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IEEE General Meeting 2011-PNNL-SA-77218

A Multi-layer, Hierarchical Information


Management System for the Smart Grid
Ning Lu, Pengwei Du, Patrick Paulson, Frank Greitzer, Xinxin Guo, and Mark Hadley

AbstractThis paper presents the modeling approach,


methodologies, and initial results of setting up a multi-layer,
hierarchical information management system (IMS) for the
smart grid. The IMS allows its users to analyze the data collected
by multiple control and communication networks to characterize
the states of the smart grid. Abnormal, corrupted, or erroneous
measurement data and outliers are detected and analyzed to
identify whether they are caused by random equipment failures,
human error, or tampering. Data collected from different
information networks are crosschecked for data integrity based
on redundancy, dependency, correlation, or cross-correlations,
which reveal the interdependency between data sets. A
hierarchically structured reasoning mechanism is used to rank
possible causes of an event to enable system operators to
proactively respond or provide mitigation recommendations to
remove or neutralize the threats. The model satisfactorily
identifies the cause of an event and significantly reduces the need
to process myriads of data.

and allow them to be aware of the status of the massive


number of devices connected to the power grid, such as
generators, breakers, even appliances in commercial buildings
or individual homes. A key characteristic of smart grid is to
use real-time information from embedded sensors and
automated controls to anticipate, detect, and respond to system
problems, and to create the most reliable and efficient electric
grid at the least cost to the economy and the least impact on
the environment.

Index Termscyber security, reliability, smart grid, predictive


defense, interoperability, data integrity.

I. INTRODUCTION

HIS paper presents a predictive defense information


management system (IMS) for the smart grid multi-layer,
multi-protocol, multi-purpose information networks to
efficiently process myriads of data to evaluate the status of the
system, identify failures, predict threats, and suggest
remediation.
As shown in Fig. 1, smart grid initiatives encourage
deployment of digital technology to save energy, reduce cost,
and increase reliability. For example, a phasor measurement
unit (PMU) collects 3060 data points per second, much faster
than the 1 data point per 12 second sampling rate of the
traditional supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
system. A smart meter collects data by the minute, while the
old metering collects data hourly or monthly. Thus, widely
used digital control and communication technologies provide
grid operators with an unprecedented amount of information
This work is supported by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory,
operated for the U.S. Department of Energy by Battelle under Contract DEAC05-76RL01830.
N. Lu, P. Du, X. Guo, M. Hadley, P. Paulson, and F. Greitzer are with
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, P.O. Box 999, MSIN: K1-85,
Richland, WA 99352, USA. Email: ning.lu@pnl.gov; pengwei.du@pnl.gov;
mark.hadley@pnl.gov;
patrick.paulson@pnl.gov;
xinxin.guo@pnl.gov;
frank.greitzer@pnl.gov.

978-1-4577-1002-5/11/$26.00 2011 IEEE

Fig. 1: The configuration of the smart grid communication and


control systems

However, because control and monitoring signals are sent


out via different networks to many end devices with various
vulnerabilities, there are serious cyber security and reliability
concerns about the smart grids ability to resist attacks and
heal itself without damaging infrastructure/equipment or
causing large-scale blackouts [1][5]. In addition, the massive
use of low-cost communication and electronics devices
provides an explosion of information that bears different data
formats and timestamps, with/without secured information
interchange mechanisms. Thus, evolving from a data rich
system to a data secure and information rich system to
reach the full potential of the smart grid poses significant
challenges. Therefore, it is critical to fully utilize the data
collection capability provided by the smart grid infrastructure
to build a trustworthy system.
This work aims to develop a dynamic information
processing mechanism for the multi-layer, multi-protocol, and

IEEE General Meeting 2011-PNNL-SA-77218


multi-purpose networks of smart grids, to facilitate reasoning
about and predictions of failure modes and possible threats,
and to identify direct and indirect responses to such failures or
threats.
The contributions of this paper are multifold. First, this
paper demonstrates the design of the IMS, which is a
comprehensive modeling platform to integrate different
aspects of smart grid operations such as wholesale market,
power grid models, communication and control network, and
custom behavior and environmental factors. While
engineering modeling of distribution network has a long
history, these modeling tools have limited modeling
capabilities and are intended to be used for very narrowly
focused applicationsprimarily for simulating the physical
characteristic of power grid (i.e., power flow models). The
IMS design is featured by modeling the communication and
control network, which is the backbone of the smart grid
implementation. The benefit is the capability of IMS to allow
for evaluation and assessment of the interactions between
information and operations. For example, questions
concerning how communication network failures can affect
distribution system operation can be answered, and the
potential vulnerabilities of the smart grid architecture design
can be revealed prior to field installation and implementation.
Another contribution of this paper is the development of a
predictive defense model (PDM) based on the information
made available by smart grid implementation. In a smart grid
environment, operators need to process a large amount of data
very quickly and efficiently. This places a significant burden
on operators without assistance from automated tools. A PDM
automatically identifies the correlation and interdependence of
data streams to detect the abnormal situation and improve the
data integrity. Additionally, as opposed to being ignored in
todays grid, corrupted data and outliers can be detected and
analyzed to pinpoint the error sources. A behavior tree is used
to associate data with behaviors, and then link behaviors with
causes. Data are also normalized based on their historical
statistical characteristics to facilitate the fuzzy threshold that
triggers a behavior. Determining the causes of these data
errors can help operators understand the nature of this data
corruption event (i.e., whether they are caused by equipment
failures, human errors, or tampering). Because data and
information are an integral and critical part of smart grid,
better data integrity will improve the reliability and credibility
of decisions.
The paper is organized as follows. The related work is
described in Section II. The prototype of the IMS is presented
in Section II. Section III discusses the modeling framework of
PDM. The main features of the reasoner and the reasoner
implementation are introduced in Section V and Section VI,
respectively. Section VII gives the test results. The
conclusions and future work are summarized in Section VIII.

II. RELATED WORK


A. System Modeling
Existing power grid test systems [6][8] emphasize
modeling of physical network components, such as the load,
generation system, or transmission network, but have no or
little capability to simulate the integration of information
extracted from different data sources. Moreover, complexities
and interdependencies among data sets are insufficiently
represented. The general purposes of those test systems are to
study power flows and voltage, angle, and transient stabilities
using power system analysis software to understand how these
phenomena can be managed to operate the power grid
reliably.
Existing power grid data modeling systems focus on
checking for data integrity and security at the equipment level.
For instance, the national SCADA testbed, designed to study
the security of the power grid infrastructure, offers the
capability to test SCADA equipment and the control system
deployed at the transmission level. However, these models do
not consider the physics of the power network, such as the
voltage-current dependencies.
In this context, the existing power system modeling
environment makes it very difficult to simulate smart grid
operations that are closely driven by abundant data flows.
B. Information Integrity
Also related is work involving the techniques for
information assurance or information integrity. Existing
techniques, which are a system-centered paradigm, fall into
two categories [9]: anomaly detection and attack signature.
For the latter, a repository of attack signatures must
continuously be updated to remain useful in changing system
configurations, protocols, architectures, and environments.
For a particular subject of interest, anomaly detection
techniques establish a profile of the subjects normal behavior;
compare the observed behavior of the subject with its normal
profile, and signal attacks when the subjects observed
behavior deviates significantly from its normal profiles.
Because the smart grid involves a broad range of technologies,
protocols, devices, and functionalities, applications of these
techniques in a smart grid impose significant challenges that
need to be addressed in considering redundancy, dependency,
correlation, and cross-correlations between data sets.
III. A SMART GRID INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
CONFIGURATION
For a smart grid, system models are built through levels of
abstraction that characterize different physical aspects of the
distribution network, and system complexity is captured at
different levels. The IMS prototype includes different
information layers: the network model, the smart meter,
advanced metering infrastructure, the SCADA network, the
utility customer information systems (CISs), the environment
network, and wholesale market model.

IEEE General Meeting 2011-PNNL-SA-77218


A. The Network Model
The network model used in the simulation is the standard
IEEE 13-node model [8], as depicted in Fig. 2.
650
646

611

645

684

652

632

671

633

692

634

675

680

Fig. 2: The IEEE 13-node test feeder

B. The Smart Meter


A smart meter is a digital electrical meter that measures
energy consumption more accurately than a conventional
meter, generally with two-way communication that receives
real-time price from utility and sends information back for
monitoring and billing purposes [10]. In our base case, the
smart meter data is modeled with the data collected in the
Pacific Northwest GridWise Testbed project, which is a
field demonstration of smart grid technologies that has been
funded by the U.S. Department of Energy since 2004. This
project monitored energy usages of 112 households and
ambient temperatures on a 15-minute basis through an
automated two-way communication network for one year,
from early 2006 through March 2007. Detailed descriptions
can be found in [11].
C. Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI)
The wireless smart meters installed for every household are
connected to the communication network. The modeling of
the communication network is a simplified model independent
of the communication medium, protocol, and technologies.
Each smart meter data set includes an outage rate and a
communication error rate. The outage rate represents the
likelihood of the smart meter hardware failure. The
communication error rate represents the failure probability in
the communication media networks. A meter outage rate is
associated with each smart meter to determine at each time
step if the meter is broken. A corruption rate is associated with
each information package to determine if the package is
corrupt.
D. The SCADA Network
The electrical systems measurements along the feeder, such
as voltage, current, power, and energy, are collected through
SCADA. The IMS also records the sequence of events.
Outage management systems are integrated with SCADA

systems, which can automatically report the operation of


monitored circuit breakers.
E. The Utility CIS
Smart meter data are collected and summarized as billing
information in the utility CIS. Payment information, such as
the billing delinquency and late payment, are included in the
modeled CIS database.
F. Environmental Data
Ambient environment data include temperature, wind speed,
and lighting strikes. In the GridWise Testbed project,
temperature and wind speed were collected hourly at a local
airport. The two measurement data sets are used in our base
case to preserve the correlation between the meter data set and
the weather data set. Lighting strikes are a modeled data set to
simulate lighting caused equipment failure events.
G. Wholesale Market
In a deregulated market, multiple parties in the bulk power
systems engage in an open-access market competition with
their own economic objectives. The market is bid-based. The
Independent System Operator (ISO) collects bids from
generation companies (GenCos) and load servicing entities
(LSEs), based on which a supply curve, S, and a demand
curve, D, can be obtained. The ISO then calculates the
market clearing prices, B. Fig. 3 shows how an LSE can
interact with the market by installing a price-responsive
controller.
The energy price signals used in the IMS are also taken
from the Pacific Northwest GridWise Testbed project to
preserve the correlation among data sets.

Fig. 3. A block diagram of a price responsive LSE


IV. THE MODELING FRAMEWORK OF PDM
The PDM has three major functions: detection, reasoning
and predicting, and response, as shown in Fig. 4. The goal is
to detect a number of threats and failure modes in major
communication/control network models and identify crosscorrelations and interdependency among events across
networks.
1) Detection
In this paper, detection is achieved by deploying the
detection-in-depth process of information by dynamic
filtering, multi-layer triggering, and cross-diagnosis to identify
the nature of system events and incidents as security

IEEE General Meeting 2011-PNNL-SA-77218


vulnerabilities in personnel, technology, or operation. Then,
response can be taken effectively.
The idea behind the detection-in-depth is similar to defensein-depth approach [12]. It detects anomalies using several
varying filtering methods against information collected from
different control and communication networks.

communication networks, crosschecking enforces data


authentication and increases the credibility and reliability of
decisions.
3) Response
The PDM response module features stage responses, which
direct the returning system to a safe operation mode first, and
then identify location and provide fixes. In most cases, the
reasoner may not be able to identify the nature of an abnormal
behavior without a few iterations of data requests and
synthesis. At lower information awareness levels, passive
response optionsranging from issuing data requests,
suspending control privileges, or switching to backup
systems may be first taken. Once the possible nature of the
problem has been identified, a number of active responses
such as reporting malicious attempts to authorities or sending
a maintenance crew will be suggested to the system operator.
V. HIERARCHICAL REASONING PROCESS
The reasoner has four unique features in the design to
help operators detect an abnormal system behavior, as
described below.

Fig. 4: The framework of a PDM for the smart grid

To accommodate the dynamic filtering process, we


implement a number of general and specific data filters with
an emphasis on dynamic bandwidth/signature settings. Each
filter will have a feedback loop from the reasoner. Once a
problem is detected, the bandwidth and signature may change
accordingly. More data will be sent for analysis. Specific
filters may turn on to scan data at a finer detail.
2) Reasoning and Predicting
A reasoner is developed for predicting and identifying an
abnormal system behavior. Inside the reasoner, incoming data
are processed to infer observations, which are then used to
infer indicators of behaviors. From these indicators, we can
assess the risk of the threat posed by anomalous behavior.
Detailed discussion on the reasoner is presented in the next
section.
At the core of reasoner is an interdependency trigger that
handles a hierarchically structured reasoning process to
enable multi-layer triggering and multi-angle reasoning. The
smart grid technology application raises issues such as data
overflow and increasing possibilities of cyber security
breaches that lead to infrastructure failures, but it also
provides the data redundancy that enables cross-checking for
data integrity and abnormal behaviors. Because the same
device may be measured for different purposes, and the
measurements are sent to operators through different

A. Multiple-layer Reasoning Process


The reasoner is a multi-layered analysis/inference process
that progresses from data to observations to indicators to
behaviors. It consists of two major steps, as follows.
1) Observations are processed from cyber and operation
data to infer indicators
Observations are based on data and reflect a cognitively
meaningful state. Indicators are activities or events that make
up the evidence or signature from which behavior (or
scenario) is inferred. An individual indicator signifies the
presence or absence of a particular property of the modeled
entity, such as voltage higher than allowable values, electricity
consumption lower than a reasonable value, or an equipment
outage. The presence of an indicator is, in turn, determined by
particular data values. Indicators are essentially the semantics
of insider behavior and characteristicsinterpretations of
intentions and actions based on observations.
2) Indicators are processed to infer behaviors
A group of indicators is regarded as a manifestation of the
behavior (or scenario). Behaviors are sequences of activities
or events for achieving a specific purpose. The situation is
complicated by the fact that malicious attack and the outages
could have much in common. It is thus the aggregation of
these activities that needs to be recognized as manifestation of
the behavior (or scenario).
B. Hierarchically Structured Reasoning Process
The model of the reasoner uses a hybrid approach based on
pattern recognition and model-based reasoning. While
identifying deviations from normal behavior is part of the

IEEE General Meeting 2011-PNNL-SA-77218


analysis, so too is reasoning about conformance with
prototypical behaviors that change seasonally, weekly, and
daily. The challenge is to conduct model-based reasoning on
the recognized patterns at a semantic level rather than
applying template recognition.
At the highest level, the model comprises a knowledge
base of indicators and heuristic models of abnormal behavior.
This knowledge base informs all of the components of the
IMS model, and is in turn updated or modified by outputs
from components that perform functions such as data
collection, data fusion, and analysis. Indicators for higher
levels of reasoning can be based on patterns discovered at
lower levels. In addition, the reasoner can support the
triggering of actions when particular patterns are recognized.
Some of these actions might result in additional information
being analyzed and collected for further reasoning steps.
C. Redundancy Design
A fundamental assumption is that not all possible data can
be collected continuously, and some data may be unavailable
or lost during data transfer. Some data may indicate that
additional scrutiny is needed but might not warrant specific
action. We therefore adopt an incremental approach to data
collection, analysis, and decision making.
The reasoner examines data sources for the presence of
an indicator. Multiple detectors are used for a particular
indicator, each potentially examining observables from
multiple data sources. This redundancy helps ensure the
detection of an indicator even if some data sources are
unavailable. In addition, we can draw observables from
different information layers; the desired behavior can then be
modeled using indicators drawn from different data collection
points, integrating data from the available information layers.
D. Probability-based Reasoning
The existence of a particular behavior (or scenario) is often
not an all-or-none proposition. We are often interested in the
degree to which the operation of distribution grid is affected
or the amount of evidence pointing to smart-meter tampering.
To support this kind of understanding, detectors need to
provide a graded level of support for a particular indicator.
This approach yields a representation of the confidence
levelan uncertainty concept more general than probability
that a concept applies to a particular entity for a point in time.
The degree of belief that a state is assigned varies with the
observed indicators.
VI. REASONER IMPLEMENTATION
A. Data Flow
Fig. 5 depicts how the data flows in PDM. The main data
processing components include data collection of observable
data, data preprocessing module, the reasoner, and the
response module. Observable data include meter data, price
signal, SCADA data, communication network errors, utility
CIS, and environmental data as described in the Section III. In

the preprocessing step, the data collected is normalized with


respect to the normal value to eliminate the scale effect for
different measurements. A historical database is used to save
the output of the reasoner at each time step; this result is
recalled in the next time step as the behavior (or scenario)
tracked previously. The predictive model provides expert
knowledge of abnormal behaviors, and this heuristic model is
updated upon the arrival of new data. After a possible failure
mode is detected or a cyber security concern is raised, the
response module will be triggered to request further scrutiny
or require operator intervention.

}
Fig. 5: Data flow diagram

B. The Reasoner
Unlike traditional approaches that rely exclusively on
pattern recognition and anomaly detection, the reasoner [13]
[15] uses a hybrid pattern recognition approach that assesses
not only deviations from norms but also conformance with
prototypical exploits and behaviors that have been identified.
It is characterized by a two-step process.
1) Detector
First, the reasoner uses multiple detectors to examine the
data sources, and each detector processes data independently.
In this paper, the data sources examined are energy, power
voltage,
current,
communication
status,
weather,
neighborhood energy usages, and customer delinquency
information. For each detector, the measurement data are
compared to the information passed from the predictive model
for abnormality. The information from the predictive model is
a threshold with various forms. The thresholds can be datadriven or specified; a threshold can be a value or a fuzzy set.
In addition, some thresholds are values accumulated over
time, for example, the attack attempts and the customer
delinquency record.
In some cases, the threshold is a scalar value. For example,
the tripping of a circuit breaker either occurs or does not. For
some measurements, however, the threshold may have two or
more values. For example, voltages below 95% or higher than
105% per unit (p.u.) value are considered under-voltage or
over-voltage, respectively. In addition, there is a duration
requirement. Only when the system voltage is higher or lower
than the per unit value that exceeds a duration of t is it
considered an over- or under-voltage event. Therefore, these

IEEE General Meeting 2011-PNNL-SA-77218


thresholds are vectors.
Another important consideration is the design of detectors
for non-stationary processes. One example is the household
energy consumptions that vary daily, monthly and seasonally.
Therefore, it is no longer appropriate to use a fixed threshold
throughout a year to determine whether or not the energy
consumption of a household is too high or too low. Thus,
historical energy usage pattern and present weather data can
be used to create a more inclusive context for these
measurements to account for the variations in these
measurements.
As mentioned above, we are often interested in the degree
to which an indicator of abnormality is present. When this is
the case, a threshold may be better described by a fuzzy set or
a vector containing threshold values. In Fig. 6, monthly
energy usages of 50 households are plotted in the left figure
and the threshold derived is plot in the right figure. If a house
used 70 kWh in the month, it is marked as energy-use-low,
with a fuzzy membership at 0.42.
500

450

400

400

350

350

Energy Consumption (kWh)

Energy Consumption (kWh)

450

300
250
200
150
100

In an IMS environment, abnormalities can be simulated. An


abnormality can have several possible causes, such as bad
weather, equipment failure, cyber attack, and energy theft. For
example, in energy theft scenario, the smart meter reading
saved in baseline is manipulated. As a consequence, it can
result in several abnormal phenomena (or data corruption):

300
250
200
150
100

50

VII. TEST RESULTS

500
above High limit

detectors for behaviors along with the previously determined


plausibility values for behaviors. The reasoner maps the
observable inputs into the vocabulary of a fuzzy finite-state
automata and the behaviors into the current support for states
in the automata. The transition function of the automata is
invoked, providing new plausibility values for the behaviors
to use as input for the next time period. The reasoner
continually assesses current indicators in combination with
previously inferred indicators and behaviors to determine the
plausibility of threat behaviors.

50

Energy bill is significantly lower than average


Electricity consumption of neighboring households is
higher than normal
Electricity consumption pattern is irregular
Energy consumption deviates from its past patterns
Outage rate of the tampered smart meter is high
Communication package from the tampered smart
meter can be easily lost
No energy discount issued to the customer

below Low limit


0
0

10

20
30
Household ID

40

50

0
0

0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Value of the fuzzy membership function

Fig. 6: The threshold of the household monthly energy usage

2) Behaviors (or Scenario) Inference


The second step of the reasoner is to synthesize the results
from detectors to infer behavior (or scenario). Fig. 7 illustrates
a single time-step in our analysis.

As shown in Fig. 8, one scenario (equipment failure, cyber


attack, or energy theft) can trigger multiple changes in the
baseline data set; on the other hand, a change in the
baseline data set may be tracked back to different causes (or
scenarios). This highlights the difficulty of detecting an
abnormality using a single database and clearly shows the
need for the synthesis of multiple data sources.

Technical

Voltage
Energy

Equipment
Failure

Feeder outage
Meter outage
Com outage
Cyber Attacks
Billing

Payment History
Neighborhood Background his

Energy
Theft

Cyber

Attack History
Equipment Attack Possibility

Environment
Lighting/Wind/T(quakes/etc)
Tree/Snake/Squirrel

e
jac
Ad

as
a re
nt

Time

Space

Fig.7: Synthesis of indictors to infer behavior (or scenario)

The reasoner accepts the current plausibility measures from

Fig. 8 Examples of scenario simulation

After a scenario is set up, the corresponding data set will be

IEEE General Meeting 2011-PNNL-SA-77218


examined by detectors. The reasoner uses a series of logic
steps as a descriptive means for determining the
interdependence between data and different scenarios and
calculating probabilities. The logic process is adaptively
changed to reflect different operation conditions (for example,
seasonal variations). One example of the output given by the
reasoner is shown in Fig. 9, which lists several scenarios with
bars representing the probability of occurrence. The most
likely cause for the tampered data received is bad weather,
while the chances for other events like cyber attack or energy
theft are considerably low.
0

1.0

Bad Weather

REFERENCES
[1] Litos Strategic Communication, The Smart Grid: an Introduction,
http://www.oe.energy.gov/1165.htm.
[2] J. Meserve, Smart Grid may be vulnerable to hackers,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/03/20/smartgrid.vulnerability/index.html.
[3] J. Osborne, Electrical Smart Grid Not Yet Smart Enough to Block
Hackers, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,511648,00.html.
[4] PMU guidance: http://www.naspi.org/pmu.stm.
[5] C. McKenna, Smart Grid
http://www.govtech.com/gt/626637.

Security

Requirements

Released,

[6] APM Subcommittee. IEEE Reliability Test System, IEEE Trans. on


Power Apparatus and Systems, Vol. 98, pp. 2047---2054, 1979.
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test feeders, IEEE Trans. on Power Systems, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 975---985,
1991.
[8] Distribution Test Feeders, Distribution Test Feeder Working Group, IEEE
PES Distribution System Analysis Subcommittee. Available online:
http://www.ewh.ieee.org/soc/pes/dsacom/testfeeders/index.html.

Outage
Cyber Attack
Meter Outage

[9] N. Ye, J. Giordano, and J. Feldman, CACSA process control approach


to cyber attack detection, Communications of the ACM, Vol. 44, No. 8, pp.
7682, 2001.

Energy theft
Comm Errors
Norm Outage

[10] Smart Meter. Available online:


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smart_meter.

Lack of Data

Fig. 9. One example of output from the reasoner

VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The benefit of an investment in smart grid infrastructure is
the availability of high resolution data collected from more
measurement points. To monetize the benefit, information that
can facilitate the grid operation, maintenance, and planning
needs to be extracted from these data sets and made available
to grid operators in an actionable manner. Therefore, in a
smart grid infrastructure, there is a critical need to analyze the
data collected by multiple control and communication
networks 1) to characterize the states of the smart grid and 2)
to improve data integrity by detecting corrupted or erroneous
measurement data. To this end, we developed a multi-layer,
hierarchical information management system. In this paper,
we presented design considerations, physical and information
network configurations, data flow generations, detector
design, and testing results of the PDM.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
1) This paper demonstrates the design of the IMS, which
is a comprehensive modeling platform to integrate
different aspects of smart grid operations such as
wholesale market, power grid models, communication and
control network, and custom behavior and environmental
factors.
2) A reasoner is developed for predicting and identifying
an abnormal system behavior. A reasoner automatically
identifies the correlation and interdependence of data
streams to detect the abnormal situation and improve the
data integrity.

[11] D. J. Hammerstrom, J. Brous, T.A. Carlon, D.P. Chassin, C. Eustis,


G.R. Horst, O.M. Jrvegren, R. Kajfasz, W. Marek, P. Michie, R.L. Munson,
T. Oliver, and R.G. Pratt. 2007. Pacific Northwest GridWise Testbed
Projects: Part 2. Grid Friendly Appliance Project. PNNL-17079, Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, WA.
[12] Defense-in-Depth,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defense_in_Depth_(computing).
[13] P. Paulson, et al., A Methodology for Integrating Images and Text for
Object Identification, Proc. ASPRS 2006, Prospecting for Geospatial
Information Integration, 2006.
[14] F. Baader and W. Nutt, Basic Description Logics, The Description
Logic Handbook, F. Baader, et al., eds., Cambridge University Press, 2003,
pp. 43-95.
[15] T. E. Carroll, P. Paulson, F. Greizter, R. Hohimer, and Lyndsey
Franklin, Reasoning About the Insider Threat, IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy (IEEE/SP 2010), May 1619. 2010, Oakland, CA.

Ning Lu (M98-SM05) received her B.S.E.E. from


Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin, China, in 1993,
and her M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in electric power
engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy,
NY, in 1999 and 2002, respectively. Her research interests
include modeling and analysis of power system load
behaviors, energy storage evaluation, renewable
integration, climate impact on power grids, and smart grid
modeling and diagnosis. Currently, she is a senior research engineer with the
Energy Science & Technology Division, Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory, Richland, WA. She was with Shenyang Electric Power Survey
and Design Institute from 1993 to 1998.
Pengwei Du (M06) received B.Sc. and M.Sc. degrees in electrical
engineering from Southeast University, Nanjing, China, in 1997 and 2000,
respectively, and his Ph.D. in electrical engineering from Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY, in 2006. He has worked at Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory, Richland, WA, since 2008. His research interests include
distributed generation, power system modeling and analysis, and energy
storage applications. He has published over 10 journal or conference papers
and holds 2 patents. He is the member of WECC modeling and validation
working group.

IEEE General Meeting 2011-PNNL-SA-77218


Patrick Paulson is a Senior Research Scientist in the Knowledge Sciences
group. Patrick received his Ph.D. from North Dakota State University in 2001,
where his research interests were reinforcement learning and case-based
reasoning. His current research interests include knowledge representation,
semantic computing, provenance representation, uncertainty, and fuzzy logic.
While at PNNL, he has developed models of socio-cultural factors and
insider-threats and managed research projects in semantic similarity, semantic
fusion of image and text documents, and applying risk modeling to cyber
security.
Frank L. Greitzer received his B.S. in mathematics from Harvey Mudd
College, Claremont, CA, in 1968 and Ph.D. degree in mathematical
psychology from University of California, Los Angeles in 1975. His research
interests include human decision making/information processing and human
information interaction concepts for enhancing operator decision making in
complex environments such as intelligence analysis and power grid
operations. His research interests also include evaluation methods and metrics
for assessing effectiveness of decision aids, analysis methods, and displays.
Dr. Greitzer is a chief scientist for cognitive informatics in the National
Security Directorate, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, WA.
Xinxin Guo received a B.S. of electronic engineering from Dalian Maritime
University in 1997 and M.S. degrees in engineering from the University of
Wisconsin at Madison in 2007. He is currently a research scientist at Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory in Richland, WA. His research interests are in
power system dynamics and stability, demand response, energy storage, and
smart grid.

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