CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | B2015

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | B2015
TUMANG VS. BAUTISTA (Presiding Judge of RTC) and JAVIER

(private
respondent)
May 31,
1985 Abad
Santos, J.
SUMMARY: Private respondent Emilio Javier filed a sakdal, which was unaccompanied by an English translation, against Enrique Tumang
and his daughter Georgia Tumang para Danyos Purhisyo. The petitioners filed a motion asking the Court to order the private respondent
to file the sakdal in English and to attach a copy of the acquittal of Javier in the criminal complaint filed against him for Unjust Vexation.
**Note: sakdal = complaint, according to Court.
DOCTRINE: The complaint must be written in English, which is almost exclusively used, and not Filipino because the latter is still a
gestating language
FACTS:
Private respondent filed a sakdal para Danyos Purhisyo against Enrique Tumang and his daughter Georgia Tumang. The complaint
was written in Pilipino and was unaccompanied by an English translation. The sakdal made reference to a case of Unjust Vexation where
Javier was acquitted (it wasnt stated in the case but I think the complainants were the Tumangs, which is the reason for the present
sakdal para danyos purhisyo but this is just my guess). Enrique Tumang and his daughter filed a motion for a bill of particulars asking
for: a) an English translation of the Sakdal, b) copy of the complaint for unjust vexation and copy of the decision acquitting Javier, and c)
any other document pertinent to the issue.
RTC: Pilipino can be used. Copy of the complaint for unjust vexation is not necessary but Javier must provide the title and number of the
case.
ISSUES:
1. WON it is necessary for the sakdal to be filed in English
RATIO:
1. YES
According to the Consitution, Until otherwise provided by law, English and Pilipino shall be the official languages
(Art. XV, Sec. 3, par. 3).

Although it is said that both English and Pilipino may be used, English is almost exclusively used because Pilipino is still
a gestating language.
The Batasang Pambansa still has to take steps towards the development and formal adoption of Pilipino as a common
national language.
SUMMARY: Bienvenido Ebarle, Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, sought injunctive relief in 2 separate petitions, to enjoin further proceedings in a
series of criminal prosecutions filed by the Anti-Graft League for alleged violation of various provisions of the Anti-Graft Law and the RPC. Ebarle
opines that the non-compliance of the procedures laid down by
However, the petitioner cannot raise this issue before the Court because it tacitly submitted to the RTCs ruling by
failing to file an appeal

and analyzing the contents of the sakdal when it argued that the sakdal stated no cause of action,
Ruling: Petition denied.
EBARLE v. SUCALDITO
December 29,
1987
Sarmiento, J.

E.O. 264 regarding complaints of irregularities against government officials is fatal to the criminal actions filed. He also argues that the Anti-Graft League
has no standing in filing the complaints since it is not the offended party.
DOCTRINE: E.O. 264 is not applicable in this case since it has exclusive application to administrative complaints, not criminal. As a general rule, a
criminal action is commenced by complaint or information, both of which are filed in court. In case of a complaint, it must be filed by the offended party;
with respect to an information, it is the fiscal who files it. But a complaint filed with the fiscal prior to a judicial action may be filed by any person.
FACTS: The Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. filed a series of complaints against Bienvenido Ebarle, provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur
and a candidate for reelection. The first series of complaints were filed by the Anti-Graft League alleging violations of the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law
as well as various provisions of the RPC. These complaints are as follows:
1. CRIM CASE 1-70: A complaint for violation of the Anti-Graft Law and Art 171, RPC alleging the manipulation of a bidding for the supply of gravel
and sand for the Province of Zamboanga del Sur by falsifying and simulating the bidding papers to favor Tabiliran Trucking Company
2. CRIM CASE 2-71: A complaint for violation of the Anti-Graft Law and Art 171, RPC alleging the manipulation of a bidding for the construction of
the right wing portion of the Capitol Bidding by maliciously manipulating the results to favor Codeniera Construction, owned and managed by
Ebarles spouses brother-in-law.
3. I.S. NO. 4-71: A complaint for violation of Art. 182, 183, and 318, RPC alleging that Ebarle falsely testified under oath in a Cadastral Case for the
registration of certain lot.
4. I.S. NO. 5-71: A complaint for violation of the Anti-Graft Law and Art 171 and 213, RPC for illegally and irregularly awarding the contract for the
supply of gravel and sand for the Province to Cesar Tabiliran, associate of Ebarle and by maliciously excluding Teoson Trucking Services from the
bidding conducted despite compliance with all rules and requirements on public bidding.
Ebarle moved to dismiss the preliminary investigations but was denied. He then went to CFI-Zamboanga del Sur, presided by Judge Sucaldito, on
petition for prohibition and mandamus (docketed SPECIAL CASE NO. 1000) and praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin further proceedings.
A restraining order was given. The Anti-Graft League moved to have the restraining order lifted and the petition dismissed. Judge Sucaldito found for
Anti-Graft League and dismissed SPECIAL CASE NO. 1000.
The Anti-Graft League filed yet another 3 complaints for violation of various provisions of the Anti-Graft Law and Art 171(4), RPC. Subsequently, I.S.
NO. 6-71, and 7-71 were also filed for various violations of the Anti-Graft Law.
Ebarle filed 2 petitions, consolidated by the Supreme Court, relying on the failure of the City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League to comply with the
provisions of E.O. 264 Outlining the Procedure by which Complainants Charging Government Officials and Employees with Commission of Irregularities
Should Be Guided, preliminary to their criminal recourses.
ISSUES:
1. WON the non-compliance of E.O. 264 by the Anti-Graft League is fatal to the institution of the criminal actions. NO, it is not.
2. WON the Anti-Graft League has standing to commence the series of prosecution. YES, even if it is not the offended party
RATIO :
I. The non-compliance of the procedures in filing laid down by E.O. 264 is not fatal to the criminal actions commenced by Anti-Graft League since E.O.
264 is not applicable in the first place.
A. From the plain wording of E.O. 264, it is clear that it is exclusively applied to administrative, not criminal complaints.
B. The title itself speaks of irregularities and there is no mention of criminal offenses
C. The procedure provided by law and regulations referred to by E.O. 264 pertains to existing procedural rules with respect to the
presentation of administrative charges against government officials.
D. From the language and the words used by the E.O., the intent of the measure clearly is not criminal. If it were, it would have employed
technical terms such as accused, convicted, or acquitted.
II. That the Anti-Graft League is not an offended party within the meaning of Rule 110 cannot abate the complaints in question.
A. A complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal NEED NOT BE FILED by the offended party
1. RULE: Unless the offense subject thereof is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the same may be filed, for preliminary
investigation purposes, by any competent person
2. The complaint referred to in Rule 110 contemplates one filed in court, not with the fiscal, in that case, the proceeding
must be started by the aggrieved party himself.
B. GENERAL RULE: a criminal action is commenced by complaint or information, both of which are filed in court.
1. In case of a COMPLAINT, it must be filed by the offended party
2. In case of an INFORMATION, it is the fiscal who files it
a. NOTE: But a COMPLAINT filed with the fiscal prior to a judicial action may be filed by any person
DISPOSITIVE: Petitions are dismissed. Temporary restraining orders are lifted and set aside. Preliminary investigations can proceed.
Del Rosario v. Mercado

August 28,
1969
Fernando,J
SUMMARY: Mercado was killed by the petitioners who are police officers. The complaint of murder was filed by Mercados wife. The
petitioners are asserting that the complaint should be considered void as it was instituted not by the offended party.
DOCTRINE: The widow of a murdered person has a right to file a complaint for murder as an offended party.
FACTS:
The petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus asserting that the complaint filed by the widow of the murder victim is void as it
was not signed by the offended party. They argue that she being merely the heir of the offended party and not the offended party herself
within the meaning of the above-cited provision of the Rules of Court has noright to file the action.
There was a motion to intervene as well as an opposition to the petition filed on behalf of the widow, Juanita Olidar,
maintaining her right to file the complaint and praying that the petition for habeas corpus be denied.
CFI of La Union ruled in favour of the petitioners.
ISSUES:
Whether a widow may be considered an offended party within the meaning of the applicable Rules of Court provision, entitled to
file a complaint for the murder of her deceased husband?
RATIO:
The court ruled that the wife may file such action as in offended party. To view it otherwise would be an affront to reason. That is
precisely one instance where the unity that marks the relationship of husband and wife calls for the most emphatic affirmation. More
specifically, in the case before us, the injury to the widow cannot be disputed. Her right to consortium was definitely put an end to. The
loss of the material support to which she was entitled was equally evident. The suffering she had to endure then as the survivor of the
tragedy was unavoidable even if time could thereafter be trusted to assuage the pain. It would show less than full regard then for the
realities of the situation not to reconsider her an offended party within the meaning of the Rules of Court provision.

A contrary holding, is likely to be attended with deplorable consequences, as in this case, where the accused is a member of the
police force. Under such circumstance, reliance on the police force to file the complaint might in not a few instances prove futile. For one
thing, a false sense of camaraderie may paralyze the hand of such offi cials.
People v. Beriales
April 7, 1976
Concepcion JR., J.
SUMMARY: Three men charged with murder, were arraigned, tried and convicted without the presence of the Fiscal or his representatives.
DOCTRINE: Though the Fiscal may turn over the active conduct of a trial to a private prosecutor, his duty to direct and control the prosecution of
criminal cases requires that he must be present during the proceedings.
FACTS:
Ricardo Beriales, Benedicto Custodio, Pablito Custodio charged before the CFI-Leyte of murdering Saturnina Porcadilla
November 26, 1974: Appellants moved for a reinvestigation of the case by the Fiscal- court approves reinvestigation
Arraignment and trial moved to December 5 and 6 then postponed by the Fiscal to December 17 and 18 to finish his reinvestigation
The trial court, however, relying on the mandate that "All p ersons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases, resumed hearing the
case on December 10 (the hearing went on up to December 13 when appellants were convicted)
Special Counsel Rosario R. Polines, in representation of the Fiscal, manifested that the private prosecutor, Atty. Procadilla, be authorized to conduct the
case for the prosecution for the December 13 hearing
The appellants challenged the resumption of the hearing without finishing the reinvestigation first
When arraigned, the three appellants declined to plead, saying: "I am not going to answer the question because the Fiscal is not yet around."
Thereupon, the trial court entered a plea of "Not Guilty" for each of them
appellants' counsel again manifested that the Fiscal was absent and that they could not go to trial without the fiscal and his report on the reinvestigation
conducted by him
however, the trial continued and appellants were convicted
appellants interposed appeal on the grounds of denial of due process
ISSUES:
1. WON the absence of the Fiscal/ Fiscals representative on December 13 was denial of due process? YES
2. WON the lower court should have waited for the results of the reinvestigation? YES
RATIO:
1. What is deplorable and which renders patently irregular all the proceedings taken in this case, was the total absence of the Fiscal and any of his
assistants or special counsel on December 13, when the appellants were arraigned and when the private prosecutor presented evidence and
rested the case supposedly for the People. While there is nothing in the rule of practice and procedure in criminal cases which denies the right of
the Fiscal, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to turn over the active conduct of the trial to a private prosecutor, his duty to direct and control
the prosecution of criminal cases requires that he must be present during the proceedings.
2.
After the trial court granted the motion for reinvestigation, it became incumbent upon the court to delay the trial until it has been conducted. It
was a matter of duty on the part of the TC, not only to be consistent with its own order, but also to avoid a possible miscarriage of justice given
that the offense charged is murder.
Decision appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the lower courts for another arraignment and trial.
REPUBLIC VS. SUNGA

June 20,
1988
Padilla, J.
SUMMARY: Petition for review on certiorari filed by the provincial fiscal seeking clarification on whether or not a criminal case can be
dismissed by the trial court on the basis of an affidavit of desistance executed by the offended party but without motion to dismiss filed by
the prosecuting fiscal. Court held that while the trial court is the sole judge on whether a criminal case should be dismissed, the fiscals view
on the matter should be heard by said court first before making such decision of dismissal.
DOCTRINE: Court held that while the trial court is the sole judge on whether a criminal case should be dismissed, the fiscals view on the
matter should be heard by said court first before making such decision of dismissal
FACTS:
- August 10, 1964: information for attempted homicide was filed by fiscal of Camarines sur against accused-private respondents Rafael,
Ariston and Jose all surnamed Anadilla.
- March 11, 1974: hearing was set but was postponed because Rafael Anadilla was absent (he wasnt arrested yet by police).
Court a quo issued an order of arrest for Rafael and also set the trial of the case for 29 and 30 July 1974
-
March 20, 1974: court a quo issued assailed order which contains the ff. points:
o The offended party is no longer interested in further prosecution of the case
o The case is dimissed
- The affidavit of desistance filed by offended party stated that he was no longer interested in the prosecution of the case, he has already
forgiven the accused and that his material witnesses could no longer be contacted
Provincial fiscal moved to reconsider the order of dismissal but was denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON the court a quo may dismiss a criminal case on the basis of an affidavit of desistance executed by the offended party, but
without a motion to
dismiss filed by the prosecuting
fiscal RATIO:
- Yes but court should always ask the opinion of the fiscal first.
In Crespo v. Mogul, it was held that the rule is that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case rests in
the sound
discretion of the court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it.
In the case at bar, it took 10 years from the filing of the information for the trial to begin. Hence the disposition of the complainant
is not unusual.
Despite this, the fact that the fiscal opposed said dismissal of the case seems to imply that he believe that despite such
manifestation of the complaint, he could prove the prosecutions case.

- Through crespo doctrine still is true (trial court is sole judge on whether a crim case should be dismissed), any move on the part of
complainant to dismiss the criminal case, even without the objection of the accused, should first be referred to the prosecuting
fiscal for his own view on the matter. It is only after hearing the prosecuting fiscals view that the court should exercise its
exclusive authority to continue or dismiss the case
HELD: petition dismissed
Ingco v. Sandiganbayan
May 23,
1997
Vitug, J
SUMMARY: A man accused of graft and corruption as a Sr VP for PNB claims that since the information alleged against him was not filed
in the proper court before the ten-year prescription period, liability for such wrongdoing has prescribed.
DOCTRINE: Filing an information for preliminary investigation, even in a Court or Office with no proper jurisdiction of the crime alleged,
suspends the prescription period.
FACTS: PNB alleged that Domingo Ingco, as Sr. VP for PNB, had favorably recommended the approval of the application for loan of
Cresta Monte Shipping Corporation in the amount of US $5.91 million and US $7.5 million, notwithstanding that: [a] Cresta Monte had a
capitalization of only P1 million; [b] no project feasibility study was conducted; [c] the PNB Credit Department submitted an adverse
comment; and [d] the collaterals for the loans were deficient. With regard to the other petitioners, Ernesto Magboo and Herminio Alcasid,
the information alleged that their joint and several signatures and those of their spouses, in violation of the terms and conditions of the
loan, were not given. This, they claimed, was in contrary to RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Ingco, et al, filed a motion to quash, which was denied by the Sandiganbayan, hence this appeal for certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. WON the offense has already prescribed. - NO
2. WON the facts charged in the info constituted an offense. - NO
RATIO:
1. The offense has not yet prescribed because regardless that the offense allegedly happened in September 1977 and/or March
1978, and the filing under the Sandiganbayan happened only in July 1993, the prescriptive period was suspended when a case
was filed with the Ombudsman in May 1987.
People v. Taico, People v. del Rosario and People v. Coquia states that only filing in the proper court suspends the prescriptive
period, but People v. Olarte (1967) has cleared that filing even with the justice of peace for preliminary investigation purposes
suspends the prescriptive period. In Francisco v. CA, SC held that filing even in the Fiscals Office defers prescription.
2. Ingco only acted as an assessor of the application for loans, and his endorsement for the approval of Cresta Montes despite the
lack of requirements of its owner/managers does not constitute a crime under RA 3019. It could have been merely a mistake on
Ingcos part. Furthermore, it is not Ingco who approves, but the Board itself, and thus no damage could have resulted from Ingcos
positive evaluation of Cresta Montes assets. Ingco is cleared of the crime. As for Magboo and Alcasid, PNB may choose its
remedy against them elsewhere.
HELD:
Petition for certiorari granted, resolutions set aside.
DOMONDON vs SANDIGANBAYAN
March 16,
200 Buena,
J:
SUMMARY: Several informations were filed against the petitioner and several others connected with a violation of the Anti-Graft Law RA
3019. Petitioner filed a motion for consolidation and reconsideration of an order of the Ombudsman including him in the information for
Crim Case 20574, which was denied by the Ombudsman.
DOCTRINE: Courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the fiscal or Ombudsman in their investigatory and prosecutory power to
determine probable cause, unless there is a finding of grave abuse of discretion.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a writ of prelim injunction seeking to set aside the order of the
Office of the Special Prosecutor/ Ombudsman. There were 4 separate informations filed against petitioner and several others. Another
information (Crim Case 20574) was filed against petitioner due to the discovery of a chain of irregularities within the Philippine
National Police. Petitioner was included on account of his approval for the Chief, PNP, as the Director of the Office of the Directorate for
Comptrollership of the release of Advice of Allotment in the amounts Php 5M and Php 15M. Petitioner filed a motion for consolidation
before the Sandiganbayan (SB). The SB issued an order ordering the prosecution to demonstrate probable complicity of the accused in
the transaction described in the information, resulting in the violation of the Anti-Graft Law under sec 3 (e) of RA 3019, with the second
order deferring action on the motion to consolidate, pending the compliance with the first order. An order by Special Prosecution
Officer III recommended the amendment of the information to exclude 6 of the accused, not including petitioner, and prosecution for
the remaining accused continue. A motion for reconsideration of this order was filed by petitioner, which is pending in the Office of the
Ombudsman. Special Prosecutor I of the Ombudsman issued an order recommending the modification of the first order to exclude
petitioner from the information and deny the motion for consolidation. This was disapproved by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, on the
recommendation of Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa. Arraignment was proposed to be set, and amended information was
admitted and excluded some of the accused but included petitioner for prosecution.
ISSUES:
1. WON there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of Villa and Desierto on denying the motion for
reconsideration
2. WON the respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for consolidation
RATIO:
1.
HELD, No. The general rule is that courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the fiscal or Ombudsman to determine the adequacy
of the averments of the offense charged. He can dismiss the complaint if it is insufficient in form or substance, or he finds no ground to
continue with it, or he may proceed with the investigation if the complaint is in due and proper form. This does not preclude the courts
from reviewing the Ombudsman if there is an abuse of discretion. The court finds that there is none in this case. Respondents in this case
found sufficient probable cause to include petitioner in the indictment.
2.
HELD, No. Once the case has been filed with the Sandiganbayan, it has the full control of the case so much that the informations may
not be dismissed or consolidated with other pending cases, without the approval of said court, therefore justifying the denial.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court said that it cannot determine whether the complicity and participation of the petitioner in the several
cases are the same since the present petition only concerns Crim Case 20574, and the court will not interfere with the Ombudsmans
exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners recourse should be with the
Sandiganbayan where the cases are already pending.
The Petition is DISMISSED.
PINOTE v. AYCO
December 13,
2005 CarpioMorales, J.
SUMMARY: Judge Ayco allowed the presentation of evidence of the defense in a criminal case without the presence of the state
prosecutor, Ringcar Pinote, who filed the present case.
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and direction of the public prosecutor. This
transgression could not be rectified by subsequently giving the prsecution a chance to cross-examine the witnesses.
FACTS:
A criminal case entitled People v. Vice Mayor Salvador Ramos, et. al. was filed in the sala of Judge Roberto L. Ayco of Branch 26,
RTC of South Cotabato. State Prosecutor Pinote who was the prosecutor in the said case was absent for two days in the proceedings of
the case due to medical treatments he underwent. He was not able to inform the court beforehand of his inability to attend the said
hearings.
While he was absent, Judge Ayco allowed the presentation of evidence by the defense consisting of testimonies of two witnesses.
On the subsequent hearings, Pinote refused to cross-examine the witnesses, maintaining that the proceedings conducted in his absence
were void. Pinote filed a manifestation and prayed that the testimonies be striken off the record and that he should not be coerced to
cross-examine. Judge Ayco deemed waived the right of the prosecutor to conduct cross-examination on the two witnesses.
Pinote filed an administrative complaint against Ayco for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority and Serious
Misconduct. By way of counter-complaint, Ayco charged Pinote with Contempt of Court and Grace Misconduct and/or Conduct
Unbecoming of a Member of the Bar as an Officer of the Court.
The OCA recommended that Ayce be reprimanded with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.
ISSUE: WON a judge can allow the presentation of evidence in the absence of the prosecutor
HELD and RATIO:
No. As a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and direction of the public prosecutor. Rule 110,
Sec. 5 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor.
Judge Ayco clearly transgressed the Rule when he allowed the presentation of evidence in the absence of the prosecutor. This
could not be rectified by subsequently giving the prosecution a chance to cross-examine the witnesses.
Ayco is ordered to pay P5,000 with warning.
Tan, Jr. v.
Gallardo October
5, 1976
Antonio, J.
SUMMARY: Private prosecutors take a contrary position to Solicitor Generals stand. The Court held that private prosecutors intervention in a criminal
case is subject to the control of the SolGen, in fact, their role in this particular case to cooperate with the SolGen, hence, they cannot take a position
contratry to his.
DOCTRINE: In a criminal case, the public prosecutor represents the Republic, due to this interest, the prosecution is placed under his direction, control
and responsibility. The private prosecutor, on the other hand, represents the offended party with respect to the civil action for recovery of the civil
liability arising from the offense, his interverntion is always subject to the control and direction of the prosecuting official.
FACTS:
Judge Ayco released orders pertaining to a criminal case. The petitioners seek to annul such orders and to compel the judge to desist from the case.
The SolGen submitted his comment to the petition and recommended the remand of the case to a trial court for the decision of another judge
because it found that Judge Aycos decisions are not free from bias.
The private prosecutors submitted their comment and objected to the remand of the case, insisting that they have the right to take a postion in
contravention to that of the SolGens.
ISSUE: WON the private prosecutors have the right to intervene independently of the Solicitor General and to adopt a stand inconsistent with that
of the latter in the present proceedings.
RATIO:
Public Prosecutor - Sec. 1 of P.D. 478 Defining the Powers and Functions of the Office of the Solicitor General enumerates the powers and functions of
the SolGen. In a criminal case, the public prosecutor represents the Republic, due to this interest, the prosecution is placed under his direction, control
and responsibility.
Private Prosecutor - The private prosecutor, on the other hand, represents the offended party with respect to the civil action for recovery of the civil
liability arising from the offense, his interverntion is always subject to the control and direction of the prosecuting official. Moreover, when the offended
party waives his right to civil action or expressly waives his right to institute it, the private prosecutor loses the right to intervene. Also, where from the
nature of the offense, or where the law defining and

punishing the offense charged does not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the offense. This limit in
the role of private
prosecutors is found in Sec. 4 and 15, Rule 106 of the Rules of Court. Hence, private prosecutors may intervene but they are not in control of the case.
Case at Bar
In addition to the aforementioned rules, the Court also found that the request for remand done by the SolGen is not without basis. The
SolGen gave a report of instances where the judge had an improper interaction with the parties of the case.
People v. Liggayu
October 31,
1955
Labrador, J.
SUMMARY: A complaint was filed by a member of the police force charging Liggayu for having killed one Teresita Young de Dyogi.
Another complaint was filed which charged Liggayus companion Franco of the same crime. The fiscal, after conducting an investigation,
filed a motion to dismiss the case against Franco, citing that it was Liggayu who was on the wheel when Teresita was ran over.
DOCTRINE: All criminal actions either commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the fiscal. The offended party may, as of right, intervene in the prosecution of a criminal action, but only when from the
nature of the offense, he is entitled to indemnity and that he has not waived or expressly reserved the action. If the criminal action is
dismissed by the court, on motion of the fiscal, on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, the offended party cannot appeal from the
order of dismissal.
FACTS:
This is an appeal of the offended parties from an order of dismissal of the case against the accused Roy Franco. The first
complaint was filed by a member of the police force in the Justice of the Peace Court of Caloocan charging Benjamin Liggayu y Sion
through Reckless Imprudence for running over and killing Teresita Young de Dyogi. Two weeks after, the husband of the deceased and
their nine children filed another complaint, charging Roy Franco as well. It was alleged that, after Liggayu had run over Teresita, he
stopped the car and told Franco to move the car forward. Franco did so negligently that Teresitas injury was aggravated. The justice of
the peace of Caloocan remanded the case to the CFI for further proceedings. It was at the CFI where the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss.
The motion stated that at the time the deceased was run over the accused Benjamin Liggayu was on the wheel.
The court granted the motion. At the same time the motion to dismiss was filed, the fiscal filed an information accusing Liggayu
alone. The offended parties appealed, alleging that:
1. That they were not notified of the hearing conducted by the provincial fiscal or of the motion for dismissal, and
2. That the court erred in not holding that a prima facie case exists against Roy Franco, and in dismissing the case against him.
ISSUES:
1. WON the offended party has the right to be heard at all stages of the case and can appeal from any decision denying that right.
2. WON notification of the motion to dismiss was necessary.
RATIO:
No. The appellants first assignment of error is supported by the cases of Gonzales v. CFI of Bulacan and People v. Bataller. The
cases show that an offended party has the right to be heard at all stages of the case and can appeal from any decision denying that right
(Sec. 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). However, the provision being referred to was not carried in the revised Rules of Court. The
new rules contain the following provisions.
Sec. 10 Who must prosecute criminal actions - all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. (Rule 106)
Sec. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. - Unless the offended party has waived the civil action or expressly reserved the
right to institute it separately from the criminal action, and subject to the provisions of section 4 hereof, he may intervene, personally or by
attorney, in the prosecution of the offense.
The right to appeal from an order of dismissal granted by the court on motion of the fiscal may now be challenged
under the theory that the right of an offended party to intervene is subject to the fiscals right of control. To permit an
offended party to appeal from such an order would be akin to giving said party as much right to the direction and control of a criminal
proceeding as that of the fiscal. Under General Orders No. 58, the direction of the prosecution was subjected to the right of the person
injured to appeal from any decision of the court denying a legal right. The fiscal was merely to direct the prosecution, while the direction
is subject to the right of the offended party. However, under the new Rules of Court, the fiscal had both direction and control.
No. It would have served o purpose and would be mere idle ceremony, as the fiscal has direct control. The decision of the
fiscal with regard to the insufficiency against anoher accused is not appealable.
Bernabe v. Bolinas, Jr.

November 29,
1966 Justice
Barrera
SUMMARY: Wife of the deceased wanted the charge for the death of her husband changed from homicide to murder with aggravating
circumstance of use of motor vehicle. The Provincial Fiscal and Assistant Provincial Fiscal refused to do so claiming that there was no
treachery involved in the stabbing of the victim.
DOCTRINE: A prosecuting officer is sworn, under his oath of office, not merely to file charges against an accused, but to file the
corresponding information in accordance with the facts and/or evidence obtaining in the case.
FACTS:
Unanimous account of witnesses:
The deceased Sedesio del Castillo, along with Fernando Castromayor and the accused Pedro del Castillo, Sr., after a drinking spree,
stayed at a house of Tinong to seek shelter from the rain. At Tinongs house, Castromayor and Pedro, Sr. fought. They were separated by
Sedesio who left with Castromayor and together reported the incident to the police. At about 9.30pm, while Sedesio and Castromayor
were on their way home, a jeep headed in their direction causing Sedesio to shout a warning to his companions. He was hit by the jeep,
from which Pedro, Sr. alighted and struck Sedesio on the head and then stabbed him twice in
the neck. Castromayor ran away. Pedro, Jr., upon realizing that they hit Sedesio, instead of Castromayor, brought the victim to a doctor.
Nevertheless, Sedesio still died without receiving any medical treatment.
Procedural facts:
Based on the facts established above, the Chief of Police of Sara, Iloilo, filed a complaint for homicide through reckless
imprudence against Pedro del Castillo, Sr. and was later amended to include Pedro del Castillo, Jr. The widow of Sedesio, Estelita
Bernabe, requested the provincial fiscal to reinvestigate the case, claiming that the accused should be charged with murder. But the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor still maintained that the charge was merely homicide. Consequently, Bernabe filed a Petition for
Mandamus with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to compel the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo to amend the information for the case. She
claimed that the Provincial Fiscal and the Assistant Provincial Fiscal acted with grave abuse of discretion and neglected to perform an act
which the law enjoined them to do so.
The fiscals filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that there was no treachery involved in the killing of Sedesio so the crime only
amounts to homicide. They also contended that mandamus does not lie as government prosecutors have the discretion to determine
not only the sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence establishing a prima facie case, but also the nature of the offense committed. The
remedy of mandamus is a relief for official inaction. Since they already filed the information, they have performed their duty so no
cause of action lies against them.
The Court of First Instance granted the Motion to Dismiss for lack of legal basis. Subsequently, Bernabe appealed to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUES:
1.
WON there was abuse of discretion on the part of the fiscals when they refused to amend the information, considering the affidavits of
the eyewitnesses.
2.
If there were such abuse of discretion, WON the fiscals can be compelled by mandamus to amend
the information. RATIO:
1. WON there was abuse of discretion on the part of the fiscals when they refused to amend the information, considering the affidavits
of the eyewitnesses.
2. WON there was abuse of discretion on the part of the fiscals when they refused to amend the information, considering the
affidavits of the eyewitnesses.
Yes. Based on the testimony of the witnesses, there was treachery involved. Sedesio was already hit by the jeep and lying on the
ground when he was hit in the head and stabbed by Pedro, Sr. He was helpless when he received the injuries that caused his
death. Treachery exists when the aggressor has adopted a mode of attack intended to facilitate the commission of the crime
without risk to himself. Even though Sedesio saw the jeep coming, it does not mean that he was prepared for the attack of the
accused.
Although the remedy of mandamus is a relief for official inaction, a prosecuting officer is sworn, under his oath of office,
not merely to file charges against an accused, but to file the corresponding information in accordance with the
facts and/or evidence obtaining in the case. The fiscals, based on eyewitness account, should have filed a case for murder.
This makes the fiscals subject to the writ of mandamus.
The order of the Court of First Instance is reversed. The fiscals are directed to amend the information to murder.
VDA. DE BAGATUA, ET AL. VS. REVILLA AND LOMBOS (1958)

Appeal from the order of the CFI of Rizal (Quezon
City) Felix, J.
Summary: City Attorney recommended that the complaint for estafa be dismissed for lack of
merit so CFI accordingly dismissed it. Complainants appealed to SC through a petition
for mandamus to compel City Attorneys to file the case of estafa against Pangilinan
Doctrine: the remedy is not that of mandamus but the filing with the proper authorities or court
of criminal or administrative charges if the alleged offended parties believe that the
former maliciously refrained from instituting actions for the punishment of violators of
the law
Facts:
Rodrigo Bagatua, acting for himself and on behalf of his sisters, accused Burgos L. Pangilinan of estafa before the City Attorney of
Quezon City for having allegedly induced them to sign papers supposedly necessary for the subdivision of their lot, but one of
which turned out to be a deed of sale.
>>The lot (Lot 569 of Piedad Esate ~43,871sq.m.) was donated by their mother Beatriz Ramos, widow of Apolonio Bagatua
Assistant City Attorney, acting for the City Attorney, conducted a preliminary investigation and recommended the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed.
The complainants thus filed a petition for mandamus with the CFI of Quezon City against the City Attorney and the Assistant City Attorney
seeking to compel the aforesaid officials to file the corresponding information against Burgos Pangilinan for estafa, contending that the
respondents, in dismissing the complaint, committed a grave abuse of discretion.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, on the theory that as the duties of a fiscal are not
ministerial but involve discretion, it cannot be controlled by mandamus unless there had been a grave abuse thereof. CFI
sustained this motion to dismiss and held that there is no clear indication that respondents abused their discretion. From this
order, petitioners appealed to SC.
Issue: WON the City Attorney can be compelled to file an information through a petition for mandamus filed before the Supreme Court?
Held: NO
Section 28-(h) of Republic Act No. 537, known as the Revised Charter of Quezon City, prescribes that:
(h) He (the City Attorney) shall cause to be investigated shall charges of crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of
ordinances and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made against the persons accused. He or any of
his Assistants may conduct such investigations by taking oral evidence of reputable witnesses, and for this purpose may
issue subpoena, summon witnesses to appear and testify under oath before him, . . .
** City Attorneys are empowered to conduct preliminary investigation
Section 4, Rule 106, Rules of Court: All criminal actions, either commenced by complaint or information, shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the fiscal.
From these legal mandates springs the principle that where the fiscal, after conducting a preliminary investigation is convinced that the
evidence is insufficient to establish, at least prima facie, the guilt of the accused, he has the perfect authority to dismiss the same
Of course, the power of the City Attorney or prosecuting fiscal in connection with the filing and prosecution of criminal charges in
court is not altogether absolute; but the remedy is not that of mandamus but the filing with the proper authorities or court of
criminal or administrative charges if the alleged offended parties believe that the former maliciously refrained from instituting
actions for the punishment of violators of the law (Article 208, Revised Penal Code).
A fiscals failure to give credence or weight to the testimony of witnesses or otherwise appreciate the evidence presented in a
preliminary investigation, unless patently capricious or arbitrary, cannot be taken as an abuse of discretion, for he must have
formed his impression after observing and evaluating the demeanor and conduct of a witness testifying before him.
Order appealed AFFIRMED.
CRESPO v. MOGUL
June 30,
1987
Gancayco,
J.
SUMMARY: A Circuit Criminal Court Judge refused to grant a motion to dismiss (a criminal case) filed by a Provincial Fiscal upon
instructions by the Secretary of Justice.
DOCTRINE: Once a complaint or information is filed in Court, the acquittal/dismissal/conviction rests solely on the discretion of the
Court. It is within the Courts discretion to deny a motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal or the Secretary of Justice. Even if he does not
FACTS: believe that there is a basis for prosecution, the fiscal or prosecutor still has the legal duty to continue with the presentation of
evidence in order for the Court to arrive at an objective judgment of the case.
Assistant Fiscal Proceso de Gala filed a case for estafa against Mario Crespo. When the case was set for arraignment, the
accused filed a motion to defer arraignment because there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice
regarding the filing of the information for his case. The presiding judge Leodegario Mogul denied the accuseds motion.
The accused filed a case for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction to compel the Mogul to
delay the arraignment, and the CA released an order restraining the judge from proceeding with Crespos arraignment until the Secretary
of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review. The Undersecretary of Justice, resolving the accuseds petition for review,
directed the fiscal to move for the immediate dismissal of the information filed against Crespo based on isufficiency of evidence, which
the Provincial fiscal did. Judge Mogul denied this motion and set an arraignment date.
Crespo filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of
prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the CA. The CA issued a restraining order for Judge Mogul, but in a late decision, it
dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order. Crespo filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
ISSUE:
1.
WON a judge may refuse to grant a motion to dismiss filed by the Provincial Fiscal/Secretary of Justice and insist on the
arraignment and trial on the
merits- YES
RATIO:
Criminal actions commenced either by complaint or by information are to be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
fiscal, and the institution of a criminal case depends upon his discretion. The decision of whether or not to pursue a criminal case based
on the findings of a preliminary investigation is a decision made by the fiscal. This is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by
private persons. They have a legal duty to prosecute when they find that there is a prima facie case, and a legal duty not to prosecute
when there is none. However, once a complaint or information is filed by the fiscal in Court, the disposition of the case
(acquittal/dismissal/conviction) transfers to the sole discretion of the Court. If a fiscal should find it proper to reinvestigate, he shall ask
permission from the Court. If the fiscal changes his mind about the existence of a prima facie case and files a motion to dismiss, it is
within the Courts discretion to deny such motion. In such a case, even if the fiscal does not believe in the existence of a basis for
prosecution, the fiscal or prosecutor still has the legal duty to continue with the presentation of evidence in order for the Court to arrive
at an objective judgment of the case.
STA. ROSA MINING CO. v. ZABALA

August 31,
1987 Bidin
SUMMARY: A criminal information was filed with the Court of First Instance. Upon request of accused private respondents, the Secretary
of Justice reviewed the case. The Secretary later reversed the findings of the case and directed prosecution to move for dismissal. Such
FACTS: motion was denied by the Court. Now, petitioner files for mandamus to compel Respondent Fiscal to continue prosecuting the
criminal case.
DOCTRINE: A fiscal has the power to institute a criminal action. However, once a case has already been filed, the fiscal loses power over
the case and must continue prosecuting it, as his duty of the Government.
Petitioner filed a complaint for attempted theft of materials against private respondents, with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal.
The case was assigned to an Assistant Fiscal, who, after conducting a preliminary investigation, recommended that an
information for Attempted Theft be filed, on a finding of a prime facie case.
The Provincial Fiscal, Ilustre, filed an information with the Court of First Instance, charging private respondents with Attempted
Theft.
Private respondents requested the Secretary of Justice for a review.
The Secretary of Justice reversed the findings of the prima facie case and directed prosecution to move for dismissal.
Ilustre filed a motion to dismiss, but the Court denied the motion.
Respondent Fiscal Zabala became Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal.
Zabala filed a second motion to dismiss, manifesting that he would not prosecute the case, and disauthorized any private
prosecutor from appearing.
Hence, this petition for mandamus compelling Zabala to continue prosecuting the criminal case.
ISSUES: WON Respondent Fiscal may be compelled to continue prosecuting a criminal case YES
RATIO:
It is true that the institution of a criminal action lies at the sound discretion of the investigating fiscal. The institution of such case
is his choice, subject to his judgment whether the evidence adduced has established the accuseds guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Further, when he decides not to institute a criminal action, he may not be compelled to do so.
However, once the case has already been filed, a fiscal is not clothed with the power to dismiss it, as this power is vested solely in
the court. In US v. Valencia, it was held that once the complaint has been presented and the trial has commenced, the court, and not the
fiscal, has full control of it. It is discretionary on the court where the case is pending to grant or deny a motion to dismiss.
In the case at bar, the court below denied the fiscals motion to dismiss. Now, the fiscal refuses to prosecute. The fiscal must
proceed with his duty of presenting evidence for the court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to the culpability of the accused.
The fiscal should not shirk from his responsibility, much less leave it in the hands of a private prosecutor. In the trial of criminal offenses,
it is the duty of the fiscal to appear for the Government, as the offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State. If the fiscal is not
convinced that a case exists, he cannot simply move for dismissal, then refuse to prosecute the same when the motion is denied. He
cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. What the fiscal can do is to continue appearing for the Government, and turn over the
presentation of evidence to another fiscal or to a private prosecutor. But when no other prosecutor is available, he should proceed with
his duty to discharge his duty and present the evidence to the best of his ability, and let the court decide.
The fact that the Secretary of Justice directed the fiscal to move for dismissal is no justification for the refusal of the fiscal to
prosecute the case. In Mario Fl. Crespo v. Hon. Leodegario L. Mogul, it was actually held by the Court that the Secretary of Justice should
refrain from entering a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been in
Court.
BANAL v. TADEO,Jr.
Dec. 11 1987
Ponente Gutierrez, Jr.
SUMMARY: Atty. Bustos was not allowed by the court to appear as private prosecutor in a criminal case for violation of BP 22 on grounds
that such was a crime against public order and not against property. He filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus to compel the court
to allow him to appear in behalf of his client who was the injured party. The court said that his intervention in the case was allowed since
not only the State but the petitioner too is entitled to relief. It could not have been the intention of BP 22 to leave the offended party
defrauded by excluding the civil liability of the offended. Also, it will facilitate the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice
eliminating the burden of having to file a separate civil case
DOCTRINE: A private prosecutor can intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case if the same felonious act or omission results in
direct damage of injury to another, giving rise to civil liability.
FACTS:
15 separate informations for violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) were filed against Rosario Claudio. She was arraigned in
1986 where she pleaded not guilty and thereafter, the pre-trial was set on January 1987. Judge Tadeo, Jr replaced Judge Serquina, who
was then presiding judge. The trial court issued an order, which rejected the appearance of Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos to appear as private
prosecutor because the charge was for violation of BP 22, which it stated did not provide for an civil liability or indemnity and was a
crime not against property but public order.
Thus, a petition for certiorari was filed to review the order of the trial court and for mandamus to allow Atty Bustos to appear as
private prosecutor for the case.
ISSUES:
WON the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in rejecting the appearance of the private prosecutor
RATIO:
Yes. The intervention of the private prosecutor in behalf of the offended party, Banal, should be permitted in the prosecution of
this civil case.
The basis of civil liability arising from crime is found in Art. 100 of the RPC,Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable. When
a person commits a crime, he offends two entities- the state, and the individual whose person, right, honor or property was directly
injured by the same punishable act or omission. One act or omission may produce both a crime and a tort.
Civil liability to the offended party cannot be denied (Lozano v. Martinez). In the case at bar, not only the State but the petitioner too
is entitled to relief as a member of the public, which the law seeks to prevent. She suffered with the State when the checks bounced. It
also could not have been the intention of the framers of the constitution to leave the offended party defrauded and empty-handed by
excluding civil liability of the offender. If she is given the only the remedy of having to file separate civil case, she may be unable to
recover even the face value of the check, unjustly enriching the errant draw at the expense of the payee.
The intervention is justified also for the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice mandated by Section 16 of the Bill of
Rights. A separate civil case proves costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and cause further delay in the disposition of
the case.
PEREZ vs. HAGONOY RURAL BANK, INC., and CA

March 9,
2000 DE
LEON, JR.,J.
SUMMARY: Petitioner as officer in charge, cashier and teller of Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. was charged with estafa thru falsification of
commercial documents. Private respondent bank questions the ruling of the RTC judge in dismissing the criminal case by a petition for
certiorari.
DOCTRINE: The Solicitor General is the only one that may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or
represent the People or State in criminal proceedings pending in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the private offended party
retains the right to bring a special civil action for certiorari in his own name in criminal proceedings before the courts of law.
FACTS:
Respondent Bank filed a complaint for Estafa against petitioner, the officer in charge, cashier and teller of Hagonoy Rural Bank,
Inc., together with other employees of the Bank. They made anomalous withdrawals from the bank by falsification of withdrawal slips
and tampering with the subsidiary ledgers. The prosecutor initially found the petitioner had committed the crime prompting her to file a
petition for review with the Sec. of Justice praying for the dismissal of the charges against her. While petition for review was pending the
prosecutor filed an information for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents against petitioner and her co-accused. Sec. of
Justice issued resolution ordering the prosecutor to order the dismissal of the case against the petitioner on the ground of insufficient
evidence.
Prosecutor subsequently filed a motion to dismiss case against petitioner that was granted by RTC judge. Respondent Bank
assailed the dismissal which the CA granted thus this petition for certiorari. The petitioner questions the legal standing of the respondent
to file the petition for certiorari considering that this is a criminal case and the proper party must be the state represented by the
Solicitor General.
ISSUES:
1.
WON the private respondent, as private complainant, in a criminal case has the legal personality to question the dismissal
by the trial judge of the
criminal charges against herein petitioner upon the motion filed by the prosecutor
RATIO:
The private respondent, as private complainant, had legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case against the
petitioner on the ground that the order of dismissal was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In the case of Dela Rosa v. Court of Appeals, the court held that:
"In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition
may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or
complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the
decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, the complainant should not bring the action in the name
of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in (the) name of the said complainant."
Thus, while it is only the Solicitor General that may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or
represent the People or State in criminal proceedings pending in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the private offended party
retains the right to bring a special civil action for certiorari in his own name in criminal proceedings before the courts of law.
JALANDONI v. DRILON
March 2,
2000
Buena, J.
SUMMARY: Private respondent Ledesma filed an administrative complaint against petitioner for violation of the RPC and the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act with the PCGG. A full-page advertisement was subsequently caused to be published by private respondents in
daily newspapers. An open letter to OPMC stockholders was also issued private respondent. Both articles were said to impute illegal and
unauthorized acts to petitioner Jalandoni, relative to the sale of OPMC shares. Because of this, two separate complaints for the crime of
libel were filed by petitioner Jalandoni against private respondents. After the filing of
affidavits, the Asst. Prosecutor issued a Memorandum, approved by the Provincial Prosecutor, and two separate informations for the
complaints were filed in two different branches of the Makati RTC. After the respondents appeal, Secretary Drilon issued a DOJ Resolution
ordering withdrawal of the informations.
DOCTRINE: It is a well-settled rule that the Secretary of Justice has the power to review resolutions and decisions of the city or provincial
prosecutor or the Chief State prosecutor upon petition by a proper party. The Revised Administrative Code gives the Secretary of Justice
the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors. Given this, he may then affirm, nullify, modify or reverse their rulings
as he may see fit.
FACTS:
On July 1992, private respondent Jaime Ledesma filed an administrative complaint for violation of the RPC and the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act against petitioner Mario Jalandoni with the PCGG. Two days after, news articles about such appeared in various
newspapers. Also, a full-page advertisement was caused to be published by private respondents Coyiuto, Jr., Ledesma, Garcia, Barcelon,
Ozaeta, and Dyhongpo in 5 major daily newspapers.
Exactly a year after the publication, petitioner Jalandoni filed a complaint (I.S. No. 93-6228) for the crime of libel before the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal against private respondents who were officials of Oriental Petroleum & Minerals Corporation (OPMC). The
complaint stemmed from the full-page advertisement a year earlier, which contained allegations naming Jalandoni, who was then a PCGG
Commissioner, of having committed illegal and unauthorized acts constituting graft and corruption, relative to the sale of OPMC shares
held by Piedras Petroleum to the RCBC-Yuchenco Group.
6 days after the filing of the first libel complaint, Jalandoni filed another complaint for libel (I.S. No. 93-6422) before the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal against then OPMC Chairman and President Coyiuto, Jr. This complaint was caused by Coyiuto, Jr.s August 1992 open
letter addressed to the OPMC stockholders.
After the affidavits and counter-affidavits were filed, 3 rd Assistant Prosecutor Bautista issued a Memorandum in I.S. No. 93-6228,
approved by Rizal Provincial Prosecutor Castro, recommending the indictment of private respondents. An information for the crime of libel
was filed with the Makati RTC. I.S. No. 93-6422 underwent the same process but the information for the crime of libel was filed with a
different branch in the Makati RTC.
All private respondents appealed to then Secretary of Justice, Franklin M. Drilon. On March 1994, Secretary Drilon issued the
questioned DOJ Resolution No. 211, Series of 1994, which set aside the two questioned resolutions (info for the 2 libel cases?), dismissed
the 2 complaints, and ordered the immediate withdrawal of the two Informations. A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied
in a letter-order.
ISSUES:
1. WON Secretary Drilons DOJ Resolution is valid (WON the Secretary of Justice has the power to review resolutions or decisions of
city or provincial prosecutors)
2. *WON articles in question were libelous
3. *WON a writ of certiorari must be issued
RATIO:
1. YES. It is a well-settled rule that the Secretary of Justice has the power to review resolutions and decisions of the city or provincial
prosecutor or the Chief State prosecutor upon petition by a proper party. The Revised Administrative Code gives the Secretary of
Justice the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors. Given this, he may then affirm, nullify, modify or reverse
their rulings as he may see fit.
2. NO. The Court took the liberty to review the libellous articles complained of and did not find them to be such. It cited Vasquez vs.
CA and said that in libel cases against public officials, for liability to arise, the alleged defamatory statement must relate to official
conduct, even if the defamatory statement
is false, unless the public official concerned proves the existence of actual malice in the making of the statement. In this case, the
petitioner failed to prove actual malice. Hence, the statements made in the articles in question are protected by the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech.
3. NO. A special civil action for certiorari will prosper only when a grave abuse of discretion is manifested. For an abuse to be grave,
the power must be exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility (Republic v. Villarama,
Jr.) Petitioner failed to prove the existence of the abuse.
Cerezo v. People
June 1,
2011
Nachura,
J:
SUMMARY: Complaint for libel was filed by Cerezo. QC Prosecution Office filed by the corresponding information. Defendants filed a motion
to reconsider the prosecutors evidence. The prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the information so the RTC withdrew it. Upon Cerezos
Motion and upon review by the DOJ, the RTC revived the case.
DOCTRINE: Once the case is filed in court, the Court must make its own determination of whether to proceed with the case. It must not
solely rely on the prosecutors motion or orders.
FAC TS:
Read the table from L-R, Top to bottom. I put it in a table to you can see how the case is passed from one entity to another.
Respondents in Cerezos
QC Prosecution Office
Cerezo (complainant)
RTC
Secretary of Justice (DOJ)
complaint
(OP- QC)
Filed complaint for libel
Filed corresponding
information (before RTC)
Filed Motion for
Recommended withdrawal
Reconsideration and/or
of information it filed
Motion to Re-evaluate
earlier
Prosecutions Evidence
(filed at OP-QC)
Filed Motion to Dismiss
and Withdraw
Entered a plea of not
Ordered the criminal case
guilty in the
dismissed:
arraignment
Prosecutor was vested
with power to reconsider
his own resolution. If the
case is filed in court
already, he can interfere
with it subject to the
Filed a Motion for

Reconsideration of the
RTCs order.
His argument: OP-QCs
Reversed and set aside

OP-QCs motion to
dismiss and withdraw
information.
resolution has not yet

attained finality
because it was the
subject of a Petition for
Review before DOJ.
Ordered OP-QC to refile

the earlier information for
libel
Granted Cerezos Motion

Reconsideration,
reviving the libel case,
conformably with the
DOJs resolution.
Order
of dismissal and
withdrawal of
information was not
yet final because of the
timely
Motionfiling
for of Cerezos
Reconsideration
CA: RTC abused its discretion in reviving the case. There was double jeopardy. The information is valid and the termination
of the case was not expressly consented to by the defendants. Hence, it cannot be revived. DOJ improperly took
cognizance of the case.
ISSUE
2. WON the there was valid termination of the case as to usher the impregnable wall of double jeopardy - NO (this is how the SC phrased the
issue)
RATIO:
1.
WON the there was valid termination of the case as to usher the impregnable wall of double jeopardy - NO Order of
dismissal
and
withdrawal
of
information was not yet final because of the timely filing of Cerezos Motion for Reconsideration
Once a case is filed in Court, any disposition of it rests on the sound discretion of the court. The trial court should not rely
solely on the findings of the public prosecutor. It is the courts duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and
this assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing the motion.
In initially dismissing the case, RTC judge failed to make his own determination of W/N there was prima facie case to hold
respondents for trial. He failed to make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case. RTC judge
blindly relied on the recommendation of the prosecutor when he shouldve been more circumspect and judicious especially
when the prosecution appeared to be uncertain and undecided.
In ordering the revival of the case, the above-mentioned still holds true. He failed to make a separate evaluation and merely
awaited the DOJs resolution.
By relying solely on the manifestation of the public prosecutor, the trial court abdicated its judicial power. It acted with
grave abuse of discretion and violated Cerezos right to due process. Their orders are void and had no legal standing.
DECISION
REMAND the case to RTC so that it can rule on the merits of the case
People v. Guevarra
December 4,
1989 Padilla, J.
SUMMARY: Armed men robbed the Cruz family. Priscilla, the wife of Luisito Cruz, was forcibly boarded onto her own care and driven
away. Priscilla was told that she would be held for ransom but the men changed their minds and left her. Luisito informed the police;
subsequently, Vergel Bustamante alias Dan Saksak was investigated and detained. Affirmed with modification Bustamante sentenced to
suffer reclusion perpetua.
DOCTRINE: Amendment of Information to include a defendant cannot be without basis. Examples: previously-issued subpoenas, return
of service for subpoenas as answered by jail warden, order of other courts, letters of transmittal of case records.
FACTS: Armed men entered the house of the spouses Cruz, in the evening of April 8, 1980. They robbed the spouses of P3,000 and
pieces of jewelry. The men demanded Luisito Cruz to give the key to his car, which he did, giving it to one of the armed men. Priscilla,
Luisitos wife, was forcibly boarded onto her own car by the men. They drove off. Priscilla was told that they were going to hold her for a
P50,000 ransom but they changed their mind. That same evening, Luisito reported the robbery to the police. Vergel Bustamante was
investigated and detained, and later identified by Priscilla Cruz to be one of her kidnappers. An Amended Information charged Vergel
Bustamante alias Dan Saksak together with other persons such as Roming Longhair, Boy Tae, and Boy Pogi. Separate trials were
conducted for Bustamante and one of his co-accused, as the others could not be served subpoenas or were already reported dead.
Bustamantes co-accused was acquitted, while Bustamante himself was found guilty by the RTC Nueva Ecija. Bustamante appealed.
ISSUES:
3. WON
4. WON
5. WON
6. WON
the amendment of the information to include (as party defendant) Vergel Bustamante alias Dan Saksak was an error.
a reinvestigation was conducted.
the testimonies of the witnesses are credible.
the Defendant-Appellant can be convicted of Kidnapping for the Purpose of Extorting a Ransom.
RATIO:
1. The amendment of the information to include Bustamante (alias Dan Saksak):
Defendant-Appellant: There is a lack of proof that Bustamante and Dan Saksak are one and the same person.
SC: There was basis. The records of the case show that:
1. A subpoena issued by a Municipal Court of Nueva Ecija was directed to a Vergel Bustamante alias Dan Saksak, for
two different criminal cases
2. A Return of Service of one subpoena for the previously-mentioned criminal cases bore the statement of a Jail Warden
(Manila City Jail) that Vergel Bustamante @ Dan Saksak was not in the list of present inmates.
3. The order of the Municipal Court dated September 25, 1980, found a prima facie case against, among others, one
Vergel Bustamante alias Dan Saksak. The accused in that case filed a written waiver of their rights to present
evidence.
4. The letter of transmittal of the case records to the RTC NE stated that Vegel Bustamante alias Dan Saksak was
detained at the Manila City Jail.
Also, such an issue cannot be raised for the first time upon appeal. It should have been raised before the trial court via a
Motion to Quash the Information. Defendant-Appellants counsel told the court he was going to file a Motion to Quash the
Information but did not do so.
2. The reinvestigation:
Defendant-Appellant: There was no reinvestigation committed to justify the filing of an amended information, and that the
counsel in the RTC did not know of any investigation.
SC: The reinvestigation was certified by the Fiscal. The counsel in the RTC was only appointed after the arraignment.
3. The credibility of the testimonies:
Defendant-Appellant: Improbable, contradictory, full of inconsistencies, and his own extra-judicial confession given during
custodial investigation
SC: These minor details cannot destroy the substance of the testimonies. The evidence presented was sufficient to support the
verdict even without the confession.
4. The conviction of Kidnapping for the Purpose of Extorting a Ransom:
SC: DA cannot be convicted of such crime. Priscilla merely testified that she heard one of the robbers say she would be held
for ransom. But in the instant case, there is no element of demand. No ransom note was presented, nor was there a showing
of demand for money upon the Cruz family. The absence of demand for ransom negates the allegation of kidnapping for
ransom.
US V. LAHOYLAHOY & MADANLOG

July 15,
1918
Street, J.
SUMMARY: Defendants were convicted in the CFI of robbery with homicide, however, the complaint charges that the property taken was Roman
DOCTRINE: In the crime of robbery, among others, the property taken must be that of another, and an indictment or complaint for such offense must
name the owner. A variance in this respect between the indictment (allegation in the complaint) and the proof (evidence) will be fatal and the accused
cannot be convicted.
Escribas, while the proof shows that they were Juanas. The SC acquitted the defendants of the crime of robbery but convicted them of homicide of all
four victims.
FACT S:
While the Juana and her two grandchildren (Miguela, 14 years old and Bartolome, 9 years old) were sleeping, the two accused entered the
house and demanded money. Juana gave them P100. They were further required to leave the house and go to the beach, where the accused again
demanded money, but Juana was not able to comply. Lahoyloy then struck her with a bolo just below her breast, killing her instantly. The children ran
away instantly and remained hidden during the night in the bushes. The next morning they made their way back to the house of their grandmother
where they found each other. When they went to the house of their parents, they learned that their grandmothers husband, Francisco, and their
parents were also killed and buried by the accused, with the help of Eugenio Tenedero, son-in-law of Lahoylahoy. They were threatened with death if
they made a complaint. The stayed for some time with their sister, the wife of Madanlog, then taken to the home of another sister, Dionisia Estriba,
to whom they revealed the facts and who filed the complaint. During the examination, Lahoyloy confessed that the four deceased were killed by
Madanlog with his assistance.
At the trial, the children gave a very consistent account of the robbery and murder of their grandmother. The boy did not remember whether
Madanlog was present when she was killed, but Miguela said that he was. Eugenio Tenedero testified that the defendants killed the four deceased,
and in the early morning, required him to help them bury the dead. A day or two after the crime, Madanlog went to the house of Francisco and
Juana and carried away some palay, some dawa, three pigs and a trunk containing wearing apparel, but this act should not be considered as a
continuation of the robbery but rather as a spoliation of the estate of a deceased person.
The CFI found the defendants guilty of robbery with multiple homicide and sentenced them to death. The SC found the evidence sufficient to find
the defendants guilty. However, a question arose with regard to the proof as to the ownership of the property which was taken by the accused. According
to the proof, the person robbed was Juana, while the complaint charges that the property taken belonged to Roman Estriba.
ISSUE:
1. WON the variance between the complaint and the proof with regard to the ownership of the stolen property is a fatal error in the complaint.
RATIO: Yes. Defendants acquitted of the crime of robbery, but convicted of four counts of
homicide
According to Sec. 6(5) of General Orders No. 58, a complaint or information shall show... the names of the persons against whom, or against
whose property, the offense was committed, if known. If his name cannot be ascertained, it may be alleged that it is unknown. This requirement is
necessary where the name of the injured party is necessary as a matter of essential description of the crime charged, as in the case at bar. In
crimes against property, ownership must be alleged as a matter essential to the proper description of the offense. Furthermore, according to Clarks
Criminal Procedure: in the crime of robbery, among others, the property taken must be that of another, and an indictment for such offense must
name the owner; and a variance in this respect between the indictment and the proof will be fatal. The complaint in this case does not sufficiently
describe the act of robbery or the subject of the robbery because the owner of the property was not established. The only way money, which has
been the subject of a robbery, can be described or identified in a complaint is by connecting it with the individual who was robbed as its owner or
possessor. When the offense has been so identified in the complaint, the proof must correspond upon this point with the allegation, or there can be
no conviction. The complaint is not defective in form because the charge is clear, direct and unambiguous, but because of the lack of conformity
between the allegation and the proof respecting the ownership of the property, it is impossible to convict the two accused of the crime of robbery,
and therefore they cannot be convicted of the complex crime of robbery with homicide.
They can only be convicted of homicide of the four victims(not murder because the record does not show how they were executed). Pedro
Lahoylahoy is sentenced to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day, reclusion temporal for each homicide, and Marcos Madanlog to 20 years, reclusion temporal
for each; both of them not to exceed 40 years, in view of Rule 2, Art. 88 of the Penal Code on maximum duration.
People vs. Purisima

Nov. 20,
1978
MuozPalma
SUMMARY: Petitioners did not allege in the informations that they filed all the elements constituting the crime of illegal
possession of deadly weapons punished under PD9 paragraph 3.
DOCTRINE: The Information must allege all the facts(elements) which constitute the offense for such information to constitute a
sufficiently valid charge.
FACTS: Petitioners charged 3 accused persons with illegal possession of deadly weapons under P.D. 9. Two were tried in the Court
of First Instance of Manila and one in the Court of First Instance of Samar. The 3 judges in their respective cases issued an order to
quash upon filing by the respective accused. Hence, this case was filed in the Supreme Court. All 3 of the informations filed in the
respective courts only alleged that the accused carried outside of their respective residences, a blade, ice pick and socyatan
respectively not being used as a tool or implement necessary to earn his livelihood nor being used in connection therewith . All 3
judges reasoned out that the informations did not allege one essential element of the offense charged which is that the carrying
outside of the accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or
related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder. Petitioners now argue that such alleged
element is only part of the whereas clause or preamble of PD 9 and thus not an element of such offense and that the act punished
is mala prohibitum.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Informations filed by the People(represented by the Sol-Gen, fiscal of manila and fiscal of samar)
sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under
Presidential Decree No. 9
RATIO: The Constitution provides for the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against the accused. The
Rules of Court requires that for an information to be sufficient, it must state the designation of the offense by the statute, and the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. The Supreme Court holds that PD 9 has 2 elements. (1) The carrying
outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood;
and (2) that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder. There are conflicting views on the interpretation of PD9 on
whether the acts mentioned therein are punishable irrespective of the intent of the accused. In such case, there is ambiguity which
can be resolved by looking into the spirit of the law. Such spirit can be found by looking at the preamble which embodies the
context of why the law was enacted. Thus, the 2 nd element is within the spirit of PD9 and needs to be alleged in the information.
The two elements of PD9 paragraph3 must be alleged in the Information in order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently valid
charge. The sufficiency of an information is determined solely by the facts alleged therein. If the facts are incomplete and do not
convey the elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is in order.
PEOPLE V.
FERNANDEZ Date of
the Decision
Ponente
SUMMARY: Frederico Conrado and Melquiades Fernandez were sentenced to suffer two death penalties for the rape of Rebecca Soriano.
Both appealed the decision, alleging that the lower court erred in convicting them for the two crimes of rape. During the pendency of the
appeal, Fernandez withdrew his appeal. Conrado alleges that the trial court erred in allowing two offenses to be charged under a single
information, contrary to Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
DOCTRINE: There should only one offense charged in a single information. If multiple offenses were charged, this would be a ground for
a motion to quash the complaint. Failure to object constitutes a waiver.
FACTS: Soriano was the househelper of Teofilo Malong. On January 13, 1982, after taking a bath, Conrado and Fernandez entered the
bathroom and tied a pice of cloth around her neck. They then took turns sexually abusing her. After the deed was done, Fernandez got a
mud and put it in her vagina. When the two accused left, Soriano reported the incident to Amelita Malong. Amelita testified that she saw
Soriano naked with a piece of cloth tied around her neck and mud on her lower private area. They then reported the incident to
RATIO: Amelita's father Teofilo. They then immediately brought Soriano to the police station, where she was physically examined. The
two accused raised the defense of alibi.

ISSUES: Enumerate the pertinent issues. Number format
1. Does the allegation of two offenses in a single information constitute
an error?
2. Was the CFI correctr in imposing two penalties?
1.
Under Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, there should only be one offense charged in a criminal complaint or
information. In the case of duplicity of charges made in a single information, the accused should make a motion to quash the
complaint. The failure of Conrado to do so constitutes a waiver. Since there has already been a conviction made by the trial court,
it is already too late to raise the issue. Conrado also cannot claim that he was denied the information that he was to be tried for
two separate crimes of rape, since the complaint made was in ordinary and concise languiage.
2.
In multiple rape, each defendant is responsible not only for the rape personally committed by him, but also for the rape committed by
others because each of them cooperated in the commission of the crime.
MATILDE v. JABSON
December 29,
1975 Antonio, J.
SUMMARY: While the preamble of the information contained in relation to PD 330, its body did not contain the factual allegations
which would qualify the theft as an offense under PD 330. Such failure to make the allegations falls short of the requirement of the
constitutional guarantee that the accused be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation. Absent such allegations, the PD
330 penalties cannot be validly imposed.
DOCTRINE: The body of the information should contain the factual allegations that would qualify the offense. In relation to PD 330 is not
enough.
FACTS:
Matilde [with several others] was initially charged in 3 informations with the crime of qualified theft, in relation to PD 133. [Said PD
133 imposes heavier penalties for the theft by workers and laborers of any material, spare part, product, or article that he is working on,
using or producing.] The products stolen were boxes of insecticide. The initial charges contained allegations of grave abuse of
confidence. To these charges, Matilde initially entered a plea of not guilty.
After two amendments, however, said phrase was deleted from the informations, thereby changing the charges from qualified to
simple theft. Also, there while the accused were identified as laborers of the Markes Agro-Chemical Enterprises, there was no allegation
that they were working on, using or producing the stolen products. Matilde then entered a guilty plea.
Judgment was therefore rendered, but it imposed penalties according to PD 133 (i.e. 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional to
6 years and 1 day of prision mayor). Matilde filed an MR contending that the elements of the offense defined by PD 133 are not alleged in
the body of the informations. It was denied.
ISSUES:
7. WON on the basis of the averments in the informations, the PD 133 penalties were validly imposed.
8. What should be the penalty?
RATIO:
1. NO. Giving substance to the constitutional guarantee that the accused be informed of the nature and the cause of the
accusation against him, Section 8 of Rule 110 requires that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting an offense be stated in an
ordinary and concise language. This is so that (a) a person of common understanding is able to know what offense is intended to be
charged, and (b) the court will be able to pronounce the proper judgment. The informations in this case, while alleging that the accused
were laborers, did not allege that they were working on, using or producing the stolen products. Such allegation is essential to qualify
the offense to that of PD 133. True, the preamble of the informations state that the charges were in relation to PD 133. This, however,
falls short of what is required by the constitution.
2. The proper penalty, prescribed by Article 309, RPC, mitigated by the guilty plea, is 6 months and 1 day to 1 year 8 months and
20 days.
Balitaan v. Court of First Instance of Batangas

30 July 1982
Justice Guerrero
Summary: Accused was charge with the crime of estafa through misappropriation. Accused moved to strike out the complaining witnesss
testimony because it was at variance with the allegation in the Information.
Doctrine: Every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the complaint or information. What facts and circumstances are
necessary to be stated must be determined by reference to the definition and essentials of the specific crimes.
Facts: Counsel for the plaintiff (Balitaan) filed an Information charging respondent Rita de los Reyes of the crime of estafa. It was alleged that
defendant failed to account for and deliver the amount of 127.58 to the plaintiff. This sum is in payment of work done on baby dresses by
Balitaan. Furthermore, the Information stated that it was committed with unfaithfulness and grave abuse of confidence.
During the testimony of plaintiff, the defense presented a motion to strike out all the testimonies of the witness as far as Exhibit
A was concerned (consisted of three checks and a voucher) because there said testimony was at variance in the information and there is
no allegation in the information regarding these checks and cash voucher. The Information only showed the sum of 127.58 that was
received by the defendant. The objection of the counsel of defendant was overruled.
Consequently, the defendant instituted against Balitaan an action for the annulment of the orders of the municipal court,
overruling the objections of the defendant to the testimony of complaining witness on the grounds of immateriality and variance with
the Information. The court in this case, favored the defendant.
From this decision, plaintiff Balitaan filed a petition for review.
Issues
1. W/N there is a variance between the allegation in the Information for estafa and the proof established by the petitioners
testimony
2. W/N the testimonies of the complaining witness prove the same or tend to prove estafa that is different from the one alleged in the
Information (Information alleges estafa under par 1(b) of Art. 315)
Ratio
1. None, there is no variance. The three checks and voucher need not be alleged in the Information. They did not vary the allegation in
the Information that respondent Rita de los Reyes misappropriated the amount of 127.58. Proof of the checks was a material evidence of fact
that respondent misappropriated the amount which was a part of the total sum of the checks.
Every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the Information. This is to enable the accused to prepare his
defense. As a general rule, matters of evidence need not be averred.
All that is required is that the charge be set forth with particularity as will indicate the offense which the accused was alleged to
have committed.
3. The testimony tends to prove what is alleged in the Information. Presentation of proof of deceit in a prosecution for estafa under par.
1(b) is
allowed. Abuse of confidence and deceit may co-exist. The questioned testimony eliciting the fact that the accused falsely represented the
amount of 127.58 is not at variance with the allegations in the Information. The presence of deceit did not change the theory of
prosecution that estafa with abuse of confidence was committed.
PEOPLE V CALAYCA
January 20,
1999
Martinez, J.
SUMMARY: A sworn complaint was filed by Neddy Calayca against his father, Artemio Calayca, for rape in the MCTC of Balingasag,
Misamis Oriental. The MCTC Judge found sufficient ground for prosecution and the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor had the same
findings. Subsequently, an information was filed with the RTC accusing Artemio Calayca of RAPE. Artemio Calayca was found
guilty by the RTC for QUALIFIED RAPE (victim was a minor + accused was the father) and was sentenced to death.
DOCTRINE: The 7 circumstances that raises the penalty of rape to death are qualifying circumstances, which must be alleged in the
Information to afford the accused the right to be informed of the charges against him and the right to due process. The failure to allege all
the qualifying circumstances is fatal but if the circumstance is proved, it is considered as an aggravating circumstance.
FACTS:
Accused raped her daughter several times when the latter was only 7 years old up to the time when she reached 15 years of age.
One night, her father came to her room with a bolo and threatened to hurt her if she would not accede to his wishes. She was able to talk
to her relatives, who advised her to file a complaint but they, too, were frightened of the accused. One of her relatives wrote her elder
sister, who came home and both of them escaped.
A rape charge was instituted by the victim through a sworn complaint filed with the MCTC. The MCTC Judge found sufficient ground
for prosecution and the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor agreed to the said findings. The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor filed a
complaint for RAPE where the minority of the victim was alleged but failed to state that the accused was the father of the victim.
RTC: Guilty of Qualified Rape (Minority of the victim + accused was the father) and sentenced to the penalty of death. AUTOMATIC
REVIEW OF SC
ISSUES:
9. WON the accused may be convicted of qualified rape
RATIO:
1. NO
Under Sec. 11 of RA 7659, which amended Art. 335 of the RPC, both the elements of minority of the victim and her
relationship to the offender must concur. It is not enough that only one is present for the penalty of death to be
imposed.
In People v Garcia, the Court said that it has long been the rule that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded
in the indictment. If they are not pleaded but are proved, they shall be considered only as aggravating circumstances.
It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him and a denial of due
process if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form punishable with death,
although the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and resulting in the capital punishment was
not alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned

Violates the constitutional right of the accused to be properly informed of the nature and causes of
accusation against him, which prevents him from properly preparing his defense.
There is a presumption that he does not have an independent knowledge of the facts that constituted the
case.
Ruling: Penalty reduced to reclusion perpetua.
U.S. v. JAVIER DICHAO

March 30,
1914
Moreland, J
SUMMARY: An information was filed charging Dichao of the crime of rape committed during the interval between Oct 1910 and Aug 1912. Dichao
moved for the information to be demurred on the ground, among others, that the complaint is vague, ambiguous, and does not conform substantially to
the prescribed form. The demurrer was granted by the lower court.
DOCTRINE: The allegations of an information should, if possible, be sufficiently explicit and certain as to inform the defendant of the date on which the
criminal act is alleged to have been committed. Without this information about the day, the accused may be, to an extent, deprived of the opportunity to
defend himself. In this case, the statement of the time when the crime is alleged to have been committed is so indefinite an uncertain that it does not
give the accused the information required by law
FACTS: Antonio Javier Dichao was accused of raping his step-daughter, Isabel de la Cruz, who is under 12 years of age. The information alleges that
during the interval between Oct 1910 to Aug 1912, Dichao was the legal guardian of Isabel and by threats and corporal punishment, he succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with Isabel and, as a result of which, Isabel gave birth to a child.
Dichao filed a demurrer1 alleging that:
1. The facts set forth and contained do not constitute a public offense
2. The criminal complaint does not conform substantially to the prescribed form
3. The complaint is vague and ambiguous
The CFI sustained the demurrer to the information and dismissed the case. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: WON information should be demurred YES,

it should. RATIO:
I.
The allegations of an information should, if possible, be sufficiently explicit and certain as to inform the defendant of the date on which the
criminal act is alleged to
have been committed.
A. Without this information about the day, the accused may be, to an extent, deprived of the opportunity to defend himself.
B. Though it is not necessary, unless time is a material ingredient of the offense, that the precise time of the commission of the offense
should be stated, still the act should be alleged to have been committed at some time before the filing of the complaint
II.
Where the exact date cannot be fixed, or where the prosecuting officer is not thoroughly satisfied that he can prove a precise date, the
prosecuting officer should
allege in the information that the crime was committed on or about a date named
A. Under this allegation, he is not required to prove any precise date
B. But he may prove any date which is not so remote as to surprise and prejudice the defendant
A complaint's written response that pleads for dismissal claiming that while the alleged facts were correct, they do not constitute a legal basis for a lawsuit
III.

In this case, the statement of the time when the crime is alleged to have been committed is so indefinite an uncertain that it does not give
the accused the information
required by law
A. The Oct 1910 Aug 1912 is too indefinite to give the accused an opportunity to prepare his defense.
B. The allegations of the complaint should sufficiently notify the defendant of the act claimed the crime results
C. This indefiniteness is not curd by setting out the date when a child was born as a result of the crime
D. The total omission of a date is not authorized; an indefinite allegation amounts to the same thing
IV.
It is not to be understood as saying that a variance between the date of the commission of the crime as alleged in the information and that as
proved on trial warrants
necessarily the acquittal of the accused
A. The result is that should such variance occurs and it is shown that the defendant is surprised, making him unable to defend himself
properly, the court may order the information amended and grant an adjournment so as to give the defendant time to set up his defense
DISPOSITIVE: Judgment appealed from is affirmed.
People v. Lualhati
March 16,
1989 GrinoAquino, J.
SUMMARY: Lualhati convicted of raping the 11 year old daughter of his common-law wife. He appeals on the grounds that the complaint was
ambiguous regarding the specific time of the offense, and the number of offenses.
DOCTRINE: It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed, except when time is
an essential ingredient of the offense.
FACTS:
Vicente Lualhati charged with raping the 11 year old daughter (Josephine Dimaunahan) of his common-law wife
Case was forwarded by the Fiscal to the CFI-Quezon
Lualhati files a motion to dismiss because the complaint charged more than 1 offense:
o That on or about the month of June 1978, and for some time prior and subsequent thereto, the accused Lualhati wilfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously had carnal knowledge of the complainant...
Fiscal answers that Lualhati is being tried on the basis of the information, which charges only one offense, and not the complaint:
o "..in or about the month of June 1978"
TC denies motion to dismiss
Lualhati again files a motion to dismiss because he was pardoned by the victim, her mother and grandmother (the victim, her mother and
grandmother executed a joint affidavit to that effect)
TC again denies motion because father of the victim insists on prosecuting
Lualhati is convicted of rape, appeals

ISSUES:
1.
2.
WON there is a valid complaint? YES

WON the pardon of the victim, her mother and grandmother extinguished liability? NO

RATIO:
1. Lualhati alleges ambiguity of the complaint (charging at least 3 offenses in an unclear manner) renders the complaint void. This is without merit.
The victim executed an affidavit categorically saying she was raped just before the start of classes in June 1978. Discrepancies as to the time of
carnal copulations do not affect any essential right of the accused where the acts occurred within the period of time alleged. Thus, this affidavit
which is considered part of the complaint cures any ambiguity. Also, it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time
at which the offense was committed, except when time is an essential ingredient of the offense.
2.
Art. 344 of the RPC and jurisprudence on the matter allow the victim, her parents, grandparents or guardian to pardon the offender to
extinguish liability. However, pardon given after the filing of the case in court is too late. Hence in the case at bar, the pardon did not
extinguish liability.
TC decision convicting Lualhati of rape is affirmed.
PEOPLE vs. RAZONABLE

April 12,
2000 Puno, J.
SUMMARY: Benjamin Razonable was found guilty by the lower court of raping his daughter 3 times. He appealed the case claiming that
the information was in violation of sec 6, rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court (requires that the time of commission must be alleged
as near to the actual date as the information will permit) hence defective. The information stated that the offense was committed
sometime in the year 1987. Court held that the procedure for questioning the information was not followed by the accused and
moreover he never objected or brought this up during trial.
DOCTRINE: Section 11, rule 110 of the Rules of Court requires that the time of the commission of the offense must be as near to the actual
date as the information or complaint will permit. But this contention could only be brought up through a motion to quash information or a
motion for bill of particulars. However, if the defense went ahead with presenting their evidence and the accused even gave an alibi on
where he was at that particular time, then he could not raise this defense on appeal.
FACTS
- Complainant Maria Fe was raped by her father, the accused three times in their house. She was threatened by death if she told someone so
would just usually cry herself to sleep.
But because her conscience wouldnt permit it, she told her elder sister 6 years after and they reported it to the police station.
They filed a
complaint and the doctors examination found incompletely healed hymenal lacerations at 5,6,7 and 9 o clock positions.
- The defense evidence was alibi, that he was working in a bakery from 8pm to 10am. But on cross examination, his co-worker admitted
that there were times that the accused went missing.
- RTC found accused guilty. He appealed from that decision
ISSUE: WON the information should be considered fatally defective
RATIO:
Petitioner: the information stated that the offense was committed sometime in the year 1987. That violates section 6, rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Court which states that the information must state the approximate time of the commission of the offense. Hence, its fatally
defective
SC: it is a valid information

- A motion to quash said information or a motion for bill of particulars is need to raise the issue of a defective information. An
accused who fails to take this seasonable step will be deemed to have waived the defect in said information
o The only defects that are not deemed waived: no offense is charged, lack of jurisdiction of the offense charged,
extinction of the offense or penalty and double jeopardy
- During the trial, the defense never objected to the presentation of evidence by the prosecution. Moreover, the accused was able to
give an alibi as
to his whereabouts at that particular time. Appellant cannot pretend that he was unable to defend himself in view of the
vagueness of the allegation in the information as to when the crimes at bar were committed
People v. Cristobal
March 30,
2011
Bersamin, J
SUMMARY: A woman convicted by the RTC and CA of qualified theft appeals, on the basis that the alleged date she committed the crime
was wrong.
DOCTRINE: The date on the information need not be specific, as long as it places the crime within reasonable time boundaries of the
critical moments the alleged crime was committed.
FACTS: Olivia Cristobal was charged with qualified theft, for $10,000 and Php2.2 Million in cash which she failed to account for as a teller
of Prudential Bank, Angeles City, Pampanga. Her reasons include the withdrawal of the account holder of the $10,000 (which the account
holder refuted, having deposited the amount on the same date he was said to withdrawn it), and that a man was threatening her family so
she was forced to give the money to him over a period of time.
R T C c o n v i c t e d h e r o f t h e c r i m e a n d s e n t e n c e d h e r t o r e c l u s i o n p e r p e t u a a n d C A a ffi r m e d , h e n c e t h i s
a p p e a l . ISS UE S:
1. WON the information filed against Cristobal was fatally defective. - NO
2. WON the RTC correctly found that the accused had waived her right to present evidence in her defense. - YES
3. WON the extrajudicial admission of taking the amount involved contained in the letter of the accused to the President of
Prudential Bank was admissible under the rules and jurisprudence. YES
RATIO:
Information against Cristobal was sufficient and valid. Her claim that the info filed against her was wrong (that she stole the money on
Dec 29, 1995, when in fact her account was cleared then and the actual taking happened on Jan 2, 1996) and it prejudiced against her
rights as an accused to prepare a proper defense.
Section 6 and Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the rules applicable, provide:
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense;and the place wherein the offense was committed. When an offense
is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.
Section 11. Time of the commission of the offense. - It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at
which the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have
been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will
permit.
The term on or about [specific date] indicates the non-materiality of the date in the crime, and so the conviction by the RTC and CA is
upheld.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | B2015

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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | B2015

TUMANG VS. BAUTISTA (Presiding Judge of RTC) and JAVIER

(Art. XV, Sec. 3, par. 3).

failing to file an appeal