Moncada vs Peoples Court

80 Phil 1
1/14/1948
Scope of Protection
Facts:
Petitioner stands accused of treason before the People's Court, the information against
him having been filed by Prosecutor Juan M. Ladaw on February 28, 1946.
Almost a year before, on April 4, 1945, at about 6:00 p.m., petitioner was arrested by
members of the Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States Army at his residence at 199-A
San Rafael St., Manila, without any warrant of arrest, and taken to the Bilibid Prison at
Muntinglupa, where he was detained.
On April 11, 1945, petitioner's wife, who transferred to their house at 3 Rosario Drive,
Quezon City, was approached by several CIC officers, headed by Lt. Olives, and ordered to
accompany them to the house at San Rafael to witness the taking of documents and things
belonging to petitioner. Upon hearing from the officers that they did not have any search warrant
for the purpose, she refused to go with them, but after the officers told her that with or without
her presence they would search the house at San Rafael, Mrs. Moncado decided to accompany
them.
Upon arrival at the house, Mrs. Moncado noticed that their belongings had been
ransacked by American officers and that the trunks which she had kept in the attic and in the
garage when she left the house, had been ripped open and their contents scattered on the floor.
Lt. Olives informed Mrs. Moncado that they were going to take a bundle of documents and
things, which were separated from the rest of the scattered things, because they proved the
guilt of her husband. Mrs. Moncado protested in vain. No receipt was issued to her.
Subsequently, after making an inventory of their belongings at San Rafael, Mrs.
Moncado found the following things missing:
"(a) Passes issued by Japanese friends for the personal safety and conduct of the petitioners;
"(b) Correspondences of the petitioner as president of the Neighborhood Association in Quezon
City during the Japanese occupation;
"(c) Correspondence of the petitioner with certain Japanese officers;
"(d) The personal file and the love letters of Mrs. Moncado to Dr. Moncado and vice versa;
"(e) Marriage certificate of Dr. Moncado with Mrs. Moncado issued at Reno, Nevada;
"(f) Private correspondence and letters of Dr. Moncado to and from his Filipino Federation of
America in Hawaii and United States;
"(g) Several law books by Guevara, Albert, Francisco, Harvard Classics (complete set), books
on diplomacy, international law;
"(h) A complete collection of the 'Tribunal' compilation of the same during occupation until the
last day of its issuance;
"(i) Complete collection of American magazines, from 1940 to 1941 - Los Angeles Examiner,
San Francisco Chronicle, Los Angeles Evening Herald and newspapers edited and owned by
Dr. Moncado and published in the United States; and National Geographic Society;

"(j) Personal letters of Dr. Moncado with several members of the United States Senate and
Congress of the United States including a picture of President Hoover dedicated to Dr.
Moncado;
"(k) Pictures with personal dedication and autograph to Dr. and Mrs. Moncado by actors and
actresses from Hollywood, including Mary Astor, Binnie Barnes, Robert Montgomery, Clark
Gable, Gary Cooper, Boris Karloff, Wallace Beery, William and Dick Powell, Myrna Loy, Bette
Davis and Ceasar Romero;
"(l) Certificate as first flighter in the Pan-American Airways and even several stickers issued by
Pan American Airways for passengers' baggage;
"(m) A promissory note of Dr. Moncado for fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) in favor of Architect
Mr. Igmidio A. Marquez of Quezon City;
"(n) Three (3) volumes of modern ballroom dancing by Arthur MacMurray of New York,
pamphlets of dancing obtained by Dr. Moncado while he was studying dancing at WaldorfAstoria, New York;
"(o) Two (2) volumes of rhumba, zamba and tango obtained from Mexico and Argentina by Dr.
Moncado"
On June 27, 1946, petitioner filed with the People's Court a motion praying that the return of
said documents and things be ordered. The petition was denied on July 9, 1946.
Thereupon, petitioner filed with this Supreme Court on August 10, 1946, a petition
praying that the lower court's order of July 9, 1946, be set aside, that said court be required to
order the return of the documents and things in question to petitioner, and that the prosecutor be
restrained from using and presenting them as evidence at the trial of the criminal case for
treason.
All seized documents were not denied by the prosecution and that the said documents
are at their possession.
Respondents argue:
We followed the decision in Alvero vs. Dizon (L-342) that the seized documents at his
house at the time of arrest be admitted as competent evidence against the crime charged.
Issue:
1.) Whether or not the petitioner can avail the constitutional inhibition against
unlawful searches and seizures and to privacy of communication and correspondence?
2.) Whether or not the arrest, searches and seizures done were legal and authorized
by law?
3.) Whether or not the seized documents can be admitted in prosecuting the
petitioner against the crime charged?
Held:
1.) Yes, the petitioner can avail the constitutional inhibition against unlawful searches
and seizures and to privacy of communication and correspondence because the rights
are available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused of crime or not.

2.) No. The seizure of the papers and effects in questions, having been made
without any search warrant, was and is illegal, and was effected in open violation of the
following provisions of the Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determine by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
(Article III, section 1 [3] of the Constitution.)
The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court or when public safety and order require otherwise. (Article
III, section 1 [5] of the Constitution.)
The seizure was also in open violation of sections 3, 10, and 11 of Rule
122,which are as follows:
SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant.
A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.SEC.
10. Receipt for the property seized.
The officer seizing property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt
for the same to the person on whom or in whose possession it was found, or in
the absence of any person, must, in the presence of at least two witnesses, leave
a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property.SEC. 11. Delivery of
property and inventory there of to court.
The officer must forthwith deliver the property to the justice of the peace
or judge of the municipal court or of the Court of First Instance which issue the
warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified by oath.
To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for
the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant.
The fallacy of the doctrine contended for by appellant is in
assuming that the constitutional rights of the defendant are violated by
using his private papers as evidence against him, whereas it was the invasion of
his premises and the taking of his goods that constituted the offense irrespective
of what was taken or what use was made of it; and the law having declared that
the articles taken are competent and admissible evidence, notwithstanding the
unlawful search and seizure, how can the circumstance that the court erred in an
independent proceeding for the return of the property on defendant's demand
add anything to or detract from the violation of the defendant's constitutional
rights in the unlawful search and seizure?

3.) No. The argument that goods and personal properties illegally taken, stolen, or
snatched from the owner of possessor without a duly issued search warrant can be
retained by the prosecution for use as evidence in a criminal case instituted is initiated
by an original and basic flaw. The argument rests on the assume existence or
commission of a crime as its minor premise. but, under the orderly processes of law, the
assumption has yet to be proved, and it is impossible to be proved before it can be of
any use to support and clinch the argument.
The prosecution is called upon to make the assumption that the goods and
properties in question are evidence of a crime. To be valid, the assumption has to
presuppose the commission or existence of the crime.That presupposition, in order to be
valid, must in turn stand on an authoritative pronouncement which can only be made in a
final and executory decision rendered by a court of justice. The prosecution cannot make
a conclusive pronouncement, as to the existence or commission of a crime, the basic
fact which, under the argument, will entitled the prosecution to retain and use the goods
and properties in question. The argument assumes a fact the existence of which still
remains to be proved and continues to be enveloped in the mists of the realm of
uncertainties, which fact may lead to the disputed right of the prosecution to retain the
goods and properties illegally seized as essential evidence of the crime. The line of
reasoning the build up the argument can be restated in more abstract terms as follows:
justify the means by their necessity to attain an end by starting from the premise that the
end was accomplished. Such a reasoning process is fundamentally subversive to logic
and is incompatible with the natural workings of the human mind.
Disposition:
The court granted the prayer of the herein petitioner.

People v. Salanguit
G.R. No. 1333254-55
4/19/01
Existence of Probable Cause
Facts:
On December 26,1995, Sr.Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite, to search the residence of accused-appellant Robert Salanguit
y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund
Badua, who tesed that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from
accused-appellant. The sale took place in accused-appellants room, and Badua saw that the
shabu was taken by accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his room. The application was
granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol.
ProsecuonVersion:

At about 10:30p.m. of December 26,1995, a group of about 10 policemen, along with

one civilian informer, went to the residence of accused-appellant to serve the warrant. The
police operatives knocked on accused-appellants door, but nobody opened it. They heard
people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open
and entered the house.
Ater showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group
started searching the house. They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags
containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline
substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint
having a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams. A receipt of the items seized was prepared,
but the accused-appellant refused to sign it.
Version of Defense:
On the night of December 26, 1995, as they were about to leave their house, they heard
a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their house. Suddenly, about 20 men in civilian are,
brandishing long rearms, climbed over the gate and descended through an opening in the roof.
When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search warrant, a piece of paper inside a
folder was waved in front of him.
As accused-appellant fumbled for his glasses, however, the paper was withdrawn and
he had no chance to read it. Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one
place of the house while the policemen conducted a search, forcibly opening cabinets and
taking his bag containing money, a licensed .45 caliber rearm, jewelry, and canned goods.
Aftermath:
After the search, the accused together with the conscated contraband were taken to the
police station. The RTC convicted the accused of violation of Sec.16, Republic Act No. 6425 and
to suer the penalty of indeterminate sentence with a minimum of six (6)months of arresto
mayor and a maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional and in
violation of Sec.8 of the same law and sentenced to suer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
a ne of Php 700,000.00
The Accused-appellant appeals on this contentions:
a. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE SEARCH
WARRANT VALID
b. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU)
c. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT FOR VIOLATION 8, R.A. NO. 6425
d. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE TWO (2)
BRICKS OF MARIJUANA
e. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE POLICEMEN USED
EXCESSIVE FORCE IN ENFORCING THE SEARCH WARRANT.
Issue:

Accused-appellant assails the validity of the warrant on three grounds:

(1) that there was no probable cause to search for drug paraphernalia;
(2) that the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense; and
(3) that the place to be searched was not described with sufficient particularity.
Held:
The warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined quantity of shabu and drug
paraphernalia." Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Accused-appellant contends, however, that the search warrant issued is void because
no evidence was presented showing the existence of drug paraphernalia and the same should
not have been ordered to be seized by the trial court.
However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the
seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void.
This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact
is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search
warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to
the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing
probable cause as to its existence.
Thus, in Aday v. Superior Court, the warrant properly described two obscene books but
improperly described other articles. It was held:
Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does not follow that it
was invalid as a whole. Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain
articles, even though proper if viewed separately, must be condemned merely because
the warrant was defective with respect to other articles. The invalid portions of the
warrant are severable from the authorization relating to the named books, which formed
the principal basis of the charge of obscenity. The search for and seizure of these books,
if otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the defects concerning other
articles. . . .
In so holding we do not mean to suggest that invalid portions of a warrant will be
treated as severable under all circumstances. We recognize the danger that warrants
might be obtained which are essentially general in character but as to minor items meet
the requirement of particularity, and that wholesale seizures might be made under them,
in the expectation that the seizure would in any event be upheld as to the property
specified. Such an abuse of the warrant procedure, of course, could not be tolerated.
It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable cause
and particularly describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in toto
because the judge erred in authorizing a search for other items not supported by the evidence.
Accordingly, we hold that the first part of the search warrant, authorizing the search of accusedappellant's house for an undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the second part,
with respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not.

Disposition:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of
possession of illegal drugs under 16 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer a prison term ranging from six (6) months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, and four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum, and ordering the confiscation of 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride is
AFFIRMED.
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court finding accusedappellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited drugs under 8 of R.A. No.
6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a
fine of P700,000.00 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged. However, the confiscation of the 1,254 grams of marijuana,
as well as the 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered
by the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Salazar v. Achacoso
183 SCRA 145
Personal Determination of Probable Cause by the judge
Exception: Determination by administrative officials
(Exception to the Exception)
Facts:
Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged
petitioner with illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a
telegram directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the complaint against him.
On the same day, after knowing that petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment
agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure Order
No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that there will a seizure of the documents and paraphernalia
being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having
verified that petitioner has (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed are acts
prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code.
A team was then tasked to implement the said Order. The group, accompanied by media
men and Mandaluyong policemen, went to petitioners residence. They served the order to a
certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in. The team confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner
filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of the seized properties, because she was not

given prior notice and hearing. The said Order violated due process. She also alleged that it
violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the properties were confiscated against her will and were
done with unreasonable force and intimidation.

Issue:
Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of
Labor) can validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor
Code?
Held:
Under the new Constitution, . . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Mayors and prosecuting officers cannot issue warrants of seizure or arrest. The Closure
and Seizure Order was based on Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court held, We
reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest
warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare
Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously,
exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) cannot be made to extend to other cases, like the
one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.
Furthermore, the search and seizure order was in the nature of a general warrant. The
court held that the warrant is null and void, because it must identify specifically the things to be
seized.
Disposition:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all
materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.

20th Century Fox v CA

164 SCRA 655
Particularity of Description
Facts:
Petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation sought the assistance of the NBI in
conducting searches and seizures in connection with the NBIs anti-film piracy campaign.

Petitioner alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the
unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in violation of PD No. 49 (the old
Intellectual Property Law).
The NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the
petitioner and subsequently filed three (3) applications for search warrants against the video
outlets owned by the private respondents. The lower court issued the desired search warrants.
The NBI, accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets and seized the items
described in the three warrants.
Private respondents later filed a motion to lift the search warrants and release the seized
properties, which was granted by the lower court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied by the lower court. The CA affirmed the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the judge properly lift the search warrants he issued earlier?
Held:
YES, the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier.
The lower court lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the absence of
probable cause that the private respondents violated P.D. 49. NBI agents who acted as
witnesses during the application for search warrant did not have personal knowledge of the
subject matter of their testimony, which was the alleged commission of the offense of piracy by
the private respondents. Only the petitioners counsel who was also a witness during the
application stated that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the
private respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner. The
lower court lifted the warrants, declaring that the testimony of petitioners counsel did not have
much credence because the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the
court during the application.
The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films, from which the pirated
films were allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who
have in their possession the pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the
presentation of the master tapes at the time of application may not be necessary as these would
be merely evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists
to justify the issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that
duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity
of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the
court the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes

allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former.
This linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films
cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
Disposition:
The Court DISMISSED the petition and AFFIRMED the questioned decision and
resolution of the CA.