Admin Digests B2013

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | Dean Carlota | A2010 Digests (Updated by B2013)
I. HISTORICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL

CONSIDERATIONS
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION INC. v PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION
70 PHIL 221
LAUREL; June 26, 1940
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- For the past 20 years, Pangasinan Transport has
been engaged in the business of transporting in
Pangasinan, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija through TPU
buses in accordance with the terms and conditions
of the certificates of public convenience issued by
the Public Utility Commission (later called Public
Service Commission).
- August 26, 1939 PTI applied for an authorization
to operate ten additional Brockway trucks on the
ground that they were needed to comply with the
terms and conditions of its existing certificates and
as a result of the application of the Eight Hour Labor
Law. This was granted by the Public Service
Commission with the following conditions (which are
written in a beautiful language called Spanish so you
may refer to the original text in the case if there is a
lack of confidence in my translation ^_^):

- That the certificates of authorization issued to
Pangasinan Transport would be valid only for a
period of 25 years counted from the date of
promulgation
- That the company may be acquired by the
Philippine Commonwealth with proper payment
of the cost price of its equipment, taking into
account reasonable depreciation to be fixed by
the Commission at the time of it acquisition.
- October 9, 1939 PTI did not agree with the
conditions set by PSC so it filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the latter.
- November 20, 1939 - The present petition for a writ
of certiorari was instituted in this court praying that:
- An order be issued directing the secretary of
the Public Service Commission to certify
forthwith to this court the records of all
proceedings in the case.
- After hearing, the Court should render a
decision declaring section 1 of Commonwealth
Act No. 454 unconstitutional and void
- If this court should be of the opinion that
section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454 is
constitutional, a decision should be rendered
declaring that the provisions are not applicable
to valid and subsisting certificates issued prior to
June 8, 1939.
- Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as

amended by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
454 states that no public service shall operate in the
Philippines without possessing a valid and
subsisting certificate from the Public Service
Commission and that the Commission may
prescribe as a condition for the issuance of the
certificate provided in the preceding paragraph that
the service can be acquired by the Commonwealth
of the Philippines or by any instrumentality thereof
upon payment of the cost price of its useful
equipment, less reasonable depreciation; and
likewise, that the certificate shall valid only for a
definite period of time; and that the violation of any
of these conditions shall produce the immediate
cancellation of the certificate without the necessity of
any express action on the part of the Commission.
ISSUE
WON the conditions set by the Public Service
Commission were valid (as mandated by
Commonwealth Act 146)
HELD
YES but a remand of the case was ordered
Reasoning
- The condition that the Commission can acquire PTI
is a restatement of the constitutional provision that
the State may, in the interest of national welfare and

defense, establish and operate industries and
means of transportation and communication, and,
upon payment of just compensation, transfer to
public ownership utilities and other private
enterprises to be operated by the Government.
- PTI assails the condition that the certificates will be
valid only for a period of time. This should be
construed with the mandate that the Public Service
Commission should issue certifications with the
public interest in mind. Thus the period for validity is
established in relation to promoting and
safeguarding public interest.
- Section 8 of Article XIII of the Constitution
provides, among other things, that no franchise,
certificate, or any other form of authorization for
the operation of a public utility shall be "for a
longer period than fifty years."
- When it was ordained, in section 15 of
Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 454, that the Public
Service Commission may prescribe as a
condition for the issuance of a certificate that it
"shall be valid only for a definite period of time"
and, in section 16 (a) that "no such certificates
shall be issued for a period of more than fifty
years," the National Assembly meant to give
effect to this constitutional mandate.
- All that has been delegated to the Commission,

therefore, is the administrative function,
involving the use discretion, to carry out the will
of the National Assembly having in view, in
addition, the promotion of "public interests in a
proper and suitable manner."
- The petitioner is mistaken in the suggestion that,
simply because its existing certificates had been
granted before June 8, 1939, the date when
Commonwealth Act No. 454, amendatory of section
15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, was approved, it
must be deemed to have the right of holding them in
perpetuity.
The Constitution of the Philippines
provided, in section 8 of Article XIII, that "no
franchise or right shall be granted to any individual,
firm, or corporation, except under the condition that
it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or
repeal by the National Assembly when the public
interest so requires." This is in accordance with all
other previous laws (such as the Jones Law and the
Philippine Bill) on the matter.
- Statutes enacted for the regulation of public
utilities, being a proper exercise by the state of its
police power, are applicable not only to those public
utilities coming into existence after its passage, but
likewise to those already established and in
operation.
- Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and 454 are not
only the organic acts of the Public Service

Commission but are "a part of the charter of every
utility company operating or seeking to operate a
franchise" in the Philippines.
- However the Court ordered a remand of the case.
- The petitioner's application here was for an
increase of its equipment to enable it to comply
with the conditions of its certificates of public
convenience.
- On the matter of limitation to twenty five (25)
years of the life of its certificates of public
convenience, there had been neither notice nor
opportunity given the petitioner to be heard or
present evidence.
Disposition The decision appealed from is hereby
reversed and the case remanded to the Public
Service Commission for further proceedings in
accordance with law and this decision, without any
pronouncement regarding costs.
MANILA ELECTRIC v PASAY TRANSPO
57 PHIL 600
MALCOLM ; NOV 25, 1932
FACTS
-Act No. 1446 granted a franchise to Charles M.
Swift to construct, maintain, and operate an electric
railway, and to construct, maintain, and operate an

electric light, heat, and power system from a point in
the City of Manila in an easterly direction to the town
in Pasig, in the Province of Rizal."
-Section 11 of the Act provides: "Whenever any
franchise or right of way is granted to any other
person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence,
over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee
herein, the terms on which said other person or
corporation shall use such right of way, and the
compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by
such other person or corporation for said use, shall
be fixed by the members of the Supreme Court,
sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a
majority of whom shall be final."
- Manila Electric now asks the members of the
Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to
fix the terms upon which certain transportation
companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig
bridge of the Manila Electric Company and the
compensation to be paid to the Manila Electric
Company by such transportation companies
ISSUE/S
WON the members of the SC has legal right to act
as board of arbitrators
HELD
NO
- Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the
maxims which guide the operation of a democratic
government constitutionally established, and that it
would be improper and illegal for the members of the
Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the
decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act
on the petition of the Manila Electric Company.
-The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands
represents one of the three divisions of power in our
government. It is judicial power and judicial power
only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just
as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of
constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations
by any other department of the government, so
should it as strictly confine its own sphere of
influence to the powers expressly or by implication
conferred on it by the Organic Act. The Supreme
Court and its members should not and cannot be
required to exercise any power or to perform any
trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or
connected with the administering of judicial
functions.
-The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of
the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise
jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such
additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be

prescribed by law. When the Organic Act speaks of
the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court, it
could only mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the
Supreme Court acting as a court, and could hardly
mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the members
of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators. There is an important distinction between
the Supreme Court as an entity and the members of
the Supreme Court. A board of arbitrators is not a
"court" in any proper sense of the term, and possess
none of the jurisdiction which the Organic Act
contemplates shall be exercised by the Supreme
Court.
Disposition The members of the Supreme Court
decline to proceed further in the matter.
NOBLEJAS v TEEHANKEE
23 SCRA 405
REYES JBL; April 29, 1968
NATURE:
Petition for writ of prohibition with preliminary
injunction
FACTS:
10
- Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed,

confirmed and qualified Commissioner of Land
Registration. By the terms of section 2 of RA 1151,
the said Commissioner is declared "entitled to the
same compensation, emoluments and privileges as
those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance."
- On March 7, 1968, Sec of Justice Teehankee
coursed to Noblejas a letter requiring him to explain
in writing why no disciplinary action should be taken
against petitioner for "approving or recommending
approval of subdivision, consolidation and
consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas
greatly in excess of the areas covered by the
original titles." Noblejas answered and apprised the
Secretary of Justice that, as he enjoyed the rank,
privileges, emoluments and compensation of a
Judge of the Court of First Instance, he could only
be suspended and investigated in the same
manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance,
and, therefore, the papers relative to his case
should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for
action thereon conformably to section 67 of the
Judiciary Act (R. A. No. 296) and Revised Rule 140
of the Rules of Court.
- On March 17, 1968, Noblejas received a
communication signed by the Executive Secretary,
"by authority of the President", whereby, based on
"finding that a prima facie case exists against you
11
for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the

public interest", petitioner was "hereby suspended,
upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the
above charges."
- On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court,
reiterating the contentions advanced in his letter to
the Secretary of Justice, claiming lack of jurisdiction
and abuse of discretion, and praying for restraining
writs. In their answer respondents admit the facts
but denied that petitioner, as Land Registration
Commissioner, exercises judicial functions, or that
the petitioner may be considered a Judge of First
Instance within the purview of the Judiciary Act and
Revised Rules of Court 140; that the function of
investigating charges against public officers is
administrative or executive in nature; that the
Legislature may not charge the judiciary with nonjudicial functions or duties except when reasonably
incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties, as it
would be in violation of the principle of the
separation of powers.
ISSUE: WON the Commissioner of Land
Registration may only be investigated by the
Supreme Court, in view of the conferment upon him
by RA 1151 and Appropriation Laws of the rank and
privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance.
12
HELD:
NO
- section 67 of the Judiciary Act providing for
investigation, suspension or removal of Judges,
specifically recites that "No District Judge shall be
separated or removed from office by the President of
the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall exist in
the judgment of the Supreme Court . . ." and it is
nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the
Commissioner of Land Registration is a District
Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary.
- petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a
Judge of First Instance" includes by implication the
right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court
and to be suspended or removed upon its
recommendation, would necessarily result in the
same right being possessed by a variety of
executive officials upon whom the Legislature had
indiscriminately conferred the same privileges.
- Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to
the conclusion that the Solicitor General, another
appointee of the President, could not be removed by
the latter, since the Appropriation Acts confer upon
the Solicitor General the rank and privileges of a
Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these Justices
are only removable by the Legislature, through the
process of impeachment (Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par.
2).
13
- such unusual corollaries could not have been

intended by the Legislature when it granted these
executive officials the rank and privileges of Judges
of First Instance. Where the legislative design is to
make the suspension or removal procedure
prescribed for Judges of First Instance applicable to
other officers, provision to that effect is made in plain
and unequivocal language.
- if the Legislature had really intended to include in
the general grant of "privileges" or "rank and
privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance"
the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court,
and to be suspended or removed only upon
recommendation of that Court, then such grant of
privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would
violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of
powers, by charging this court with the
administrative function of supervisory control over
executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro
tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such
officials.
Disposition Writs denied, petition dismissed
GARCIA v MACARAIG
39 SCRA 106
BARREDO; MAY 31, 1971
14
NATURE
Administrative complaint
FACTS
-Respondent Judge Macaraig was appointed to one
of the newly created CFI branches in Laguna, in
1970. At the time of appointment, he was Chief of
the Technical Staff of the DOJ, receiving salary
therefrom.
- After confirmation of his appointment by the COA,
respondent judge took his oath of office on June
1970. However, due to several delays in securing
the court sala (unavailability of funds for office
equipment and supplies, trouble securing the space
for the courtroom due to objections and
disagreement over price), he never had the chance
to actually perform the functions of a district judge.
After realizing that it might take sometime before he
could actually begin hearing cases in his court, he
decided to apply for an extended leave of absence.
The Sec. of Justice, however, asked him to forego
his leave and, instead, requested him to assist him,
without being extended a formal detail, which he
accepted.
- Having taken his oath as District Judge and,
drawing salary as judge but without performing his
functions as such, respondent was charged by Paz
15
Garcia for dishonesty, violation of his oath of office

as judge.. .gross incompetence, violation of RA 296,
particularly Secs 5, 55 and 58 thereof.
ISSUE
WON respondent is guilty of the allegations
HELD
No.
Reasoning He has not yet started performing any
judicial functions. None of these laws and circulars
apply to him, for all of them contemplate judges who
are actually holding trials and hearings and making
decisions and others. That he could not actually hold
office in the court to which he was appointed was not
of his making.
***While the SC dismissed the complaint, it
nevertheless expressed the opinion that it did not
look with favor the long standing practice of judges
being detailed in the DOJ to assist the Secretary
even if it were only in connection with his work of
exercising administrative authority over the courts,
stressing the principle of separation of powers. The
Court was of the opinion that respondent was not
guilty of dishonesty or violation of his oath of office
as district judge as it was not altogether his fault that
he could not actually perform his functions as
presiding judge of the CFI of Laguna. Under the
16
circumstances he was placed in, he made himself

available to the DOJ to assist the Secretary, using
his experience as technical assistant in said office.
Disposition Administrative complaint DISMISSED.
IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U.
MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS NORTE
PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE
166 SCRA 106
PADILLA; October 5, 1988
NATURE
Request for the issuance of a SC Resolution on the
appointment of Judge Manzano as a member of the
Prov. Committee on Justice
FACTS
-On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano,
Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch
19, sent this Court a letter which reads:
I was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Committee on Justice
Before I may accept the appointment and enter in
the discharge of the powers and duties of the
position as member of the Provincial Committee on
Justice, may I have the honor to request for the
17
issuance by the Honorable Supreme Court of a

Resolution, as follows:
(1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to
as assume and discharge the powers and duties
attached to the said position;
(2) Considering my membership in the Committee as
neither violative of the Independence of the Judiciary
nor a violation of Section 12, Article VIII, or of the
second paragraph of Section .7, Article IX (B), both
of the Constitution, and will not in any way amount to
an abandonment of my present position as
Executive Judge and as a member of the Judiciary;
and
(3) Consider my membership in the said Committee
as part of the primary functions of an Executive
Judge.
- An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as
amended, reveals that Provincial/City Committees
on Justice are created to insure the speedy
disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those
involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating
jail congestion and improving local jail conditions.
Among the functions of the Committee are:
-- Receive complaints against any apprehending
officer, jail warden, final or judge who may be found
to have committed abuses in the discharge of his
duties and refer the same to proper authority for
appropriate action;
18
-- Recommend revision of any law or regulation

which is believed prejudicial to the proper
administration of criminal justice.
- It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees
on Justice perform administrative functions.
Administrative functions are those which involve the
regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of
individuals for; their own welfare and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry
out the policy of the legislature or such as are
devolved upon the administrative agency by the
organic law of its existence.
- Furthermore, it is provided that The Provincial/City
Committees on Justice shall be under the
supervision of the Secretary of justice Quarterly
accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the
Office of the Secretary of Justice.
HELD
- Under the Constitution, the members of the
Supreme Court and other courts established by law
shall not be designated to any agency performing
quasi- judicial or administrative functions
- Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in
the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice,
which discharges a administrative functions, will be
in violation of the Constitution, the Court is
constrained to deny his request.
19
- in Garcia vs. Macaraig: While the doctrine of

separation of powers is a relative theory not to be
enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands
of government precluding its doctrinaire application,
it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being
required to assume a position or perform a duty nonjudicial in character. That is implicit in the principle.
Otherwise there is a plain departure from its
command. The essence of the trust reposed in him
is to decide. Only a higher court can pass on his
actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or
legislative official, however eminent. It is
indispensable that there be no exception to the
rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be
confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his
sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of
respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing
less.
- This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges
should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or
unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee
on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form
part of the structure of government. Their integrity
and performance in the adjudication of cases
contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public
officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even
as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on
Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to
20
said Committees to help promote the laudable

purposes for which they exist, but only when such
assistance may be reasonably incidental to the
fulfillment of their judicial duties.
Disposition The aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo
U. Manzano is DENIED.
SEPARATE OPINIONS
GUTIERREZ, dissenting:
- The Constitution prohibits the designation of
members of the judiciary to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
- Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it
has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can
confidently refrain from participating in the work of
any administrative agency which adjudicates
disputes and controversies involving the rights of
parties within its jurisdiction. The issue involved in
this case is where to draw the line insofar as
administrative functions are concerned.
- "Administrative functions" as used in Section 12
refers to the executive machinery of government and
the performance by that machinery of governmental
acts. It refers to the management actions,
determinations, and orders of executive officials as
they administer the laws and try to make
21
government effective. There is an element of

positive action, of supervision or control.
- membership in the Provincial or City
Committee on Justice would not involve any
regulation or control over the conduct and
affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee
on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor
exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work
is purely advisory. I do not see anything wrong in a
member of the judiciary joining any study group
which concentrates on the administration of justice
as long as the group merely deliberates on problems
involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly
those involving the poor and needy litigants or
detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of
the members, and limits itself to recommendations
which may be adopted or rejected by those who
have the power to legislate or administer the
particular function involved in their implementation.
-The constitutional provision is intended to shield
Judges from participating in activities which may
compromise their independence or hamper their
work.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, dissenting:
- What I believe is contemplated by the
Constitutional prohibition is designation, for
example, to such quasi-judicial bodies as the SEC,
22
or administrative agencies like the BIR. Those are

full-time positions involving running the affairs of
government, which will interfere with the discharge
of judicial functions or totally remove a Judge/Justice
from the performance of his regular functions.
- The Committee on Justice cannot be likened to
such an administrative agency of government. It is a
study group with recommendatory functions.
PUYAT v DE GUZMAN JR.
113 SCRA 31
Melencio-Herrera; March 25 1982
NATURE
This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction is poised against the Order
of respondent Associate Commissioner of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez
leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747
FACTS
On May 14,1979, an election for the eleven
Directors of the International Pipe Industries
Corporation (IPI) a private corporation, was held.
Some named on the left list of elected officials
may be called the Puyat Group; those on the
23
right, the Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat Group

would be in control of the Board and of the
management of IPI. The Acero Group instituted at
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
quo warranto proceedings, docketed as Case No.
1747 (the SEC Case), questioning the election of
May 14, 1979. The Acero Group claimed that the
stockholders' votes were not properly counted.
The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of
the parties with respondent SEC Commissioner
de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez,
then a member of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as
counsel for respondent Acero to which the Puyat
Group objected on Constitutional grounds.
Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution,
then in force, provided that no Assemblyman
could "appear as counsel before ... any
administrative body", and SEC was an
administrative body. Incidentally, the same
prohibition was maintained by the April 7, 1981
plebiscite. The cited Constitutional prohibition
being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not
continue his appearance for respondent Acero.
When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that:
(i) On May 15, 1979, Assemblyman Estanislao A.
Fernandez had purchased from Augusto A.
Morales ten (10) shares of stock of IPI for P200.00
24
upon request of respondent Acero to qualify him to

run for election as a Director.
(ii) The deed of sale, however, was notarized only
on May 30, 1979 and was sought to be registered
on said date.
(iii) On May 31, 1979, the day following the
notarization
of
Assemblyman
Fernandez'
purchase, the latter had filed an Urgent Motion for
Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner of ten
(10) IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter
in litigation.
The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis
of Atty. Fernandez' ownership of the said ten
shares. It is this Order allowing intervention that
precipitated the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a
then stockholder of IPI may intervene in the SEC
Case without violating Section 11, Article VIII of
the Constitution
HELD
1. NO.
Ratio
Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution, which,
as amended, reads: SEC. 11.
25
No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear

as counsel before any court without appellate
jurisdiction.
before any court in any civil case wherein the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof is the adverse party,
or in any criminal case wherein any officer or
employee of the Government is accused of an
offense committed in relation to his office,
or before any administrative body.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be interested
financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, during his term of office.
He shall not accept employment to intervene in any
cause or matter where he may be called to act on
account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
Reasoning
Certain salient circumstances militate against the
intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC
Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of
stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843
outstanding shares. He acquired them "after the
fact" that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested
election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo
warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before
26
SEC and one day before the scheduled hearing of

the case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what
is more, before he moved to intervene, he had
signified his intention to appear as counsel for
respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, but which was
objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the
validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to
"intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the
matter under litigation. And it maybe noted that in
the case filed before the Rizal Court of First Instance
(L-51928), he appeared as counsel for defendant
Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero therein.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are
constrained to find that there has been an indirect
"appearance as counsel before ... an administrative
body" and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention of
the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was
an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in
the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe
the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him
eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in
the event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC
Case would be pure naivete. He would still appear
as counsel indirectly. A ruling upholding the
"intervention" would make the constitutional
provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if
he wants to influence an administrative body is to
acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the
27
client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That

which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be
done by indirection or by a general legislative act
which is intended to accomplish the objects
specifically or impliedly prohibited.
In brief, the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez
in SEC. No. 1747 falls within the ambit of the
prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
II. CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
A. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE
EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT
ARTICLE VII, 1987 Constitution
Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in
the President of the Philippines.
Section 17. The President shall have control of all
the executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
B. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT POWER
MACALINTAL v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
405 SCRA 693
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J., July 10, 2003
28
NATURE
Petition for certiorari and prohibition
FACTS
-Macalintal as taxpayer avers that Sections 19 and
25 of R.A. No. 9189 violate Article IX-A (Common
Provisions) of the Constitution, to wit: Section 1. The
Constitutional Commissions, which shall be
independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on
Audit.
-He submits that the creation of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee with the power
to review, revise, amend and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated
by the COMELEC, R.A. No. 9189 intrudes into the
independence of the COMELEC which, as a
constitutional body, is not under the control of either
the executive or legislative departments of
government; that only the COMELEC itself can
promulgate rules and regulations which may be
changed or revised only by the majority of its
members; and that should the rules promulgated by
the COMELEC violate any law, it is the Court that
has the power to review the same via the petition of
any interested party, including the legislators.
-It is only on this question that respondent
COMELEC submitted its Comment. It agrees with
29
the petitioner that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No.

9189 are unconstitutional.
Like the petitioner,
respondent COMELEC anchors its claim of
unconstitutionality of said Sections upon Section 1,
Article IX-A of the Constitution providing for the
independence of the constitutional commissions
such as the COMELEC. It asserts that its power to
formulate rules and regulations has been upheld in
Gallardo vs. Tabamo, Jr. [RELATIVE NI JAT?-hehe]
where this Court held that the power of the
COMELEC to formulate rules and regulations is
implicit in its power to implement regulations under
Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution.
COMELEC joins the petitioner in asserting that as
an independent constitutional body, it may not be
subject to interference by any government
instrumentality and that only this Court may review
COMELEC rules and only in cases of grave abuse
of discretion.
- The COMELEC adds, however, that another
provision, vis--vis its rule-making power, to wit:
SEC. 17. Voting by Mail. 17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission
shall authorize voting by mail in not more than three
(3) countries, subject to the approval of the
Congressional Oversight Committee. Voting by mail
may be allowed in countries that satisfy the following
conditions:
30
a)
Where the mailing system is fairly welldeveloped and secure to prevent occasion for fraud;
b)
Where there exists a technically established
identification system that would preclude multiple or
proxy voting; and
c)
Where the system of reception and custody of
mailed ballots in the embassies, consulates and
other foreign service establishments concerned are
adequate and well-secured.
Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be
allowed only upon review and approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee.
... ...
...
is likewise unconstitutional as it violates Section 1,
Article IX-A mandating the independence of
constitutional commissions.
-The Solicitor General takes exception to his
prefatory statement that the constitutional challenge
must fail and agrees with the petitioner that Sections
19 and 25 are invalid and unconstitutional on the
ground that there is nothing in Article VI of the
Constitution on Legislative Department that would as
much as imply that Congress has concurrent power
to enforce and administer election laws with the
COMELEC; and by the principles of exclusio unius
est exclusio alterius and expressum facit
cessare tacitum, the constitutionally enumerated
31
powers of Congress circumscribe its authority to the

exclusion of all others.
ISSUE
Whether or not Congress, through the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created in
Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the
power to review, revise, amend, and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations that the
Commission on Elections shall promulgate
without violating the independence of the
COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the
Constitution?
HELD
NO.
RATIOOnce a law is enacted and approved, the
legislative function is deemed accomplished and
complete. The legislative function may spring back
to Congress relative to the same law only if that
body deems it proper to review, amend and revise
the law, but certainly not to approve, review, revise
and amend the IRR of the COMELEC.
-By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review,
amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went
beyond the scope of its constitutional authority.
Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate
32
of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a

situation, the Court is left with no option but to
withdraw from its usual reticence in declaring a
provision of law unconstitutional.
REASONING Composed of Senators and Members
of the House of Representatives, the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) is a
purely legislative body. There is no question that the
authority of Congress to "monitor and evaluate the
implementation" of R.A. No. 9189 is geared towards
possible amendments or revision of the law itself
and thus, may be performed in aid of its legislation.
-However, aside from its monitoring and evaluation
functions, R.A. No. 9189 gives to the JCOC the
following functions: (a) to "review, revise, amend and
approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations"
(IRR) promulgated by the COMELEC [Sections 25
and 19]; and (b) subject to the approval of the JCOC
[Section 17.1], the voting by mail in not more than
three countries for the May 2004 elections and in
any country determined by COMELEC.
-The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of
the Constitution is circumscribed by other
constitutional provisions. One such provision is
Section 1 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution
ordaining that constitutional commissions such as
the COMELEC shall be "independent."
33
-Interpreting Section 1, Article X of the 1935

Constitution providing that there shall be an
independent COMELEC, the Court has held that
"[w]hatever may be the nature of the functions of the
Commission on Elections, the fact is that the framers
of the Constitution wanted it to be independent from
the other departments of the Government.
-The Court has no general powers of supervision
over COMELEC which is an independent body
"except those specifically granted by the
Constitution," that is, to review its decisions, orders
and rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct to
hold that because of its recognized extensive
legislative power to enact election laws, Congress
may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC
by exercising supervisory powers over its rulemaking authority.
-By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress
has empowered the COMELEC to "issue the
necessary rules and regulations to effectively
implement the provisions of this Act within sixty days
from the effectivity of this Act." This provision of law
follows the usual procedure in drafting rules and
regulations to implement a law - the legislature
grants an administrative agency the authority to craft
the rules and regulations implementing the law it has
enacted, in recognition of the administrative
34
expertise of that agency in its particular field of

operation.
-The second sentence of the first paragraph of
Section 19 stating that "[t]he Implementing Rules
and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created by
virtue of this Act for prior approval," and the second
sentence of the second paragraph of Section 25
stating that "[i]t shall review, revise, amend and
approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Commission," whereby
Congress, in both provisions, arrogates unto itself a
function not specifically vested by the Constitution,
should be stricken out of the subject statute for
constitutional infirmity. Both provisions brazenly
violate the mandate on the independence of the
COMELEC.
-Similarly, the phrase, "subject to the approval of the
Congressional Oversight Committee" in the first
sentence of Section 17.1 which empowers the
Commission to authorize voting by mail in not more
than three countries for the May, 2004 elections; and
the phrase, "only upon review and approval of the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee" found in
the second paragraph of the same section are
unconstitutional as they require review and approval
of voting by mail in any country after the 2004
elections. Congress may not confer upon itself the
35
authority to approve or disapprove the countries

wherein voting by mail shall be allowed, as
determined by the COMELEC pursuant to the
conditions provided for in Section 17.1 of R.A. No.
9189.[48] Otherwise, Congress would overstep the
bounds of its constitutional mandate and intrude into
the independence of the COMELEC.
-During the deliberations, all the members of the
Court agreed to ADOPT THE SEPARATE OPINION
OF JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO AS PART OF
THE
PONENCIA
ON
THE
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTIONS 17.1, 19
AND 25 OF R.A. NO. 9189 INSOFAR AS THEY
RELATE TO THE CREATION OF AND THE
POWERS
GIVEN
TO
THE
JOINT
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE.
Disposition WHEREFORE, the petition is partly
GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189
are declared VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
a)
The phrase in the first sentence of the first
paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: "subject to the
approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee;"
b)
The portion of the last paragraph of Section
17.1, to wit: "only upon review and approval of the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;"
36
c)
The second sentence of the first paragraph of
Section 19, to wit: "The Implementing Rules and
Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created by
virtue of this Act for prior approval;" and
d)
The second sentence in the second paragraph
of Section 25, to wit: "It shall review, revise, amend
and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the Commission" of the
same law;
for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of the
Constitution mandating the independence of
constitutional commission, such as COMELEC.
The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of R.A. No.
9189 is UPHELD with respect only to the authority
given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning
candidates for the Senators and party-list
representatives but not as to the power to canvass
the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for
President and Vice-President which is lodged with
Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution.
The constitutionality of Section 5(d) is UPHELD.
Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of
the provisions of said law continues to be in full force
and effect.
SEPARATE OPINION
37
PUNO, concurring and dissenting:1:

The resolution of the issue entails a two-tiered
discussion of the: (1) whether Congress has
oversight functions over constitutional bodies like the
COMELEC; and (2) assuming that it has, whether
Congress exceeded the permissible exercise of its
oversight functions.
Separation of powers and checks and balances
The principle of separation of powers prevents the
concentration of legislative, executive, and judicial
powers to a single branch of government by deftly
allocating their exercise to the three branches of
government. This principle dates back from the time
of Aristotle but the "modern" concept owes its origin
in the seventeenth and eighteenth century writings
of political philosophers including Locke and
Montesquieu. Their writings were mainly reactions to
the ruinous struggle for power by the monarchs and
the parliaments in Western Europe.
-The Constitution divided the powers of our
government into three categories, legislative,
executive, and judicial. Although not "hermetically
sealed" from one another, the powers of the three
1
I dissent from the majoritys ruling upholding the constitutionality of section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189, which allows an immigrant
or a permanent resident of a foreign country to vote for President, Vice-President, Senators and Party-List Representatives after
executing the required affidavit. I concur, however, with the majoritys ruling upholding the constitutionality of section 18.5 of Rep.
Act No. 9189 with respect to the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for Senators and Party-List
Representatives but not as to the power to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President.
I also concur with the majority with respect to the unconstitutionality of sections 17.1, 19 and 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189 subjecting the
implementation of voting by mail, and the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Rep. Act No. 9189 to be promulgated by
COMELEC, to prior review and approval by Congress.
38
branches are functionally identifiable. In this respect,

legislative power is generally exercised in the
enactment of the law; executive power, in its
execution; and judicial power, in its interpretation. In
the absence of specific provision in the Constitution,
it is fundamental under the principle of separation of
powers that one branch cannot exercise or share the
power of the other.
-Justce Puno locates the concept of congressional
oversight in the grand scheme of checks and
balances under the doctrine of separation of power.
Concept and bases of congressional oversight
-Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces
all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its
understanding of and influence over the
implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly,
oversight concerns post-enactment measures
undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic
compliance with program objectives, (b) to
determine
whether
agencies
are
properly
administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and
dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of
legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive
conformity with the congressional perception of
public interest.
-The power of oversight has been held to be
intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself
and integral to the checks and balances inherent
39
in a democratic system of government. Among

the most quoted justifications for this power are the
writings of John Stuart Mill and Woodrow Wilson. In
his Consideration of Representative Government,
Mill wrote that the duty of the legislature is "to watch
and control the government; to throw the light of
publicity on its acts; to compel a full exposition and
justification of all of them which any one considers
objectionable; and to censure them if found
condemnable." Wilson went one step farther and
opined that the legislatures informing function
should be preferred to its legislative function. He
emphasized that "[E]ven more important than
legislation is the instruction and guidance in political
affairs which the people might receive from a body
which kept all national concerns suffused in a broad
daylight of discussion."
Categories of congressional oversight functions
The acts done by Congress purportedly in the
exercise of its oversight powers may be divided into
three categories, namely: scrutiny, investigation and
supervision.
a. Scrutiny
Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and
continuity of attention to administrative operations.
Its primary purpose is to determine economy and
efficiency of the operation of government activities.
In the exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress may
40
request information and report from the other

branches
of
government.
It
can
give
recommendations
or
pass
resolutions
for
consideration of the agency involved.
-Legislative scrutiny is based primarily on the power
of appropriation of Congress. Under the
Constitution, the "power of the purse" belongs to
Congress. The President may propose the budget,
but still, Congress has the final say on
appropriations.
Consequently, administrative
officials appear every year before the appropriation
committees of Congress to report and submit a
budget estimate and a program of administration for
the succeeding fiscal year. During budget hearings,
administrative officials defend their budget
proposals.
-The power of appropriation carries with it the power
to specify the project or activity to be funded. Hence,
the holding of budget hearing has been the usual
means of reviewing policy and of auditing the use of
previous appropriation to ascertain whether they
have been disbursed for purposes authorized in an
appropriation act. The consideration of the budget is
also an opportunity for the lawmakers to express
their confidence in the performance of a Cabinet
Secretary or to manifest their disgust or disfavor of
the continuance in office of a bureaucrat. Congress
41
can even curtail the activities of the administrative

agencies by denial of funds.
-But legislative scrutiny does not end in budget
hearings. Congress can ask the heads of
departments to appear before and be heard by
either House of Congress on any matter pertaining
to their departments. Section 22, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution provides: The heads of
departments may, upon their own initiative, with the
consent of the President, or upon the request of
either House, as the rules of each House shall
provide, appear before and be heard by such House
on any matter pertaining to their departments.
Written questions shall be submitted to the
President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House
of Representatives at least three days before their
scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be
limited to written questions, but may cover matters
related thereto. When the security of the State or the
public interest so requires and the President so
states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted
in executive session.
-This provision originated from the Administrative
Code and was later elevated to the level of a
constitutional provision due to its "great value in the
work of the legislature."
-Likewise,
Congress
exercises
legislative
scrutiny thru its power of confirmation. Section
42
18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides for

the organization of a Commission on Appointments
consisting of the President of the Senate as ex
officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve
members of the House of Representatives, elected
by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system.
Consent of the Commission on Appointments is
needed for the nominees of the President for the
following positions: (a) heads of executive
departments, (b) ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, (c) officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
(d) other officers whose appointments are vested
with the President under the Constitution.
-Through the power of confirmation, Congress
shares in the appointing power of the executive.
Theoretically, it is intended to lessen political
considerations in the appointment of officials in
sensitive positions in the government. It also
provides Congress an opportunity to find out
whether the nominee possesses the necessary
qualifications, integrity and probity required of all
public servants.
b. Congressional investigation
While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a
passive process of looking at the facts that are
43
readily
available,
congressional
investigation
involves a more intense digging of facts. The power
of Congress to conduct investigation is recognized
by the 1987 Constitution under section 21, Article
VI, viz:
The Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its respective committee
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
-But even in the absence of an express provision in
the Constitution, congressional investigation has
been held to be an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function.
-American jurisprudence upholding the inherent
power of Congress to conduct investigation has
been adopted in our jurisdiction in Arnault v.
Nazareno, decided in 1950, when no provision yet
existed granting Congress the power to conduct
investigation. Upholding the power of the Senate to
punish Arnault for contempt, the Court ruled as
follows:
-Although there is no provision in the Constitution
expressly investing either House of Congress with
power to make investigations and exact testimony to
the end that it may exercise its legislative functions
advisedly and effectively, such power is so far
incidental to the legislative function as to be implied.
44
In other words, the power of inquiry with process

to enforce it is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence
of information respecting the conditions which
legislation is intended to affect or change; and
where the legislative body does not itself possess
the requisite information which is not frequently
true recourse must be had to others who do
possess it. Experience has shown that mere
requests for such information are often unavailing,
and also that information which is volunteered is not
always accurate or complete; so some means of
compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. . .
The fact that the Constitution expressly gives the
Congress the power to punish its Members for
disorderly behaviour, does not by necessary
implication exclude the power to punish for contempt
any other person.
-The Court further ruled that the power of the Senate
to punish a witness for contempt does not terminate
upon the adjournment of the session.
-The Court further held that once an inquiry is
admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction
of a legislative body to make, the investigating
committee has the power to require a witness to
answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject
to his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
45
The inquiry must be material or necessary to the

exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution.
Hence, a witness can not be coerced to answer a
question that obviously has no relation to the subject
of the inquiry. But the Court explained that "the
materiality of the question must be determined by its
direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by
its indirect relation to any proposed or possible
legislation." The reason is that the necessity or lack
of necessity for legislative action and the form and
character of the action itself are determined by the
sum total of the information to be gathered as a
result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of
such information elicited from a single question.
-Finally, the Court ruled that the ground on which
Arnault invoked the right against self-incrimination
"is too shaky, infirm, and slippery to afford him
safety." It noted that since Arnault himself said that
the transaction was legal, and that he gave the
P440,000.00 to a representative of Burt in
compliance with the latters verbal instruction, there
is therefore no basis upon which to sustain his claim
that to reveal the name of that person would
incriminate him. It held that it is not enough for the
witness to say that the answer will incriminate him
for he is not the sole judge of his liability, thus:
. . .[T]he danger of self-incrimination must appear
reasonable and real to the court, from all the
46
circumstances and from the whole case, as well as

from his general conception of the relations of the
witness. . . The fact that the testimony of the witness
may tend to show that he has violated the law is not
sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the
constitutional provision against self-incrimination,
unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution
and punishment for such violation. The witness
cannot assert his privilege by reason of some
fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary
danger, or to secure immunity to a third person.[
-As now contained in the 1987 Constitution, the
power of Congress to investigate is circumscribed by
three limitations, namely: (a) it must be in aid of its
legislative functions, (b) it must be conducted in
accordance with duly published rules of
procedure, and (c) the persons appearing therein
are afforded their constitutional rights.
-In Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,
this Court held that the senate committee exceeded
the permissible exercise of legislative investigation
because there was nothing in Senator Enriles
speech which indicate that it is in aid of legislation.
-The conduct of legislative investigation is also
subject to the rules of each House. In the House of
Representatives, an inquiry may be initiated or
conducted by a committee motu proprio on any
matter within its jurisdiction upon a majority vote of
47
all its Members or upon order of the House of

Representatives through:
(1)
the referral of a privilege speech containing or
conveying a request or demand for the conduct of
an inquiry, to the appropriate committee, upon
motion of the Majority Leader or his deputies; or
(2)
the adoption of a resolution directing a
committee to conduct an inquiry reported out by the
Committee on Rules after making a determination
on the necessity and propriety of the conduct of an
inquiry by such committee: Provided, That all
resolutions directing any committee to conduct an
inquiry shall be referred to the Committee on Rules;
or
(3)
the referral by the Committee on Rules to the
appropriate committee, after making a determination
on the necessity and propriety of the conduct of
inquiry by such committee, of a petition filed or
information given by a Member of the House
requesting such inquiry and endorsed by the
Speaker: Provided, That such petition or information
shall be given under oath, stating the facts upon
which it is based, and accompanied by supporting
affidavits.
-The committee to which a privilege speech,
resolution, petition or information requesting an
inquiry is referred may constitute and appoint subcommittees composed of at least one-third (1/3) of
48
the committee for the purpose of performing any and

all acts which the committee as a whole is
authorized to perform, except to punish for
contempt. In case a privilege speech is referred to
two or more committees, a joint inquiry by the said
committees shall be conducted. The inquiries are to
be held in public except when the committee or subcommittee deems that the examination of a witness
in a public hearing may endanger national security.
In which case, it shall conduct the hearing in an
executive session.
-The Rules further provide that "the filing or
pendency of a case before any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial or administrative bodies shall not
stop or abate any inquiry conducted to carry out
a specific legislative purpose." In exercise of
congressional inquiry, the committee has the power
"to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum to a
witness in any part of the country, signed by the
chairperson or acting chairperson and the Speaker
or acting Speaker." Furthermore, the committee
may, by a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of all its
members constituting a quorum, punish for
contempt any person who: (a) refuses, after being
duly summoned, to obey such summons without
legal excuse; (b) refuses to be sworn or placed
under affirmation; (c) refuses to answer any relevant
inquiry; (d) refuses to produce any books, papers,
49
documents or records that are relevant to the inquiry

and are in his/her possession; (e) acts in a
disrespectful manner towards any member of the
Committee or commits misbehavior in the presence
of the committee; or (f) unduly interferes in the
conduct of proceedings during meetings.
-Nevertheless, any person called to be a witness
may be represented by a counsel and is entitled to
all rights including the right against selfincrimination.
c. Legislative supervision
The third and most encompassing form by which
Congress exercises its oversight power is thru
legislative supervision. "Supervision" connotes a
continuing and informed awareness on the part of a
congressional committee regarding executive
operations in a given administrative area. While both
congressional scrutiny and investigation involve
inquiry into past executive branch actions in order to
influence future executive branch performance,
congressional supervision allows Congress to
scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making
authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that
delegated authority.
-Congress exercises supervision over the executive
agencies through its veto power. It typically utilizes
veto provisions when granting the President or an
executive agency the power to promulgate
50
regulations with the force of law. These provisions

require the President or an agency to present the
proposed regulations to Congress, which retains
a "right" to approve or disapprove any regulation
before it takes effect. Such legislative veto
provisions usually provide that a proposed
regulation will become a law after the expiration of a
certain period of time, only if Congress does not
affirmatively disapprove of the regulation in the
meantime. Less frequently, the statute provides that
a proposed regulation will become law if Congress
affirmatively approves it.
-The legislative veto was developed initially in
response to the problems of reorganizing the U.S.
Government structure during the Great Depression
in early 20th century. When U.S. President Hoover
requested authority to reorganize the government in
1929, he coupled his request with a proposal for
legislative review. He proposed that the Executive
"should act upon approval of a joint Committee of
Congress or with the reservation of power of revision
by Congress within some limited period adequate for
its consideration." Congress followed President
Hoovers suggestion and authorized reorganization
subject to legislative review. Although the
reorganization authority reenacted in 1933 did not
contain a legislative veto provision, the provision
returned during the Roosevelt administration and
51
has since been renewed several times. Over the

years, the provision was used extensively. Various
American Presidents submitted to Congress some
115 Reorganization Plans, 23 of which were
disapproved pursuant to legislative veto provisions.
-Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is
necessary to maintain the balance of power between
the legislative and the executive branches of
government as it offers lawmakers a way to delegate
vast power to the executive branch or to
independent agencies while retaining the option to
cancel particular exercise of such power without
having to pass new legislation or to repeal existing
law. They contend that this arrangement promotes
democratic accountability as it provides legislative
check on the activities of unelected administrative
agencies. One proponent thus explains:
It is too late to debate the merits of this delegation
policy: the policy is too deeply embedded in our law
and practice. It suffices to say that the complexities
of modern government have often led Congresswhether by actual or perceived necessity- to
legislate by declaring broad policy goals and
general statutory standards, leaving the choice
of policy options to the discretion of an
executive officer. Congress articulates legislative
aims, but leaves their implementation to the
judgment of parties who may or may not have
52
participated in or agreed with the development of

those aims. Consequently, absent safeguards, in
many instances the reverse of our constitutional
scheme could be effected: Congress proposes, the
Executive disposes. One safeguard, of course, is
the legislative power to enact new legislation or to
change existing law. But without some means of
overseeing post enactment activities of the
executive branch, Congress would be unable to
determine whether its policies have been
implemented in accordance with legislative intent
and thus whether legislative intervention is
appropriate.
-Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto
as undue encroachment upon the executive
prerogatives. They urge that any post-enactment
measures undertaken by the legislative branch
should be limited to scrutiny and investigation; any
measure beyond that would undermine the
separation of powers guaranteed by the
Constitution.] They contend that legislative veto
constitutes an impermissible evasion of the
Presidents veto authority and intrusion into the
powers vested in the executive or judicial branches
of government. Proponents counter that legislative
veto enhances separation of powers as it prevents
the executive branch and independent agencies
from accumulating too much power. They submit
53
that reporting requirements and congressional

committee investigations allow Congress to
scrutinize only the exercise of delegated law-making
authority. They do not allow Congress to review
executive proposals before they take effect and they
do not afford the opportunity for ongoing and binding
expressions of congressional intent. In contrast,
legislative veto permits Congress to participate
prospectively in the approval or disapproval of
"subordinate law" or those enacted by the
executive branch pursuant to a delegation of
authority by Congress. They further argue that
legislative veto "is a necessary response by
Congress to the accretion of policy control by forces
outside its chambers." In an era of delegated
authority, they point out that legislative veto "is the
most efficient means Congress has yet devised to
retain control over the evolution and implementation
of its policy as declared by statute."
-Given the concept and configuration of the power of
congressional oversight, the next level of inquiry is
whether congress exceeded its permissible exercise
in the case at bar. But before proceeding, a
discussion of the nature and powers of the
Commission on Elections as provided in the 1987
Constitution is decisive to the issue.
Congressional Oversight and COMELEC
54
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is a

constitutional body exclusively charged with the
enforcement and administration of "all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall," and is
invested with the power to decide all questions
affecting elections save those involving the right to
vote.
-Given its important role in preserving the sanctity of
the right of suffrage, the COMELEC was purposely
constituted as a body separate from the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of government.
Originally, the power to enforce our election laws
was vested with the President and exercised
through the Department of the Interior. According to
Dean Sinco, however, the view ultimately emerged
that an independent body could better protect the
right of suffrage of our people. Hence, the
enforcement of our election laws, while an
executive power, was transferred to the
COMELEC.
-Several safeguards have been put in place to
protect the independence of the COMELEC from
unwarranted encroachment by the other branches of
government. While the President appoints the
Commissioners with the concurrence of the
Commission on Appointments, the Commissioners
are not accountable to the President in the
55
discharge of their functions. They have a fixed

tenure and are removable only by impeachment. To
ensure that not all Commissioners are appointed by
the same President at any one time, a staggered
system of appointment was devised. Thus, of the
Commissioners first appointed, three shall hold
office for seven years, three for five years, and the
last three for three years. Reappointment and
temporary designation or appointment is prohibited.
In case of vacancy, the appointee shall only serve
the unexpired term of the predecessor.
The
COMELEC is likewise granted the power to
promulgate its own rules of procedure,] and to
appoint its own officials and employees in
accordance with Civil Service laws.
-The COMELEC exercises quasi-judicial powers but
it is not part of the judiciary. This Court has no
general power of supervision over the Commission
on Elections except those specifically granted by the
Constitution. As such, the Rules of Court are not
applicable to the Commission on Elections. In
addition, the decisions of the COMELEC are
reviewable only by petition for certiorari on grounds
of grave abuse of discretion.
-The COMELEC is, however, subject to
congressional scrutiny especially during budget
hearings. But Congress cannot abolish the
COMELEC as it can in case of other agencies under
56
the executive branch. The reason is obvious. The

COMELEC is not a mere creature of the legislature;
it owes its origin from the Constitution.
-Be that as it may, I respectfully submit that the
legislative veto power or congressional
oversight power over the authority of COMELEC
to issue rules and regulations in order to enforce
election laws is unconstitutional. The COMELEC
occupies a distinct place in our scheme of
government. As the constitutional body charged
with the administration of our election laws, it is
endowed with independence in the exercise of some
of its powers and the discharge of its responsibilities.
The power to promulgate rules and regulations in
order to administer our election laws belongs to this
category of powers as this has been vested
exclusively by the 1987 Constitution to the
COMELEC.
It cannot be trenched upon by
Congress in the exercise of its oversight powers.
DOUBTLESS, IF ITS RULE-MAKING POWER IS
MADE TO DEPEND ON STATUTES, CONGRESS
MAY WITHDRAW THE SAME AT ANY TIME.
INDEED,
THE
PRESENT
CONSTITUTION
ENVISIONS
A
TRULY
INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS COMMITTED TO
ENSURE FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST, PEACEFUL
AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS, AND TO SERVE AS
THE GUARDIAN OF THE PEOPLE'S SACRED
57
RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE THE CITIZENRY'S VITAL

WEAPON IN EFFECTING A PEACEFUL CHANGE
OF GOVERNMENT AND IN ACHIEVING AND
PROMOTING POLITICAL STABILITY. [ BSJ: This
statement of Puno supports the notion that in the
Philippines, there is such thing as a legislative veto
albeit there is no express constitutional provision
using the term LEGISLATIVE VETO. He limits the
notion of legislative veto to powers conferred by
statute or delegated powers. When a power is
conferred by the Constitution itself such as the
COMELECs rulemaking power, it is already beyond
the ambit of legislative veto]
The elevation of the COMELECs power to
promulgate rules and regulations in the 1987
Constitution
is
suffused
with
significance.
Heretofore, it was Congress that granted COMELEC
the power to promulgate rules and regulations, and
hence, Congress can withdraw or restrict it by the
exercise of its veto or oversight power. Under the
1987 Constitution, the power to promulgate rules
and regulations has been directly granted by the
Constitution and no longer by Congress.
Undoubtedly, the power was granted to COMELEC
to strengthen its independence, hence, its exercise
is beyond invasion by Congress. Under any lens,
sections 19 and 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189 constitute
undue restrictions on the constitutional power of the
58
COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations for

such rules are made subject to the prior review and
approval of Congress. The impugned provisions can
result in the denial of this constitutionally conferred
power because Congress can veto the rules and
regulations the COMELEC has promulgated. Thus, I
respectfully submit that sections 19 and 25 of Rep.
Act No. 9189 granting Congress the power to
review,
revise,
amend
and
approve
the
implementing rules and regulations of the
COMELEC, otherwise known as subordinate
legislations in other countries, are unconstitutional.
Since the legislative standards have been defined,
all that remains is their enforcement. Our
Constitution has specifically given the COMELEC
the power to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election.
The power is exclusive and it ought to be selfevident that it cannot be subject to review and
revision or veto by Congress in the exercise of its
oversight power.
Again, the reason for the
exclusivity is to insulate COMELEC from the virus of
partisan politics. In the exercise of this exclusive
power, the Commission must be accorded
considerable latitude. Unless the means and
methods adopted by COMELEC are clearly illegal or
constitute grave abuse of discretion, they should not
be interfered with.
59
LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL CONTROL OF

ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION MAKING;
SALVADOR T. CARLOTA
Administrative agencies have proliferated in recent
years. Administrative agencies are endowed with
significant rulemaking and adjudicative powers and
make decisions that affect both public interest and
private rights. To confer both rule making powers
and adjudicatory powers seem to run counter the
principle of separation of powers. But recent
developments and the complexities of contemporary
society has left us with no choice but to adopt a
more hospitable interpretation of the doctrine of
separation of powers that can accommodate the
existence of administrative agencies within our
constitutional system.
-Their creation is directed towards the regulation of
sensitive areas in social and economic relations but
the exercise of the powers vested upon them is
constantly attended by arbitrariness or abuse of
discretion, thus the need and the development of
mechanisms of control over these agencies.
LEGISLATIVE
CONTROL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
OVER
60
Power of Creation, Appropriation, and Investigation

Creation
- (In theory) Congress can create, divide, merge
modify and abolish agencies.
- (In reality) Congress creates rather than abolish
(evidenced by the multiplication of regulatory
agencies) as society becomes more complex.
-the state is compelled to create admin agencies to
deal with problems brought by social and economic
change.
Appropriation
-have potential for checking arbitrariness in the
administrative process but in reality these have no
appreciable effect in controlling administrative
discretionary power.
-Congress has the power to withhold funds for these
agencies but at the end of the day it is reluctant in
wielding this power because it recognizes that if it
does, it will affect public interest. So what happens
is, during budget hearings, these agencies undergo
strict scrutiny but receive their appropriations just the
same.
Investigation
-has limited value as a tool to provide as effective
regular control of the improper exercise of
administrative power
-effective only as an aid in legislation
61
The non-delegation doctrine and the requirement of

legislative standards
-traditional legal thinking places considerable
emphasis on the non-delegation doctrine and the
prescription of legislative standards to control
administrative agencies in the exercise of their
powers
-the rule is for delegation of powers to an
administrative agency to be valid, the legislature
must not only declare the policy to be executed but it
must likewise fix a standard to guide the agency in
the exercise of its delegated power
-for this doctrine to be effective, the legislature must
be able to provide sufficient or definite standards
every time it decides to delegate powers to an
administrative agency, the more specific the
standards the greater the chances of confining
administrative discretion within its proper limits
If the standards are too broad or vague, the
administrator is allowed to exercise uncontrolled
discretion
-Non-delegation cases shows that in many instances
of delegation, the legislature is unable to provide for
definite or specific standards because there are
numerous areas of regulation which are of different
nature, subject to variable conditions and policy
considerations with varying degrees of susceptibility
to definite standards. Stone stresses that in
62
providing definite standards the following must be

considered (a) the number, vagueness and degree
of potential conflicts among policy indications which
the legislature wants to be accommodated, and (b)
the rate of change and movement in the facts
concerning such policies
-this inability has not caused the Supreme Court to
shy away from assuming a liberal posture I resolving
challenges regarding the sufficiency of standards,
the Court is generally unwilling to strike down the
validity of the delegation for broadness or
vagueness of the standards.
-Interest of law and order, public interest, justice and
equity and substantial merits of the case have been
considered as sufficient standards to sustain the
constitutionality of the delegation of powers.
-the SC recognizes that delegation to administrative
agencies is a compelling necessity on a modern
complex society.
-this combination (inability of congress to provide
sufficient standards and reluctance of SC to strike
down the constitutionality of such delegation)
undermines the efficacy of the non-delegation
doctrine. Thus, the administrators discretion is
virtually unconfined and the possibility of abuse in
the exercise of such discretionary power becomes a
real problem
63
-In the US this doctrine has long been regarded as

unsatisfactory
-Davis suggests that the non-delegation doctrine
should be altered to turn it into an effective and
useful judicial tool. The focus should no longer be
exclusively on standards; it should be on the totality
of protections against arbitrariness, Including both
safeguards and standards. The key should no longer
be statutory words; it should be protections and the
administrators in fact provide, irrespective of what
the statutes say or fail to say. The focus of judicial
inquiries thus should shift from statutory standards
to administrative safeguards and standards.
Administrative Procedure as a Mode of Control
-the legislature can, although indirectly exert control
over the activities of administrative agencies through
the prescription of rules or principles of
administrative procedure
-these rules of procedure serve to maximize fairness
in the administrative process
-in prescribing rules of procedure the following must
be considered (a) administrative agencies are not
bound by the technical rules of procedure and
evidence followed in regular courts (b) administrative
agencies are designed to act with dispatch and
flexibility to enable them to speedily accomplish their
objectives. This does not however exempt them from
64
the fundamental requirements of procedural due

process (see Ang Tibay v CIR).(c)Administrative
agencies are created to deal with specific problems,
with different objectives and under varying
conditions, thus a uniform rule of procedure for all is
out of the question. There is a need to grant them
enough leeway to come up with rules particularly
suited to their areas of concern. The ideal situation is
to provide them with minimum procedural guidelines
and general principles to be observed in the
performance of their rulemaking and adjudicative
functions.
-for a long time there was no law that prescribed
common procedural guidelines for all administrative
agencies, thus they adopted their own rules of
procedure which resulted in a bewildering variety of
rules and regulations promulgated by the agencies
which in turn caused confusion and was prejudicial
to the persons affected especially when the rules
were not made easily available to them.
-The Administrative Code of 1987 was a significant
legislative measure that answered this problem; it
contains provisions which are applicable to all
agencies. It provides for the minimum procedural
standards which in their totality strike a harmonious
balance between the fundamental requirements of
procedural due process and the demands of
administrative flexibility.
65
JUDICIAL
REVIEW
OF
ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISION MAKING
-Judicial review of agency decisions is given special
emphasis in administrative law.
-that there should be judicial review is not contested,
the debate is on the purpose of such review.
-A radical view would subject not only the agency
conclusion of law but its determinations of fact policy
as well.
-the controlling principles frown upon a wide-ranging
or freewheeling type of judicial review.
-The courts, traditionally, have been confined to the
role of seeing to it that administrative agencies stay
within the limits of their power as defined in their
enabling statutes and protecting private rights by
checking arbitrariness in the administrative process.
-Even if the enabling statutes of these agencies are
silent with regard to judicial review, the Supreme
Court has consistently held that this does not
foreclose the possibility of such review. In one case
it held that it is generally understood that as to
administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial or
legislative power there is an underlying power in the
courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on the
question of law ad jurisdiction even though no right
of review is given by statute. The purpose of judicial
review is to keep the administrative agency within its
66
jurisdiction and protects substantial rights of parties

affected by its decisions. It is part of a system of
checks and balances which restricts the separation
of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust
adjudications. Judicial review is proper in case of
lack of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion, error
of law, fraud or collusion (San Miguel v Sec of
Labor).
-note that the Supreme Court made no mention of
judicial review of agency determination of fact and
policy.
-The judiciary recognizes that its traditional role is
deeply rooted to the idea of judicial deference to
administrative expertise and the now well
entrenched
substantial
evidence
rule
in
administrative law.
-Questions of law belong to the domain of the
judiciary, questions of fact and policy on the other
hand are better resolved by administrative agencies
which posses expertise or experience in their
respective areas of specialization.
-While deference to administrative expertise is the
rule the courts nevertheless is not precluded from
reviewing agency determination of fact and policy.
When the substantiality of the evidence supporting
the factual findings of the agency is challenged, the
issue assumes a judicial character. And the lack of
67
substantial evidence to support agency finding

causes the overturning of such by the courts.
-The courts generally avoid intervention in cases
involving policy considerations, however there are
occasions when in the course of resolving questions
of law which are intimately linked to policy matters,
the courts are unable to exclude the consideration of
such matters in the review.
CONCLUSION
The rise of administrative power has generated a
host of problems regarding controls over the
exercise of such power.
Legislative Controls
Appropriation Power of the purse; but is generally
not wielded in consideration of public interest
Fixing of Standards- Has been proven to be of little
value
Prescription of Rules-prescription of minimum
procedural guidelines and general principles to be
commonly observed by agencies can help maximize
fairness in the administrative process.
Administrative Code of 1987 strikes a
harmonious balance between the fundamental
requirements of fairness and the need for
administrative flexibility
68
Judicial Review important instrument to control

agency behavior through the courts actual policing
of agency behavior to ensure that it is confined
within the limits set by law
THE OMBUDSMAN: ITS EFFECTIVITY AND
VISIBILITY AMIDST BUREAUCRATIC ABUSE
AND IRREGULARITY
(not assigned)
CONCERNED OFFICALS OF MWSS v VASQUEZ,
PLDPPMA
240 SCRA 502
VITUG; January 25, 1995
NATURE
Petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary
injunction
FACTS
- MWSS conducted bidding for two projects
concerning its water distribution system in Metro
Manila. The Philippine Large Diameter Pressure
Pipes Manufacturers Association (PLDPPMA) then
questioned the award of the projects with the Office
of the Ombudsman (Vasquez), charging an
69
apparent plan on the part of the MWSS to favor

certain suppliers (those offering fiberglass pipes over
those offering steel pipes) through the technical
specifications, and urging the Ombudsman to
conduct an investigation thereon and hold in
abeyance the award of the contracts. The
Ombudsman then issued the assailed order,
directing the MWSS to: set aside the
recommendation of an MWSS committee to award
the contact to a contractor offering fiberglass pipes,
and award the subject contract to a complying and
responsive bidder
- the officials of MWSS filed the instant petition with
the SC, contending that the ombudsman acted
beyond the competence of his office when he
assumed jurisdiction over the complaint, when the
same is clearly among the excepted cases
enumerated in the Ombudsman Act. Also, that the
Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion by
arbitrarily and capriciously interfering with the
exercise of sound discretion of the MWSS
ISSUE
1. WON the Ombudsman had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the complaint filed by the PLDPPMA
and correspondingly issue the challenged orders
70
HELD
1. NO
Ratio The
Reasoning On the basis of all the provisions
regarding the Office of the Ombudsman, SolicitorGeneral insists that the authority of the Ombudsman
is sufficiently broad enough to cloth it with sufficient
power to look into the alleged irregularities in the
bidding conducted by the MWSS
- The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in
the 1987 Consti and for the grant to it of broad
investigative authority, is to insulate said office from
the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to
penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others
involved in the prosecution of erring public officials,
and through the exertion of official pressure and
influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations
into malfeasances and misfeasances committed by
public officers. It was deemed necessary, therefore,
to create a special office to investigate all criminal
complaints against public officers regardless of
whether or not the acts or omissions complained of
are related to or arise from the performance of the
duties of their office. The Ombudsman Act makes
perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman
encompasses
'all
kinds
of
malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that
have been committed by any officer or employee as
71
mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of

office.
- the powers, functions and duties of the
Ombudsman have generally been categorized into:
Investigatory Power; Prosecutory Power; Public
Assistance Functions; Authority to Inquire and
Obtain Information; and Function to Adopt, Institute
and Implement. This case concerns the investigatory
power and Public Assistance Duties of the
Ombudsman
- the Ombudsman, in resolving the complaint,
considered 3 issues: (1) WON the technical
specifications prescribed by MWSS in the projects
have been so designed as to really favor Fiberglass
Pipes-Contractors/ Bidders; (2) WON the MWSS has
the technical knowledge and expertise with
fiberglass pipes; and (3) WON the contractors and
local manufacturers of fiberglass pipes have the
experience and qualification to undertake the
projects. While the broad authority of the
Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission
which "xxx appears illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient" may be yielded, it is difficult to equally
concede, however, that the Constitution and the Law
have intended to likewise confer upon it veto or
revisory power over an exercise of judgment or
discretion by an agency or officer upon whom that
judgment or discretion is lawfully vested. It seems
72
that the Ombudsman, in issuing the challenged

orders, has not only directly assumed jurisdiction
over, but likewise preempted the exercise of
discretion by, the Board of Trustees of MWSS.
Indeed, the recommendation of the MWSS
Committee to award the contract appears to be yet
pending consideration and action by the MWSS
Board of Trustees.
We can only view the assailed order to be more of
an undue interference in the adjudicative
responsibility of the MWSS Board of Trustees rather
than a mere directive requiring the proper
observance of and compliance with the law.
Disposition Petition is granted. Order annulled and
set aside.
LASTIMOSA v VASQUEZ
243 SCRA 497
MENDOZA; April 6, 1995
NATURE
Petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioner to set aside the orders of the Ombudsman
with respect to the two proceedings: complaint for
grave misconduct, insubordination, gross neglect of
73
duty and maliciously refraining from prosecuting

crime and a charge for indirect contempt.
FACTS
- February 18, 1993 > Dayon, public health nurse at
Cebu, filed with the Office of the OmbudsmanVisayas a criminal complaint for frustrated rape and
an administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse
of authority and grave misconduct against the
Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo.
After an investigation, the investigating officer found
no prima facie evidence and recommended its
dismissal.
But
the
Ombudsman,
Vasquez,
disapproved the recommendation and directed that
Mayor Ilustrisimo be charged with attempted rape.
Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas Mojica referred the
case to Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar for the
"filing of appropriate information with the Regional
Trial Court of Danao City. The case eventually went
to First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria G.
Lastimosa.
- Lastimosa conducted a PI and found that only acts
of lasciviousness had been committed. With the
approval of Kintanar, she filed an information for acts
of lasciviousness. As no case for attempted rape
had been filed by the Prosecutor's Office, Mojica
ordered Kintanar and Lastimosa to show cause why
they should not be punished for contempt for
74
"refusing and failing to obey the lawful directives" of

the Office of the Ombudsman.
- Mojica issued an order placing Lastimosa and
Kintanar under preventive suspension for a period of
six (6) months as approved by Ombudsman
Vasquez
- September 6, 1994 > Lastimosa filed the petition
for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the orders
directing them to file of the action (for Attempted
Rape) against the Mayor; instructing Lastimosa and
Kintanar to explain in writing why they should not be
punished for indirect Contempt of the Office of the
Ombudsman "for refusing and failing to file the
appropriate Information for Attempted Rape against
the Mayor; stating that the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor to comply with the directive of the Office
of the Ombudsman that a charge for attempted rape
be filed against the Mayor in recognition of the
authority of said Office; approving of the placement
of Lastimosa and Kintanar under preventive
suspension for a period of six (6) months, without
pay; directing Assistant Regional State Prosecutor to
implement preventive suspension; and designating
Assistant Regional State Prosecutor Concepcion as
Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu
- Petitioner claims: Office of the Ombudsman and
the prosecutor's office have concurrent authority to
investigate public officers or employees and that
75
when the former first took cognizance of the case

against Mayor Ilustrisimo, it did so to the exclusion
of the latter. In any event, the Office of the
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case
against the mayor because the crime involved (rape)
was not committed in relation to a public office.
Therefore the Office of the Ombudsman has no
authority to place her and Provincial Prosecutor
Kintanar under preventive suspension for refusing to
follow his orders and to cite them for indirect
contempt for such refusal.
ISSUES
1. WON the Office of the Ombudsman has the
power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to assist it
in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape
against Mayor Ilustrisimo
2. WON Office of the Ombudsman has the power to
punish for contempt and impose preventive
suspension
HELD
1. YES
Ratio When a prosecutor is deputized, he comes
under the "supervision and control" of the
Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the
power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve,
reverse or modify his (prosecutor's) decision.
76
Petitioner cannot legally act on her own and refuse

to prepare and file the information as directed by the
Ombudsman.
Reasoning
- Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors
for assistance. Sec 31 of the Ombudsman Act of
1989
(RA6770)
provides:
Designation
of
Investigators and Prosecutors. The Ombudsman
may utilize the personnel of his office and/or
designate of deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or
lawyer in the government service to act as special
investigator or prosecutor to assist in the
investigation and prosecution of certain cases.
Those designated or deputized to assist him as
herein provided shall be under his supervision and
control.
Obiter
- The office of the Ombudsman has the power to
"investigate and prosecute on its own or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient." This power has been held to
include the investigation and prosecution of any
crime committed by a public official regardless of
whether the acts or omissions complained of are
related to, or connected with, or arise from, the
performance of his official duty. It is enough that the
77
act or omission was committed by a public official.

Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a
public official like a municipal mayor, is within the
power of the Ombudsman to investigate and
prosecute.
2. YES
- Sec 15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office
of the Ombudsman the power to "punish for
contempt, in accordance with the Rules of Court and
under the same procedure and with the same
penalties provided therein."
- Suspension is not a punishment or penalty for the
acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only
as a preventive measure. Suspension is a
preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If
after such investigation, the charges are established
and the person investigated is found guilty of acts
warranting his removal, then he is removed or
dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore,
nothing improper in suspending an officer pending
his investigation and before the opportunity to prove
his innocence.
Disposition Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit
and the Motion to Lift Order of Preventive
Suspension is DENIED
78
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE v OFFICE OF

THE OMBUDSMAN
380 SCRA 424
de Leon, Jr., J; April 11, 2002
NATURE
Special civil Action . Certiorari and Prohibition
FACTS
- The Office of the Ombudsman received information
from an informant for reward regarding the
anomalous grant of tax refunds to Distillera Limtuaco
and La Tondena Distilleries. On the basis of this
information, the Ombudsman directed via a
subpoena duces tecum, Atty. Mansequiao of the
legal department of the BIR to appear before him
together with the complete case dockets of the two
companies.
- BIR resisted this summons on the grounds that the
grant of the tax refund had already been decided by
the Sandiganbayan in People vs Larin, that the BIR
had exclusive authority to grant a tax credit, that the
proper authority to review is with the Court of Tax
Appeal, that there must be a pending action before
the issuance of a subpoena can be made, and that
the subpoena did not specifically described the
documents sought to be produced.
- The Ombudsman denied the motion of the BIR and
79
reiterated it instructions to the BIR to produce the

documents sought.
- The BIR filed this Petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and preliminary injunction, and temporary restraining
order with the SC
ISSUE/S
1. WON the Ombudsman could validly exercise its
power to investigate only when there exist an
appropriate case
2. WON it violated due process in issuing subpoena
without first giving BIR the summary of complaint
and requiring it to submit a written reply
HELD
1. No. The power to investigate and to prosecute
granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and
unqualified. The 1987 Constitution provides that the
Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the
people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any
form or manner against public officials or employees
of the government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government owned
or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate
cases, notify the complainants of the action taken
and the result thereof. The Ombudsman Act makes
it perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman
encompasses
all
kinds
of
80
malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance that

have been committed by any officer or employee
during his tenure.
2. Yes. The SC held that the procedure of
immediately issuing the subpeona duces tecum was
violative of the right to due process and did no
comply with Section 26, paragraph 2 of the
Ombudsman Act (RA 6770). The law clearly
provides that if there is reasonable ground to
investigate further, the investigator shall first furnish
the respondent public official or employee with a
summary of the complaint and require him to submit
a written answer within 72 hours from receipt of said
complaint. As noted, the BIR was never given a copy
of the complaint but was summarily ordered to
appear before the Ombudsman and to produce the
case dockets of the tax refunds granted to the two
companies. Clearly, the Ombudsman failed to afford
BIR with the basic due process in conducting the
investigation.
Disposition
Petition is granted. Ombudsman is prohibited from
proceeding with the case and its orders are annulled
and set aside.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v ENOC
81
G.R. Nos. 145957-68

MENDOZA; January 25, 2002
NATURE
FACTS
- Respondents were employed at the Office of the
Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC), Davao del
Sur with salaries below grade 27.
- They were charged with 11 counts of
malversation through falsification, based on
alleged purchases of medicine and food
assistance for cultural community members, and
one count of violation of R.A. No. 3019, 3(e), in
connection with the purchases of supplies for the
OSCC without bidding/canvass.
- Respondents moved to quash the informations
saying that the Ombudsman has no authority to
prosecute graft cases falling within the jurisdiction of
regular courts. This motion was granted by the RTC
and the cases were dismissed without prejudice,
however, to their refiling by the appropriate officer.
- The Office of the Ombudsman filed the instant
petition.
ISSUE
WON the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to investigate
82
and prosecute cases before the regular courts.

HELD
- YES. Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not
only graft cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by the
regular courts. The power to investigate and to
prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is
plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or
omission of any public officer or employee when
such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not
make a distinction between cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular
courts. It has been held that the clause any illegal
act or omission of any public official is broad
enough to embrace any crime committed by a public
officer or employee.
- The jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman
should not be equated with the limited authority of
the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a
component of the Office of the Ombudsman and
may only act under the supervision and control and
upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to
conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is
limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.
83
- The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all

complaints against officers and employees of the
government and to enforce their administrative, civil
and criminal liability in every case where the
evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the law
allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or
designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in
the government service to act as special investigator
or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and
prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or
deputized to assist him work under his supervision
and control. The law likewise allows him to direct
the Special prosecutor to prosecute cases outside
the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction in accordance with
Section 11(4c) of RA 6770.
Disposition
WHEREFORE, the order, dated
October 7, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, branch
19 of Digos, Davao del Sur is SET ASIDE and
Criminal Case Nos. 374(97) to 385(97) are hereby
REINSTATED and the Regional Trial Court is
ORDERED to try and decide the same.
FUENTES v OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
GR NO. 124295
PARDO; October 23, 2001
NATURE
84
Petition for certiorari

FACTS
- Pursuant to the government's plan to construct its
first fly-over in Davao City, the RP represented by
the DPWH filed an expropriation case against the
owners of the properties affected by the project
(namely, Tessie Amadeo, Reynaldo Lao and Rev.
Alfonso Galo). The case was presided by Judge
Renato A. Fuentes.
- The govt won the expropriation case.
- The properties subject of the levy as described as
all scrap iron/junks found in the premises of the
DPWH. An auction was conducted wherein Alex
Bacquial emerged as the highest bidder. However,
Bacquial together with Sheriff Norberto Paralisan
attempted to withdraw the auctioned properties but
they were prevented from doing so because many
of these were still serviceable and were due for
repair and rehabilitation. (as opposed to their
classification as scrap iron/junk)
- So Alex Baquial filed an ex-parte urgent motion for
the issuance of a 'break through' order to enable
him to effect the withdrawal of the auctioned
properties. The motion was granted by Judge
Fuentes that same day. Thus, Bacquial succeeded
in hauling off the scrap iron/junk equipment in the
depot, including the repairable equipment within the
85
DPWH depot. He hauled equipment from the depot

for five successive days until the lower court issued
another order temporarily suspending the writ of
execution it earlier issued in the expropriation case
and directing Bacquial not to implement the writ.
The lower court issued another order upholding the
validity of the writ of execution
- On the basis of letters from Congressman Manuel
M. Garcia of the Second District of Davao City and
Engineer Ramon A. Alejo, the Court Administrator,
the SC directed Judge Renato A. Fuentes and
Sheriff Norberto Paralisan to comment on the report
recommending the filing of an administrative case
against the sheriff and other persons responsible
for the anomalous implementation of the writ of
execution. Also, the DPWH filed an administrative
complaint against Sheriff Norberto Paralisan for
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, in violation of Article IX, Section 36 (b) of P.
D. No. 807.
- After considering the facts, the SC ordered the
sheriffs dismissal. From this order, the office of the
Court Administrator was also directed to conduct
an investigation on Judge Renato Fuentes and to
charge him if the result of the investigation so
warrants. The Office of the Solicitor General is
likewise ordered to take appropriate action to
recover the value of the serviceable or repairable
86
equipment which were unlawfully hauled by Alex

Bacquial.
- Thus, Director Antonio E. Valenzuela of the Office
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao recommended that
petitioner Judge Renato A. Fuentes be charged
before the Sandiganbayan with violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3 (e) and likewise
be administratively charged before the Supreme
Court with acts unbecoming of a judge. Fuentes.
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a
motion to dismiss complaint and/or manifestation to
forward all records to the Supreme Court. The
motion was dismissed hence this petition.
ISSUE
1.
WON the Ombudsman may conduct an
investigation of acts of a judge in the exercise of his
official functions alleged to be in violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the
absence of an administrative charge for the same
acts before the Supreme Court.
HELD
NO. The Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate
a criminal or administrative complaint before his
office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power
to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must
indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for
87
appropriate action. Article VIII, Section 6 of the

Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.
Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to
oversee the judges and court personnel and take the
proper administrative action against them if they
commit any violation of the laws of the land. No
other branch of government may intrude into this
power, without running afoul of the independence of
the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of
powers.
No other entity or official of the
Government, not the prosecution or investigation
service of any other branch, not any functionary
thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or
decision--whether final and executory or not--and
pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a
criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an
unjust judgment or order. That prerogative belongs
to the courts alone.
Dispositive
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Ombudsman is directed to dismiss the case and
refer the complaint against petitioner Judge Renato
A. Fuentes to the Supreme Court for appropriate
action.
88
LEDESMA v CA (DESIERTO)
G.R. No. 161629
YNARES-SANTIAGO; July 29, 2005
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari to reverese and set
aside CA decision
FACTS
- Atty Ronaldo Ledesma is the chaiman of the 1st
division of the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) of the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID).
Agusto Somalio with the Fact Finding and
Intelligence Bureau (FIIB) of the Office of the
Ombudsman filed a complaint requesting for an
investigation on alleged anomalies durrounding the
extension of the Temporary Resident Visas (TRVs)
of 2 foreigners. The FIIB investigation revealed 7
other cases of TRV extensions with similar
irregularities.
- The FIIB, as nominal complainant filed with
Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of the Office of the
Ombudsman a formal complaint against the
petitioner. Atty. Artherl Caronongan (board member)
and Ma. Elena Ang (exec asst) were also charged
administratively. The case against the petitioner was
89
treated as both criminal and administative for 9

countsof violationof the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act for falsification of public documents
and 9 counts of Dishonesty, grave Misconduct,
Falsification of Public Documents and Gross Neglect
of Duty.
- The complaint alleged the ff illegal acts: (a)
irregularily in granting TRVs beyond the prescbed
period and (b) using photocopied applications for a
TRV extension wthout the applicants fixing their
signatures to validate the correctness of the
information. Ladesma and Coarongan allegedly
signed the Memorandum of Transmittal to the Board
of Commission (BOC) of the BID, forwarding the
applications for TRV extension of several aliens
whose papers were questionable.
- Graft Investigation Officer Marlyn Reyes resolved
the
administrative
cases
in
a
resolution
recommending that Ledesma be suspended from
the service for 1 year for Conduct Prejudicial to the
Interest of the Service, that Caronongan be
dismissed for being moot and academic and the
case against Ang be dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.
- Asst Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera reviewed
the joint resolution which was approved by
Ombudsman Desierto.
- Pending the approval by Desierto, he approved the
90
resolution of Graft Investigation Officer Marilou

Ancheta-Mejica dismissing criminal charges for
insufficiency of evidence.
- Petitioner filed an MFR in the administrative case
alleging that the BOC which reviewed the
applications for extension approved theTRVs in
question
thereby
effectively
declared
the
applicationd regular and in order and waived any
infurmity thereon.
- Graft Officer Reyes recommended the denial of the
MFR which was approved by Desierto but reduced
the suspension from 1yr to 9mos without pay.
- Petitionerfiled a petition for review with the CA with
a preliminary prohobitory mandatory injunction
and/or temporary restraining order to enjoin public
respondents from the implementation of the order of
suspension. CA issued the TRO.
- CA affirmed the suspension but reduced it to 6mos
and 1day without pay. MFR was denied.
ISSUE/S
1. WON CA manifestly overlooked relevant facts
which would have justified a conclusion in favor of
the petitioner
2. WON CA erred in finding that the ombudsman is
not merely advisory on the Bureau of Immigration
3. WON CA failed to consider that the
Ombudsmand's
resolution
finding
Ledesma
91
administratively liable constitutes an indirect

encroachment intot he power of the Bureau of
Immigration over immigration matters
HELD
1. NO
Reasoning Petitioner undermines his position in the
BID and his role in the processing of the subject
applications. The BSI reviews the applications and
when it finds them in order, executes a
Memorandum of Tranmittal to the BOC certifying to
the regularity of the application.
All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable
extent on their subordinated. He cannot feign good
faith when the irregularities of the TRV extention
application were patently clear on its face. The
contention that the BOC's approval of the defective
application for TRV extension cured any infirmaties
absolved petitioner's administrative lapse.
The main thrust of the case is to determine whether
petitioner committedany misconduct, nonfeasance,
misfeasance or mal feasance in the performance of
his duties.
2and3. NO
Ratio The creation of the Office of the Ombudsman
is a unique feature of the 1987 Constitution. The
Ombudsman and his deputies are mandated to act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
92
against officers or employeed of the Government.

Foremost among its powers is the authority to
investigate and prosecute public officers and
employees.
Reasoning Ledesma argues that to uphold CA's
ruling expands authority granted by the constitution
to the Office of the Ombudsman.
The authority of the Ombudsman to conduct
administrative investigations as in the present case
is settled. Section 19 of RA 6770 providesa that the
Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but
not limited to acts or omissions which: (a) Are
contrary to law or regulation; (b) Are unreasonable,
unfair, oppressive or discriminatory; (c) Are
inconsistent with the general course of an agencys
functions, though in accordance with law; (d)
Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary
ascertainment of facts; (e) Are in the exercise of
discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
(f) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of
justification.
Under Section 13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only
recommend the removal of the public official or
employee found to be at fault, to the public official
concerned. The Solicitor General and the Office of
the Ombudsman argue that the word recommend
must be taken in conjunction with the phrase and
93
ensure compliance therewith and not its literal

meaning.
The Constitutional Commission left to Congress to
empower the Ombudsman with prosecutorial
functions which it did when RA 6770 was enacted.
Disposition WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
DENIED.
ESTARIJA v RANADA
492 SCRA 652
QUISUMBING; Jun 26, 2006
NATURE
FACTS
Captain Edgardo V. Estarija, Harbor Master of the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), was found guilty by
the Ombudsman of dishonesty and grave
misconduct for having been demanding monies for
the approval and issuance of berthing permits and
monthly contribution from the Davao Pilots
Association, Inc. (DPAI). He was dismissed from the
service.
ISSUES
94
1. WON there is substantial evidence to hold

petitioner liable for dishonesty and grave
misconduct
2. WON the power of the Ombudsman to directly
remove, suspend, demote, fine or censure erring
officials is unconstitutional since the under the 1987
Constitution, the Ombudsmans administrative
authority is merely recommendatory
HELD
1. YES.
Reasoning:
a. Estarija was caught red-handed in an entrapment
operation. When Estarija went to the office of Adrian
Cagata to pick up the money, his doing so was
indicative of his willingness to commit the crime.
b. In an administrative proceeding, the quantum of
proof required for a finding of guilt is only substantial
evidence, that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify
a conclusion.
2. NO.
Rep. Act No. 6770 provides for the functional and
structural organization of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
In passing Rep. Act No. 6770,
Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman
with the power to prosecute offenses committed by
95
public officers and employees to make him a more

active and effective agent of the people in ensuring
accountability in public office. Moreover, the
legislature has vested the Ombudsman with broad
powers to enable him to implement his own actions.
Reasoning
a. Jurisprudence
- In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, we held that Rep.
Act No. 6770 is consistent with the intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution.
They gave
Congress the discretion to give the Ombudsman
powers that are not merely persuasive in character.
Thus, in addition to the power of the Ombudsman to
prosecute
and
conduct
investigations,
the
lawmakers intended to provide the Ombudsman with
the power to punish for contempt and preventively
suspend any officer under his authority pending an
investigation when the case so warrants. He was
likewise given disciplinary authority over all elective
and appointive officials of the government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies except
members of Congress and the Judiciary.
b. intent of the framers of the Constitution
Based on the record of the Constitutional
Commission, they clarified that the powers of the
Ombudsman are not exclusive.
They are not
foreclosing the possibility that in the future, the
96
Assembly may have to give additional powers to the

Ombudsman.
3. The Constitution does not restrict the powers of
the Ombudsman in Section 13, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, but allows the Legislature to enact a
law that would spell out the powers of the
Ombudsman. Through the enactment of Rep. Act
No. 6770, specifically Section 15, par. 3, the
lawmakers gave the Ombudsman such powers to
sanction erring officials and employees, except
members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
DISPOSITION The petition is DENIED.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN V. MASING
Date: January 22, 2008
Ponente: Puno, C.J
Nature: Special civil actions in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari.
Doctrine:
Intervention of the Office of the Ombudsman
may be allowed where the ruling of the Court of
Appeals adversely affected the formers all-important
jurisdiction, the ruling having serious consequences
on its effectiveness as the body charged by the
97
Constitution with the prosecution of officials and

employees of the government suspecting of violating
our laws on graft and corruption.
Facts:
In G.R Nos. 165416 and 165731, respondents
Masing and Tayactac, who were then holding the
positions of principal and office clerk of the Davao
City Integrated Special School (DCISS), were
administratively charged before the Office of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao for allegedly collecting
unauthorized fees, failing to remit authorized fees,
and to account for public funds. The complainants
were the parents of the children studying at the
DCISS.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the Office of the Ombudsman does not
have jurisdiction over them. They assert that the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS) has jurisdiction over them which shall
exercise the same through a committee to be
constituted under Section 9 of RA No. 4670, or the
Magna Carta of Public School Teachers.
Respondents motion was denied, as well as their
motion for reconsideration. The Office of the
Ombudsman
rendered
a
decision
finding
respondents guilty. Masing was dismissed from
98
service, while Tayactac was suspended for 6

months.
Upon denial of respondents MR before the
Office of the Ombudsman, they filed a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the ROC to the CA. CA
granted the petition and ordered the immediate
reinstatement of the respondents.
The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus
Motion to Intervene and for reconsideration, which
the CA denied on the following grounds:
1.Intervention is not proper because it is sought by
the quasi-judicial body whose judgment is on
appeal
2.Intervention, even if possible, is belated under
Section 2, Rule 19 of ROC
In another case filed against respondent Masing
GR No. 165584, she was charged and found guilty
of oppression, serious misconduct, discourtesy in
the conduct of official duties and physical or mental
incapacity before the Office of the Ombudsman.
What followed after is similar to that in
aforementioned cases.
Issue:
1.WON the Office of the Ombudsman may
intervene and seek reconsideration of the
adverse decisions rendered by the CA
99
2.WON the Office of the Ombudsman may directly

discipline public school teachers and employees
Held:
1.Yes, it may intervene and seek reconsideration
2.Yes, the Office of the Ombudsman is
empowered to directly discipline public school
teachers and employees
Ratio:
1.Intervention of the Office of the Ombudsman
may be allowed where the ruling of the Court of
Appeals adversely affected the formers all-important
jurisdiction, the ruling having serious consequences
on its effectiveness as the body charged by the
Constitution with the prosecution of officials and
employees of the government suspecting of violating
our laws on graft and corruption.
Moreover, CA reasoned that the motions to
intervene filed by the Office of the Ombudsman were
already belated since decisions have already been
rendered. Section 2, Rule 19 of the ROC provides
that a motion for intervention may be filed before
rendition of judgment. The SC, on the other hand,
ruled that allowance or disallowance of a motion for
intervention rests on the sound discretion of the
court after consideration of the appropriate
circumstances.
100
2.The authority of the Ombudsman to act on

complaints filed against public officers and
employees is explicit in Article XI, Section 12 of the
1987 Constitution.
Article XI, Section 12. The Ombudsman and his
Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officers and employees
xxx
Article XI, Rule 13 delineates the powers,
functions and duties of the Ombudsman, but the
same is non-exclusive. The Ombudsman Act of 1989
(RA 6770) gives the Office such other powers that it
may need to efficiently perform the task given by the
Constitution.
Note:
Respondents rely on the ruling in Fabella case,
but the same does not apply because the charges
against them were for violations of RA 6713,
otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, collecting unauthorized fees, failing to
remit authorized fees, etc. Such acts complained of
relate to respondents conduct as public official and
101
employee, if not outright graft and corruption. In

Fabella, the public schoolteachers were charged
with violation of civil service laws, rules and
regulations initiated by the DECS Secretary.
- Anne Amantillo III. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
A. LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION
1. NON DELEGATION DOCTRINE
COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE
FILIPINAS v THE BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITY
COMMISIONERS
G.R. NO. L-11216
Moreland, J.: March 6, 1916
NATURE
Petition for review of an order of the Board of Public
Utility Commissioners (the Board)
FACTS
-petitioner is a foreign corporation organized under
the laws of Spain and engaged in business in the
Phils. as a common carrier of passengers and
merchandise by water. The Board dictated an order
requiring petitioner to present a detailed report of its
102
finances and operations of its vessels in the Phils. in

the form of annual reports, upon hearing and service
of an order for petitioner to show cause why such
reports should not be required of them.
-The Board relied on Sec. 16 of Act No. 2307 for its
authority which states that:
the board shall have power, after hearing, upon
notice, by order in writing, to require every public
utility as herein defined
(e) to furnish annually a detailed report of finances
and operations, in
such form and containing
such matters as the Boars may from time to time
by order prescribe.
-petitioner questioned the Boards authority on the
ground that Act No. 2307 was invalid as constituting
an unlawful attempt on the part of Legislature to
delegate legislative power to the Board.
ISSUE
WON there was a delegation of legislative power to
the Board
HELD
YES. Act No. 2307 failed to lay down the general
rules of action under which the Board was to
proceed, and did not prescribe in detail the contents
of the reports it required. Everything was left to the
judgment and discretion of the Board rendering the
103
Act arbitrary, special legislation, and violative of the

constitution. It did not indicate what specific
information the State required and instead
authorized the Board to require whatever information
it wanted. This amounted to the Legislatures
abdication of its powers and functions to the Board
as held in Birdsall vs Clark: if discretion and
judgment are to be exercised, either as to time or
manner, the body entrusted with the duty must
exercise it, and cannot delegate it to another.
-As stated in Interstate Commerce Commission vs
Goodrich Transit, The Congress may not delegate
its purely legislative powers to a commission, but,
having laid down the general rules of action under
which a commission shall proceed, it may require of
that commission the application of such rules to
particular situations and the investigation of facts,
with a view to making orders in a particular matter
within the rules laid down by the Congress. Here,
the general rules had been laid down for the
guidance of the commission, the latter only having to
carry out the details. This case illustrates the
conferring of authority as to the execution of the law,
which is completely valid, as opposed to the
delegation of the power to make the law. Dowling vs
Lancashire Insurance Co. furthers that the law must
be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it
leaves the legislature, so that, in form and
104
substance, it is a law in all its details, in presenti, but

which may be left to take effect in futuro. As held in
Merchants Exchange vs Knott, in essence, the
delegation of legislative power is pure and simple
despotism.
The order appealed from is set aside and the
cause returned to the Board with instruction to
dismiss
US v ANG TANG HO
43 Phil 1
Johns; February 27, 1922
FACTS
- In 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No.
2868. The Act 1) makes unlawful the monopoly and
hoarding of palay, rice or corn and provides penalty
for such violations; and 2) authorizes the GG to fix
the quantities of said products that a company or
individual may acquire, and the maximum sale price
that the industrial or merchant may demand.
- The GG thus issued a proclamation fixing the
price at which rice should be sold.
- A complaint was filed against the Ang Tang Ho,
charging him with the sale of rice at an excessive
price. Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty
105
and sentenced to imprisonment and to pay a fine.

Hence this appeal.
ISSUE
WON Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the GG
to fix the price at which rice should be sold, is
unconstitutional.
HELD.
YES
It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the GG, with
the consent of the Council of State, for any cause
resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay,
rice or corn, to issue and promulgated temporary
rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the
promulgation of temporary rules and emergency
measures is left to the discretion of the GG. The
Legislature does not undertake reasons the
Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but
says that it may be issued " for any cause," and
leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to the
discretion of the GG. The Act also says: "For any
cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary
rise in the price of palay, rice or corn." The
Legislature does not specify or define what is "an
extraordinary rise." That is also left to the discretion
of the GG. The Act also says that the Governor-
106
General, "with the consent of the Council of State,"

is authorized to issue and promulgate "temporary
rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purposes of this Act." It does not specify or define
what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure,
or how long such temporary rules or emergency
measures shall remain in force and effect, or when
they shall take effect. That is to say the Legislature
itself has no in any manner specified or defined any
basis for the order, but has left it to the sole
judgment and discretion of the GG to say what is or
what is not "a cause," and what is or what is not "an
extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as to what
a temporary rule or an emergency measure for the
carrying out the purpose of the Act. Under this state
of facts, if the law is valid and the GG issues a
proclamation fixing the minimum price at which rice
should be sold, any dealer who, with or without
notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal.
There may not have been any cause, and the price
may not have been extraordinary, and there may not
have been an emergency, but, if the GG found the
existence of such facts and issued a proclamation,
and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller
commits a crime.
By the Organic Law, all legislative power is vested in
the Legislature, and the power conferred upon the
Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the
107
GG, or any one else. The Legislative cannot

delegate the Legislative power to enact any law. If
Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and
it does nothing more than to authorize the GG to
make rules and regulations to carry the law into
effect, then the Legislature itself created the law.
There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On
the other hand, if the Act within itself does not define
a crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act
remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the
doing of which is vested in the GG, then the Act is a
delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional
and void.
Supreme Court of Wisconsin:
"That no part of the legislative power can be
delegated by the legislature to any other department
of the government, executive or judicial, is a
fundamental principle in constitutional law, essential
to the integrity and maintenance of the system of
government established by the constitution.
"Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law,
and is complete in and of itself, it may be provided
that it shall become operative only upon some
certain act or event, or, in like manner, that its
operation shall be suspended.
The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a
law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to
determine some fact or state of things upon which
108
the law makes, or intends to make, its own action to

depend."
It must conceded that, after the passage of Act No.
2868, and before any rules and regulations were
promulgated by the GG, a dealer in rice could sell it
at any price, and that he would not commit a crime,
because there would be no law fixing the price of
rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be a
crime. That is to say, in the absence of a
proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any
price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant
committed a crime, it was because the GovernorGeneral issued the proclamation. There was no act
of the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any
price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it at
any price was not crime.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of
the proclamation of the GG which constitutes the
crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to
sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature
left it to the sole discretion of the GG to say what
was and what was not "any cause" for enforcing the
act, and what was and what was not "an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn,"
and under certain undefined conditions to fix the
price at which rice should be sold, without regard to
grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation
should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not
109
the law should be enforced, how long it should be

enforced, and when the law should be suspended.
The Legislature did not specify or define what was
"any cause," or what was "an extraordinary rise in
the price of rice, palay or corn." Neither did it specify
or define the conditions upon which the proclamation
should be issued. In the absence of the
proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged
sale was made a crime, if at all, because the GG
issued the proclamation.
PEOPLE v VERA
65 Phil 56
LAUREL; November 16, 1937
FACTS
-1931: information for criminal case against Mariano
Cu Unjieng, et. al was filed in CFI Manila. HSBC, the
offended party, intervened.
-1934: CFI convicted Cu Unjieng
-1935: SC upholds conviction of Cu Unjieng,
modified duration of imprisonment. After MFR and
motions for new trial which were denied by SC, final
judgment was entered. Cu Unjieng now sought to
elevate case to US SC. US SC denied petition for
certiorari.
-1936: RP SC denied Cu Unjiengs petition for leave
110
to file MFR or new trial, remanded the case to CFI

Manila for execution of judgment. Cu Unjieng
applied for provation under Act No. 4221, which was
referred to the Insular Probation Office (IPO)
-1937: IPO recommended denial of Cu Unjiengs
application for probation. Petition for probation heard
before Judge Veras court. HSBC attacked
constitutionality of Act No. 4221 based on the
following: equal protection of the laws (its
applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands);
undue delegation of legislative power (section 11
of the said Act endows provl boards w/ power to
make said law effective or otherwise in their
respective provinces). Judge Vera eventually
promulgates resolution finding Cu Unjieng innocent
of the crime of which he stands convicted but
denying the latters petition for probation. Counsel
for MCU files exception to the resolution denying
probation & notice of intention to file MFR. This was
followed by a series of alternative motions for new
reconsideration or new trial. A motion for leave to
intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by 33
(34) attorneys was also filed. (Attorney Eulalio
Chaves, 1 of the 34, subsequently filed a petition for
leave to withdraw his appearance as amicus curiae
on the ground that the motion was circulated at a
banquet given by counsel for MCU & that he signed
the same "without mature deliberation & purely as a
111
matter of courtesy.) HSBC filed opposition to motion

for intervention. The Fiscal of the City of Manila filed
motion w/ TC for issuance of an order to execute
judgment of Phil SC in said case & to commit MCU
to jail in obedience to said judgment.
-19 August 1937: hearing on the various motions for
CFIs consideration. On this same date, this instant
case was field before Phil SC to put an end to what
they alleged was an interminable proceeding in CFI
Mnla.
- Note Probation implies guilt by final judgment.
While a probation case may look into the
circumstances attending the commission of the
offense, this does not authorize it to reverse the
findings and conclusive of this court, either directly
or indirectly, especially wherefrom its own admission
reliance was merely had on the printed briefs,
averments, and pleadings of the parties. If each and
every Court of First Instance could enjoy the
privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme
Court, there would be no end to litigation, and
judicial chaos would result. <emphasis on the
hierarchy in the Philippine judicial system>
ISSUE
NOTE: There were many issues in this case
regarding the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 but for
purposes of Admininstative law, the focus of the
112
digest is the non delegation doctrine WON section

11 of Act No. 4221 constitute Undue Delegation of
Legislative Power, and is therefore unconstitutional
and void
HELD
YES. Section 11 constitutes an improper and
unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the
provincial boards, therefore, unconstitutional and
void.
Reasoning. Under the Consti, govt powers are
distributed among 3 coordinate and substantially
independent organs: legislative, executive and
judicial. Each department derives its authority from
the Constitution, the highest expression of popular
will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters
within its jurisdiction, supreme within its own sphere.
- The power to make laws (the legislative power) is
vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law
(sec. 12) and in a unicameral National Assembly by
the Constitution (A6,s1). The Philippine Legislature
or the National Assembly may not escape its duties
and responsibilities by delegating that power to any
other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the
power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle
that potestas delegata non delegare potest, an
accepted corollary of the principle of separation of
powers.
113
- The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of

legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It
admits of exceptions like: (1) delegation of legislative
powers to local authorities; (2) to such agencies in
US territories as Congress may select; (3) to the
people at large; and (4) to those whom the
Constitution itself delegates such legislative powers
(e.g., the President). The case before us does not
fall under any of these exceptions.
- Test of Undue Delegation: to inquire whether the
statute was complete in all its terms and provisions
when it left the hands of the legislature so that
nothing was left to the judgment of any other
appointee or delegate of the legislature. BUT to a
certain extent matters of detail may be left to be
filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or
promulgated by executive officers and administrative
boards. As a rule, an act of the legislature is
incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down
any rule or definite standard by which the
administrative officer or board may be guided in the
exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.
- In the case at bar, the provincial boards of the
various provinces are to determine for themselves,
whether the Probation Law shall apply to their
provinces or not at all. The applicability and
application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in
the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial
114
board does not wish to have the Act applied in its

province, all that it has to do is to decline to
appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a
probation officer. The plain language of the Act is not
susceptible of any other interpretation.
- The true distinction is between the delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection
can be made.
- It is true that laws may be made effective on certain
contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive
or the adoption by the people of a particular
community. The legislature may delegate a power
not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise.
The power to ascertain facts is such a power which
may be delegated. There is nothing essentially
legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or
conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a
law. That is a mental process common to all
branches of the government.
- The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of
legislative will must, of course, come from Congress,
but the ascertainment of the contingency upon which
the Act shall take effect may be left to such agencies
as it may designate. The legislature, then may
115
provide that a contingencies leaving to some other

person or body the power to determine when the
specified contingencies has arisen. In the case at
bar, the various provincial boards are, in practical
effect, endowed with the power of suspending the
operation of the Probation Law in their respective
provinces.
- While the legislature may suspend a law, or the
execution or operation of a law, a law may not be
suspended as to certain individuals only, leaving the
law to be enjoyed by others. The suspension must
be general, and cannot be made for individual cases
or for particular localities. Here the sovereign and
absolute power resides in the people; and the
legislature can only exercise what is delegated to
them according to the constitution. It is manifestly
contrary to the first principles of civil liberty and
natural justice, and to the spirit of our constitution
and laws, that any one citizen should enjoy
privileges and advantages which are denied to all
others under like circumstances; or that ant one
should be subject to losses, damages, suits, or
actions from which all others under like
circumstances are exempted.
- True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular
locality different from those applicable to other
localities. But option laws thus sustained treat of
subjects purely local in character which should
116
receive different treatment in different localities

placed under different circumstances. While we do
not deny the right of local self-government and the
propriety of leaving matters of purely local concern
in the hands of local authorities or for the people of
small communities to pass upon, we believe that in
matters of general of general legislation like that
which treats of criminals in general, and as regards
the general subject of probation, discretion may not
be vested in a manner so unqualified and absolute
as provided in Act No. 4221. The validity of a law is
not tested by what has been done but by what may
be done under its provisions.
- A great deal of latitude should be granted to the
legislature not only in the expression of what may be
termed legislative policy but in the elaboration and
execution thereof. "Without this power, legislation
would become oppressive and yet imbecile." The
mass of powers of government is vested in the
representatives of the people and that these
representatives are no further restrained under our
system than by the express language of the
instrument imposing the restraint, or by particular
provisions which by clear intendment, have that
effect. (Angara case)
Decision WHEREFORE, Act No. 4221 is hereby
declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of
prohibition is, accordingly, granted. Without any
117
pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.

PELAEZ v AUDITOR GENERAL
G.R. L-23285
CONCEPCION; December 24, 1965
NATURE
Special civil action (for a writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction) against the Auditor General,
to restrain him, as well as his representatives and
agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of
public funds in implementation of contested EOs
FACTS
- Emmanuel Pelaez, in his capacity as Vice
President and as a taxpayer instituted this civil
action alleging validity of EO Nos. 93 to 121, 124
and 126 to 129. These executive orders created 33
municipalities, and were issued by the President in
virtue of Sec. 68 of the Revised Admin Code.
- Pelaez alleged that such are null and void, since
Sec. 68 has been impliedly repealed by RA 2370
and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power.
Sec 3 of RA 2370 provides that barrios may "not be
created or their boundaries altered nor their names
changed" except by Act of Congress or of the
118
corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a

majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the
"recommendation of the council of the municipality
or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is
situated."
- Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the President,
under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can
he create a municipality which is composed of
several barrios, since barrios are units of
municipalities?"
- Auditor General answered that this can be done,
upon the theory that a new municipality can be
created without creating new barrios, such as, by
placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new
municipality.
ISSUE/S
1. WON the power of the President to create
municipalities under Sec. 682 of the Revised Admin
Code amounts to an undue delegation of legislative
power
2. WON Sec. 68 is deemed repealed
The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province,
subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised
therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into such
portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created, and
may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That
the authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any
province or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by the
(Governor-General) President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the
jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with the
recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the
several officers affected and assign such officers to the new districts so formed.
2
119
HELD
1.YES
Ratio The authority to create municipal corporations
is essentially legislative in nature. In the language of
other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function" or
solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative
power." Although Congress may delegate to another
branch of the Government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or
administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that
said law: (a) be complete in itself - it must set forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard
- the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable to which the delegate must conform in
the performance of his functions.
Reasoning Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code does not meet these well settled requirements
for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in
the enforcement of a law.
- "Public welfare" and "public interest," are sufficient
standards for a valid delegation of the authority to
execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in
Calalang v Williams must be construed in relation to
the specific facts and issues involved - grants to
administrative officers of powers related to the
exercise of their administrative functions, calling for
120
the determination of questions of fact. Such is not

the nature of the powers dealt with in section 68.
The question of whether or not "public interest"
demands the exercise of such power is not one of
fact. it is "purely a legislative question " or a political
question.
NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINE
- If the validity of the delegation of powers made in
Section 68 were upheld, there would no longer be
any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority
to the President to do anything which, in his opinion,
may be required by public welfare or public interest.
Such grant of authority would be a virtual abdication
of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive.
- Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law
ordains: The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise
general supervision over all local governments as
may be provided by law, and take care that the laws
be faithfully executed. The power of control under
this provision implies the right of the President to
interfere in the exercise of such discretion BUT this
power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive,
insofar as local governments are concerned. The
President cannot interfere with local governments,
so long as the same or its officers act within the
scope of their authority. Manifestly, such control
does not include the authority either to abolish an
121
executive department or bureau, or to create a new

one.
2. YES
Reasoning Even if it did entail an undue delegation
of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said Sec
68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code,
approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed
repealed by the subsequent adoption of the
Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible
and inconsistent with said statutory enactment.
Disposition The Executive Orders in question are
hereby declared null and void ab initio and the
respondent
(Auditor
General)
permanently
restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of
public funds in implementation of said Executive
Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities
above referred to.
BENGZON [concur & dissent]
- The issue is whether the legislature can validly
delegate to the Executive such power. The power to
create a municipality is legislative in character.
American authorities have therefore favored the
view that it cannot be delegated; that what is
delegable is not the power to create municipalities
but only the power to determine the existence of
facts under which creation of a municipality will
result.
122
- The test is said to lie in whether the statute allows

any discretion on the delegate as to whether the
municipal corporation should be created. If so, there
is an attempted delegation of legislative power and
the statute is invalid. Now Section 68 no doubt gives
the President such discretion, since it says that the
President "may by executive order" exercise the
powers therein granted.
123
EDU v ERICTA
35 SCRA 481
FERNANDO; October 24, 1970
NATURE
Petition for certiorari and prohibition
FACTS
-Galo, on his behalf and that of other motorists, filed
on May 20, 1970 a suit for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of
the Reflector Law as an invalid exercise of the police
power, for being violative of the due process clause.
-This he followed on May 28, 1970 with a
manifestation wherein he sought as an alternative
remedy that, in the event that respondent Judge
would hold said statute constitutional, Administrative
Order No. 2 of the Land Transportation
Commissioner, implementing such legislation be
nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power.
-On May 28, 1970, respondent Judge ordered the
issuance of a preliminary injunction directed against
the enforcement of such administrative order.
-SolGen filed MFR
-On June 9, 1970, respondent Judge denied the
motion for reconsideration of the order of injunction,
hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition
124
ISSUE
WON Admninstrative Order No. 2 is invalid for being
contrary to the principle of non-delegation of
legislative power.
HELD
No.
-It is not to be lost sight of that under Republic Act
No. 4136, of which the Reflector Law is an
amendment, petitioner, as the Land Transportation
Commissioner, may, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
issue rules and regulations for its implementation as
long as they do not conflict with its provisions
-It is a fundamental principle flowing from the
doctrine of separation of powers that Congress
may not delegate its legislative power to the two
other branches of the government, subject to the
exception that local governments may over local
affairs participate in its exercise.
-What cannot be delegated is the authority under
the Constitution to make laws and to alter and
repeal them; the test is the completeness of the
statute in all its term and provisions when it
leaves the hands of the legislature.
-To determine whether or not there is an undue
delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be
directed to the scope and definiteness of the
125
measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate

its functions when it describes what job must be
done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his
authority.
-A distinction has rightfully been made between
delegation of power to make the laws which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it
shall be, which constitutionally may not be done,
and delegation of authority or discretion as to its
execution to exercised under and in pursuance
of the law, to which no valid objection call be
made.
-The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as
denying the legislature the necessary resources of
flexibility and practicability.
-To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there
must be a standard, which implies at the very least
that the legislature itself determines matters of
principle and lay down fundamental policy. A
standard thus defines legislative policy, marks
its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies
the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected. It is the criterion by
which legislative purpose may be carried out.
Thereafter, the executive or administrative office
designated may in pursuance of the above
guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and
126
regulations.
-The standard may be either express or implied.
If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily
met. The standard though does not have to be
spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the
policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole.
In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective
is public safety.
-Justice Laurel: The principle of non-delegation
"has been made to adapt itself the complexities
of modern governments, giving rise to the
adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of
"subordinate legislation" not only in the United
States and England but in practically all modern
governments. Accordingly, with the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of
the subjects of governmental regulation, and the
increased difficulty of administering the laws,
there is a constantly growing tendency toward
the delegation of greater powers by the
legislature and toward the approval of the
practice by the courts."
-Justice J. B. L. Reyes in People vs. Exconde: "It is
well establish in this jurisdiction that, while the
making of laws is a non-delegable activity that
corresponds
exclusively
to
Congress,
nevertheless the latter may constitutionally
delegate authority to promulgate rules and
127
regulations to implement a given legislation and

effectuate its policies, for the reason that the
legislature often finds it impracticable (if not
impossible) to anticipate and proved for the
multifarious and complex situations that may be
met in carrying the law in effect. All that is
required is that the regulation should germane to
the objects and purposes of the law; that the
regulation be not in contradiction with it; but
conform to the standards that the law prescribes
... "
-Chief Justice, Concepcion: "It is one thing is to
delegate the power to determine what the law
shall be, and another thing to delegate the
authority to fix the details in the execution of
enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself.
Briefly stated, the rule is that the delegated powers
fall under the second category, if the law authorizing
the, delegation furnishes a reasonable standard
which "sufficiently marks the field within which the
Administrator is to act so that it may be known
whether he has kept within it in compliance with the
legislative will."
-The Reflector Law, construed together with the
Land Transportation Code, Republic Act No. 4136,
of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to
the stress and emphasis on public safety which is
the prime consideration in statutes of this character.
128
There is likewise a categorical affirmation of the

power of petitioner as Land Transportation
Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations
to give life to and translate into actuality such
fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has
been no abuse. His Administrative Order No. 2 can
easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable,
launched against it by respondent Galo.
Disposition Petition is granted. The constitutionality
of the Reflector Law and the validity of
Administrative Order No. 2 issued in the
implementation thereof are sustained.
AGUSTIN v EDU
88 SCRA 195
FERNANDO; Feb. 2, 1979
NATURE
Petition for prohibition
FACTS
-Letter of Instruction No. 229 (1974) as amended by
Letter of Instruction No. 479 (1976) required every
motor vehicle owner to procure and use one pair of
a reflectorized triangular early warning device
whenever any vehicle is stalled or disabled or is
129
parked for thirty (30) minutes or more on any street,

or highway, including expressways or limited access
roads.
-The implementing rules and regulations prepared
by
the
respondent
Land
Transportation
Commissioner on December 10, 1976 were not
enforced as President Marcos, on January 25, 1977,
ordered a six-month period of suspension insofar as
the installation of early warning device (EWD) as a
pre-registration requirement for motor vehicles was
concerned. Letter of Instruction No. 716, issued on
June 30, 1978 lifted such suspension and in
pursuance thereof, the rules and regulations
prepared by respondent Commission were approved
for immediate implementation by respondent
Minister of Public Works and Communication.
-Petitioner came to court alleging that Letter of
Instruction 229, as amended, clearly violates the
provisions of the New Constitution on due process,
equal protection and delegation of police power.
That it is oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary,
confiscatory and contrary to the precepts of our
compassionate New Society.
-The respondents' Answer demonstrated that the
assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of
the police power; that the implementing rules and
regulations of respondent Land Transportation
Commissioner do not constitute unlawful delegation
130
of legislative power and that the hazards posed by

such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by
international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the
1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals
of which Philippines was a signatory and which was
duly ratified and the United Nations Organization.
ISSUE
1. WON the implementing rules and regulations of
respondent Land Transportation Commissioner
constitute unlawful delegation of legislative power
HELD
1. NO.
Reasoning The Court dismissed the petition for
prohibition ruling that the Letter of Instruction in
question was issued in the exercise of the State's
police power intended to promote public safety; that
there has been no undue delegation of legislative
power as a standard has been set ; and that the
country cannot repudiate its commitment to
international bodies and the accepted principles of
international law. The petition itself quoted these two
whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction:
"[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions
to traffic have been recognized by international
bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the
131
United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the

said Vienna Convention, which was ratified by the
Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207,
recommended the enactment of local legislation for
the installation of road safety signs and devices; . . ."
It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of
Principle found in the Constitution possesses
relevance: "The Philippines . . . adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land, . . ." The 1968 Vienna Convention on
Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a
character. It is not for this country to repudiate a
commitment to which it had pledged its word. The
concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of
such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the
principle of international morality.
Disposition Petition DISMISSED
FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION v
MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
108 SCRA 757
FERNANDO; Feb. 2, 1979
NATURE
Petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court
132
FACTS
-Petitioner filed with the Ministry of Labor a notice of
strike for unfair labor practices allegedly committed
by private respondent company inviolation of their
existing collective bargaining agreement, particularly
the unilateral and arbitrary implementation of a Code
of Conduct to the detriment and interest of its
members.
-Several conciliation meetings called by the Ministry
followed. Thereafter, the Ministry of Labor pursuant
to law, certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for
compulsory arbitration and the holding of any strike
at private respondent establishment was enjoined.
Hearing was subsequently conducted whereas
private respondent agreed to the indefinite
preventive suspension of the provisions of the Code
of Conduct, the principal cause of the controversy.
-In a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court,
petitioner union submits that Batas Pambansa Blg.
130 insofar as it amends Article 264 of the Labor
Code delegating to the Minister of Labor the power
and discretion to assume jurisdiction and/or certify
strikes for compulsory arbitration to the NLRC, and
in effect make or unmake the law on free collective
bargaining, is an undue delegation of legislative
powers and is contrary to the assurance of the State
to the workers' right to self organization and
collective bargaining. Such power, according to
133
petitioner union, is within the competence of the

President who can best determine national interests
when a strike is in progress.
ISSUE
2. WON Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 insofar as it
amends Article 264 of the Labor Code delegating to
the Minister of Labor the power and discretion to
assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for
compulsory arbitration to the NLRC, and in effect
make or unmake the law on free collective
bargaining, is an undue delegation of legislative
powers and hence unconstitutional
HELD
2. NO.
Reasoning the unconstitutional of the act has not
been demonstrated and that any ruling on the
question of unconstitutional application would be
premature in the absence of factual determination by
the Ministry of Labor and the NLRC. Batas
Pambansa Blg. 130 insofar as it empowers the
Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor
disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or
lockouts adversely affecting the national interest and
thereafter decide it or certify the same to the NLRC
is not on its face unconstitutional for being violative
of the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power.
134
It stressed further that compulsory arbitration must

be exercised in accordance with the constitutional
mandate of protection to labor. To repeat, there is no
ruling on the question of whether or not it has been
unconstitutionally applied in this case, for being
repugnant to the regime of self-organization and free
collective bargaining, as on the facts alleged,
disputed by private respondent, the matter is not ripe
for judicial determination. It must be stressed anew,
however, that the power of compulsory arbitration,
while allowable under the Constitution and quite
understandable in labor disputes affected with a
national interest, to be free from the taint of
unconstitutionality, must be exercised in accordance
with the constitutional mandate of protection to labor.
Disposition Petition DISMISSED
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE
CORPORATION v ALCUAZ
180 SCRA 218
REGALADO; Dec 18, 1989
NATURE
Petition to annul and set aside an Order issued by
respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the
National Telecommunications Commission
135
FACTS
By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, PHILCOMSAT
was granted "a franchise to establish, construct,
maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such
places as the grantee may select, station or stations
and associated equipment and facilities for
international satellite communications." Under this
franchise, it was likewise granted the authority to
"construct and operate such ground facilities as
needed to deliver telecommunications services from
the communications satellite system and ground
terminal or terminals."
Pursuant to said franchise, petitioner puts on record
that it undertook the certain activities and
established the various installations:
By designation of the Republic of the Philippines, the
petitioner is also the sole signatory for the
Philippines in the Agreement and the Operating
Agreement
relating
to
the
International
Telecommunications
Satellite
Organization
(INTELSAT) of 115 member nations, as well as in
the Convention and the Operating Agreement of the
International
Maritime
Satellite
Organization
(INMARSAT) of 53 member nations, which two
global commercial telecommunications satellite
corporations were collectively established by various
states in line with the principles set forth in
136
Resolution 1721 (XVI) of the General Assembly of

the United Nations.
Since 1968, the petitioner has been leasing its
satellite circuits to:1. Philippine Long Distance
Telephone
Company;
2.
Philippine
Global
Communications,
Inc.;
3.
Eastern
Telecommunications Phils., Inc.; 4. Globe Mackay
Cable and Radio Corp. ITT; and 5. Capitol Wireless,
Inc.
or their predecessors-in-interest. The satellite
services thus provided by petitioner enable said
international carriers to serve the public with
indispensable communication services, such as
overseas telephone, telex, facsimile, telegrams, high
speed data, live television in full color, and television
standard conversion from European to American or
vice versa.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner
was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public
Service Commission, now respondent NTC.
However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196
issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed
under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of
respondent NTC, including all its facilities and
services and the fixing of rates. Implementing said
Executive Order No. 196, respondents required
137
petitioner to apply for the requisite certificate of

public convenience and necessity covering its
facilities and the services it renders, as well as the
corresponding authority to charge rates therefor.
Consequently, under date of September 9, 1987,
petitioner filed with respondent NTC an application
for authority to continue operating and maintaining
the same facilities it has been continuously
operating and maintaining since 1967, to continue
providing the international satellite communications
services it has likewise been providing since 1967,
and to charge the current rates applied for in
rendering such services. Pending hearing, it also
applied for a provisional authority so that it can
continue to operate and maintain the above
mentioned facilities, provide the services and charge
therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for.
On September 16, 1987, petitioner was granted a
provisional authority to continue operating its
existing facilities, to render the services it was then
offering, and to charge the rates it was then
charging. This authority was valid for six (6) months
from the date of said order. When said provisional
authority expired on March 17, 1988, it was
extended for another six (6) months, or up to
September 16, 1988.
138
The NTC order now in controversy had further

extended the provisional authority of the petitioner
for another six (6) months, counted from September
16, 1988, but it directed the petitioner to charge
modified reduced rates through a reduction of fifteen
percent (15%) on the present authorized rates.
PHILCOMSAT argues that the enabling act
(Executive Order No. 546) of respondent NTC
empowering it to fix rates for public service
communications does not provide the necessary
standards constitutionally required, hence there is
an undue delegation of legislative power, particularly
the adjudicatory powers of NTC.
ISSUE
WON Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196 are
unconstitutional on the ground that the same do not
fix a standard for the exercise of the power therein
conferred.
HELD
NO. Fundamental is the rule that delegation of
legislative power may be sustained only upon the
ground that some standard for its exercise is
provided and that the legislature in making the
delegation has prescribed the manner of the
exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when
the administrative agency concerned, respondent
139
NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must

both be non- confiscatory and must have been
established in the manner prescribed by the
legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed
standard, the delegation of power becomes
unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing
power, the only standard which the legislature is
required to prescribe for the guidance of the
administrative authority is that the rate be
reasonable and just. However, it has been held that
even in the absence of an express requirement as to
reasonableness, this standard may be implied.
It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of
the power delegated to respondent NTC and the
manner required by the statute for the lawful
exercise thereof.
Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196,
respondent NTC is empowered,among others, to
determine and prescribe rates pertinent to the
operation of public service communications which
necessarily include the power to promulgate rules
and regulations in connection therewith. And, under
Section 15(g) of Executive Order No. 546,
respondent NTC should be guided by the
requirements of public safety, public interest and
reasonable feasibility of maintaining effective
competition of private entities in communications
140
and broadcasting facilities. Likewise, in Section 6(d)

thereof, which provides for the creation of the
Ministry of Transportation and Communications with
control and supervision over respondent NTC, it is
specifically provided that the national economic
viability of the entire network or components of the
communications systems contemplated therein
should be maintained at reasonable rates.
We need not go into an in-depth analysis of the
pertinent provisions of the law in order to conclude
that respondent NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing
power, is limited by the requirements of public safety,
public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable
rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the
requirements of a valid delegation of legislative
power.
Dispositive Petition granted
CHIONGBIAN v ORBOS
245 SCRA 253
MENDOZA; June 22, 1995
NATURE: PROHIBITION AND CERTIORARI
Facts:
- These suits challenge the validity of a provision of
the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
141
Muslim Mindanao (or R.A. No. 6734 which was

passed pursuant to Art. X, Sec 18 of the 1987
Constitution), authorizing the President of the
Philippines
to
"merge"
by
administrative
determination the regions remaining after the
establishment of the AR, and the EO No. 429 issued
by the President pursuant to such authority,
"Providing for the Reorganization of Administrative
Regions in Mindanao."
- Pursuant to Art. XIX, Sec 13 of R.A. No.
6734(which provides for the authority of merging
upon administrative determination the other
regions), Pres. Aquino issued the questioned EO
No. 429 joining provinces from other regions to
another region (eg. Misamis Occidental, wast part of
Region X, became part of Region IX etc.)
- Herein petitioners in the first case, wrote then
President Aquino protesting E.O. No. 429.
- They contended that the transfer of the provinces
of Misamis Occidental from Region X to Region IX
etc are alterations of the existing structures of
governmental units, in other words, reorganization.
And that her authority necessarily includes the
authority to merge, the authority to merge does not
include the authority to reorganize. Therefore, the
President's authority under RA 6734 to "merge
existing regions" cannot be construed to include the
authority to reorganize them.
142
- Jaldon, a resident of Zamboanga City, who is suing

in the capacity of taxpayer also contends that Art.
XIX, Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional
because (1) it unduly delegates legislative power to
the President by authorizing him to "merge [by
administrative determination] the existing regions" or
at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of
the power delegated and (2) the power granted is
not expressed in the title of the law.
- SOLGEN: the exercise of a power "traditionally
lodged in the President," as held in Abbas v.
Comelec, and as a mere incident of his power of
general supervision over local governments and
control of executive departments, bureaus and
offices under Art. X Sec 16 and Art. VII Sec 17 of the
Constitution.
- He contends that there is no undue delegation of
legislative power but only a grant of the power to "fill
up" or provide the details of legislation because
Congress did not have the facility to provide for
them.
- Also, he justifies the grant to the President of the
power "to merge the existing regions" as something
fairly embraced in the title of R.A. No. 6734, to wit,
"An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao," because
it is germane to it.
143
- He argues that the power is not limited to the

merger of those regions in which the provinces and
cities which took part in the plebiscite are located but
that it extends to all regions in Mindanao as
necessitated by the establishment of the
autonomous region.
Issues:
1. WON the merging of admin regions is an
administrative matter
2. WON Congress has provided a sufficient standard
by which the President is to be guided in the
exercise of the power granted and
3. WON the grant of power to him is included in the
subject expressed in the title of the law.
4. WON the power granted to the President is limited
to the reorganization of administrative regions in
which some of the provinces and cities which voted
in favor of regional autonomy are found pursuant to
Art. 13 Sec 13
HELD:
1. YES. The power conferred on the President to
MERGE Admin Regions is similar to the power to
adjust municipal boundaries which has been
described in Pelaez v. Auditor General or as
"administrative in nature." (while the CREATION
of municipalities is purely a legislative matter.)
144
2. YES. The standard is to be found in the same

policy underlying the grant to the President in R.A.
No. 5435.
- A legislative standard need not be expressed. It
may simply be gathered or implied. Nor need it be
found in the law challenged because it may be
embodied in other statutes on the same subject as
that of the challenged legislation.
- Nature of administrative regions and the basis and
purpose for their creation:
* Basis: R.A. No. 5435 granted authority to the
Pres, with the help of a Commission on
Reorganization, to reorganize the different
executive departments, bureaus, offices, etc.
* The law provided that any reorganization plan
submitted would become effective only upon the
approval of Congress.
* Purpose was to promote "simplicity, economy
and efficiency in the government."
- The choice of the President as delegate is logical
because the division of the country into regions is
intended to facilitate not only the administration of
local governments but also the direction of executive
departments which the law requires should have
regional offices.
145
- Abbas v. COMELEC: "while the power to merge

administrative regions is not expressly provided for
in the Constitution, it is a power which has
traditionally been lodged with the President to
facilitate the exercise of the power of general
supervision over local governments [see Art. X, Sec
4 of the Constitution]." The regions themselves are
not territorial and political divisions like provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere
groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative
purposes."
- There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of
its legislative power in conferring on the President
the power to merge administrative regions.
3. YES. It is a sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement if the title expresses the
general subject and all provisions of the statute are
germane to that subject.
Certainly the
reorganization of the remaining administrative
regions is germane to the general subject of R.A.
No. 6734, which is the establishment of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
4. YES. The questioned EO No. 429 distorted and,
in fact, contravened the clear intent of this provision
by moving out or transferring certain political
146
subdivisions (provinces/cities) out of their legally

designated regions.
- Aggravating this unacceptable or untenable
situation is EO No. 429's effecting certain
movements on areas which did not even participate
in the plebiscite.
- While Art. XIX, Sec 13 provides that "The provinces
and cities which do not vote for inclusion in the
Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing
administrative regions," this provision is subject to
the qualification that "the President may by
administrative determination merge the existing
regions."
- This means that while non-assenting provinces and
cities are to remain in the regions as designated
upon the creation of the Autonomous Region, they
may nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous
provinces forming other regions as the exigency of
administration may require.
- The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves
no more than are definition or redrawing of the lines
separating administrative regions for the purpose of
facilitating the administrative supervision of local
government units by the President and insuring the
efficient delivery of essential services.
- There will be no "transfer" of local governments
from one region to another except as they may thus
be regrouped so that a province like Lanao del
147
Norte, which is at present part of Region XII, will

become part of Region IX.
- The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even
analogous to a redistricting or to the division or
merger of local governments, which all have political
consequences on the right of people residing in
those political units to vote and to be voted for. It
cannot be overemphasized that administrative
regions are mere groupings of contiguous
provinces for administrative purposes, not for
political representation.
- To be fundamental reason Art. XIX, Sec 13 is not
so limited. But the more fundamental reason is that
the President's power cannot be so limited without
neglecting the necessities of administration.
- E.O. No. 429 is based on relevant criteria, to wit:
(1) contiguity and geographical features; (2)
transportation and communication facilities; (3)
cultural and language groupings; (4) land area and
population; (5) existing regional centers adopted by
several agencies; (6) socio-economic development
programs in the regions and (7) number of provinces
and cities.
Dispositive: The petitions for certiorari
prohibition are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
and
148
SANTIAGO v COMELEC
Title:
MIRIAM
DEFENSOR
SANTIAGO,
ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL
ONGPIN, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,
JESUS
DELFIN,
ALBERTO
PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their
capacities as founding members of the People's
Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA),respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYAIPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK),
MOVEMENT
OF
ATTORNEYS
FOR
BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM,
INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES
(IBP),
and
LABAN
NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitionersintervenors.
Date: March 19, 1997
Ponente: Davide, Jr. J.
Facts:
On 6 December 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed
with the Commission on Elections a "Petition to
Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of
Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (Delfin
149
Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for

an order:
o Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering
all over the country;
o Causing the necessary publications of said
Order and the attached "Petition for Initiative on
the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general
and local circulation;
o Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all
Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners
and volunteers, in establishing signing stations
at the time and on the dates designated for the
purpose.
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander
Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special
civil action for prohibition raising the following
arguments:
o The constitutional provision on people's initiative
to amend the Constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress.
No such law has been passed.
o It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three
systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the
Constitution, on statutes, and on local
legislation. However, it failed to provide any
subtitle on initiative on the Constitution,
150
unlike in the other modes of initiative, which

are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and
Subtitle III. This deliberate omission
indicates that the matter of people's initiative
to amend the Constitution was left to some
future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino
stressed this deficiency in the law in his
privilege speech delivered before the Senate
in 1994: "There is not a single word in that
law
which
can
be
considered
as
implementing
[the
provision
on
constitutional initiative]. Such implementing
provisions have been obviously left to a
separate law.
o Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity
of the law after publication in print media. This
indicates that the Act covers only laws and not
constitutional amendments because the latter
take effect only upon ratification and not after
publication.
o COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on
16 January 1991 to govern "the conduct of
initiative on the Constitution and initiative
and referendum on national and local laws,
is ultra vires insofar as initiative on
amendments
to
the
Constitution
is
concerned, since the COMELEC has no
power to provide rules and regulations for
151
the exercise of the right of initiative to amend

the
Constitution.
Only
Congress
is
authorized by the Constitution to pass the
implementing law.
o The people's initiative is limited to amendments
to the Constitution, not to revision thereof.
Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a
revision and is, therefore, outside the power of
the people's initiative.
o Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds
for people's initiative; neither the COMELEC nor
any other government department, agency, or
office has realigned funds for the purpose.
Petitioners argue that: The claim that COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by
(a) Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which
grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A.
6735, which empowers the COMELEC to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.
Issue:
1) W/N R.A. 6735 has provided for the
implementation of the system of initiative (to propose
152
amendment to the constitution) under the

constitution? No.
2) W/N COMELEC resolution No. 2300 is a valid
implementing rules and regulations for the exercise
of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution?
No.
Held:
No. While R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost
diligence and care in providing for the details in the
implementation of initiative and referendum on
national and local legislation thereby giving them
special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do
so on the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. Anent the initiative on national
legislation, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to
sign the petition and the contents of the petition;
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;
(c) The submission to the electorate of the
proposition and the required number of votes for its
approval;
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the
approval of the proposition;
(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines; and
153
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the

proposition. 55
As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the
following:
(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of
signatures of registered voters for the petition;
(b) The submission of the petition to the local
legislative body concerned;
(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to
favorably act thereon, and the invocation of the
power of initiative as a consequence thereof;
(d) The formulation of the proposition;
(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be
signed;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC
through its official in the local government unit
concerned as to whether the required number of
signatures have been obtained;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the
submission of the proposition to the registered
voters for their approval, which must be within the
period specified therein;
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;
(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
(k) The limitations on local initiative; and
(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies.
154
Upon the other hand, as to initiative on

amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in
all of its twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions,
the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b) defines
"initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the
enumeration of the three systems of initiative in
Section 3; (c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process
by which the proposition in an initiative on the
Constitution may be approved or rejected by the
people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements
as to the number of voters who should sign the
petition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of
the approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading
of the more important or the paramount system of
initiative. RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating
blow to the system of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip
service.
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that
R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting
in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative
on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its
lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and
cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act.
155
2) No. The rule is that what has been delegated,

cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin
maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest. The
recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the
President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative
body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to
promulgate rules and regulations is a form of
delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above.
However, in every case of permissible delegation,
there must be a showing that the delegation itself is
valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself,
setting forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b)
fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate and determinable to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply
156
it. It indicates the circumstances under which the

legislative command is to be effected.
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to
the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735
miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in
subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power
to the COMELEC is then invalid.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot
validly promulgate rules and regulations to
implement the exercise of the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of initiative. It does not have that
power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the
COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IXC of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and
regulations referred to therein are those
promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3
of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where
subordinate legislation is authorized and which
satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient
standard" tests.
- Cy Arnesto PANAMA REFINING CO v RYAN
293 U.S. 388
HUGHES; January 7, 1935
157
FACTS
- EO 6199, which prohibited the transportation in
interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and
the products produced or withdrawn from storage in
excess of the amount permitted to be produced or
withdrawn from storage by any State law or valid
regulation or order prescribed by any board,
commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency
of a State, was enacted, pursuant to sec 9(c) of title
1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16,
193, which states that 'The President is authorized
to prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign
commerce of petroleum and the products thereof
produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the
amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from
storage by any State law or valid regulation or order
prescribed by any board, commission, officer, or
other duly authorized agency of a State. Any
violation of any order of the Pres issued under the
provisions of this subsection shall be punishable by
fine of not to exceed $1k, or imprisonment for not to
exceed 6 months, or both.
- EO 6204, based on sec 10(a) of the NIRA,
authorizing the Pres 'to prescribe such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes' of title 1 and providing that 'any violation
of any such rule or regulation shall be punishable by
158
fine of not to exceed $500, or imprisonment for not

to exceed 6 months, or both,' authorized the Sec of
the Interior to exercise all the powers vested in the
Pres for the purpose of enforcing Sec 9(c), including
full authority to designate and appoint such agents
and to set up such boards and agencies as he may
see fit, and to promulgate such rules and regulations
as he may deem necessary.
- Sec of Interior issued the regulations which
included the requirement for every producer,
purchaser or shipper of petroleum to file a monthly
statement under oath, giving information re: their
residence and post office address, and other
information regarding the sale, purchase, production
of petroleum (Regulations IV, V and VII)
- EO 6256 approved Code of Fair Competition for
the Petroleum Industry.
- Thru EO of August 28, 1933, the Pres designated
the Sec of the Interior as Administrator, and the Dept
of the Interior as the federal agency, to exercise on
his behalf all the powers vested in him under that act
and code. Sec 3(f), title 1 of the NIRA, provides that,
when a code of fair competition has been approved
or prescribed by the Pres under that title, 'any
violation of any provision in any transaction in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be a
misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof an
offender shall be fined not more than $500 for each
159
offense, and each day such violation continues shall

be deemed a separate offense.'
- By EO No. 6284-a, the 2nd par of sec 4 of art III3
was eliminated. It was reinstated by EO 6855.
- Panama Refining Company, as owner of an oil
refining plant in Texas, and its coplaintiff, a producer
having oil and gas leases in Texas, and Amazon
Petroleum Corporation and its coplaintiffs, all being
oil producers in Texas and owning separate
properties, sued to restrain officials from enforcing
the laws promulgated by the Sec of Interior and
questioned the constitutionality of the EOs.
ISSUE
WON the EOs are constitutional
HELD
NO, because of unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power
Ratio The Legislature, to prevent its being a pure
delegation of legislative power, must enjoin upon the
agent a certain course of procedure and certain
rules of decision in the performance of its function.
Reasoning
- The Constitution has never been regarded as
denying the Congress the necessary resources of
3
'If any subdivision into quotas of production allocated to any State shall be made within a State any production by any person, as
person is defined in Article I, Section 3 of this code in excess of any such quota assigned to him, shall be deemed an unfair trade
practice and in violation of this code.'
160
flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to

perform its function in laying down policies and
establishing standards, while leaving to selected
instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules
within prescribed limits and the determination of
facts to which the policy as declared by the
Legislature is to apply. But the constant recognition
of the necessity and validity of such provisions and
the wide range of administrative authority which has
been developed by means of them cannot be
allowed to obscure the limitations of the authority to
delegate, if our constitutional system is to be
maintained.
- Authorizations given by Congress to selected
instrumentalities for the purpose of ascertaining the
existence of facts to which legislation is directed
have constantly been sustained. Moreover the
Congress may not only give such authorizations to
determine specific facts, but may establish primary
standards, devolving upon others the duty to carry
out the declared legislative policy.
- Thus, in every case in which the question has been
raised, the Court has recognized that there are limits
of delegation which there is no constitutional
authority to transcend. We think that section 9(c)
goes beyond those limits. As to the transportation of
oil production in excess of state permission, the
Congress has declared no policy, has established no
161
standard, has laid down no rule. There is no

requirement, no definition of circumstances and
conditions in which the transportation is to be
allowed or prohibited.
- Section 9(c) is brief and unambiguous. It leaves to
the states and to their constituted authorities the
determination of what production shall be permitted.
It does not qualify the President's authority by
reference to the basis or extent of the state's
limitation of production. It does not state whether or
in what circumstances or under what conditions the
President is to prohibit the transportation of the
amount of petroleum or petroleum products
produced in excess of the state's permission. It
establishes no creterion to govern the President's
course. It does not require any finding by the
President as a condition of his action.The Congress
in section 9(c) thus declares no policy as to the
transportation of the excess production. So far as
this section is concerned, it gives to the President an
unlimited authority to determine the policy and to lay
down the prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may
see fit. And disobedience to his order is made a
crime punishable by fine and imprisonment.
- The Congress left the matter to the President
without standard or rule, to be dealt with as he
pleased. The effort by ingenious and diligent
construction to supply a criterion still permits such a
162
breadth of authorized action as essentially to commit

to the President the functions of a Legislature rather
than those of an executive or administrative officer
executing a declared legislative policy. We find
nothing in section 1 which limits or controls the
authority conferred by section 9(c).
- When the President is invested with legislative
authority as the delegate of Congress in carrying out
a declared policy, he necessarily acts under the
constitutional restriction applicable to such a
delegation.
Disposition EO Nos. 6199, 6204, and the
regulations issued by the Sec of the Interior, are
without constitutional authority.
SEPARATE OPINION
CARDOZO [dissenting]
- To uphold the delegation there is need to discover
in the terms of the act a standard reasonably clear
whereby discretion must be governed. Such a
standard is not lacking in respect of the prohibitions
permitted by this section when the act with all its
reasonable implications is considered as a whole.
What the standard is becomes the pivotal inquiry.
- The Pres has choice, though within limits, as to the
occasion, but none whatever as to the means. The
means have been prescribed by Congress. There
163
has been no grant to the Executive of any roving

commission to inquire into evils and then, upon
discovering them, do anything he pleases. If we look
to the whole structure of the statute, the test is
plainly this, that the President is to forbid the
transportation of the oil when he believes, in the light
of the conditions of the industry as disclosed from
time to time, that the prohibition will tend to
effectuate the declared policies of the act-not merely
his own conception of its policies, undirected by any
extrinsic guide, but the policies announced by
section 1.
- The President has the privilege of choice between
one standard and another. What he does is to
inquire into the industrial facts as they exist from
time to time. These being ascertained, he is not to
prefer one standard to another in any subjective
attitude of mind, in any personal or willful way. He is
to study the facts objectively, the violation of a
standard impelling him to action or inaction
according to its observed effect upon industrial
recovery-the ultimate end, as appears by the very
heading of the title, to which all the other ends are
tributary and mediate.
- Congress was aware that for the recovery of
national well-being there might be need of temp
restriction upon production in one industry or
another. When it clothed the Pres with power to
164
impose such a restriction-to prohibit the flow of oil

illegally produced-it laid upon him a mandate to
inquire and determine whether the conditions in that
particular industry were such at any given time as to
make restriction helpful to the declared objectives of
the act and to the ultimate attainment of industrial
recovery.
- A reference, express or implied, to the policy of
Congress, is a sufficient definition of a standard to
make the statute valid. Discretion is not unconfined
and vagrant. The separation of powers between the
Executive and Congress is not a doctrinaire concept
to be made use of with pedantic rigor. There must be
sensible approximation, there must be elasticity of
adjustment, in response to the practical necessities
of government, which cannot foresee to-day the
developments of tomorrow in their nearly infinite
variety.
- The President was not required either by the
Constitution or by any statute to state the reasons
that had induced him to exercise the granted power.
It is enough that the grant of power had been made
and that pursuant to that grant he had signified the
will to act.
- The President, when acting in the exercise of a
delegated power, is not a quasi judicial officer,
whose rulings are subject to review upon certiorari
or appeal, or an administrative agency supervised in
165
the same way. Officers and bodies such as those

may be required by reviewing courts to express their
decision in formal and explicit findings to the end
that review may be intelligent. Such is not the
position or duty of the President. He is the Chief
Executive of the nation, exercising a power
committed to him by Congress, and subject, in
respect of the formal qualities of his acts, to the
restrictions, if any, accompanying the grant, but not
to any others.
ABAKADA GURO v EXEC. SEC. ERMITA
GR No. 168207
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; September 1, 2005
NATURE
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition
FACTS
- On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law
Republic Act 9337 or the VAT Reform Act. Before the
law was to take effect on July 1, 2005, the Court
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
government from implementing the law in response
to a slew of petitions for certiorari and prohibition
questioning the constitutionality of the new law.
166
- NON-DELEGATION ISSUE: The new law in its

Sections 4, 5 and 6 granted the Secretary of
Finance the authority to ascertain whether by
December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as a
percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 2
and 4/5% or the national government deficit as a
percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 1
and 1/2%. If either of these two instances has
occurred, the Secretary of Finance, must submit
such information to the President. Then the 12%
VAT rate must be imposed by the President effective
January 1, 2006.
ISSUE
WON the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the
Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on
account of the recommendatory power granted to
the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue
delegation of legislative power
HELD
NO.
Ratio Congress does not abdicate its functions or
unduly delegate power when it describes what job
must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope
of his authority; in our complex economy that is
frequently the only way in which the legislative
process can go forward.
167
Reasoning The case before the Court is not a

delegation of legislative power. It is simply a
delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which
enforcement and administration of the increased
rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has
made the operation of the 12% rate effective
January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or
condition. It leaves the entire operation or nonoperation of the 12% rate upon factual matters
outside of the control of the executive. No discretion
would be exercised by the President. Highlighting
the absence of discretion is the fact that the word
shall is used in the common proviso. The use of the
word shall connote a mandatory order. Its use in a
statute denotes an imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of discretion.
- Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to
immediately impose the 12% rate upon the
existence of any of the conditions specified by
Congress. This is a duty, which cannot be evaded by
the President. It is a clear directive to impose the
12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are
present.
- In making his recommendation to the President on
the existence of either of the two conditions, the
Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of
the President or even her subordinate. He is acting
as the agent of the legislative department, to
168
determine and declare the event upon which its

expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of
Finance becomes the means or tool by which
legislative policy is determined and implemented,
considering that he possesses all the facilities to
gather data and information and has a much broader
perspective to properly evaluate them. His function
is to gather and collate statistical data and other
pertinent information and verify if any of the two
conditions laid out by Congress is present.
- There is no undue delegation of legislative power
but only of the discretion as to the execution of a
law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress
did not delegate the power to tax but the mere
implementation of the law. The intent and will to
increase the VAT rate to 12% came from Congress
and the task of the President is to simply execute
the legislative policy.
Disposition Petition is DENIED.
REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES V. ERMITA
REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
EDUARDO
ERMITA
and
COMMISSION
ON
HIGHER
EDUCATION
169
represented by its Chairman ROMULO L. NERI,

Respondents.
CPA REVIEW SCHOOL OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC. (CPAR), PROFESSIONAL REVIEW AND
TRAINING CENTER, INC. (PRTC), ReSA REVIEW
SCHOOL, INC. (ReSA), CRC-ACE REVIEW
SCHOOL, INC. (CRC-ACE)Petitioners-Intervenors.
PIMSAT COLLEGES, Respondent-Intervenor.
Carpio, 2009
Facts:
- There was a report that handwritten copies of two
sets of 2006 Nursing Board examination were
circulated during the examination period among
examinees reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz Review
Center and Inress Review Center. The examinees
were provided with a list of 500 questions and
answers in two of the examinations five subjects,
particularly Tests III (Psychiatric Nursing) and V
(Medical-Surgical Nursing). The PRC later admitted
the leakage and traced it to two Board of Nursing
members. Exam results came out but Court of
Appeals restrained the PRC from proceeding with
the oath-taking of the successful examinees.
170
- President GMA ordered for a re-examination and

issued EO 566 which authorized the CHED to
supervise the establishment and operation of all
review centers and similar entities in the Philippines.
CHED
Chairman
Puno
approved
CHED
Memorandum Order No. 49 series of 2006
(Implementing Rules and Regulations).
- Review Center Association of the Philippines
(petitioner), an organization of independent review
centers, asked the CHED to "amend, if not withdraw"
the IRR arguing, among other things, that giving
permits to operate a review center to Higher
Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs
and professional organizations will effectively abolish
independent review centers. CHED Chairman Puno
however
believed
that
suspending
the
implementation of the IRR would be inconsistent
with the mandate of EO 566.
- A dialogue between the petitioner and CHED took
place. Revised IRR was approved. Petitioner filed
before the CHED a Petition to Clarify/Amend RIRR
praying to exclude independent review center from
the coverage of the CHED; to clarify the meaning of
the requirement for existing review centers to tie-up
with HEIs; to revise the rules to make it conform with
171
RA 7722 limiting the CHEDs coverage to public and

private institutions of higher.
- In 2007, then CHED Chairman Neri responded to
the petitioner that: to exclude the operation of
independent review centers from the coverage of
CHED would clearly contradict the intention of the
said Executive Order No. 566; As to the request to
clarify what is meant by tie-up/be integrated with an
HEI, tie-up/be integrated simply means, to be in
partner with an HEI.
- Petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and
Mandamus before this Court praying for the
annulment of the RIRR, the declaration of EO 566
as invalid and unconstitutional exercise of
legislative power, and the prohibition against
CHED from implementing the RIRR. Motion to
intervene filed by other organizations/institutions
were granted by the Court.
- On 21 May 2008, CHED issued CHED
Memorandum Order No. 21, Series of 2008 (CMO
21, s. 2008) extending the deadline for six
months from 27 May 2008 for all existing
independent review centers to tie-up or be
integrated with HEIs in accordance with the
RIRR. On 25 November 2008 Resolution, SC
172
resolved to require the parties to observe the status

quo prevailing before the issuance of EO 566, the
RIRR, and CMO 21, s. 2008.
Issues: 1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional
exercise by the Executive of legislative power as it
expands the CHEDs jurisdiction [Yes, it expands
CHEDs jurisdiction, hence unconsititutional]; and
2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the
Executives rule-making power. [Yes, it is invalid.]
Held/Ratio: 1. The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR
clearly expand the CHEDs coverage under RA
7722. The CHEDs coverage under RA 7722 is
limited to public and private institutions of
higher education and degree-granting programs
in all public and private post-secondary
educational institutions. EO 566 directed the
CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of
review centers and similar entities.
The definition of a review center under EO 566
shows that it refers to one which offers "a program
or course of study that is intended to refresh and
enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills
of reviewees obtained in the formal school setting in
preparation for the licensure examinations" given by
173
the PRC. It does not offer a degree-granting

program that would put it under the jurisdiction of the
CHED. A review course is only intended to "refresh
and enhance the knowledge or competencies and
skills of reviewees." Thus, programs given by
review centers could not be considered
"programs x x x of higher learning" that would
put them under the jurisdiction of the CHED.
"Higher education," is defined as "education beyond
the secondary level or "education provided by a
college or university."
Further, the "similar entities" in EO 566 cover
centers providing "review or tutorial services" in
areas not covered by licensure examinations given
by the PRC, which include, although not limited to,
college entrance examinations, Civil Services
examinations, and tutorial services. These review
and tutorial services hardly qualify as programs of
higher learning.
2. ) The exercise of the Presidents residual powers
under Section 20, Title I of Book III of EO (invoked
by the OSG to justify GMAs action) requires
legislation; as the provision clearly states that the
exercise of the Presidents other powers and
functions has to be "provided for under the law."
There is no law granting the President the power to
174
amend the functions of the CHED. The President

has no inherent or delegated legislative power to
amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722.
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive
power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the
authority, under the Constitution, to make laws,
and to alter and repeal them." The Constitution, as
the will of the people in their original, sovereign and
unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the
Congress of the Philippines. Any power, deemed to
be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily
possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has
lodged it elsewhere.
The President has control over the executive
department, bureaus and offices. Meaning, he has
the authority to assume directly the functions of the
executive department, bureau and office, or interfere
with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the
power of control, he is granted administrative
power. Administrative power is concerned with the
work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. It
enables the President to fix a uniform standard of
administrative efficiency and check the official
conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations. An
175
administrative order is an ordinance issued by the

President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be
in harmony with the law and should be for the
sole purpose of implementing the law and
carrying out the legislative policy.
Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative
power, the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the
CHEDs quasi-legislative power. Administrative
agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rulemaking power through the promulgation of rules and
regulations. The CHED may only exercise its rulemaking power within the confines of its jurisdiction
under RA 7722. But The RIRR covers review centers
and similar entities.
Other issues: Re: issue judicial hierarchy, the
alleged violation of the Constitution by the Executive
Department when it issued EO 566 justifies the
exercise by the Court of its primary jurisdiction over
the case. The Court is not precluded from brushing
aside technicalities and taking cognizance of an
action due to its importance to the public.
Re: police power, no delegation of police power
exists under RA 7722 authorizing the President to
176
regulate the operations of non-degree granting

review centers.
Re: RA 8981 as the appropriate law, the PRC has
the power to adopt measures to preserve the
integrity and inviolability of licensure examinations.
However, this power should properly be interpreted
to refer to the conduct of the examinations. The
power to preserve the integrity and inviolability of
licensure examinations should be read together with
these functions. These powers of the PRC have
nothing to do at all with the regulation of review
centers.
- Lala Badi A. L. A. SCHECHTER POULTRY CORP. V UNITED
STATES
295 U.S. 495
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ;
May 27, 1935
FACTS
- Schechter was found to have violated the Live
Poultry Code promulgated under NIRA (National
Industrial Recovery Act) but written by industry
groups then approved by the President through the
177
Ag Secy. NIRA gave President the authority to

approve codes of fair competition applied by a
trade or industrial group.
- Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act
provides that "codes of fair competition," which shall
be the " standards of fair competition" for the trades
and industries to which they relate, may be
approved by the President upon application of
representative associations of the trades or
industries to be affected, or may be prescribed by
him on his own motion. Their provisions [p496] are
to be enforced by injunctions from the federal courts,
and "any violation of any of their provisions in any
transaction in or affecting interstate commerce" is to
be deemed an unfair method of competition within
the meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
and is to be punished as a crime against the United
States. Before approving, the President is to make
certain findings as to the character of the association
presenting the code and absence of design to
promote monopoly or oppress small enterprises, and
must find that it will "tend to effectuate the policy of
this title." Codes permitting monopolies or
monopolistic practices are forbidden. The President
may
"impose
such
conditions
(including
requirements for the making of reports and the
keeping of accounts) for the protection of
consumers, competitors, employees and others, and
178
in the furtherance of the public interest, and may

provide such exceptions and exemptions from the
provisions of such code," as he, in his discretion,
deems necessary "to effectuate the policy herein
declared." A code prescribed by him is to have the
same effect as one approved on application.
ISSUE
WON the Live Poultry Code is unconstitutional for
being an undue delegation of legislative powers.
(YES.)
HELD
RATIO: Congress is not permitted by the
Constitution to abdicate, or to transfer to others, the
essential legislative functions with which it is vested.
Congress may leave to selected instrumentalities
the making of subordinate rules within prescribed
limits, and the determination of facts to which the
policy, as declared by Congress, is to apply; but it
must itself lay down the policies and establish
standards.
REASONING:
- The delegation of legislative power sought to be
made to the President by 3 of the National
Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933, is
unconstitutional and the Act is also unconstitutional,
as applied in this case, because it exceeds the
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce
179
and invades the power reserved exclusively to the

States
- This code was found to be an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power because:
1) private groups were given lawmaking
function and discretion to make the policies.
Authority wasnt really delegated to the President.
2) It covered every sector of the economy (not like
the FCC, which just deals with communications). It
was an overbroad delegation of authority.
There was no limitation on things that could be
subject to the codes of fair competition.
3) no formal procedures constraining the
President
when
he
decides
to
approve/disapprove the codes. No deliberation
was required in acting to promulgate the codes.
- Furthermore, there were no statutory standards or
procedural safeguards for promulgating the codes.
+ Cardozo wrote a strong concurrence saying that
this was a situation of delegation run riot, that
although Congress delegating power to executive
can sometimes be ok, congress delegating power to
industrial or trade associations was out of the
question.
FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION v AL
GONQUIN SNG, INC.
180
Date: 17 June 1976

Ponente: Marshall, J.
Facts:
Sec.232(b)4 of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962, as amended, provides that, if the
Secretary of the Treasury finds that an
article is being imported into the United States
in such quantities or under such circumstances
as to threaten to impair national security, the
President is authorized to take such action,
and for such time, as he deems necessary to
adjust the imports of [the] article and its
derivatives so that. . . imports [of the article] will
not threaten to impair the national security.
o (Historical) President Eisenhower invoked
said Sec.232(b) to establish the Mandatory
Oil Import Program (MOIP), a system of
quotas to control the importation of, and thus
avert damage to domestic industries by
lessening dependence to, foreign oil.
4
Sec. 232 in full reads as: "Upon request of the head of any department or agency, upon application of an interested party, or upon
his own motion, the Secretary of the Treasury (hereinafter referred to as the 'Secretary') shall immediately make an appropriate
investigation, in the course of which he shall seek information and advice from, and shall consult with, the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of Commerce, and other appropriate officers of the United States, to determine the effects on the national security of
imports of the article which is the subject of such request, application, or motion. The Secretary shall, if it is appropriate and after
reasonable notice, hold public hearings or otherwise afford interested parties an opportunity to present information and advice
relevant to such investigation. The Secretary shall report the findings of his investigation under this subsection with respect to the
effect of the importation of such article in such quantities or under such circumstances upon the national security and, based on
such findings, his recommendation for action or inaction under this section to the President within one year after receiving an
application from an interested party or otherwise beginning an investigation under this subsection. If the Secretary finds that such
article is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national
security, he shall so advise the President and the President shall take such action, and for such time, as he deems necessary to
adjust the imports of such article and its derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security, unless the
President determines that the article is not being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as
to threaten to impair the national security."
181
o This system continued to exist under the

administration of Presidents Kennedy,
Johnson and Nixon but the permissible
quota levels were increased so as to meet
the fast growing domestic demand for oil.
There then came a shift to the imposition of
gradually increasing (importation) license
fees under President Nixon.
During the time of President Ford, the Secretary
of the Treasury made a report (without public
hearing/consultation)
revealing
that
the
measures taken by the former administrations to
lessen foreign oil dependence did not meet their
objectives, as still more than one-third of oil
consumption were sourced from foreign
sources, and recommended to the President
that appropriate action be taken to reduce
imports said commodity.
Consequently, President Ford issued a
Proclamation on 23 January 1975, invoking
232(b), that raised first-tier license fees
imposed in 1973 to the maximum levels
scheduled to be reached only some months later
(at around an increase of $1/month on the
license fees for every barrel of oil). Said
Proclamation also reinstated related tariffs
suspended in April 1973.
182
Herein respondents (8 States and their

Governors, 10 utility companies, Congressman
of Massachusetts), challenged the validity of
the license fees and prayed for injunctions in 2
suits against the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Administrator of FEA and the Treasurer of the
US in the US District Court of the District Court
of Columbia.
Respondents (before the DC): (1) imposition
of the fees was beyond the Presidents
constitutional and statutory authority; (2) the
necessary procedural steps in imposing said
fees not taken; and (3) an environmental impact
statement prior fee imposition was no prepared,
in violation of the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969.
DC: denied motions for preliminary injunctions;
(1) 232(b) is a valid delegation to the
President of power to impose license fees on
oil imports; (2) procedures followed in imposing
the fees conformed to statutory requirements;
and (3) failure to make the environmental impact
assessment justified by the emergency nature of
the problem needing prompt action.
CA for the District of Columbia Circuit (appeal by
respondents): reversed DC; 232(b) did not
authorize President to impose license fees
183
but rather to use only direct controls such

as quotas.
Issue: WON Sec.232(b) authorizes the President to
adjust petroleum imports by imposing license fees.
(or WON construing Sec.232(b) as allowing the
President to adjust oil imports by imposing license
fees is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power.=>NO, there is no unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power)
Held: Yes. CA judgment reversed. Case remanded
for further proceedings.
Ratio:
The Court declined to adhere to respondents
suggestion to narrowly construe Sec.232(b) in a
way that it only allows the President to control
importation of oil by imposing quotas and not by
having license fees. Respondents submit that
this
interpretation
helps
avoid
an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
In Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 US 394
(1928), the SCOTUS laid down the following
test to determine whether there has been a valid
delegation of legislative power:
o If Congress shall law down by
legislative act an intelligible principle to
184
which the [President] is directed to

conform, such legislative action is not a
forbidden delegation of legislative
power.
232(b) passes said test. It provided for the
preconditions to be met for Presidential
action, above all:
o A finding by the Secretary of the Treasure
that an article is being imported into the
United States in such quantities or under
such circumstances as to threaten to impair
the national security.
The action to be taken by the President upon
the concurrence of the preconditions laid down
in 232(b) also is bounded as he can only act to
the extent he deems necessary to adjust the
imports of such article and its derivatives so
that such imports will not threaten to impair
the national security.
232(c) also provides for factors that must be
considered by the President in invoking
232(b). These factors, together with the Courts
recognition of the fact that [n]ecessity. . . fixes a
point beyond which it is unreasonable and
impracticable to compel Congress to prescribe
detailed rules. . . the Court did not find an
improper delegation of legislative power in
185
construing 232(b) as allowing the President to

impose monetary exactions such as license fees
in controlling the importation of petroleum.
Also, the legislative history of 232(b) shows,
as can be gleaned from the pronouncements of
the sponsors of said laws precursor and from its
amendments, that there is no intention on the
lawmakers part to limit the Presidents
authority to the imposition of quotas and to
disallow him in the use of a license fee
system.
- Aboy Bayalan WHITE V ROUGHTON
530 F.2d 750
PER CURIAM; February 27,1976
NATURE
Appeal from order denying application for
preliminary injunction to prevent termination by
defendant of general assistance granted to plaintiffs.
FACTS
- Roughton is supervisor of the town of the City of
Champaign Township. In this capacity he
administers the general township assistance
186
program which provides locally collected taxes for

distribution as welfare to needy township residents.
- Plaintiff White received assistance in the form of
food orders. Plaintiff Walker was provided food order
and rent. Subsequently, assistance to both were
terminated and they received neither notice,
explanation nor information as to the right of appeal.
- Plaintiff Silagy aplied for assistance at least thrice
but was always denied without informing her of the
reasons supporting her rejection or the right to
appeal.
- Defendant admitted that he and his staff determine
eligibility based upon their own unwritten personal
standards.
ISSUE/S
1. WON the injunction must issue
HELD
1. YES
Ratio Welfare recipients must be provided with
adequate notice and an evidentiary hearing before
benefits may be discontinued. (Goldberg v Kelly)
Reasoning General assistance welfare grants are
clearly state action under provisions of statute
relating to public aid and are therefore subject to due
process protection.
Defendant as administrator of the general
187
assistance program has the responsibility to

administer the program to ensure the fair and
consistent application of eligibility requirements. Fair
and consistent application of such requirements
requires that Roughton establish written standards
and regulations.
Disposition Reversed and remanded with directions
2. PERMISSIBLE DELEGATION
a. ASCERTAINMENT OF FACT
PANAMA REFINING CO v RYAN
293 U.S. 388
HUGHES; January 7, 1935
FACTS:
-Based on section 9(c) of title 1 of the National
Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933 which
states that: The President is authorized to prohibit
the transportation in interstate and foreign
prescribed thereunder, by any board, commission,
officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State.
Any violation of any order of the President issued
under the provisions of this subsection shall be
188
punishable by fine of not to exceed $1,000, or

imprisonment for not to exceed six months, or both.,
the President by Executive Order No. 6199,
prohibited 'the transportation in interstate and foreign
prescribed thereunder, by any board, commission,
officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State.'
-Under section 10(a) of the National Industrial
Recovery Act, authorizing the President to prescribe
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the purposes' of title 1 of the National
Industrial Recovery Act and providing that 'any
violation of any such rule or regulation shall be
punishable by fine of not to exceed $500, or
imprisonment for not to exceed six months, or both.
the President, by Executive Order No. 6204,
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to exercise
all the powers vested in the President 'for the
purpose of enforcing Section 9(c) of said act and
said order' of July 11, 1933, 'including full authority to
designate and appoint such agents and to set up
such boards and agencies as he may see fit, and to
promulgate such rules and regulations as he may
deem necessary.'
189
- On July 15, 1933, the Secretary of the Interior

issued regulations to carry out the President's orders
of July 11 and 14, 1933. the regulations and the
orders of the President were questioned by oil
companies affected by the Orders. They question
the basis of the power of the President to make such
orders as an undue delegation of legislative powers.
ISSUE:
WON there was an undue delegation of legislative
powers when the Legislature, through section 9(c) of
title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act of June
16, 1933, allowed the President to issue the Orders
complained of.
HELD: Yes the delegation of such power was
undue.
(AS TO PERMISSIBLE DELEGATIONS)
-The Constitution has never been regarded as
denying to the Congress the necessary resources of
flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to
perform its function in laying down policies and
establishing standards, while leaving to selected
instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules
within prescribed limits and the determination of
facts to which the policy as declared by the
Legislature is to apply. Without capacity to give
authorizations of that sort we should have the
190
anomaly of a legislative power which in many

circumstances calling for its exertion would be but a
futility
-the Court cited several cases wherein the Congress
delegated the power of ascertaining facts for the
implementation of orders. First of which was Aurora
v US wherein the Congress left the power to
determine whether Great Britain modified her edicts
so as not to violate the Neutral Commerce Act of the
US. It gave the President the power to suspend
trade relations with Great Britain until such
determination by the President. The Court ruled that
it could see no sufficient reason why the Legislature
should not exercise its discretion in reviving the act
of 1809, 'either expressly or conditionally, as their
judgment should direct.'
-Field v Clark where the case was about an Act
which gave the President the power to suspend the
introduction of products from different countries
which imposed duties or other exactions on
agricultural produce of the US. The Court found that
the act before it was not inconsistent with the
principle of delegation of powers; that it did not 'in
any real sense, invest the president with the power
of legislation.' As 'the suspension was absolutely
required when the president ascertained the
existence of a particular fact,' it could not be said
'that in ascertaining that fact, and in issuing his
191
proclamation, in obedience to the legislative will, he

exercised the function of making laws.' 'He was the
mere agent of the law-making department to
ascertain and declare the event upon which its
expressed will was to take effect.'
-authorizations given by Congress to selected
instrumentalities for the purpose of ascertaining the
existence of facts to which legislation is directed
have constantly been sustained. Moreover the
Congress may not only give such authorizations to
determine specific facts, but may establish primary
standards, devolving upon others the duty to carry
out the declared legislative policy
-examples for the allowing of the Congress to
authorize instrumentalities to fix standards were the
Radio Act of 1927 and Hampton Jr. & Co. v United
States
-in the present case the Court ruled that section
9(c) goes beyond those limits. As to the
transportation of oil production in excess of state
permission, the Congress has declared no policy,
has established no standard, has laid down no rule.
There is no requirement, no definition of
circumstances and conditions in which the
transportation is to be allowed or prohibited
DISSENTING Cardozo supra
192
LOVINA v MORENO
9 SCRA 557
REYES, J.B.L: November 29, 1963
NATURE: Appeal from a decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila
FACTS:
- The cause started by a petition of numerous
residents of the said municipality to the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, complaining
that appellees had blocked the "Sapang Bulati", a
navigable river in Macabebe, Pampanga, and
asking that the obstructions be ordered removed,
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056.
- After notice and hearing to the parties, the said
Secretary found the constructions to be a public
nuisance in navigable waters ordered the land
owners, spouses Lovina, to remove five (5)
closures of Sapang Bulati; otherwise, the Secretary
would order their removal at the expense of the
respondent.
- After receipt of the decision, the respondent filed a
petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila to
restrain the Secretary from enforcing his decision.
The trial court, after due hearing, granted a
193
permanent injunction, which is now the subject of

the present appeal.
- The position of the plaintiffs-appellees in the court
below was that Republic Act No. 2056 is
unconstitutional because it invests the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications with sweeping,
unrestrained, final and unappealable authority to
pass upon the issues of whether a river or stream is
public and navigable, whether a dam encroaches
upon such waters and is constitutive as a public
nuisance, and whether the law applies to the state
of facts, thereby constituting an alleged unlawful
delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications.
ISSUE:
WON there RA 2056 is unconstitutional because
it constitutes unlawful delegation of judicial
power
HELD:
NO
Reasoning
- The objections of the appellees to the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 2056, not only
as an undue delegation of judicial power to the
Secretary of Public Works but also for being
unreasonable and arbitrary, are not tenable. It will
194
be noted that R.A. 2056 merely empowers the

Secretary to remove unauthorized obstructions or
encroachments upon public streams, constructions
that no private person was anyway entitled to
make, because the bed of navigable streams is
public property, and ownership thereof is not
acquirable by adverse possession
- It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's power
under
the Act
necessarily
involves
the
determination of some questions of fact, such as
the existence of the stream and its previous
navigable character; but these functions, whether
judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely incidental
to the exercise of the power granted by law to
clear
navigable
streams
of
unauthorized
obstructions or encroachments, and authorities are
clear that they are, validly conferable upon
executive officials provided the party affected is
given opportunity to be heard, as is expressly
required by Republic Act No. 2056, section 2.
- It thus appears that the delegation by Congress to
executive or administrative agencies of functions of
judicial, or at least, quasi-judicial functions is
incidental to the exercise by such agencies of their
executive or administrative powers, is not in
violation of the Separation of Powers so far as that
principle is recognized by the Federal Constitution
nor is it in violation of due process of law.
195
- The mere fact that an officer is required by law to

inquire the existence of certain facts and to apply
the law thereto in order to determine what his
official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts
may affect private, rights do not constitute an
exercise of judicial powers. Accordingly, a statute
may give to non-judicial officers the power to
declare the existence of facts which call into
operation its provisions, and similarly may grant to
commissioners and other subordinate officer, power
to ascertain and determine appropriate facts as a
basis for procedure in the enforcement of particular
laws.
b. FILLING IN OF DETAILS
ALEGRE v COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS
53 PHIL 394
JOHNS; August 27, 1929
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of CFI
FACTS
- The petitioner for a number of years has been and
is now engaged in the production of abaca and its
exportation to foreign markets. November 8, 1927,
he applied to the respondent for a permit to export
196
one hundred bales of abaca to England, which was

denied, and advised that he would not be permitted
to export the abaca in question without a certificate
of the Fiber Standardization Board. He then filed in
the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for a
writ of mandamus, alleging that the provisions of the
Administrative Code for the grading, inspection and
certification of fibers and, in particular, sections 1772
and 1244 of that Code, are unconstitutional and
void.
Section 1244. A collector of customs shall not permit
abaca, maguey, or sisal or other fibrous products for
which standard grades have been established by the
Director of Agriculture to be laden aboard a vessel
clearing for a foreign port, unless the shipment
conforms to the requirements of law relative to the
shipment of such fibers.
Section 1772. The Fiber Standardization Board shall
determine the official standards for the various
commercial grades of Philippine fibers that are or
may hereafter be produced on the Philippine Islands
for shipment abroad. Each grade shall have its
proper name and designation which, together with
the basis upon which the several grades are
determined, shall be defined by the said Board in a
general order. Such order shall have the approval of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources;
and for the dissemination of information, copies of
197
the same shall be supplied gratis to the foreign

markets, provincial governors, municipal presidents,
and to such other persons and agencies as shall
make request therefor. If it is considered expedient
to change these standards at any time, notice shall
be given in the local and foreign markets for a period
of at least six months before the new standards shall
go into effect.
Section 1788. No fiber within the purview of this law
shall be exported from the Philippine Islands in
quantity greater than the amount sufficient to make
one bale, without being graded, baled, inspected,
and certified as in this law provided.
- CFI held that sections 1722 and 1783 of the
Administrative
Code,
as
amended,
are
unconstitutional and void. Hence, this appeal by
defs.
ISSUE/S
1. WON the law in question delegates to the Fiber
Board legislative powers or administrative functions
to carry out the purpose and intent (details) of the
law for its more efficient administration
HELD
- The act in question, is not a delegation of
legislative power to the Fiber Board, and that the
powers given by the Legislature to the board are for
198
an administrative purposes, to enforce and carry out

the intent of the law.
- The law provides in detail for the inspection,
grading and bailing of hemp the Fiber Board with the
power and authority to devise ways and means for
its execution. In legal effect, the Legislature has said
that before any hemp is exported from the Philippine
Islands it must be inspected, graded and baled, and
has created a board or that purpose and vested it
with the power and authority to do the actual work.
That is not a delegation o legislative power. It is
nothing more than a delegation of administrative
power in the Fiber Board, to carry out the purpose
and intent of the law. In the very nature of things, the
Legislature could not inspect, grade and bale the
hemp, and from necessity, the power to do that
would have to be vested in a board of commission.
- The petitioner's contention would leave the law,
which provides for the inspection, grading and baling
of hemp, without any means of its enforcement. The
criticism that there is partiality or even fraud in the
administration of the law is not an argument against
its constitutionality.
Disposition The judgment of the lower court is
reversed and the petition is dismissed.
c. ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING
199
BOOK VII
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1. Scope. - This Book shall be applicable
to all agencies as defined in the next succeeding
section, except the Congress, the Judiciary, the
Constitutional
Commissions,
military
establishments in all matters relating exclusively to
Armed Forces personnel, the Board of Pardons
and Parole, and state universities and colleges.
Section 2. Definitions. - As used in this Book:
(1) "Agency" includes any department, bureau,
office, commission, authority or officer of the
National Government authorized by law or
executive order to make rules, issue licenses,
grant rights or privileges, and adjudicate cases;
research institutions with respect to licensing
functions; government corporations with
respect to functions regulating private right,
privileges, occupation or business; and officials
in the exercise of disciplinary power as
provided by law.
(2) "Rule" means any agency statement of
general applicability that implements or
200
interprets a law, fixes and describes the

procedures in, or practice requirements of, an
agency, including its regulations. The term
includes memoranda or statements concerning
the internal administration or management of
an agency not affecting the rights of, or
procedure available to, the public.
(3) "Rate" means any charge to the public for a
service open to all and upon the same terms,
including individual or joint rates, tolls,
classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as
commutation, mileage, kilometerage and other
special rates which shall be imposed by law or
regulation to be observed and followed by any
person.
(4) "Rule making" means an agency process
for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a
rule.
(5) "Contested case" means any proceeding,
including licensing, in which the legal rights,
duties or privileges asserted by specific parties
as required by the Constitution or by law are to
be determined after hearing.
(6) "Person" includes an individual, partnership,
corporation, association, public or private
organization of any character other than an
agency.
(7) "Party" includes a person or agency named
201
or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and

entitled as of right to be admitted as a party, in
any agency proceeding; but nothing herein
shall be construed to prevent an agency from
admitting any person or agency as a party for
limited purposes.
(8) "Decision" means the whole or any part of
the final disposition, not of an interlocutory
character, whether affirmative, negative, or
injunctive in form, of an agency in any matter,
including licensing, rate fixing and granting of
rights and privileges.
(9) "Adjudication" means an agency process for
the formulation of a final order.
(10) "License" includes the whole or any part of
any agency permit, certificate, passport,
clearance, approval, registration, charter,
membership, statutory exemption or other form
of permission, or regulation of the exercise of a
right or privilege.
(11) "Licensing" includes agency process
involving the grant, renewal, denial, revocation,
suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation,
amendment, modification or conditioning of a
license.
(12) "Sanction" includes the whole or part of a
prohibition, limitation or other condition
affecting the liberty of any person; the
202
withholding of relief; the imposition of penalty or

fine; the destruction, taking, seizure or
withholding of property; the assessment of
damages,
reimbursement,
restitution,
compensation, cost, charges or fees; the
revocation or suspension of license; or the
taking of other compulsory or restrictive action.
(13) "Relief" includes the whole or part of any
grant of money, assistance, license, authority,
privilege, exemption, exception, or remedy;
recognition of any claim, right, immunity,
privilege, exemption or exception; or taking of
any action upon the application or petition of
any person.
(14) "Agency proceeding" means any agency
process
with
respect
to
rule-making,
adjudication and licensing.
1."Agency action" includes the whole or part
of every agency rule, order, license,
sanction, relief or its equivalent or denial
thereof.
CHAPTER 2
RULES AND REGULATIONS
Section 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of
the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified
copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in
203
force on the date of effectivity of this Code

which are not filed within three (3) months from
that date shall not thereafter be the basis of
any sanction against any party or persons.
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his
equivalent functionary, shall carry out the
requirements of this section under pain of
disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be
kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to
public inspection.
Section 4. Effectivity. - In addition to other rulemaking requirements provided by law not
inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become
effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as
above provided unless a different date is fixed by
law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent
danger to public health, safety and welfare, the
existence of which must be expressed in a
statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall
take appropriate measures to make emergency
rules known to persons who may be affected by
them.
Section 5. Publication and Recording. - The
University of the Philippines Law Center shall:
(1) Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the
204
text of rules filed with it during the preceding

quarter; and
(2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules
thus published and remaining in effect, together
with a complete index and appropriate tables.
Section 6. Omission of Some Rules. (1) The University of the Philippines Law
Center may omit from the bulletin or the
codification any rule if its publication would be
unduly cumbersome, expensive or otherwise
inexpedient, but copies of that rule shall be
made available on application to the agency
which adopted it, and the bulletin shall contain
a notice stating the general subject matter of
the omitted rule and new copies thereof may be
obtained.
(2) Every rule establishing an offense or
defining an act which, pursuant to law, is
punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty
shall in all cases be published in full text.
Section 7. Distribution of Bulletin and Codified
Rules. - The University of the Philippines Law
Center shall furnish one (1) free copy each of every
issue of the bulletin and of the codified rules or
supplements to the Office of the President,
Congress, all appellate courts and the National
205
Library. The bulletin and the codified rules shall be

made available free of charge to such public
officers or agencies as the Congress may select,
and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover
publication and mailing or distribution costs.
Section 8. Judicial Notice. - The court shall take
judicial notice of the certified copy of each rule duly
filed or as published in the bulletin or the codified
rules.
Section 9. Public Participation. (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency
shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate
notices of proposed rules and afford interested
parties the opportunity to submit their views
prior to the adoption of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order
shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall
have been published in a newspaper of general
circulation at least two (2) weeks before the
first hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested
cases shall be observed.
1. LIMITS ON RULE-MAKING POWER
OLSEN v ALDENESE
206
43 Phil 259
JOHNS; March 29, 1922
NATURE
Petition for a peremptory writ of mandamus
FACTS
- The Tariff Act of 1913, conferred legal right on
Olsen and Co. to export from the Phil. Islands into
the US cigars which it manufactured from tobacco
grown in the Phil. Islands In 1916, Phil. Legislature
enacted Act. No. 2613 entitled "An Act to improve
the methods of production and the quality of tobacco
in the Philippine and to develop the export trade
therein," The Collector of Internal Revenue then
promulgated Administrative Order No. 35, known as
"Tobacco Inspection Regulations."
- Olsen applied to the Collector of Internal Revenue
(CIR) for such a certificate re the 10,00 cigars
manufactured by it from tobacco grown and
produced in the Philippine Islands.
- Olsen alleged that CIR wrongfully and unlawfully
refused to issue such certificate of origin "on the
ground that said cigars were not manufactured of
long filler tobacco produced exclusively in the
provinces of Cagayan, Isabela or Nueva Vizcaya."
Despite such refusal, Olsen applied to the Insular
Collector of Customs for the certificate of origin, and
207
that officer wrongfully and unlawfully refused to issue

such certificate "on the ground that the petitioner
had not obtained and presented with the application
the certificate of the said respondent Collector of
Internal Revenue.
Preliminary Notes:
- The important question here involved is the
construction of Secs. 6, 7, and 11 of Act No. 2613 of
the Philippine Legislature, and Sec. 9 of the
"Tobacco Inspection Regulations," promulgated by
Administrative Order No. 35.
- Clause B of Sec 6 of Act No. 2613 empowers the
Collector of Internal Revenue to establish rules
defining the standard and the type of leaf and
manufactured tobacco which may be exported into
the United States. Portion of Sec. 7 of said Act
provides: "No leaf tobacco or manufactured tobacco
shall be exported from the Philippine Islands to the
United States until it shall have been in inspected by
the Collector of Internal Revenue, etc." Portion of
Sec. 11 of the Act requires the certificate of origin of
the Collector of Internal Revenue to show that the
tobacco to be exported is standard. And, portion of
Sec. 9 of Administrative Order No. 35 limits the
exportation into the U.S. of Philippine cigars to those
manufactured from long filler tobacco exclusively the
product of the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, or
Nueva Vizcaya.
208
ISSUE
WON the CIR exceeded his rule-making powers as
shown in Sec.9 of the Adm. Order 35.
HELD
YES.
Ratio The authority of the Collector of Internal
Revenue to make any rules and regulations must be
founded upon some legislative act, and that they
must follow and be within the scope and purview of
the act.
Reasoning
- It will be noted that the power of the Collector of
Internal Revenue to make rules and regulations is
confined to the making of rules and regulations for
the classification, making, and packing of tobacco,
and that such power is further limited to the making
of such rules for the classification, marking, and
packing of tobacco as may be necessary to secure
leaf tobacco of good quality and its handling under
sanitary conditions. It is for such purpose only that
the Collector of Internal Revenue is authorized to
make any rules or regulations.
- Analyzing the power conferred, it will be found that
the provisions of the legislative act are NOT limited
to the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, or Nueva
Vizcaya, or to any province, and that there is no
209
limitation as to the place where the tobacco should

be grown in the Philippine Islands. The only power
conferred is to establish general and local rules for
the classification, marking, and packing of tobacco
and the standard and the type of tobacco which may
be exported to the United States. By Sec. 9 of Admin
Order 35, Cir went beyond its authority of rulemaking power as limited by law. Limting the
exportation into the U.S. of Philippine cigars to those
manufactured from long filler tobacco exclusively the
product of the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, or
Nueva Vizcaya is invalid.
*There was a long discussion on the inapplicability
of and difference of this case with Buttfield vs.
Stranahan (192 U. S., 525). See original.
Disposition.Petition GRANTED.
SYMAN v JACINTO
93 Phil 1093
Montemayor; 31 Oct 1953
Nature
Appeal against the decision of CFI
Facts
-Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila ordered
the seizure of two shipments of textile and a number
210
of sewing machines, consigned to the petitioner (Sy

Man).
-Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, after
due hearing, rendered a decision that the articles
covered are delivered to the importer after payment
of the necessary customs duty, sales tax and other
charges except the sewing machines which are
hereby declared forfeited to the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines to be sold at public
auction in conformity with law if found saleable,
otherwise, to be destroyed.
-Sy Man received a copy of the decision of the
Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila. Asking
for the execution of the decision, in view of the fact
that it had become final and could no longer be
reviewed by the Commissioner of Customs after the
lapse of fifteen days from the date of notification
thereof was given to the herein petitioner who did
not appeal from said decision to the Commissioner
of Customs within the aforesaid period of time.
-Counsel for the petitioner requested that the goods
be released because of the decision.
-Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila
responded and said that such was endorsed to the
Commissioner of Customs, requesting information
whether the merchandise may now be delivered to
the owner upon showing that the decision has
become final and executory after fifteen (15) days
211
from the receipt of a copy of the same by the

claimant.
-Sy Man sought (1) to declare null and void that
portion of the Memorandum Order promulgated by
the Insular Collector of Customs dated August 18,
1947, which provides that as in protest cases,
decisions of the Collector of Customs in seizure
cases, whether appealed or not, are subject to
review by the Insular Collector (now commissioner);
that such decisions and their supporting papers be
submitted to his office, and that pending action by
him on such decisions, final disposal of the goods
involved shall not be made; and (2) to order the
Collector to deliver to the petitioner the shipments of
textiles claimed to be final and executory.
-TC granted the petition.
Issue
WON this supposed power of revision by the
Commissioner of unappealed decisions of the
Collector in seizure cases, is supported by law
Held
Yes.
-Let us now see if there is any law giving authority to
the Commissioner of Customs to review and revise
unappealed decisions in seizure cases. In cases
involving assessment of duties, even when the
212
importer fails to protest the decision of the Collector

of Customs, the Commissioner may order a
reliquidation if he believes that the decision of the
Collector was erroneous and unfavorable to the
Government; and the Department Head in his turn if
he believes that the decision of the Commissioner in
any unprotested case of assessment of duties is
erroneous and unfavorable to the Government, may
require the Commissioner to order a reliquidation or
he may direct the Commissioner to certify the case
to the CFI.
"SEC. 1393.
Supervisory authority of
Commissioner and of Department Head in certain
cases. - If in any case involving the assessment of
duties the importer shall fail to protest the decision of
the collector of customs and the Commissioner shall
be of the opinion that the decision was erroneous
and unfavorable to the Government, the latter may
order a reliquidation; and if the decision of the
Commissioner in any unprotested case should, in
the opinion of the Department Head, be erroneous
and unfavorable to the Government, the Department
Head may require the Commissioner to order a
reliquidation or he may, if in his opinion the public
interest requires, direct the Commissioner to certify
the cause to the Court of First Instance of Manila, in
the manner provided in section one thousand three
hundred and eighty-six hereof, there to be reviewed
213
by the court as other customs cases removed

thereto.
"Except as in the preceding paragraph provided, the
supervisory authority of the Department Head over
the Bureau of Customs shall not extend to the
administrative revisal of the decisions of the
Commissioner in matters removable into court."
It will be noticed that the section is entitled
"supervisory authority of the Commissioner and of
the Department Head in certain cases." We find no
similar legal provision in seizure cases. The logical
inference is that the lawmakers did not deem it
necessary or advisable to provide for this
supervisory authority or power of revision by the
Commissioner and the Department Head on
unappealed seizure cases; and it is highly
possible that up to and until 1947, when the
memorandum order of August 18th of that year
was issued, it was not the practice of the Bureau
of Customs to have unappealed seizure cases
sent up by Collectors to the Commissioner's
office for review and revision. This we may gather
from the memorandum order itself, where the
Commissioner observes that in seizure cases some
collectors of customs merely submit to him their
reports of their seizure and the subsequent final
disposition thereof without transmitting the records
of their proceedings, and he therein asserts the right
214
of the Commissioner of Customs to review decisions

of Collector of Customs in seizure cases though
unappealed. If that right and that practice had
existed from the beginning, it is not likely that
Collectors would disregard and ignore it, to the
extent that it was necessary to remind them of it by
means of a memorandum order.
-It would seem that in a seizure case, the Collector
transmits all the papers in the cause to the
Commissioner only when and after the importer
notifies him in writing signifying his desire to have
the matter reviewed by the Commissioner. The
section does not say that without the notice of
appeal, the Collector is called upon to transmit the
papers of the case to the Commissioner. If this be
true, then legally, a case of seizure unappealed ends
right in the office of the Collector, without prejudice
of course to the Collector subsequently making a
report of his action to the Commissioner.
Furthermore, section 1388 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides thus:.
"SEC. 1388. Settlement of cause by payment of
fine or redemption of forfeited property. - If, in any
seizure case, the owner or agent shall, while the
cause is yet before the collector of the district of
seizure, pay to such collector the fine imposed by
him or, in case of forfeiture, shall pay the appraised
value of the property, or if, after removal of the
215
cause, he shall pay to the Commissioner the amount

of the fine as finally determined by him, or, in case of
forfeiture, shall pay the appraised value of the
property, such property shall be forthwith
surrendered, and all liability which may or might
attach to the property by virtue of the offense which
was the occasion of the seizure and all liability which
might have been incurred under any bond given by
the owner or agent in respect to such property shall
thereupon be deemed to be discharged.
"Redemption of forfeited property shall not be
allowed in any case where the importation is
absolutely prohibited or where the surrender of the
property to the person offering to redeem the same
would be contrary to law."
If under the above provisions, in a seizure case the
owner or agent may, while the cause is yet before
the collector, pay the fine imposed, or in case of
forfeiture, pay the appraised value of the property,
and thereafter such properties shall be surrendered
and all liability which may attach to said property by
virtue of the offense causing the seizure is to be
deemed discharged, the conclusion to be drawn is
that it is within the power and right of an importer,
owner or agent to end the case in the office of the
Collector, thereby precluding any intervention by the
Commissioner in the way of reviewing and revising
216
the decision of the Collector. Again, under section

1389 immediately following which reads "SEC. 1389.
Right of protest in such cases. Where payment is made or redemption effected as
allowed under the preceding section, the party
making payment or effecting the redemption may, if
he desires to test the validity of the proceedings,
make formal protest at the time of making such
payment or affecting such redemption, or within
fifteen days thereafter, and make claim for the
repayment of the whole or any part of the sum so
paid by him; whereupon the proceedings shall take
the same course as in ordinary cases of protest
against customs duties and charges generally."
The importer or owner of goods seized, after
payment is made or redemption effected, is allowed
if he desires to test the validity or correctness of the
decision of the Collector, to appeal the same to the
Commissioner of Customs presumably, to decrease
the amount of his liability or annul the seizure
altogether and have all the amounts paid by him
refunded. The inference follows that by making
payment and redeeming the property seized
under the decision of the Collector of Customs,
the owner may terminate the case right there,
although notwithstanding his payment he still
has the right to have the case elevated to the
Office of the Commissioner of Customs. It would
217
seem that the elevation of the case and the

transmittal of the papers thereof to the
Commissioner lies within the owner's exclusive
power and discretion. This argues against the
pretended power of the Commissioner of
automatic review and revision of decisions of
Collectors in unappealed seizure cases.
It is argued that if this power of review and revision
by the Commissioner of unappealed seizure cases
is not conceded, then in cases where the Collector
in his decision commits a blunder prejudicial to the
interests of the Government, or renders a decision
through fraud or in collusion with the importer, the
Government cannot protect itself. The argument is
not without merit; but we must bear in mind that the
law is promulgated to operate on ordinary, common,
routine cases. The rule is and the law presumes
that in seizure cases Collectors of Customs act
honestly and correctly and as Government
officials, always with an eye to the protection of
the interests of the Government employing them.
If mistakes are committed at all more often than
not they are in favor of the Government and not
against it, and that is the reason why when the
importer feels aggrieved by their decision, he is
given every chance and facility to protest the
decision and appeal to the Commissioner. Cases
of erroneous decisions against the interest of
218
the Government of decisions rendered in

collusion and connivance with importers are the
exception. To protect the Government in such
exceptional cases, we find that in every seizure
case, section 1378 of the Revised Administrative
Code requires the Collector to immediately notify
the Commissioner and the Auditor General. It
may be that this requirement has for its main
purpose the recording of and accounting for the
articles seized so that in case of confiscation the
Commissioner and the Auditor General will know
what articles have become government property.
But the notice will also inform the Commissioner
and the Auditor General of the seizure. If the
seizure
is
important
or
unusual,
the
Commissioner may, if he so desires, order the
Collector as his subordinate to withhold action
on the seizure, or hold in abeyance, within a
reasonable time, the promulgation of his
decision until after he had conferred with the
Commissioner or the latter had studied the case
and given suggestions. At that stage of the
proceedings before definite action is taken by
the Collector, and a decision rendered by him, it
would seem that any action by him as a
subordinate is still subject to the supervisory
authority and control of the Commissioner as his
Chief, and the latter may still influence and direct
219
the Collector's action if he finds occasion for

doing so.
But if the Government deems it necessary to provide
for review and revision by the Commissioner or even
by the Department Head of the decisions of the
Collector of Customs in unappealed seizure cases,
the Legislature may be requested to insert a section
in the Revised Administrative Code similar to
Section 1393 which applies to unprotested cases of
assessment duties. The defect in said section
however is that it does not fix the period within which
the automatic review and revision or reliquidation to
be ordered by the Commissioner and the Secretary
of Finance must be effected. This defect should be
remedied.
In conclusion, we find and hold that under the
present law governing the Bureau of Customs, the
decision of the Collector of Customs in a seizure
case if not protested and appealed by the importer
to the Commissioner of Customs on time, becomes
final not only as to him but against the Government
as well, and neither the Commissioner nor the
Department Head has the power to review, revise or
modify such unappealed decision. We also find and
hold that the memorandum order of the Insular
Collector of Customs of August 18, 1947, is void and
220
of no effect, not only because it has not been duly

approved by the Department Head and duly
published as required by section 551 of the Revised
Administrative Code but also because it is
inconsistent with law.
Disposition
For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed
from is hereby affirmed. No pronouncement as to
costs.
PEOPLE v MACEREN
79 SCRA 450
AQUINO; October 18, 1977
FACTS
- Section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use
of any obnoxious or poisonous substance" in fishing.
- The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, upon the recommendation of the
Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224),
prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters.
- Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin
Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were
charged
with
having
violated
Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged that
221
they engaged in electro fishing.

- Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court
dismissed the case. CFI affirmed. The lower court
held that electro fishing cannot be penalized
because electric current is not an obnoxious or
poisonous substance as contemplated in section II
of the Fisheries Law. The lower court further held
that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro
fishing, the executive and judicial departments
cannot consider it unlawful.
ISSUE/S
1. WON the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources exceeded his authority in issuing
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84
HELD
1. YES.
Ratio The rule-making power must be confined to
details for regulating the mode or proceeding to
carry into effect the law as it his been enacted. The
power cannot be extended to amending or
expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace
matters not covered by the statute
Reasoning The Fisheries Law does not expressly
prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not
banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture
222
and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of

Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the
lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a
penal provision to that effect could have been easily
embodied in the old Fisheries Law. Nowhere in the
said law is electro fishing specifically punished.
Administrative agents are clothed with rule-making
powers because the lawmaking body finds it
impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and
provide for the multifarious and complex situations
that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All
that is required is that the regulation should be
germane to the defects and purposes of the law and
that it should conform to the standards that the law
prescribes.
Disposition Decision affirmed
TOLEDO v CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
(COMELEC)
202 SCRA 507
PARAS, J.; October 4, 1991
NATURE
Petition for certiorari from a Resolution of the CSC
223
FACTS
- Petitioner Atty. Augusto Toledo was appointed by
then Comelec Chairman Ramon Felipe as Manager
of the Education and Information Department of the
Comelec. At the time of his appointment, petitioner
was already more than 57 years old. However, no
prior request for exemption from the provisions of
Sec. 22, Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on
Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP) was
secured. Said provision prohibits the appointment of
persons 57 years old or above into the government
service without prior approval by the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). Petitioner officially reported for
work and assumed the functions of his office.
- Public respondent Comelec, upon discovery of the
lack of authority required under the CSRPAP, issued
Resolution No. 2066, which declared Toledos
appointment void ab initio. Petitioner appealed the
foregoing Resolution to public respondent CSC.
CSC promulgated Resolution No. 89-468 which
disposed of the appeal, declaring the appointment
merely voidable and not void ab initio, and declaring
Toledo a de facto officer from the time he assumed
to office to the issuance of Comelec Resolution No.
2066.
ISSUE
WON Sec. 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP is valid
224
HELD
NO
Ratio The provision on 57-year old persons in the
Revised Civil Service Rules cannot be accorded
validity. It is entirely a creation of the CSC, having no
basis in the law which it was meant to implement. It
cannot be related to or connected with any specific
provision of the law which it is meant to carry into
effect. It was therefore an unauthorized act of
legislation on the part of the CSC.
Reasoning RA 2260, establishing the CSC and
authorizing it to prescribe and enforce rules for
carrying into effect the provisions of the law,
contained no provision prohibiting appointment or
reinstatement in the Government service of any
person who was already 57 years old, or otherwise
requiring that some limitation as regards to age be
placed on employment in the Government service.
This prohibition was purely a creation of the CSC.
The power vested in the CSC was to implement the
law or put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the
law into effect or execution, not to supply perceived
omissions in it.
Disposition
The petition is GRANTED
225
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v CA

(R.O.H. AUTO PRODUCTS)
240 SCRA 368
VITUG; January 20, 1995
NATURE
Petition for review of a decision of the CA.
FACTS
- August 22, 1986: EO 41 was promulgated
declaring a one-time tax amnesty on unpaid income
taxes, later amended to include estate and donors
taxes and taxes on business, for the taxable years
1981 to 1985.
- R.O.H. Auto Products availed of the amnesty, and
filed in October 1986 and November 1986 its Tax
Amnesty Return and paid the corresponding
amnesty taxes due.
- Prior to this, petitioner CIR assessed R.O.H.
deficiency income and business taxes for its fiscal
years ended 30 Sept 1981 and 30 Sept 1982 in an
aggregate amount of P1.41 M. The taxpayer wrote
back to state that since it had been able to avail
itself of the tax amnesty, the deficiency tax notice
should forthwith be cancelled and withdrawn. The
request was denied by the Commissioner on the
ground that Revenue Memorandum Order 4-87
226
implementing EO 41 had construed the amnesty

coverage to include only assessments issued by the
BIR after promulgation of the executive order on 22
August 1986 and not to assessments theretofore
made.
1.02. A certification by the Tax Amnesty
Implementation Officer of the fact of availment of the
said tax amnesty shall be a sufficient basis for:
1.02.3. xxx the cancellation/ withdrawal of
assessment notices and letters of demand
issued after August 21, 1986 for the collection of
income, business, estate or donors taxes due
during the same taxable years.
- Court of Tax Appeals ruled for the taxpayer. It said
that the Commissioner failed to present any case or
law which proves that an assessment can withstand
or negate the force and effects of a tax amnesty.
This burden of proof on taxpayer was created by the
clear and express terms of the executive orders
intentionqualified availers of the amnesty may pay
an amnesty tax in lieu of said unpaid taxes which
are forgiven.
- CA affirmed the decision of CTA. It said that a tax
amnesty, being a general pardon or intention
overlooking by the State of its authority to impose
penalties on persons otherwise guilty of evasion or
227
violation of a revenue or tax law, partakes of an

absolute forgiveness or waiver by the Government
of its right to collect what otherwise would be due it
xxx
ISSUES
1.WON the position taken by the Commissioner
coincides with the meaning and intent of EO 41.
HELD
YES.
Ratio All issuances must not override, but must
remain consistent and in harmony with the law they
seek to apply and implement. The authority of the
Minister of Finance (Secretary of Finance) in
conjunction with the CIR to promulgate all needful
rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of
internal revenue laws cannot be controverted.
Neither can it be disputed that such rules and
regulates, as well as administrative opinions and
rulings, ordinarily should deserve weight and respect
by the courts.
Reasoning
- If EO 41 had not been intended to exclude 19811985 tax liabilities already assessed prior to 22
August 1986, the law could have simply so provided
in it exclusionary clauses. It did not. The executive
order has been designed to be in the nature of a
228
general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the

cases specifically excepted by it.
- There is no pretension that the tax amnesty returns
and due payments made by the taxpayer did not
conform with the conditions expressed in the
amnesty order.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILS v CA (Yap)
249 SCRA 149
FRANCISCO; October 6, 1995
NATURE
Consolidation of two separate petitions for review
filed by Department of Agrarian Reform and Land
Bank of the Philippines, assailing the CA decision,
which granted private respondents' petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus.
FACTS
-Private respondents (Pedro Yap, Heirs of Emiliano
Santiago, AMADCOR) are landowners whose
landholdings were acquired by the DAR and
subjected to transfer schemes to qualified
beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (RA 6657). Aggrieved by the alleged
lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to
the valuation and payment of compensation for their
229
land, private respondents filed with this Court a

petition questioning the validity of DAR Admin Order
No. 6 (1992) and DAR Admin Order No. 9 (1990),
and sought to compel the DAR to expedite the
pending summary administrative proceedings to
finally determine the just compensation of their
properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and
bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked",
"reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for
private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw
the same.
-SC referred the petition to CA for proper
determination and disposition. CA found the
following facts undisputed.
Respondents Arguments:
-Admin Order No. 9 (1990) was issued in GADALEJ
because it permits the opening of trust accounts by
the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds
in an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the
compensation for the land before it is taken and the
titles are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e)
of RA 6657.
DAR and the Landbank merely "earmarked",
"deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation
in their names as landowners despite the clear
mandate that before taking possession of the
property, the compensation must be deposited in
cash or in bonds.
230
Petitioners Arguments:
-DAR: Admin Order No. 9 is a valid exercise of its
rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA
6657. The issuance of the "Certificate of Deposit" by
the Landbank was a substantial compliance with
Section 16(e) of RA 6657.
-Landbank: the issuance of the Certificates of
Deposits is in consonance with Circular Nos. 29, 29A and 54 of the Land Registration Authority where
the words "reserved/deposited" were also used.
ISSUES
1. WON CA erred in declaring as null and void DAR
Admin Order No. 9 (1990) insofar as it provides for
the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposit in
cash or in bonds
2. WON CA erred in holding that private respondents
are entitled as a matter of right to the immediate and
provisional release of the amounts deposited in trust
pending the final resolution of the cases it has filed
for just compensation.
HELD
1. NO.
-Section 16(e) of RA 6657: Procedure for Acquisition
of Private Lands. (e) Upon receipt by the landowner
of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection
or no response from the landowner, upon the
231
deposit with an accessible bank designated by the

DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in
accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take
immediate possession of the land and shall request
the proper Register of Deeds to issue a TCT in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines.
-It is very explicit that the deposit must be made only
in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does it appear
nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made
in any other form. There is no ambiguity in Section
16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded
construction of the term "deposit".
Ratio The conclusive effect of administrative
construction is not absolute. Action of an
administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside
by the judicial department if there is an error of law,
a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with
either the letter or the spirit of a legislative
enactment. The function of promulgating rules and
regulations may be legitimately exercised only for
the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into
effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus
confined to implementing the law or putting it into
effect. Corollary to this is that administrative
regulations cannot extend the law and amend a
legislative enactment, for settled is the rule that
administrative regulations must be in harmony with
232
the provisions of the law. And in case there is a

discrepancy between the basic law and an
implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that
prevails.
2. YES.
-The ruling in the case of Association of Small
Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of
Agrarian
Reform
merely
recognized
the
extraordinary nature of the expropriation to be
undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a
deviation from the traditional mode of payment of
compensation and recognized payment other than in
cash. It did not, however, dispense with the settled
rule that there must be full payment of just
compensation before the title to the expropriated
property is transferred.
-To withhold the right of the landowners to
appropriate the amounts already deposited in their
behalf as compensation for their properties simply
because they rejected the DAR's valuation, and
notwithstanding that they have already been
deprived of the possession and use of such
properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent
domain.
-It is unnecessary to distinguish between provisional
compensation under Section 16(e) and final
compensation under Section 18 for purposes of
233
exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the

same. The immediate effect in both situations is the
same, the landowner is deprived of the use and
possession of his property for which he should be
fairly and immediately compensated.
Disposition Petition denied for lack of merit.
Appealed decision affirmed.
GMCR, INC. v BELL TELECOMMUNICATION
PHILIPPINES, INC.
271 SCRA 790
HERMOSISIMA, JR.; April 30, 1997
NATURE
Consolidated petitions seeking the review and
reversal of the decision] of the respondent Court of
Appeals
FACTS
- Republic Act No. 7692 was enacted granting
private respondent BellTel a congressional franchise
- BellTel filed with the NTC a second Application
praying for the issuance of a Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity for the installation,
operation and maintenance of a combined
nationwide local toll (domestic and international) and
tandem telephone exchanges and facilities using
234
wire, wireless, microwave radio, satellites and fiber

optic cable with Public Calling Offices (PCOs) and
very small aperture antennas (VSATs) under an
integrated system.
- The CCAD submitted to Deputy Commissioner
Fidelo Q. Dumlao, a Memorandum manifesting his
findings and recommending that based on technical
documents submitted, BellTels proposal is
technically feasible.
- Subsequently, Mr. Raulito Suarez, the chief of the
Rates and Regulatory Division of CCAD, conducted
a financial evaluation of the project proposal of
private respondent BellTel. Mr. Suarez made the
finding that BellTel has the financial capability to
support its proposed project at least for the initial two
(2) years.
- Agreeing with the findings and recommendations of
the CCAD, NTC Deputy Commissioners Fidelo
Dumlao and Consuelo Perez adopted the same and
expressly signified their approval
-In view of these favorable recommendations by the
CCAD and two members of the NTC, the Legal
Department thereof prepared a working draft of the
order granting provisional authority to private
respondent BellTel. The said working draft was
initialed by Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Q. Dumlao
and Consuelo Perez but was not signed by
Commissioner Simeon Kintanar.
235
- While ordinarily, a decision that is concurred in by

two of the three members composing a quasi-judicial
body is entitled to promulgation, petitioners claim
that pursuant to the prevailing policy and the
corresponding procedure and practice in the NTC,
the exclusive authority to sign, validate and
promulgate any and all orders, resolutions and
decisions of the NTC is lodged in the Chairman, in
this case, Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, and,
thus, since only Commissioner Simeon Kintanar is
recognized by the NTC Secretariat as the sole
authority to sign any and all orders, resolutions and
decisions of the NTC, only his vote counts; Deputy
Commissioners Dumlao and Perez have allegedly
no voting power and both their concurrence which
actually constitutes the majority is inutile without the
assent of Commissioner Kintanar.
- Anxious over the inaction of the NTC in the matter
of its petition praying for the issuance of a
provisional authority, private respondent BellTel an
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Application and
for the Issuance of a Provisional Authority.
- No action was taken by the NTC on the aforecited
motion. Thus, BellTel filed a Second Urgent ExParte Motionreiterating its earlier prayer.
-In an Order signed solely by Commissioner Simeon
Kintanar, the NTC, instead of resolving the two
pending motions of private respondent BellTel, set
236
the said motions for a hearing however, no hearing

was conducted as the same was reset.
- On the day of the hearing, BellTel filed a motion,
prayed for the promulgation of the working draft of
the order granting a provisional authority to private
respondent BellTel, on the ground that the said
working draft had already been signed or initialed by
Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez who,
together, constitute a majority out of the three
commissioners composing the NTC.
- NTC denied the said motion in an Order solely
signed by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar.
- BellTel filed with this court a Petition for Certiorari,
Mandamus and Prohibition seeking the nullification
of the Order
- The SC issued a Resolution referring said petition
to the respondent Court of Appeals for proper
determination and resolution
- The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed
decision which set aside NTC Memorandum Circular
No. 1-1-93, Annex J of the Petition, Memorandum
Circular No. 3-1-93, Annex K of the Petition and the
Order of Kintanar, Annex L of the Petition and
directed . NTC to meet en banc and to consider and
act on the draft Order
- Petitioners filed with this court separate petitions
for review.
237
ISSUE
WON the CAs act of nullifying NTC Memorandum
Circular No. 1-1-93 and NTC Memorandum Circular
No. 3-1-93 was a collateral attack against the
aforecited circulars and an unnecessary and abusive
exercise of the courts power to nullify administrative
regulations.
HELD
NO.
Ratio Administrative regulations derive their validity
from the statute that they were, in the first place,
intended to implement.
Reasoning Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-193 are on their face null and void ab initio for being
unabashedly contrary to law. They were nullified by
respondent Court of Appeals because they are
absolutely illegal and, as such, are without any force
and effect. The fact that implementation of these
illegal
regulations
has
resulted
in
the
institutionalization of the one-man rule in the NTC, is
not and can never be a ratification of such an illegal
practice. At the least, these illegal regulations are
an erroneous interpretation of E.O. No. 546 and in
the context of and its predecessor laws.
At the
most, these illegal regulations are attempts to
validate the one-man rule in the NTC as executed by
238
persons with the selfish interest of maintaining their

illusory hold of power.
Since the questioned memorandum circulars are
inherently and patently null and void for being totally
violative of the spirit and letter of E.O. No. 546 that
constitutes the NTC as a collegial body, no court
may shirk from its duty of striking down such illegal
regulations.
Disposition Petitions DISMISSED
ASSOCIATION OF PHIL COCONUT
DESSICATORS v PHIL COCONUT AUTHORITY
286 SCRA 109
MENDOZA; February 10, 1998
FACTS
- Nov. 5, 1992 APCD brought suit to enjoin PCA from
issuing permits to applicants for the establishment of
new desiccated coconut processing plants
issuance would violate PCAs Admin. Order No.02
series of 1991 as applicants were seeking to operate
in congested areas
- Nov.6 trial court issued TRO enjoining PCA from
ussiung licenses
- Pending the case, PCA issued on March 24, 1993
Resolution No.018-93 providing for the withdrawal of
239
the PCA from all regulation of coconut product

processing industry; registration would be limited to
the monitoring of their volumes of production and
admin of quality standards
- PCA then issued certificates of registration to those
wishing to operate desiccated coconut processing
plants
ISSUE
WON the PCA can renounce the power to regulate
implicit in the law creating it for that is what the
resolution in question actually is.
HELD
- The power given to the PCA to formulate and
adopt a general program of devt for the coconut and
other palms oil industry is not a roving commission
to adopt any program deemed necessary to promote
the devt of the coconut and other palm oils industry,
but one to be exercised in the context of the
regulatory structure.
Reasoning
- PCA was originally created by PD232 on June 30,
1973 to take over the powers and functions of the
Coconut Coordinating Council, the Phil. Coco
Admin, and the Phil. Coco Research Institute
- By PD1468 on June 11, 1978, it was made an
independent public corp...charged with carrying out
240
States policy to promote the rapid integrated devt

and growth of the coco and other palm oil industry
and to ensure that the coco farmers become direct
participants and beneficiaries through a regulatory
scheme set up by law
- Aug.28, 1982 by EO826 govt temporarily
prohibited the opening of new coco processing
plants and on Dec.6 phased out some of the existing
ones--- because of overproduction in the industry
resulting, ultimately, in the decline of the export
performance of coco-based products
- Oct.23, 1987 PCA adopted Resolution No.058-87
authorizing establishment and operation of
additional DCN plants because of increased demand
in world market
- The above measures were adopted within the
framework of regulation as established by law to
promote rapid integrated devt and growth of coco
and other palm oil industry and to ensure that the
coco farmers become direct participants and
beneficiaries
- the questioned resolution allows not only
indiscriminate opening of new plants, but the virtual
dismantling of the regulatory infrastructure
- PD1468 Art.II Revised Coco Codethe role of the
PCA is to formulate and adopt a general program of
devt for the coco and other palm oil industry in all its
aspects
241
o
By limiting the purpose of reg. to merely
monitoring volumes of production and admin. Of
quality standards, PCA in effect abdicates its role
and leaves it almost completely to market forces
how the industry will develop
- Constitution Art.XII
o
Sec.6 ...duty of the State to promote
distributive justice and to intervene when the
common good so demands
o
Sec.19 State shall regulate or prohibit
monopolies when public interest so requires
o
Any change in policy must be made by the
legislative dept of the govt. The regulatory system
has been set up by law. It is beyond the power of
an administrative agency to dismantle it.
Decision Petition GRANTED; resolution NULL and
VOID
BLAS OPLE V RUBEN TORRES
G.R. No. 127685
PUNO; JULY 23, 1998
FACTS
- Senator Blas Ople sought to invalidate A.O 308
entitled Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System" on the grounds
242
that: 1) it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to

legislate (bec the establishment of a National ID
system requires a legislative act) 2) the
appropriation of public funds by the president for the
implementation of the AO is an unconstitutional
usurpation of the exclusive right of congress to
appropriate public funds for expenditure; 3) it
impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected
zone of privacy
- Respondents: THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT
A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD WARRANT A
JUDICIAL REVIEW; A.O. NO. 308 WAS ISSUED
WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT
ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS
OF CONGRESS; THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDENTIFICATION
REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM
THE
BUDGETS
OF
THE
CONCERNED
AGENCIES; A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN
INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN PRIVACY.
ISSUES
1. WON petitioner has standing
2. WON petition is ripe for adjudication
3. WON A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative
order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the
President to issue
243
4. WON A.O No. 308 violates the right to privacy

HELD
1. YES
- As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the
requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that
the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of
legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the
GSIS, petitioner can also impugn the legality of the
misalignment of public funds and the misuse of
GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.
2. YES
- The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar
is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules
of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per
se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not
premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot
cure its fatal defects.
3. YES not a mere administrative order but a law
and hence, beyond the power of the President to
issue
- A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not
appropriate to be covered by an administrative
order. An administrative order is:
"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders.
Acts of the
President which relate to particular aspects of
governmental operation in pursuance of his
244
duties as administrative head shall be

promulgated in administrative orders."
-An administrative order is an ordinance issued by
the President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in
harmony with the law and should be for the sole
purpose of implementing the law and carrying
out the legislative policy.
- It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308
merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987.
It establishes for the first time a National
Computerized Identification Reference System.
Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of
various contending state policies - the primacy of
national security, the extent of privacy interest
against dossier-gathering by government, the choice
of policies, etc. The said A.O. redefines the
parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry visa-vis the State as well as the line that separates the
administrative power of the President to make rules
and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be
evident that it deals with a subject that should be
covered by law.
-Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that
A.O. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no right,
imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates
no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot
transact business with government agencies
245
delivering basic services to the people without the

contemplated identification card. No citizen will
refuse to get this identification card for no one can
avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as
daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have
difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his
privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O.
No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot
stand.
-the dissenting opinions unduly expand the limits of
administrative legislation and consequently erodes
the plenary power of Congress to make laws. This is
contrary to the established approach defining the
traditional limits of administrative legislation. As well
stated by Fisher: ". . . Many regulations however,
bear directly on the public. It is here that
administrative legislation must be restricted in its
scope and application. Regulations are not
supposed to be a substitute for the general policymaking that Congress enacts in the form of a public
law. Although administrative regulations are entitled
to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and
regulations is not an independent source of power to
make laws."
4. YES
-We prescind from the premise that the right to
privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government
246
to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some

compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn.
-A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations:
(1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners
with the facility to conveniently transact business
with basic service and social security providers and
other government instrumentalities and (2) the need
to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent
transactions and misrepresentations by persons
seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these
interests are compelling enough to warrant the
issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is
the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of
A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our
people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.
- The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Sec 4 which
provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN)
as a "common reference number to establish a
linkage among concerned agencies" through the use
of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer
application designs."
A.O. No. 308 does not state what specific biological
characteristics and what particular biometrics
technology shall be used to identify people who will
seek its coverage. Considering the banquet of
options available to the implementors of A.O. No.
308, the fear that it threatens the right to privacy of
247
our people is not groundless.

- The right to privacy is one of the most threatened
rights of man living in a mass society. In the case at
bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of
government which by issuing A.O. No. 308
pressures the people to surrender their privacy by
giving information about themselves on the pretext
that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given
the record-keeping power of the computer, only the
indifferent will fail to perceive the danger that A.O.
No. 308 gives the government the power to compile
a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens.
Disposition: the petition is granted and
Administrative Order No. 308 declared null and void
for being unconstitutional.
Separate Opinions:
ROMERO concur
So terrifying are the possibilities of a law such as
Administrative Order No. 308 in making inroads into
the private lives of the citizens, a virtual Big Brother
looking over our shoulders, that it must, without
delay, be "slain upon sight" before our society turns
totalitarian with each of us, a mindless robot.
VITUG concur
I find it hard to peremptorily assume at this time that
the administrative order will be misused and to
248
thereby ignore the possible benefits that can be

derived from or the merits of, a nationwide
computerized identification reference system. The
great strides and swift advances in technology
render it inescapable that one day we will, at all
events, have to face up with the reality of seeing
extremely sophisticated methods of personal
identification and any attempt to stop the inevitable
may either be short-lived or even futile. The
imperatives would instead be to now install specific
safeguards and control measures that may be
calculated best to ward-off probable ill effects of any
such device. Here, it may be apropos to recall the
pronouncement of this Court in People vs. Nazario
that "As a rule, a statute or [an] act may be said to be
vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men 'of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application.' It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle."
Administrative Order No. 308 appears to be so
extensively drawn that could, indeed, allow unbridled
249
options to become available to its implementors

beyond the reasonable comfort of the citizens and of
residents alike.
The
subject
covered
by
the
questioned
administrative order can have far-reaching
consequences that can tell on all individuals, their
liberty and privacy, that, to my mind, should make it
indispensable and appropriate to have the matter
specifically addressed by the Congress of the
Philippines, the policy-making body of our
government, to which the task should initially belong
and to which the authority to formulate and
promulgate that policy is constitutionally lodged.
PANGANIBAN concur
I concur only in the result and only on the ground
that an executive issuance is not legally sufficient to
establish an all-encompassing computerized system
of identification in the country. The subject matter
contained in AO 308 is beyond the powers of the
President to regulate without a legislative
enactment.
I reserve judgment on the issue of whether a
national ID system is an infringement of the
constitutional right to privacy or of the freedom of
thought until after Congress passes, if ever, a law to
this effect. Only then, and upon the filing of a proper
petition, may the provisions of the statute be
250
scrutinized by the judiciary to determine their

constitutional foundation. Until such time, the issue
is premature; and any decision thereon, speculative
and academic.
KAPUNAN, dissent
There is nothing in the whole breadth and length of
Administrative Order No. 308 that suggests a taint of
constitutional infirmity.
1st ISSUE: was the issuance of A.O No. 308 an
exercise by the President of legislative power
properly belonging to Congress? NO
-The Administrative Code of 1987 has unequivocally
vested the President with quasi-legislative powers in
the form of executive orders, administrative orders,
proclamations, memorandum orders and circulars
and general or special orders. An administrative
order, like the one under which the new identification
system is embodied, has its peculiar meaning under
the 1987 Administrative Code:
SEC. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President
which relate to particular aspects of governmental
operations in pursuance of his duties as
administrative head shall be promulgated in
administrative orders.
- A.O. No. 308 was promulgated by the President
pursuant to the quasi-legislative powers expressly
granted to him by law and in accordance with his
251
duty as administrative head. The contention that the

President usurped the legislative prerogatives of
Congress has no firm basis.
-Being the "administrative head," it is unquestionably
the responsibility of the President to find ways and
means to improve the government bureaucracy, and
make it more professional, efficient and reliable,
specially
those
government
agencies
and
instrumentalities which provide basic services and
which the citizenry constantly transact with.
-If we think of the separation of powers as carrying
out the distinction between legislation and
administration with mathematical precision and as
dividing the branches of government into watertight
compartments, we would probably have to conclude
that any exercise of lawmaking authority by an
agency is automatically invalid. Such a rigorous
application of the constitutional doctrine is neither
desirable nor feasible
A mingling of powers among the three branches of
government is not a novel concept. This blending of
powers has become necessary to properly address
the complexities brought about by a rapidly
developing society and which the traditional
branches of government have difficulty coping with.
2nd ISSUE: ripeness
-Basic in constitutional law is the rule that before the
252
court assumes jurisdiction over and decide

constitutional issues, the ff requisites must first be
satisfied:
1) there must be an actual case or
controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible
of judicial determination; 2) the constitutional
question must be raised by a proper party; 3) the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and
4) the resolution of the constitutional question
must be necessary to the resolution of the case.
-In this case, it is evident that the first element is
missing. Judicial intervention calls for an actual case
or controversy which is defined as "an existing case
or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory."
3rd ISSUE: is AO violative of right to privacy
-There is nothing in A.O. No. 308, as it is worded, to
suggest that the advanced methods of the
Biometrics Technology that may pose danger to the
right of privacy will be adopted.
-The standards set in A.O. No. 308 for the adoption
of the new system are clear-cut and unequivocably
spelled out in the "WHEREASES" and body of the
order, namely, the need to provide citizens and
foreign residents with the facility to conveniently
transact business with basic service and social
security
providers
and
other
government
instrumentalities; the computerized system is
253
intended to properly and efficiently identify persons

seeking basic services or social security and reduce,
if not totally eradicate fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentation
-Again, the concerns of the majority are premature
precisely because there are as yet no guidelines that
will direct the Court and serve as solid basis for
determining the constitutionality of the new
identification system. The Court cannot and should
not anticipate the constitutional issues and rule on
the basis of guesswork. The guidelines would,
among others, determine the particular biometrics
method that would be used and the specific personal
data that would be collected, provide the safeguards
(if any) and supply the details on how this new
system is supposed to work. The Court should not
jump the gun on the Executive.
MENDOZA, dissent
I cannot find anything in the text of Administrative
Order No. 308 of the President of the Philippines
that would warrant a declaration that it is violative of
the right of privacy.
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS v
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
302 SCRA 241
254
QUISUMBING; Jan 28, 1999

Nature:
Petition for review
Facts:
- Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) filed
its quarterly income tax returns for the first and
second quarters of 1985, reported profits, and paid
the total income tax of P5,016,954.00. The taxes
due were settled by applying PBCom's tax credit
memos and accordingly, the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) issued Tax Debit Memos.
- Subsequently, however, PBCom suffered losses so
that when it filed its Annual Income Tax Returns for
the year-ended Dec 31, 1986, it likewise reported a
net loss of P14,129,602.00, and thus declared no
tax payable for the year.
- But during these two years, PBCom earned rental
income from leased properties. The lessees withheld
and remitted to the BIR withholding creditable taxes
of P282,795.50 in 1985 and P234,077.69 in 1986.
- On Aug 7, 1987, petitioner requested the CIR,
among others, for a tax credit of P5,016,954.00
representing the overpayment of taxes in the first
and second quarters of 1985.
- On July 25, 1988, PBCom filed a claim for refund
of creditable taxes withheld by their lessees from
255
property rentals in 1985 for P282,795.50 and in

1986 for P234,077.69.
- Pending the investigation of the CIR, petitioner
instituted a Petition for Review on Nov 18, 1988
before the Court of Tax Appeals.
- On May 20, 1993, the CTA denied the request of
PBCom for a tax refund or credit of P5,299,749.95,
on the ground that it was filed beyond the two-year
reglementary period provided for by law. The
petitioner's claim for refund in 1986 amounting to
P234,077.69 was likewise denied on the assumption
that it was automatically credited by PBCom against
its tax payment in the succeeding year. Petitioners
MFR was denied.
- PBCom filed a petition for review with the CA,
which affirmed in toto the CTA's resolution.
- Petitioner: its claims for refund and tax credits are
not yet barred by prescription relying on the
applicability of Revenue Memorandum Circular No.
7-85 issued on April 1, 1985. The circular states that
overpaid income taxes are not covered by the twoyear prescriptive period under the tax Code and that
taxpayers may claim refund or tax credits for the
excess quarterly income tax with the BIR within ten
years under Art 1144 of the Civil Code. Citing ABS
CBN Broadcasting Corporation vs. Court of Tax
Appeals petitioner claims that rulings or circulars
promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal
256
Revenue have no retroactive effect if it would be

prejudicial to taxpayers, as provided by Sec. 246 of
the National Internal Revenue Code.
- Respondent: the two-year prescriptive period for
filing tax cases in court concerning income tax
payments of Corporations is reckoned from the date
of filing the Final Adjusted Income Tax Return. CIR
also states that since the Final Adjusted Income Tax
Return of the petitioner for the taxable year 1985
was supposed to be filed on April 15, 1986, the latter
had only until April 15, 1988 to seek relief from the
court. When the petitioner filed the case before the
CTA on Nov 18, 1988, the same was filed beyond
the time fixed by law, and such failure is fatal to
petitioner's cause of action.
Issues:
WON CA erred in denying the plea for tax refund or
tax credits on the ground of prescription, despite
petitioner's reliance on RMC No. 7-85, changing the
prescriptive period of two years to ten years
Held:
NO
- Sec. 230 of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC) of 1977 (now Sec. 229, NIRC of 1997)
provides for the prescriptive period for filing a court
proceeding for the recovery of tax erroneously or
257
illegally collected. The rule states that the taxpayer

may file a claim for refund or credit with the CIR,
within two years after payment of tax, before any suit
in CTA is commenced. The two-year prescriptive
period provided should be computed from the time
of filing the Adjustment Return and final payment of
the tax for the year.
- When the Acting Commissioner of Internal
Revenue issued RMC 7-85, changing the
prescriptive period of two years to ten years on
claims of excess quarterly income tax payments,
such circular created a clear inconsistency with the
provision of Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC. In so doing, the
BIR did not simply interpret the law; rather it
legislated guidelines contrary to the statute passed
by Congress.
- Revenue memorandum-circulars are considered
administrative rulings (in the sense of more specific
and less general interpretations of tax laws) which
are issued from time to time by the CIR. The
interpretation placed upon a statute by the executive
officers, whose duty is to enforce it, is entitled to
great respect by the courts. Nevertheless, such
interpretation is not conclusive and will be ignored if
judicially found to be erroneous. Thus, courts will not
countenance administrative issuances that override,
instead of remaining consistent and in harmony with
the law they seek to apply and implement.
258
- In the case of People vs. Lim, it was held that rules

and regulations issued by administrative officials to
implement a law cannot go beyond the terms and
provisions of the latter.
- The State cannot be put in estoppel by the
mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. The
nullification of RMC No. 7-85 issued by the Acting
Commissioner of Internal Revenue is an
administrative interpretation which is not in harmony
with Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC for being contrary to the
express provision of a statute. Hence, his
interpretation could not be given weight for to do so
would, in effect, amend the statute.
- Art. 8 of the Civil Code recognizes judicial
decisions, applying or interpreting statutes as part of
the legal system of the country. But administrative
decisions do not enjoy that level of recognition. A
memorandum-circular of a bureau head could not
operate to vest a taxpayer with shield against judicial
action. For there are no vested rights to speak of
respecting a wrong construction of the law by the
administrative officials and such wrong interpretation
could not place the Government in estoppel to
correct or overrule the same.
Disposition Petition is DENIED. The decision of CA
is AFFIRMED.
259
CHINA BANKING CORP & CBC PROPERTIES

AND COMPUTER CENTER INC. v MEMBERS OF
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, HOME
DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND
307 SCRA 443
GONZAGA-REYES; MAY 19, 1999
NATURE
Appeal by certiorari from RTC order
FACTS
- Petitioners China Banking Corp. (CBC) and CBC
Properties and Computer Center Inc. (CBC-PCCI)
are both employers who were granted by the Home
Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) waiver
certificates for having a Superior Retirement Plan
pursuant to Sec. 19 of PD 1752 (Home
Development Mutual Fund Law of 1980) which
provides: employers who have their own existing
provident AND/OR employees-housing plans may
register for annual certification for waiver or
suspension from coverage or participation in the
Home Development Mutual Fund.
- In June 1994, RA 7742 amending PD 1752 was
approved. In Sept. 1995, respondent HDMF Board
issued an amendment to the Rules and Regulations
Implementing RA 7742 (The Amendment), and
pursuant to said amendment, the Board issued a
260
circular entitled Revised Guidelines and Procedure

for filing Application for Waiver or Suspension of
Fund Coverage under PD 1752 (Guidelines).
Under the Amendment and the Guidelines, a
company must have a provident/retirement AND
housing plan superior to that provided under the
Pag-IBIG Fund to be entitled to exemption/waiver
from fund coverage.
- CBC and CBC-PCCI applied for renewal of waiver
of coverage from the fund for the year 1996, but the
applications were disapproved after a finding that
their retirement plan is not superior to Pag-IBIG
Fund. The other reason is that under the amended
IRR of RA 7742, to qualify for waiver, a company
must have retirement/provident and housing plans
which are both superior to Pag-IBIG funds.
- Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the RTC seeking to annul and
declare void the Amendment and the Guidelines for
having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners claimed that
the HDMF Board exceeded its rule-making power in
requiring the employer to have both a
retirement/provident plan and an employee housing
plan in order to be entitled to a certificate of waiver
or suspension of coverage from the HDMF.
- Respondent Board filed motion to dismiss which
was granted by the RTC. The petition for certiorari
261
was dismissed by the RTC on the grounds (1) that

the denial or grant of an application for
waiver/coverage is within the power and authority of
the HDMF Board, and the said Board did not exceed
its jurisdiction or act with grave abuse of discretion in
denying the applications; and (2) the petitioners
have lost their right to appeal by failure to appeal
within the periods provided in the Rules for
appealing from the order of denial to the HDMF
Board of Trustees, and thereafter, to the CA. RTC
stated that certiorari will not lie as a substitute for a
lost remedy of appeal.
- Petitioners filed a MFR which was denied. They
then filed this appeal contending that it does not
question the power of respondent HDMF, as an
administrative agency to issue rules and regulations
to implement PD 1752 and Sec.5 of RA 7742;
however, the Amendment and Guidelines issued by
it should be set aside and declared null and void for
being inconsistent with the enabling law, PD 1752,
as amended by RA 7742, which merely requires as
a pre-condition for exemption for coverage, the
existence of either a superior provident (retirement)
plan or a superior housing plan, and not the
concurrence of both plans.
- Respondents contend that there is no question of
law involved. The interpretation of the phrase
"and/or" is not purely a legal question and it is
262
susceptible of administrative determination. In

denying petitioners application for waiver of
coverage, respondent Board was exercising its
quasi-judicial function and its findings are generally
accorded not only respect but even finality.
Moreover, the Amendment and the Guidelines are
consistent with the enabling law, which is a piece of
social legislation intended to provide both a savings
generation and a house building program.
ISSUE
WON respondent Board acted in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the
Amendment and Guidelines insofar as they impose
as a requirement for exemption from coverage or
participation in the HMDF Fund the existence of both
a superior housing plan and a provident plan.
HELD
YES. The assailed Amendment to the Rules and
Regulations and the Revised Guidelines suffer from
a legal infirmity and should be set aside.
Ratio The rules and regulations which are the
product of a delegated power to create new or
additional legal provisions that have the effect of law,
should be within the scope of the statutory authority
263
granted by the legislature to the Administrative

agency.
- Administrative regulations adopted under
legislative authority by a particular department must
be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and
should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect
its general provisions.
- The rule making power must be confined to details
for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into
effect the law as it has been enacted. The power
cannot be extended to amending or expanding the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not
covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the
statute cannot be sanctioned.
Reasoning
Sec. 19 of PD 1752 provides: An employer and/or
employee-group who, at the time this Decree
becomes effective have their own provident and/or
employee-housing plans, may register with the
Fund, for any of the following purposes.
- On June 17, 1994, RA 7742, amending certain
sections of PD 1752 was approved. Sec. 5 of the
said statute provides that within sixty (60) days from
the approval of the Act, the Board of Trustees of the
Home Development Mutual Fund shall promulgate
the rules and regulations necessary for the effective
implementation of (this) Act.
264
- Pursuant to the above authority the Home

Development Mutual Fund Board of Trustees
promulgated The Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA 7742 amending PD 1752, Rule
VII Sec.1 thereof reads:
SECTION 1. Waiver or Suspension-Existing
Provident or Retirement Plan.
An employer and/or employee group who has an
existing provident or retirement plan as of the
effectivity of RA 7742, qualified under RA 4917 and
actuarially determined to be sound and reasonable
by an independent actuary duly accredited by the
Insurance Commission, may apply with the Fund
for waiver or suspension of coverage.
- Subsequently, the HDMF Board adopted in a
Special Board Meeting, Amendments to the Rules
and Regulations Implementing RA 7742. As
amended, Rule VII on "Waiver or Suspension" now
reads:
RULE VII. WAIVER OF SUSPENSION
SEC1 Waiver or Suspension Because of Existing
Provident/Retirement and Housing Plan.
Any employer with a plan providing both for a
provident/retirement and housing benefits for all his
employees and existing as of Dec. 14, 1980, the
effectivity date of Presidential Decree No. 1752,
may apply with the Fund for waiver or suspension
of coverage.
265
- On Oct.23, 1995, HDMF Circular No. 124-B entitled

Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing
Applications for Waiver or Suspension of Fund
Coverage under PD 1752, as amended by RA
7742, was promulgated. The Circular pertinently
provides:
I. GROUNDS FOR WAIVER OR SUSPENSION
OF FUND COVERAGE:
A. SUPERIOR PROVIDENT/RETIREMENT PLAN
AND HOUSING PLAN
ANY EMPLOYER WHO HAS A PROVIDENT,
RETIREMENT, GRATUITY OR PENSION PLAN
AND A HOUSING PLAN, EXISTING AS OF
DECEMBER 14, 1980, THE EFFECTIVITY OF P.D.
NO. 1752, may file an application for waiver or
suspension from Fund coverage, provided:
- In the instant case, the legal meaning of the words
and/or should be taken in its ordinary signification,
i.e., either and or; e.g. butter and/or eggs means
butter and eggs or butter or eggs. It is accordingly
ordinarily held that the intention of the legislature in
using the term and/or is that the word and and
the word or are to be used interchangeably.
- It is seems to us clear from the language of the
enabling law that Sec.19 of PD 1752, intended that
an employer with a provident plan or an employee
housing plan superior to that of the fund may obtain
exemption from coverage. If the law had intended
266
that the employee should have both a superior

provident plan and a housing plan in order to qualify
for exemption, it would have used the words and
instead of and/or. The law obviously contemplates
that the existence of either plan is considered as
sufficient basis for the grant of an exemption;
needless to state, the concurrence of both plans is
more than sufficient. To require the existence of both
plans would radically impose a more stringent
condition for waiver which was not clearly
envisioned by the basic law. By removing the
disjunctive word or in the implementing rules the
respondent Board has exceeded its authority.
Disposition petition is given due course and the
assailed Orders of the court a quo are SET ASIDE.
The Amendment and the Guideline, insofar as
they require that an employer should have both a
provident/retirement
plan
superior
to
the
retirement/provident benefits offered by the Fund
and a housing plan superior to the Pag-IBIG housing
loan program in order to qualify for waiver or
suspension of fund coverage, are hereby declared
null and void.
MAXIMA REALTY MANAGEMENT AND DEVT
CORP v PARKWAY REAL ESTATE DEVT CORP
442 SCRA 572
267
YNARES-SANTIAGO; February 13, 2004

NATURE
FACTS
- The subject of the controversy is Unit #702 of Heart
Tower Condominium located along Valero Street,
Salcedo Village, Makati City. Said unit was originally
sold by Segovia Development Corporation (Segovia)
to Masahiko Morishita, who in turn sold and
assigned all his rights thereto in favor of Parkway
Real Estate Development Corporation (Parkway)
- Sometime in April 1990, Parkway and petitioner
Maxima Realty Management and Development
Corporation (Maxima) entered into an agreement to
buy and sell, on installment basis, Unit #702 in
consideration of the amount of 3 Million Pesos. It
was further agreed that failure to pay any of the
installments on their due dates shall entitle Parkway
to forfeit the amounts paid by way of liquidated
damages.
- Maxima defaulted in the payment of the
installments due but was granted several grace
periods until it has paid a total of P1,180,000.00,
leaving a balance of P1,820,000.00.
- Meanwhile on May 10, 1990, Parkway, with the
consent of Segovia, executed a Deed of Assignment
268
transferring all its rights in the condominium unit in

favor of Maxima. This Deed was intended to enable
Maxima to obtain title in its name and use the same
as security for P1,820,000.00 loan with RCBC,
which amount will be used by Maxima to pay its
obligation to Parkway. On the other hand, Segovia
and Maxima agreed to transfer title to the
condominium unit directly in Maximas name subject
to the condition that the latter shall pay Segovia the
amount of P58,114.00, representing transfer fee,
utility
expenses,
association
dues
and
miscellaneous charges.
- RCBC informed Parkway of the approval of
Maximas P1.82M loan subject to the submission of,
among others, the Condominium Certificate of Title
transferred in the name of Maxima and the
Certificate of Completion and turn over of unit.
- Maxima, however, failed to pay Segovia the
amount of P58,114.00 for fees and charges. Thus,
Segovia did not transfer the title of the condominium
unit to Maxima. Since Parkway was not paid the
balance of P1.82M, it cancelled its agreement to buy
and sell and Deed of Assignment in favor of Maxima.
- Maxima filed with the Office of Appeals,
Adjudication and Legal Affairs of the HLURB, a
complaint for specific performance to enforce the
agreement to buy and sell Unit #702.
269
- HLURB Arbiter sustained the nullification of the

Deed of Assignment and ordered Parkway to refund
to Maxima the amount of P1,180,000.00. Segovia
was further ordered to issue the condominium
certificate of title over Unit #702 in favor of Parkway
upon payment by the latter of the registration fees.
- Both Maxima and Parkway appealed to the Board
of Commissioners of the HLURB. During the
pendency of the appeal, Maxima offered to pay the
balance of P1.82M, which was accepted by
Parkway. The Board then ordered Maxima to deliver
said amount in the form of managers check to
Parkway; and directed Segovia to transfer title over
the property to Maxima. The latter, however, failed to
make good its offer, which compelled Parkway to file
a Manifestation that the appeal be resolved.
- the Board rendered judgment modifying the
decision of the HLURB Arbiter by forfeiting in favor
of Parkway 50% of the total amount paid by Maxima
and ordering Segovia to pay Parkway the amount of
P10,000.00 as attorneys fees.
- Maxima appealed to the Office of the President
which dismissed the appeal for having been filed out
of time.
- Maxima filed a petition for review with the CA.
- CA affirmed the Decision of the Office of the
President.
270
ISSUE
WON petitioners appeal before the Office of the
President was filed within the reglementary period.
HELD
NO.
- In SGMC Realty Corporation v. Office of the
President it was settled that the period within which
to appeal the decision of the Board of
Commissioners of HLURB to the Office of the
President is 15 days from receipt of the assailed
decision, pursuant to Section 1521 of Presidential
Decree No. 957 (Subdivision and Condominium
Buyers Protection Decree) and Section 222 of
Presidential Decree No. 1344.
- We find petitioners contention bereft of merit,
because of its reliance on a literal reading of cited
rules without correlating them to current laws as well
as presidential decrees on the matter.
Section 27 of the 1994 HLURB Rules of Procedure
provides as follows:
Section 27. Appeal to the Office of the President.Any party may, upon notice to the Board and the
other party, appeal the decision of the Board of
Commissioners or its division to the Office of the
President within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof
pursuant to and in accordance with Administrative
Order No. 18, of the Office of the President dated
271
February 12, 1987. Decision of the President shall

be final subject only to review by the Supreme Court
on certiorari or on questions of law.
On the other hand, Administrative Order No. 18,
series of 1987, issued by public respondent reads:
Section 1. Unless otherwise governed by special
laws, an appeal to the Office of the President shall
be taken within thirty (30) days from receipt by the
aggrieved party of the decision/resolution/order
complained of or appealed from.
As pointed out by public respondent, the aforecited
administrative order allows the aggrieved party to file
its appeal with the Office of the President within
thirty (30) days from receipt of the decision
complained of. Nonetheless, such thirty-day period
is subject to the qualification that there are no other
statutory periods of appeal applicable. If there are
special laws governing particular cases which
provide for a shorter or longer reglementary period,
the same shall prevail over the thirty-day period
provided for in the administrative order. This is in
line with the rule in statutory construction that
an administrative rule or regulation, in order to
be valid, must not contradict but conform to the
provisions of the enabling law.
- there are special laws that mandate a shorter
period of fifteen days within which to appeal a case
to public respondent. First, Section 15 of PD 957
272
provides that the decisions of the National Housing

Authority shall become final and executory after the
lapse of fifteen days from the date of receipt of the
decision. Second, Section 2 of PD 1344 states that
decisions of the NHA shall become final and
executory after the lapse of fifteen days from the
date of its receipt. The latter decree provides that the
decisions of NHA are appealable only to the Office of
the President. Further, we note that the regulatory
functions of NHA relating to housing and land
development has been transferred to Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission, now known as
HLURB. Thus, said presidential issuances providing
for a reglementary period of appeal of fifteen days
apply in this case.
- Accordingly, the period of appeal of thirty days set
forth in Section 27 of HLURB 1994 Rules of
Procedure no longer holds true for being in conflict
with the provisions of aforesaid presidential decrees.
For it is axiomatic that administrative rules
derive their validity from the statute that they are
intended to implement. Any rule which is not
consistent with the statute itself is null and void.
- In this case, petitioner received a copy of the
decision of HLURB on October 23, 1995.
Considering that the reglementary period to appeal
is fifteen days, petitioner has only until November 7,
1995, to file its appeal. Unfortunately, petitioner filed
273
its appeal 28 days from receipt of the appealed

decision, which is obviously filed out of time.
- In the case at bar, Maxima had until May 4, 1994 to
appeal to the Office of the President. The appeal
which was filed on May 10, 1994 was clearly beyond
the reglementary period.
Disposition WHEREFORE the Decision of the CA is
AFFIRMED.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | Dean Carlota | A2010 Digests (Updated by B2013)

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