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Bill of rights

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,


plaintiff-appellee
vs. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA,
accused-appellant
G.R. No. 121777
FACTS:
O n t h e a f t e r n o o n o f J a n u a r y 3 0 , 1 9 9 4 , M a r i a L o u r d e s M o d e s t o a n d Nancy Araneta together with
her friends Jennelyn Baez, and Sandra Aquino went to the house of Jasmine Alejandro, after having
learned that a woman is t h e r e t o r e c r u i t j o b a p p l i c a n t s f o r S i n g a p o r e . C a r o l d e l a P i e d r a
w a s a l r e a d y briefing some people when they arrived. Jasmine, on the other hand, welcomed and asked them to sit down.
T h e y l i s t e n e d t o t h e r e c r u i t e r w h o w a s t h e n t a l k i n g a b o u t t h e breakdown
of the fees involved: P30,000 for the visa and the round trip ticket, and P5,000 as placement fee and for
the processing of the papers. The initial payment was P2,000, while P30,000 will be by salary
deduction. The recruiter said that she was recruiting nurses for Singapore. Araneta, her friends and Lourdes then
filled up bio-data forms and were r e q u i r e d t o s u b m i t p i c t u r e s a n d a t r a n s c r i p t o f r e c o r d s . A f t e r
t h e i n t e r v i e w , Lourdes gave the initial payment of P2,000 to Jasmine, who assured her that she was
authorized to receive the money. Meanwhile, in the morning of the said date, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from a n u n i d e n t i f i e d
w o m a n i n q u i r i n g a b o u t t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f t h e r e c r u i t m e n t conducted by a certain Mrs.
Carol Figueroa.
Ramos, whose duties include the surveillance of suspected illegal recruiters, immediately contacted a
friend,
ac e r t a i n M a y e t h B e l l o t i n d o s , s o t h e y c o u l d b o t h g o t h e p l a c e w h e r e t h e rec
ruitment was reportedly being undertaken
U p o n a r r i v i n g a t t h e r e p o r t e d area at around 4:00 p.m., Bellotindos entered the house and pretended to be an
applicant. Ramos remained outside and stood on the pavement, from where he w a s a b l e t o s e e a r o u n d s i x ( 6 )
p e r s o n s i n t h e s a l a . R a m o s e v e n h e a r d a woman, identified as Carol Figueroa, talk about the possible
employment she h a s t o p r o v i d e i n S i n g a p o r e a n d t h e d o c u m e n t s t h a t t h e a p p l i c a n t s h a v e t o
comply with. Fifteen (15) minutes later, Bellotindos came out with a bio-data form in hand. Thereafter, Ramos
conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) to organize the arrest of the alleged illegal
recruiter. A surveillance team was then organized to confirm the report. After which, a raid was
executed.C o n s e q u e n t l y, C a r o l w a s c h a r g e d a n d c o n v i c t e d b y t h e t r i a l c o u r t o f illegal recruitment.
Upon appeal, accused questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in l a r g e s c a l e a n d a s s a i l s , a s
w e l l , t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f t h e l a w d e f i n i n g a n d penalizing said crime. First, a c c u s e d s u b m i t s
t h a t A r t i c l e 1 3 ( b ) o f t h e L a b o r Code defining recruitment and placement is void for vagueness and,
thus,violates the due process clause. The provision in question reads:
ART. 13. Definitions.
(a) x x x.
(b) R e c r u i t m e n t a n d p l a c e m e n t r e f e r s t o a n y a c t o f c a n v a s s i n g , enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, w h e t h e r f o r p r o f i t o r n o t :
P r o v i d e d , T h a t a n y p e r s o n o r e n t i t y w h i c h , i n a n y manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two
or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
ISSUES:
(1)W h e t h e r o r n o t s e c . 1 3 ( b ) o f P.D . 4 4 2 , a s a m e n d e d , o t h e r w i s e known as the illegal recruitment
law is unconstitutional as it violates the due process clause.
(2)Whether or not accused was denied equal protection and therefore should be exculpated
HELD:
(1)For the First issue, dela Piedra submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment and
placement is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause.
D u e p r o c e s s r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e t e r m s o f a p e n a l s t a t u t e m u s t b e sufficiently explicit to inform those who
are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties. In support of her submission, dela Piedra
invokes People vs. Panis, where the Supreme Court criticized the definition of recruitment and placement. The Court
ruled, however, that her reliance on the said case was misplaced. The issue in Panis was whether, under the proviso
of Article 13 (b), the crime of illegal recruitment could be committed only whenever two or more persons are in
any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee. In this case, the Court merely bemoaned the lack of records that
would help shed light on the meaning of the proviso. The absence of s u c h r e c o r d s
n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , t h e C o u r t w a s a b l e t o a r r i v e a t a reasonable interpretation of the
proviso by applying principles in criminal law and drawing from the language and intent of the law itself. Section 13(b),

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therefore, is not a perfectly vague act whose obscurity is evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein
is merely couched in imprecise l a n g u a g e t h a t w a s s a l v a g e d b y p r o p e r c o n s t r u c t i o n . I t i s n o t
v o i d f o r vagueness.
D e l a P i e d r a f u r t h e r a r g u e s t h a t t h e a c t s t h a t c o n s t i t u t e recruitment and placement
suffer from overbreadth since by merely referring a person for employment, a person may be
convicted of illegal recruitment. That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary and
harmless acts such as labor or employment referral (referring an applicant, according to appellant, for
employment to a prospective employer) does not render the law overbroad. Evidently, Dela Piedra
misapprehends concept of overbreadth.A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the e x e r c i s e
of individual freedoms
a f f i r m a t i v e l y g u a r a n t e e d b y t h e Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or religi
on. A generally worded statute, when construed to punish conduct which cannot be
constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it f a i l s t o g i v e a d e q u a t e
w a r n i n g o f t h e b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n t h e constitutionally permissible and
t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y i m p e r m i s s i b l e applications of the statute.
(2)A n e n t t h e s e c o n d i s s u e , D e l a P i e d r a i n v o k e s t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n c
lause in her defense.
S h e p o i n t s o u t t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e evidence purportedly shows that Jasmine Alejandro hand
e d o u t a p p l i c a t i o n forms and even received Lourdes Modestos payment, appellant was the only o n e
c riminall y ch arge d. Al ejandro, on the other hand, remained scot-fr ee. From this, she
concludes that the prosecution discriminated against her on grounds of regional
o r i g i n s . A p p e l l a n t i s a C e b u a n a w h i l e A l e j a n d r o i s a Zamboanguea, and the alleged crime took place in
Zamboanga City. The Supreme Court held that the argument has no merit. The prosecution of one guilty person while
others equally guilty are not prosecuted, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The
unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those
who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an
element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there
must be a showing of clear and intentional discrimination. In the case at bar, Dela Piedra has failed to show that, in
charging her, there was a clear and intentional discrimination on the part of the prosecuting officials.
F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e p r e s u m p t i o n i s t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t i n g o f f i c e r s regularly performed their duties, and this
presumption can be overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation. As said earlier, accused has not
presented any evidence to overcome this presumption. The mere allegation that dela Piedra, a Cebuana, was
charged with
thec o m m i s s i o n o f a c r i m e , w h i l e a Z a m b o a n g u e a , t h e g u i l t y p a r t y i n appellants eyes,
was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion that the prosecution officers denied appellant equal protection of the laws.
Republic v. Pilipinas ShellPetroleum Corp.
SUMMARY:
The OEA informed Pilipinas Shell that the latters
contributions to the OPSF were insufficient. As a consequence, a surcharge was imposed upon Pilipinas Shell. The surcharge
was imposed pursuant to a Department of Finance Circular. Pilipinas Shell challenged this and refused to pay the surcharges,
claiming the payments it made were based on a valid interpretation of a Department of Finance Order and Department of
Energy Circular. However, the DOE only reiterated its demand for Pilipinas Shell to settle the surcharges due. The Office of
the President affirmed the DOE. CA reversed, ruling that the Department of Finance Circular was ineffective for failure to
comply with the requirement to file with ONAR. SC affirmed CA.
DOCTRINE:
The requirements of publication and filing were put in place as safeguards against abuses on the part of lawmakers, and as
guarantees to the constitutional right to due process and information on matters of public concerns, and therefore, require
strict compliance. Strict compliance with the requirements of publication cannot be annulled by a mere allegation that parties
were notified of the existence of the implementing rules
PEFIANCO V. MORAL
Facts: D filed a mandamus and injunction case seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a decision which had already become
final. P filed a Motion to Dismiss. The judge denied the motion without stating the basis why Ps motion should be denied.
Issue: Whether the judges denial of the motion was proper
Held: No. Rule 16 mandatorily requires that the resolution of a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the
reasons therefor. The rule proscribes the common practice of perfunctorily denying motions to dismiss for lack of merit. The
challenged order of the trial court falls short of the requirements stated in Rule 16.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Pascual

Bill of rights
Facts: Sometime in February, 1993, a certain Ceferino Tigas wrote a letter, addressed to Hon. Reynaldo Suarez of the Office of
the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court, charging that irregularities andcorruption were being committed by the
respondent Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan.
On March 10, 1993, the letter was referred to the National Bureau of Investigation in order that an investigation on the alleged
illegal and corrupt practices of the respondent may be conducted. Ordered to
conduct a discreet investigation by
the then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco were: SA Edward Villarta, team leader, SI Reynaldo Olazo, HA Teofilo Galang,
SI Florino Javier and SI Jose
Icasiano. They proceeded to Angat, Bulacan, in order to look for Ceferino Tigas, the letter writer. Tigas, the NBI teamrealized
was a fictitious character. In view of their failure to find Tigas, they proceeded to the residence of Candido Cruz, an accused in
respondents sala.
In his affidavit executed on March 23, 1993 before SA Edward Villarta, Cruz declared that he was the accused in Criminal
Case No. 2154, charged with the crime of Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge, after conducting the preliminary investigation
of the case, decided that the crime he committed was only physical injuries and so, respondent judge assumed jurisdiction over
the case. Cruz believed that he was made to understand by the respondent that, in view of his favorable action, Cruz was to
give to respondent the sum ofP2,000.00. Respondent judge is believed to be a drunkard and, in all probability, would need
money to serve his vice. In view of this statement, the NBI agents assigned to the case caused respondent judge to be
entrapped, for which reason, the judge was thought to have been caught in flagrante delicto. NBI agents Villarta and Olazo
filed the following report: On 25 March 1993, at about 4:00 in the afternoon, CANDIDO CRUZ met with Judge PASCUAL
at the Colegio de Sta. Monica, near the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan, where Subject is attending the graduation of
his daughter. CANDIDO CRUZ told Judge PASCUAL that he already had the P2,000.00 which he (Judge PASCUAL) is
asking him. However, Judge PASCUAL did not receive the money because according to him there were plenty of people
around. He then instructed CANDIDO CRUZ to see him(Judge PASCUAL) at his office the following day. At about 8:30 in
the morning of the following day (26 March 1993), CANDIDO CRUZ proceeded to the office of Judge PASCUAL at the
Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, and thereat handed to him four(4) pieces of P500.00 bills contained in a white
mailing envelope previously marked and glazed with fluorescent powder. In the meantime, the Undersigned stayed outside the
court room and after about 15 minutes, CANDIDOCRUZ came out of the room and signaled to the Undersigned that Judge
PASCUAL had already received the marked money. The Undersigned immediately entered the room and informed Subject
about the entrapment. Subject denied having received anything from CANDIDO CRUZ, but after a thorough search, the
marked money was found inserted between the pages of a blue book on top of his table. Subject was invited to the Office of
the NBI-NCR, Manila wherein he was subjected to ultra violet light examination. After finding Subjects right hand for the
presence of fluorescent powder, he was booked, photographed and fingerprinted in accordance with our Standard Operating
Procedure (S.O.P.).On even date, the results of our investigation together with the person of Judge FILOMENO PASCUAL
was referred to the Inquest Prosecutor of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Ombudsman, with the recommendation that he
be charged and prosecuted for Bribery as defined and penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidences presented against Judge Filomeno Pascual were strong enough to convict him.
Held:
We find that the evidence on record does not warrant conviction.
We note that the only bases for the Report and Recommendation submitted by Executive Judge Natividad G. Dizon consist
of: The Complaint, the Answer, the Memorandum of the respondent, and the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing of
the bribery case of respondent judge at the Sandiganbayan. The respondent was, therefore, not afforded the right to open trial
wherein respondent can confront the witnesses against him and present evidence in his defense.
This lapse in due process is unfortunate. The Rules, even in an administrative cases, demand that, if the respondent judge
should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence against him should be competent and should be
derived from direct knowledge. The Judiciary to which respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its members
could be faulted, it should be only after due investigation and after presentation of competent evidence, especially since the
charge is penal in character.[7] The above-quoted Report and Recommendation of the investigating judge had fallen short of
the requirements of due process. The evidence aforesaid admits of irreconcilable inconsistencies in the testimonies of principal
witness, Candido Cruz, and NBI Agent SI Reynaldo Olazo on several material points. It will be remembered that the charge
was intimated by someone who must have had an ax to grind against the respondent judge but who, by reason of cowardice or
lack of evidence to put up a righteous case, did not come out in the open and instead wrote an anonymous letter. The letterwriter, naming himself as Ceferino Tigas, did not specify crimes committed or illegal acts perpetrated but charged respondent
with anomalies in general terms. Respondent judge could not have been expected to make a valid answer or to otherwise
defend himself from such vague accusations. While then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco, upon being apprised of the Tigas
letter, ordered the NBI investigating team to make a discreet investigation of respondent, the NBI team had instead caused
an instigation or the entrapment of respondent judge. Not having found letter-writer Tigas and concluding that no such person
exists, they sought out an accused before respondents court who could possibly be respondent judges virtual

Bill of rights
victim. Approached by the NBI team was Candido Cruz, a person who had been brought before the Municipal Trial Court of
Angat, Bulacan, for preliminary investigation on the charge of Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge gave judgment to
the effect that the crime committed by Candido Cruz was that of physical injuries merely. He declared then that he had original
jurisdiction to try the case. But, respondents action in this regard was perpetrated some time before Candido Cruz was
persuaded to participate in what they (the NBI agents) called entrapment operation. The opportune
time to bribe the respondent should have been before he acted in reducing Cruz criminal liability from Frustrated Murder to
Physical Injuries. No bribe was asked then. It was unlikely that respondent would ask for it on the date of the entrapment on
March 26, 1993, the favorable verdict having been rendered already. It is significant to note that NBI Agent Olazo admitted[8]
that, despite the fact that he scoured the table of the respondent in search of the envelope, with marked money in it, no
envelope was found and so he had to call Candido Cruz who was already outside so that Cruz can locate the envelope. In view
of these antecedents, we find reason to favorably consider the allegations of respondent judge in his defense that, at around
9:30 oclock in the morning of March 26, 1993, Candido Cruz, along with the NBI agents, went to the Municipal Building of
Angat, Bulacan. Candido Cruz, alone, went inside respondent judges chambers, located thereat, and
placed before respondent judge an envelope containing marked money. Respondent judge thought that what was placed before
him was a pleading for filing and so, he told Candido Cruz to file it with the Office of the Clerk of Court, that is, in a room
adjacent to his chambers. Candido Cruz replied that it was the money the judge was asking for. Upon hearing this reply,
respondent judge suddenly erupted in anger. He grabbed the envelope on the desk and hurled it at Candido Cruz. The envelope
fell on the floor. Respondent judge then picked it up and inserted it inside the pocket of Cruz polo shirt and drove him out
of his chambers. NBI Agents Villarta and Olazo immediately entered the door of the judges chambers, introduced themselves,
and told respondent judge that the money that Cruz gave him was marked. Respondent judge told them that he did not receive
or accept money from Candido Cruz. After respondent judge said this, the NBI Agents nevertheless proceeded to search the
room, examined tables, drawers, and every nook and cranny of respondents chambers, and the pockets of the pants of
respondent judge. Even after rigid search of the chambers of respondent, the NBI Agents failed to find the envelope containing
marked money allegedly given by Candido Cruz to respondent judge
Valenzuela vs Bellosillo Case Digest
Facts: Respondent Judge is being charged with gross violation of the constitutional right of subject accused to assistance by
counsel of her own choice, gross misconduct, oppression, partiality and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics.
In a BP 22 case, Judge allegedly granted bail to the accused despite not being accompanied and represented by her counsel at
that time. It appears that Judge granted bail without the assistance of the counsel of record, Atty. Valenzuela and he even
suggested that the latter should be replaced by another counsel. Aghast by such decision, Atty. V filed his Notice of
Withdrawal, in conformity with his clients decision, Meriam Colapo. Subsequently, he filed the instant administrative
complaint against respondent Judge. To support his position, he attached an Affidavit allegedly executed by his client Colapo.
However, during the hearing of the case, he failed to present Colapo as Witness as she was allegedly out of the country
although she was willing to testify at that time.
Held: NOT GUILTY. On the issue of granting bail without the assistance of counsel, the Court held that it was valid and
sufficiently based on the Manifestation filed by Atty. Valenzuela. With regard to the alleged act of respondent Judge suggesting
to the accused that she should change her counsel (complainant Atty. V) and recommending a different lawyer, the Court
found that the evidence adduced by the complainant was insufficient to substantiate the charges against him. The only
evidence offered by complainant was the Affidavit of his client Meriam Colapo, and it cannot be the basis of a finding of guilt
even in an administrative case. The complainants failure to present his principal witness, in the absence of other evidence to
prove his charges was fatal and said Affidavit cannot be given credence and is inadmissible without the said affiant being
placed on the witness stand.
The employment or profession of a person is a property right within the constitutional guaranty of due process of law. This
applies also to Judges. Respondent judge cannot therefore be adjudged guilty of the charges against him without affording him
a chance to confront the said witness, Meriam Colapo. Otherwise, his right to due process would be infringed.
Lumiqued vs exevea
Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged by Zamudio, the Regional Cashier, for dishonesty due to
questionable gas expenses under his office. It was alleged that he was falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements and that he
had an unliquidated cash advance worth P116,000.00. Zamudio also complained that she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued
two weeks after she filed the two complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee hearings on the complaints were
conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its
resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither
Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for
resolution. The Investigating Committee recommended the dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the
recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued.
ISSUE: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry?

Bill of rights
HELD: The SC ruled against Lumiqued. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in
the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right
and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case
at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his
own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the
committee created by Department Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable
under the law for the complaints filed against him. The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by
the Constitution or the law.
. . . There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by
counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while
desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the
participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he
cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side. Whatever irregularity
attended the proceedings conducted by the committee was cured by Lumiqueds appeal and his subsequent filing of motions
for reconsideration.
Govn. Of hk vs. olalia
Facts
Private respondent Muoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were issued and by virtue of a final decree
the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the
extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the private respondent.
The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the same in extradition cases and that the
respondent was a high flight risk. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent
judge subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the
issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further
appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order before
this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at
any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real
and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be
forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent judge. Hence, this instant petition.
Issue
WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail

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Ruling
A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.
Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential
extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a
prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.
In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G.
Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675
April 2007, that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the same being available only in
criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the following trends in international law:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;
(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and
(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on
extradition, on the other.
In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to the worth of the individual and the sanctity
of human rights, the Court departed from the ruling in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.
Acad discipline
NON VS. DAMES [185 SCRA 523; G.R. NO. 89317; 20 MAY 1990]
Facts: Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to reenroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in
the preceding semester. The subject of the protests is not, however, made clear in the pleadings.
Petitioners filed a petition in the court seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the trial court dismissed the
petition. They now petition the court to reverse its ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA1, which was also applied in the case. The court
said that petitioners waived their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college when they adopted,
signed, and used its enrollment form for the first semester ofschool year 1988-89, which states that: The Mabini College
reserves the right to deny admission of students whose scholarship and attendance are unsatisfactory and to require withdrawal
of students whose conduct discredits the institution and/or whose activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient
operation of the college. Students, therefore, are required to behave in accord with the Mabini College code of conduct and
discipline.
Issue: Whether or Not the students right to freedom of speech and assembly infringed.
Held: Yes. The protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Constitution is similarly available to
students is well-settled in our jurisdiction. However there are limitations. The permissible limitation on Student Exercise of
Constitutional Rights within the school presupposes that conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason
whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior should not materially disrupt classwork or must not involve substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others.
Admu vs, capulong
On February 8, 9, and 10 of 1991, a fraternity in Ateneo Law School named Aquila Legis conducted its initiation rites upon
neophytes. Unfortunately, one neophyte died as a result thereof and one was hospitalized due to serious physical injuries. In a

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resolution dated March 9, 1991, the Disciplinary Board formed by Ateneo found seven students guilty of violating Rule 3 of
the Rules on Discipline. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, then president of Ateneo, on the basis of the findings, ordered the expulsion of the
seven students. However, on May 17, 1991, Judge Ignacio Capulong of the Makati RTC, upon the students petition
for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, ordered Ateneo to reverse its decision and reinstate the said students.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ateneo Law School has competence to issue an order dismissing such students pursuant to its
rules.
HELD: Yes, Ateneo has the competence and the power to dismiss its erring students and therefore it had validly exercised
such power. The students do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution such as Ateneo as their own a minute longer for
they may forseeably cast a malevolent influence on students currently enrolled as well as those who come after them. This is
academic freedom on the part of the school which includes:
a. freedom to determine who may teach;
b. freedom to determine what may be taught;
c. freedom to determine how it shall be taught;
d. freedom to determine who may be admitted to study.
Fixing rates
Globe Telecom, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission [G.R. No.143964. July 26, 2004]
FACTS
Private respondent Smart Communications, Inc (Smart) filed with the NTC a Complaint to effect the interconnection of their
SMS or texting services with petitioner Globe Telecom, Inc. (Globe). Globe pointed out procedural defects in Smarts
complaints and moved to dismiss the case. I also pointed out that another network, Islacom, was allowed to provide
such service without prior NTC approval. The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) ruled that both Smart and
Globe were equally blameworthy and issued an Order penalizing both on the ground of providing SMS under Value Added
Services (VAS) without prior approval from the NTC. The Court of Appeals sustained the NTC Order.
ISSUES
Whether or not:
(1) Globe may be required to secure prior NTC approval before providing SMS or texting services;
(2) SMS is a VAS under Public telecommunications Act (PTA) of 1995;
RULING
(1) NO. The NTC may not legally require Globe to secure its approval for Globe to continue providing SMS. This does not
imply though that NTC lacks authority to regulate SMS or to classify it as VAS. However, the move should be implemented
properly, through unequivocal regulations applicable to all entities that are similarly situated, and in an even-handed manner.
This should not be interpreted, however, as removing SMS from the ambit of jurisdiction and review by the NTC. The NTC
will continue to exercise, by way of its broad grant, jurisdiction over Globe and Smarts SMS offerings, including questions of
rates and customer complaints. Yet caution must be had. Much complication could have been avoided had the NTC adopted a
proactive position, promulgating the necessary rules and regulations to cope up with the advent of the technologies it

Bill of rights
superintends. With the persistent advent of new offerings in the telecommunications industry, the NTCs role will become
more crucial than at any time before.
(2) NO. There is no legal basis under the PTA or the memorandum circulars promulgated by the NTC to denominate SMS as
VAS, and any subsequent determination by the NTC on whether SMS is VAS should be made with proper regard for due
process and in conformity with the PTA. The Court realizes that the PTA is not intended to constrain the industry within a
cumbersome regulatory regime. The policy as pre-ordained by legislative fiat renders the traditionally regimented business in
an elementary free state to make business decisions, avowing that it is under this atmosphere that the industry would prosper.
It is disappointing at least if the deregulation thrust of the law is skirted deliberately. But it is ignominious if the spirit is
defeated through a crazy quilt of vague, overlapping rules that are implemented haphazardly.
Closure proceedings
Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 88353, May 8, 1992
The following requisites must be present before the order of conservatorship may be set aside by a court: (1) The
appropriate pleading must be filed by the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock of the bank
in the proper court; (2) Said pleading must be filed within ten (10) days from receipt of notice by said majority stockholders
of the order placing the bank under conservatorship; and (3) There must be convincing proof, after hearing, that the
action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in not dismissing the case for lack of cause of action and declaring the MB
resolutions as arbitrary.
Held: The following requisites must be present before the order of conservatorship may be set aside by a court: (1) The
appropriate pleading must be filed by the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock of the bank in
the proper court; (2) Said pleading must be filed within ten (10) days from receipt of notice by said majority stockholders of
the order placing the bank under conservatorship; and (3) There must be convincing proof, after hearing, that the action is
plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith.
In the instant case, the original complaint was filed more than 3 years after PBP was placed under conservator, long after the
expiration of the 10-day period deferred to above. It is also beyond question that the complaint and the amended complaint
were not initiated by the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock.
Agabon vs. NLRC Case Digest
Facts: Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of selling and installing ornamental
and construction materials. It employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers
on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work.
Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims and on December 28, 1999, the Labor
Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissals illegal and ordered private respondent to pay the monetary claims.
Issue: Whether or not respondents dismissal is illegal and if not, entitles them benefits.
Ruling: The Court ruled that the dismissal is legal and entitles them of payment of benefits.
Dismissals based on just causes contemplate acts or omissions attributable to the employee while dismissals based on
authorized causes involve grounds under the Labor Code which allow the employer to terminate employees. A termination for
an authorized cause requires payment of separation pay. When the termination of employment is declared illegal,
reinstatement and full back wages are mandated under Article 279. If reinstatement is no longer possible where the dismissal
was unjust, separation pay may be granted.
Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer must give the employee two written
notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before terminating the employment: a notice
specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity
to be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes under Articles 283 and
284, the employer must give the employee and the Department of Labor and Employment written notices 30 days prior to the
effectivity of his separation.

Bill of rights
From the foregoing rules four possible situations may be derived: (1) the dismissal is for a just cause under Article 282 of the
Labor Code, for an authorized cause under Article 283, or for health reasons under Article 284, and due process was observed;
(2) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause but due process was observed; (3) the dismissal is without just or
authorized cause and there was no due process; and (4) the dismissal is for just or authorized cause but due process was not
observed.
In the fourth situation, the dismissal should be upheld. While the procedural infirmity cannot be cured, it should not invalidate
the dismissal. However, the employer should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due
process.
The present case squarely falls under the fourth situation. The dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the
petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for another company. Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice
requirements and instead argued that sending notices to the last known addresses would have been useless because they did
not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the law mandates the
twin notice requirements to the employees last known address. Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance with the
procedural requirements of due process.
The Court ruled that respondent is liable for petitioners holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay without
deductions. The evident intention of Presidential Decree No. 851 is to grant an additional income in the form of the 13th
month pay to employees not already receiving the same so as to further protect the level of real wages from the ravages of
world-wide inflation. Clearly, as additional income, the 13th month pay is included in the definition of wage under Article
97(f) of the Labor Code.
An employer is prohibited under Article 113 of the same Code from making any deductions without the employees
knowledge and consent
Substantive due process
US v. Toribio
Facts:
The appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption the carabao described in the information,
without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of the provisions of
sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle.
It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was slaughtered there is no municipal
slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under such circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not
prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure.
Issue:
Whether or not the proper construction of the language of these provisions limit the prohibition contained in Section 30 and
the penalty imposed in Section 33 to cases:
(1) of slaughter of large cattles for human consumption in a municipal slaughter house without a permit duly secured from the
municipal treasurer, and
(2) cases of killing of large cattle for food in a municipal slaughter-house without a permit duly secured from the municipal
treasurer.
Held:
The prohibition contained in section 30 refers (1) to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a
permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) expressly and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a
municipal slaughterhouse without such permit; and that the penalty provided in section 33 applies generally to the slaughter of
large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and specifically to
the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit.
Sections 30 and 33 prohibit and penalize the slaughter for human consumption or killing for food at a municipal
slaughterhouse of such animals without a permit issued by the municipal treasurer, and section 32 provides for the keeping of
detailed records of all such permits in the office of the municipal and also of the provincial treasurer.
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction should be adopted which
will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted,
and a construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the
object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment. Therefore, sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the
slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit provided for
in section 30.
Velasco vs. villegas

FERNANDO, C.J.:

Bill of rights
This is an appeal from an order of the lower court dismissing a suit for declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality
based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila, the contention being that it amounts to a deprivation of property of
petitioners-appellants of their means of livelihood without due process of law. The assailed ordinance is worded thus: It shall
be prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any
adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is
located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person. 1 As noted
in the appealed order, petitioners-appellants admitted that criminal cases for the violation of this ordinance had been
previously filed and decided. The lower court, therefore, held that a petition for declaratory relief did not lie, its availability
being dependent on there being as yet no case involving such issue having been filed. 2
Even if such were not the case, the attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out in the brief of respondentsappellees, it is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: (1) To be able to impose payment of the
license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an
entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible
immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers. 3This Court has been most
liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria, 4 a 1918 decision, this
Court through Justice Malcolm made clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which delegates in statutory form the
police power to a municipality. As above stated, this clause has been given wide application by municipal authorities and has
in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really is the
progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence. 5 As it was then, so it has continued to be. 6There is no showing, therefore, of
the unconstitutionality of such ordinance.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the lower court is affirmed. No costs.
VELASCO v. VILLEGAS
Facts:
The petitioners filed a declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality based on Ordinance No.4964 of the City of Manila,
the contention being that it amounts to a deprivation of property of their meansof livelihood without due process of law.The
assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shopto conduct the business of
massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of saidbarber shop, or in any room or rooms within the
same building where the barber shop is located as longas the operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging is
conducted is the same person."The lower court ruled in favor of the constitutionality of the assailed ordinance. Hence, the
appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 4964 is unconstitutional
Held:
NO
It is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: "(1) To be able to imposepayment of the license fee for
engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 asamended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different
measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which
might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers."The Court has been most liberal in sustaining
ordinances based on the general welfare clausebecause it "delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality; this
clause has been given wideapplication by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the
case beenliberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really is the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence."The
judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
City of manila vs. judge laguio
On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT
OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES
AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels and hotels from operating
in the Malate District which was notoriously viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist
Development Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places

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offering amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not market such nor do they use women as tools for
entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The
City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise
emphasized that the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only
be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the
procedure prescribedby law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon;
and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of
the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
White light corp. vs. city of manila
Police Power Not Validly Exercised Infringement of Private Rights
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in hotels,
motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator
ofmini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of
their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under
the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.
The CA ruled in favor of the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also violates the
due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades
private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only.
Some are tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said
ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely
affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
Ynot vs. iac

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Bill of rights
Police Power Not Validly Exercised
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued
EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On
13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A.
Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the
authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower
court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb
down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based on the
judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the
same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can
be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due
process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of
the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.
There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are
granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
Lupangco vs CA Case Digest
Lupangco vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988
Facts: PRC issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for
admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy.
Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy, filed with the RTC a complaint for
injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter
from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.
Issue: Can the Professional Regulation Commission lawfully prohibit the examiness from attending review classes, receiving
handout materials, tips, or the like 3 days before the date of the examination?
Ruling: We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to preserve the integrity
and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On
its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing,
conference or the like, or receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any
review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar
institutions.
The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives
will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the
Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the examination
period.
It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of
rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If
shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be
invalid.
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the
licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their
ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their
endeavors
Balacuit v CFI G.R. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988

12

Bill of rights
Facts:
Petitioners, theater owners, assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of
Butuan on April 21, 1969. This called for a reduction to of the ticket price given to minors from 7-12 years old. There was a
fine from 200-600 pesos or a 2-6 month imprisonment
The complaint was issued in the trial court. A TRO was then issued to prevent the law from being enforced. The respondent
court entered its decision declaring the law valid.
Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid
exercise of police power. Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is not within the power of' the Municipal Board to enact
as provided for in Section 15(n) of Republic Act No. 523 where it states that the Muncipal board can only fix license fees for
theaters and notadmission rates.
The respondent attempts to justify the enactment of the ordinance by invoking the general welfare clause embodied in Section
15 (nn) of the cited law.
Issue:
Does this power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the fixing of prices of admission to these places of exhibition
and amusement whether under its general grant of power or under the general welfare clause as invoked by the City?
Held: The ordinance is under neither and thus unconstitutional. Petition granted.
1. Kwong Sing v. City of Manila- the word "regulate" was interpreted to include the power to control, to govern and to
restrain, it would seem that under its power to regulate places of exhibitions and amusement, the Municipal Board of the City
of Butuan could make proper policeregulations as to the mode in which the business shall be exercised.
In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of public exhibition are
subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police power by the local government.
People v. Chan- an ordinance of the City of Manila prohibiting first run cinematographs fromselling tickets beyond
their seating capacity was upheld as constitutional for being a valid exercise of police power.
The City of Butuan, apparently realizing that it has no authority to enact the ordinance in question under its power to
regulate embodied in Section 15(n), now invokes the police power as delegated to it under the general welfare clause to justify
the enactment of said ordinance
To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally requires
an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose
unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, the determination as to what is a proper
exercise of its police power is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts.
Petitioners maintain that Ordinance No. 640 violates the due process clause of the Constitution for being oppressive, unfair,
unjust, confiscatory, and an undue restraint of trade, and violative of the right of persons to enter into contracts, considering
that the theater owners are bound under a contract with the film owners for just admission prices for general admission,
balcony and lodge.
Homeowners Association- the exercise of police power is necessarily subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction
demanded by the regard, the respect and the obedience due to the prescriptions of the fundamental law
The court agreed with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public interest. The police power
legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and
means.
The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who have to shell out the same
amount of money for the admission of their children, as they would for themselves. A reduction in the price
of admission would mean corresponding savings for the parents; however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of
these savings. The ordinance does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise penalizes them for
failure to comply with it. Furthermore, as petitioners point out, there will be difficulty in its implementation because as already
experienced by petitioners since the effectivity of the ordinance, children over 12 years of age tried to pass off their age as
below 12 years in order to avail of the benefit of the ordinance. The ordinance does not provide a safeguard against this
undesirable practice and as such, the respondent City of Butuan now suggests that birth certificates be exhibited by movie
house patrons to prove the age of children. This is, however, not at all practicable. We can see that the ordinance is clearly
unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible relation between the
ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare.
Respondent further alleges that by charging the full price, the children are being exploited by movie house operators. We fail
to see how the children are exploited if they pay the full price ofadmission. They are treated with the same quality of
entertainment as the adults.
Moreover, as a logical consequence of the ordinance, movie house and theater operators will be discouraged from exhibiting
wholesome movies for general patronage, much less children's pictures if only to avoid compliance with the ordinance and
still earn profits for themselves.

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Bill of rights
A theater ticket has been described to be either a mere license, revocable at the will of the proprietor of the theater or it may be
evidence of a contract whereby, for a valuable consideration, the purchaser has acquired the right to enter the theater and
observe the performance on condition that he behaves properly. Such ticket, therefore, represents a right, Positive or
conditional, as the case may be, according to the terms of the original contract of sale. This right is clearly a right of property.
The ticket which represents that right is also, necessarily, a species of property. As such, the owner thereof, in the absence of
any condition to the contrary in the contract by which he obtained it, has the clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he
pleases and at such price as he can obtain.
In no sense could theaters be considered public utilities. The State has not found it appropriate as a national policy to interfere
with the admission prices to these performances. This does not mean however, that theaters and exhibitions are not affected
with public interest even to a certain degree. Motion pictures have been considered important both as a medium for the
communication of Ideas and expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perceptions by our people of issues and
public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits are considerable.
While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason,
that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to
an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the
guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power.
A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the
legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. 34 The right of the owner to fix a price at which his
property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due
process clause.
Although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must
nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is established
by proper evidence
Agustin vs. edu
Generally Accepted Principles of International Law Police Power
Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction No 229 which requires all
motor vehicles to have early warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair of reflectorized triangular early warning
devices. Agustin is arguing that this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars
are already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to other motorists. And that the mandate
to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and would only make manufacturers and
dealers instant millionaires.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.
HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are
already equipped with 1) blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles, 2) battery-powered blinking lights inside
motor vehicles, 3) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles, or 4) well-lighted two (2)
petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions,
and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part
of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will
conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor
vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who
sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate
advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law
enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than
decrease, the danger of collision.
On Police Power
The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the
main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has

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offended against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned
only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of
the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after
the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.
Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the
people. The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as that inherent and
plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that
sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in
the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, the most
essential, insistent, and at least illimitable powers, extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out to all the great public
needs. Its scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the
present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time. The police power is thus a dynamic
agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing
upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a
group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace,
safety, good order, and welfare.
It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the fact that the particular police power measure
challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a
legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The
latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment conceived with the same end
in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: To promote safe transit
upon, and avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads . . . As a matter of fact, the first law sought to
be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, with petitioner failing in his quest, was
likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.
Equal protection
People vs. cayat
In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or any other liquor outside of their
customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was
then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he
challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal protection afforded
by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them with discrimination or mark them as inferior or less capable race and
less entitled will meet with their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians from
Christians.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.
HELD: The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable classification. The SC emphasized that it
is not enough that the members of a group have the characteristics that distinguish them from others. The classification must,
as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are;
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;

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Bill of rights
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical,
distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth or parentage. The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes
as an inferior or less capable race. On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy
towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by
their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the
government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of
their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.
Ichong vs. hernandez
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities herein abound
(then) particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the
local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the
purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification
of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the
equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the
country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all between the
raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause does not demand absolute
equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be
upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or
surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the
Pasay city market.
Villegas vs. hiu chiong tsui
FACTS: This case involves an ordinance prohibiting aliens from being employed or engage or participate in any position or
occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment
permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00. Private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was
employed in Manila, filed a petition to stop the enforcement of such ordinance as well as to declare the same null and void.
Trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, hence this case.
ISSUE: WON said Ordinance violates due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The Ordinance The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the
Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor who may withhold or refuse
it at his will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood.
While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he

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cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of
protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
Tiu v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 278 (1999)
posted in CONLAW2 cases by katcobing
The constitutionality and validity of EO 97-A, that provides that the grant and enjoyment of the tax and duty incentives
authorized under RA 7227 were limited to the business enterprises and residents within the fenced-in area of the Subic Special
Economic Zone (SSEZ), was questioned.
Nature of the case: A petition for review to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals which upheld the constitutionality
and validity of the E.O. 97-A.
Facts of the case: The petitioners assail the constitutionality of the said Order claiming that they are excluded from the
benefits provided by RA 7227 without any reasonable standards and thus violated the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. The Court of Appeals upheld the validity and constitutionality and denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence,
this petition was filed.
Issue: WON E.O. 97-A violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution
Arguments: Petitioners contend that the SSEZ encompasses (1) the City of Olongapo, (2) the Municipality of Subic in
Zambales, and (3) the area formerly occupied by the Subic Naval Base. However, EO 97-A, according to them, narrowed
down the area within which the special privileges granted to the entire zone would apply to the present fenced-in former
Subic Naval Base only. It has thereby excluded the residents of the first two components of the zone from enjoying the
benefits granted by the law. It has effectively discriminated against them, without reasonable or valid standards, in
contravention of the equal protection guarantee.
The solicitor general defends the validity of EO 97-A, arguing that Section 12 of RA 7227 clearly vests in the President the
authority to delineate the metes and bounds of the SSEZ. He adds that the issuance fully complies with the requirements of a
valid classification.
Decision: Panganiban J., The Court held that the classification was based on valid and reasonable standards and does not
violate the equal protection clause.
The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
differently from another. The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those
belonging to the same class.
Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited
to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.
Ruling: Petition denied. The challenge decision and resolution were affirmed.
Isae v. quisimbing
FACTS:

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Bill of rights
Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD 732, is a domestic educational institution established
primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. The decree authorizes the School to
employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other
nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except
laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. School hires both foreign and local teachers as
members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate 25% more
than local-hires.
When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a legitimate labor union and the collective
bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and
local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit,
eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.
ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a compromise in the NCMB, the matter reached the DOLE which
favored the School. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local- hires.

RULING:
NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor is entitled to humane conditions of work.
These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace the factory, the office or the field but include as well the
manner by which employers treat their employees.
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization.
The Constitution enjoins the State to protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare, In Section 18, Article II of the
constitution mandates to afford labor full protection. The State has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor
and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective
bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good.
However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.
A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the
parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2)
affinity and unity of the employees interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation
and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of

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Bill of rights
employment status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining units acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the
combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.
In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for
purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always
treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform
similar functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted
to local-hires such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances. These benefits are
reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreignhires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining
rights.
PT&T vs. NLRC
272 SCRA 596
FACTS:
PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically as Supernumerary Project
Worker, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity
leave. She was again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June
10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991.
On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee where probationary period will
cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the job application form under civil status that she was single although she had
contracted marriage a few months earlier. When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M.
Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a
reminder about the companys policy of not accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed from the company
effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner illegally
dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had
been discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company policies.
ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of an employee.
HELD:
Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of
marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that company is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to
firing, according to their discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those
provided by law.
PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage is afoul of the right
against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly
that de Guzmans ties with PT&T were dissolved principally because of the companys policy that married women are not
qualified for employment in the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As stated in the labor code:
ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or
continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a
woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice
a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.
The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free
from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals
and public policy, depriving a woman of her freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an
intangible and inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of

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marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation. Such policy must be
prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not
only for order but also imperatively required.
Dumlao vs. comelec
Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement
benefits therefrom. He filed for reelection to the same office for the 1980 local elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed
(par 1 thereof) providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed the BP averring that it is class legislation
hence unconstitutional. His petition was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two however have different issues. The
suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of
the elected officials, the length of the campaign and the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public
office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from
office. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the there is cause of action.
HELD: The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case would never have been merged. Dumlaos cause is
different from Igots. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that itd be eligible for
judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the
existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed
upon in order to decide the case. In this case, only the 3 rd requisite was met. The SC ruled however that the provision barring
persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary
investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void.
The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real
differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service,
employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are
subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of
age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the
Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political
elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing,
there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees,
aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office,
there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged
provision.

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