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Introduction2
While the nal decades of the twentieth century were dominated by
widespread optimism about the benets of globalization, the rst few
years of the twenty-rst century have been characterized by a greater
measure of skepticism. The recurrence of nancial crises, the growing
gap between rich and poor, and the rising tide of criticism from nongovernmental organizations, scholars, activists and policymakers alike
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necessary to pursue their own goals.4 The Funds legitimacy has thus
rested in part on the separation of economics from ethics. How then do
we explain the recent turn to moral arguments by members of both academic and policymaking circles in international nance? Why would the
Managing Director of the IMF have called on several occasions for a
new global ethics, and what does this new ethics look like? These are
the questions that I shall be exploring in this chapter as I seek to uncover
one more aspect of the role of ethics in globalization.
I will begin by taking a closer look at the question of ethics, outlining two dierent ways in which we might conceptualize ethics in international economicsa universalist cosmopolitan ethics that seeks to
determine universal global norms of conduct, and a more contextualist
communitarian ethics that sees norms as varying among communities. I
will then turn to the question of economics and examine recent events
in international nance, concentrating in particular on the debate over
the appropriate response to the nancial crises of the past decade. Focusing
on the mainstream proposals for nancial reform, I will bring ethics and
economics into conversation with one another, exploring the recent use
of moral arguments to justify particular policy directions. I will suggest
that in their turn to explicitly moral language, Fund representatives have
sought to combine cosmopolitan and communitarian arguments in a new
hybrid that has very specic political consequences. In the process, two
seemingly contradictory ethical frameworks are thus combined into a
new form of communitarian economic liberalism. This new ethical hybrid
plays a crucial role in legitimizing the Funds reforms, embedding a universal vision of the global economy through a particularist ethics that
places the responsibility for change on developing states.
Two Approaches to International Ethics
Although there are many dierent ways of categorizing ethical perspectives, the most central division in international ethics has traditionally
been that between cosmopolitan and communitarian approaches.5 These
two ethical approaches conceptualize moral agency dierently, with cosmopolitan perspectives focusing on the individual as the only genuine
moral agent, while communitarian theory emphasizes the community
or often the nation-stateas central. They also dene the source and
For a more thorough discussion of this attempt within economic theory to separate
out positive means from normative ends, see Blaug (1980: 149-152).
5
Chris Brown (1992) provides the classic discussion of the historical evolution of this
debate. For other categorizations, see Terry Nardin and David Mapel (1992 and 1998).
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6
For a more thorough critique of the implications of cosmopolitan ethics for global
economic justice, see Fiona Robinson (1999).
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too quickly to eliminate many of the key international and domestic policy tools through which states once tamed the volatile ows of capital
(Krugman 1999a; Michie and Smith 1999). These ows, moreover, have
not proven to be as rational or as disciplining as the advocates of liberalization had hoped; instead, in the case of the Asian nancial crisis,
the deregulation of nancial controls in fact allowed capital to move into
increasingly irrational and risky speculative areas, eectively producing
an unsustainable bubble (Stiglitz 1998; Singh 1999; Grabel 1999). In
response, such critics have suggested that what is needed is more rather
than less regulation, selective controls on capital, and a signicant political reform of the International Monetary Fund (Kaplan and Rodrik
2001; Eatwell and Taylor 2000; Stiglitz 2002; Krugman 1999b).
Second, there are those who argue that the process of nancial liberalization has not gone far enough. The fundamental cause of the crises,
they suggest, was the persistence of illiberal economic practices among
the aected states. In spite of their progress towards liberalization, they
argue, these economies continued to follow the Asian model of capitalist development, retaining signicant state involvement in the economy that ultimately encouraged lax risk management on the part of
investors (Camdessus 2001; Calomiris 1998a; Greenspan 1998).9 Once
market participants discovered these problems, they responded rationally
by withdrawing their capital, thus disciplining these errant states. Such
analysts have argued that what is needed is more market discipline, to
be achieved both through the reform of domestic nancial governance
practices and through the reduction in the funds provided by the IMF,
which, they argue, have only encouraged reckless behavior on the part
of governments and investors alike (Meltzer 2000; Calomiris 1998b).
The third and most inuential intervention in this debate has come
from those who suggest that while nancial liberalization must continue,
it should proceed more cautiously than before. This perspective has
evolved in large measure out of the second, pro-liberalization, approach,
in response to some of the challenges brought by their critics. Advocates
of this position, including inuential academics along with major IMF
representatives, continue to place much of the responsibility for the recent
nancial crises on the aected countries themselves, citing signicant concerns about their institutional infrastructure (IMF 2001a; IMF 2001b;
Goldstein 1999; Eichengreen 1999). At the same time, they recognize
that the pace of nancial liberalization was in fact too rapid to be sus-
On the Asian model of state-led development, see Peter Evans (1989) and Singh (1999).
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10
For an excellent discussion of the moral politics of the current international focus
on corruption, see Mlada Bukovansky (2002).
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clear separation of public and private spheres as good practice, denigrating the kind of economic system in which the state plays a more
extensive role in the economy.11
Comments by Fund representatives and scholars also suggest that, in
practice, standards for good economic practice are dened in far greater
detail than the formal codes suggest, at least in cases where conditionality is involved.12 Thus IMF representative Flemming Larsen (2002)
denes a whole range of basic principles of sound economic practice,
including price stability, competitive exchange rates, open trade policy,
and sustainable debt levels, which should serve as the basis for conditionality. In her study of the international eort to eliminate corruption,
Mlada Bukovansky (2002) suggests that for many analysts, less corruption is equated with less government; a parallel assumption appears to
underlie much of the commentary on transparency, making a reduction
of the role of government a necessary component of reform.
The imposition of such universal standards and best practices will
therefore have signicant social and political eects on the countries concernedparticularly those that have traditionally allowed the state to
play a greater role in the economy. My concern here is not to debate
whether or not a more laissez-faire Anglo-American model is in fact
preferable, but rather to point out that within the context of the present call for universal standards, such debates are not being acknowledged as legitimate in the rst place. Ironically, the eect of these explicitly
normative arguments of fairness, good citizenship, and good economic
practice is to conceal the politics at stake. By suggesting that the adoption of international standards will create a level playing eld, Khler
abstracts from the current and historical context of international economic development. This abstract conception of procedural fairness
eectively ignores the existence of structural inequalities that make even
the adoption of those standards more onerous for poorer countries, and
that will no doubt continue to shape their participation in the global
economy once those practices are adopted.13 The concept of good eco11
This is particularly evident in the Funds Fiscal Transparency Questionnaire (IMF 2001c),
in which the multiple choice answers clearly establish the link between transparency and
laissez-faire on the one hand, and state-led development and opacity on the other.
12
The IMF imposes specic conditions on member states to which it provides nancial
assistance. Over the years, these conditions have grown more extensive. Currently, there
are two trends in loan conditionality: one, which I will discuss further below, to make
conditions more exible, and a second to extend them further into the arena of domestic governance. On the latter trend, see Eichengreen (1999).
13
For a discussion of some of the potentially asymmetrical costs of transparency policies in the area of trade, see Robert Wolfe (2003).
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nomic citizen similarly abstracts from the concrete conditions of radical economic inequality that make it very dicult for poorer countries
to participate actively on the international stage, even in those rare
instances in which they are granted an equal voice or vote. Finally, the
particular conception of good economic practice that is contained in
these international standards is in fact heavily inuenced by Western
economic traditions. Nevertheless, it is portrayed as a universal good that
remains beyond political contestation.
Ownership, Self-responsibility, and Solidarity
In spite of such appeals to the universality of the proposed international
standards, there has been some resistance by member states to their
introduction (IMF 2001a: 21; Khler 2003a). International Monetary
Fund representatives have responded to these more recent concerns and
to a much longer history of complaints about the one-size-ts-all nature
of Fund standards and conditions by introducing more exibility into
their programs. Central to this process have been the concepts of ownership and self-responsibility. The idea of country ownership has
become ubiquitous in Fund and other ocial documents.14 As one IMF
representative put it, We have learned that good policies are unlikely
to succeed if they are simply imposed from outsidecountry ownership
is essential if a country is to tackle its problems on a durable basis
(Larsen 2002). The idea of ownership points towards the possibility of
involving individual states in determining their own paths towards reform
and of nding economic solutions that meet their needs and desires. It
thus draws on a more communitarian form of ethics in which state
autonomy is valued and universal standards are made more responsive
to the particular complexities of individual contexts.15
IMF Managing Director, Horst Khler (2002), pairs the idea of ownership with a second powerful moral conceptthat of self-responsibility.
Countries must not only own the conditions that are the basis for IMF
nancing, he suggests, but must also take responsibility for creating better governance, a secure legal foundation, and less corruption.16 Khler
thus characterizes the various domestic nancial reforms that are either
encouraged by the IMF under the rubric of international standards, or
14
See, for example, Proposal for an International Finance Facility (London: HM Treasury,
2003). See also Camdessus (2001) and Khler (2003b).
15
In his proposals for nancial reform, Peter Kenen (2001: chap 5) builds on this
concept when he suggests a specic mechanism of negotiation and contracting through
which states could agree with the Fund and World Bank on a particular path of reform.
16
On self-responsibility, see also Khler (2001).
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17
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18
For a far more extensive discussion of this report, see Best (2003b).
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I discuss the positive possibilitiesas well as the limitsof that earlier international
nancial system in Best (2005).
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ity of ethics and politics and the complex ethical interconnections that
they create. It is in such moments that we might begin to grasp the
ethics of globalization.
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