascus suburbs, the Kurdish areas, Homs and
the border areas to Lebanon. And while the initial call in Deraa was
simply for the release of their relatives, for the (related)
abrogation of the emergency law, against corruption and for reform in
general, this slowly gave way to 'calls to topple the regime'.

- By mid-April it apparently became clear to the government that

whatever they were doing (offering?) until then was not enough in
order to contain the situation, and so the army was called in, first
into Deraa (and surrounding areas), followed by Banyas, Homs, and
finally again the border areas to Lebanon. There were also similar
operations reported in the affected Damascus suburbs, most of which
now seem to have seized. This was followed by reports of
house-to-house searches and mass arrests. It should however be noted
here that the army had already deployed to Deraa and Banyas much
earlier, but that at that time they were mostly used to cordon off the
affected areas (i.e. from the outside), and not to go in 'in
force'.
While the above sequence of events is probably not contentious, the
government's and the opposition's narratives for what has been
happening on the ground nevertheless differ widely, including the
number of casualties caused, who the victims are, and who is doing the
shooting, something that is not helped by the fact that independent
media are not allowed into the affected areas. While recognizing that
there are legitimate grievances and admitting shortcomings in the
security forces' response, the government now mostly blames the
violence on armed gangs and Islamic extremists, who, using the
demonstrations as a cover and pretext, are allegedly supported and
directed from abroad, essentially spinning it all into one big
conspiracy theory with the aim of toppling the regime. The opposition
on the other hand blames the government's heavy-handed crackdown,
claiming that the security forces (including informal militias allied
with the regime) are routinely firing at unarmed and peaceful
protesters, with tanks allegedly even shelling residential areas.
There are also reports of soldiers themselves being shot by their
superiors for not obeying orders, of mass arrests and collective
punishment, all in all invoking images from (and a narrative
reminiscent of) recent conflicts across the region.
What an 'international' (i.e. US/western-led) and concerted effort
at regime change looks like is of course amply demonstrated by the
recent war in Iraq, current events in Libya are probably best
characterized as a 'half-hearted' attempt, frequent inaction in
response to similar situations across Africa illustrates the
international community's indifference in such cases, while Bahrain
exemplifies the situation where the international community does not
want to change a regime. Syria probably lies somewhere in between
half-heartedness and indifference, but while this would not support
the government's notion of a full-blown conspiracy, there
nevertheless appears to be ample anecdotal evidence of foreign
meddling, including credible reports of weapons seizures at Syria's
borders and sophisticated communications equipment being found,
implicating certain political quarters in Lebanon that resent
Syria's (past and current) involvement there, the regional Muslim
Brotherhood, and high profile exiles, to name just a few, and that
amid allegations of private financial backing from Saudi Arabia. The
absence of a larger conspiracy does however not mean that other
regional and global stakeholders are not seizing the opportunity as
well, with the Syrian regime now weakened (and preoccupied), to push
their own demands and agendas, no matter how unrelated they may be.
There is no doubt that people have been and are (still) being killed
(including by the security forces), and that others are being
arrested, however, and similar to the government's conspiracy
theory, there also appear to be significant discrepancies between the

opposition's narrative and the purported facts. If the security

forces were indeed firing randomly into hundreds or thousands of
protesters, for the last two months, across multiple locations, and
that (now) on pretty much a daily basis, the number of casualties
would surely have to be higher. Also, this would not explain the
number of security force members being killed or injured (with related
images being presented daily on Syrian prime-time TV), unless of
course one subscribes to the opposition's story of these frequently
being shot by their own supervisors, something rather difficult to
hide in a multi-ethnic conscript army, and on such a large scale.
Similarly, neither mobile phone footage nor reports from independent
witnesses that visited the affected areas after the army's assault
would seem to support the notion of damage consistent with the
shelling of residential areas, or even the claim that utilities had
been disconnected across the board. There have also been indications,
including from recent statements by (certain) opposition activist
themselves (as reported in the international media), that there may be
extremist elements mingling within the protests, or even armed
elements resisting the army's current crackdown, including from the
most recent fighting around Tel Kelakh at the border to Lebanon.
Furthermore, numerous 'eyewitness accounts' (that the
opposition's narrative is almost exclusively based on) have
themselves been called into question, with anecdotal evidence of some
of these 'witnesses' not being where they claim to be, at times
reportedly even calling from a different country altogether, of
doctored images, and of images and footage allegedly/at times having
been obtained elsewhere, including from pro-government demonstrations.
However, the interesting point here is not so much what the
opposition, or the government for that matter, are reporting, since
both are obviously going to employ propaganda in order to support
their respective positions, but rather the fact that the international
media and by extension also the larger international community seem to
have bought almost exclusively into the opposition narrative, and that
major international news outlets like Al Jazeera or even Reuters are
now seemingly leading the call for regime change. An example of this
rather biased reporting (for lack of a better expression) would be a
recent online article by an Al Jazeera journalist who had been
detained for several days in Damascus, in which she describes what
allegedly happened to her. While this is in no way meant to belittle
her experience, or to underestimate the Syrian security service's
propensity for heavy-handedness, there is no record of violence
against foreign journalists and it is therefore simply not credible
that she really thought that she might be shot when she was allegedly
being blindfolded, something that her article clearly implies.
Similarly, it is not credible that they would have taken her as a
foreign journalist to a place where suspects were pleading for their
lives while being beaten, and where others were chained to radiators
in the corridor, for her to interview them, while marvelling at the
pools of blood that she is standing in. After all the Syrian security
services may well be brutal at times but Syria is not a banana
republic and they are not that stupid. And in her account of having
been found to be in possession of a 'commercially available'
satellite phone and internet hub (presumably the reason for her
detention), she conveniently fails to mention that these items are
(and always have been) prohibited in Syria, a fact that should be well
known to a foreign journalist coming into the country, not least
because it is exactly via these means that opposition activists
currently send out their messages to the world. Whether these items
should be banned or not is of course an entirely different matter, but

similar to hashish being readily available and legal in certain places

(and within limits), in other places possession of it will
nevertheless lead to arrest or worse.
Having a closer look at the areas that have seen the vast majority of
the protests so far is also instructive. Deraa and surroundings in the
South, the affected suburbs of Damascus and Homs, as well as the city
of Hama are all predominately if not exclusively Sunni, (mostly) poor
and very conservative, and thus also known to be opposed to a lot of
the regime's more secular policies, including the recently reversed
headscarf ban in public schools. It is probably worth mentioning here
that while Syria is clearly a dictatorship and a police state, and in
the international discourse usually portrayed as such, it nevertheless
is one of the religiously and culturally most liberal regimes in the
region, and certainly much more so than for example Jordan and Egypt,
something that is more often than not conveniently forgotten. Both the
Kurdish areas in the Northeast and the coastal areas on the other hand
have a history of ethnic friction, in the latter case reportedly also
including an alleged turf battle (between local Sunnis and Alawites)
over who controls the local port facilities, and with Banyas itself
being the birthplace and thus heartland one of one of the most
prominent exiles, Abdul Halim Khaddam, himself a former Syrian Vice
President, a Sunni, and a would-(like to)-be contender for the top
seat, should the current regime fall. Finally, the border areas to
Lebanon, again mostly Sunni, are known for their smuggling activities,
which frequently lead to confrontations with the local authorities.
Other, smaller protests also took place elsewhere, including at
universities in Damascus and Aleppo, but these reportedly only
numbered in the tens, mostly consisted of residents from the afore
mentioned areas, i.e. Deraa and surroundings, Banyas or the Kurdish
areas, and they were usually dissolved quickly, more often than not by
bystanders, and not the security forces or pro-regime thugs, as
portrayed in the international media.
Of course this is not to say that people in these areas do not have
legitimate grievances or demands, but these issues are invariably
interspersed with religious and ethnic motives, contrary to what is
being claimed on related social networking sites, and they are
certainly not as simplistic as portrayed in the international media.
Freedom and democracy in this context is mostly reduced to the
question of which group has the power to impose it's will and values
over the others, and not as a universal right for all, always invoked
by whoever is not in power, and always conveniently forgotten once
power has been attained. And while this may not sit well with the
West's current and rather rosy-eyed preoccupation with democratic
change in the Middle East, the question of how democracy is to work in
a society (and not regime) that does not permit its members to choose
which studies or occupation to pursue, where to live, or even who to
marry, is nevertheless worth considering.
In this context it is also noteworthy that protests are almost
exclusively organized around local mosques, with Friday prayers or
funerals being the chief catalysts, and it is quite unlikely that
social networking (via the internet) has anything to do with events on
the ground, other than as a conduit to the outside world, i.e. for
uploading mobile phone footage etc., with these sites presumably
operated by others, and that mostly if not exclusively outside of
Syria. Who or what these others are, and who they represent, is not
entirely clear, but the way these protests have unfolded and
transformed after the initial unrest in Deraa would seem to indicate

that certain individuals and groups were well prepared for just such
an eventuality, in the wake of the wider regional unrest, ready to use
the occasion as a pretext to push their own agendas. The recent
proliferation of self-proclaimed and here thereto unheard of Syrian
'human rights' activists and organizations is in this context
equally noteworthy, as is the fact that during the initial month of
the unrest thousands of unlicensed buildings went up almost over
night, across the country, or reports of significantly
increased/increasing petty criminality, with the authorities
preoccupied elsewhere. The latter two issues, while clearly unrelated
to the protests themselves, nevertheless nicely illustrate that others
are more than willing to take advantage of the situation.
Speaking of which, since the beginning of the uprising, the Syrian
regime has not only blamed outside forces for instigating the unrest,
it has also warned that this would invariably lead to chaos, sectarian
strive, and ultimately civil war. But while it is clearly in the
regime's interest to paint the picture as stark as possible in order
to scare both the protesters and everybody else off the streets, and
to justify it's own rather heavy-handed crackdown, this does not in
itself mean that the prediction is incorrect, nor that the government
would not be compelled to counter this perceived threat. This is not
to say that the opposition currently is widespread enough to endanger
the regime, it clearly isn't, but should the regime indeed fall,
then it would certainly be everybody fending for him/herself, which in
this region invariably means Sunnis pitted against Christians, Shias
and Alawites, and Kurds against Arabs, similar to what we have
recently seen in Iraq, albeit without the foreign occupation. But
while some outside forces are probably willing to take this risk (with
some like the Egyptian Islamic theologian Yusuf al-Qaradawi even
accepting the possibility of civil war publicly as a necessary evil in
order to topple what he sees as a heretic regime), since it anyway
won't be them paying the price while nevertheless reaping the gains,
or at least so they hope, both the international community at large
and the local demonstrators themselves appear largely oblivious to the
dangers.
The exact numbers of demonstrators to date are impossible to verify,
however they seldom appear to exceed a few thousand for a particular
event, are more often than not in the hundreds, and thus probably
represent less than a percent of the population. But whereas in most
countries this would simply be taken as evidence that the vast
majority does not sympathize or agree with the protesters' demands,
at least not to the extend that they would join them, in Syria's
case the 'Western' assumption, and aptly supported by the
opposition's narrative, seems to be that nobody can be happy living
under such a regime and that thus people that don't protest, other
than the 'few' linked directly to (and presumably corruptly
benefiting from) the regime, don't do so only out of fear. This is
not to say that there may not be people too afraid to protest
(although the vast majority of Syrians certainly don't seem to go
about their daily business constantly looking over the shoulder,
worried that the security forces might be creeping up on them), but
even if they were to come out, it is doubtful that they would raise
the number of demonstrators to anywhere near significant. And in the
meantime, the mere assumption that the silent majority would otherwise
also protest is at best patronizing, if not outright undemocratic in
itself. Similar arguments were used to discredit the few pro-regime
demonstrations to date, which nevertheless drew vast superior numbers,
but again the mere fact that these were (of course) encouraged and

facilitated by the regime, does not mean that the people did not join
them willingly, driving around and waiving flags, and that in support
of the president, and equally important, against what they see as
others meddling in and endangering their country. A similar argument,
by the way, can also be made about the recent Palestinian protesters
crossing into the Israeli occupied Golan, who although probably
encouraged (or at the very least not hindered) by the Syrian regime,
nevertheless did so willingly and out of their own conviction,
motivated by their desire to exercise their right to return.
The international community's response has at first been muted, but
the rhetoric has since changed, with increasing condemnation of the
regime, accompanied by widening sanctions, although what exactly this
is meant to achieve remains far from clear. Whatever their intentions
- out of conviction or lack thereof, out of a desire to change
Syria's stance vis-A -vis Iran and/or Israel, out of ignorance or
mere animosity towards the regime, or simply because they had
previously painted themselves into a corner, from which they now
can't get themselves out - combined with what appears to be a
concerted media campaign, and that in the wake of Iraq and Libya, it
is not surprising, that the Syrian regime and the population at large
believe that they are at the receiving end of one big conspiracy. Be
that as it may, current international action is unlikely to benefit
either side, neither is it going to tilt the scales in favor of the
opposition to the extent that they will be able to unseat the present
regime, nor will it entice the regime to speed up reforms, which,
pushed into a corner and under additional financial constrains, will
be even less inclined and able to do so, even if they wanted to. In
the meantime, these measures will only serve to polarize the situation
further, and the end result will in all likelihood be a hardening of
fronts on all sides, which given the current state of affairs, can't
really be in anybody's interest, including the international
community's, and certainly not in the short to medium term.
The main question here would not seem to be whether people are (still)
being killed (however sad or shocking this in itself may be), or
whether the government's crackdown is ruthless, they are and it
probably is, but rather whether it is innocent and peaceful protesters
that are (still) being targeted (and killed) by the security forces.
Not an easy question to answer, not least because of the media ban and
the conflicting narratives, but judging from recent opposition and
media reports, demonstrations have continued despite the army's
crackdown, even if in somewhat smaller numbers, and casualty numbers
have not only dropped significantly, they are now also mostly
constrained to areas where even opposition activist are claiming that
the army is being confronted by armed resistance. The mere fact that
demonstrations do continue, even in areas that have just seen the
army's crackdown, and that now reportedly mostly (even if not
completely) incident free, could also be taken as a sign that the
government's crackdown is not that heavy-handed after all, and that
they have thus learned from their earlier mistakes.
Whatever the case, both the government and increasingly also
opposition activists (again judging from their own statements to the
international media) seem to concur that the regime may have managed
to dodge the proverbial bullet, at least this time around, and even if
the latter would wish it was different. Probably the best indicator
that the tide may be turning is however the mood in Damascus itself,
where people and traffic have been back out in force for the last two
weeks (and especially weekends), whereas previously, although largely

unaffected by the protests themselves, the streets, restaurants and

shopping malls were half-empty, with people visibly worried. The
timing of the international community's hardening stance against
this background would therefore seem to be even more curious.
Source: http://www.stratfor.com/node/22362/archive/sf_sitrep
--