G.R. No.

L-48006
July 8, 1942
FAUSTO BARREDO vs. SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO
FACTS:
1. At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and Navotas,
Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by
Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and
one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two
days later.
2. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in CFI of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced
to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional. The
court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be
reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case.
3. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased brought an action in the CFI of
Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of
Pedro Fontanilla. The CFI of Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus
legal interest from the date of the complaint. This decision was modified by the CA by reducing
the damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action was instituted.
4. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on
the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. The main theory of the defense is that the liability
of Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary,
and as there has been no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable,
Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case.
ISSUE: W/N the employer may be held principally liable for the damages caused by the criminal act of his
driver.
HELD: YES.
First, the driver was not sued in this civil action. Second, the owner has 2 kinds of liabilities: (1) Subsidiary
as to his civil liability arising from crime; and (2) Primary, as to his presumed negligence in the quasidelict. Lastly, since the taxi driver was found to be criminally liable, with greater reason that the taxi owner
be held liable for damages.
While the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough to cover the driver's
negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not
punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless
but even simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code
has apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse confounded."
However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not
destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos
or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising
from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa
extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
In the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so that if he had even sued for
his civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held primarily liable for civil damages,
and Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing
Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his own presumed negligence which he did not
overcome under article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one
because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second,
Barredo's primary liability as an employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which
course to take, and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their rights. It
might be observed in passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and effective method of
relief, because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and besides, he was probably
without property which might be seized in enforcing any judgment against him for damages.

Elcano v Hill
FACTS: Reginald Hill killed Agapito Elcano. In the criminal case, Reginald was acquitted on the ground
that his act was not criminal for lack of intent to kill.
The parents of Agapito now files this civil case for complaint for damages against Reginald.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the civil case for complaint for damages against Reginald is barred by
his acquittal in the criminal case.
HELD: NO. Fault or negligence under Art 2176 covers not only acts not punishable by law but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action
lie against the offender in the criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and will be entitled to such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
The extinction of civil liability referred in Rule 111 Sec 2 refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only
and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Culpa aquiliana included voluntary
and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.

G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979

PORFIRIO P. CINCO vs. HON. MATEO CANONOY
FACTS:
1. Petitioner filed a Complaint in the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu for the recovery of
damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by
Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito, the last three being the
private respondents in this suit.
2. Subsequent thereto, a criminal case was filed against the driver, Romeo Hilot, arising from the
same accident.
3. At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil
action pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of
the Rules of Court, which provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the same
offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it
may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered;
4. The City Court of Mandaue ordered the suspension of the civil case.
5. Petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the CFI of Cebu which dismissed the petition on the
ground that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the City Court in suspending
the civil action inasmuch as damage to property is not one of the instances when an
independent civil action is proper; that petitioner has another plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy under the law, which is to submit his claim for damages in the criminal case;
ISSUE: whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the
pendency of the criminal action.
HELD: YES.
From the Complaint filed by petitioner before the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, it is evident that
the nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated principally on Articles 2176 and
2180 of the Civil Code
Thus, plaintiff made the essential averments that it was the fault or negligence of the driver, Romeo
Hilot, in the operation of the jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision between his
automobile and said jeepney; that damages were sustained by petitioner because of the collision; that
there was a direct causal connection between the damages he suffered and the fault and negligence
of private respondents.
Similarly, in the Answer, private respondents contended, among others, that defendant, Valeriana
Pepito, observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees, particularly of her
co-defendant Romeo Hilot, a defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict. 5
Liability being predicated on quasi-delict the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent
civil action, as specifically provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant. (n)
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in section 2,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, reading:
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34
and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Are independent civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the c action, may be brought by the injured party during the
pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the
preceding section. Such civil action shag proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Significant to note is the fact that the foregoing section categorically lists cases provided for in Article
2177 of the Civil Code, supra, as allowing of an "independent civil action."

The civil action referred to in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be
suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the criminal offense not the
civil action based on quasi-delict
Article 31 of the Civil Code then clearly assumes relevance when it provides:
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
For obviously, the jural concept of a quasi-delict is that of an independent source of obligation "not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony." Article 1157 of the Civil Code bolsters this
conclusion when it specifically recognizes that:
Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)
(Emphasis supplied)
It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based on quasi-delict. The concept of
quasidelica as enunciated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not only
injuries to persons but also damage to property. 7 It makes no distinction between "damage to persons"
on the one hand and "damage to property" on the other. Indeed, the word "damage" is used in two concepts:
the "harm" done and "reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to harm it is plain that it includes both
injuries to person and property since "harm" is not limited to personal but also to property injuries. In fact,
examples of quasi-delict in the law itself include damage to property. An instance is Article 2191(2) of the
Civil Code which holds proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke which may be
harmful to persons or property."

G.R. No. 97336

February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. CA
FACTS:
1. Private respondent filed with the trial court a complaint 2 for damages against the petitioner for the
alleged violation of their agreement to get married. As found by the trial court:
a. petitioner and private respondent were lovers,
b. private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily
submits to sexual advances,
c. petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private
respondent,
d. because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by
him,
e. by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents in accordance
with Filipino customs and traditions made some preparations for the wedding that was
to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends
and relatives and contracting sponsors,
f. petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and
g. such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality,
have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions.
2. The RTC, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered a decision 5 favoring the private
respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter moral damages (P20k) and
attorney's fees (P3k); CA affirmed in toto.
ISSUE: W/N a breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong.
HELD: YES.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions
of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict
(culpa aquiliana), is a civil law concept while torts is common law concept. Torts is much broader
than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such
as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit.
In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system intentional and malicious acts, with certain
exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be
covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts
which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It
is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly
broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the
Anglo-American law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a
man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto
him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise
was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her
consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such
promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and
reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been
committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood
to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was
likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their
daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage.

G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995

DULAY v CA
FACTS:
1. An altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang Sa
Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard
on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
2. Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own
behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela
and herein private respondents Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD")
and/or Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"), alleged employers of defendant Torzuela
3. Private respondent SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint
does not state a valid cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed
a. that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and
b. that since the alleged act of shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil
liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of RPC
c. that a complaint for damages based on negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil
Code, such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article
2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
d. In addition, the private respondent argued that petitioners' filing of the complaint is
premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a
condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability
4. Petitioners opposed stating that their cause of action against the private respondents is based on
their liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or an industry.
xxx xxx xxx
5. Meanwhile, an Information charging Benigno Torzuela with homicide was filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati
6. The RTC issued an order granting SUPERGUARD'S motion to dismiss declaring that the
complaint was one for damages founded on crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the
Revised Penal Code as distinguished from those arising from, quasi-delict. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: W/N based on the allegations of their complaint, Superguards can be held liable for quasi delict.
HELD: YES.
It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted for homicide for the fatal shooting of Napoleon
Dulay. Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended
party waives the civil action , reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act
or omission of the accused. (Emphasis supplied)
The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the
cause of action An examination of the complaint in the present case would show that the plaintiffs,
petitioners herein, are invoking their right to recover damages against the private respondents for their
vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Benigno Torzuela's act of shooting and killing Napoleon
Dulay. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176
of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that
article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and
intentional
Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee,
there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or
both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon
prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee.
Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are intentional and voluntary, it
was therefore erroneous on the part of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's complaint simply because it
failed to make allegations of attendant negligence attributable to private respondents.

G.R. No. L-35095 August 31, 1973

GARCIA vs.THE HONORABLE MARIANO M. FLORIDO and INESIN, VAYSON, MACTAN TRANSIT
CO., INC., and PEDRO TUMALA
FACTS:
1. Petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, together with his wife,
Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired and boarded a PU car
owned and operated by respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson,
for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City, for the purpose of attending a conference
of chiefs of government hospitals, hospital administrative officers, and bookkeepers of Regional
Health Office at Zamboanga City.
2. At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at
kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, said car collided with an
oncoming passenger bus owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by
defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid collision, petitioners sustained various
physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization.
3. Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were driving in a reckless, grossly
negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the
safety of the passengers aboard the PU car, petitioners filed with the CFI of Misamis Occidental an
action for damages against the private respondents, owners and drivers, respectively, of the PU
car and the passenger bus that figured in the collision, with prayer for preliminary attachment.
4. Inesin and Vayson filed their answer admitting the contract of carriage with petitioners but alleged,
by way of defense, that the accident was due to the negligence and reckless imprudence of the
bus driver. And that the passenger bus bumped the PU car, thus causing the accident in question,
and, therefore, private respondents could not be held liable for the damages caused on petitioners.
5. Respondents argue that the petitioners had no cause of action for before the filing of the present
action for damages, respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal Case for "double serious
and less serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence", and that, with the filing of the
aforesaid criminal case, no civil action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case
has been finally adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, and, therefore,
the filing of the instant civil action is premature, because the liability of the employer is merely
subsidiary and does not arise until after final judgment has been rendered finding the driver, Pedro
Tumala guilty of negligence; that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code, is not applicable because Art. 33
applied only to the crimes of physical injuries or homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence
of the driver.
6. Petitioners filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss alleging that the aforesaid action for
damages was instituted not to enforce the civil liability of the respondents under Art. 100 of the
Revised Penal Code but for their civil liability on quasi-delicts pursuant to Articles 2176-2194,
7. In dismissing the complaint for damages the lower court sustained the arguments of respondents
and declared that whether or not "the action for damages is based on criminal negligence or civil
negligence known as culpa aquiliana in the Civil Code or tort under American law" there "should
be a showing that the offended party expressly waived the civil action or reserved his right to
institute it separately" and that "the allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must not be
tainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or regulations" and because of the prayer
in the complaint asking the Court to declare the defendants jointly and severally liable for moral,
compensatory and exemplary damages, the Court is of the opinion that the action was not based
on "culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict."
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint for damages is filed by failure to reserve the right to institute the civil
case in the pending criminal case.
HELD: NO.
It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court in the cases
provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of the Civil Code, an independent civil action entirely separate
and distinct from the civil action, may be instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal

case, provided said party has reserved his right to institute it separately, but it should be noted, however,
that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit when such reservation shall be made.
In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by
the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been
terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused.
It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners have in
effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to
recover them in the present civil case.
As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the former has ceased to
be involved in the criminal action. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the
prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right
to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For by either of such actions his interest
in the criminal case has disappeared.
As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability
arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a violation
of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always had its own
foundation and individuality.
Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasidelict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the
result of the latter. Hence, "the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to ... Articles 32, 33 and 34
of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted ... and
are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111.
The proviso which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law,
Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in
the proviso." 4 But in whatever way We view the institution of the civil action for recovery of damages under
quasi-delict by petitioners, whether as one that should be governed by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule
111 of the Rules which require reservation by the injured party considering that by the institution of the civil
action even before the commencement of the trial of the criminal case, petitioners have thereby foreclosed
their right to intervene therein, or one where reservation to file the civil action need not be made, for the
reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the
offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the
case, We find no legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal.

G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990

ANDAMO vs IAC and MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC
FACTS:
1. Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated
in Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La
Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
2. Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake,
were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to
drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives
of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other
improvements to destruction.
3. Petitioners instituted a criminal action before RTC of Cavite against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay
and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction by
means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
4. Subsequently petitioners filed another action against respondent corporation, this time a civil case
for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same court.
5. The trial court, acting on respondent corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the civil action,
issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case until after judgment in the related Criminal
Case .Said order was anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court
which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted
separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted
until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action."
6. On appeal, IAC affirmed.
ISSUE: whether a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and
contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly
liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting
civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case.
HELD: YES.
The nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as
constituting the cause of action. 7 The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it, including the
period of prescription, is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument
or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. 8 The nature of an action is
not necessarily determined or controlled by its title or heading but the body of the pleading or complaint
itself.
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles
2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a)
damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose
acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal
connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such
action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil
Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights
of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have
mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as
not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build
structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care
so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces
of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter
can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.

Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by
law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually
charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only
to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight
startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence.
The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which
is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa
extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain ...

TAYLOR V MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT CO.

FACTS: Defendant employees threw several fulminating caps or detonators at the spot in its premises
where they were found, with the expectation that they will be buried out of sight by the ashes which it was
dumping in that neighborhood and left them exposed at a point on its premises which the general public
including children at play, were not prohibited from visiting.
Plaintiff D. Taylor, 15 years old, and another boy, M Claparols, 12 years old, found 20 to 30 caps scattered
on the ground which they picked up. The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. Then they
opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance, they got
matches, and lighted the contents. An explosion followed causing more or less injuries to all. Plaintiff was
more matured than the average boy of his age and have considerable aptitude and training in mechanics.
He sued for damages for his injuries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the corporation may be held liable for damages.
HELD: NO.
Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon childlike instincts and impulses; and others who
are chargeable with a duty of care and caution toward them must calculate upon this and take precautions
accordingly. If they leave exposed to the observation of children anything which would be tempting to them,
and which they in their immature judgment might naturally suppose they were at liberty to handle or play
with, they should expect that liberty to be taken.
In the case of young children, and other persons not fully sui juris an implied license might sometimes arise
when it would not on behalf of others. Thus, leaving a tempting thing for children to play with exposed,
where they would be likely to gather for that purpose, may be equivalent to an invitation to them to make
use of it; and, perhaps if one were to throw away upon his premises near the common way, things tempting
to children, the same implications should arise.
However, the Court ruled that defendant was not civilly liable because the proximate cause of the loss was
not attributable to defendants negligence and plaintiff had the capacity to realize the danger to which he
exposed himself.

G.R. No. 101983 February 1, 1993

HONORIO BULAO vs CA
FACTS:
1. Respondent Santiago Belleza filed before MCTC of Tayum, Pearrubia, Abra, 1 a complaint for
damages against petitioner Honorio Bulao.
2. The petitioner moved to dismiss the same on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. He argued that the
said case was cognizable by the RTC, the real issue being one of ownership, possession of the
land where the ditches are located, and real rights involving the use of ditches. The court denied
the motion and required him to answer the complaint.
3. The Petitioner failed to do so and was declared in default.
4. Petitioner moved for reconsideration and the lifting of the order of default. He claimed that it was
the National Water Resources Council that had jurisdiction over the case because it involved rights
on the utilization of water. The motion was also denied, and the court proceeded to receive the
evidence of the private respondent.
5. The court handed down a judgment by default ordering the petitioner to pay the following amounts
in favor of the private respondent, plus the costs:
1. P6,000.00 representing the unrealized harvest of the private respondent on the land he
was working on;
2. P2,625.00 representing his unrealized share from the harvest of his tenant; and
3. P2,000.00 representing attorney's fees.
6. The petitioner did not appeal the decision and the corresponding writ of execution was issued.
7. Petitioner lodged before the RTC of Abra a petition for relief from judgment/order in Civil Case 70.
This was dismissed on the ground that the petitioner neither filed his answer to the complaint nor
later availed himself of his right to appeal from the judgment. His motion for reconsideration was
denied.
8. Petitioner filed a certiorari with the CA but the same was denied.
ISSUE: w/n the MCTC has jurisdiction over the complaint for damages filed by respondent.
HELD: YES.
To resolve this, we have to determine first the true nature of the action filed with the court a quo. This can
be ascertained from the ultimate facts averred in the complaint as constituting the private respondent's
cause of action. The settled principle is that the allegations of the complaint determine the nature of the
action and consequently the jurisdiction of the courts. 4 This rule applies whether or not the plaintiff is entitled
to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein as this is a matter that can be resolved only after
and as a result of the trial. 5
The petitioner submits that the allegations as well as the prayer in the complaint of respondent show that
the Civil Case involves water and water rights and is thus a water dispute. The proper authority to try and
decide the case is the National Water Resources Council pursuant to Article 88 of Presidential Decree 1067
providing as follows:
Art. 88. The council shall have original jurisdiction over all disputes relating to appropriation,
utilization, exploitation, development, control, conservation and protection of waters within
the meaning and context of the provision of this Code
However, it is clear from a reading of the private respondent's complaint that it is an action for damages
predicated on a quasi-delict.
A quasi-delict has the following elements: a) the damage suffered by the plaintiff; b) the act or omission of
the defendant supposedly constituting fault or negligence; and c) the causal connection between the act
and the damage sustained by the plaintiff. 8
All these elements are set out in the private respondent's complaint. The damage claimed to have been
sustained by private respondents consists of his loss of harvest and consequent loss of income. The act
constituting the fault is the alleged malicious construction of a dam and diversion of the flow of water by the
petitioner. The said acts allegedly caused the interruption of water passing through petitioner's land towards
respondent's lands, resulting in the destruction of the respondent's rice plants. The averments of the
complaint plainly make out a case of quasi-delict that may be the basis of an action for damages.

G.R. No. L-12191

October 14, 1918

JOSE CANGCO vs. MANILA RAILROAD CO

FACTS:
1. Jose Cangco, was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk. He lived in the
pueblo of San Mateo, Rizal, which is located upon the line of the defendant railroad company; and in coming
daily by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the
company, which entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge. Upon the occasion in question,
the plaintiff arose from his seat in the second class-car where he was riding and, making, his exit through the
door, took his position upon the steps of the coach, seizing the upright guardrail with his right hand for support.
2. On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement platform which
begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from the company's office and extends along in
front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. As the train slowed down
another passenger, named Emilio Zuiga, also an employee of the railroad company, got off the same car,
alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground.
3. When the train had proceeded a little farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off also, but one or both of his
feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he
fell violently on the platform. His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car,
where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train
the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.
4. The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the railroad station was lighted dimly
by a single light located some distance away, objects on the platform where the accident occurred were
difficult to discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.
5. The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the platform where the plaintiff alighted is found in
the fact that it was the customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought to
the station for the shipment to the market. They were contained in numerous sacks which has been piled on
the platform in a row one upon another. The testimony shows that this row of sacks was so placed of melons
and the edge of platform; and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot alighted
upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped upon the platform. His statement that he failed to see
these objects in the darkness is readily to be credited.
6. The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it appeared that the injuries
which he had received were very serious. He was therefore brought at once to a certain hospital in the city
of Manila where an examination was made and his arm was amputated. The result of this operation was
unsatisfactory, and the plaintiff was then carried to another hospital where a second operation was performed
and the member was again amputated higher up near the shoulder. It appears in evidence that the plaintiff
expended the sum of P790.25 in the form of medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in connection
with the process of his curation.
7. Plaintiff instituted this proceeding in the CFI of Manila to recover damages of the defendant company,
founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks
of melons upon the platform and leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger
alighting from the company's trains.
8. The CFI found that, although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks
of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff
himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded form recovering.
ISSUE: Whether or not plaintiff may recover despite of his contributory negligence.
HELD: YES.
It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on
the platform; that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train; and that they therefore
constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the defendant
company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory
negligence. In resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary
responsibility of the defendant company and the contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be separately
examined.
The foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for
the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant

to exercise due care in its performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in legal
viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil
Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision.
Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual
obligations or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa
contractual.
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. The fundamental distinction between
extra contractual obligations and those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual
obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual
relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering
into the contractual relation.
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or omission.. The legislature which
adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual liability with certain well-defined exceptions to
cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral responsibility may
consist in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of one's agents or servants, or in the control
of persons who, by reason of their status, occupy a position of dependency with respect to the person made liable
for their conduct.
When the facts averred show a contractual undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that
plaintiff has failed or refused to perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether
the breach of the contract is due to willful fault or to negligence on the part of the defendant, or of his servants or
agents. Proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery.Thus, proof on
the part of defendant that the negligence or omission of his servants or agents caused the breach of the contract
would not constitute a defense to the action.
As to the contributory negligence of Cangco himself..
Under the doctrine of comparative negligence - if the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability
is imposed upon defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages
should be apportioned. It is, therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence.
We may say that the test is this; Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the time he
alighted from the train which would have admonished a person of average prudence that to get off the train under
the conditions then existing was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted from alighting; and his failure so
to desist was contributory negligence.1a
The only fact from which a conclusion can be drawn to the effect that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence is
that he stepped off the car without being able to discern clearly the condition of the platform and while the train was
yet slowly moving. In considering the situation thus presented, it should not be overlooked that the plaintiff was, as
we find, ignorant of the fact that the obstruction which was caused by the sacks of melons piled on the platform
existed; and as the defendant was bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to its passengers facilities
for safe egress from its trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in the absence of some circumstance to warn him
to the contrary, that the platform was clear. The place, as we have already stated, was dark, or dimly lighted, and this
also is proof of a failure upon the part of the defendant in the performance of a duty owing by it to the plaintiff; for if it
were by any possibility concede that it had right to pile these sacks in the path of alighting passengers, the placing of
them adequately so that their presence would be revealed.

11. FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs.CA

G.R. No. 108164 February 23, 1995
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondent Luis A. Luna applied for, and was
accorded, a FAREASTCARD issued by petitioner Far
East Bank and Trust Company ("FEBTC"). Upon his
request, the bank also issued a supplemental card to
private respondent Clarita S. Luna.
Years after Clarita lost her credit card. FEBTC was
forthwith informed and Clarita submitted an Affidavit
of Loss in order to replace the lost card. In this case,
the card for the mean time will appear as a "Hot Card"
or "Cancelled Card" along with the principal card, in
the banks master file.
Subsequently Luis tendered a despedida lunch for a
close friend and another guest atthe Bahia Rooftop
Restaurant of the Hotel Intercontinental Manila. To
pay for the lunch, Luis presented his FAREASTCARD to
the attending waiter who promptly had it verified
through a telephone call to the bank's CreditCard
Department. Since the card was not honored, Luis was
forced to pay in cash the bill amounting to P588.13.
Luis felt embarrassed by this incident.
Private respondent Luis Luna sent a letter to FEBTC
and demanded payment of damages. The Bank in turn
through its vice-president of the bank, expressed the
bank's apologies to and told him that the bank failed
to inform him about its security policies and that it
also sent a letter to the Manager of the Bahia Rooftop
Restaurant to assure the latter that Luis is a "very
valued clients" of FEBTC. Still evidently feeling
aggrieved, Luis filed a complaint for damages with the
RTC of Pasig against FEBTC.
RTC of Pasig ordered FEBTC to pay damaged. CA
affirmed the decision of the trial court and ordered
FEBTC to pay moral and exemplary damages.
Issue: Whether the award of damages is proper
Held: NO.
In culpa contractual, moral damages may be
recovered where the defendant is shown to have
acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the
contract. Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but
not simple, negligence. Exceptionally, in a contract of

carriage, moral damages are also allowed in case of

death of a passenger attributable to the fault of the
common carrier.
Concededly, the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting
to personally inform Luis of his own card's
cancellation. Nothing in the findings however, can
sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part
of FEBTC to cause harm to private respondents.
Neither could FEBTC's negligence in failing to give
personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to
amount to malice or bad faith.
Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional
design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or
moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea
of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates
a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design or ill will.
Private respondents' damage claim is predicated
solely on their contractual relationship; without such
agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot
by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action
or as an independent actionable tort.
Therefore, the award of moral damages made by the
court a quo, affirmed by the appellate court, to be
inordinate and substantially devoid of legal basis.
Exemplary or corrective damages, in turn, are
intended to serve as an example or as correction for
the public good in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages. In criminal
offenses, exemplary damages are imposed when the
crime is committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. In quasi-delicts, such damages are
granted if the defendant is shown to have been so
guilty of gross negligence as to approximate malice. In
contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award
exemplary damages if the defendant is found to have
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner.
Given the above premises and the factual
circumstances here obtaining, it would also be just as
arduous to sustain the exemplary damages granted by
the courts below
Nevertheless, the bank's failure, even perhaps
inadvertent, to honor its credit card issued to private

respondent Luis should entitle him to recover Nominal

Damages.
12. AIR FRANCE vs. CARRASCOSO
G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966
SANCHEZ, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondent Carrascoso is a civil engineer and
was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that
left Manila for Lourdes.
Air France, through PAL issued Carrascoso a "first
class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome.
From Manila to Bangkok, he travelled in "first class",
but at Bangkok, the Manager of Petitioner airline
forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he
was occupying because, in the words of the witness
Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the
Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat.
When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, Carrascoso
told the manager Manager that his seat would be
taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and,
according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the
Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class;
when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having
a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they
came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr.
Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man and he
reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.

which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments

and humiliations, thereby causing him mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social
humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that
there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in
the complaint.
The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act
of its employees need not be essayed. It is well settled
in law. For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's
manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Art.
21 of the Civil Code provide that Any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing
legal precept; and, we held that upon the provisions
of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable. Passengers do not contract merely for
transportation. They have a right to be treated by the
carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy
and due consideration. They are entitled to be
protected against personal misconduct, injurious
language, indignities and abuses from such
employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a
passenger gives the latter an action for damages
against the carrier.

He then filed a complaint for a complaint for damages

before the CFI of Manila, then the CFI of Manila
ordered Petitioner to pay Carrascoso damages by way
of moral damages and exemplary damages. Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision.

Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended

with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as
we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion.
This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air
carrier a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.

ISSUE:

13.
PHILIPPINE
SCHOOL
ADMINISTRATION (PSBA) vs. CA

Whether there was a contract between the parties

which entitles Carrascoso his claim for the award of
Moral and Exemplary damages.
HELD:
Yes. There was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first
class passage covering, amongst others, the BangkokTeheran leg; The said contract was breached when
petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at
Bangkok and there was bad faith when petitioner's
employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class
accommodation berth "after he was already, seated"
and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of

OF

BUSINESS

G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992

PADILLA, J.:
FACTS:
A stabbing incident which caused the death of Carlitos
Bautista while on the second-floor premises of the
Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA)
prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in
the RTC of Manila for damages against the said PSBA
and its corporate officers. At the time of his death,
Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce
course at the PSBA. It was established that his
assailants were not members of the school's academic

community but were elements from outside the

school.
The
suit impleaded the PSBA and its school
authorities and sought to adjudge them liable for the
victim's untimely demise due to their alleged
negligence, recklessness and lack of security
precautions, means and methods before, during and
after the attack on the victim.

unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard

the petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the
Court referred to the petitioner-airline's liability as
one arising from tort, not one arising from a contract
of carriage. In effect, Air France is authority for the
view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a
contract, for the act that breaks the contract may be
also a tort.

ISSUE:

In the case at bar, there is, as yet, no finding that the

contract between the school and Bautista had been
breached thru the former's negligence in providing
proper security measures. Negligence becomes
material only because of the contractual relation
between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a
contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the
school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot
exist independently of the contract, unless the
negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in
Article 21 of the Civil Code

Whether PSBA and its school authorities can be held

liable under Art 2176 and 2180 for quasi-delict.
HELD:
NO.
When an academic institution accepts students for
enrollment, there is established a contract between
them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both
parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the
school undertakes to provide the student with an
education that would presumably suffice to equip him
with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher
education or a profession. On the other hand, the
student covenants to abide by the school's academic
requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or
"built-in" obligation of providing their students with
an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its
primary undertaking of imparting knowledge.
Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate
steps are taken to maintain peace and order within
the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown
thereof.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince
a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos
Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really
govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that
obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also
known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only
between parties not otherwise bound by contract,
whether express or implied. However, this impression
has not prevented this Court from determining the
existence of a tort even when there obtains a
contract.
In Air France vs. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the private
respondent was awarded damages for his

14. REGINO vs. PANGASINAN COLLEGES OF SCIENCE

AND TECHNOLOGY
G.R. No. 156109 November 18, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year
computer science student at Respondent Pangasinan
Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST). Reared in
a poor family, Regino went to college mainly through
the financial support of her relatives. During the
second semester, she enrolled in logic and statistics
subjects under Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and
Elissa Baladad, respectively, as teachers.
In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising campaign
dubbed the "Rave Party and Dance Revolution," the
proceeds of which were to go to the construction of
the school's tennis and volleyball courts. Each student
was required to pay for two tickets at the price of
P100 each. The project was allegedly implemented by
recompensing students who purchased tickets with
additional points in their test scores; those who
refused to pay were denied the opportunity to take
the final examinations.
Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion
from attending dance parties and celebrations, Regino
refused to pay for the tickets. On the scheduled dates
of the examinations in logic and statistics, her
teachers -- Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and

Elissa Baladad -- allegedly disallowed her from taking

the tests. According to petitioner, Gamurot made her
sit out her logic class while her classmates were taking
their examinations. The next day, Baladad, after
announcing to the entire class that she was not
permitting petitioner and another student to take
their statistics examinations for failing to pay for their
tickets, allegedly ejected them from the classroom.
Petitioner filed, as a pauper litigant, a Complaint for
damages against PCST, Gamurot and Baladad. In her
Complaint, she prayed for P500,000 as nominal
damages; P500,000 as moral damages; at least
P1,000,000 as exemplary damages; P250,000 as actual
damages; plus the costs of litigation and attorney's
fees.
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
of petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. According to respondents, the question
raised involved the determination of the wisdom of an
administrative policy of the PCST; hence, the case
should have been initiated before the proper
administrative body, the Commission of Higher
Education (CHED).
ISSUE: Whether the complaint should be dismissed for
lack of cause of action.
HELD:
NO, because there is a valid contract between the
parties. Upon enrolment, students and their school
enter upon a reciprocal contract. The students agree
to abide by the standards of academic performance
and codes of conduct, issued usually in the form of
manuals that are distributed to the enrollees at the
start of the school term. Further, the school informs
them of the itemized fees they are expected to pay.
Consequently, it cannot, after the enrolment of a
student, vary the terms of the contract. It cannot
require fees other than those it specified upon
enrolment.
As to the allegation as to liability of tort
We ruled thus in PSBA vs. CA, from which we quote:
"x x x A perusal of Article 2176 [of the Civil Code]
shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or
tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise
only between parties not otherwise bound by

contract, whether express or implied. However, this

impression has not prevented this Court from
determining the existence of a tort even when there
obtains a contract. In Air France v. Carrascoso (124
Phil. 722), the private respondent was awarded
damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a firstclass seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted,
however, that the Court referred to the petitionerairline's liability as one arising from tort, not one
arising form a contract of carriage. In effect, Air
France is authority for the view that liability from tort
may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that
breaks the contract may be also a tort. x x x This view
was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as
1918, this Court was already of a similar mind. In
Cangco v. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice
Fisher elucidated thus: 'x x x. When such a contractual
relation exists the obligor may break the contract
under such conditions that the same act which
constitutes a breach of the contract would have
constituted the source of an extra-contractual
obligation had no contract existed between the
parties.'
"Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of
the Civil Code on Human Relations, particularly Article
21x x x." Academic Freedom
Once a school has, in the name of academic freedom,
set its standards, these should be meticulously
observed and should not be used to discriminate
against certain students. After accepting them upon
enrollment, the school cannot renege on its
contractual obligation on grounds other than those
made known to, and accepted by, students at the
start of the school year.
The case should not have been summarily dismissed.
Needless to say, the Court is not holding respondents
liable for the acts complained of. That will have to be
ruled upon in due course by the court a quo.
15. SPOUSES GUANIO vs. MAKATI SHANGRI-LA
HOTEL
G.R. No. 190601 February 7, 2011
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
For their wedding reception spouses Guanio booked
at the Shangri-la Hotel Makati. Prior to the event,

Makati Shangri-La Hotel & Resort, Inc. (respondent)

scheduled an initial food tasting.
Petitioners initially chose a set menu which included
black cod, king prawns and angel hair pasta with wild
mushroom sauce for the main course which cost
P1,000.00 per person. They were, however, given an
option in which salmon, instead of king prawns, would
be in the menu at P950.00 per person. They in fact
partook of the salmon.

inconveniences, to the plaintiffs-appellants. Given the

circumstances that obtained,only the Sps. Guanio may
bear whatever consequential damages that they may
have allegedly suffered.

Three days before the event, a final food tasting took

place. Petitioners aver that the salmon served was
half the size of what they were served during the
initial food tasting; and when queried about it, the
hotel quoted a much higher price (P1,200.00) for the
size that was initially served to them. The parties
eventually agreed on a final price P1,150 per person.

HELD:

A day before the event, the parties finalized and

forged their contract. Petitioners claim that during the
reception, respondents representatives did not show
up despite their assurance that they would; their
guests complained of the delay in the service of the
dinner; certain items listed in the published menu
were unavailable; the hotels waiters were rude and
unapologetic when confronted about the delay; and
despite Alvarezs promise that there would be no
charge for the extension of the reception beyond
12:00 midnight, they were billed and paid P8,000 per
hour for the three-hour extension of the event up to
4:00 A.M. the next day.
Petitioners thus sent a letter-complaint to respondent
and received an apologetic reply. They nevertheless
filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages
before the RTC.
RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner spouses and
ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiff actual
damages; moral damages; exemplary damages; and
attorneys fees.
Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision, it
holding that the proximate cause of petitioners injury
was an unexpected increase in their guests. Hence,
the alleged damage or injury brought about by the
confusion, inconvenience and disarray during the
wedding reception may not be attributed to
defendant Shangri-la. The proximate cause, which is
entirely attributable to plaintiffs-appellants, set the
chain of events which resulted in the alleged

ISSUE:
Whether the doctrine of proximate cause finds
application since petitioners complaint arose from a
contract.

The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in

actions for quasi-delicts, not in actions involving
breach of contract. x x x The doctrine is a device for
imputing liability to a person where there is no
relation between him and another party. In such a
case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where
there is a pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the
obligation, and the function of the law ismerely to
regulate the relation thus created.8 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
What applies in the present case is Article 1170.
Respondent admitted that three hotel functions
coincided with petitioners reception. To the Court,
the delay in service might have been avoided or
minimized if respondent exercised prescience in
scheduling events. No less than quality service should
be delivered especially in events which possibility of
repetition is close to nil. Petitioners are not expected
to get married twice in their lifetimes.
In the present petition, under considerations of
equity, the Court deems it just to award the amount
of P50,000.00 by way of nominal damages to
petitioners, for the discomfiture that they were
subjected to during to the event.15 The
Court recognizes that every person is entitled to
respect of his dignity, personality, privacy and peace
of mind.
Respondents lack of prudence is an affront to this
right.
16. SYQUIA vs. CA
G.R. No. 98695; January 27
CAMPOS, JR., J.:

FACTS:
Pursuant to a Deed of Sale and Interment Order
executed between plaintiff and defendant, the
former, father of deceased Vicente Juan J. Syquia
authorized and instructed defendant-appellee to inter
the remains of deceased in the Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery conformably and in accordance with
defendants interment procedures. Preparatory to
transferring the said remains to a newly purchased
family plot also at the Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, the concrete vault encasing the coffin of
the deceased was removed from its niche
underground with the assistance of certain employees
of defendant. As the concrete vault was being raised
to the surface, plaintiffs discovered that the concrete
vault had a hole approximately three (3) inches in
diameter near the bottom of one of the walls closing
out the width of the vault on one end and that for a
certain length of time (one hour, more or less), water
drained out of the hole, because of the aforesaid
discovery, plaintiffs became agitated and upset with
concern that the water which had collected inside the
vault might have risen as it in fact did rise, to the level
of the coffin and flooded the same as well as the
remains of the deceased with ill effects thereto;
Upon opening of the concrete vault, it showed
evidence of total flooding and the coffin was entirely
damaged by water, filth and silt causing the wooden
parts to warp and separate and to crack the viewing
glass panel located directly above the head and torso
of the deceased; The entire lining of the coffin, the
clothing of the deceased, and the exposed parts of the
deceased's remains were damaged and soiled by the
action of the water and silt and were also coated with
filth.
Due to the breach by the defendant of its obligation
to deliver a defect-free concrete vault and because of
defendant's gross negligence conformably in failing to
seal the concrete vault, the complaint prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering defendant-appellee to
pay plaintiffs-appellants actual damages, moral
damages, exemplary damages.
CFI dismissed the complaint and held that the
contract between the parties did not guarantee that
the cement vault would be waterproof; that there
could be no quasi-delict because the defendant was
not guilty of any fault or negligence, and because
there was a pre-existing contractual relation between

the Syquias and defendant. The CA affirmed the

judgment of dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery,
Inc., breached its contract with petitioners; or,
alternatively, whether private respondent was guilty
of a tort.
HELD:
NO.
With respect to herein petitioners' averment that
private respondent has committed culpa aquiliana,
the CA found no negligent act on the part of private
respondent to justify an award of damages against it.
Although a pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa
aquiliana, We find no reason to disregard the
respondent's Court finding that there was no
negligence.
In this case, it has been established that the Syquias
and the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., entered
into a contract entitled "Deed of Sale and Certificate
of Perpetual Care." That agreement governed the
relations of the parties and defined their respective
rights and obligations. Hence, had there been actual
negligence on the part of the Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc., it would be held liable not for a quasidelict or culpa aquiliana, but for culpa contractual as
provided by Article 1170 of the Civil Code.
It cannot be denied that the hole made possible the
entry of more water and soil than was natural had
there been no hole.
The law defines negligence as the "omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of
the persons, of the time and of the place." In the
absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the
contrary, the diligence to be observed in the
performance of the obligation is that which is
expected of a good father of a family.
The circumstances surrounding the commission of the
assailed act boring of the hole negate the
allegation of negligence.
Private respondent has exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in preventing the accumulation
of water inside the vault which would have resulted in

the caving in of earth around the grave filling the

same with earth.
Thus, finding no evidence of negligence on the part of
private respondent, We find no reason to award
damages in favor of petitioners.
17. VICENTE CALALAS vs. CA
G.R. No. 122039 May 31, 2000
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
At 10 o'clock in the morning, private respondent Eliza
Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman majoring
in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a
passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner
Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity
of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the
conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the
back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle.
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, the jeepney stopped
to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of
the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing
passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck
driven by Verena and owned by Francisco Salva
bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a
result, Sunga was injured. She was confined in the
hospital for a long time and her attending physician
certified she would remain on a cast for a period of
three months and would have to ambulate in crutches
during said period.
Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas,
alleging violation of the contract of carriage. Calalas,
on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint
against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.
The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as
third-party defendant and absolved Calalas of liability,
as the driver of the Isuzu truck heresponsible for the
accident. It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case
No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena,
for quasi-delict, which held Salva and his driver
Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his
jeepney.
On appeal the CA, reversed the ruling of the lower
court on the ground that Sunga's cause of action was
based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, the
third-party complaint was dismissed and adjudged
Calalas liable for damages to Sunga.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the
ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 that the negligence of

Verena was the proximate cause of the accident and

he assails the award of moral damages to Sunga on
the ground that it is not supported by evidence.
ISSUE: Whether the petition is meritious.
HELD:
No. The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in
Civil Case No. 3490 as liable for quasi-delict ignores
the fact that she was never a party to that case. Nor
are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present
case the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was
whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for
quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's
jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is
whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage.
The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana
or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the
negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of
contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the
negligence in the performance of acontractual
obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault
should be clearly established because it is the basis of
the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action
can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of
the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case
the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger
safely to his destination.
In case of death or injuries to passengers, common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence. This provision
necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of
proof.
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the
ruling in Civil Case No. 3490, finding Salva and his
driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioner's
jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial
that the proximate cause of the collision between the
jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck
driver.
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in
actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach
of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing
liability to a person where there is no relation
between him and another party. In such a case, the

obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is

a pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, it is the parties themselves who create the
obligation, and the function of the law is merely to
regulate the relation thus created
The fact that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who
took her to the hospital does not imply that petitioner
was utterly indifferent to the plight of his injured
passenger. If at all, it is merely implied recognition by
Verena that he was the one at fault for the accident
18. BARREDO vs. GARCIA
G.R. No. L-48006 July 8, 1942
BOCOBO, J.:
FACTS:

There was a head-on collision between a taxi of the

Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a
carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela
was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-yearold boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which
he died two days later. A criminal action was filed
against Fontanilla in the CFI of Rizal, and was
convicted. The court in the criminal case granted the
petition that the right to bring a separate civil action
be reserved and such decision was affirmed by the CA.
Parents of the deceased brought an action against
Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate
Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The CFI
awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs which
decision was modified by the CA by reducing the
amount of damages. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's
negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was
driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high
speed. As to Barredo's responsibility, it is admitted
that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof
that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.
ISSUE: Whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate
civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus making him
primarily and directly, responsible as an employer of
Pedro Fontanilla.
HELD: YES.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict
or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal institution
under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own,

and individuality that is entirely

independent from delict or crime.

apart

and

Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit of

the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of
employers may be safely anchored.
It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles
1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough to
cover the driver's negligence in the instant case,
nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or
omissions "not punishable by law." But inasmuch as
article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not
only reckless but even simple imprudence or
negligence, the fault or negligence under article 1902
of the Civil Code has apparently been crowded out. It
is this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse
confounded." However, a closer study shows that
such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent
acts does not destroy the distinction between the civil
liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for
cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same
negligent act causing damages may produce civil
liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasidelito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 19021910 of the Civil Code.
Some of the differences between crimes under the
Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito
under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasidelitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or
corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by
means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts,
because the former are punished only if there is a
penal law clearly covering them, while the latter,
cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of
fault or negligence intervenes."
However, it should be noted that not all violations of
the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as
begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of
the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when
nobody is hurt.

It will be noted that there were two liabilities of

Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil
liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter's
criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary
liability as an employer under article 1903. The
plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take,
and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing,
they were acting within their rights. It might be
observed in passing, that the plaintiff choose the
more expeditious and effective method of relief,
because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just
been released, and besides, he was probably without
property which might be seized in enforcing any
judgment against him for damages.
19. ROY PADILLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984
FACTS:
The petitioners RICO, DAVID BERMUNDO, VILLANOAC,
ROBERTO ROSALES, VILLANIA, ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE
ORTEGA, JR., RICARDO CELESTINO, REALINGO alias
"KAMLON", JOHN DOE alias TATO, and FOURTEEN (14)
RICARDO DOES were charged of the crime of GRAVE
COERCION in the municipality of Jose Panganiban,
province of Camarines Norte, in preventing Antonio
Vergara and his family to close their stall located at
the Public Market, Building No. 3 by subsequently
forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter
brutally demolishing and destroying said stall and the
furnitures therein by axes and other massive
instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and
merchandise, to the damage and prejudice of the said
Antonio Vergara and his family in the amount of
P30,000.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and
moral damages, and further the sum of P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages. Im committing the offense, the
accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy
Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor, and
the rest of the accused being policemen. The trial
court ruled in favor of the respondent. On appeal, the
petitioners contend that, the town mayor had the
power to order the clearance of market premises
pursuant to municipal ordinances to which the market
stall was a nuisance per se. The petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration contending that the
acquittal of the defendants-appellants as to criminal
liability results in the extinction of their civil liability.
The Court of Appeals denied the motion.

Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil

action.
ISSUE: Whether the order of payment for damages is
valid notwithstanding the acquittal of the accused.
HELD:
YES.
The petitioners were acquitted because these acts
were denominated coercion when they properly
constituted some other offense such as threat or
malicious mischief. The law does not allow us to
render judgment of conviction for either of these
offenses for the reason that they were not indicted
for, these offenses. The information under which they
were prosecuted does not allege the elements of
either threats or malicious mischief. Although the
information mentions that the act was by means of
threats', it does not allege the particular threat made.
An accused person is entitled to be informed of the
nature of the acts imputed to him before he can be
made to enter into trial upon valid information.
The crime of grave coercion has not been proved in
accordance with law. While appellants are entitled to
acquittal they nevertheless are liable for the actual
damages suffered by the complainants by reason of
the demolition of the stall and loss of some of their
properties. The extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it that of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that
the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
In the instant case, the fact from which the civil might
arise, namely, the demolition of the stall and loss of
the properties contained therein; exists, and this is
not denied by the accused. And since there is no
showing that the complainants have reserved or
waived their right to institute a separate civil action,
the civil aspect therein is deemed instituted with the
criminal action. The extinction of the civil action by
reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers
exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on
Article 100 of the RPC. In other words, the civil
liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of
the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as
a crime.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of
the accused for damages only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil might

arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not

extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based
on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required in civil cases; where the court
expressly declares that the liability of the accused is
not criminal but only civil in nature as, for instance, in
the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief
committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only
civil liability.
The acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case
would not constitute an obstacle to the filing of a civil
case based on the same acts which led to the criminal
prosecution. The civil action barred by such a
declaration is the civil liability arising from the offense
charged, which is the one impliedly instituted with the
criminal action.
SC hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did not
err in awarding damages despite a judgment of
acquittal.
20. CHUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 150793 November 19, 2004
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondent Lydia Hao, treasurer of Siena
Realty Corporation, filed a complaint affidavit with the
City Prosecutor of Manila charging Francis Chua and
his wife, Elsa Chua, of four counts of falsification of
public documents which the Minutes of the Annual
Stockholders meeting of the Board of Directors of the
Siena Realty Corporation, duly notarized before a
Notary Public, Atty. Juanito G. Garcia and entered in
his Notarial Registry causing it to appear in said
Minutes of the Annual Stockholders Meeting that one
LYDIA HAO CHUA was present and has participated in
said proceedings, when in truth and in fact, as the said
accused fully well knew that said Lydia C. Hao was
never present during the Annual Stockholders
Meeting. Thereafter, the City Prosecutor filed the
Information before the MeTC against Francis Chua but
dismissed the accusation against Elsa Chua.
Herein petitioner, Francis Chua, was arraigned and
trial ensued thereafter. During the trial in the MeTC,
private prosecutors Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho and Atty.
Ariel Bruno Rivera appeared as private prosecutors
and presented Hao as their first witness.
After Hao's testimony, Chua moved to exclude
complainant's counsels as private prosecutors in the

case on the ground that Hao failed to allege and prove

any civil liability in the case.
The MeTC granted Chua's motion and ordered the
complainant's counsels to be excluded from actively
prosecuting. Hao moved for reconsideration but it
was denied.
Hence, Hao filed a petition for certiorari entitled Lydia
C. Hao, in her own behalf and for the benefit of Siena
Realty Corporation v. Francis Chua, and the Honorable
Hipolito dela Vega. The RTC in an order reversed the
MeTC Order.
Dissatisfied, Chua filed before the CA a petition for
certiorari. For her part, respondent Hao claimed that
the suit was brought under the concept of a derivative
suit. CA held that the action was indeed a derivative
suit, for it alleged that petitioner falsified documents
pertaining to projects of the corporation and made it
appear that the petitioner was a stockholder and a
director of the corporation.
ISSUES: Whether the criminal complaint in the nature
of a derivative suit;Should private prosecutors be
allowed to actively participate in the trial of Criminal
Case.
HELD:
On the first issue, the case is not a derivative suit but
is merely an appeal on the civil aspect of Criminal
Cases filed with the RTC of Iloilo for estafa and
falsification of public document. Among the basic
requirements for a derivative suit to prosper is that
the minority shareholder who is suing for and on
behalf of the corporation must allege in his complaint
before the proper forum that he is suing on a
derivative cause of action on behalf of the corporation
and all other shareholders similarly situated who wish
to join. This was not complied with by the petitioners
either in their complaint before the court a quo nor in
the instant petition which, in part, merely states that
"this is a petition for review on certiorari on pure
questions of law to set aside a portion of the RTC
decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and 37098
On the second issue, Generally, the basis of civil
liability arising from crime is the fundamental
postulate that every man criminally liable is also civilly
liable. When a person commits a crime he offends two
entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or

the political entity called the State whose law he has

violated; and (2) the individual member of the society
whose person, right, honor, chastity or property has
been actually or directly injured or damaged by the
same punishable act or omission. An act or omission is
felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise
to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but
because it caused damage to another. Additionally,
what gives rise to the civil liability is really the
obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or
make whole the damage caused to another by reason
of his own act or omission, whether done
intentionally or negligently. The indemnity which a
person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of
the penalty imposed by law for the commission of the
crime. The civil action involves the civil liability arising
from the offense charged which includes restitution,
reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification
for consequential damages.
When the civil action is instituted with the criminal
action, evidence should be taken of the damages
claimed and the court should determine who are the
persons entitled to such indemnity. The civil liability
arising from the crime may be determined in the
criminal proceedings if the offended party does not
waive to have it adjudged or does not reserve the
right to institute a separate civil action against the
defendant. Accordingly, if there is no waiver or
reservation of civil liability, evidence should be
allowed to establish the extent of injuries suffered.
In the case at bar, there was neither a waiver nor a
reservation made; nor did the offended party institute
a separate civil action. It follows that evidence should
be allowed in the criminal proceedings to establish
the civil liability arising from the offense committed,
and the private offended party has the right to
intervene through the private prosecutors.

People vs. Ligon

G.R. 74041 July 29, 1987
The accused was riding in a 1978 Volkwagen Kombi, and driven by Rogelio Ligon. Fernando Gabat
was seated beside the driver in the front seat. They had to stop as the traffic light was red. At the
intersection, Gabat beckoned a cigarette vendor Jose Rosales to buy some cigarettes. Rosales approached
the Kombi and handed Gabat two stick of cigarettes. While this transaction was occurring, the traffic light
changed to green, and the Kombi suddenly moved forward. Rosales clung to the window of the Kombi but
apparently lost his grip and fell down on the pavement.
The Kombi did not stop when Rosales fell down on the pavement. A taxicab driven by Prudencio
Castillo had to pursue the Kombi, and sought the help of a nearby owner-type jeepney in chasing the
Kombi.
The Fiscal charged Rogelio Ligon with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. Six months later,
another information was filed against Ligon and Gabat for Robbery with Homicide. However, upon appeal,
Castillos statements is not entirely free from doubt because his observation could have been faulty or
mistaken, because the taxicab driven by Castillo was lower in height compared to the Kombi.
The Supreme Court did not find Gabat to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused may also be held civilly liable
HELD: Yes
It does not follow that a person who is criminally liable is also free from civil liability. The guilt in
a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, while only a preponderance of
evidence is required in a civil action for damages. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability
of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist.
In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence sufficient to establish the civil liability of
Gabat. Through fault and negligence, Gabat failed to prevent the driver from moving forward while the
purchase was completed, failed to help Rosales while the latter clung precariously to the moving vehicle,
and did not enforce his order to the driver to stop. Finally, Gabat acquiesced in the drivers act of speeding
away, instead of stopping and picking up the injured victim.

Cerezo vs. Tuazon

G.R. 141538 March 23, 2004
Tiazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo as owner of the bus line, Atty. Cerezo,
the husband, and the bus driver Danilo Foronda. The Complaint alleged that Tiazon was in his proper lane
when the second-named defendant Foronda, driving a Country Bus, did willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously operate the said motor vehicle in a negligent, careless, and imprudent manner, without due
regard to traffic rules, there being a Slow Down sign near the scene of the incident, and such negligence
resulted to severe damage to the tricycle and serious physical injuries to Tiazon thus making him unable
to walk and becoming disabled, with his thumb and middle finger on the left hand being cut.
The trial court ruled in Tuazons favor, and made no pronouncement on Forondas liability. Atty.
Cerezo was not held liabile because there is no evidence showing that the business of Mrs. Cerezo
benefited the family. Mrs. Cerezo was found solely liable, arising fomr negligence of her employee.
Mrs. Cerezo filed for the annulment of judgment before the CA on the ground that the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case considering there was no service of summons on Foronda, whom
the Cerezos claimed as an indispensable party.
ISSUE: Whether or not Foronda need to be impleaded as a party in the case for a valid judgment to be
promulgated
HELD:
No. The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from delict under Art. 103 of the RPC,
or may give rise an action for quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. An aggrieved party may
choose between the two remedies. An action based on quasi-delict may proceed independently from the
criminal action. There is however, distinction between the two.
Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on quasi-delict. Article 2180 states in part:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks Mrs. Cerezos liability as an employer in an action for quasi-delict is
not only solidary, it is also primary and direct. Foronda is not an indispensable party to the final resolution
of Tuazons action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo.
Although the liability under Article 2180 originates from the negligent act of the employee, the
aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. When an employee causes damage, the law presumes the
employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing the damage. Thus there is no need
for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda.
An action based on delict seeks to enforce the subsidiary liability of the employer for the criminal
negligence of the employee under the RPC. To hold the employer liable in a subsidiary capacity, the
aggrieved party must nitiate a criminal liability where the employees delict and corresponding primary
liability are established. In such, jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary. However, the present action is for
the quasi-delict of Cerezo and not for the delict of Foronda.

Albenson Enterprises Corp. vs. CA

G.R. 88694 January 11, 1993
Albenson Enterprises Corp. (Albenson) delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. (Guaranteed) mild
steel plates which the latter ordered. As part of payment, Albenson was given a Pacific Banking
Corporation Check, in the amount of P2,575 drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks.
When presented for payment, the check was dishonored for the reasons Account Closed.
Albenson, through counsel traced the origin of the dishonored check. The president of Guaranteed was
one Eugenio Baltao. Also, E.L. Woodworks, a single proprietorship business, was registered in the name
of Eugenio Baltao. The signature appearing on the check belonged to one Eugenio Baltao.
Albenson, through counsel, made an extrajudicial demand upon private respondent Eugenio
Baltao to make good the dishonored check.
Respondent denied that he issued the check, or that the signature appearing thereon was his, and
alleged that Guaranteed was a defunct entity.
An information was filed against Eugenio Baltao for violation of BP 22. Baltao filed for a motion
for reinvestigation. Upon reinvestigation, the information against Baltao was dismissed.
Because of the alleged unjust filing of criminal case against him, Baltao filed before the RTC of
Quezon City a complaint for damages against Albenson Enterprises, Jesse Yap, its owner, and Benjamin
Mendoza, its employee.
The trial court ruled in favor of Baltao. Denying liability, petitioners contend that the case filed
was one for malicious prosecution. Private respondent, on the other hand, anchored his complaint for
damages against Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages
HELD: No
Although the requirements of each provision is different (i.e. Arts. 19, 20, and 21), these three
articles are related to each other. The elements of abuse under Article 19 are (1) there is a legal right or
duty, (2) which is exercised in bad faith, (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article
20 provides that anyone who willfully or negligently, in the exercise of legal right or duty, causes damage
to another, shall indemnify the victim for damages. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and
has the following elements: (1) there is an act which is legal (2) but which is contrary to morals, good
customs, public order or public policy, (3) and it is done with intent to injure.
Petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. What prompted
petitioners to file the case for violation of BP 22 against private respondent was the failure to collect the
amount of P2,575 die on a bounced check.
The award of damages and attorneys fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in good
faith. If damages results from a persons exercise of legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria.

Velayo vs. Shell Company of the Philippine Islands, Ltd.

G.R. L-7817 October 31, 1956
Commercial Air Lines Inc. (CALI) had a debt in favor Shell Company of the Philippines (Shell). Mr.
Fitzgerald, its Credit Manager, CALIs Douglas C-54 plane, then in California, was offered by Mr. Alfonso
Sycip, CALIs President of the Board of Directors, in partial settlement of their accounts. It was declined by
Shell.
CALI informally convened its creditors and informed them that CALI was in a state of insolvency.
There was a discussion on the payment of claims and the preferences claimed.
Shell effected a telegraphic transfer of its credit against the CALI to the American corporation Shell
Oil Company, Inc., assigning its credit. The American Corporation filed a complaint against CALI in the
Superior Court of the State California for the collection of the assigned credit and a writ of attachment for
a C-54 plane.
Unaware of Shells assignment of credit and attachment suit, the stockholders of CALI resolved in
a special meeting to approve the memorandum of agreement of sale to Philippine Air Lines, Inc.
National Airports Corporation learned of Shells action in the United States and hastened to file
its own complaint with attachment against the CALI in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The CALI, also
prompted by Shells action in getting the alleged undue preference over the other creditors by attaching
the C-54 plane in the United States, beyond the jurisdiction of the Philippines, filed on October 7, 1948, a
petition for voluntary insolvency.
The court appointed Alfredo M. Velayo as assignee of the assets of CALI
Velayo, as the assignee, filed a case against Shell for a writ of injunction restraining Shell from
prosecuting its claim in the Superior Court of California. When the injunction was not granted, plaintiff,
upon appeal, prayed that the judgment of lower court be reversed and that Shell be ordered to pay
damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not Shell is liable for damages
HELD: Yes
The writer of this decision does not entertain any doubt that the Defendant taking advantage
of his knowledge that insolvency proceedings were to be instituted by CALI if the creditors did not come
to an understanding as to the manner of distribution of the insolvent asset among them, and believing it
most probable that they would not arrive at such understanding as it was really the case schemed and
effected the transfer of its sister corporation in the United States, where CALIs plane C-54 was by that
swift and unsuspected operation efficaciously disposed of said insolvents property depriving the latter
and the Assignee that was latter appointed, of the opportunity to recover said plane
A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute law, should be
compensated by damages. Moral damages (Art. 2217) may be recovered (Art. 2219). In Article 20, the
liability for damages arises from a willful or negligent act contrary to law. In this article, the act is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy.
Now, if Article 23 of the Civil Code goes as far as to provide that: Even if an act or event causing
damage to anothers property was not due to the fault or negligence of the Defendant, the latter shall be
liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited. with mere much more reason the
Defendant should be liable for indemnity for acts it committed in bad faith and with betrayal of
confidence.

UE vs. Jader
G.R. 132344 February 17, 2000
Romeo Jader was enrolled in UE College of Law. He failed to take the regular final examination in
Practice Court 1 for which he was given an incomplete grade. He took the examination later. When the
grades were submitted, it was given a grade of five.
During the deliberations on who among the students should be allowed to graduate, Jaders name
appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for Graduation.
Jader attended the investiture ceremonies. He went up the stage when his name was called, and
he received a rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the Law Diploma.
He prepared for the bar examination and took a leave of absence without pay from his job. Having
learned of the deficiency he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar examination.
Jader sued petitioner for damages, alleging he suffered moral shock, mental anguish, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights when he was not able to take the
1988 bar examinations arising from petitioners negligence. He prayed for an award of moral and
exemplary damages, unrealized income, attorneys fees and cost of suits.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is liable for damages
HELD: Yes, but not moral damages
It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and
information to each and every student as to whether he or she had already complied with all the
requirements for the conferment of a degree or whether they would be included among those who will
graduate.
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination,
particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to
have acted in good faith.
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not
wait for the latter to inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or
welfare of the person who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages.
Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in the performance of its obligation to inform
respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will not prepare himself for the bar
exams since that is precisely the immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate.
However award of moral damages is unwarranted. It behooved on respondent to verify for
himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. If
respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought it upon himself by not
verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements including his school records, before preparing himself for
the bar examinations.

United Coconut Planters Bank vs. Basco

G.R. 142668 August 31, 2004
Respondent BAsco had been employed with the petitioner UCPB. He was also a stockholder
thereof and owned 804 common shares of stock. He likewise maintained a checking account with the
bank at its Las Pias bank. The respondent also worked as an underwrited at the United Coconut Planters
Life Association (Coco Life), a subsidiary of UCPB.
The respondent was terminated in his employment. Luis Ma. Ongsiapco, UCPB First VicePresident, Human Resource Division, issued a Memorandum not to allow respondent access to all bank
premises.
Respondent went to UCPB Makati branch to receive a check from Rene Jolo, a bank employee,
and to deposit a money for a friend. While sitting on a sofa fronting the tellers booth, two security guards
approached respondent and showed him the Memorandum and told him to leave the bank premises.
Respondent pleaded that he be allowed to finish his transaction. One of the guards contacted the
management and was told to allow respondent to finish his transaction.
Jose Regino Casil, a bank employee, was asked by Rene Jolo to bring a check to the respondent.
He was standing in the working area. He motion the respondent to come and get the check, but the guards
tapped the respondent on the shoulder and prevented the latter from approaching Casil. Casil then
walked towards the respondent and handed him the check.
Respondent filed a complaint for damages against UCPB.
ISSUE: Whether or not UCPB is liable for damages
HELD: No
When respondent was to enter the working area, where non-employees were prohibited entry,
the guards had no recourse but to prevent the respondent from entering such working area. The security
guards need not have waited for the respondent to actually commence entering the working area before
stopping the latter. It would have been more embarrassing for the respondent to started walking to the
working area only to be halted by the guards, in full view of bank customers. The security guards were
polite to the respondent and even apologized for any inconvenience cause him. The respondent could
have just motion Casil to give him the check at the lobby area, instead of proceeding to the working area
which respondent knew to be an area off-limits to non-employees.
The respondent did not suffer embarrassment, inconvenience, or discomfort. It partakes the
nature of damnum absque injuria, i.e. damage without injury or damage inflicted without injustice, or loss
or damage without violation of legal rights, or a wrong due to a pain for which the law provided no
remedy.

Saber vs. CA
G.R. 132981 August 31, 2004
President Ferdinand Marco appointed Dr. Mamitua Saber as Executive Vice-President of the
Philippine Amanah Bank (PAB). Saber took a year-long leave of absence from his work at the university
and assumed office at the PAB.
The PAB was designated to make appropriate preparations and arrangement for the annual
pilgrimage of Filipino Muslims to Mecca.
Saber decided to charter the M/V Sweet Homes, owned by Sweet Lines, INc. for the trip. Saber
executed a Uniform Time-Charter, in which the PAB chartered the vessel to transport the pilgrims to
Mecca and back to the Philippines.
Saber wrote to President Marcos that other parties not be allowed to charter any ship or aircraft
bringing pilgrims to Jeddah, to avoid unfair competition with PAB. However, President Marcos granted
some politicians permission to charter a plane to transport the pilgrims. Worse, Sacar Basman had
represented to the public that he was one of the Pilgrimage Directors, that he had been allotted 25
passenger for the voyage on board the M/V Sweet Lines.
The Marawi Branch Manager of PAB wrote Saber expressing disappointment over the turn of
events, that politicians chartering a private plane was in direct competition with PAB. Also, those who had
booked for the voyage on the M/V Sweet Lines had already withdrawn their reservations.
Rather than allow the vessel to leave for Mecca with many vacant cabins, Saber decided to sell
tickets to Basman on credit. Saber and the Arabian Gulf Export Agency Corporation (AGEAC) entered into
a Freight Contract, wherein AGEAC was allowed to load on the M/V Sweet Homes goods and cargoes to
Saudi Arabia.
The Board of Directors of PAB, after exhaustive deliberations, declared Saber liable for receivables
on the ground that the Board did not authorize him to sell tickets on credit and to execute a Freight
Contract with AGEAC. Saber was charged with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Saber
filed a complaint for damages against PAB, alleging that he was authorized to make appropriate
arrangements for the pilgrimage and had the implied authority to enter into transactions, including the
authority to sell tickets on credit and to execute the Freight Contract. He claimed that the filing of charges,
and the nationwide publication thereof caused him dishonor, shame, discredit and contempt, shock,
besmirched reputation and wounded feelings, for which defendants were liable for moral, exemplary and
actual damages.
The Sandiganbayan acquitted Saber for the criminal charges due to his implied authority to make
contracts.
ISSUE: Whether or not Saber is entitled to payment of damages
HELD: No
Bad faith nor malice may not be imputed on the respondents on holding Saber liable for the
receivables. After an exhaustive discussion, the Board resolved that Saber had no authority to enter into
any agreement with Basman to sell tickets on credit, and to execute a Freight Contract with AGEAC. While
the Sandiganbayan ruled that Saber had the implied authority to do so, and was not criminally liable, it
cannot thereby conclude that the Board of PAB acted in bad faith or with malice.

Perez vs. Pomar

G.R. L-1299 November 16, 1903
Don Vicente Perez filed in the CFI of Laguna a complaint, asking that the court to determine the
amount due the plaintiff, for services rendered in the Tabacalera Company. He also asked for payment of
damages together with cost of suit.
Perez alleged that Don Eugenio Pomar, as general agent of the Compaa General de Tabacos,
verbally requested plaintiff to act as interpreter between himself and the military officers. Plaintiff
continued to render such services, and that he had to abandon his private business and his soap factory.
Pomar assured him that the Tabacalera Company would pay the services, and therefore, Perez should not
trouble himself about his inability to devote the necessary amount of time in his business.
Defendant denied liability, and said that plaintiff accompanied him through motives of friendship,
and that plaintiff acted as interpreter of his own free will without any offer of payment or compensation,
and that defendant, did so in his private capacity and not as agent of the company, and that it was for this
reason that he is not indebted to the plaintiff.
ISSUE: Whether or not defendant is liable to the plaintiff
HELD: Yes
There was a tacit and mutual consent as to the rendition of the services. This gives rise to the
obligation upon the person benefited by the services to make compensation therefor, since the bilateral
obligation to render services as interpreter, on the one hand, and on the other to pay for the services, is
thereby incurred. Notwithstanding the denial of the defendant, it is unquestionable that it was with his
consent that plaintiff rendered him services as interpreter.
The consideration for the contract is also evident, it being clear that a mutual benefit was derived
in consequence of the services rendered. The fact remains that Perez rendered to Pomar services as
interpreter. It doesnt appear that Perez did this gratuitously, hence, Pomar, having accepted the benefit
of the service, it is his duty to pay a just compensation therefor.
In contracts the will of the contracting parties is law. If it is a fact sufficiently proven that the
defendant, on various occasions consented to accept an interpreters services, it is but just that he should
pay a reasonable remuneration therefor, because it is a well-known principle of law that no one should
be permitted to enrich himself to the damage of another.

UP vs. Philab Industries Inc.

G.R. 152411 September 29, 2004
UP decided to construct a Research Complex. Laboratory equipment and furniture were
purchased for the National Institute of Biotechnology and Applied Microbiology (BIOTECH) at the UP Los
Baos. The Ferdinand E. Marcos Foundation (FEMF) agreed to fund the acquisition of the laboratory
furniture, including the fabrication therefor.
BIOTECH arranged for Philippine Laboratory Industries Inc. (PHILAB) to fabricate the laboratory
furniture and deliver the same to BIOTECH, for the account of FEMF.
UP and FEMF executed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) in which FEMF agreed to grant
financial support and donate sums of money to UP for the construction of buildings, installation of
laboratory and other capitalization of the project.
PHILAB submitted an accomplishment report on the project and requested payment thereof.
FEMF made partial payment representing the already delivered furnitures.
Upon completion of the project, FEMF failed to pay the bill. When President Marcos was ousted
from office, PHILAB wrote BIOTECT requesting for its much-needed assistance for the payment of the
balance already due. UP Chancellor de Guzman requested a copy of the contract between PHILAB and
FEMF, but no written contract was executed for the fabrication and delivery of laboratory furniture.
PHILAB filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against UP. UP denied liability and
alleged that PHILAB had no cause of action against it because it was merely a beneficiary of the laboratory
of the project, and that the FEMF, which funded the project, was liable to the PHILAB.
The trial court dismissed the complaint. Upon appeal, the CA ruled that UP is liable to PHILAB
under the maxim: No one should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA is correct in its ruling
HELD: No
There is no dispute the PHILAB is not a privy to the MOA executed by UP and FEMF. However, an
implied-in-fact contract of sale was entered into between PHILAB and FEMF. A contract implied in fact is
one implied from facts and circumstances showing a mutual intention to contract. It is a contract, the
existence and terms of which are manifested by conduct and not by direct or explicit words between
parties, but is to be deducted from conduct of parties or other pertinent circumstances attending the
transaction.
However, UP is not liable on the basis of the maxim that no one should enrich himself at the
expense of another. In order that accion in verso may prosper, the essential elements must be present:
(1) that the defendant had been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of
the defendant is without legal ground, (4) and that plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasicontract, crime or quasi-delict.
An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary action, available only when there is no
other remedy on contract, quasi-contract, crime, and quasi-delict. If there is an actionable action under
any other institution of positive law, that action must be resorted to.
In this case, the respondent had a remedy against FEMF via an action based on a contract impliedin-fact.

Tamio vs. Ticson

G.R. 154895 November 18, 2004
The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM) is the owner of an apartment unit leased to
Mr. Fernando Lopez Lim. After the demise of Mr. Lim, his children became the occupants therefor. One
of them, Valentin Lim, requested Encarnacion Ticson for financial assistance to purchase the apartment
unit. Valentin Lim executed a waiver in favor of respondent.
Ticson executed a contract of lease in favor of Tamio, on basis of the waiver from Valentine Lim
respecting he apartment unit. After signing the contract, petitioner discovered that the apartment was
owned by RCAM.
After the expiration of the period of lease, respondent demanded petitioner to vacate the
premises. Petitioner failed to comply, giving rise to a case for unlawful detainer.
The MTC found respondent guilty of concealment amounting to fraud when she misrepresented
that she was the owner of the property, and dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer. Upon appeal
to the RTC, the RTC ruled that the concealment did not amount to fraud, but was due to honest belief that
respondent would eventually become the owner of the property by reason of waiver. RTC ordered to pay
rental arrearages.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is liable for arrearages
HELD: No
Under the Civil Code, The lessee cannot assign the lease without the consent of the lessor, unless
there is a stipulation to the contrary. RCAM, in this case, never assented to the assignment of the lease.
There is no evidence to show that RCAM agreed to the substitution of the original lessee by respondent.
In fact, the only lessee it recognized was Fernando Lim.
Neither does respondent appear to have paid monthly rents to RCAM. Hence it cannot be charged
with knowledge of, much less implied consent to, this fact. Respondent obtains no rights to the leased
premises. Unfortunately for respondent, on March 3, 1998, RCAM chose to grant the petitioner leasehold
rights, and it was agreed that petitioner would pay RCAM reasonable compensation for the entire period
of occupancy.
To allow respondent to receive arrearages from petitioner would constitute unjust enrichment at
the expense of petitioner. Prior to the March 3, 1998 contract, petitioner and respondent were technically
strangers to the property. Petitioner cannot be faulted in assuming to pay a reasonable value for her
occupancy as a sign of good faith. On the other hand, nonpayment of rentals of respondent to RCAm is
indicative of bad faith.
Having assumed to pay the rentals to RCAM, petitioner should no longer be required to pay
arrearages to respondent. To do so would be to sanction unjust enrichment in favor of respondent. A
double burden would be imposed upon petitioner because she would be paying twice for her use of the
same premises for the same period of time.