G.R. No.

123263 December 16, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, Branch 32, and ISAH
V. RED, respondents.

NARVASA, C.J.:p
Whether it is the Regional Trial Court, or the Metropolitan Trial Court or other
first level court which has exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal actions
of libel, is the issue raised by the People of the Philippines, as petitioner in
the special civil action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus at bar. The
fairly simple facts from which the issue has arisen are hereunder briefly
narrated.
On January 30, 1995 an information for libel was filed against Isah V. Red in
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case thereby initiated was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-60134 and raffled to Branch 82.
Red filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the RTC had
no jurisdiction of the offense. The Judge found merit in the motion and by an
Order dated March 29, 1995, remanded the case to the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City "for proper action/disposition in the premises." His
Honor declared that "(u)nder Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691, which took effect on
April 15, 1994, exclusive original jurisdiction over 'all offenses punishable
with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years, irrespective of the amount of
fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof is vested in the
Municipal Trial Court. . . " The case was accordingly transferred to the
Quezon City Metropolitan Trial Court where it was docketed as Case No. 4300548 and raffled to Branch 43.
Thereafter, the private prosecutor, "under the control and supervision of the
Fiscal," filed a "Manifestation and Motion to Remand" dated August 1, 1995
praying that the case be returned to the RTC. The movant invoked Article

360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which pertinently provides

that: 1
xxx xxx xxx
The criminal action and civil action for damages in case of
written defamation, as provided for in this chapter, shall be
filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published or where any of the offended
parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense . . .",
and argued that
. . . Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a particular
court (such as the Court of Tax Appeals) are special in
character, and should prevail over the Judiciary Act defining
the jurisdiction of other courts (such as the Court of First
Instance) which is a general law. (De Joya vs. Lantin, 19
SCRA 893). Moreover, a general law cannot repeal or
amend by implication a specific provision or a special law.
Otherwise stated: a subsequent statute, general in character
as to its terms and operation, is not to be construed as
repealing a special or specific enactment, unless the
legislative purpose to do so is manifested. This is so, even if
the provisions of the latter are sufficiently comprehensive to
include what was set forth in the special act. (Philippine
Railway Co. vs. CIR, 91 Phil. 35; Villegas vs. Subido, 41
SCRA 190; Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. CA, 207
SCRA 487).
The MetroTC denied the motion by Order dated August 14, 1995. It opined
that "Rep. Act No. 7691, which took effect on April 15, 1994, would partake of
the nature of a 'modern' law which impliedly repeals an 'ancient' law (the
Revised Penal Code) which is of 1932 vintage, which is inconsistent with the
later law . .; (and that) if the repeal makes the penalty lighter in the new law,
the new law shall be applied." 2 Later, the MetroTC also denied the private
prosecutor's motion for reconsideration, by Order dated September 7, 1995.
Still later, in an Order dated October 18, 1995, it denied another motion by

the same counsel reiterating the plea to remand the case back to the RTC,
and further directed "the prosecution to present . . (its) next witness," trial
having in the meantime commenced.
Now, in this proceeding, the State prays for judgment: "(1) declaring the
questioned Orders dated August 14, 1995, September 7, 1995, and October
18, 1995 as null and void for having been issued by the respondent court
acting without jurisdiction; (2) enjoining the respondent court from further
conducting trials in Criminal Case No. 43-00548; and (3) commanding the
respondent court to remand Criminal Case No. 43-00548 to the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for proper disposition." It
cites Jalandoni v. Endaya (55 SCRA 261 [1974]), where this Court (a) drew
attention to the categorical language of Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code to the effect that "it is a court of first instance that is specifically
designated to try a libel case," and (b) indicated "thirteen (13) cases,
from People v. Topacio, 59 Phil. 356 (1934) to Time, Inc. v. Reyes, 39 SCRA
303 (1971), wherein this . . Court ruled that municipal courts do not have
jurisdiction over libel cases." 3 It further argues that in light
of Jalandoni, and Berces v. Guingona (241 SCRA 539 [1995]) to the effect
that a subsequent statute, general in character as to its terms and
application, is not to be construed as repealing a special or specific
enactment unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest or an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists between them Article
360 of the Revised Penal Code may not be deemed to have been
superseded by Republic Act No. 7691.
This Court has already had occasion to resolve the issue, substantially in line
with the position taken by the People, account having been taken of
substantially the same arguments adduced by the opposing parties in this
case. In G.R. No. 122126 entitled Lydia Caro vs. Court of
Appeals and Violeta Sarigumba, involving the same jurisdictional issue as
that specifically presented in the case at bar, this Court promulgated a
Resolution on June 19, 1996 pertinently reading as follows:
Anent the question of jurisdiction, we . . find no reversible error
committed by public respondent Court of Appeals in denying petitioner's
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The contention . . that R.A. No.
7691 divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction to try libel cases
cannot be sustained. While libel is punishable by imprisonment of six
months and one day to four years and two months (Art. 360, Revised

Penal Code) which imposable penalty is lodged within the Municipal Trial
Courts' jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691 (Sec. 32 [21]), said law,
however, excludes therefrom ". . cases falling within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts . . ." The Court in Bocobo
vs.Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520 and Jalandoni vs. Endaya, 55 SCRA 261,
correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, has laid down the rule that
Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive jurisdiction over libel cases,
hence, the expanded jurisdiction conferred by R.A. 7691 to inferior courts
cannot be applied to libel cases.
Moreover, Administrative Order No. 104-96 treating of the subject:
". . DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY,
CARNAPPING, DANGEROUS DRUGS CASES AND OTHER HEINOUS
CRIMES; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND
JURISDICTION IN LIBEL CASES" issued on October 21, 1996 by the
Chief Justice upon the advice and consent of the Court En Banc, inter
alia provides, in categorical acknowledgment of the validity of the doctrine
just adverted to, that "LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THEM TO THE
EXCLUSION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL
CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS."
The proposition is hereby reaffirmed, the Court perceiving no argument
advanced by respondents justifying its abrogation or modification.
Concerning respondents' contention that the challenged orders are now
immutable, having become final and executory for failure of the prosecution
to take an appeal therefrom, it suffices to advert to the familiar and uniformly
applied axiom that only final orders i.e., those that finally dispose of a
case, leaving nothing more to be done by the court respecting the merits of a
case can become final and executory in the sense of becoming
unalterable through an appeal or review proceeding. 4 Interlocutory orders, on
the other hand i.e., those which resolve incidental motions or collateral
matters but do not put an end to the case never become final in the sense
of becoming unchangeable and impervious to impugnation after expiration of
the period prescribed for taking an appeal from a final judgment. 5
Respecting respondents' claim that venue is merely procedural, suffice it to
point out that unlike in civil cases, in criminal cases venue is jurisdictional. 6

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the respondent Court's Orders dated

August 14, 1995, September 7, 1995, and October 18, 1995 are declared
null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction; and said Court is
enjoined from further taking cognizance of and proceeding with Criminal
Case No. 43-00548, which it is commanded to remand to the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for proper disposition.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 115115 July 18, 1995

CONRAD AND COMPANY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, FITRITE INC., and VICTORIA BISCUITS
CO., INC., respondents.
VITUG, J.:
In an Amended Decision, dated 20 April 1994, the Court of
Appeals reversed an order of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") which
dismissed Civil Case No. 91-3119 for "Injunction with Damages with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction" filed by herein private respondents
Fitrite, Inc., and Victoria Biscuits Co., Inc., against petitioner Conrad and
Company, Inc.

The RTC, acting on a motion to dismiss filed by petitioner, ordered the

dismissal of the complaint. Accordingly, for purposes of this review, the
facts alleged in the complaint, narrated by the appellate court and
hereunder reproduced, should be deemed hypothetically admitted.
. . . Plaintiffs appellants FITRITE, INC. and VICTORIA BISCUIT CO.,
INC. [private respondents here], both domestic corporations, are
engaged in the business of manufacturing, selling and distributing
biscuits and cookies bearing the trademark "SUNSHINE" in the
Philippines. Defendant CONRAD AND COMPANY [petitioner here] is
also engaged in the business of importing, selling and distributing
biscuits and cookies in the Philippines.
Sometime in April 1982, plaintiff FITRITE filed in the Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (hereto referred as
BPTTT) applications for registration of the trademark "SUNSHINE,"
both in the Supplemental and Principal Registers, to be used on
biscuits and cookies. Since March 31, 1981 FITRITE had exclusively
used this trademark in the concept of owner on its biscuits and
cookies. On May 20, 1983 FITRITE's application for this trademark in
the Supplemental Register was approved by the BPTTT and FITRITE
was issued a Certificate of Registration No. SR-6217 for a term of 20
years from the date of approval. On March 22, 1990 FITRITE's
application for the same trademark in the Principal Register was
approved by BPTTT and FITRITE was issued a Certificate of
Registration No. 47590 for a term of 20 years from said date of
approval. On June 28, 1984 FITRITE authorized its sister company,
co-plaintiff VICTORIA BISCUIT CO., to use this trademark on its
biscuits and cookies, as well as to manufacture, promote, sell and
distribute products bearing said trademark.
On September 7, 1990, FITRITE assigned its trademark "SUNSHINE
AND DEVICE LABEL," together with its interest and business
goodwill to said VICTORIA BISCUIT. From the time FITRITE was
issued the Certificate of Registration for this trademark on May 20,
1983 up to the filing of the complaint a quo FITRITE and VICTORIA
BISCUIT have been manufacturing, selling and distributing on a
massive scale biscuits and cookies bearing this trademark; so that

through the years of extensive marketing of plaintiffs' biscuits and

cookies with this trademark, their products have become popularly
known and enjoyed wide acceptability in Metro Manila and in the
provinces.
Then sometime in June 1990, through the affidavit executed on May
30, 1990 by defendant CONRAD's own Import Manager and
Executive Assistant by the name of Raul Olaya, plaintiffs succeeded
in tracing and discovered that CONRAD had been importing, selling
and distributing biscuits and cookies, and other food items bearing
this trademark in the Philippines. Although CONRAD had never
before been engaged in the importation, sale and distribution of
products similar to those of plaintiffs, on April 18, 1988 CONRAD was
suddenly designated exclusive importer and dealer of the products of
"Sunshine Biscuits, Inc." for sale in the Philippine market; and on April
21, 1988, per the affidavit of said Raul Olaya, CONRAD made its first
importation, which was continuously repeated up to the present (May
30, 1990 [date of the affidavit]), altogether consisting of 51,575
cartons and amounting to $579,224.35.
Those acts of CONRAD, done without plaintiffs' consent, were
deliberately calculated to mislead and deceive the purchasers by making
them believe that its (CONRAD'S) "Sunshine" products had originated
from plaintiffs and thereby inducing them to patronize those products, all
to the damage and prejudice of both the purchasing public and plaintiffs.
Through their counsel, plaintiffs addressed a letter to CONRAD
demanding, among other things, that it cease and desist from continuing
with those acts, but the demand was ignored. Being acts of infringement
and unfair competition in violation of plaintiffs' rights, plaintiffs can validly
avail themselves of the remedies against infringement under Sec. 23 of
Republic Act No. 166, as amended, as well as of the remedies against
unfair competition under Sec. 29 of the same statute. 1

In seeking the dismissal of the complaint filed by private respondents with

the trial court, petitioner invoked, jamong other grounds, litis pendentia,
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and failure to state a cause of action.
The trial court, agreeing with petitioner, granted the motion to dismiss the
complaint in an Order, dated 26 February 1992, reading thusly:

The Court agrees with defendant that internationally accepted

trademarks enjoy protection under Philippine laws. Defendant having
been granted distributorship by Sunshine Biscuits USA over
Philippine territory it follows that the resolution of the issue with
respect to the ownership of Sunshine Biscuits which is the basis of
plaintiffs' claim is lodged under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
BPTTT. The action filed by defendant's principal in whose name the
trademark "SUNSHINE BISCUITS" is alleged to be registered in the
United States should be considered as including defendant Conrad
and Company, Inc., it being the beneficiary/agent/assignee of said
Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. Thus, the Court finds the ground of forum
shopping applicable to the case at bar. It cannot also be denied that
there is another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause. Plaintiffs, therefore, should not have filed this case with
this court. It must, therefore, be summarily dismissed. The ground of
litis pendentia is no doubt meritorious. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction should be made to apply in this case considering that the
BPTTT had already acquired jurisdiction over the suit brought by
defendant's principal against the plaintiffs involving the right of
plaintiffs to use said trademark. No doubt the BPTTT is better
situated, considering its experience and special knowledge to
determine the matters of fact involved. Indeed, the rulings laid down
by the Supreme Court on the point is along this trend.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion To Dismiss
filed by defendant is hereby GRANTED. The instant case
filed by plaintiffs is hereby ordered DISMISSED. 2 (Emphasis
ours)

Unsuccessful in their attempt to have the order reconsidered, private

respondents brought the case to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No.
38822).
In an amended decision, dated 20 April 1994, the appellate
court reversed the order of the trial court and ordered the reinstatement
of the case, holding, in part, thusly:
1. It was a motion to dismiss that CONRAD filed instead of an answer
where its "affirmative defense" could have been alleged and later

raised in a motion for preliminary hearing for reception of evidence

and not, as CONRAD did, raise such defense in a mere motion to
dismiss, although such defense involved factual matters outside of
the allegations contained in the complaint;
2. No evidence whatever had been introduced before the outright
dismissal, despite the fact that the factual issues involved in
CONRAD's "affirmative defense" were whether the "SUNSHINE"
trademark has been registered in the United States of America as
claimed by CONRAD; if so registered, whether such registration
antedated the registered trademark of FITRITE in the Philippines;
whether Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., CONRAD's principal, is the actual
registrant thereof; and whether CONRAD is truly an agent of
Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. who is protected by the alleged American
"SUNSHINE" trademark and therefore vested with the legal capacity
to raise such "affirmative defense" in the action a quo; etc.; and
3. Unless and until FITRITE's certificates both in the Supplemental
and Principal Registers as registrant of said "SUNSHINE" trademark
are cancelled by BPTTT, or so long as said "SUNSHINE" trademark
has not been successfully proved by CONRAD in the action
a quo as belonging to Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. or so long as said
trademark has not been successfully proved by Sunshine Biscuits,
Inc. in the cancellation proceeding before BPTTT as belonging to it
(Sunshine Biscuits), for all legal intents and purposes the trademark
belongs to FITRITE and all those acts of importing, selling and
distributing by CONRAD constitute infringement as defined in said
Sec. 22 of Republic Act No. 166, as amended.
xxx xxx xxx
In sum, we find the appeal impressed with merit, considering that
FITRITE is the registrant of the "SUNSHINE" trademark in the
Philippines; that CONRAD's claim that its principal, Sunshine Biscuits,
Inc., is the registrant of a "SUNSHINE" trademark in the United States
of America is a mere allegation still subject to proof; that there is no
identity of causes of action and because the cause before BPTTT is the
cancellability of FITRITE's registration while the cause in the case a

quo is infringement by CONRAD of said "SUNSHINE" trademark of

FITRITE; that there is implied admission that CONRAD has been
importing, selling and distributing biscuits, cookies and other food items
bearing said "SUNSHINE" trademark without FITRITE's consent; that
so long as the cancellation proceeding remains pending in BPTTT, said
"SUNSHINE" trademark belongs exclusively to FITRITE in the
Philippines, and any person using it without FITRITE's consent is guilty
of infringement.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby:
(1) SETS ASIDE the appealed order dated February 26, 1992
dismissing the complaint a quo;
(2) REINSTATES the complaint;
(3) ORDERS defendant Conrad and Company, Inc. to file its
answer within the reglementary period from receipt hereof;
(4) ORDERS the lower court to proceed with the action a quo,
although for a good cause shown the lower court, in its sound
discretion, may suspend the action pending outcome of the
cancellation proceeding between Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. and Fitrite,
Inc. in Inter Partes Case No. 3397 before BPTTT, subject to the
condition provided for in No. (5) below;
(5) ORDERS defendant-appellee Conrad and Company, Inc. to desist
and refrain from importing, manufacturing, selling and distributing in
the Philippines any goods bearing the trademark "SUNSHINE &
DEVICE LABEL" registered in FITRITE's name pending final decision
in the action a quo, it being understood that this order, to effect such
desistance and enjoin defendant-appellee from the aforesaid
activities, shall be considered as the Writ of Injunction itself and an
integral part of this Amended Decision.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 3 (Emphasis ours.)

In the instant petition for review, which has additionally prayed for a writ
of preliminary injunction or for a temporary restraining order, petitioner
tells us that the appellate court has erred
1. When it ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
upon private respondents, posting of a bond in the sum of
P10,000.00, despite the pendency of the cancellation proceedings in
Inter Partes case Nos. 3397 and 3739, and in subsequently
amending its decision by issuing the writ of preliminary injunction
itself.
2. When respondent court failed to apply and totally disregarded the
provisions of the Paris Convention for the protection of industrial
property, as well as the memorandum of the Minister of Trade, dated
November 20, 1980.
3. In holding that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction by the Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT) is not
applicable in this case, and in further holding that the issues involved
in this case is not whether the "SUNSHINE" trademark in question is
registerable or cancellable.
4. Respondent court erred in holding that the ground of litis
pendentia under the Rules of Court does not apply in this case for the
reason that the cause of action in the cancellation proceedings before
the BPTTT is not the same as the cause of action in the case a quo.
5. In ordering the lower court to proceed with the action a quo, although
for a good cause shown the lower court, in its sound discretion, may
suspend the action pending outcome of the cancellation proceeding
between Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. and Fitrite, Inc. in inter partes Case No.
3397 and 3739 before BPTTT. 4

The petition was given due course; however, neither a writ of preliminary
injunction nor a restraining order was issued by this Court.
Unadorned, the issues would revolve simply around the question of
whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error (1) in
allowing the trial court to proceed with the case for "injunction with

damages" filed by private respondents notwithstanding the pendency of

an administrative case for the cancellation of the former's trademark filed
by supposedly "petitioner's principal" with the Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks and Technology Transfer ("BPTTT"); and (2) in meanwhile
issuing an injunction order against petitioner.
We find for private respondents.
The assailed amended decision of the appellate court reinstated the
complaint for "Injunction with Damages with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction" filed by private respondents with the trial court and ordered
petitioner to file its answer. The appellate court enjoined petitioner in the
meantime from importing, manufacturing, selling and distributing in the
Philippines goods bearing the trademark "Sunshine and Device Label"
duly registered with BPTTT in private respondents' name.
Petitioner, invoking the case of Developers Group of Companies
vs. Court of Appeals (219 SCRA 715), contends that the "Petitions for
Cancellation" of Fitrite's Certificate of Registration No. SR-6217 and No.
47590 in the Supplemental Register and the Principal Register,
respectively, which Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., of the United States of
America filed in 1989 and in 1990 (docketed Inter Partes Case No. 3397
and 3739) with BPTTT cast a cloud of doubt on private respondents'
claim of ownership and exclusive right to the use of the trademark
"Sunshine." Considering that this matter is at issue before the BPTTT,
which has primary jurisdiction over the case, petitioner argues, an
injunctive relief from any court would be precipitate and improper.
The appellate court, in disposing of petitioner's argument, points out:
Notwithstanding those provisions, it is CONRAD's contention
relying on the ruling in Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. 88550, 184 SCRA 426 [1990]) that, because
technical matters or intricate issues of fact regarding the ownership of
the trademark in question are involved, its determination requires the
expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper
administrative body, which is BPTTT, which has the primary

jurisdiction over the action a quo; and therefore the trial court should,
and as it correctly did, yield its jurisdiction to BPTTT.
The trial court erred in adopting such fallacious argument. The issue
involved in the action a quo is not whether the "SUNSHINE"
trademark in question is registerable or cancellable which is the
issue pending in BPTTT that may be technical in nature requiring
"expertise, specialized skills and knowledge" since the trademark
has already been registered in both the Supplemental and Principal
Registers of BPTTT in the name of FITRITE; actually, the issue
involved in the action a quo is whether CONRAD's acts of importing,
selling and distributing biscuits, cookies and other food items bearing
said registered "SUNSHINE" trademark in the Philippines without the
consent of its registrant (FITRITE) constitute infringement thereof in
contemplation of Sec. 22 of Republic Act No. 166, as amended.
Under Sec. 22, the elements that constitute infringement are simply
(1) the use by any person, without the consent of the registrant, (2) of
any registered mark or trade-name in connection with the sale,
business or services, among other things, bearing such registered
mark or trade-name. This, clearly, is a factual question that does not
require any specialized skill and knowledge for resolution to justify
the exercise of primary jurisdiction by BPTTT.
But, even assuming which is not the case that the issue involved
here is technical in nature requiring specialized skills and knowledge,
still Industrialized Enterprises does not authorize the outright dismissal of
a case originally cognizable in the courts; what it says is where primary
jurisdiction comes into play in a case "the judicial process is suspended
pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view. 5

We cannot see any error in the above disquisition. It might be mentioned

that while an application for the administrative cancellation of a registered
trademark on any of the grounds enumerated in Section 17 6 of Republic
Act No. 166, as amended, otherwise known as the Trade-Mark Law, falls
under the exclusive cognizance of BPTTT (Sec. 19, Trade-Mark Law), an
action, however, for infringement or unfair competition, as well as the
remedy of injunction and relief for damages, is explicitly and
unquestionably within the competence and jurisdiction of ordinary courts.

Private respondents are the holder of Certificate of Registration No.

47590 (Principal Register) for the questioned trademark. In Lorenzana
vs. Macagba, 154 SCRA 723, cited with approval in Del Monte
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 410, we have declared that
registration in the Principal Register gives rise to a presumption of validity
of the registration and of the registrant's ownership and right to the
exclusive use of the mark. It is precisely such a registration that can
serve as the basis for an action for infringement. 7 An invasion of this right
entitles the registrant to court protection and relief. Section 23 and
Section 27, Chapter V, of the Trade-Mark Law provides:
Sec. 23. Actions, and damages and injunction for infringement.
Any person entitled to the exclusive use of a registered mark or tradename may recover damages in a civil action from any person who
infringes his rights, and the measure of the damages suffered shall
be either the reasonable profit which the complaining party would
have made, had the defendant not infringe his said rights, or the profit
which the defendant actually made out of the infringement, or in the
event such measure of damages cannot be readily ascertained with
reasonable certainty, then the court may award as damages a
reasonable percentage based upon the amount of gross sales of the
defendant or the value of the services in connection with which the
mark or trade-name was used in the infringement of the rights of the
complaining party. In cases where actual intent to mislead the public
or to defraud the complaining party shall be shown, in the discretion
of the court, the damages may be doubled.
The complaining party, upon proper showing, may also be granted
injunction.
Sec. 27. Jurisdiction of [Regional Trial Court]. All actions under this
Chapter and Chapters VI and VII hereof shall be brought before the
proper [Regional Trial Court].
Surely, an application with BPTTT for an administrative cancellation of a
registered trade mark cannot per se have the effect of restraining or
preventing the courts from the exercise of their lawfully conferred
jurisdiction. A contrary rule would unduly expand the doctrine of primary

jurisdiction which, simply expressed, would merely behoove regular

courts, in controversies involving specialized disputes, to defer to the
findings of resolutions of administrative tribunals on certain technical
matters. This rule, evidently, did not escape the appellate court for it
likewise decreed that for "good cause shown, the lower court, in its sound
discretion, may suspend the action pending outcome of the cancellation
proceedings" before BPTTT.
Needless to say, we cannot at this stage delve into the merits of the
cancellation case. In this instance, the sole concern, outside of the
jurisdictional aspect of the petition hereinbefore discussed, would be
that which focuses on the propriety of the injunction order of the
appellate court. On this score, the appellate court has said:
Thus, having the exclusive right over said trademark, FITRITE should
be protected in the use thereof (Philips Export B.V. vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 96161, 206 SCRA 457 [1992]); and considering that
it is apparent from the record that the invasion of the right FITRITE
sought to protect is material and substantial; that such right of FITRITE
is clear and unmistakable; and that there is an urgent necessity to
prevent serious damage to FITRITE's business interest, goodwill and
profit, thus under the authority of Sec. 23 of said Republic Act No. 166,
as amended, a preliminary injunction may be issued in favor of
FITRITE to maintain the status quo pending trial of the action a quo on
the merits without prejudice to the suspension of such action if the
aforesaid cancellation proceeding before the BPTTT has not been
concluded. 8 (Emphasis supplied.)

The appellate court's finding that there is an urgent necessity for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction pending resolution by BPTTT
of the petition for cancellation filed by Sunshine USA in Inter Partes Case
No. 3397 would indeed appear to have merit. The prematurity of
petitioner's motion to dismiss places the case at bench quite apart from
that of Developers Group of Companies, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 219
SCRA 715. The allegations of the complaint, perforced hypothetically
deemed admitted by petitioner, would here justify the issuance by
appellate court of its injunction order. Petitioner, itself, does not even
appear to be a party in the administrative case (Inter Partes Case No.
3397). The averment that Sunshine USA is petitioner's principal, and that

it has a prior foreign registration that should be respected conformably

with the Convention of the Union of Paris for the Protection of Industrial
Property are mere asseverations in the motion to dismiss which, along
with some other factual assertions, are yet to be established.
All given, we find no reversible error on the part of the appellate court in
its appealed decision.
In closing, the Court would urge the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and
Technology Transfer to resolve with dispatch the administrative cases
(Inter Partes Case No. 3397 and No. 3739) referred to in this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit, and
the questioned amended decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
Romero, Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 1690

Present:

CARPIO, J., C
VELASCO, JR
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,* a
ABAD, JJ.

-versus-

SANDIGANBAYAN
DIVISION) and ROLANDO PLAZA,
Respondents.

(THIRD
Promulgated:

September 1

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DECISION

the period required by law, with deliberate intent and intent to gain,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to
liquidate said cash advances of P33,000.00, Philippine Currency,
despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in
the aforesaid amount.

PERALTA, J.:

CONTRARY TO LAW.

For this Court's resolution is a petition[1] dated September 2, 2005

Thereafter, respondent Plaza filed a Motion to Dismiss [3] dated April

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court that seeks to reverse and set aside the

7, 2005 with the Sandiganbayan, to which the latter issued an

Resolution[2] of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division), dated July 20, 2005,

Order[4] dated April

dismissing Criminal Case No. 27988, entitled People of the Philippines v.

comment. Petitioner filed its Opposition[5] to the Motion to Dismiss on April

Rolando Plaza for lack of jurisdiction.

19,

12,

2005. Eventually,

2005 directing
the

petitioner

Sandiganbayan

to

submit

promulgated

its
its

Resolution[6] on July 20, 2005 dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction,
The facts follow.
Respondent Rolando Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu, at the time relevant to this case, with
salary grade 25, had been charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation of
Section 89 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, or The Auditing Code of

without prejudice to its filing before the proper court. The dispositive
portion of the said Resolution provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case
is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without
prejudice to its filing in the proper court.
SO ORDERED.

the Philippines for his failure to liquidate the cash advances he received on
December 19, 1995 in the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos
(P33,000.00) . The Information reads:
That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime
prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo City, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused ROLANDO PLAZA, a high-ranking public
officer, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo
City, and committing the offense, in relation to office, having
obtained cash advances from the City Government of Toledo in the
total amount of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND PESOS
(P33,000.00), Philippine Currency, which he received by reason of
his office, for which he is duty bound to liquidate the same within

Thus, the present petition.

Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan has criminal jurisdiction
over cases involving public officials and employees enumerated under
Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, (as amended by Republic Act [R.A.] Nos.
7975 and 8249), whether or not occupying a position classified under salary
grade 27 and above, who are charged not only for violation of R.A. 3019,
R.A. 1379 or any of the felonies included in Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, but also for crimes committed in relation

to

office. Furthermore,

petitioner

questioned

the

Sandiganbayans

appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan,[7] claiming

Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of

The Auditing Code of the Philippines.

that the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine
the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of

This Court has already resolved the above issue in the

P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is

affirmative. People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante[9] is a case with uncanny

either a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII

similarities to the present one. In fact, the respondent in the earlier case,

of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in Section 4

Victoria Amante and herein respondent Plaza were both members of

(a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and R.A. 8249, which was

the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu at the time pertinent to

made applicable to cases concerning violations of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and

this case. The only difference is that, respondent Amante failed to liquidate

Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, equally applies to

the amount of Seventy-One Thousand Ninety-Five Pesos (P71,095.00) while

offenses committed in relation to public office.

respondent Plaza failed to liquidate the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand

Pesos (P33,000.00).

[8]

In his Comment dated November 30, 2005, respondent Plaza

argued that, as phrased in Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, it is apparent
that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was defined first, while the

In ruling that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of

exceptions to the general rule are provided in the rest of the paragraph and

the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged

sub-paragraphs of Section 4; hence, the Sandiganbayan was right in ruling

with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines, this Court cited the

that it has original jurisdiction only over the following cases: (a) where the

case of Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.[10] as a background on the conferment

accused is a public official with salary grade 27 and higher; (b) in cases

of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, thus:

where the accused is a public official below grade 27 but his position is one
of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1) (a) to (g) of P. D.
1606, as amended and his offense involves a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A.
1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and (c)
if the indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the three
aforementioned statutes, the general rule that a public official must occupy a
position with salary grade 27 and higher in order that the Sandiganbayan
could exercise jurisdiction over him must apply.
In a nutshell, the core issue raised in the petition is whether or not the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of theSangguniang

x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486,

promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June
11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of
official conduct required of public officers and employees,
based on the concept that public officers and employees shall
serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times
accountable to the people.[11]
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No.
1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D.
No. 1606 expanded thejurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[12]
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861
on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan

jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975approved on March 30,

1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which
was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. x x x .

permanent,
acting
or
interim
capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense: x x x.[14]

Like in the earlier case, the present case definitely falls under Section
Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. 7975 which

4 (b) where other offenses and felonies committed by public officials or

took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended on February 5,

employees in relation to their office are involved where the said provision,

1997 by R.A. 8249, is the law that should be applied in the present case, the

contains no exception. Therefore, what applies in the present case is the

offense having been allegedly committed on or about December 19, 1995 and

general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be

the Information having been filed on March 25, 2004. As extensively

determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the

explained in the earlier mentioned case,

commission of the offense. The present case having been instituted on March

The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is

to be determined at the time of the institution of the
action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.
[13]
The exception contained in R. A. 7975, as well as R.
A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving
violations of R. A. No. 3019, as amended, R. A. No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense
involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the
Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of
paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states:
Sec.
4. Jurisdiction.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A.

Violations of Republic Act No. 3019,

as amended, other known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in
the government, whether in a

25, 2004, the provisions of R.A. 8249 shall govern. P.D. 1606, as amended
by R.A. 8249 states that:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - - The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch
occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and
higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vicegovernors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and provincial treasurers,

assessors, engineers, and other city

department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice mayors,
members of the sangguniang panlungsod,
city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and
other city department heads.
(c) Officials of the diplomatic
service occupying the position of consul
and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force
colonels, naval captains, and all officers
of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and
PNP officers of higher rank;
(f)
City
and
provincial
prosecutors and their assistants, and
officials and prosecutors in the Office of
the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of governmentowned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials
thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4)
Chairmen
and
members
of
Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials

classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.
B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed
with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
Again, the earlier case interpreted the above provisions, thus:
The above law is clear as to the composition of the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4
(a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated:
violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In
order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the
said offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others,
officials of the executive branch occupying positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27
and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of
exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and
below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus
enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively
enumerated are provincial governors, vice-govenors,
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial
department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers,
and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic
service occupying the position as consul and higher;
Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP
officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and
their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of

the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents,

directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section
4 (b) of the same law provides that other offenses or
felonies committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also
fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[15]

Clearly, as decided in the earlier case and by simple application of

the pertinent provisions of the law, respondent Plaza, a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod during the alleged commission of an offense in
relation to his office, necessarily falls within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Finally, as to the inapplicability of the Inding[16] case wherein it was
ruled that the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D.
1606, as amended, are included within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade and which the Sandiganbayan
relied upon in its assailed Resolution, this Court enunciated, still in the
earlier case of People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante,[17] that the Inding case
did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of
the enumeration provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as
amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a
violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code. As thoroughly discussed:
x x x In the Inding case, the public official involved was a
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod with Salary Grade
25 and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In
ruling that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the said
public official, this Court concentrated its disquisition on
the provisions contained in Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, where the offenses involved are

specifically enumerated and not on Section 4 (b) where

offenses or felonies involved are those that are in relation
to the public officials' office. Section 4 (b) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, provides that:
b. Other offenses or felonies
committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of
this section in relation to their office.
A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above
provision shows that those public officials enumerated in
Sec. 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be
charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A.
No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other
offenses or felonies in relation to their office. The said
other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are
limited only to those that are committed in relation to the
public official or employee's office. This Court had ruled
that as long as the offense charged in the information is
intimately connected with the office and is alleged to
have been perpetrated while the accused was in the
performance, though improper or irregular, of his
official functions, there being no personal motive to
commit the crime and had the accused not have
committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the
accused is held to have been indicted for an offense
committed in relation to his office.[18] Thus, in the case
of Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et al..,[19]where the crime
involved was murder, this Court held that:
The phrase other offenses or felonies is
too broad as to include the crime of murder,
provided it was committed in relation to the
accuseds official functions. Thus, under said
paragraph
b,
what
determines
the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the official
position or rank of the offender that is, whether
he is one of those public officers or employees
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. x x x

Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,

[20]
where the public official was charged with grave
threats, this Court ruled:
x x x In the case at bar, the amended
information contained allegations that the accused,
petitioner herein, took advantage of his official
functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan,
Bulacan when he committed the crime of grave
threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal
Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a
municipal councilor. The Office of the Special
Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at
and threatening to kill Legaspi during a public
hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege
speech critical of petitioners administration. Clearly,
based on such allegations, the crime charged is
intimately connected with the discharge of
petitioners official functions. This was elaborated
upon by public respondent in its April 25,
1997 resolution wherein it held that the accused was
performing his official duty as municipal mayor
when he attended said public hearing and that
accuseds violent act was precipitated by
complainants criticism of his administration as the
mayor or chief executive of the municipality, during
the latters privilege speech. It was his response to
private complainants attack to his office. If he was
not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or
angered by whatever private complainant might have
said during said privilege speech. Thus, based on the
allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan
correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close
reading of the Information filed against respondent Amante for
violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the
said offense was committed in relation to her office, making her fall
under Section 4 (b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended.

According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan,

if the intention of the law had been to extend the application of the
exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan could
assert jurisdiction, then there would have been no need to
distinguish between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on the
one hand, and other offenses or felonies committed by public
officials and employees in relation to their office on the other. The
said reasoning is misleading because a distinction apparently
exists. In the offenses involved in Section 4 (a), it is not disputed
that public office is essential as an element of the said offenses
themselves, while in those offenses and felonies involved in
Section 4 (b), it is enough that the said offenses and felonies
were committed in relation to the public officials or employees'
office. In expounding the meaning of offenses deemed to have
been committed in relation to office, this Court held:
In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)],
the Court elaborated on the scope and reach of the term
offense committed in relation to [an accuseds] office by
referring to the principle laid down in Montilla v.
Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an exception to that
principle which was recognized in People v. Montejo [108
Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out inMontilla v.
Hilario is that an offense may be considered as committed
in relation to the accuseds office if the offense cannot
exist without the office such that the office [is] a
constituent element of the crime x x x. In People v.
Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said
that although public office is not an element of the crime
of murder in [the] abstract, the facts in a particular case
may show that
x x x the offense therein charged is
intimately connected with [the accuseds]
respective offices and was perpetrated
while they were in the performance, though
improper or irregular, of their official
functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no
personal motive to commit the crime and
they would not have committed it had they
not held their aforesaid offices. x x x[21]

Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same

provisions of Section 4 (b) does not mention any
qualification as to the public officials involved. It simply
stated, public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it refers to
those public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above,
except those specifically enumerated. It is a well-settled
principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will
be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification,[22] unless it is evident

that the legislature intended a technical or

special legal meaning to those words. [23] The
intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily,
untrained philologists and lexicographers - to
use statutory phraseology in such a manner is
always presumed. (Italics supplied.)[24]

With the resolution of the present case and the earlier

case of People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante,[25] the issue as
to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has now attained
clarity.
WHEREFORE, the Petition dated September 2,
2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated July 20, 2005 is
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Let the case
be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-14595

May 31, 1960

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE GREGORIO MONTEJO, Judge, Court of First Instance,
Zamboanga City and Basilan City, MAYOR LEROY S. BROWN,
DETECTIVE JOAQUIN R. POLLISCO, PATROLMAN GRACIANO
LACERNA aliasDODONG, PATROLMAN MOHAMAD HASBI, SPECIAL
POLICEMAN DIONISIO DINGLASA, SPECIAL POLICEMAN
HADJARATIL, SPECIAL POLICEMAN ALO, and JOHN
DOES, respondents.
Acting City Atty. Perfecto B. Querubin for petitioner.
Hon. Gregorio Montejo in his own behalf.
C. A. S. Sipin, Jr. for the other respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:

This is a special civil action for certiorari , with mandamus and

preliminary injunction, against Hon. Gregorio Montejo, as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of the cities of Zamboanga and Basilan, and the
defendants in Criminal Case No. 672 of said court.
In the petition herein, which was filed by the prosecution in said criminal
case, it is prayed that, pending the final determination thereof, a writ of
preliminary injunction issue, enjoining respondent Judge from proceeding
with the trial of said case; that, after due hearing, the rulings of
respondent Judge, rejecting some evidence for the prosecution therein
and not permitting the same to propound certain questions, be set aside;
that said respondent Judge be ordered to admit the aforementioned
evidence and permit said questions; and that Senator Roseller Lim be
declared, contrary to another ruling made by respondent Judge,
disqualified by the Constitution from appearing as counsel for the
accused in said criminal case. Soon, after the filing of the petition, we
issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for, without bond.
In their respective answers, respondents alleged, in substance, that the
ruling complained of are in conformity with law.
Respondents Leroy S. Brown, Mayor of Basilan City, Detective Joaquin
R. Pollisco, Patrolman Graciano Lacerna (alias Dodong) and Mohamad
Hasbi, Special Policemen Dionisio Dinglasa, Moro Yakan, Hadjaratil,
Moro Alo and several John Does, are charged, in said Criminal Case No.
672, with murder. It is alleged in the information therein that, during May
and June, 1958, in the sitio of Tipo-Tipo, district of Lamitan, City of
Basilan, Mayor Brown "organized groups of police patrol and civilian
commandoes", consisting of regular and special policemen, whom he
"armed with pistols and high power guns", and then "established a
camp", called sub-police headquarters hereinafter referred to as substation at Tipo-Tipo, Lamitan, which was placed under his command,
orders, direct supervision and control, and in which his codefendants
were stationed; that the criminal complaints were entertained in said substation, in which defendant Pollisco acted as investigating officer and
exercised authority to order the apprehension of persons and their
detention in the camp, for days or weeks, without due process of law and
without bringing them to the proper court; that, on or about June 4, and 5,

1958; one Yokan Awalin Tebag was arrested by order of Mayor Brown,
without any warrant or complaint filed in court, and then brought to, and
detained in, the aforementioned sub-station; that while on the way
thereto, said Awalin Tebag was maltreated, pursuant to instructions of
Mayor Brown, concurred in by Pollisco, to the effect that Tebag be
mauled until such time as he shall surrender his gun; that, once in the
sub-station, Tebag, whose hands were securely tied, was subjected, by
defendants Lacerna, Hasbi, Pollisco, Dinglasa, and other special
policemen, to further and more severe torture, in consequence of which
Tebag died; that, in order to simulate that Tebag had been killed by peace
officers in the course of an encounter between the latter and a band of
armed bandits of which he formed part, the body of Tebag was brought,
early the next morning, to a nearby isolated field, where defendant Hasbi
fired twice at said dead body from behind, and then an old Japanese rifle,
supplied by Mayor Brown, was placed beside said body; and that, in
furtherance of the aforementioned simulation, a report of said imaginary
encounter, mentioning Tebag as the only member of a band of armed
bandits whose identity was known, was submitted and respondent Hasbi
caused one of his companions to shoot him on the left arm.
During the trial of said criminal case, respondent Judge rejected the
following evidence for the prosecution therein:
1. Exhibit A A report of Capt. F. G. Sarrosa, Commanding Officer of the
PC Detachment in Basilan City, who investigated the case, showing that
on June 5, 1958, he and Lt. Clemente Antonio, PAF, found nine (9)
detainees in the Tipo-Tipo sub-station. This was part of the chain of
evidence of the prosecution to prove that persons used to be detained in
the aforementioned sub-station by the main respondents herein, without
either a warrant of arrest or a complaint filed in court.
2. Exhibit C Letter of Atty. Doroteo de Guzman to the officer in charge
of the sub-station, dated June 4, 1958, inquiring as to the whereabouts of
Awalin Tebag, who, according to the letter, was arrested in his house, by
policemen, on June 4, 1958. Capt. Sarrosa took possession of this letter
in the course of his aforementioned investigation.

3. Exhibits G, G-1, G-2 and G-3 These are the transcript of the
testimony of Tebag's mother, before the City Fiscal of Basilan City, when
she asked an autopsy of the body of her son.
4. Exhibits J to V Consisting of the following, namely: a sketch of the
sub-station; pictures of several huts therein, indicating their relative
positions and distances; a picture depicting how the body of Tebag was
taken from a camarin in the sub-station; a picture showing how
Patrolman Hasbiwas shot by a companion, at this request; and a picture,
Exhibit T, demonstrating how Mayor Brown allegedly gave the Japanese
rifle, Exhibit Y, to Hasbi, to be planted beside Tebag's body.
Although referred to by Yakan Carnain, Arit, Lianson, Kona Amenola, and
Asidin, in the course of their testimony as witnesses for the prosecution,
these exhibits were not admitted in evidence, which were presented to
show how they were able to observe the movements in the sub-station,
the same being quite small.
5. Exhibits X (a "barong") and X-1 (a scabbard) Amenola said that
these effects were given to him by Mayor Brown in the latter's office, and
that he then saw therein the Japanese rifle, Exhibit Y, which was later
placed beside the dead body of Awalin Tebag.
6. Exhibits DD, DD-1, FF, JJ, KK and LL These show that on April 28,
1958, Yakan Kallapattoh and Fernandez (Pilnandiz) executed affidavits
admitting participation in a given robbery; that an information therefor
(Exh. KK) was filed against them on May 2, 1958, with the municipal
court of Basilan City (Criminal Case No. 1774); and that, in compliance
with warrants for their arrest then issued, they were apprehended and
detained in the sub-station, thus corroborating the testimony of
prosecution witness Yakans Amenola, Carnain Asidin and Arip to the
effect that Kallapattoh and Fernandez (Pilnandiz) were together with
them, in the aforementioned sub-station, when Tebag was maltreated and
died therein, on June 4, 1958, as well as confirming Pollisco's statement,
Exhibit TT-18, before the City Fiscal of Basilan city, on June 21, 1958,
admitting that Fernandez was in the sub-station on June 5, 1958, on
account of the warrant of arrest adverted to. Through the exhibits in
question the prosecution sought, also, to bolster up its theory that

Kallapattoh and Fernandez disappeared from the sub-station after

Tebag's death, because the main respondents herein illegally released
them to prevent them from revealing the circumstances surrounding said
event.
7. Exhibits II, II-1, and MM These are sketches of a human body and
pictures purporting to show the points of entrance, as well as of exit, of
two (2) bullets wounds found on the body of Tebag. Respondent Judge
rejected these exhibits and did not allow Dr. Rosalino Reyes, Chief of the
Medico-Legal Section of the National Bureau of Investigation, to answer
questions asked by the prosecution, to establish that the trajectories of
said bullets wounds were parallel to each other, which, the prosecution
claims, would have been impossible had Tebag been alive when he
sustained said wounds..
8. Respondent Judge sustained, also, the objections to certain questions
propounded to said Dr. Reyes, to show that the injuries sustained by
Tebag in the large intestines must have been inflicted when Tebag was
dead already, and did not allow Dr. Reyes to draw lines on Exhibits II and
MM, indicating the connection between the points of entrance and those
of exit of said wounds.
9. Exhibits Z, Z-1, Z-2 These are records of the office of the City Fiscal
of Basilan City showing that the Japanese rifle, Exhibit Y, two rounds of
ammunitions and one empty shell were received by said Office from the
Police Department of Basilan City on June 17, 1958. These exhibits were
presented to show that said rifle tallies with the description thereof given
by prosecution witness Kona Amenola, in his affidavit, dated June 14,
1958, when said weapon was still in the possession of respondent
Pollisco, and hence, to establish Amenola's veracity.
Likewise, the following rebuttal evidence for the prosecution were
rejected by respondent Judge, viz:
1. Exhibits OO to OO-8 These are daily records of events of the police
department, Lamitan District, Basilan City, including the Tipo-Tipo region.
They do not mention the killing therein, by the police patrol, of any outlaw
on June 5, 1958, thereby contradicting the reports (Exhs. 12 and 12-A) of

respondent Pollisco and Hasbi about it. Respondent Judge did not allow
the record clerk of the City Fiscal's office to identify said exhibits, upon
the ground that it was too late to present him although when the exhibits
were marked by the prosecution it reserved the right to identify them as
part of official records.
2. Exhibits PP, QQ to QQ-3 Respondent Pollisco had testified that on
June 4, 1958, Hadji Aisa inquired about one Awalin; that he told Aisa that
Awalin was taken by Mayor Brown to the seat of the city government; and
that he (Pollisco) suggested that Datu Unding be advised not to worry,
because there was no evidence against Awalin. To impeach the veracity
of Pollisco, the prosecution presented the exhibits under consideration,
for the same show that one Dong Awalin (who is different from Awalin
Tebag) was apprehended on May 27, 1958, and released on bail on June
23, 1958; that Pollisco could not have truthfully informed Aisa on June 4,
1958, what Dong Awalin had been taken by Mayor Brown to the seat of
the city government and that there was no evidence against him; for he
was then a detention prisoner; and that Pollisco could not have had in
mind, therefore, said Dong Awalin as the Awalin about whom Aisa had
inquired. Indeed, Exhibits TT-13 to TT-16 show that, testifying before the
City Fiscal, respondent Pollisco said that he twice ordered Patrolman
Lacerna on June 4, 1958, to bring Awalin Tebag to him (Pollisco) for
investigation.
3. Exhibits SS to SS-7 These are the testimonies before the City
Fiscal, of defense witness Mohammad Sali who, on cross examination by
the prosecution, denied having given it. Thus the predicate therefor was
established by the prosecution which sought thereby to impeach Sali's
veracity.
4. Exhibits TT, TT-1 to TT-25 These are the testimonies, before the
City Fiscal of the main respondents herein, who gave a different story
before respondent Judge. The prosecution thus sought to impeach their
veracity as witnesses in their own behalf, after laying down the predicate
in the course of their cross examination.

5. Exhibits UU, UU-1 to UU-3 These are sworn statements made by

defendant Hasbi before the City Fiscal. They were presented in rebuttal,
after laying down the predicate, to impeach his testimony in court.
6. Exhibits RR, RR-1, XX and XX-1 With these exhibits the
prosecution tried to rebut Pollisco's testimony to the effect that
prosecution witness Lianson Arip had a grudge against him, he (Pollisco)
having charged him with theft in the City Fiscal's Office. It appears from
said exhibits that Arip's affidavit, implicating Pollisco, was dated June 8,
1958, whereas Pollisco's affidavit charging Arip with theft, was dated
June 20, 1958, so that said statement of Arip could not have been
influenced by Pollisco's subsequent act.
In contrast with the severe and rigorous policy used by respondent Judge
in dealing with the aforementioned evidence for the prosecution,
petitioner herein cites the liberality with which the lower court admitted,
as evidence for the defense, records of supposed achievements of the
Tipo-Tipo sub-station (Exhibits 9 to 9-G, 10 to 10-I, 17 to 17-C, 19 to 19A, 20 to 20-I 21 and 22), a congratulatory communication (Exh. 24), and
a letter of commendation to a peace officer assigned thereto (Exh. 7),
including an article in the Philippine Free Press (Exhs. 23 and 23-A).
Upon a review of the record, we are fully satisfied that the lower court
had, not only erred, but, also, committed a grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the resolutions complained of, in rejecting the aforementioned
direct and rebuttal evidence for the prosecution, and in not permitting the
same to propound the questions, already adverted to. It is obvious to us
that said direct and rebuttal evidence, as well as the aforementioned
questions, are relevant to the issues involved in Criminal Case No. 627.
Although it is not possible to determine with precision, at this stage of the
proceedings, how far said exhibits may affect the outcome of that case, it
is elemental that all parties therein are entitled to a reasonable
opportunity to establish their respective pretense. In this connection it
should be noted that, in the light of the allegations of the amended
information in said case and of the records before us, the issue of the
guilt or innocence of the accused therein is bound to hinge heavily upon
the veracity of the opposing witnesses and the weight attached to their
respective testimony. Hence, the parties should be allowed a certain

latitude in the presentation of their evidence lest they may be so

hampered that the ends of justice may eventually be defeated or appear
to be defeated. The danger of leading to such result must be avoided,
particularly in cases of the nature, importance and significance of the one
under consideration.
With respect to the question whether or not Senator Roseller Lim may
appear as counsel for the main respondents herein, as defendants in
said criminal case, the Constitution provides that no Senator or Member
of the House of Representatives shall "appear as counsel ... in any
criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the Government is
accused of an offense committed in relation of his office ... (Art. VI, Sec.
17, Const. of the Phil.). The issue, therefore, is whether the defendants in
Criminal case No. 672 are "accused of an offense committed in relation"
to their office.
A mere perusal of the amended information therein readily elicits an
affirmative answer. It is alleged in said amended information that "Leroy
S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of
police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policemen
and ... special policemen, appointed and provided by him with pistols and
high power guns" and then "established a camp ... at Tipo-Tipo," which is
under his "command, ... supervision and control," where his codefendants
were stationed, entertained criminal complaints and conducted the
corresponding investigations, as well as assumed the authority to arrest
and detain persons without due process of law and without bringing them
to the proper court, and that, in line with this set-up established by said
Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders, his
codefendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag, who died in
consequence thereof.
It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office is not an
element of the crime of murder in abstract, as committed by the main
respondents herein, according to the amended information, the offense
therein charged is intimately connected with their respective offices and
was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or
irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, they had no personal motive to
commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held

their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S. Brown,

obeyed his instructions because he was their superior officer, as Mayor of
Basilan City.
The case of Monllito vs. Hilario and Crisologo, 90 Phil., 49, relied upon by
respondent Judge, in overruling the objection of the prosecution to the
appearance of Senator Roseller Lim, is not in point, for, as stated in the
decision therein:
From the allegations of the information it does not appear that the
official positions of the accused were connected with the offense
charged. In fact, the attorneys for the prosecution stated that the
motives for the crimes were personal with political character. It
does not even appear, nor is there assertion, that the crimes were
committed by the defendants in line of duty or in the performance
of their official functions. (Emphasis supplied.)
Such is not the situation obtaining in the case at bar.
Wherefore, the rulings complained of are set aside and reversed and
respondent Judge is hereby enjoined to admit the aforementioned direct
and rebuttal evidence for the prosecution, as well as to permit the
formulation, of the questions already referred to, with costs against the
respondents herein. It is so ordered.

On 13 January 1994, two informations for kidnapping for ransom with

murder were filed with the RTC of Bacolod City against fourteen persons,
five of whom are members of the PNP, namely, P/Col. Nicolas M. Torres,
P/Insp. Adonis C. Abeto, Police Officers Mario Lamis, Jose Pahayupan,
and Vicente Canuday, Jr.; the other nine are civilians. The informations,
later docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in Branch 47 of
the said court, are similarly worded, except as to the names of the
victims, who are Rufino Gargar, Jr. in the first case and Danilo
Lumangyao in the second, thus:
The undersigned hereby accuses JEANETTE YANSONDUMANCAS, CHARLES DUMANCAS (BOTH AS PRINCIPALS BY
INDUCTION), POLICE COL. NICOLAS M. TORRES (AS PRINCIPAL
BY INDUCTION AND BY DIRECTION AND/OR INDISPENSABLE
COOPERATION), POLICE INSPECTOR ADONIS C. ABETO,
POLICE OFFICERS MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ, JOSE
PAHAYUPAN, VICENTE CANUDAY, JR., DOMINADOR GEROCHE
Y MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO, ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ,
EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY DELGADO, ALL AS PRINCIPALS
BY PARTICIPATION, CESAR PECHA AND EDGAR HILADO, BOTH
AS ACCESSORIES, of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM
WITH MURDER, committed as follows:
G.R. Nos. 118013-14 October 11, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. DEMOSTHENES L. MAGALLANES, as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Bacolod City, and P/COL. NICOLAS
M. TORRES, P/INSP. ADONIS C. ABETO, PO MARIO LAMIS Y
FERNANDEZ, PO JOSE PAHAYUPAN, PO VICENTE CANUDAY, JR.,
JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANCAS, CHARLES DUMANCAS,
DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO,
ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY
DELGADO, CESAR PECHA, and EDGAR HILADO, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
At issue in this special civil action for certiorari is whether it is the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City or the Sandiganbayan that
has jurisdiction over the two criminal cases for kidnapping for ransom
with murder wherein some of the accused implicated as principals are
members of the Philippine National Police (PNP).

That during the period beginning in the late afternoon of August 6,

1992 and ending the late evening of the following day in Sitio
Pedrosa, Barangay Alijis, Bacolod City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and concurring in a common criminal intent
and execution thereof with one another, save for the accessories for
the purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of P353, 000.00, did,
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously to wit:
Acting upon the inducement of spouses Jeanette YansonDumancas and Charles Dumancas, under the direction cooperation
and undue influence, exerted by P/Col. Nicolas M. Torres, taking
advantage of his position as Station Commander of the Philippine
National Police, Bacolod City Station, with the direct participation
and cooperation of Police Inspector Adonis C. Abeto, other police
officers Vicente Canuday, Jr., Jose Pahayupan, Mario Lamis,
civilian (police) agents Rolando R. Fernandez, Edwin Divinagracia,
Teody Delgado, Jaime Gargallano, also taking advantage of their
respective positions, and Dominador Geroche, concurring and
affirming in the said criminal design, with the use of motor vehicle
abduct, kidnap and detain one RUFINO GARGAR, JR. (Criminal

Case No. 94-15562 and DANILO LUMANGYAO (Criminal Case No.

94-15563), shortly thereafter at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening
of August 7, 1992, failing in their aforesaid common purpose to
extort money and in furtherance of said conspiracy, with evident
premeditation and treachery nocturnity and the use of motor
vehicle, did then and there shot and kill the said victims, while being
handcuffed and blindfolded; that accused Cesar Pecha and Edgar
Hilado, with knowledge that the said Gargar [and Lumangyao, in
Crim. Case No. 94-15563 were victims] of violence, did then and
there secretly bury the corpses in a makeshift shallow grave for the
purpose of concealing the crime of murder in order to prevent its
discovery for a fee of P500.00 each; aforesaid act or acts has
caused damage and prejudice to the heirs of said victims, to wit:

P 50,000.00 as indemnity for death;

50,000.00 actual damages;

300,000.00 compensatory damages

(Lost income);

100,000.00 moral damages;

50,000.00 exemplary damages.

CONTRARY TO LAW (Articles 268 and 248

in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code).1

These cases were consolidated.

Each of the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Later, they
filed their respective motions for bail. At the hearings thereof, the

prosecution presented state witness Moises Grandeza, the alleged lone

eyewitness and co-conspirator in the commission of the complex crimes.
After the completion of his testimony, the trial court, per Judge Edgar G.
Garvilles, granted bail in favor of only six of the accused, namely, P/Insp.
Adonis Abeto, Police Officers Jose Pahayupan and Vicente Canuday, Jr.,
Charles Dumancas, Edgar Hilado, and Cesar Pecha. The other eight
accused who were denied bail are now detained at the City Jail of
Bacolod City. 2
Through the testimony of Grandeza, the prosecution established that in
response to the complaint of spouses Charles and Jeanette Dumancas,
P/Col. Nicolas Torres instructed his men to look for Rufino Gargar and
Danilo Lumangyao who were allegedly members of the group that had
swindled the Dumancas spouses. On 6 August 1992, Police Officer Mario
Lamis, together with civilian agents, namely, Teody Delgado, Edwin
Divinagracia, Jaime Gargallano, Rolando Fernandez, and Moises
Grandeza, arrested and abducted the two swindling suspects.
Conformably with Torres's order, the two suspects were brought to
Dragon Lodge Motel. There, they were investigated by Police Inspector
Adonis Abeto and Police Officers Jose Pahayupan and Vicente Canuday,
Jr.. They were then taken to the Ceres Compound, where Jeanette
Dumancas identified Lumangyao as a member of the group that had
swindled her. She then asked about the money that the group had
received from her. Upon being told by Lumangyao that the money had
already been divided among his partners long time ago, she said to the
accused, specifically to Dominador Geroche: "Doming, bring these two to
the PC or police and I will call Atty. Geocadin so that proper cases could
be filed against them." Thereafter, the two suspects were transferred to D'
Hacienda Motel, then to Moonlit Inn, then to Casa Mel Lodge, and back
to D' Hacienda Motel, where the two were shot and killed. The team
forthwith went to the office of P/Col. Torres and reported that the killing
had been done. The latter told them: "You who are here inside, nobody
knows what you have done, but you have to hide because the NBI's are
after you." 3
Thereafter, the prosecution rested its case and the trial court started to
receive the evidence for the accused. Accused Torres and Abeto
presented their respective evidence. Presentation of evidence by the
other accused was, however, suspended because of the motions of
several accused for the inhibition of Judge Garvilles. Despite opposition
by the prosecution, Judge Garvilles voluntarily inhibited himself from
further hearing both cases, which were thereafter re-raffled to Branch 54,
presided by herein public respondent Judge Demosthenes L.
Magallanes.

On 24 June 1994, the private prosecutors moved for the transmittal of the
records of the cases to the Sandiganbayan on the ground that, pursuant
to our decision of 11 March 1994 in Republic of the Philippines vs.
Asuncion, 4 the trial court has no jurisdiction over the cases because the
offenses charged were committed in relation to the office of the accused
PNP officers. In his Manifestation with Urgent Motion to Transmit
Records, the State Prosecutor adopted the motion of the private
prosecutors. 5
In its order of 15 August 1994, 6 the trial court, thru respondent Judge,
ruled that the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the subject
cases because the informations do not state that the offenses were
committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers. Citing
People vs. Montilla, 7 it held that the allegation in the informations that the
accused PNP officers took advantage of their office in the commission of
the offense charged is merely an allegation of an aggravating
circumstance. It further stated that a public office is not a constituent
element of the offense of kidnapping with murder nor is the said offense
intimately connected with the office. It then denied the motion for transfer
of the records to the Sandiganbayan and declared that the trial of the
case should continue.
Relying on People vs. Montejo, 8 the prosecution moved to reconsider the
said order. 9
On 7 September 1994, 10 the trial court issued an order denying the
motion because People vs. Montejo is not applicable, since in that case
there was (a) an intimate connection between the offense charged and
the public position of the accused and (b) a total absence of personal
motive; whereas, in these cases, no such intimate connection exists and
the informations emphasize that the accused were moved by selfish
motives of ransom and extortion.
The respondent Judge then resumed the reception of the evidence for
the other accused. Accused Gargallano, Fernandez, Lamis, Delgado, and
Geroche, as well as his three witnesses, had already completed their
respective testimonies when, upon motion of the prosecution, the
respondent Judge voluntarily inhibited himself on 15 September 1994.
The cases were then re-raffled to Branch 49 of the RTC of Bacolod City.
On 5 December 1994, the prosecution, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed with us a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus with a prayer for a temporary restraining order

challenging the refusal of the respondent Judge to transfer the cases to

the Sandiganbayan.
On 12 December 1994, we required the respondents to comment on the
petition and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the public
respondent or his successor to desist from proceeding with the trial of the
subject cases. 11
On 27 February 1995, after considering the allegations, issues, and
arguments adduced in the petition as well as in the comments of the
private respondents, we gave due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda. Most of them submitted
their memoranda, while the petitioner and some of the private
respondents adopted their initiatory pleadings as their memoranda.
On 22 March 1995, private respondent Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas filed
an urgent motion for the grant of bail, 12which we noted on 15 May
1995. 13
Deliberating on the arguments adduced by the parties, we are convinced
that public respondent Judge Magallanes committed no grave abuse of
discretion in holding that it is his court and not the Sandiganbayan which
has jurisdiction over the two cases for kidnapping for ransom with
murder.
At the time the informations in the said cases were filed, the law
governing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861, which pertinently provides as
follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or

complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by Law

is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years,
or a fine of 16,000.00:PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or
felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed
by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment of six
(6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court
and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.

the offender, and we further intimated that the fact that the offense was
committed in relation to the office must be alleged in the information. 20
There is no dispute that the prescribed penalties for the offenses charged
in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 before the court below are
higher than prision correcional or imprisonment for more than six years.
The only question that remains to be resolved then is whether the said
offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP
officers.

(b) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction:

(1) On appeal, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the
Regional Trial Courts in cases originally decided by them in their
respective territorial jurisdiction.
(2) By petition for review, from the final judgments, resolutions or
orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate
jurisdiction over cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, in
their respective jurisdiction.
xxx xxx xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices
or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall
be tried jointly with said public officers and employees.
Applying this section, we held in Aguinaldo vs. Domagas 14 that for the
Sandiganbayan to have exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses or
felonies committed by public officers or employees under Section 4(a) (2)
above, it is not enough that the penalty prescribed therefor is higher
than prision correccional or imprisonment for six years, or a fine of
P6,000.00; it is also necessary that the offenses or felonies were
committed in relation to their office. We reiterated this pronouncement
in Sanchez vs. Demetriou, 15 Natividad vs. Felix, 16 and Republic vs.
Asuncion,17 In Sanchez, we restated the principle laid down in Montilla vs.
Hilario 18 that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to
the office if it cannot exist without the office, or if the office is a constituent
element of the crime as defined in the statute, such as, for instance, the
crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the
Revised Penal Code. We also reiterated the principle in People vs.
Montejo 19 that the offense must be intimately connected with the office of

Relying on its evidence and on the Montejo case, the petitioner submits
that the crimes charged in the subject cases were connected with public
office because the accused PNP officers, together with the civilian
agents, arrested the two swindling suspects in the course of the
performance of their duty and not out of personal motive, and if they
demanded from the two suspects the production of the money of the
Dumancas spouses and later killed the two; they did so in the course of
the investigation conducted by them as policemen. The petitioner further
asserts that the allegations in the informations reading "taking advantage
of his position as Station Commander of the Philippine National Police"
and "taking advantage of their respective positions" presuppose the
exercise of the functions attached to the office of the accused PNP
officers and are sufficient to show that the offenses charged were
committed in relation to their office. The petitioner then concludes that the
cases below fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information, 21 and not by the result of evidence after
trial. 22
In Montejo 23 where the amended information alleged:
Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized
groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular
policemen and . . . special policemen, appointed and provided by him
with pistols and high power guns and then established a camp . . . at
Tipo-tipo, which is under his command . . . supervision and control,
where his codefendants were stationed, entertained criminal
complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations, as well
as assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons without due
process of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that
in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as

such, and acting upon his orders, his codefendants arrested and
maltreated Awalin Tebag, who died in consequence thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office
of the accused because it was perpetrated while they were in the
performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions and
would not have peen committed had they not held their office; besides,
the accused had no personal motive in committing the crime; thus,
there was an intimate connection between the offense and the office of
the accused.
Unlike in Montejo, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and
15563 in the court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and
investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course of the
investigation. The informations merely allege that the accused, for the
purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of P353,000.00, abducted,
kidnapped, and detained the two victims, and failing in their common
purpose, they shot and killed the said victims. For the purpose of
determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not
the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.
The allegation of "taking advantage of his position" or "taking advantage
of their respective positions" incorporated in the informations is not
sufficient to bring the offenses within the definition of "offenses committed
in relation to public office." In Montilla vs. Hilario, 24 such an allegation
was considered merely as an allegation of an aggravating
circumstance, 25 and not as one that qualifies the crime as having been
committed in relation to public office, It says:
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an
element; and even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality
arises, not from the allegations but on the proof, not from the fact that
the criminals are public officials but from the manner of the commission
of the crime.
Also, in Bartolome vs. People of the Philippines, 26 despite the allegation
that the accused public officers committed the crime of falsification of
official document by "taking advantage of their official positions," this
Court held that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case
because "[t]he information [did] not allege that there was an intimate
connection between the discharge of official duties and the commission
of the offense."

Accordingly, for lack of an allegation in the informations that the offenses

were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers or
were intimately connected with the discharge of the functions of the
accused, the subject cases come within the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court 27 and not of the Sandiganbayan as insisted by the petitioner.
In Dumancas's and Torres's motions for the early resolution of this case
and in Abeto's Supplement to Comment with Motion to Dismiss all filed in
July 1995, it is contended that even assuming that the informations do
charge the accused PNP officers with crimes committed in relation to
their office, still the Regional Trial Court would have jurisdiction over the
subject cases in view of the amendments to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606,
as amended, introduced by R.A. No. 7975, which was approved on 30
March 1995, whose Section 2 provides:
Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606,
as amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where
one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting
or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sanggunian panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of
consul and higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;
(a) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants and
officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and
special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of governmentowned or -controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27"
and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to
their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying the
positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in
the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of
superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as
the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided
in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on

appeals from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of regular courts
where all the accused are occupying positions lower than grade "27," or
not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration.
xxx xxx xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they
shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the
proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them.
(emphasis supplied).
As a consequence of these amendments, the Sandiganbayan partly lost
its exclusive original jurisdiction in cases involving violations of R.A. No.
3019, 28 as amended; R.A. No. 1379; 29 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII
of the Revised Penal Code; 30 it retains only cases where the accused are
those enumerated in subsection a, Section 4 above and, generally,
national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6758).
Moreover, its jurisdiction over other offenses or felonies committed by
public officials and employees in relation to their office is no longer
determined by the prescribed penalty, viz., that which is higher
than prision correccional or imprisonment for six years or a fine of
P6,000.00; it is enough that they are committed by those public officials
and employees enumerated in subsection a, Section 4 above. However,
it retains its exclusive original jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases
filed pursuant to or in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 31 2, 32 14, 33 and 14A. 34
The respondents maintain that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 because none of the five
PNP officers involved therein occupy the rank of chief superintendent or
higher, or are classified as Grade "27" or higher under R.A. No. 6758 and
of the five, P/Col. Nicolas Torres has the highest rank,viz., Senior
Superintendent whose salary grade under the said Act is Grade "18."
Assuming then for the sake of argument that the informations in the said
cases allege that the crimes charged were committed by the five PNP
officers in relation to their office, it would appear indubitable that the
cases would fall within the jurisdiction of the court a quo. Under Section 4
of P.D. No. 1606, as further amended by R.A. No. 7975:

In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying the positions
corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of
superintendent 35 or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the
case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

However, the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the law in force at

the time of the commencement of the action. 36 Under the above
assumption then, the cases should have been filed with the
Sandiganbayan since at the time the informations were filed, the
governing law was Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No.
1861. But, would that jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan be affected by
R.A. No. 7975?
Ordinarily, jurisdiction once acquired is not affected by subsequent
legislative enactment placing jurisdiction in another tribunal. It remains
with the court until the case is finally terminated. 37 Hence, the
Sandiganbayan or the courts, as the case may be, cannot be divested of
jurisdiction over cases filed before them by reason of R.A. No. 7975.
They retain their jurisdiction until the end of the litigation.
In the instant case, the Sandiganbayan has not yet acquired jurisdiction
over the subject criminal cases, as the informations were filed not before
it but before the Regional Trial Court. Even if we labor under the
foregoing assumption that the informations in the subject cases do
charge the respondent PNP officers with offenses committed in relation to
their office so that jurisdiction thereof would fall under the
Sandiganbayan, and assuming further that the informations had already
been filed with the said tribunal but hearing thereon has not begun yet,
the Sandiganbayan can no longer proceed to hear the cases in view of
the express provision of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975. That section
provides that upon the effectivity of the Act, all criminal cases in which
trial has not yet begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the
proper courts. Hence, cases which were previously cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan under P.D. No. 1606, as amended, but are already under
the jurisdiction of the courts by virtue of the amendment introduced by
R.A. No. 7975, shall be referred to the latter courts if hearing thereon has
not yet been commenced in the Sandiganbayan.
It would, therefore, be a futile exercise to transfer the cases to the
Sandiganbayan because the same would anyway be transferred again to

the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 7 of the new law in relation
to Section 2 thereof.
As regards the motions for bail of accused-respondents Jeanette
Dumancas and Nicolas Torres, the same must fail. Section 17, Rule 114
of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 17 Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed
with the court where the case is pending, or, in the absence or
unavailability of the judge thereof, with another branch of the same
court within the province or city. If the accused is arrested in a
province, city or municipality other than where the case is pending,
bail may be filed also with any regional trial court of said place, or, if
no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge,
municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge therein.
(b) Whenever the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the
accused seeks to be released on recognizance, the application
therefor may be filed only in the particular court where the case is
pending, whether for preliminary investigation, trial, on appeal.
(c) Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply
for bail with any court in the province, city or municipality where he is
held.
In the instant case, the motions for bail filed by the said accusedrespondents with the Regional Trial Court where the cases against them
are pending were denied sometime in February, 1994
In Enrile vs. Salazar, 38 as reiterated in Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, 39 this
Court said: "Only after that remedy [petition to be admitted to bail] was
denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court [be]
invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals
if appropriate relief was also available there."
There is no showing that the said accused-respondents have questioned
the denial of their applications for bail in a petition for certiorari either
before the Court of Appeals or this Court. It was only on 26 December
1994, when they filed their respective comments on the instant petition,
that they challenged the denial premised on the ground that the evidence
of guilt against them was not strong. Even if their respective Comment
and Reiteration of Motion for Bail 40 and respondent Dumancas's Motion
for Bail 41 filed on 22 March 1995, were treated as petitions for certiorari,

still the same would not prosper for not having been seasonably filed.
While the Rules of Court does not fix a time-frame for the filing of a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
existing jurisprudence requires that the same be filed within a reasonable
period of time from receipt of the questioned judgment or order. 42 And,
in Philec Workers' Union vs. Hon. Romeo A. Young 43 it was held that a
petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court should be filed
within a reasonable period of three months from notice of the decision or
order. Here, about nine to ten months had already elapsed before the
respondents assailed the denial of their motions for bail. In any event, the
private respondents who were denied bail are not precluded from
reiterating before the trial court their plea for admission to bail.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The challenged orders are
AFFIRMED, and the motions for bail of accused-respondents Jeanette
Dumancas and Nicolas Torres are DENIED.
The temporary restraining order issued on 12 December 1994 is LIFTED,
and the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City is directed to immediately
resume the hearings of Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 and to
thereafter resolve them with reasonable and purposeful dispatch.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
While I agree with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. that
the two (2) informations subject of the present petition should remain in
the Regional Trial Court, I arrive at this conclusion based solely on the
provisions of Rep. Act No. 7975.
It is my considered opinion, unlike the majority, that the accused PNP
personnel committed the crime alleged in the two (2) informations in
relation to their office. The wording of the two (2) informations clearly
shows that P/Col. Nicolas M. Torres used his authority over his
subordinate officers when he ordered them to arrest the two (2) swindling
suspects/victims in connection with the complaint of the Dumancas

spouses. This act of Torres is undoubtedly "intimately connected" with his

position as Station Commander of the PNP, Bacolod Station. In turn, the
other accused PNP personnel who detained the two (2) victims were
performing their functions as law enforcers under orders from their direct
superior. Under such circumstances, the two (2) informations would have
been properly filed with the Sandiganbayan since the law in force at the
time was P.D. No. 1606 which gave the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over
offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office where the
penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correctional or
imprisonment of six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00.
The above view notwithstanding, Rep. Act No. 7975 has revised the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under said revised jurisdiction, the
Regional Trial Courts now have jurisdiction over offenses committed by
PNP officers with ranks below that of superintendent or its equivalent,
whether or not the offenses are committed in relation to their office. In the
present case, none of the accused PNP officers has the rank of
superintendent or higher.
Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 7975 also provides that upon effectivity of said
Act, all criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under
P.D. No. 1606 where trial has not begun in said court, shall be referred to
the proper courts.
In the present case, even if the criminal cases were then within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the offenses having been committed in
relation to the accuseds' office, as earlier discussed, yet, the cases were
not filed in said court. Since the cases now fall within the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court under the express provisions of Rep. Act No.
7975, they can remain in said regional trial court.
On the issue of whether accused Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas should be
granted bail, I agree with Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan that the Court
should exercise its discretion, disregard technicalities and rule on the
motion for bail filed with this Court.
Accused Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas should, in my view, be released on
bail for the following reasons:
1. The spouses Dumancas were included in the informations as accused
merely because they were the ones who complained to the police that
the two (2) victims had swindled them. There is no showing that the
spouses knew, much less instigated, the kidnapping and murder of the

victims. Of note is a portion of the testimony of the alleged lone

eyewitness and co-conspirator turned state witness, Moises Grandeza,
where he declared that Jeanette Dumancas told accused Dominador
Geroche to bring the two (2) swindling suspects to the police station and
that she would call a certain Atty. Geocadin so the proper cases could be
filed against them. Such statements of Dumancas indicate lack of any
criminal intent unless the contrary is later proven during the trial.
2. The situation of Jeanette Dumancas is no different from that of her
husband who was granted bail by the trial court.
3. Jeanette Dumancas came back from abroad even after the charges
against her had been filed. Certainly, this is not indicative of a probability
of her later jumping bail should she be released on bail.
4. To deny bail to a mother of two (2) minor children in the absence of
direct evidence that she was indeed a principal by inducement as alleged
in the two (2) informations, is antagonistic not only to her constitutional
right to bail but also to the ideals and demands of a just and humane
society.
KAPUNAN, J., concurring and dissenting:
I fully agree with much of what my esteemed colleague, Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. has Mitten in this case. However, at least
with respect to petitioner Jeanette Dumancas, I think this Court,
mainly for humanitarian reasons, should exercise its discretion to
grant said petitioner her constitutional right to bail, pending the
determination of her guilt or innocence in the trial court.
The facts so far established in the case at bench with respect to the
spouses Dumancas as narrated in the court's opinion simply show that
they were civilians who complained to the authorities (respondents
herein) to the effect that they were swindled by Rufino Gangar and Danilo
Lumangyao, the alleged murder-kidnapping victims. After respondent
Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas identified them, the lone witness for the
prosecution in this case testified that she requested the accused,
specifically Domingo Geroche to "bring (the two men) to the PC or police"
so that she could in the meantime locate her attorney for the purpose of
filing the proper charges against them. Possibly out of sheer
overzealousness, or for reasons not yet established in the trial court, both
men were brought elsewhere and shot. Thus, apparently, the only reason
why the spouses were charged as principals by inducement was

because, as possible victims of a group of alleged swindlers, they

initiated-through their apparently legitimate complaint the chain of
events which led to the death of the victims in the case at bench.
This narration clearly casts enough doubt regarding the strength of the
evidence of guilt against Mrs. Dumancas, which ought to be sufficient for
us for us to exercise our discretion to grant bail in her case. The trial court
has already refused to grant her petition for bail, which under the facts
and circumstances so far available to the lower court, constitutes a grave
abuse of discretion, subject to this court's action. While I agree that
normally, a motion for reconsideration should be addressed to the trial
court or to the Court of Appeals (if the said motion were denied by the
lower court), I see no reason why, here and now, we should not exercise
our discretion, for compelling humanitarian reasons, to grant Mrs.
Dumancas her constitutional right to bail. Firstly, she is the mother of two
minor children, aged seven (7) and one (1) years old, who have been
deprived of her care for over a year. Second, even with the knowledge
that she would face possible arrest, she came back to the country from
abroad, risking-incarceration in order to face the charges against her.
Without prejudice to whatever the lower court would in the course of
hearing the case, deem appropriate, I vote to grant Mrs. Dumancas'
petition for bail.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
While I agree with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. that
the two (2) informations subject of the present petition should remain in
the Regional Trial Court, I arrive at this conclusion based solely on the
provisions of Rep. Act No. 7975.
It is my considered opinion, unlike the majority, that the accused PNP
personnel committed the crime alleged in the two (2) informations in
relation to their office. The wording of the two (2) informations clearly
shows that P/Col. Nicolas M. Torres used his authority over his
subordinate officers when he ordered them to arrest the two (2) swindling
suspects/victims in connection with the complaint of the Dumancas
spouses. This act of Torres is undoubtedly "intimately connected" with his
position as Station Commander of the PNP, Bacolod Station. In turn, the
other accused PNP personnel who detained the two (2) victims were
performing their functions as law enforcers under orders from their direct

superior. Under such circumstances, the two (2) informations would have
been properly filed with the Sandiganbayan since the law in force at the
time was P.D. No. 1606 which gave the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over
offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office where the
penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correctional or
imprisonment of six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00.

that she would call a certain Atty. Geocadin so the proper cases could be
filed against them. Such statements of Dumancas indicate lack of any
criminal intent unless the contrary is later proven during the trial.

The above view notwithstanding, Rep. Act No. 7975 has revised the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under said revised jurisdiction, the
Regional Trial Courts now have jurisdiction over offenses committed by
PNP officers with ranks below that of superintendent or its equivalent,
whether or not the offenses are committed in relation to their office. In the
present case, none of the accused PNP officers has the rank of
superintendent or higher.

3. Jeanette Dumancas came back from abroad even after the charges
against her had been filed. Certainly, this is not indicative of a probability
of her later jumping bail should she be released on bail.

Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 7975 also provides that upon effectivity of said
Act, all criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under
P.D. No. 1606 where trial has not begun in said court, shall be referred to
the proper courts.
In the present case, even if the criminal cases were then within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the offenses having been committed in
relation to the accuseds' office, as earlier discussed, yet, the cases were
not filed in said court. Since the cases now fall within the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court under the express provisions of Rep. Act No.
7975, they can remain in said regional trial court.
On the issue of whether accused Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas should be
granted bail, I agree with Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan that the Court
should exercise its discretion, disregard technicalities and rule on the
motion for bail filed with this Court.
Accused Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas should, in my view, be released on
bail for the following reasons:
1. The spouses Dumancas were included in the informations as accused
merely because they were the ones who complained to the police that
the two (2) victims had swindled them. There is no showing that the
spouses knew, much less instigated, the kidnapping and murder of the
victims. Of note is a portion of the testimony of the alleged lone
eyewitness and co-conspirator turned state witness, Moises Grandeza,
where he declared that Jeanette Dumancas told accused Dominador
Geroche to bring the two (2) swindling suspects to the police station and

2. The situation of Jeanette Dumancas is no different from that of her

husband who was granted bail by the trial court.

4. To deny bail to a mother of two (2) minor children in the absence of

direct evidence that she was indeed a principal by inducement as alleged
in the two (2) informations, is antagonistic not only to her constitutional
right to bail but also to the ideals and demands of a just and humane
society.

Prudencio Cruz for petitioner in L-64559.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

Before us is a decision of the Sandiganbayan convicting the 4548 and

G.R. No. 64559 of the crime petitioners in G. R. No. 6 of Falsification of a
Public Document, as defined and penalized under Article 171, paragraph
4, of the Revised Penal Code.
The charge in this case reads in full as follows:
I N F O R MATI O N
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses
ROLANDO BARTOLOME Y PEREZ and ELINO CORONEL Y
SANTOS of the crime of Falsification of Official Document as defined
and penalized under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code, committed as follows:
G.R. No. L-64548 July 7, 1986
ROLANDO P. BARTOLOME, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
G.R. No. L-64559 July 7, 1986
ELINO CORONEL Y SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
Jesus L. Santos Law Office for petitioner in L-64548.

That on or about the 12th day of January, 1977, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused ROLANDO BARTOLOME Y PEREZ, a public officer having
been duly appointed and qualified as Senior Labor Regulation Officer
and Chief of the Labor Regulations Section, Ministry of Labor,
National Capital Region, Manila, conspiring and conniving with the
other accused ELINO CORONEL Y SANTOS, also a public officer
having been duly appointed and qualified as Labor Regulation Officer
of the same office, taking advantage of their official positions, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare and falsify an
official document, to wit: the CS Personal Data Sheet (Civil Service
Form No. 212) which bears the Residence Certificate No. A-9086374
issued at Manila on January 12, 1977, by making it appear in said
document that accused ROLANDO BARTOLOME Y PEREZ had
taken and passed the 'Career Service (Professional Qualifying
Examination on 'May 2, 1976' with a rating of '73.35% in Manila' and

that he was a '4th Year AB student at the Far Eastern University

(FEU), when in truth and in fact, as both accused well knew, accused
ROLANDO BARTOLOME Y PEREZ had not taken and passed the
same nor was he a '4th Year AB student, thereby making untruthful
statements in a narration of facts.

Title VII, Book Two, of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes a
wide range of offenses committed by public officers, from knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment under Article 204 to abuses against chastity
in Article 245, but falsification of an official document is not included. This
is punished in Article 171 under Title IV, Book Two, on Crimes against
Public Interest.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila, Philippines, January 21, 1982.
RICARDO A. BUENVIAJE
Special Prosecutor

The nearest approach to the claimed jurisdiction is paragraph (c) of the

above-quoted section, which speaks of crimes committed by public
officers and employees in relation to their office. Under existing
jurisprudence, however, the crime imputed to the petitioners cannot come
under this heading.

We hold that the proceedings in the court a quo are nun and void ab
initio. The Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case.

The pertinent case is Montilla v. Hilario, 1 where a municipal mayor and three policemen charged with
murder and frustrated murder retained Rep. Floro Crisologo as their counsel. The prosecution sought
to disqualify him on the ground that a member of Congress could not appear as counsel "in any
criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed

Under Section 4 of P.D. 1606, which created this special court:

in relation to his office." 2 The Supreme Court allowed his appearance, interpreting the underscored
phrase in this wise:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction

over:
(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Republic Act
No. 1379;
(b) Crime committed by public officers and employees, including
those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations,
embraced in Title VI I of the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes; and
(c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, in relation to their office. (Emphasis
supplied).
A careful reading of Republic Act No. 3019 and Republic Act No. 1379
will reveal that nowhere in either statute is falsification of an official
document mentioned, even tangentially or by implication.

The information charges that the defendants, 'taking advantage of

their respective public positions conspiring together ... did then and
there ... assault, attack and shoot with their firearms' several persons
'with the intent to kill and did kill one Claudio Ragasa and inflict
physical injuries on three others.
From the allegations of the information it does not appear that the
official positions of the accused were connected with the offenses
charged. In fact, the attorneys for the prosecution stated that the
motives for the cranes were 'personal with political character.' It does
not even appear, nor is there assertion, that the crimes were
committed by the defendants in fine of duty or in the performance of
their official functions.
Judged by the context of section 17 of Article VI, supra, and the
proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, the relation between
the crime and the office contemplated by the Constitution is, in our
opinion, direct and not accidental. To fan into the intent of the
Constitution, the relation has to be such that, in the legal sense, the
offense cannot exist without the office. In other words, the office must

be a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute, such

as, for instance, the crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to
Six, Title Seven, of the Revised Penal Code.
Public office is not of the essence of murder. The taking of human life
is either murder or homicide whether done by a private citizen or
public servant, and the penalty is the same except when the
perpetrator, being a public functionary, took advantage of his office,
as alleged in this case, in which event the penalty is increased.
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an
element; and even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality
arises, not from the allegations but on the proof, not from the fact that
the criminals are public officials but from the manner of the
commission of the crime.
Montilla must be read with People v. Montejo 3 which laid down the exception to the basic rule. In this
case, a city mayor and several members of the police were also accused of murder They retained as
their counsel Sen. Roseller Lim who was also challenged on the basis of the same Article VI, Section
17, of the 1935 Constitution. The legislator was disqualified because, as the Court put it, there was on
the face of the information an intimate connection between the commission of the offense and the
discharge of public office that made the crime an offense committed in relation to the office of the
accused.

With respect to the question whether or not Senator Roseller Lim may
appear as counsel for the main respondents herein, as defendants in
said criminal case, the Constitution provides that no Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives shall 'appear as counsel ...
in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the
Government is accused of an offense committed in relation of his
office ... (Art. VI Sec. 17, Const. of the Phil.). The issue, therefore, is
whether the defendants in Criminal case No. 672 are accused of an
offense committed in relation' to their office.
A mere perusal of the amended information therein readily elicits an
affirmative answer. It is alleged in said amended information that
'Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized
groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular
policemen and ... special policemen, appointed and provided by him
with pistols and high power guns and then established a camp ... at

Tipo-Tipo,' which is under his 'command, ... supervision and control,'

where his co-defendants were stationed, entertained criminal
complainants and conducted the corresponding investigations, as
well as assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons without
due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and
that, in fine with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City
as such, and acting upon his orders, his co-defendants arrested and
maltreated Awalin Tebag who died in consequence thereof.
It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office is not
an element of the crime of murder in abstract, as committed by the
main respondents herein, according to the amended information, the
offense therein charged is intimately connected with their respective
offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance,
though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, they
had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have
committed it had they not held their afraid offices. The co-defendants
of respondent Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his instructions because he
was their superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City.
The difference between Montilla and Montejo is that whereas in the
former the murder was committed outside office hours and for personal or
political motives, the victim in the latter case was killed while he was
undergoing custodial investigation in the police sub-station. The crime in
Montejo would not have been committed were it not for the fact that the
accused were actually discharging official functions at the time.
The case of Montilla vs. Hilario and Crisologo, 90 Phil., 49, relied
upon by respondent Judge, in overruling the objection of the
prosecution to the appearance of Senator Roseller Lim, is not in
point, for, as stated in the decision therein;
'From the allegations of the information it does not appear that the
official positions of the accused were connected with the offers
charged. In fact, the attorneys for the prosecution stated that the
motives for the crimes were personal with political character. It does
not even appear, nor is there assertion, that the crimes were

committed by the defendants in line of duty or in the performance of

their official functions.'
Such is not the situation obtaining in the case at bar.
In the instant case, there is no showing that the alleged falsification was
committed by the accused, if at all, as a consequence of, and while they
were discharging, official functions. The information does not allege that
there was an intimate connection between the discharge of official duties
and the commission of the offense. Besides, falsification of an official
document may be committed not only by public officers and employees
but even by private persons only. To paraphrase Montilla, public office is
not an essential ingredient of the offense such that the offense cannot
exist without the office.

G.R. No. 192565

UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES and DESI TOMAS, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION

Clearly, therefore, as the alleged falsification was not an offense committed in relation to the office of
the accused, it did not come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It follows that all its acts in
the instant case are null and void ab initio. 4

WHEREFORE, the petitions are granted and the decision of the

Sandiganbayan is set aside, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is
so ordered.

February 28, 2012

BRION, J.:
We review in this Rule 45 petition, the decision1 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 65, Makati City (RTC-Makati City) in Civil Case No. 091038. The petition seeks to reverse and set aside the RTC-Makati City
decision dismissing the petition for certiorari of petitioners Union Bank of
the Philippines (Union Bank) and Desi Tomas (collectively, the
petitioners). The RTC found that the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 63,
Makati City (MeTC-Makati City) did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion in denying the motion to quash the information for perjury filed
by Tomas.
The Antecedents
Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) for making a false narration in a Certificate against
Forum Shopping. The Information against her reads:
That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a material matter

before a competent person authorized to administer oath which the law

requires to wit: said accused stated in the
Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for sum of money
with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of
the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the
Philippines has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving
the same issues in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that
said material statement was false thereby making a willful and deliberate
assertion of falsehood.2
The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Banks two (2) complaints
for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses
Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0717, was filed before the RTC, Branch
109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint, docketed as
Civil Case No. 342-000, was filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the
MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both complaints showed that Tomas
executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping.
Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the
RPC by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum
Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence any other
action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or
agency.
Tomas filed a Motion to Quash,3 citing two grounds. First, she argued that
the venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court (where the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and not the
MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case. Second, she
argued that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because: (a)
the third element of perjury the willful and deliberate assertion of
falsehood was not alleged with particularity without specifying what the
other action or proceeding commenced involving the same issues in
another tribunal or agency; (b) there was no other action or proceeding
pending in another court when the second complaint was filed; and (c)
she was charged with perjury by giving false testimony while the
allegations in the Information make out perjury by making a false affidavit.

The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has
jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate against Forum Shopping
was notarized in Makati City.4 The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that the
allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with
perjury.5 The MeTC-Makati City subsequently denied Tomas motion for
reconsideration.6
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to
annul and set aside the MeTC-Makati City orders on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion. The petitioners anchored their petition on the rulings
in United States v. Canet7 and Ilusorio v. Bildner8 which ruled that venue
and jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document was
presented.
The Assailed RTC Decision
In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the RTC-Makati City held:
[I]nsofar as the petitioners stance is concerned[,] the more recent case of
[Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy] (GR Nos. 174168 & 179438, March 30, 2009)
however, reaffirms what has been the long standing view on the venue
with respect to perjury cases. In this particular case[,] the high court
reiterated the rule that the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in
the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed,
or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. It went on to declare
that since the subject document[,] the execution of which was the subject
of the charge[,] was subscribed and sworn to in Manila[,] then the court of
the said territorial jurisdiction was the proper venue of the criminal
action[.]
xxxx
x x x Given the present state of jurisprudence on the matter, it is not
amiss to state that the city court of Makati City has jurisdiction to try and
decide the case for perjury inasmuch as the gist of the complaint itself
which constitute[s] the charge against the petitioner dwells solely on the
act of subscribing to a false certification. On the other hand, the charge
against the accused in the case of Ilusorio v. Bildner, et al., based on the

complaint-affidavits therein[,] was not simply the execution of the

questioned documents but rather the introduction of the false evidence
through the subject documents before the court of Makati
City.9 (emphasis ours)
The RTC-Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City did not commit
grave abuse of discretion since the order denying the Motion to Quash
was based on jurisprudence later than Ilusorio. The RTC-Makati City also
observed that the facts in Ilusorio are different from the facts of the
present case. Lastly, the RTC-Makati City ruled that the Rule 65 petition
was improper since the petitioners can later appeal the decision in the
principal case. The RTC-Makati City subsequently denied the petitioners
motion for reconsideration.10
The Petition
The petitioners pray that we reverse the RTC-Makati City decision and
quash the Information for perjury against Tomas. The petitioners contend
that the Ilusorio ruling is more applicable to the present facts than our
ruling in Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim.11 They argued that the facts in
Ilusorio showed that the filing of the petitions in court containing the false
statements was the essential ingredient that consummated the perjury. In
Sy Tiong, the perjurious statements were made in a General Information
Sheet (GIS) that was submitted to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).
Interestingly, Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz shared the
petitioners view. In his Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment
(which we hereby treat as the Comment to the petition), the Solicitor
General also relied on Ilusorio and opined that the lis mota in the crime of
perjury is the deliberate or intentional giving of false evidence in the court
where the evidence is material. The Solicitor General observed that the
criminal intent to assert a falsehood under oath only became manifest
before the MeTC-Pasay City.
The Issue

The case presents to us the issue of what the proper venue of perjury
under Article 183 of the RPC should be Makati City, where the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where
the Certification was presented to the trial court.
The Courts Ruling
We deny the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper
venue and the proper court to take cognizance of the perjury case
against the petitioners.
Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction
Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It
determines not only the place where the criminal action is to be instituted,
but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The
reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is
limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court can only hear and
try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial
jurisdiction.12 Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded
on the necessity and justice of having an accused on trial in the
municipality of province where witnesses and other facilities for his
defense are available.13
Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries
jurisdictional consequences. In determining the venue where the criminal
action is to be instituted and the court which has jurisdiction over it,
Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted
and tried in the court or municipality or territory where the offense
was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.
[emphasis ours]
The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:

Place of commission of the offense. The complaint or information is

sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that the offense was
committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place
within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was
committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is
necessary for its identification.

In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under Article 183
of the RPC for making a false Certificate against Forum Shopping. The
elements of perjury under Article 183 are:

Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over

criminal cases not only in the court where the offense was committed, but
also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In other words, the
venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where
the Information states that the offense was committed or some of its
essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court.

(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent

officer, authorized to receive and administer oath.

(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed

an affidavit upon a material matter.

(c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful

and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is
required by law or made for a legal purpose.15 (emphasis ours)

Information Charging Perjury

Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
contains the requirement for a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The
Certificate against Forum Shopping can be made either by a statement
under oath in the complaint or initiatory pleading asserting a claim or
relief; it may also be in a sworn certification annexed to the complaint or
initiatory pleading. In both instances, the affiant is required to execute a
statement under oath before a duly commissioned notary public or any
competent person authorized to administer oath that: (a) he or she has
not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the
best of his or her knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he or she should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or
is pending, he or she shall report that fact within five days therefrom to
the court wherein his or her aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has
been filed. In relation to the crime of perjury, the material matter in a
Certificate against Forum Shopping is the truth of the required
declarations which is designed to guard against litigants pursuing
simultaneous remedies in different fora.14

Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on

the ground of improper venue, the allegations in the complaint and
information must be examined together with Section 15(a), Rule 110 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this basis, we find
that the allegations in the Information sufficiently support a finding that
the crime of perjury was committed by Tomas within the territorial
jurisdiction of the MeTC-Makati City.
The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject
Certificate against Forum Shopping was alleged in the Information to
have been committed in Makati City. Likewise, the second and fourth
elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping to be under
oath before a notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the
Information to have been made in Makati City:
That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a material matter
before a competent person authorized to administer oath which the law
requires to wit: said accused stated in the
Verification/Certification/Affidavit x x x.16

We also find that the third element of willful and deliberate falsehood was
also sufficiently alleged to have been committed in Makati City, not Pasay
City, as indicated in the last portion of the Information:
[S]aid accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a
complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as
[Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that
the Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other action
or proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or
agency, accused knowing well that said material statement was
false thereby making a willful and deliberate assertion of
falsehood.17 (underscoring ours)
Tomas deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly
shown when she made the false declarations in the Certificate against
Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite her
knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to
were not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati
City is the proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to
Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
as all the essential elements constituting the crime of perjury were
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.
Referral to the En Banc
The present case was referred to the En Banc primarily to address the
seeming conflict between the division rulings of the Court in the Ilusorio
case that is cited as basis of this petition, and the Sy Tiong case that was
the basis of the assailed RTC-Makati City ruling.
The Cited Ilusorio and Sy Tiong Cases
The subject matter of the perjury charge in Ilusorio involved false
statements contained in verified petitions filed with the court for the
issuance of a new owners duplicate copies of certificates of title. The
verified petitions containing the false statements were subscribed and
sworn to in Pasig City, but were filed in Makati City and Tagaytay City.

The question posed was: which court (Pasig City, Makati City and/or
Tagaytay City) had jurisdiction to try and hear the perjury cases?
We ruled that the venues of the action were in Makati City and Tagaytay
City, the places where the verified petitions were filed. The Court
reasoned out that it was only upon filing that the intent to assert an
alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful
statement found relevance or materiality. We cited as jurisprudential
authority the case of United States. v. Caet18 which ruled:
It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long as
it appears from the information that the defendant, by means of such
affidavit, "swore to" and knowingly submitted false evidence, material to a
point at issue in a judicial proceeding pending in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo Province. The gist of the offense charged is not the
making of the affidavit in Manila, but the intentional giving of false
evidence in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province by means of
such affidavit. [emphasis and underscoring deleted]
In Sy Tiong, the perjured statements were made in a GIS which was
subscribed and sworn to in Manila. We ruled that the proper venue for the
perjury charges was in Manila where the GIS was subscribed and sworn
to. We held that the perjury was consummated in Manila where the false
statement was made. As supporting jurisprudence, we cited the case of
Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice19 that, in turn, cited an American case
entitled U.S. v. Norris.20We ruled in Villanueva that
Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration well may affect the
dearest concerns of the parties before a tribunal. Deliberate material
falsification under oath constitutes the crime of perjury, and the crime is
complete when a witness' statement has once been made.
The Crime of Perjury: A Background
To have a better appreciation of the issue facing the Court, a look at the
historical background of how the crime of perjury (specifically, Article 183
of the RPC) evolved in our jurisdiction.

The RPC penalizes three forms of false testimonies. The first is false
testimony for and against the defendant in a criminal case (Articles 180
and 181, RPC); the second is false testimony in a civil case (Article 182,
RPC); and the third is false testimony in other cases (Article 183, RPC).
Based on the Information filed, the present case involves the making of
an untruthful statement in an affidavit on a material matter.
These RPC provisions, however, are not really the bases of the rulings
cited by the parties in their respective arguments. The cited Ilusorio
ruling, although issued by this Court in 2008, harked back to the case of
Caet which was decided in 1915, i.e., before the present RPC took
effect.21 Sy Tiong, on the other hand, is a 2009 ruling that cited
Villanueva, a 2005 case that in turn cited United States v. Norris, a 1937
American case. Significantly, unlike Canet, Sy Tiong is entirely based on
rulings rendered after the present RPC took effect.22
The perjurious act in Caet consisted of an information charging perjury
through the presentation in court of a motion accompanied by a false
sworn affidavit. At the time the Caet ruling was rendered, the prevailing
law on perjury and the rules on prosecution of criminal offenses were
found in Section 3, Act No. 1697 of the Philippine Commission, and in
Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 5823 for the procedural
aspect.
Section 3 of Act No. 1697 reads:
Sec. 3. Any person who, having taken oath before a competent tribunal,
officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the Philippine Islands
authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare,
depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration,
disposition, or certificate by him subscribed is true, willfully and contrary
to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not
believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall be punished by a fine of
not more than two thousand pesos and by imprisonment for not more
than five years; and shall moreover, thereafter be incapable of holding
any public office or of giving testimony in any court of the Philippine
Islands until such time as the judgment against him is reversed.

This law was copied, with the necessary changes, from Sections
539224 and 539325 of the Revised Statutes of the United States.26 Act No.
1697 was intended to make the mere execution of a false affidavit
punishable in our jurisdiction.27
In turn, Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 provided that
the venue shall be the court of the place where the crime was committed.
As applied and interpreted by the Court in Caet, perjury was committed
by the act of representing a false document in a judicial proceeding. 28 The
venue of action was held by the Court to be at the place where the false
document was presented since the presentation was the act that
consummated the crime.
The annotation of Justices Aquino and Grio-Aquino in their textbook on
the RPC29 interestingly explains the history of the perjury provisions of the
present RPC and traces as well the linkage between Act No. 1697 and
the present Code. To quote these authors:30
Art. 180 was taken from art. 318 of the Old Penal Code and art. 154 of
Del Pans Proposed Correctional Code, while art. 181 was taken from art.
319 of the old Penal Code and Art. 157 of Del Pans Proposed
Correctional Code. Said arts. 318 and 319, together with art. 321 of the
old Penal Code, were impliedly repealed by Act 1697, the Perjury Law,
passed on August 23, 1907, which in turn was expressly repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1916, Act 2657. In view of the express repeal of
Act 1697, arts. 318 and 321 of the old Penal Code were deemed revived.
However, Act 2718 expressly revived secs. 3 and 4 of the Perjury Law.
Art. 367 of the Revised Penal Code repealed Act Nos. 1697 and 2718.
It should be noted that perjury under Acts 1697 and 2718 includes false
testimony, whereas, under the Revised Penal Code, false testimony
includes perjury. Our law on false testimony is of Spanish origin, but our
law on perjury (art. 183 taken from sec. 3 of Act 1697) is derived from
American statutes. The provisions of the old Penal Code on false
testimony embrace perjury committed in court or in some contentious
proceeding, while perjury as defined in Act 1697 includes the making of a
false affidavit. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on false

testimony "are more severe and strict than those of Act 1697" on perjury.
[italics ours]
With this background, it can be appreciated that Article 183 of the RPC
which provides:
The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person,
who knowingly makes untruthful statements and not being included in the
provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make
an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person
authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.
[emphasis supplied; emphases ours]
in fact refers to either of two punishable acts (1) falsely testifying under
oath in a proceeding other than a criminal or civil case; and (2) making a
false affidavit before a person authorized to administer an oath on any
material matter where the law requires an oath.
As above discussed, Sy Tiong decided under Article 183 of the RPC
essentially involved perjured statements made in a GIS that was
subscribed and sworn to in Manila and submitted to the SEC in
Mandaluyong City. Thus, the case involved the making of an affidavit, not
an actual testimony in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil. From
this perspective, the situs of the oath, i.e., the place where the oath was
taken, is the place where the offense was committed. By implication, the
proper venue would have been the City of Mandaluyong the site of the
SEC had the charge involved an actual testimony made before the
SEC.
In contrast, Caet involved the presentation in court of a motion
supported and accompanied by an affidavit that contained a falsity. With
Section 3 of Act No. 1697 as basis, the issue related to the submission of
the affidavit in a judicial proceeding. This came at a time when Act No.
1697 was the perjury law, and made no distinction between judicial and
other proceedings, and at the same time separately penalized the making
of false statements under oath (unlike the present RPC which separately
deals with false testimony in criminal, civil and other proceedings, while

at the same time also penalizing the making of false affidavits).

Understandably, the venue should be the place where the submission
was made to the court or the situs of the court; it could not have been the
place where the affidavit was sworn to simply because this was not the
offense charged in the Information.
The case of Ilusorio cited the Caet case as its authority, in a situation
where the sworn petitions filed in court for the issuance of duplicate
certificates of title (that were allegedly lost) were the cited sworn
statements to support the charge of perjury for the falsities stated in the
sworn petitions. The Court ruled that the proper venue should be the
Cities of Makati and Tagaytay because it was in the courts of these cities
"where the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and
where the alleged untruthful statement finds relevance or materiality in
deciding the issue of whether new owners duplicate copies of the
[Certificate of Condominium Title] and [Transfer Certificates of Title] may
issue."31 To the Court, "whether the perjurious statements contained in the
four petitions were subscribed and sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the gist
of the offense of perjury being the intentional giving of false
statement,"32 citing Caet as authority for its statement.
The statement in Ilusorio may have partly led to the present confusion on
venue because of its very categorical tenor in pointing to the
considerations to be made in the determination of venue; it leaves the
impression that the place where the oath was taken is not at all a material
consideration, forgetting that Article 183 of the RPC clearly speaks of two
situations while Article 182 of the RPC likewise applies to false testimony
in civil cases.
The Ilusorio statement would have made perfect sense had the basis for
the charge been Article 182 of the RPC, on the assumption that the
petition itself constitutes a false testimony in a civil case. The Caet ruling
would then have been completely applicable as the sworn statement is
used in a civil case, although no such distinction was made under Caet
because the applicable law at the time (Act No. 1697) did not make any
distinction.

If Article 183 of the RPC were to be used, as what in fact appears in the
Ilusorio ruling, then only that portion of the article, referring to the making
of an affidavit, would have been applicable as the other portion refers to
false testimony in other proceedings which a judicial petition for the
issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of a Certificate of
Condominium Title is not because it is a civil proceeding in court. As a
perjury based on the making of a false affidavit, what assumes materiality
is the site where the oath was taken as this is the place where the oath
was made, in this case, Pasig City.
Procedurally, the rule on venue of criminal cases has been subject to
various changes from the time General Order No. 58 was replaced by
Rules 106 to 122 of the Rules of Court on July 1, 1940. Section 14, Rule
106 of the Rules of Court provided for the rule on venue of criminal
actions and it expressly included, as proper venue, the place where any
one of the essential ingredients of the crime took place. This change
was followed by the passage of the 1964 Rules of Criminal
Procedure,33 the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,34 and the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which all adopted the 1940 Rules of
Criminal Procedures expanded venue of criminal actions. Thus, the
venue of criminal cases is not only in the place where the offense was
committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place.
1wphi1

In the present case, the Certification against Forum Shopping was made
integral parts of two complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of
replevin against the respondent spouses Eddie Tamondong and Eliza B.
Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a complaint-affidavit against Tomas for
violation of Article 183 of the RPC. As alleged in the Information that
followed, the criminal act charged was for the execution by Tomas of an
affidavit that contained a falsity.

Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable
provision; thus, jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the basis
of this article which penalizes one who "make[s] an affidavit, upon any
material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an
oath in cases in which the law so requires." The constitutive act of the
offense is the making of an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is
consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and
sworn before a duly authorized person.
Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is
more in accord with Article 183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To reiterate for the
guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed
through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is
committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her
affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury
are executed. When the crime is committed through false testimony
under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at
the place where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as
supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither
criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may
either be at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where
the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the submission are both
material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, determination of
venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be
constitutive of the crime committed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for
lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 158763

March 31, 2006

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B.

OCON, Petitioners,
vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the 18 December 2002 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12 June 2003 Resolution denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the
assailed decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to
have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders, the instant petition for
certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN
DUE COURSE, and it is hereby ordered:
1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated
September 21, 2001, Joint Order dated October 16, 2001 and
Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 dismissing the two (2)
Informations for Murder, all issued by public respondent Judge
Anastacio D. Anghad in Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 363524 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and another entered UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,]
and REINSTATING the Order dated June 25, 2001 and Joint
Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then acting Presiding
Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;

2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered

REINSTATED in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36
of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela; and
3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED
to ISSUE forthwith Warrants of Arrest for the apprehension of
private respondents Jose "Pempe" Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P.
Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T. Maderal in
said Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524. 2
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan,
Ramon, Isabela, which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente
Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is
now under the witness protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leao,
SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander
Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of
Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of
reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at
that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on
automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused
therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April
2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C.
Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain
Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the
deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.

Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against

petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn
confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge
Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and
SPO2 Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete
preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the
warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan
noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said
urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by
the court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State
Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took
over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of
Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the
warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied
this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21
September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao
moved for the reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the
inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration was denied
in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition was
denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari,
mandamus and prohibition with this Court, with prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further
proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint
Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16
October 2001, and 22 October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant
the prayer for a temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from
further proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly after the aforesaid

resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001

dismissing the two Informations for murder against petitioners. On 19
November 2001, this Court took note of respondents cash bond
evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued
the temporary restraining order while referring the petition to the Court of
Appeals for adjudication on the merits.
Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public
Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and
willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November
2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for
murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of
Appeals in view of the previous referral to it of respondents petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
decision granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the
criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the issuance of
warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners
moved for a reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied in
a Resolution dated 12 June 2003.
Hence, this petition.
The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this
Court the following assignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in
reversing and setting aside the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad
dated August 17, 2001, September 21, 2001, October 16, 2001 and
November 14, 2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 363524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and reinstating the Order dated
July 6, 2001 issued by then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan,
on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he
does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in
directing the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524
in the docket of Active Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial
Court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent
to re-issue the warrants of arrest against herein petitioners.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 363523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36
of the regional trial court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the
public respondent to issue warrants of arrest against herein petitioners,
the order of dismissal issued therein having become final and executory.
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the
body of the accused.
The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the
Court of Appeals ruling that:
[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his
person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the
accused may be acquired either through compulsory process, such as
warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he
surrenders to the police or to the court. It is only when the court has
already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke
the processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M.
No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must first be
placed in the custody of the law before the court may validly act on his
petition for judicial reliefs.3
Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners
Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they
were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty at the time

they filed their "Urgent Motion to complete preliminary investigation; to

reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest."4
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is required only in applications
for bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue, assuming that such jurisdiction
over their person is required before the court can act on their motion to
quash the warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was
already acquired by the court by their filing of the above Urgent Motion.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the
adjudication of applications for bail, petitioners quote Retired Court of
Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera:
Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or
grant other relief. The outright dismissal of the case even before the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused is authorized under
Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and
the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs.
Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on motion of the
accused for lack of probable cause without the accused having been
arrested. In Paul Roberts vs. Court of Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the
Court was ordered to hold the issuance of a warrant of arrest in
abeyance pending review by the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson vs.
Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 1025), the Court ordered the case
transferred from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered
the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause.6
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was
already acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners
invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in
Santiago v. Vasquez7:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the
merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring
the exercise of the courts jurisdiction thereover, appearing for

arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since

the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a
rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been
acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary
surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of
the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required
before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required
for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the
mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.8 Custody of the law is
accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender,9 while jurisdiction
over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary
appearance. 10 One can be under the custody of the law but not yet
subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a
person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment
to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of
the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has
commenced. 11Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the
person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to
become obedient to the will of the law. 12 Custody of the law is literally
custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to,
detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 cited by the Court of
Appeals should not have been separated from the issue in that case,
which is the application for admission to bail of someone not yet in the
custody of the law. The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico
reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law
or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes
of that court. Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained the
whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the
body of the accused before considering the application for bail. 13

While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it

concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an
affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court. 15 As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an
affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings,
constitutes voluntary appearance.

impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases

involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of
the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor
custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction
of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of
the law.

Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special
requirement of the applicant being in the custody of the law. In Feliciano
v. Pasicolan, 16 we held that "[t]he purpose of bail is to secure ones
release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free.
Thus, bail is the security required and given for the release of a person
who is in the custody of law." The rationale behind this special rule on
bail is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious
practice wherein the accused could just send another in his stead to post
his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal
appearance therein and compliance with the requirements therefor. 17

In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule
applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding
this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The
following cases best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs
to accused who were not in the custody of the law, but were deemed to
have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that
none of these cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to
quash an information due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a
motion to quash a warrant of arrest:

There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking
affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent
submission of ones person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the
case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the
jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These
pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other
grounds for dismissal are included; 18 (2) in criminal cases, motions to
quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two
are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a
waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a
consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process
forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue
in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.

1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for

certiorari on the ground of lack of probable cause, we issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and
the respondent judge therein from further proceeding with the case and,
instead, to elevate the records to us.

To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases,

jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the
accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except
in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by

2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 upon the accuseds Motion to

Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of
Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for Review with the
Department of Justice, we directed respondent judge therein to cease
and desist from further proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the
issuance of warrants of arrests against the accused.
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of the accused in a
petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
Sandiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal
cases to the Regional Trial Court even before the issuance of the
warrants of arrest.

We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in

applications for bail are not present in motions to quash the warrant of
arrest. If we allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the
law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail will
remain at large, and could elude being held to answer for the commission
of the offense if ever he is proven guilty. On the other hand, if we allow
the quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody of the law,
it would be very rare that a person not genuinely entitled to liberty would
remain scot-free. This is because it is the same judge who issued the
warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not he followed the
Constitution in his determination of probable cause, and he can easily
deny the motion to quash if he really did find probable cause after
personally examining the records of the case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions,
the warrant continues in force and effect until it is quashed and therefore
can still be enforced on any day and at any time of the day and
night.22Furthermore, the continued absence of the accused can be taken
against him in the determination of probable cause, since flight is
indicative of guilt.
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is
likewise incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before
asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of
rights than property rights,23 demanding that due process in the
deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and not after.
Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for
review with the Secretary of Justice and based on doubts engendered by
the political climate constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of
Judge Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing the
criminal cases against the petitioners. First, he quashed the standing
warrant of arrest issued by his predecessor because of a subsequently
filed appeal to the Secretary of Justice, and because of his doubts on the
existence of probable cause due to the political climate in the city.
Second, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutors

resolution, he dismissed the criminal cases on the basis of a decision of

this Court in another case with different accused, doing so two days after
this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order against further
proceeding with the case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners,
petitioner Miranda appealed the assistant prosecutors resolution before
the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming office,
quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to
Judge Anghad, "x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of comity, a
deferment of the proceedings is but proper."24
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to
charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity
when he issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners just because
the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutors
resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for review
was filed before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains
that the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutors
resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.
In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as
premature the filing of the information in court against them on the
ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse resolution of
the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the issuance of
warrants of arrest against petitioners herein should not have been
quashed as premature on the same ground.
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the
warrant of arrest is in order if true: violation of the Constitution. Hence,
Judge Anghad asked and resolved the question:
In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the
above-quoted constitutional proscription, which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of
Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure and to the
above-cited decisional cases? To this query or issue, after a deep perusal
of the arguments raised, this Court, through [its] regular Presiding Judge,

finds merit in the contention of herein accused-movant, Jose "Pempe"

Miranda.26
Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as
having been violated by Judge Tumaliuan:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.27

The records of the case show that the prosecutors certification was
accompanied by supporting documents, following the requirement under
Lim, Sr. v. Felix30 and People v. Inting.31 The supporting documents are
the following:
1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S.
Reyes;
2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;
3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C.
Miranda and Reynaldo de la Cruz;

However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the
supporting evidence to the resolution of the prosecutor in his
determination of probable cause, we find that Judge Anghad gravely
abused his discretion.

5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;

According to petitioners:

7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;

In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of
the petitioners is apparent from the face of the order itself, which clearly
stated that the determination of probable cause was based on the
certification, under oath, of the fiscal and not on a separate determination
personally made by the Judge. No presumption of regularity could be
drawn from the order since it expressly and clearly showed that it was
based only on the fiscals certification.28

8. Information dated 22 June 2001;

Petitioners claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuans Joint Order contains no

such indication that he relied solely on the prosecutors certification. The
Joint Order even indicated the contrary:
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the
Court proceeded to determine the existence of a probable cause by
personally evaluating the records x x x.[29]

6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of

Manila, Branch 41 in Criminal Case No. 97-160355;

9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and

10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and
Vicente Buazon.
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the
part of Judge Tumaliuan of Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution.
Judge Anghad, however, focused on the substantive part of said section,
i.e., the existence of probable cause. In failing to find probable cause,
Judge Anghad ruled that the confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for
the following reasons: (1) it was given after almost two years in the
custody of the National Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was given by
someone who rendered himself untrustworthy for being a fugitive for five
years; (3) it was given in exchange for an obvious reward of discharge

from the information; and (4) it was given during the election period
amidst a "politically charged scenario where "Santiago City voters were
pitted against each other along the lines of the Miranda camp on one side
and former City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro, and allegedly that of DENR
Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other."32
We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no
reason to disturb the findings of probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan.
It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a
witness is not within the province of the determination of probable cause.
As we held in Webb33:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that
more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by
the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable
cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than
evidence which would justify x x x conviction." A finding of probable cause
merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of
guilt.
x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be
determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part
of trial x x x.
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in
another case with different accused constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among
other things, that there was a petition for review of the assistant
prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of Justice. However, after
the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutors resolution, Judge
Anghad summarily dismissed the two criminal cases against the
petitioners on the basis of the following explanation:

Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo Leano, et
al., RTC, Branch 41, Manila, and based from his sworn statements, he
pinpointed to Mr. Miranda the mastermind and with him and the other
police officers as the direct perpetrators, the October 9, 2001 Decision of
the Supreme Court absolving the five cops of murder, certainly makes his
sworn Statements a "narration of falsehood and lies" and that because of
the decision acquitting said officers "who were likewise falsely linked by
said Rodel Maderal in his April 27, 2001 statements, it is now beyond
doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured
statements and therefore the same is without probable value." This Court
agrees with the defenses views. Indeed, of what use is Maderals
statements when the Supreme Court rejected the prosecutions evidence
presented and adduced in Criminal Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal
is supposed to turn state witness in these two (2) cases but with the
Supreme Court decision adverted to, the probative value of his
statements is practically nil.
xxxx
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated
October 18, 2001, praying for the summary dismissal of the two (2)
murder charges in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court in
People of the Philippines vs. Wilfredo Leao, et al., G.R. No. 13886,
acquitting the accused therein and in effect disregarding all the evidence
presented by the prosecution in that case. Accordingly, the two (2)
informations [for] murder filed against Jose Miranda are ordered
dismissed.34
This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to
twist our decision and interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who
was still at large when the evidence of the prosecution in the Leao case
was presented. A decision, even of this Court, acquitting the accused
therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case
against different accused for the same crime. The blunder of Judge
Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact that our decision in Leao
was based on reasonable doubt. We never ruled in Leao that the crime
did not happen; we just found that there was reasonable doubt as to the
guilt of the accused therein, since the prosecution in that case relied on

circumstantial evidence, which interestingly is not even the situation in

the criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as there is here an
eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The accused in Leao furthermore had no
motive to kill respondent Tuliaos son, whereas petitioners herein had
been implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao before the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee.
It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable
doubt in Leao, "it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made
untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is
without probable value."35 On the contrary, if we are to permit the use of
our decision in Leao, an acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt
actually points to the probability of the prosecutions version of the facts
therein. Such probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of probable
cause.
We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghads dismissal of the
informations two days after we resolved to issue, upon the filing of a
bond, a temporary restraining order prohibiting him from further
proceeding with the case. The bond was filed the day after the
informations were dismissed. While the dismissal of the case was able to
beat the effectivity date of the temporary restraining order, such abrupt
dismissal of the informations (days after this Courts resolve to issue a
TRO against Judge Anghad) creates wild suspicions about the motives of
Judge Anghad.
Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement
of the orders set aside by the nullified proceeding.

arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a matter of scrupulous

semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof should not be allowed to affect
the dispositions on the merits, especially in this case where the other
dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other direction. Firstly,
the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 June 2001 Order of Judge
Tumaliuan,37 which issued the warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court of
Appeals likewise declared the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad
void. Certainly, the declaration of nullity of proceedings should be
deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the
nullified proceedings. Judge Anghads order quashing the warrants of
arrest had been nullified; therefore those warrants of arrest are
henceforth deemed unquashed.
Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new
warrants of arrest based on a determination of probable cause, it would
have been legally permissible for them to do so. The records of the
preliminary investigation had been available to the Court of Appeals, and
are also available to this Court, allowing both the Court of Appeals and
this Court to personally examine the records of the case and not merely
rely on the certification of the prosecutor. As we have ruled in Allado v.
Diokno and Roberts v. Court of Appeals, the determination of probable
cause does not rest on a subjective criteria. As we had resolved in those
cases to overrule the finding of probable cause of the judges therein on
the ground of grave abuse of discretion, in the same vein, we can also
overrule the decision of a judge reversing a finding of probable cause,
also on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case
dismissed before arraignment

In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of

Appeals did not recall or reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by Judge
Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge Anghad to issue apparently new
warrants of arrest.36 According to the petitioners, it was an error for the
Court of Appeals to have done so, without a personal determination of
probable cause.

In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of

Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of
Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524, alleging that the order of
dismissal issued therein had become final and executory. According to
petitioners:

We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new

warrants of arrest or merely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of

It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge
Anghad dated November 14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which

were assailed in the private respondent Tuliaos Petition for Certiorari,

Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the private respondent before the
Court of Appeals. As carefully enumerated in the first page of the assailed
Decision, only the following Orders issued by Judge Anghad were
questioned by private respondent, to wit:
1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;
2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;
3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and
4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.
Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad,
which ultimately dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is
NOT included in the list of the assailed Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the
Court of Appeals should not have passed upon the validity or nullity of the
Joint Order of November 14, 2001.38
Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliaos Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus was filed not with the Court of
Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of Appeals decided the case
because we referred the same to them in our 19 November 2001
Resolution. Such petition was filed on 25 October 2001, around three
weeks before the 14 November 2001 Order. Upon receipt of the 14
November 2001 Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no time in filing
with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging
that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court
when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November
2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we
referred said motion to the Court of Appeals, in view of the previous
referral of respondent Tuliaos petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus.
Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public
Repondent in Contempt places the 14 November 2001 Order within the
issues of the case decided by the Court of Appeals. In claiming that

Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court in issuing the 14

November 2001 Order, respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad
an act much more serious than grave abuse of discretion.
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November
2001 Order on 15 November 2001, antedating it so as to avoid the effects
of our 12 November 2001 Resolution. In said 12 November 2001
Resolution, we resolved to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining
Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases upon the
respondent Tuliaos filing of a bond in the amount of P20,000.00.
Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond on 15 November 2005.
While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt,
seeing as disobedience to lawful orders of a court and abuse of court
processes are cases of indirect contempt which require the granting of
opportunity to be heard on the part of respondent, 39 the prayer to cite
public respondent in contempt and for other reliefs just and equitable
under the premises should be construed to include a prayer for the
nullification of said 14 November 2001 Order.
In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before
arraignment does not constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot
be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon
his express motion that the case was dismissed.40
As to respondent Tuliaos prayer (in both the original petition for certiorari
as well as in his motion to cite for contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad
from further proceeding with the case, we hold that the number of
instances of abuse of discretion in this case are enough to convince us of
an apparent bias on the part of Judge Anghad. We further resolve to
follow the case of People v. SPO1 Leao,41 by transferring the venue of
Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 to the City of Manila,
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December
2002 and the Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Criminal Cases No. 36-

3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial
Court of the City of Manila. In this connection,
1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of
the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to effect
the transfer of the cases within ten (10) days after receipt hereof;
2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago,
Isabela, is likewise directed to report to this Court compliance
hereto within ten (10) days from transfer of these cases;
3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to
raffle the criminal cases within ten (10) days from the transfer;
4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed
to report to this Court compliance with the order to raffle within
ten (10) days from said compliance; and
5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is
directed to act on said cases with reasonable dispatch.
6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue
forthwith warrants of arrest for the apprehension of petitioners
Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon, and
accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably with the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2002.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August
2003 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 113630 May 5, 1994

DIOSDADO JOSE ALLADO and ROBERTO L. MENDOZA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, Presiding Judge, Br. 62, Regional Trial
Court, Makati, Metro Manila, and PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-CRIME
COMMISSION, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On balance at the fulcrum once again are the intrinsic right of the State to
prosecute perceived transgressors of the law, which can be regulated,
and the innate value of human liberty, which can hardly be weighed.
Some twelve years ago we were confronted with a similar problem when
former Senator Jovito R. Salonga invoked before this Court his "right to
life and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that
no prima faciecase has been established to warrant the filing of an
information for subversion against him." 1 We resolved the issue then and
sustained him. He is now back before us, this time as counsel pleading
the cause of petitioners herein who, he claims, are in a situation far

worse than his predicament twelve (12) years ago. He postulates that no
probable cause likewise exists in this case, and what is worse is that no
bail is recommended.
This petition gives us an opportunity to revisit the concept and implication
of probable cause, the existence of which is necessary for the prosecutor
to have an accused held for trial and for a trial judge to issue a warrant
for his arrest. It is mandatory therefore that there be probable cause
before an information is filed and a warrant of arrest issued.
Unfortunately, however, at times a criminal case is filed, a warrant of
arrest issued and a person consequently incarcerated on unsubstantiated
allegations that only feign probable cause.
Petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, alumni of the
College of Law, University of the Philippines, are partners of the Law Firm
of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado. In the practice of their profession, and
on the basis of an alleged extrajudicial confession of a security guard,
they have been accused of the heinous crime of kidnapping with murder
by the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) and ordered arrested
without bail by respondent judge.
The focal source of the information against petitioners is the sworn
statement dated 16 September 1993 of Security Guard Escolastico
Umbal, a discharge of the Philippine Constabulary, implicating them as
the brains behind the alleged kidnapping and slaying of one Eugen
Alexander Van Twest, a German national. 2 In that extrajudicial
confession, Umbal claimed that he and his companions were met by
petitioners at Silahis Hotel and in exchange for P2.5M the former
undertook to apprehend Van Twest who allegedly had an international
warrant of arrest against him. Thus, on 16 June 1992, after placing him
under surveillance for nearly a month, Umbal, Ex-policeman Rolando
Gamatero, AFPCIG Agent Roberto Santiago and SPO2 Sergio Antonino
abducted Van Twest. They blocked his blue Nissan Pathfinder under the
Alabang overpass and forced him into their car. They brought him to a
"safe house" just behind the New Bilibid Prisons. Umbal was tasked to
watch over their quarry. After four (4) days, Gamatero, Santiago and
Antonino returned to the "safe house" together with petitioners and SPO2
Roger Bato, known to Umbal also as "Batok." SPO2 Bato faked the

interrogation of Van Twest, pretending it was official, and then made him
sign certain documents. The following day, Gamatero shot Van Twest in
the chest with a baby armalite, after which Antonino stabbed him
repeatedly, cut off his private part, and later burned his cadaver into fine
ashes using gasoline and rubber tires. Umbal could not recall the exact
date when the incident happened, but he was certain it was about a year
ago.
A day after Umbal executed his extrajudicial confession, the operatives of
the PACC, armed with a search warrant issued by Judge Roberto A.
Barrios of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 11, 3 separately raided
the two (2) dwellings of Santiago, one located at No. 7 Sangley Street,
and the other, along Amalingan Street, both in Green Heights
Subdivision, Paraaque. The raiders recovered a blue Nissan Pathfinder
and assorted firearms and ammunition and placed Santiago and his
trusted aide, Efren Madolid, under arrest. Also arrested later that day
were Antonio and Bato who were found to have in their possession
several firearms and ammunition and Van Twest's Cartier sunglasses.
After evaluating the pieces of evidence gathered by PACC operatives,
Sr., Supt. Panfilo Lacson, Chief of PACC Task Force Habagat, referred
the case to the Department of Justice for the institution of criminal
proceedings against AFPCIG Agent Roberto Santiago, SPO1 Sergio
Antonino, SPO2 Roger Bato, Ex-policeman Rolando Gamatero, Efren
Madolid, and petitioners herein, Atty. Diosdado Jose Allado and Atty.
Roberto L. Mendoza, for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition,
carnapping, kidnapping for ransom with murder, and usurpation of
authority. 4 In his letter to the State Prosecutor dated 17 September 1993,
Sr. Supt. Lacson charged that
Atty. Roberto L. Mendoza and Atty. Allado of Salonga, Hernandez and
Allado Law Offices . . . planned and conspired with other suspects to
abduct and kill the German national Alexander Van Twest in order to
eliminate him after forcing the victim to sign several documents
transferring ownership of several properties amounting to several
million pesos and caused the withdrawal of P5M deposit from the
victim's bank account.

Thereafter, Senior State Prosecutor Ferdinand prosecutor Ferdinand R.

Abesamis issued a subpoena to petitioners informing them that a
complaint
was filed against them by PACC TF-Habagat, directing them to appear on
30 September 1993 at the Multi-Purpose Hall of the Department of
Justice and to submit their counter-affidavits. Attached to the subpoena
were copies of the affidavits executed by Umbal and members of the
team who raided the two (2) dwellings of Santiago. 5
Not satisfied merely with the affidavits attached to the subpoena,
petitioner Mendoza moved for the production of other documents for
examination and copying to enable him to fully prepare for his defense
and to submit an intelligible counter-affidavit. 6 Specifically, petitioner
Mendoza was interested in (a) the "several documents transferring
ownership of several properties amounting to several million pesos and
the withdrawal of P5M deposits from the victim's bank account," as stated
in the complaint; (b) the complete records of the PACC's investigation,
including investigations on other suspects and their disposition, PACC's
Order of Battle for 1992 and early 1993; and, (c) such other written
statements issued in the above-entitled case, and all other documents
intended to be used in this case. 7 Petitioners likewise sought the
inhibition of the members of the panel of prosecutors, which was created
to conduct the preliminary investigation, on the ground that they were
members of the legal staff assigned to PACC and thus could not act with
impartiality.

In its Order of 11 October 1993, 8 the new panel of prosecutors composed

of Senior State Prosecutor Bernelito R. Fernandez as Chairman, with
Rogelio F. Vista and Purita M. Deynata as Members, confirmed that the
motion for inhibition of the members of the old panel as well as the
appeal to the Secretary of Justice was resolved on 8 October 1993
resulting in the creation of a new panel. Thereafter, the new panel
granted the prayer of petitioner Mendoza for the production of additional
documents used or intended to be used against him. Meanwhile, Task
Force Habagat, in compliance with the order, submitted only copies of the
request for verification of the firearms seized from the accused, the result
of the request for verification, and a Philippine Times Journal article on
the case with a marginal note of President Fidel V. Ramos addressed to
the Chief of the Philippine National Police directing the submission of a
report and summary of actions taken thereon.
Not having been provided with the requested documents, petitioners
nevertheless submitted their respective counter-affidavits denying the
accusations against them. 9
After a preliminary hearing where clarificatory questions were additionally
propounded, the case was deemed submitted for resolution. But before
the new panel could resolve the case, SPO2 Bato filed a manifestation
stating that he was reconsidering the earlier waiver of his right to file
counter- affidavit, 10 and "in the greater interest of truth, justice and fair
play" moved for the admissions of his counter-affidavit 11 confessing
participation in the abduction and slaying of Van Twest and implicating
petitioners Allado and Mendoza. Sometime in January 1994, however,
before petitioners could refute Bato's counter-affidavit, he moved to
suppress it on the ground that it was extracted through intimidation and
duress.
On 3 February 1994, with the new penal failing to act on the twin motions
of SPO2 Bato, petitioners heard over the radio that the panel had issued
a resolution finding a prima facie case against them and that an
information had already been filed in court. Upon verification with the
Department of Justice, however, petitioners were informed that the
resolution was not yet ready for release, but later that afternoon they
were able to secure a copy of the information for kidnapping with murder

against them 12 and the 15-page undated resolution under the letterhead
of PACC, signed by the panel of prosecutors, with the Head of the PACC
Task Force recommending approval thereof. 13 That same day, the
information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati and raffled
off to Branch 62 presided by respondent Judge Roberto C. Diokno.
On 4 February 1994, respondent judge, in response to petitioners'
request, gave them until 8 February 1994 to submit their opposition to the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against all the accused. 14 On 7 February
1994, petitioners complied with the order of respondent judge. 15 The
following day,
8 February 1994, petitioner Allado filed an appeal with the Secretary of
Justice seeking review and reversal of the undated resolution of the
panel
of prosecutors, 16 which appeal was adopted by petitioner Mendoza. 17 On
11 February 1994, petitioner Allado moved to defer the proceedings
before the trial court pending resolution of his appeal before the
Secretary of Justice. 18 However, on even date, respondent judge issued
the assailed warrant of arrest against petitioners. 19 Hence, on 15
February 1994, petitioners filed with us the instant petition
forcertiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order.
On 16 February 1994, we required respondents to comment on the
petition and set the case for hearing on 28 February 1994. After the
hearing, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from
enforcing the warrant of arrest and respondent judge from conducting
further proceedings on the case and, instead, to elevate the records to
us. Meanwhile, on 27 February 1994, petitioners voluntarily surrendered
at the Headquarters of the Capital Command (CAPCOM), Philippine
National Police (PNP), Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Metro Manila, and
on 29 February 1994, they were released on the basis of our temporary
restraining order.
Petitioners, in their 335-page petition, inclusive of annexes, principally
contend that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and
in excess of jurisdiction in "whimsically holding that there is probable
cause against petitioners without determining the admissibility of the
evidence against petitioners and without even stating the basis of his

findings," 20 and in "relying on the Resolution of the Panel and their

certification that probable cause exists when the certification is
flawed." 21 Petitioners maintain that the records of the preliminary
investigation which respondent judge solely relied upon failed to establish
probable cause against them to justify the issuance of the warrant of
arrest. Petitioners likewise assail the prosecutors' "clear sign of bias and
impartiality (sic)." 22
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the
determination of probable cause is a function of the judge who is merely
required to personally appreciate certain facts to convince him that the
accused probably committed the crime charged.
Section 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution, lays down the requirements
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, i.e., a warrant of arrest shall issue
only upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce.
As early as 1915, in Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban, 23 this Court
speaking through Associate Justice Sherman Moreland defined probable
cause as "the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite
the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge
of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for
which he was prosecuted." This definition is still relevant today as we
continue to cite it in recent cases. 24 Hence, probable cause for an arrest
or for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonable discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought
to be arrested. 25 And as a protection against false prosecution and arrest,
it is the knowledge of facts, actual or apparent, strong enough to justify a
reasonable man in the belief that he was lawful grounds for arresting the
accused. 26
Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan 27 sets a standard for determining the existence
of probable cause. While it appears in that case that we have granted the
prosecutor and the trial judge seemingly unlimited latitude in determining
the existence of absence of probable cause by affirming the long-

standing procedure that they can base their findings merely on their
personal opinion and reasonable belief, yet, this permissiveness should
not be interpreted as giving them arbitrary powers and letting them loose
in the determination of the existence of probable cause, a delicate legal
question which can result in the harassment and deprivation of liberty of
the person sought to be charged or arrested. There we said
Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is,
or may be, well founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the
prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to
believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so.
The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import
absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.
Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough
that it is it believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes
the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of
evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.
Whether an act was done causing undue injury to the government and
whether the same was done with manifest partiality or evident bad faith can
only be made out by proper and sufficient testimony. Necessarily, a
conclusion can be arrived at when the case has already proceeded on
sufficient proof. 28

Accordingly, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must satisfy

himself that based on the evidence submitted there is sufficient proof that
a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty thereof. In the Order of respondent judge dated 11
February 1994, it is expressly stated that "[t]his court after careful
evaluation of the evidence on record, believes and rules that probable
cause exists; and therefore, a warrant of arrest should be issued."
However, we are unable to see how respondent judge arrived at such
ruling. We have painstakingly examined the records and we cannot find
any support for his conclusion. On the contrary, we discern a number of
reasons why we consider the evidence submitted to be insufficient for a
finding of probable cause against petitioners.

The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission relies heavily on the sworn

statement of Security Guard Umbal who supposedly confessed his
participation in the alleged kidnapping and murder of Van Twest. For one,
there is serious doubt on Van Twest's reported death since the corpus
delicti has not been established, nor have his remains been recovered.
Umbal claims that Van Twest was completely burned into ashes with the
use of gasoline and rubber tires from around ten o'clock in the evening to
six o'clock the next morning. 29 This is highly improbable, if not ridiculous.
A human body cannot be pulverized into ashes by simply burning it with
the use of gasoline and rubber tires in an open field. Even crematoria use
entirely closed incinerators where the corpse is subjected to intense
heat. 30 Thereafter, the remains undergo a process where the bones are
completely ground to dust.
In the case of Van Twest, there is not even any insinuation that earnest
efforts were exerted to recover traces of his remains from the scene of
the alleged cremation. 31 Could it be that the government investigators did
to the place of cremation but could not find any? Or could it be that they
did not go at all because they knew that there would not be any as no
burning ever took place? To allege then that the body of Van Twest was
completely burned to ashes in an open field with the use merely of tires
and gasoline is a tale too tall to gulp.
Strangely, if not awkwardly, after Van Twest's reported abduction on
16 June 1992 which culminated in his decimation by cremation, his
counsel continued to represent him before judicial and quasi-judicial
proceedings. Thus on 31 July 1992, his counsel filed in his behalf a
petition for review before this Court, docketed as G.R. Nos. 106253, and
on 18 March 1993, a memorandum before the Securities and Exchange
Commission in SEC Case No. 3896. On
26 November 1993, during the preliminary investigation conducted by the
panel of prosecutors, counsel again manifested that "even then and even
as of this time, I stated in my counter-affidavit that until the matter of
death is to be established in the proper proceedings, I shall continue to
pursue my duties and responsibilities as counsel for Mr. Van
Twest." 32 Hence, even Asst. Solicitor General Estoesta believes that
counsel of Van Twest doubted the latter's
death. 33 Obviously, counsel himself does not believe that his client is in

fact already dead otherwise his obligation to his client would have ceased
except to comply with his duty "to inform the court promptly of such death
. . . and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator,
guardian or other legal representative," 34 which he did not.
Under the circumstances, we cannot discount petitioners' theory that the
supposed death of Van Twest who is reportedly an international fugitive
from justice, a fact substantiated by petitioners and never refuted by
PACC, is a likely story to stop the international manhunt for his arrest. In
this regard, we are reminded of the leading case ofU.S. v.
Samarin 35 decided ninety-two years ago where this Court ruled that when
the supposed victim is wholly unknown, his body not found, and there is
but one witness who testifies to the killing, the corpus delicti is not
sufficiently proved.
Then, the extrajudicial statement of Umbal suffers from material
inconsistencies. In his sworn statement, he said that he together with his
cohorts was met by petitioners in Silahis Hotel where they hatched the
plan to abduct Van Twest. 36 However, during the preliminary
investigation, he stated that he was not part of the actual meeting as he
only waited outside in the car for his companions who supposedly
discussed the plan inside Silahis Hotel. 37
Umbal also said that petitioners arrived with Bato and conducted a mock
interrogation of Van Twest who thereafter signed various documents
upon being compelled to do so. 38 During the clarificatory questioning,
however, Umbal changed his story and said that he was asked to go
outside of the "safe house" at the time Van Twest was interrogated and
thus did not see if Van Twest indeed signed certain documents. Why
Umbal had to be sent out of the "safe house,"
no explanation was offered. Did these documents really exist? Or could
the
non-existence of these documents be the reason why PACC was not able
to comply with the order of the prosecutors to produce them during the
preliminary investigation? And then, what happened to the P2.5M that
was supposedly offered by petitioners in exchange for the abduction of
Van Twest? These and more remain unanswered.

Most perplexing however is that while the whole investigation was

supposedly triggered off by Umbal's confession of 16 September 1993,
the application of the PACC operatives for a search warrant to be served
in the
two (2) dwellings of Santiago was filed and granted by the Regional Trial
Court of Manila on 15 September 1993, a day before Umbal executed his
sworn statement. In support of the application, the PACC agents claimed
that Umbal had been in their custody since 10 September 1993.
Significantly, although he was said to be already under their custody,
Umbal claims he was never interrogated until 16 September 1993 and
only at the security barracks of Valle Verde V, Pasig, where he was a
security guard. 39
The alleged counter-affidavit of SPO2 Bato, which the panel of
prosecutors also considered in filing the charges against petitioners, can
hardly be credited as its probative value has tremendously waned. The
records show that the alleged counter-affidavit, which is selfincriminating, was filed after the panel had considered the case submitted
for resolution. And before petitioners could refute this counter-affidavit,
Bato moved to suppress the same on the ground that it was extracted
through duress and intimidation.
For sure, the credibility of Umbal is badly battered. Certainly, his bare
allegations, even if the State invokes its inherent right to prosecute, are
insufficient to justify sending two lawyers to jail, or anybody for that
matter. More importantly, the PACC operatives who applied for a warrant
to search the dwellings of Santiago never implicated petitioners. In fact
they claimed that according to Umbal, it was Santiago, and not
petitioners, who masterminded the whole affair. 40 While there may be bits
of evidence against petitioners'
co-accused, i.e., referring to those seized from the dwellings of Santiago,
these do not in the least prove petitioners' complicity in the crime
charged. Based on the evidence thus far submitted there is nothing
indeed, much less is there probable cause, to incriminate petitioners. For
them to stand trial and be deprived in the meantime of their liberty,
however brief, the law appropriately exacts much more to sustain a
warrant for their arrest facts and circumstances strong enough in

themselves to support the belief that they are guilty of a crime that in fact
happened. Quite obviously, this has not been met.
Verily, respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the warrant for the arrest of petitioners it appearing that he did not
personally examine the evidence nor did he call for the complainant and
his witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts. Instead, he merely
relied on the certification of the prosecutors that probable cause existed.
For, otherwise, he would have found out that the evidence thus far
presented was utterly insufficient to warrant the arrest of petitioners. In
this regard, we restate the procedure we outlined in various cases we
have already decided.
In Soliven v. Makasiar, 41 we said that the judge (a) shall personally
evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or, (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no
probable cause, may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion on the existence of probable cause.
In People v. Inting, 42 we emphasized the important features of the
constitutional mandate: (a) The determination of probable cause is a
function of the judge; it is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to
ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this determination;
(b) The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge.
It merely assists him in making the determination of probable cause. The
judge does not have to follow what the prosecutor presents to him. By
itself, the prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is
the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes (if any), and
all other supporting documents behind the prosecutor's certification which
are material in assisting the judge in his determination of probable cause;
and, (c) Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary
inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether
the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries
be conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there
should be no confusion about their objectives. The determination of

probable cause for the warrant is made by the judge. The preliminary
investigation
proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the
accused is guilty of the offense charged and therefore, whether or not he
should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial
is a function of the prosecutor.
In Lim v. Felix, 43 where we reiterated Soliven v. Makasiar and People v.
Inting, we said
[T]he Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and
his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a
commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be
a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal's bare
certification. All these should be before the Judge.
The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its
annexes depends on the circumstances of each case. We cannot
determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's
examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for,
after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the
Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the circumstances of
each case require. To be sure, the judge must go beyond the
Prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever necessary.
He should call for the complainant and witnesses themselves to answer
the court's probing questions when the circumstances of the case so
require.
Clearly, probable cause may not be established simply by showing that a
trial judge subjectively believes that he has good grounds for his action.
Good faith is not enough. If subjective good faith alone were the test, the
constitutional protection would be demeaned and the people would be
"secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects" only in the fallible
discretion of the judge. 44 On the contrary, the probable cause test is an
objective one, for in order that there be probable cause the facts and
circumstances must be such as would warrant a belief by a reasonably
discreet and prudent man that the accused is guilty of the crime which
has just been committed.45 This, as we said, is the standard. Hence, if

upon the filing of the information in court the trial judge, after reviewing
the information and the documents attached thereto, finds that no
probable cause exists must either call for the complainant and the
witnesses themselves or simply dismiss the case. There is no reason to
hold the accused for trial and further expose him to an open and public
accusation of the crime when no probable cause exists.
But then, it appears in the instant case that the prosecutors have similarly
misappropriated, if not abused, their discretion. If they really believed that
petitioners were probably guilty, they should have armed themselves with
facts and circumstances in support of that belief; for mere belief is not
enough. They should have presented sufficient and credible evidence to
demonstrate the existence of probable cause. For the prosecuting officer
"is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.
As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law,
the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.
He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor indeed, he should do
so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul
ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated
to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to
bring about a just one" 46

In the case at bench, the undue haste in the filing of the information and
the inordinate interest of the government cannot be ignored. From the
gathering of evidence until the termination of the preliminary
investigation, it appears that the state prosecutors were overly eager to
file the case and secure a warrant for the arrest of the accused without
bail and their consequent detention. Umbal's sworn statement is laden
with inconsistencies and improbabilities. Bato's counter-affidavit was
considered without giving petitioners the opportunity to refute the same.
The PACC which gathered the evidence appears to have had a hand in
the determination of probable cause in the preliminary inquiry as the
undated resolution of the panel not only bears the letterhead of PACC but
was also recommended for approval by the head of the PACC Task
Force. Then petitioners were given the runaround in securing a copy of
the resolution and the information against them.
Indeed, the task of ridding society of criminals and misfits and sending
them to jail in the hope that they will in the future reform and be
productive members of the community rests both on the judiciousness of
judges and the prudence of prosecutors. And, whether it is a preliminary
investigation by the prosecutor, which ascertains if the respondent should
be held for trial, or a preliminary inquiry by the trial judge which
determines if an arrest warrant should issue, the bottomline is that there
is a standard in the determination of the existence of probable cause, i.e.,
there should be facts and circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
to warrant a prudent and cautious man to believe that the accused is
guilty of the crime with which he is charged. Judges and prosecutors are
not off on a frolic of their own, but rather engaged in a delicate legal duty
defined by law and jurisprudence.
In this instance, Salonga v. Pao 47 finds application
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent
against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him
from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense
and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless
and expensive trial (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241, citing Hashim v.
Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The right to a preliminary investigation is a
statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress constitutional

due process (People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277). However, in order to

satisfy the due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary
investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that the
transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation
serves not only for the purposes of the State. More importantly, it is a
part of the guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of
all who live in the country. It is therefore imperative upon the fiscal or
the judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of
going thru a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient
to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a
sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused (emphasis supplied).
The facts of this case are fatefully distressing as they showcase the
seeming immensity of government power which when unchecked
becomes tyrannical and oppressive. Hence the Constitution, particularly
the Bill of Rights, defines the limits beyond which lie unsanctioned state
actions. But on occasion, for one reason or another, the State transcends
this parameter. In consequence, individual liberty unnecessarily suffers.
The case before us, if uncurbed, can be illustrative of a dismal trend.
Needless injury of the sort inflicted by government agents is not reflective
of responsible government. Judges and law enforcers are not, by reason
of their high and prestigious office, relieved of the common obligation to
avoid deliberately inflicting unnecessary injury.
The sovereign power has the inherent right to protect itself and its people
from vicious acts which endanger the proper administration of justice;
hence, the State has every right to prosecute and punish violators of the
law. This is essential for its self- preservation, nay, its very existence. But
this does not confer a license for pointless assaults on its citizens. The
right of the State to prosecute is not a carte blanche for government
agents to defy and disregard the rights of its citizens under the
Constitution. Confinement, regardless of duration, is too high a price to
pay for reckless and impulsive prosecution. Hence, even if we apply in
this case the "multifactor balancing test" which requires the officer to
weigh the manner and intensity of the interference on the right of the
people, the gravity of the crime committed and the circumstances
attending the incident, still we cannot see probable cause to order the
detention of petitioners. 48

The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect the people against arbitrary
and discriminatory use of political power. This bundle of rights guarantees
the preservation of our natural rights which include personal liberty and
security against invasion by the government or any of its branches or
instrumentalities. Certainly, in the hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights
takes precedence over the right of the State to prosecute, and when
weighed against each other, the scales of justice tilt towards the former.
Thus, relief may be availed of to stop the purported enforcement of
criminal law where it is necessary to provide for an orderly administration
of justice, to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive
and vindictive manner, and to afford adequate protection to constitutional
rights. 49
Perhaps, this case would not have reached this Court if petitioners were
ordinary people submissive to the dictates of government. They would
have been illegally arrested and detained without bail. Then we would not
have the opportunity to rectify the injustice. Fortunately, the victims of
injustice are lawyers who are vigilant of their rights, who fight for their
liberty and freedom not otherwise available to those who cower in fear
and subjection.
Let this then be a constant reminder to judges, prosecutors and other
government agents tasked with the enforcement of the law that in the
performance of their duties they must act with circumspection, lest their
thoughtless ways, methods and practices cause a disservice to their
office and maim their countrymen they are sworn to serve and protect.
We thus caution government agents, particularly the law enforcers, to be
more prudent in the prosecution of cases and not to be oblivious of
human rights protected by the fundamental law. While we greatly applaud
their determined efforts to weed society of felons, let not their impetuous
eagerness violate constitutional precepts which circumscribe the
structure of a civilized community.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED.
The temporary restraining order we issued on 28 February 1994 in favor
of petitioners, Atty. Diosdado Jose Allado and Atty. Roberto L. Mendoza,
is made permanent. The warrant of arrest issued against them is SET
ASIDE and respondent Judge Roberto C. Diokno is ENJOINED from

proceeding any further against herein petitioners in Crim. Case No. 941757 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati.

to subject this case to a painstaking review to ascertain the validity of the

now joint submission of the prosecution and the defense.

SO ORDERED

Appellant was charged with abduction with rape in an information which

reads as follows:
The undersigned upon complaint filed by the offended
party, Marinel Idea, accuses Bienvenido
Leoparte alias Emben (prisoner) of the crime of forcible
abduction with rape, committed as follows:

G.R. No. 85328 July 4, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BIENVENIDO LEOPARTE, alias "EMBEN," accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Joaquin M. Trinidad for accused-appellant.

That on or about the 16th day of September 1985, at Padre

Burgos, Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a deadly weapon, moved by lewd
design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and forcibly abduct the complainant Marinel Idea, against
her will and consent by taking and carrying her away from
her home and bringing her, thereafter, to different places
where said accused, by means of force, threats and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously had (sic) carnal knowledge several times with the
said Marinel Idea against her will and consent. 2

REGALADO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena,
Branch 60, convicting accused-appellant Bienvenido
Leoparte, alias "Emben," of the complex crime of forcible abduction with
rape and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the
indemnification of the offended party in the sum of P30,000.00. 1
Taking an atypical but laudable stand in this case, the Solicitor General,
in lieu of an appellee's brief, filed a manifestation and motion
recommending the acquittal of appellant since his guilt had not been
established beyond reasonable doubt. Rare though such instances may
be, it is tangible proof that said government counsel, although tasked with
representing the prosecution against an appeal from a judgment of
conviction, yields in proper cases to the paramount consideration that
while guilt should not escape, innocence must not suffer. Our task then is

Appellee narrates that the prosecution presented Marinel Idea, the

alleged offended party, who testified 3 that on September 16, 1985, at
about 7:00 P.M. more or less, she was returning home by the railroad
tracks from the house of her brother which was about two (2) kilometers
away, when appellant suddenly pulled her by the right arm threatening
that if she should shout, he would kill her. Appellant then allegedly
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her at the nearby banana
plantation. She declared that appellant first fondled the different parts of
her body, more particularly her bust, and kissed her several times. Then
he opened her thighs, inserted his fingers and, later, his penis inside her
vagina. She allegedly resisted the appellant, but the latter threatened to
kill her with a pointed weapon if she would not surrender herself to him.
After the alleged assault on her honor, appellant brought her to the house
of his sister, arriving there at around 8:00 P.M. Appellant's sister, his

nephews and nieces were present. There, appellant had carnal

knowledge of her three times, despite her resistance and her telling
appellant not to do it because she was getting married to another man.
However, appellant allegedly boxed her in the thigh and again threatened
to kill her if she would not submit to his wishes.
The following day, September 17, 1985, at about 7:00 A.M., they left the
house of appellant's sister and proceeded to the house of appellant's
uncle, Vicente Liwag, located at Barangay Marao, Padre Burgos,
Quezon. Appellant introduced her to his uncle, to the latter's wife and to
their children telling them that she and appellant had eloped. She
allegedly denied what appellant said, but his uncle did not believe her.
They remained in the house of appellant's uncle for two days. During the
night, they slept in a separate house which was also owned by
appellant's uncle and built just beside the latter's residence. There she
was allegedly sexually abused by appellant three (3) more times at 8:00
P.M., 9:00 P.M. and, finally, at 10:00 P.M.

Appellant, on the other hand, adduced evidence materially contradicting

the prosecution's allegation of abduction with rape and intended to
establish that appellant and Marinel Idea were lovers and that they
agreed to elope that night of September 16, 1985. Hence, it is claimed
complainant's going with appellant and the sexual relations between
them were voluntary. 4
The defense also presented as a witness one Pastor Opo, Barangay
Captain of Barangay Marao, who testified that the accused together with
the offended party went to his house and informed him that they eloped
and intended to get married, so he told appellant's mother to attend to the
matter so that the two could get married. 5
On August 29, 1988, as stated at the outset, a judgment of conviction
was rendered by the court below. Appellant is now before us, seeking the
reversal of said decision on the following assignment of errors:
I

Leaving the residence of appellant's uncle, appellant and the offended

party proceeded to the house of appellant's father, where appellant
himself resided. Appellant's parents, his brothers and sisters were there.
Appellant announced to his family that she eloped with him, but she
allegedly told them to bring her home because her own mother, brothers
and sisters must be looking for her. There, she was once again allegedly
abused by appellant in a room on the third floor. The following day, her
parents, accompanied by Philippine Constabulary soldiers, arrived and
took her away and appellant was arrested.
Thereafter, Marinel Idea went to the municipal hall and talked to a certain
Commander Aris of the Burgos Police Station, who told her to see a
doctor. She consulted Dr. Umali of the Padre Burgos Hospital. She then
returned to Commander Aris to consult another physician at the Quezon
Memorial Hospital, which she did. She also gave a copy of the
examination results to Commander Aris. Thereafter, she was investigated
by Commander Aris, which investigation was reduced into writing and
was marked in court as Exhibit "A."

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING JUDICIAL

NOTICE OF THE COMPLAINT FILED BY MARINEL
IDEA AND HER MOTHER WHICH ACCORDING TO THE
TRIAL COURT IS FOUND IN THE RECORDS OF THE
PROVINCIAL FISCAL;
II
THE TRIAL COURT, NOR ANY COURT FOR THAT
MATTER, DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THIS CASE; and
III
THE PROSECUTION MISERABLY FAILED TO PROVE THE
GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT. 6

The first and second assignment of errors are palpably without merit. The
complaint by the offended party provided for in Article 344 of the Revised

Penal Code does not determine the jurisdiction of the courts over crimes
against chastity but is only a condition precedent for the exercise by the
proper authorities of the power to prosecute. 7
The same not being jurisdictional, the failure of appellant to raise said
issue at the trial court barred him from raising said issue on appeal, in
consonance with Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 8. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground
therefor. The failure of the accused to assert any
ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the
complaint or information, either because he did not file a
motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said
motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a
motion to quash, except the grounds of no offense
charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged,
extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy, as
provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (h) of Section 3
of this Rule.
Article 344 was not enacted for the specific purpose of benefiting the
accused. When it is said that the requirement in Article 344 that a
complaint of the offended party or her relatives is jurisdictional, what is
meant is that it is the complaint that starts the prosecutory proceeding. It
is not the complaint which confers jurisdiction on the court to try the case.
The court's jurisdiction is vested in it by the Judiciary Law. 8 Such
condition has been imposed out of consideration for the offended woman
and her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather
than go through with the scandal of a public trial. 9
The overriding consideration in determining the issue of whether or not
the condition precedent prescribed in Article 344 has been complied with
is the intent of the aggrieved party to seek judicial redress for the affront
committed. 10 In the case at bar, the active cooperation of the offended
party in the prosecution of the case, as witness, clearly indicates said
intent. Moreover, the information filed by the fiscal specifically states that
the same was instituted upon the complaint of the offended party.

On the third assignment of error, appellant contends that he is entitled to

an acquittal. We agree.
In view of the severity of the penalties for the offense of rape, the
judiciary must take extreme care to avoid an injustice to the accused. If a
reasonable doubt exists, the verdict must be one of acquittal. Rape is an
accusation easy to make, hard to prove, but harder to defend by the
accused, though innocent. The evidence for the prosecution must be
clear and convincing to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence. Rape is an offense to which, as is often the case, only two
people can testify, thus requiring the most conscientious effort on the part
of the arbiter to weigh and appraise the conflicting testimonies. If a
reasonable doubt exists, the verdict must be one of acquittal. 11
In the case at bar, the evidence for the People is undeniably insufficient
to sustain a conviction. The uncorroborated, vacillating and inherently
improbable testimony of the offended party has itself created doubts as to
the guilt of the accused. For one, it failed to establish the presence of
violence or intimidation which is the common element of the component
offenses charged here as a complex crime. A number of circumstances,
culled from the testimony of the offended party, belies her claim that she
was forcibly abducted and raped by appellant.
Graphic illustrations thereof are found in the following observations of the
Solicitor General which we quote with approval:
1. From September 16, 1985 to September 20, 1985 appellant and
complainant transferred from one house to another. They travelled by
the road, in broad daylight at that, meeting several people on the way.
Complainant, therefore, had more than ample opportunity to seek the
help of other people and free herself from appellant if indeed she was
abducted and abused by the latter. She met several members of
appellant's family and relatives. At least one of them could have
disfavored the alleged abduction and could have helped complainant
had there been any perceivable indication of resistance on her part. On
the contrary, the allegation of appellant's sister that she suggested to
bring complainant home because she knew complainant's mother, but

yet complainant refused as she would rather be with appellant. This

assertion of appellant's sister on the witness stand remains unrebutted.
2. Significantly, the house of appellant's sister where she and appellant
spent the night after the first sexual intercourse by the banana
plantation is just a stone's throw away from the P.C. Detachment (tsn
Leoparte, November 18, 1987, p. 11). Right there and then,
complainant could have readily sought the help of the P.C. authorities if
she wanted to. That she did not only points to the inevitable conclusion
that indeed she eloped with appellant.
3. Per complainant's own testimony, the first in the series of sexual
encounters between her and appellant occurred at the banana
plantation around 7:00 p.m. of September 16, 1985. The details of this
first sexual intercourse were revealed during the cross examination.
The banana plantation adverted to is about 2 kilometers away from the
railroad track where allegedly appellant first accosted complainant (tsn
Idea, September 18, 1986, p. 30). There, while she was sitting down in
a squatting position, appellant started to remove her clothings: first her
maong shorts, then her panty, the blouse, and the skirt (Ibid, Nov. 27,
1986, p. 16), and appellant also removed her brassiere. While appellant
was engaged in the ceremony of removing all her clothings and
underwear (according to complainant she was wearing several
clothings and underwears one after the other), he was kissing her on
the cheeks (Ibid, p. 10). Then appellant transferred towards her back in
order to loosen and remove her bra. From behind appellant continued
kissing her on the lips and cheeks, at the same time caressing her
nipples with his left and right hands (Ibid, p. 13). Later, when both of
them were totally naked, appellant made her lie down on a banana leaf
which appellant had earlier prepared as cover (Ibid, p. 18). And the
sexual act was consummated.
itc-asl

This vivid description coming as it does from complainant herself of the

preliminaries and the sexual union itself between her and appellant
cannot be anything else but a manifestation of a mutual passion and
longing for each other. Certainly, the foregoing circumstances belie any
pretense on the part of the complainant that she offered resistance
thereto. On the contrary complainant's testimony is pure and simple

lovemaking, immoral though it may be, yet still lovemaking in the true
sense of the art. For, a rapist, whose only objective at the moment is
the satisfaction of his lust, would not understandably have the time
much less the concern to remove all of his victim's clothing, including
his own, and indulge in the sexual act preceded as it was by such
intimate and elaborate foreplay. That the sexual union was
consummated when appellant and complainant were in total
nakedness, appellant having removed complainant's dress and
underwear with such ease, only signifies that she was a willing partner
to the love tryst. In fact, complainant while describing the sexual
intercourse, never mentioned on her own initiative any form of
resistance from her. For that matter, the resistance she claims to have
employed, albeit weakly, was only in response to the question of
counsel, aware perhaps that without resistance the complaint for rape
against appellant is doomed. Worse still is the reason advanced by
complainant for resisting the sexual act. She allegedly resisted
appellant not because she does not like it but simply because she was
already getting married to another man.
In the same vein, the subsequent sexual intercourses between
complainant and appellant in a house of the latter's uncle, where only
the two of them stayed for two nights, and in appellant's own house,
were no less than part of their pre-marital honeymoon. They indulged in
the sexual activity while being completely naked with such frequency
and regularity. No resistance ever came from complainant except the
lame allegation that she was getting married to another man.
4. As complainant's theory of abduction with rape crumbles, appellant's
claim that they eloped because they are sweetheart gains more solid
grounds. Complainant admitted that the various woman's dresses and
underthings in appellant's possession were hers. However, she failed to
explain why they were all in appellant's possession. The only logical
explanation is that which was offered by appellant. That when he and
complainant met on the night of September 16, 1985, she was carrying
with her some clothes, aside from what she was wearing. Here again
the physical facts of the case belie any claim of abduction. For when a
woman leaves her own house with some extra clothes with her, the
theory of elopement is more credible than the allegation of abduction.

5. Appellant's claim that he and complainant eloped because they were

lovers is further fortified by the unrebutted testimony of Pastor Opo, the
Barangay Captain, who categorically stated that appellant and
complainant appeared before him seeking his help so that they could
be married. He even reduced their statements into writing and let them
sign it. The prosecution's inability to present evidence to rebut this
damaging allegation only proves that the charge of abduction with rape
is more imaginary than real.
6. Finally, it is intriguing how complainant's parents and the P.C. authorities
were able to trace that she was with appellant. Her parents must have had
some idea of the blooming love affair between her and appellant such that
when she disappeared her parents knew right away where to locate her. It
can, therefore, be safely assumed, without fear of contradiction that the
criminal case against the appellant was initiated by the family of the
complainant and the latter was only freed to sustain the same. 12

The recital of the foregoing circumstances, taken not only from the
defense evidence but from that of the prosecution itself, cannot but
support the claim of appellant that the offended party went with him
voluntarily and that their sexual relations thereafter were with their mutual
consent. We are accordingly convinced that, as prayed for by appellant
and recommended by the Solicitor General, a verdict of not guilty should
be handed down in this case.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and

SET ASIDE and accused-appellant Bienvenido Leoparte is ACQUITTED
of the crime charged, with costs de oficio. His immediate release from
confinement is hereby ordered unless he is being held on other legal
grounds.
SO ORDERED.