Mysticism and understanding:

Steven Katz and his critics

BRUCEJANZ

Interpretation is the only game in town. I

Language is the universal medium in which understand­

ing occurs. Understanding occurs in interpreting.1!

We are interpretation all the way down.!l

A current debate in theory of interpretation revolves around what has been

called "universal hermeneutics," the position expressed by the above quo­
tations. On this position, there is no object of interpretation, no final refer­
ence for the defence of any interpretation, no guarantees about any of our
attempts to understand. The distinction between truth and meaning is fuzzy
or even non-existent. While debate continues concerning whether this anti­
foundationalism applies to natural science and our experience of the outside
world, the position enjoys much greater acceptance in the human sciences.
If this is the case, there is one interesting counter-instance in the human
sciences worth considering: mysticism. Is mystical experience interpretive
"all the way down," or is there bedrock? Is there something that anchors
mystical experience, or is the very experience itself an interpretation? Does
mystical experience require reference to mediating factors, such as tjJ.eo­
logical doctrine, culture, or whatever, or is it pure? Does interpretation con­
dition the experience, or merely follow the experience? Is mystical experi­
ence really part of the human sciences, or is it a natural science?

Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? (Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press,
1980),p.350,352.
2 H.-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd cd. (New York; Crossroad, 1989), p. 389.
3 D. Hiley, J. Bohman and R. Shusterman, eds., The Interpretive Turn (Ithaca, NY; Cornell
University Press, 1991), p. 7.

Bruce Janz is Assistant Professor of Philosophy in Augustana University College, 4901 46 Ave­
nue, Camrose, AB T4V 2R3.

Studies illReligiun / Sciences Religieuses 24/1 (1995): 77-94

© 1995 Canadian Corporation for Studies in Religion I Corporation Canadienne des Sciences Religieuses
78 Studies in Religion / Sciences Religieuses 24/1 1995

While Steven Katz was not the first to apply universal "hermeneutics to
mysticism, he certainly gave its most eloquent expression, and has been the
focus of most of the subsequent debate. In his essay "Language, Epistemol­
ogy, and Mysticism,"4 he argues that there is no "pure" mystical experience
at the core of the various interpretations, at least no core that is available ei­
ther to the mystic or to the later interpreter.
If a measure of the success of a philosophical article is how much atten­
tion it commands, Katz's article is a winner. Relatively little of the attention
has been positive, however. A host of writers have attacked Katz on a variety
of points. Gary Kessler and Norman Prigge,5 Peter Byrne,6 James Robert­
son Price m,1 J. W. Forgie,8 Huston Smith,9 Donald Evans,10 Sallie B.
King,ll Robert Forman,12 Jonathan Shear,13 Michael Stoeber 14 Nelson
Pike 15 have all argued against various aspects or implications of Katz's pro}

4 Steven Katz, "Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism," in S. Katz, ed., Mysticism and
Philosaphical Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 22-74. For further work
by Katz on this, see also "The 'Conservative' Character of Mystical Experience," in
S. Katz, ed., Mysticism and Religious Traditions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983);
and S. Katz, Mysticism and LanifUage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
5 Gary Kessler and Norman Prigge, "Is Mystical Experience Everywhere the Same?,"
Sophia, 21 (1982): 39-55.
6 Peter Byrne, "Mysticism, Identity, and Realism: A Debate Reviewed," Internalionaljournal
ofthePhilosaphy ofReligian, 16 (1984): 23744.
7 James Robertson Price, "The Objectivity of Mystical Truth Claims," Thom;sl, 49 (1985):
81-98.
8 J. W. Forgie, "Hyper-Kantianism in Recent Discussions of Mystical Experience," Religious
Studies,21 (1985): 205-18.
9 Huston Smith, "Is There a Perennial Philosophy?," journal ofthe American Academy of Reli­
gian,55 (1897): 553-66.
10 Donald Evans, "Can Philosophers Limit \\-'hat Mystics Can Do? A Critique of Steven
Katz," Religious Studus, 25 (1988): 53-60.
II Sallie King, "Two Epistemological Models for the Interpretation of Mysticism," journal of
the American Academy ofReligion, 61 (1988): 257-79.
12 Robert Forman, "The Construction of Mystical Experience," Faith and Philosaphy, 5
(1988): 254-67, and Robert Forman, "Paramartha and Modern Constructivists on Mysti­
cism: Epistemological Monomorphism versus Duomorphism," Philosaphy East and West,
39 (1989): 393418.
13 Jonathan Shear, "Mystical Experience, Hermeneutics, and Rationality," International
Philosaphical Quarterly, 30 (1990): 391-40 I.
14 Michael Stoeber, "Constructivist Epistemologies of Mysticism: A Critique and a Revi­
sion," Religious Studies, 28 (1991): 107-16.
15 Nelson Pike, "Steven Katz on Christian Mysticism," in Mystic Unian: An Essay in the Phe­
nomenology ofMysticism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 194-207. For other
discussions of Katz, see also J. Gill, "Mysticism and Mediation," Faith and Philosophy, 1
(1984): 111-21; GraceJantzen, "Mysticism and Experience," Religious Studus, 25 (1988):
295-315; Bernard McGinn, The Foundations of Mysticism (New York: Crossroad, 1991),
p. 321-24; A. Perovich, "Mysticism and the Philosophy of Science," Journal of Religion, 65
(1985); 63-82; and Wayne Proudfoot, ReligiottsExperience (Berkeley, CA: University of Cali­
fornia Press, 1985), p. 122-54.
Janz / Steven Katz and his critics 79

ect, in favour (usually) of the importance of purity of the pre-interpretive

experience.
The purpose of this article will be to outline the debate over the relation­
ship between the mystical experience and interpretation. I intend to show
that both Steven Katz and his critics assume a certain metaphor for mysti­
cism which fuels this debate. I will then suggest another metaphor that, at
least in part, resolves the debate by recasting mysticism as a hermeneutical
issue (although not one that necessarily buys into universal hermeneutics)
rather than an epistemological one.

1 Definitions and distinctions

The first distinction that must be made is between the purity of a mystical
experience and the phenomenological unity of mystical experiences. If a
mystical experience occurs without any dependence on social, cultural,
theological, religious or other mediation, it can be called "pure." This is
not exactly the same use of "pure" that Horne l6 uses in discussing pure
and mixed mysticism, for he limits the distinction to lack of doctrinal con­
tent, while in this context the purity of the experience refers to the lack of
any mediation or influence at all in determining or producing the mystical
experience. To assert that mystical experiences are unified means that they
are identical despite different theological or cultural contexts.
The unity of the experience is different from its purity. If we decide that
the experience is pure, at best only the first step toward a unified experi­
ence has been achieved. In itself, demonstrating purity does not necessarily
entail the unity or similarity of any mystical experiences across cultures and
traditions. It is still possible, at least logically, assuming that the purity of the
experience has been shown, that a Christian mystic and a Hindu mystic
could have pure introvertive mystical experiences, but that these could be
fundamentally different. Arguing that the purity of the experience entails
the unity of experiences requires a metaphysical assumption about the na­
ture of reality that would negate the purity of the experience, because the
arguer would have to claim that the mystic's experience had as part of it the
experience of a single reality for all mystics. It could just as well be the case
that one mystic directly experiences a reality different from that of another.
Furthermore, demonstrating unity across traditions (for instance, the
agreement of mystics with each other on important points) does not neces­
sarily entail purity. The seeming unity of experiences could be the result of
later interpretation. To argue that unity implies purity means that the pu­
rity of the experience must already have been assumed. The interpreter

16 James Horne, The Moral Mystic (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1983),
p.39-40.
80 Studies in Religion / Sciences Religieuses 24/1 1995

must be able to show positively that differences amongst reports of experi­

ences are attributable to some later factor, and nothing else. It is very un­
likely that this could be done. Further, arguing that unity entails purity as­
sumes that we can get beyond the mechanism for reporting the experi­
ences to the experience itself. While this may be true for a particular mystic
by that mystic himself or herself, it would require a meta-mystical experi­
ence to transcend particular experiences.
What happens if we demonstrate lack of purity? Does this allow us to con­
clude that there is also either unity or a lack of unity? This does not neces­
sarily follow. We might show that there is no essence, or core, to mystical ex­
perience. Nevertheless, it still could be that the mediating factors are wide­
spread enough and similar enough to allow for a unity of the experience
without purity. There may be mediating elements that transcend particular
religious systems, perhaps ones common to all humanity, that could mean
that the experiences of various mystics are still very similar. Experiences of
death, for instance, could inform and structure the mystical experience,
even though death is universally experienced.
Finally, does the lack of unity allow us to conclude there is a lack of pu­
rity? No, this does not follow either. Mystics could have deep differences be­
tween reports of experiences, and it could be that we could in principle
never get beyond those reports. Even mystics themselves have to rely on the
reports of other mystics to determine whether there is unity. Perhaps the
reports differ sufficiently to cast doubt, but that could just be a result of the
necessity of the theologically and culturally biased reporting mechanism,
not the experience itself.
So, to summarize: (1) Purity does not necessarily entail unity, or lack of
unity; (2) Unity does not necessarily entail purity, or lack of purity; (3) Lack
of purity does not necessarily entail either unity or lack of unity; and (4)
Lack of unity does not necessarily entail either purity or lack of purity.
All this means that, if a person wanted to argue against Katz's position
that mystical experience is not pure, it would not be sufficient to link it to
the unity of mystics across traditions. On the other hand, it also would not
work to point to the differences in mystical experiences to argue for Katz's
position. Establishing unity does not necessarily mean anything for purity,
and establishing lack of unity does not necessarily mean anything for lack
of purity. Thus, Huston Smith's17 argument for perennial philosophy
(meaning unity, as is clear by page 564) may be true, but it is strictly speak­
ing irrelevant if it intends to argue for the phenomenological purity of the
mystical experience. Smith is not the only one to make this connection.
One objection to this analysis (made by several earlier readers of this
article) might be that it holds for all mystical experiences except those in

17 Smith, "Is There a Perennial Philosophy?," p. 553-66.

Janz / Steven Katz and his critics 81

which there is no intentional object. Experiences of pure consciousness, it

might be said, must be exempt because they lack any content at all, and are
therefore both pure (because there is nothing not to be pure) and unified
(for there is nothing to distinguish one experience from another). The
problem with this objection is that Katz would be unwilling to admit that
these pure consciousness experiences actually exist at all. In other words,
for this objection to have force it must assume the ultimate correctness of
one side of the debate.
The second distinction that must be made concerns the names used for
each side in this debate. Katz uses a couple of terms for the other side: es­
sentialist, for instance, and also philosophia perennis. 18 The first term implies
that there is a core, or essence to mystical experience which precedes inter­
pretation. The second (here used differently than by Smith, above) implies
that this core extends universally. In other words, the first term implies pu­
rity and the second implies unity.
Names for the other side are many and varied, ranging from the relatively
neutral to the positively vituperative. Katz calls his own position the "contex­
tual thesis."19 The names given by others include constructivist, 20 hermeneut­
ical,21 mediated,22 neo-Kantian,23 hyper-Kantian 24 and pluralist. 25
Notice that these terms have different implications. Katz's "contextual
thesis" is only about purity, not about unity, although he does make com­
ments about the diversity (lack of unity) of mystical experiences. To call the
position "constructivist" is to change the emphasis from saying that the ex­
perience is understandable only in its context, to saying that the experi­
ence can be generated from other parts, and therefore may also be reduc­
ible to those parts. Katz himself calls the other side reductionist, in that its
supporters reduce all reports of x to one claimed essence y.26 Contextual­
ism, on the other hand, does not imply reductionism for him. Constructiv­
ism is not the same as Katz' contextualism, because to say that a mystical ex­
perience happens within a context is not the same as saying that it is con­
structed from more basic parts.
Associating Katz's position with Kant (neo-Kantian, hyper-Kantian) is ac­
tually to call it constructivist in a more specific way. The critics that charac­

18 Katz, "Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism," p. 24.

19 Ibid., p. 46.

20 Forman, "The Construction of Mystical Experience"; Forman, "Paramartha and Modern

Constructivists on Mysticism"; and Stoeber, "Constructivist Epistemologies of Mysticism."

21 Shear, "Mystical Experience," p. 391-401.
22 Gill, "Mysticism and Mediation," p. 111-21.
23 Evans, "Can Philosophers Limit What Mystics Can Do?," p. 53-60.
24 Forgie, "H)per-Kamianism," p. 205-18.
25 King, "Two Epistemological Models," p. 257-79.
26 Katz, "Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism," p. 24.
82 Studies in Religion / Sciences Religieuses 24/1 1995

terize Katz as neo-Kantian do so because of the family resemblance be­

tween Katz's position that the mystical experience is mediated by tradition
and Kant's position that sensation is mediated by categories. These critics
all attack Katz by saying that he has deviated from the transcendental (uni­
versal and necessary) nature of the Kantian categories and has thus made
the mystical experience into a construction of personal experience. In
other words, the mystical experience seems to be reduced to a psychologi­
cal experience, which undermines the possibility of any objective nature.
There are two problems in characterizing Katz's work as Kantian
though. First, the only place Katz mentions Kant is in a specific, limited
context. 27 He is arguing against the phenomenologists' position that the
given can be intuited. He points out that these intuitions lead to very differ­
ent descriptions of the given, and cites Kant approvingly that epistemic ac­
tivity requires bringing to light both the conditions of knowing in general,
as well as the grounds of its own operation. He does not propose to outline
what that structuring is, and says that it will not happen in the manner Kant
worked out.
Is this enough to argue for constructivism? I do not think so. It is not
clear that Katz would agree with the claim that contextualization implies
Kantian constructivism. In fact, I suspect that he would be more amenable
to a comparison with Wittgenstein than with Kant, a comparison that Sallie
King makes and critiques.
The second problem is that Katz is being accused of not quite being like
Kant. At least if he followed Kant faithfully (so the argument goes) he
would be committed to (1) the transcendental nature of the categories,
which would ensure at least the unity of experiences, if not their purity, and
(2) the noumenal world, which provides the "stuff" for the categories to
structure. But Katz seems to want to have the Kantian categories without
the Kantian restrictions on relativism. He is therefore a constructivist of the
crassest sort, who would reduce mystical experience to a collection of inter­
changeable parts.
Criticizing Katz for almost looking like Kant, however, is not much of a
criticism. Most contemporary critics of Kant also pointed out the problems
with Kant's doctrine of transcendental idealism; it is only recently that that
particular doctrine has been reconsidered and defended. And, even if Katz
and Kant both depend on categories (which is by no means clear), it does
not follow that these categories are identical or that their structure or im­
plementation is identical. In fact, Katz says that he does not follow Kant on
the way to structure experience.
Even if Katz does bear some resemblance to Kant, does this imply rela­
tivistic constructivism? Not necessarily. Katz nowhere wants to claim the re­

21 Ibid.. p. 59.
Janz / Steven Katz and his critics 83

ductionist thesis. Perhaps there is a way to contextualize mystical experi­

ence that does not fall into the problem of arbitrariness or subjectivity, and
retains the importance of the mystical experience. In short, I think the at­
tempt to critique Katz as if he was a Kantian strayed from the fold misses
the point.
Jonathan Shear calls Katz a "hermeneutical thinker," and characterizes
such thinkers as holding that "the standard, seemingly commonsensical
analyses of mystical experiences do not do justice to general, epistemologi­
cally related facts of the nature of human experience."28 This position is
overly generalized, Shear argues, and is sometimes completely false.
Shear wants to cast Katz as a constructivist, although the word he uses is
"hermeneutical." For instance, consider this paragraph:
Let us now examine Katz's general argument a little further. His "basic claim," as
we saw, is that all mystical experiences (like all others) are "shaped" by the ex­
periencer in terms of memory, apprehension, expectation, language, accumula­
tion of prior experiences, concepts, etc. Thus, as we saw, mystical experiences, like
all others, are "built" of all these "elements."29

\\-'hile Katz does use words of this sort,30 and could therefore be taken in
isolated instances to be advocating a constructivist program, most times he
sounds quite different. For instance: "all experience is processed through,
organized by, and makes itself available to us in extremely complex episte­
mological ways."31 This seems to be contextualization, not construction.
Katz resists reducing mystical experience to component elements that are
all naturally explainable. I myself do not believe he is driven to this kind of
reductionism. My argument later will try to establish a rapprochement be­
tween purity and contextualism. But Shear's attempt seems to simply be a
misunderstanding of both hermeneutics and Katz's position.
Sallie King characterizes Katz's position as pluralist, as opposed to her
own "Buddhist-phenomenological model.,,32 But "pluralism" implies lack
of unity, while Katz is arguing for lack of purity. On the face of it, then, it
seems that King too has missed the point. In calling her model phenome­
nological, however, she is clearly intending to address the question of pu­
rity. She seems to be following a modified form of Ninian Smart's posi­
tion. 33 It should be pointed out, though, that the most she can do (and per­

28 Shear, "Mystical Experience," p. 392. Shear's use ofthe term "hermeneutics" is very dif­
ferent from my use later in this article.
29 Ibid., p. 394.
30 Katz, "Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism," p. 59.
31 Ibid., p. 26.
32 Sallie King. "Interpretation of mysticism," p. 258. 271.
33 Ninian Smart, "Interpretation and Mystical Experience," in R. Woods, ed.. Understanding
Mysticism (Garden City, NY: Image Books, 1980). p. 78-91.
84 Studies in Religion / Sciences Religieuses 24/1 1995

haps, the most that can be done) is to argue that the pure experience is at
least possible.
We could go on, but the point is this: confusing the two issues of purity
and unity has led to misconstruing Katz's position. This misconstrual has its
most clear manifestation in the names used for that position. This should
not be taken as an apologetic for Katz; rather, I simply want to set the stage
to consider the debate in a new way.

2 Mysticism as epistemology
Much discussion in mysticism has been carried on over the epistemological
status of the experience the mystic has. Is the mystic's experience knowl­
edge? Is it verifiable or communicable? The present debate, I would argue,
is also driven by epistemological concerns. Katz, on the one side, argues
that the experience happens within a context. That could make the mys­
tic's experience almost a separate Wittgensteinian language game, not ac­
cessible from other language games. Or it could reduce the experience to
the level of doctrine and tradition, making it accessible to anyone who
cares to take a first-year religious studies course. If a contextualized experi­
ence is to be known, therefore, it entails either meta-mysticism-a mystical
leap between mystical language games-or no mysticism at all.
Either way, the concern affects the knowledge status of the experience.
The first option rules mysticism out of court as knowledge at all. Many
people find this unpalatable, because it is common to claim a kind of inner
rationality to the mystical experience. The experience is not irrational, but
super-rational, accessible only on its own terms. A contextualized mystical
experience could easily be an arbitrary experience, undistinguishable from
psychosis. The second option makes mystical knowledge trivial, simply a
way of accessing publicly available doctrines. The experience itself could
then be explained psychologically, and dismissed as an affectation of cer­
tain personali ty types.
Katz meets some of these problems, as well as addressing the essentialist
critique, by recasting his position as a dialectic between the "radical" (that
is, the experience is completely unique-roughly equivalent to the essen­
tialist position) and "conservative" (that is, the experience conserves the
tradition-the contextualist position).34 He even uses the term "herme­
neutical" of this position, as I do. 35 In shifting his emphasis, he recognizes
that a balance must be struck between the two extremes. Unfortunately,
the answer (that there is a dialectic between the two extremes) seems to in­
dicate a separation between "elements" within mysticism, and is far from

34 Katz, "The 'Conservative' Character," p. 3-60.

35 Ibid., p. 5.
Janz / Steven Katz and his critics 85

the unified experience that mystics actually report. His attempt at reconcili­
ation has not seemed to satisty the critics.
So there are some problems with Katz's position, if we take it as operat­
ing within the realm of knowledge claims, although I do not think that Katz
is ignorant of these problems. Despite them, there are benefits to advocat­
ing the position that mystical experience is mediated or constructed by
doctrine, tradition or culture.
One seeming benefit is that it enables us to explain why mystics from dif­
ferent backgrounds give different reports of their experiences. Buddhist
mystics, after all, rarely have visions of the Virgin Mary. Even outside the
visionary type of mysticism, experiences tend to confirm doctrinal posi­
tions. Of course, given what I said earlier about the difference between the
purity and the unity of the mystical experience, this advantage looks better
than it actually is. Katz wants to argue for lack of purity; this benefit applies
to lack of unity (diversity). There would need to be some explicit argument
given for why the first entails the second, for the implication is not a logi­
cally necessary one. Thus, we will have to look for better reasons for argu­
ing for the contextual thesis.
Second, reports of mystics tend to confirm their own tradition. It is rare
that a mystic reports experiences that are at variance with his or her tradi­
tion. Michael Stoeber does point out that mystics are sometimes heretics,36
but this heresy commonly pushes the boundaries of the stagnant metaphys­
ics of a tradition, rather than denying that tradition. These heretics are rad­
ical in the true sense of the word: they go to the root of the tradition, to re­
cover it. 37 This is a much better reason. At least it deals with the conver­
gence between theology and experience within a tradition.
A third benefit of the contextual, or mediated version of mystical experi­
ence is that it undermines some of the traditional objections to mystical ex­
perience. For instance, some might argue that mysticism makes for a hier­
archical theology. There can be a two-tiered system-those who have had
the mystical experience (the elite) and those who have not (the seekers).
Contextualism can answer this objection by saying that the experience is
still within the public world of dogma and culture, and therefore confirms
that world. Essentialism's only answer is that this is just the way it is. Some
are blessed and some are not.
Furthermore, if mysticism is contextual, there could be an antidote to
the perennial charge against some forms of mysticism: quietism. If some
mystics are led to withdraw from the world, that is not the fault of the expe­

36 Stoeber, "Constructivist Epistemologies of Mysticism," p. 112.

37 Steven Katz also argues for this sense of the radical, although ironically, the sense of radi­
cal as "rooted" is really his category of "conservative" (Katz, "The 'Conservative' Char­
acter," p. ~).
86 Studies in Religion / Sciences Religieuses 24/1 1995

rience, but of the theology and culture which made that experience pos­
sible. And this theology or culture can be addressed in ways that the experi­
ence cannot.
Of course, the critics do not object simply because of whim. The appeal
of the essentialist position differs for different critics, but there are some
important benefits to holding essentialism and denying contextualism:
One commonly mentioned benefit is this: while there are many differ­
ences in the reports mystics give of their experiences, there are also many
similarities. The essentialist position takes these similarities seriously and
accounts for the differences through later interpretation. This reason, like
the first reason for the contextual thesis, is not compelling because it con­
fuses the purity/unity distinction. Similarities do not entail purity any more
than differences entail lack of purity.
Second, it ensures that mystical experience is not reduced to cultural ex­
perience. If mysticism is mediated by theology, tradition or culture, the fear
is that it will be regarded as nothing more than an intense appreciation of
that theology, tradition or culture. Mysticism will in some way become "nat­
ural," and that will take something important away from the experience.
Third, it ensures that the mystical experience is unique, not reducible to
psychological experience. The mystic is not simply a particular brand of
psychotic or religious fanatic. If the experience is naturalized, however, that
danger exists.
Fourth, following from the previous two reasons, if mysticism is reduc­
ible, it is also explainable. A hallmark of mysticism is mystery and paradox;
yet, if we find that it is reallyjust intensely felt theology, or psychological ab­
erration, we can ignore the question of the meaningfulness of the experi­
ence. This isJonathan Shear's concern. 38
Finally, if mystical experience is mediated by expectations of some sort,
it seems difficult to account for the reports of many mystics, that there is a
"pure consciousness" in the experience. It is not an intentional experience
at all.
The concerns of both sides seem legitimate. Furthermore, the argu­
ments for one side or the other seem to rely in part on a conceptual confu­
sion (purity/unity) and mislabelling of positions. This is not to say that
there are no good arguments for each side; in fact, I think there are. How­
ever, they seem to balance each other out. How are we to decide between
them? I would like to suggest one reason for the impasse, and propose a
way out.

38 Shear, "Mystical Experience, Hermeneutics, and Rationality," p. 400.

Janz I Steven Katz and his critics 87

3 Mystical experience vs. mystical understanding

There is an important presupposition in this debate which must be brought
to light. Virtually all discussants, including Katz, assume that mystical expe­
rience is analogous to sense experience. The debate then becomes one
over whether experience is structured in itself (Katz's position, and one cri­
tiqued as neo-Kantian by J. William Forgie, Donald Evans and, to a certain
extent, Michael Stoeber), or whether experience is primitive (the position
most of the critics hold) .39 Why are mystical experience and sense experi­
ence so easily related? There are some good philosophical and historical
reasons for this.
The first and most obvious concerns light imagery used by many mystics,
leading one to believe that the mystical "vision" or "insight" or "illumina­
tion" is like sight, only enhanced. As well, some mystic experiences are re­
ported as auditory, rather than visual. The mystic might hear voices or mu­
sic. Again, there is an easy connection between the experience and a
heightened sensory state. Furthermore, the mystics that do not use vision
or sound as metaphors use touch, smell and taste. It is the difference be­
tween Augustine (light/intellectual presence) and Gregory of Nyssa (dark­
ness/immediate presence). In general, if a mystic wants to communicate
the experience he or she has had, metaphors must be used that the audi­
ence will understand. In philosophical tradition, the most significan t forms
of knowledge are that derived from the senses and that derived from rea­
son. But the second also uses the first as its metaphor. So, knowledge that
people already have is infused with the sensory metaphor.
Another benefit is that the analogy to sensation ensures the reality of the
experience. The fact that we sense cannot be disputed, although what we
sense may be questioned. In the same way, if mysticism is like sensation, it
seems more difficult to dismiss the experience. Furthermore, sensation is
something that everyone can relate to. By using this metaphor for mysti­
cism, the experience is easily communicated, even if the meaning is not. As
well, the analogy to sensation reinforces the immediacy of the experience.
There is a tradition (probably due to British empiricism) that sensation is
primitive and immediate, and forms the building-blocks of our mental

39 It should be noted that, when I refer to the metaphor of sensation, I mean the traditional
empiricist position that sensation is primitive, the building blocks for later interpreta­
tion. Much discussion of mysticism has assumed this version of sensation. I realize that it
is quite possible that sensation is itself hermeneutical, but that is not how most scholars
of mysticism have taken it. This is, after all, a metaphor which is assumed in making the
mystical experience into an epistemological event, and so the issue concerns what episte­
mology has been inherited, not which one could be consciously argued for. One good
source that argues for the hermeneutical nature of sensation is Graeme Nicholson, Seeing
and Reading (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1984).
88 Studies in Religion / Sciences Religieuses 24/1 1995

world. But just as this view of sensation has been questioned, so too this
view of mysticism has been questioned by Katz and others.
Finally, the discussion about mysticism has been driven, in part, by the
question of whether mystical knowledge is legitimate. This stems from the
early philosophical discussions of mysticism, as a branch of the "religious
experience" argument for the existence of God or for the legitimacy of a
particular religion. While mystical insights have for centuries been ap­
propriated enthusiastically by mainstream philosophers (often without giv­
ing the true source its due recognition), mystical experience has been harder
to deal with. It is relatively recent that respectable philosophers have been
able to talk about mystical experience without being accused of falling into
psychology or, worse yet, religion.
But how did philosophy deal with mystical experience when it began to
take it seriously? By using its own metaphors. And the most important, the
most ready metaphor, was that of knowledge. But knowledge comes with its
own metaphors, which are often based on sensation. Walter Ong does a
marvellous job of showing the pervasiveness and usefulness of the sensory
metaphors for knowledge.40 The argument, then, goes like this: mystical
experience provides knowledge, just as other experience provides knowl­
edge; knowledge is not only normally derived from sensation, but is best
understood through sensory metaphors; therefore, mystical experience is
best understood through sensory metaphors.
There are, though, differences between the mystical experience and the
empiricist version of sensation. Sensation is, after all, only a metaphor for
the mystical experience, albeit one that has held such powerful sway that
most people simply assume that the mystical experience is just another
kind of sensation.
One difference is that the mystic does not report the experience as one
which requires further understanding, but as one characterized as pure un­
derstanding. The mystic does not have the sensation first and understand it
later. The "raw data" of the experience does not require any inbred func­
tions of the mind, like judgment, memory or whatever, to be understood.
Any empiricist must combine an active mind and passive sensations. This is
not what happens in mystical experience, though. The experience is the
understanding. This is a very important difference, for it collapses the tra­
ditional empiricist/pragmatist structure of mysticism (critiqued by, among
others, GraceJantzen 41 ) and opens the door for characterizing mystical ex­
perience as hermeneutical. We need an account that deals with mysticism

40 Walter Ong, "I See What You Say: Sense Analogues for Intellect," in Interfaces of the Word
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 121-44.
41 Jantzen. "Mysticism and Experience." p. 313-15.
Janz / Steven Katz and his critics 89

as understanding at its most basic level, not as knowledge that has been
constructed from some raw data. It is this hermeneutical model I favour.
There is another difference. Many mystics report that there is conscious­
ness without any object at all. Sensation typically is intentional-it is of
something. Scholars who recognize the non-intentional nature of many
mystical experiences, but still hold on to the sensation metaphor, are likely
simply to drop the "object" and retain the "subject." Or, if there is an ob­
ject, it is an onto/theological one. It is a metaphysical thing, like the objects
of normal sensation. The point is that the subject/object split is tacitly
maintained in the metaphor used, even though the scholar may try in
other ways to transcend that distinction. Sallie King goes partway in resolv­
ing this subject/object split by relying on Husserlian descriptive phenome­
nology. My modification of her position (which actually turns out to argue
against her conclusion that there is a core to mystical experience) is that
phenomenology must be hermeneutical, not simply descriptive.
It is important to note in this analysis that I am not suggesting that most
analyses of mysticism claim that mysticism is like sensation, and therefore
falls into the traditional empiricist distinction between the knowing subject
and the empirical object of that knowledge. Many theorists explicitly reject
the idea that mysticism is a subject/object type of experience. However,
they may be implicitly committed to that split, in that they may hold that
mystical experience gives or forms the basis for knowledge. It is this con­
nection I really take issue with, because the metaphor of many discussions
of knowledge has been sensory. Thus, the problem does not lie in the claim
that mysticism is like sensation, but that mysticism is knowledge, which is
like sensation. The fact that some mystics report sensory-type experiences
is used as a support of the epistemological character of the experience.
Identitying the places where mysticism is not like sensation could argue
for a "neo-Kantian" version of sensation, but that is not the only conclu­
sion possible. It might also mean that mysticism is more like an act in which
experience and understanding are co-temporaneous-like reading, for in­
stance. If a person does not understand at least at some basic level while
reading, the person is not reading but only looking. The idea that the mys­
tical experience is hermeneutical, like textual experience, opens up inter­
esting possibilities. These are well expressed in another context by one of
Paul Ricoeur's works on interpretation theory.42 In a series of lectures,
Ricoeur argues that reading a text consists of the tension and in terplay be­
tween two parts, variously portrayed as code and message, meaning and
event, langue and parole. In each case, the message is imbedded in the code,
but the code exists only through the message. Which is more real? The

42 Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth, TX:
Texas Christian University Press, 1976).
90 Studies in Religion / Sciences Religieuses 24/1 1995

unique message is what I am saying now; the grammar (structure. code) is

virtual. or assumed. Therefore the message is more real. But the language
will remain long after the message is gone; therefore, the code is more real. Is
the message unique? It relies on the reference to the structure of previous
messages for its meaning. and therefore does not seem to be unique; yet. it is
a new message with a sense of its own, not reducible to the other messages
nor generatable from them, and therefore does seem to be unique.
Ricoeur's point is that, even though the message (meaning) is imbed­
ded in a structure, the message (event) is still unique. For example, a novel­
ist may write a novel, and that novel will follow the conventions of novel
writing. Is the novel reducible to its implied references? No; it is unique.
But could the message be understood without its implied references? No.
These implied references point to other instances within a genre (we un­
derstand novels from having experienced other novels), to other writing
outside the genre (the novel differs from the factual report, and the reader
can become disoriented if that boundary blurs), and to experience apart
from writing (the novel makes sense ifitrings true to experience).
What is the experience of the novel? Is it reducible to the sensory inputs
of reading? No, because we could imagine experiencing the same novel
through different senses-hearing, for instance-or through different
media, such as drama. Understanding the novel is not reducible to the sen­
sations involved in reading. Reading the novel is an irreducible act of un­
derstanding. That understanding may not be complete, but it exists apart
from the sensation of the means of transmission of the novel.
Is the understanding of the novel only an intellectual act? No; there may
be strong emotional components to it. If you "see yourself" in a novel, that
does not necessarily mean that you simply agree with concepts contained
therein. It means that a character or situation reflects your experience in
all its rational, pre-rational, and non-rational diversity. Understanding is
not reducible to knowledge about the novel, nor is it reducible to proposi­
tions about the novel. Understanding catches us up in our totality.
How does this apply to the mystical experience? One might argue that
the mystical experience, whether visionary or not, is totally unique, and
does not have a literature. Or, if it has a literature, it comes after the fact, as
an attempt to rationalize the experience. In Ninian Smart's schematization,
whether there is auto- or hetero-interpretation, there is always some degree
of ramification. 43 In other words, all mystical experience is phenomenolog­
ically the same; it is the later interpretation that makes the difference.
But how can this be defended? It seems to be no more than an assump­
tion. While there are problems with the contextualist model, there are also
problems with the "primitive experience," or essentialist model. It is not

43 Smart, "Interpretation and Mystical Experience," p. 78-91.

Janz / Steven Katz and his critics 91

true that all mystics report the same thing, although there are similarities.
To decide that the experiences are all the same is itself a philosophical deci­
sion not derivable from the evidence alone. A contextualist will always be
able to see mediation and context; an essentialist will always be able to see
the primitive experience. Simply asserting one or the other will not solve
the issue.
I believe that it is possible both to understand that the experience hap­
pens within a tradition and to regard it as unique. While it is not true that
all mystical experiences happen within a tradition that encourages the ex­
perience, most do. While it is not true that all mystics have experiences that
are part of their religious or cultural heritage, most do. And very few have
experiences that actually contradict their heritage, St. Paul's experience
notwithstanding. Even in his case, one could argue that the vision ex­
tended, rather than negated, his Jewish heritage. This is a hallmark of mys­
tical experience, that the edges of orthodoxy are pushed; but this is not
necessarily a contradiction of orthodoxy. It could be a deepening or
grounding of orthodoxy.
Changing from the metaphor of sensation to the metaphor of under­
standing a text is the first step in breaking the impasse. The metaphor of
sensation is a useful one, and should not be thrown out; however, it is a par­
tial one. The danger has been that we have forgotten that it is just a meta­
phor. So, this second metaphor should be put in tension with the first.
How is mysticism like reading a novel? There is the obvious parallel be­
tween the understanding that characterizes both. It is immediate, and at
the best of times, it can "take over." I am not suggesting that reading a
novel is a form of mystical insight; this is just a metaphor. But a good novel
can create a new consciousness. It is an event. The reader can become lost
in a new world. The mystic typically is called back to the experience, as the
reader is called back to a good book. Both find new things all the time. For
both, the understanding is one of opening new possibilities when before all
possibilities were stagnant or non-existent. The mystical experience, like
the novel, is new. unique and exciting.
And yet ... it exists in a context. It works only because the mystic, or the
reader, is ready for the experience. It works because the mystic has come to
terms with his or her existence, and found that existence to be lacking.
This may be a conscious realization or something that is only realized when
the experience highlights life as it is, and as it could be. The novel, and the
mystical experience. then. might be something that has had a long prepara­
tion, or it might take the person by surprise.
Of course, reading the novel is not an act of pure consciousness. Meta­
phors can only be pushed so far. Nevertheless, the very act of setting up an
alternate metaphor to the sensation image highlights the fact that these are
only metaphors that open up some ways of understanding, but close off
92 Studies in Religion / Sciences Religieuses 24/1 1995

others. The problem for both Katz and most of his critics is that they forget
the metaphor. Is the mystical experience really primitive or is it really con­
structed? This is a false dichotomy, brought on by the metaphor of sensa­
tion. Like the novel, the mystical experience can be both.
Why should anyone prefer this hermeneutical account to either the es­
sentialist or the contextualist account? Mainly because it avoids the prob­
lems of either pole of the debate, it gives an account that recognizes the sig­
nificance of the uniqueness of the mystic's understanding while at the same
time recognizing what most mystics would claim about themselves, that
they are rooted in a tradition. Robert Forman 44 critiques both sides (which
he calls "perennialism" and "constructivism") and proposes a solution
which incorporates "forgetting." I believe my hermeneutical account in­
corporates his answer, as I will try to show in the next section.

4 Structure and uniqueness

While it is true that many mystics have experiences where elements of cul­
ture or doctrine are present, the more interesting structural connections
happen in absence, rather than presence. Some writers have pointed out
that there is a great deal of negativity involved in mysticism. While not want­
ing to be committed to Derrida's entire project, we could also draw on his
notion of absence. 45 The meaning of a text comes not because of the pres­
ence of certain elements, but due to their absence. In the case of mysticism,
perhaps it is not the fact that the mystic makes specific references to a
dogma or tradition that is important, but that the mystic's experience exists
in the negation of his or her other experiences.
But that only goes so far. The mystic, after all, is not the objective ob­
server of his or her own experiences. We hardly expect the mystic to com­
pare the present experience with absent experiences, and thereby begin to
understand. The understanding is immediate, not inferential, even though
this immediacy does not necessarily imply total understanding. What is ab­
sent, then? Robert Forman and Michael Stoeber both give us a hint.
Forman 46 points out that the mystical pure consciousness is the process
of forgetting. While he uses sensory analogies (perhaps unavoidably), he
also uses doctrinal examples. Eckhart talks of letting go of all notions of

44 Robert Forman, "Of Deserts and Doors: Methodology of the Study of Mysticism," Sophia,
32 (1993): 31-44.
45 I am aware that Derrida has rejected the idea that deconstruction is a kind of apophatic the­
ology. The best treatment of the negativity in theology and deconstruction, that avoids the
route of apophatic theology but affirms the relevance of deconstruction for theology is
It Hart, The Trespass ofthe Sign (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
46 Forman, "The Construction of Mystical Experience," Faith and Phiwsophy, p. 254-67, and
Forman, "Of Deserts and Doors," p. 31-44.
Janz / Steven Katz and his critics 93

God (going as far in one place as saying that he must be rid of God in order
to see God). A famous Zen Buddhist aphorism is "If you see the Buddha on
the road, kill him." Examples of this type of forgetting could be compounded
from StJohn of the Cross,Jacob Boehme and many other mystics.
Now, is this forgetting an attempt to negate one's knowledge? Is the mys­
tic yearning for a time before knowledge? Is pure experience something
that happens in the denial of experience or in the transcendence of experi­
ence? I would contend that the mystic's knowledge is part of the necessary
path that brings him or her to the place where that knowledge can be given
up. It is a Hegelian Aujhelntng, the simultaneous transcending and destruc­
tion of a state, which recognizes that state was necessary for the higher one
to take place. There is plenty of evidence that mystics travel a path-the
dark night of the soul, the eight-fold path-to mystical insight. Of course,
not everyone who has a mystical experience has followed this path. Never­
theless, it seems clear that the experience of most mystics was necessary in
order to arrive at the place where mystical experience can happen. This is
contextualized experience necessary for understanding, but which does
not reduce to doctrine or tradition. And recognition of this contextualiza­
tion is important both for the mystic and for the later interpreter.
This can be put in another way for some mystics. The path the mystic takes
to enlightenment is often one of struggle with the seeming contradictions of
received theology, tradition, or culture. The mystic (from the perspective of
Western theology for the moment) cannot make coherent the love of God
with the evil in the world, or the oneness of God with the fragmentation of
creation. This problem becomes an all-consuming existential issue. The an­
swer, if it comes (and there are no guarantees). comes as the solution to this
problem. Some mysticism can be seen as a kind of existential release to an ir­
resolvable dilemma. Because of the high stakes, this is not simply Ar­
chimedes' intellectual "Eureka" upon realizing how to determine the mass
of Hiero's crown. The problem has taken over the person's very being, and
therefore so does the answer. It is understanding-perhaps understanding
that defies ready communication-but understanding nonetheless. And this
understanding is multifaceted: emotional, intellectual, volitional.
While this is not an explanation of the mystical experience, it is a contex­
tualization. It does help both the mystic and the scholar to understand the
path that led to the experience. The understanding is unique, yet situated.
Michael Stoeber47 seems to be sympathetic to this as well. Although he
seems caught up in the sensory analogy (along with an unfortunate tend­
ency to regard mystical experience as a kind of information processing-a
computer metaphor that does more harm than good), his critique of the

47 Stoeber, "Constructivist Epistemologies of Mysticism," p. 107-16.

94 Studies in Religion / Scie'lces Religieuses 24/1 1995

"constructivist" pOSItIOn (represented by John Hick48 rather than Steven

Katz) amounts to a revision rather than a rejection. While he sees serious
problems with Hick's extreme constructivism, he is also uneasy with the es­
sentialist position on mysticism. His answer is an "experiential-constructivist"
position that understands mystical experience "in terms of a diversity of both
experiences and interpretations. ,,49 As he put it, "though mystics do not nec­
essarily experience that which they expect, they can only experience that
which they are prepared for or that which they can assimilate. "50
This fits well with my position. The mystic is placed in the position to
have an experience, and will have the experience his or her background al­
lows. Katz made this point in the original essay.51 Stoeber wants to argue
that the experience can outstrip interpretation,52 which I can also accept,
as long as a distinction is made between interpretation and understanding
(perhaps along Heidegger's lines). Interpretations change over time as
mystics receive new insight and struggle with their own metaphors for ex­
pressing that insight (Jacob Boehme is a good example of this develop­
ment). But the insight is still irreducibly understanding, not sensation, a
point Stoeber obscures by his continual use of sense metaphors.
This hermeneutical account can, I think, be applied to individual mysti­
cal experiences profitably. It would dissolve the impasse between the con­
textualist and the essentialist position, and enable us to get on with address­
ing the accounts of mystics. It would take seriously mystics as mystics, rather
than as closet theologians or psychotics; yet it would also take seriously the
self-perception of many mystics to be part of a tradition that the mystical ex­
perience confirms and grounds.

A last word: is this hermeneutical metaphor necessarily true for all mysti­
cism? I do not think so. I have no desire to give a totalizing account, to give
a new "essence" of mysticism, to require that mystics must live up to myac­
count or they are not mystics. I give a narrative, a metaphor that I believe
makes sense of much mystical experience. There will always be some who
will appeal to a personal mystical experience, and on that basis claim that
my account is wrong or irrelevant, that the hermeneutic metaphor is also
only partial. This partiality is, of course, something I admit. The preroga­
tive of the mystic is to break through the totalization of rational or non­
rational accounts, whether essentialist, contextualist or hermeneutical. For
a scholar to deny that would be hybris.

48 John Hick, An Interpretation o/Religion (London: Macmillan, 1989).

49 Stoeber, "Constructivist Epistemologies of Mysticism," p. 108.

50 Ibid., p. 113.

51 Katz, "Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism," p. 59.

52 Stoeber, "Constructivist Epistemologies of Mysticism," p. 114.